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POLITICAL REALISM : AN APPRAISAL

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TOWARDS A RECONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL REALISM - KURBAN

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Abstract

The phenomena with which politics deals have their own typical peculiarities. These peculiarities make it hard to develop a theory which helps us predict further political phenomena. That is why, perhaps, we ^{are} ~~are~~ ^{more} ~~more~~ ^{recently} ~~recently~~ more involved in "theory of theory"¹ than in theorizing.

A carefully studied methodology is badly needed for developing political theory - a framework of systematic concepts that orders the facts, and endows them with specific meanings. Not only does such a methodology help us delimit the field of politics. It is also our best bet for tackling the problems ~~with~~ which we meet. With such an important tool we can't afford to ~~be~~ ^{be} the careless. We must be very clear not only about its explicit and basic principles but also about its implicit assumptions, expected results, and aimed at purposes.

Besides a methodology that distinguishes between genuine and ingenuine questions and provides us with principles for the solution of the genuine problems, we shall rely, for delimiting the field and for finding our way

1. World Politics, vol. XIV, no. 1, Oct. 1961.

through the complexities of the material of the landscape on another principle - politics is what statesmen or politicians do qua politicians. We shall find that all the traditionally suggested criteria - power, state, authoritative distribution of values, settling disagreements, etc. - are unsatisfactory for doing the job. Nor is our enterprise unconditional. Two considerations limit it: - one voluntary, the other is forced upon us. This latter is more exacting for it is the expression of the limitation of our knowledge both of the data we study and of the tools and techniques we use in that study.

This study will prove to have two aspects. Looked at from the standpoint of the person involved, these two aspects are his attitude toward the phenomena he studies, and the structure, relationships, and nature of these phenomena as they are in themselves, or better still as they lend themselves to our knowledge. Both of them are important and no progress can be attained except to the extent to which they do supplement each other. Short of an ideal situation, though, where they are integrated in a very mature behaviour, the attitudinal is the more significant - because it is a prerequisite to the other - its origination, use, and fruition.

Three of its basic features recommend mention: openness, positiveness and impartiality with all they ^{pre-}suppose and entail.

These being provided for, politics becomes a science only when its typical phenomena, unique, complex, changeable, affected by many variables (some known others not, some rational and others irrational), - lend themselves more easily to scrutiny and investigation, - ~~are~~ available to us by the method and techniques of research which we happen to have developed for that purpose. Even if all these conditions prove to be satisfied, politics will still have to suffer the consequences of being essentially normative. That is why a "theory" of value is a pre-requisite for a satisfactory "theory" of politics. This, however, adds to the complication of an already complicated picture. The fact that at this normative point the method, the attitude, and the knowledge of the objective fact meet, creates for the analyst as well as for the agent, more problems than it helps solve. That is the case because man, the center where these converge (or for that matter fail to converge or harmonize) is able to command, at least in part and sometimes for mere whim or caprice, the interplay between his actual conduct on the one hand and absolutes, objective standards, and fictions (or

falsehood) on the other. There may be many reasons for politics being more of an art than of a strict science. This however, remains their most essential and basic one: man's many levelled encounters with the surrounding phenomena is partly his own making.

Introduction

The tragedy of "political theory" is the outcome of so many inherent tensions:- the antagonism between abstract absolute ideals, once they appeal to the political man's imagination, and the concrete stubborn realities of political life which they intend to mold; the struggle between logical systematizing reason and the irrational drives and chaotic forces to which the categories of reason are to apply; and the hesitancy of man, the analyst or the agent on the political scene, between full confidence in himself and his in-amicable natural and social surroundings, and his suspicion of both. Nor is this list of anomalies all inclusive. Small wonder, then, why politics is not as yet a science?

Attempts at making politics a science, in the strict sense of this term, are further confounded by the confusion created by the fact that man, even by sheer arbitrariness, can regard¹ fiction as a kind of an absolute and the absolute, conversely, as mere fiction - or even a non-significant entity. Especially this is true in the context of a conceptual

1. What is more important, however, is that he can reflect this regard of his into his behaviour.

framework which emphasizes, as ours does, the open actions of the actors on the political scene as evidences or counter evidences for policy.²

It is very important, however, for us to be able to distinguish, in the context of a satisfactory conceptual framework - a framework that at least brings "order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it remains disconnected and unintelligible,"³ between absolutes, objective standards, and mere fictions. Absolutes and fictions will force themselves upon us for consideration only if some men chose to translate them into programmes of actions. Objective standards are indispensable techniques of our way of judging political behaviour.

Nor will politics become a science in the strict helpful sense before it is able to tame the if-known reluctant and recalcitrant factors of its typical phenomena. Or else, it must be able to separate between these factors and the more manageable ones so as both to guarantee some understanding of,

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2. "The character of a policy can be ascertained only through the examination of the political acts performed and of the foreseeable consequences of these acts. (Morgenthau, PAN, p. 5 & 12).
 3. This is what constitutes, according to Morgenthau (PAN, pp. 6 & 20), the "purpose" of a theory, and hence the standard by reference to which it is to be judged. We consider this one necessary criterion for the satisfactionness of a conceptual framework.

evaluation of, and control over them, and at the same time, not to distort their nature.

As the case stands, politics is not, as we shall see, a "science" in the narrow strict sense of the term. Nor does it entail a "theory". It follows that "prediction" is out of the question in its context.⁴

We are forced then to accept "a conceptual framework" for a "theory", and to substitute "happy guesses" for "prediction." No wonder then that we see contemporary political realists examine the roots and causes of such "wise guesses"⁵ as a means of avoiding wild ones.

Another distinctive feature of this reconstruction of

4. Heckscher, G., SCGP, p. 18ff.
D. Easton, The Political System, P.A. Knopf, p.57.
H.C. Kelman, "S.A. SFIR" Rept. in Hoffmann, CTIR, pp.221-222.
K. Thompson, PRCWP, P.P. ix, 22 and p.4.
5. Kenneth Thompson in his Political Realism attributes the likelihood of such successful guesses to the school of political thought that possesses "a lively sense of history" (p.8), "a clear conception of the human nature" (p.11), a definite stand concerning "progress" (p.12) and politics (p.13). The discussion of these categories by Thompson shows a definite advance on Morgenthau's - an advance along the line of further specification. Yet they suffer, in Thompson's version from methodological and philosophical misgivings.

political realism is its being committed to recognize all⁶ the relevant factors to rational theorizing on political behaviour. Some of these factors do ~~confuse~~ the picture to a considerable extent. As a matter of fact it is mainly due to them that politics is far from being a science and that its theory is still in its very primitive stages of development. Yet we can not legitimately blind our eyes to them. This version of realism, committed as it is, to openness, positiveness, and impartiality, cannot, without betraying its own nature, brush aside any of these disturbing unwelcome factors. It will have to learn how to live with them unless, one way or another, it becomes able, with the help of advances in the other cognate fields of study such as psychology, sociology, economics, etc., to tame and subject them to rigorous study. Even the claim of making "political

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6. "...The advocates of a broader scope for international relations, including the social, cultural, and institutional factors, will see in the narrowness of the strictly political (meaning, power) approach a major weakness. He admits the centrality of the strictly political, however conceived, but wishes to include the other factors as a condition of genuine realism."

George Liska, International Equilibrium,
Rept. in Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 144.

theory" more rational⁷ than political behaviour - a claim that is usually and within limits a legitimate one - is not a legitimate excuse for a priori or arbitrary brushing off any one of them out of the picture.

Retouching is permissible; but only within the limits of keeping the identity of the object portrayed. How else could it be found out whether it is really re-touching or intended elimination of unfriendly data to the theory supported?

Nor does this reconstruction claim finality. It is only a step along the long and tedious road leading to more and more satisfactory formulae for the analysis and control of political phenomena. This is quite in the tradition⁸ of realism.

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7. "The difference between international politics as it actually is and a rational theory derived from it is like the difference between a photograph and a painted portrait. The photograph shows everything that can be seen by the naked eye; the painted portrait does not show everything that can be seen by the naked eye, but it shows, or at least seeks to show, one thing that the naked eye can not see: the essence of the person portrayed." Morgenthau, PAM, p. 7.
 8. "Each successive generation of observers and interpreters carries the heavy burden of appraising and, if necessary, correcting or enlarging the reach and grasp of those who have gone before. I see this contribution of the political realists in this light." op.cit., K. Thompson, p.ix.

Also in the tradition of realism, this ⁵contraction tries to portray reality, chaotic and ugly as it is. It breaks sharply, so it seems,⁹ with the traditional realists in making room for an "ideal" attitude - a positive concern about this reality. For it attempts as an attitude at least to improve this chaotic, shabby reality - to put it in order and if possible to control it. Basically therefore, this reconstruction is committed to optimism - the decision to make the world in which it lives, and

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9. "...I may be permitted to say...that there is a surprising measure of real idealism, and sometimes even nobility. But do not look to the diplomatist for any verbal acknowledgement of this idealism, for any belief in human perfectability, for any optimistic philosophy of public affairs. The professional diplomatist is, after all, only a species of physician. He has...a shabby and irritating group of patients: violent, headstrong, frivolous, unreasonable."

G. Kennan, "Diplomacy as viewed by a Diplomat," Rept. in Kertesoz and Titysimons DCW, p.108. Also quoted by Thompson, p. 58.

to the extent to which it can - a better¹⁰ world. It has, however, no illusions¹¹ as to its powers. It does not expect too much in the context of the tight hard, and

10. The ethical version of this doctrine corresponds to the principle of "maximizing of value" elaborated by Arnold Wolfers in his "Statesmanship and Moral Choice."
(See S. Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 275, note 3).

It has also some affinity with Morgenthau's belief, namely, to choose among several expedient actions the least evil one (Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p.203), though it has some serious reservations on his saying: "Political ethics is indeed the ethics of doing evil" (Ibid. p. 202).

Another principle of Morgenthau's political ethics is welcomed in this context; that is, that the national interest is to be defined in terms compatible with other nations interests."
("Another great Debate..." Rept. in S. Hoffmann's CTIR, p.78.)

11. "Fortunately logic is not life and man is not intellect alone. And whilst those same men whose critical faculty is warped are the men of passion and imagination, in the life of society the intellect plays a very small part, and with very little exaggeration it may be said that things go their way independent of our actings."
Croce, The Historic Materialism of Karl Marx, p. 100. Quoted by W.Y. Elliot, PRP, p. 25.

difficult circumstances that surround it¹² - nor does it claim too high a value for the significance of the effects of its efforts. Measured by the "real standards" of things as they are and the "absolute principles of significance," whatever these concepts mean, its efforts may very well be infinitesimally small. How much do they affect the cosmic course of events, and how significant is that influence are questions which have to be settled, if ever, on their own merits. But whatever these consequences, and whatever their value, still a realist of the school here expounded, is free to take a definite attitude - an attitude in the soil of which

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12. Knowing that this is the nature and make up of the world in which he lives, and recognizing its very complex limitations, a realist of this school is always prepared to see his hopes shattered to pieces.

"How often have statesmen been motivated by the drive to improve the world, and ended by making it worse." Morgenthau (PAN, p.6)

It makes a great deal of difference however, from the point of view of this reconstruction, who or what is to blame under these circumstances. All we are responsible for is to hope for the best and act for the better in the light of what we seriously tried to, and honestly did, know. Beyond that we can only take what comes. We can also develop an attitude of even enduring the worst!

all, or nearly all of his actions will have their roots.

Positive¹³ and optimistic is the attitude we take.

In his attitude free choice plays a major role.

13.a. Even when we can't do anything about the world outside us, this attitude will have some justifying rewards to some at least.

b. "Let each one do energetically and courageously the task which is incumbent on him in the milieu and the conditions in which nature has placed him, and the life of society (la vie generale) will be." So it is hoped, "by so much, the more active, the more fruitful, and perhaps the more happy."

(M. Duguit, Quoted by W.Y. Elliott's PRP, pp. 43-44).

c. Alfred de Wigny puts the same basic idea, but in a completely different setting, when he says:

Gemir, prier, pleurer sont également lâches,
Fais energiquement ton longè et lourde tâche
Dans la voie on le sort a voulu t'appeler,
Puis apres, comme mois, souffre et meurs
sans parler.

(Underlining mine) (Ibid., p.44.)

d. George Kennan in his article Diplomacy as viewed by a Diplomat, expresses a similar attitude when, inspite of realizing that "what emerges...from the hopper of the political process in each country and proceeds to speak for the country in international affairs is always to some degree a corrupted voice," (p. 104) and that "the professional sees the relations between governments as largely the product of the follies and ambitions and brutalities" of minorities (p.107) - inspite of that he believes "in the importance and necessity of his menial function." (p.108) For if he were not there things would be much worse."

Ibid. References are to DCW.

As a matter of fact this attitude itself is primarily a question of commitment. To that extent man himself is either to blame or/^{to}praise for it. Though not completely rational or purely voluntary, reason and the will have influential hands in shaping it. It should not, however, be misconstrued as completely rationalistic. Nor as merely arbitrary. To the extent to which it is an act of choice or of commitment it is a responsible act taken in the light of, and with due consideration of hard facts, bitter necessities, and stubborn realities. This explains the importance of the relation - a relation that methodological realism has to scrutinize - between "realism" as a portrait of the external objective world and "realism" as an expression of the temper, attitude or state of mind of the politician or statesman. Perhaps the differentiation between politician and statesman finds its deepest roots in this act of commitment, closely as it is related to his attitude or state of mind.

Thus for strength, this reconstruction of political realism does not have to, though it may, travel far. The source of strength, it believes, can be internal to the statesman who happens to uphold it. With the absolutes, therefore, it does not have to concern itself. ~~As a~~ self-

commitment and a responsible decision to serve the truth, the good, the beautiful or any other high value or principle as they are known to him on the basis of his study of the available and relevant facts past and present - these are the compass and stick with which the realist of this school tries to find his way out through the landscape of politics and the difficulties of life. Beyond that he does not have to go. Furthermore, if he is to be true to the principles of methodological realism, he is advised not to take that venture into the realm of beliefs which it can not significantly settle by reference to objective criteria.

On the other hand a statesman is not denied the right to have recourse to absolutes if he so chooses. His methodological difficulties are thereby multiplied. But if he is willing to take the risks and abide by their limitations, a decision which methodological realism considers quite rash, he is not for that condemned as believing either in meaningless or irrelevant notions. This is the case because this reconstruction does not make the methodological mistake of denying either the existence or the meaning of absolute essences. It simply refuses, on purely methodological grounds, to commit itself with regard

to them. Nor does it refuse to admit, under all circumstances, their relevance to political behaviour. Methodologically speaking, absolutes like fictions,¹⁴ and figments of the imagination become both real and significant through the actions of some sincere people. If some actors on the political scene choose to believe in them, to call upon them for inspiration or for help in the solution of the difficulties they meet, they are free to do so. But then they have to answer to questions concerning the relations of these absolutes to actions taken in their light.

On the other hand, "realism" is suggested as an alternative conceptual framework for the analysis, understanding, evaluation, and if possible control of political

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14. The moral behaviour of the state is a hypothesis, but we need not regard as "unreal" a hypothesis (a fiction) which is accepted in certain contexts as a guide to individual behaviour and does in fact influence that behaviour."
E.H. Carr, The Twenty Year Crisis, Rept. in Hoffmann's CTIR, p.259.

Again:

"There is a world community for the reason (and for no other) that people talk, and within certain limits behave, as if there were a world community."

Ibid., p. 267.

phenomena. It is not, rather it does not claim to be, the "true theory." As an issue of pure principle it could be, on its own principles, either accepted or rejected.

What it claims is that it provides a more satisfactory¹⁵ approach to the actual problems and issues of politics. Independent of these it has no virtues to claim.¹⁶ Even in connection with them its claims to tentative and temporary

15. This is merely carrying a step further, the tradition of realists as stated by Thompson. Refer back to p. 5, note 2.

16.a. "The reader will find here no plea for theory for its own sake. Theory is no more than" a set of tools whose usefulness is tested in their ability to solve concrete problems. (Barrington More Jr., Social Theory and Contemporary Politics. Quoted by Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 8.

b. The case then for political science - conceived as a pure science of human behaviour or as the worship of apparently irrelevant abstractions unrelated to life's problems or of towering objectivity in social affairs - may in the end prove to be based on a false conception of the nature of science itself." K. Thompson, PRCWP, pp. 7-8.

c. This task (world peace) will be best approached not through the establishment of rigid legal norms but rather by the traditional devices of political expediency... Few people are ever going to have an abstract devotion to the principles of international legality capable of competing with the impulses from which wars are apt to arise."

G. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy, p. 36. Quoted by Thompson's PRCWP, pp. 60-61.

satisfactoriness are limited by certain assumptions and specific purposes and ~~known~~ presuppositions - both on the level of policy and of methodology. If any of these is disturbed either by experience or by responsible commitment than repercussions, of this disturbance(s) must be felt by this school of realism. The extent of this disturbance might be so great as to justify even the rejection of realism.¹⁷

This disturbance though has first to be genuine. It has, in other words to be closely connected with genuine problems. Methodologically, therefore, this reconstruction has to distinguish between genuine, and ingenuine questions. Not any question the mind raises is susceptible to a legitimate convincing¹⁸ answer. Only those that can be settled according to the scientific method are to be considered genuine issues. These will delimit the field of discussion,

17. For one of the methodological aims of this reconstruction is the improvement of its techniques and the corrections of its mistakes.
18. The process of convincing others, it also realizes, is a very complex one. It has its subjective as well as objective aspects. A convincing argument, therefore, depends as much on the state of mind and attitude of the audience as it does, if not more so, on its own logical consistency and empirical support.

and hence of behaviour. Others are to be considered as expressions of opinions, at least temporarily. These will constitute the field of research.

When we come to the settlement of genuine questions, disputes, and disagreements, the principle of methodological equality is of the greatest significance. Whatever a disputant allows for himself he is, according to this principle, to allow for others - his opponents. This is the denial of privileges in connection with the scientific realistic settlements of disagreements.

Furthermore, no method is worth our trouble and/or respect which leads, with this principle, to deadlocks or impasses between the disputants.

Realism, to sum up and conclude, as a positive optimistic voluntary¹⁹ attitude is within our reach and power.

19. Some would argue that this voluntarism is more or less enforced upon us by the conditions of life itself.

"Yet if armed with logic alone, Reason has wounded itself, the doubt of consistent skepticism is even more suicidal. Life demands an affirmation from those who would keep it. One is a voluntarist by the mere fact of living. To treat the tough world of fact as one of mere appearance is itself the greatest illusion. This realism is the first premiss of the anti-intellectualism which, under a variety of names, makes common cause against the metaphysical abstractions of absolute idealism."

W.Y. Elliott, P.R.P., p.9.

As a sound method it is only partially so. These are the necessary conditions for success in the formulation of political theory. They are not sufficient though. Further research is urgently needed if we require from our theory, besides, to be practicable, to allow for inventiveness, to encourage the exercise of wisdom, courage, and integrity, to be able to safeguard itself against ignorance and intellectual error and confusion, to avoid dangerous extremes, and to encompass impressionistic observation, historical analogy,²⁰ and common sense judgement.

Till we attain this noble and perhaps ambitious aim, and even after we do so, the achievements of political realists

20. One has to remember in this connection P.H. Nitze's advice:

"Historical analogies have great utility in illuminating complex situations and in helping one to sort out the significant from the merely striking. But action based too closely on historical analogies is apt to be sterile and unimaginative." "Role of the Learned man in Government." The Review of Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3, p. 280. Quoted by Thompson's PRCWP, p.93.

will always be limited by their skill, tact, and wisdom.
The successful solution of the problems of life, political
problems included, is not merely the job of science but
also of art - an art that is touched with genius!

CHAPTER ONE

Realism

"Judge the politician by all means,
but be sure that the criteria applied,
are appropriate."

Nicholas Doman

"Realism", like all other symbols of communication,
may be used in two,¹ if not more, different senses.

The descriptive sense of Realism. One might use
"realism" in politics to describe a political fact, relation,
event, or a set of such conditions in the external world,
simple or complex, in isolation or intertwined.²

In this sense the truth or falsity of the notion in

1. Distinguishing between them will prove to be one basic pre-requisite of clear thinking:
"much of the international (or domestic) evil of power is rooted not in the sinfulness of man but in a context, a constitution, a situation in which even good men are forced to act selfishly or immorally. Discrimination between the inherent or instinctive aspect of the "power drive" and the situational or accidental ones, is an "important task." CTIR, S.Hoffmann, p.31.
The distinction also fits well Aron's "situation - decision anti-thesis" - a useful notion for the conceptualization of the facts of international politics.
2. These phenomena constitute one class of objective criteria by reference to which the truth or falsity of the notion at hand is to be determined. The principles of logic constitute the other class.

question is a question that is not only open for disputation but also, within more or less restricted conditions, for final settlement. Hence disagreements here may very likely be significant and real. Verification, if ever possible, must be possible in this context, and truth is an empirical objective characteristic - being a relation between a symbol (or an idea represented by that symbol) and objective phenomena in the world the existence or non-existence of which do not primarily depend on the will or wishes of the person speaking (or thinking).

We say primarily because the will or commitment of the agent on the political scene can have something to do in connection with these objective phenomena. If it is of the nature of politics to be normative, then participation in politics involves the participants in transforming³ some at

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3. "Political Realism does not assume that the contemporary conditions under which foreign policy operates, with their extreme instability and, the ever present threat of large-scale violence, can not be changed.
(Morgenthau, PAM, p.8)

This reconstruction will not have been satisfied with this negative way of putting the idea. It commits itself to changing these phenomena, whenever possible to the better.

least of its objective features. There is no need for ~~ap~~ ~~the-~~ ~~ment~~ to support the antecedent of this conditional statement. A very superficial look gives it plenty of support. The deeper one digs into typical behaviour for underlying principles the more he is convinced of its truth. Had it not been for the possibility of that change, our optimistic posture would be simply useless. Also with this normative element would collapse the significance of our free commitment to improve the world. In a world where freedom is a mere illusion, a statesman's commitment to make it better would be of no objective consequence whatsoever; and politics ~~diminishes~~ to a meaningless game. It may still be self-amusing, but in so far as affecting the course of events its efforts would be doomed a priori to failure.

The expressive sense of realism. Thus we are driven to stand face to face with the expressive sense of "realism" - as used to express the attitude or state of mind of the ~~s~~ ~~pe~~ ~~a~~ ~~k~~ ~~e~~ ~~r~~ or the agent on the political scene.

Truth (or falsehood) in connection with this sense is a subjective matter. While it is in connection with the descriptive sense a kind of relation (the conditions of which

are to be determined and agreed upon independently of the political question) between the symbol and the meant phenomena in the external empirical, publicly observable, world, it is in connection with this expressive sense a relation between the symbol and a personal idea, impression, motive, a state of mind, or an attitude - all subjective specifications of the speaker or agent, characteristics that are directly accessible, if accessible at all, only to him. Others may, if ever, confirm or disconfirm the presence and some of the characteristics of these psychological phenomena, but only indirectly. This involves the formulation of hypotheses concerning them and the verification of such hypotheses - an operation that is so difficult and slippery that even if successfully performed yields only, and at best, probable results,⁴ never certainties. Hence

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4. For other reasons R. Aron reaches to the same conclusion:

"But the fact that the sociologists have not yet made an exhaustive list of such factors and still more that sociology has not arrived at unanimously accepted theory of civilizations without war, means that any advice given can be based at least, only on probabilities, and must generally be ambiguous and doubtful."

"Conflict & War" Rept. in S. Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 207.

Morgenthau is right in saying:

"The search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the most illusive of psychological data, distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the interests and emotions of actor and observor alike. Do we really know what our own motives are? And what do we know of the motives of others?
(PAN, p. 6.)

The last two questions, however, have^d different logic. It is true that we sometimes don't really know what are our own motives. It is equally true, however, that we are the best judges of them granted the most favorable conditions of knowing, that we are honest, courageous, and truthful, and that the factors we analyse are on the level of the conscious. Of course all of these are questionable assumptions. Seldom do all of them apply to any person. What follows from them, however, is that politics can't be, under the conditions of our present techniques of knowledge, a science in the strict sense. A corollary of this is spelling grave doubts in "political theory." What does not follow is that others who have the same qualifications as we do are or could ever be, except in abnormal cases,

better judges⁵ than we are of them.

Thus we are involved again in the logic of the second question raised by the quoted passage. Verification here is indirect, through hypotheses, and yields, as a result, only

5. Morgenthau's "projective method" then commits two methodological errors. In the first place it grants the observer the right to be a better judge of the motives of the agent. In the second place it assumes that its results, in this, are certain. What is this projective method?

The political realist puts himself in the "position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem" (p.5) under certain circumstances and asks himself "what the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner) and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances is likely to choose?" (Ibid) It (this method) "enables the disinterested observer" "to understand the thoughts and actions" of the statesman, "perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself" (Ibid).

We shall have the chance later on to point to two other mistakes this method commits:- the assumption that all political behaviour is a rational one; and the right to legislate for others. (See also p.58-59 below.

One must, on the other hand, admit that this method has its advantages. It at least tries to avoid, the arm-chair kind of theorizing - the kind that lends itself more to free play of the imagination and abstract thinking than to careful planning based on, and connected with, harsh facts and bitter necessities.

probabilities.

This process of ascertaining our results becomes even more difficult and slippery under the assumption of dishonesty. In politics reference to ideologies is quite frequent.⁶ Sometimes, it is true, this recourse is a mere camouflage. But not always. Unless we allow ourselves to judge people a priori, and in so doing, betray our own principles, we shall have to not only distinguish between two meanings of ideology,⁷ but also to judge the actions of statesmen or their policies each on its own merits. Methodological realism, if it claims any degree of satisfactoriness, must be able not only to make the distinction between the two senses of "ideology," and to judge

6. "Because of its effects on the psychology of rulers and people, and because of the inevitable clashes between regimes subscribing to opposing principles, ideology is a factor to be reckoned with in international relations." R. Aron ("Conflict and War", Rept. in S. Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 196).

7. Ideology might mean either an ideal or set of ideals or values to the service of which an agent, (a statesman) is seriously and honestly committed or a set of disguising procedures.

Karl Manheim, Ideology and Utopia, (New York: Hartcourt & Co., 1936), p. 49. Quoted by Morgenthau's PAN, p. 80.

policies of statesmen each on its relevant evidences, but also to guard against moving from the one of these senses to the other in a light manner; not to accuse people who work in the light of one of working by inspiration of the other, and finally, not to minimize the difficulties involved in the confirmation of our suspicions of them.⁸ For we are entitled to suspect the intentions of other people. But to condemn them on the basis of this suspicion alone or on evidences irrelevant to their particular

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8. "Then again statesmen may sincerely believe that a particular course of action is dictated by vital interests; but judged by non-nationalistic standards of this they may be placing undue value on certain interests of their people or underestimating the value of things not pertaining to their nation which their policy would sacrifice."

"While this makes moral criticism and self-criticism imperative the difficulties which stand in the way of their proper use in international politics need to be emphasized. If it is hard for statesmen to make proper moral choices, it is not any easier for others to do justice to their conduct of foreign policy." A. Wolfers "Statesmanship and Moral Choice", Rept. in CTIR, pp. 283-84. (Underlining mine)

Nor are these difficulties limited to moral judgements!

actions⁹ - actions that are the subject of our suspicion, is to commit methodological blunders.

Our methodological troubles¹⁰ would not end even when we are certain ^{of} other people's motives or ideologies or for the matter our own. This is the case because the relation between what is referred to by the expressive sense of

9. "We assume that statesmen act and think in terms of interest defined as power, and the evidence of history bears that assumption. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as it were, the steps of a statesman - past, present or future - has taken or will take on the political scene." (Morgenthau, PAN, p.5.)

Isn't Morgenthau's argument here like the argument of a woman who rebuffs an honest, sincere and noble man because she happens to have had the experience only of making the acquaintance of dishonest rogues?

That even if one make the assumption Morgenthau makes still one could make dangerous mistakes is quite eloquently made clear by K.Thompson in his Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics, pp. 206, 210.

See paper on Thompson, p. 1.

10. "Yet even if we had access to the real motives of statesmen, that knowledge would help us little in understanding foreign policies and might lead us astray. It is true that knowledge of the statesman's motives may give us one among many clues as to what the direction of his foreign policy might be...

"History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy. This is true both of moral and of political qualities."

(Morgenthau, op.cit., p. 6.)

"realism" and what is indicated by the descriptive sense is subject to many variables - the statesman's pattern of culture, his likes and dislikes, his commitments on the one hand, and his mistakes in judging the realities of the case estimating (or underestimating) his own or his nations possibilities or other nations resources or reactions to a certain policy.

This adds support to our claims that politics is far from being a science. Its "theory" hence is called theory only by a far stretching of the word.

It is a mistake, however, to eliminate¹¹ reference to motives on that account.

Doubled is the mistake of one who complains¹² against our knowledge of motives for not providing us with the "one

11. "A realist theory of international politics, then, will guard against two popular fallacies: the concern with motives, and the concern with ideological preferences."

(op.cit., Morgenthau, pp. 5-6).

12. "It can not give us, however, the one clue by which to predict his foreign policies."

(Ibid., p. 6).

clue by which to predict foreign policies."

To assume that you can predict in politics is, as has become clear and will become clearer later on, a mistake. Doubled is the mistake when you assume you can predict on the basis of one clue. The logic of prediction¹³ is^a somewhat more elaborate a process.

What we have to notice at this stage of the argument is that there is an empirical connection between our states of mind and our overt behaviour. In ideal circumstances the two levels of us are perfectly integrated. Then and only then our actions translate perfectly well our intensions and ideals, and our ideals and intensions feel perfectly projected in the external world. Seldom however, is this the case in our ordinary daily life. That is why it is important to distinguish between the expressive and the descriptive senses

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13. Prediction must satisfy the following requirements:
- a. From a set of specified (iable) facts a,b,c, d_e - n.....;
 - b. And, a set of already confirmed laws L₁, L₂, L₃....L₃; One must be able to deduce, according to specific known rules;;
 - c. Either a set of facts of the kind already known, a,b,n; or a set of facts the kind of which is not already known - x, y, z, ... etc.

"realism" - if only for the sake of clarity of analysis.

What, if any, particular features characterize the realist attitude as we envisage it? Four of these traits call for specific mention.

a. Positiveness.

As a responsible attitude, realism commits itself to a serious enterprise. It faces problems of political life with the intention of solving them. It discusses these problems, as a part of studying them, in order to reach agreements about them. Ideally these agreements would be based on the knowledge of the truths concerning the relevant data connected with them. These truths do not have to be the real absolute truths. It is enough that they ^{be} the truths as they appear to impartial judges.

Disagreements¹⁴ can be settled (this is a well known political practice) without regard to truth (or for that matter any other value). If this happens and if the disputants accept it, the issue is over - for all practical

14. These fall into one category of the kind of problems. Methodological realism has to concern itself with - interpersonal problems. The other category is those problems of research - ~~dis-~~ concerning objective rules of behaviour, truths about facts, etc...

purposes. A kind of peaceful living is thus achieved.

This is considered the most urgent¹⁵ and pressing practical political problem of the modern age. It must therefore, be regarded as the minimum long range objective of any theorizing on political behaviour both domestic or international. Other problems gain practical significance to the extent to which they bear upon this one.

The maximum ultimate of political theory and behaviour would require the satisfaction of other values and conditions.

15. a. "Surely war and peace are now the most important issues men anywhere can reason about."
C.Wright Mills, CWWT, p. 21.
- b. "It is impossible to overemphasize the theoretical significance for all politics of the differentiation between a crisis situation - implying conflict over sheer physical or political survival as the minimum immediate objective of policy - and a non-crisis situation (in times and conditions of relaxed competition and tensions) - implying an often cooperative quest for additional goals, such as individual freedoms, general welfare, and justice, as the maximum and long-range political objectives. Failure to make the differentiation explicit has been responsible for much confusion in theoretical debate."

G. Liska IE, Rept. Hoffmann's p. 144.
G.

Since these do change with man's development both spiritual and material, a specific statement of that goal is not possible at this time - or any other time except in very general terms¹⁶ - terms which may be rhetorically very impressive but logically quite in need of further trimmings. It remains true, however, that mutual understanding, peaceful co-existence of competing views, and confidence, are pre-requisites for that ultimate aim.

It remains also true that, unless politics is taken merely as a leisurely game, positive attitude is the primary voluntary factor that generates efforts - on all levels - for the tackling of problems man faces in his endeavour to attain all objectives immediate or ultimate.

b. Openness.

Unless one claims to know the absolute final truths, unless one claims to be omniscient - claims that go contrary

16. "There are many approaches and intermediate objectives under different *names* and symbols; the ultimate goal remains the good life of individual men in free communities, great or small." G. Liska, International Equilibrium, Rept. in Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 149.

to our methodological commitments, one is either open to the charge of intentionally blinding one's eyes, one time or another, to relevant new facts or to new interpretations of old facts, or else he must be open-minded. This means that he must always be prepared to change his stands as intellectual honesty requires. Sometimes when the issues concerned are of minor importance, this change is quite easy. But, when the issues to be modified or rejected are very important and traditionally cherished, this change is very difficult. Here we have an index of the strength of the statesman's personality. The stronger his personality the better prepared he is to accept these changes or make them - once he is convinced they are legitimate. Here also we have a clue to one's intellectual honesty. What does it take to convince him? Does he brush off disconfirming evidences to his theses? Does he, though admitting these evidences, try to minimize their significance? The more inclined he is to do such things the less intellectually honest he becomes. We have here again a key to one's insight and wisdom and goodness. Does he sacrifice everything whatsoever to fulfill a certain principle or promise? Does he give due values to other factors of human nature than reason? Does he consider the interests of others as he does his own?

Does he see the relationships, apparent or deep, between the different facts of life? Is he able to anticipate consequences of his action and their effects on others? Does he learn from past experience? The more he does the more mature is his behaviour.

Without this preparedness to change stands the search for further truth becomes a mere joke. Similar must be the fate of responsible discussion. It is only against a background of an assumption of an attitude characterized by openness that George Kennan remarks on NATO are valuable.¹⁷ The same holds

17. "It is on the front of police realities, not on regular military battlefields, that the threat of Russian Communism must primarily be met. The training of such forces ought to be such as to prepare them not only to offer whatever overt resistance might be possible to a foreign invader but also to constitute the core of a civil resistance movement on any territory that might be overrun by the enemy; and every forethought should be exercised to facilitate their assumption and execution of this role in the case of necessity. For this reason they need not, and should not, be burdened with heavy equipment or elaborate supply requirements...

"I would not wish to make a fetish of it or to suggest any sweeping uniform changes. The situations of no two NATO countries are alike. There are some that will continue to require, for various reasons, other kinds of armed forces as well. I mean merely to suggest that if there could be a more realistic concept of the problem and the evolution of a strategic doctrine more directly addressed to the Soviet threat as it really is and not as we have imagined it." G. Kennan, RAW, pp.65-66.

true of other such admonitions.¹⁸

The gap, it must always be noticed, between this preparedness to change and actual change is somewhat wide and slippery. It is only when this change is legitimate and possible - questions which methodological realism has to settle each on its own merits - that this attitude translates itself, at the hands of a responsible agent, into action. Change is recommended in other words, only when it is a change for the better.

The attitude of preparedness to make the change, on the other hand, or to make this change wisely when it is made, is an attitude that must always be prevalent. The lack of it may become the cause of catastrophies. This lack remains a weak characteristic of an unsound attitude even if its consequences are, as usually they are, less drastic. We recommend its presence, however, because ^{of} its positive contributions - contributions without which progress and civilization would stand in the danger of freezing stagnation.

18. "But the truth, I am going to argue, is that it is the rigidity of those who have access to the new means of history making that has created and is creating the "inevitability" of World War III" C. Wright, Mills, CWWT, p. 21.

c. Impartiality.

Impartiality has already been referred to. It implies not only recognition of hostile facts but also giving them due consideration.

A corollary of this is independent thinking. George Kennan was referring to this complex trait of mind when he said:

"The Russians are not always wrong, any more than we are always right. Our task, in any case, is to make up our minds independently." (RAW, p. 62).

Another is that it avoids, committed as it is to careful and systematic explanation, "advance-judgements."¹⁹

A Few points follow.

The expressive sense of realism, as here characterized becomes very close to, if distinguishable at all from, the scientific attitude. Nor is this a complete innovation.

19. "Here, a teleological interpretation which discourages further research and twists the facts into a predetermined pattern is substituted for careful and systematic explanation. It is "a set of advance-judgements." (Ernest Barker, in M. F. Ashly Montegue. (ed.) Toynbee and History, pp. 94-95. Also quoted in GTIR, by S. Hoffmann, p. 38.)

Some well known political theorists,²⁰ have already made the suggestion.

The point of elaborating on the foregoing becomes clearer when we make clear a conviction the upholding of which will influence to a great extent this reconstruction. We believe that the attitude one takes towards the events²¹

20.a. "The flood of events has many other meanings... What has happened in the eighteen months since the book was written has, I think, tended to confirm the analysis given here, to make more appropriate its tone of urgency and more relevant and realistic the proposals offered." C. Wright Mills, The Causes of World War Three, p.14.

b. "Under the circumstances usually prevailing in a multi-state system painful limitations are set on policies of self-negation, generosity or restraint of power. It would be utopian to expect drastic changes in this respect. But to say that the field of international politics is reserved for selfishness, brutality, self-righteousness or unrestrained ambition for power is not only cynical but manifestly unrealistic." Arnold Wolfers, op.cit., pp.285-286.

c. See also note 17 p. 33 quoted from Q. Kennan's RAW.

21.a. "Perhaps there is something in the basic values and character patterns of a nation and its elite or in their traditional attitudes towards the other nations concerned which predisposes them towards perceiving situations as requiring war and towards resisting alternative means." H.C. Kelman, "Societal, attitudinal, and structural Factors in Int. Rel.", Rept. in Hoffmann's CTIR, pp.210-211.

b. "The cultural pattern is more enduring than an aggressive or pacific, imperialistic or defensive, foreign policy." R. Aron, op.cit., p. 197.

c. "More important than structure is the commitment

of life is of equal, if not more, importance than these events themselves. But differently, one's commitment to abide by and impliment the truth is at least of equal importance and sometimes even more important than, knowing the truth.

Unless we conceive the development of history as a divine plan in the unfolding of which man has no significant role to play, or that everything man does is completely determined by forces, whether materialistic or idealistic, external and alien to him - conceptions which our scientific method does not justify,²² we are to put emphasise on man's decisions and ^{his} efforts guided by such decisions. Truth, if it is to triumph in the end, must enlist in its service some energetic, dedicated, and honest men. If the development of history has anything to do with truth, and we take it that

of states participating in an international organization - in our case mainly that for mutual assistance against threats to security. What matters is that the actual readiness of members to perform correspond to their formal obligations." G.Liska, op.cit., p.140.

22. We do not deny these conceptions of history; nor do we claim that they are false. All we commit ourselves to in regard to them is that we can not prove them or even confirm them with what we know of facts and principles.

it has, then the movements of history must be carried on by efforts of men, whose decisions have something to say regarding the courses of those movements.

What is true of truth in its relation to man's decisions and efforts and the facts of life and history is equally true of goodness or beauty or any other value.

Nor should this stand of ours be misconstrued as taking a stand in relation to history. In a comprehensive significant sense we don't know what is the nature, direction, plot, ^hrythms, or significance of history.²³ Nor do we think any responsible thinker could take such a stand without exposing his belief to disconfirmation. What we are committed to however, in this connection, is only one element of a stand - whatever the nature of history; Man's freedom, and hence ^{his} decisions, and hence ^{his} actions guided by such decisions, and hence modifications in the course of events within limits of course, and hence his attitude towards life, and hence his commitment to make the world better - all these are significant beliefs both on the level of theory and on

23. a. K. Thompson, P.R.C.W.P., pp.58; p.8-11.

b. H. Morgenthau, PAN, p. 4.

the level of practice.

Sometimes history is referred to by realists for evidences to support their theses. In this general sense of history, the womb and the tomb of all events, such a reference is of no valuable help whatsoever. Like the beggars bag, or perhaps more so, history embraces all sorts of events. So rich is its fund that any theory whatsoever could find somewhere in its dark corners some supporting evidences.

Furthermore, values of history change²⁴ This does not mean to deny all value of history. History is certainly valuable, but it is still an open unsettled question how to benefit from it. It may be true

24. "Medieval history" said the historian Stubbs, "is a history of rights and wrongs, modern history as contrasted with medieval is a history of powers, forces, dynasties, and ideas..." quoted by Martin Wright, in "Power Politics," in Roots of Political Behaviour, ed. by R.C. Snyder and H.H. Wilson, 1949, p, 136."

as Bacon says, ²⁵ ^{that} "History makes men wise," but we still don't know whether it is wise men that benefit from history or, ^{whether} it is history that makes any of its reader wise. Against the latter we have ^{much} disconfirming evidences. The former alternative is not a high complement to history either.

A good illustration of learning from history is the following passage:

"If experience of this century has taught us anything it is that the long-term effects of modern war are by no means governed just by formal outcome of the struggle in terms of victory or defeat. Modern war is not just an instrument of policy. It is an experience in itself. It does things to him who practices it, irrespective of whether he wins or loses. Can we really suppose that poor old Europe, so deeply and insidiously weakened by the ulterior effects of the two previous wars of this century, could stand another and even more horrible ordeal of this nature? Let us by all means think for once not just in the mathematics of destruction - not just in these grisly equations of probable military casualties - let us rather think of people as they are; of the limits of their strength, their hope, their capacity for suffering, their capacity for believing in the future. And let us ask ourselves in all seriousness how much worth saving is going to be saved if war now rages for the third time in a half-century over the face of Europe, and this time in a form vastly more destructive than anything ever known before."

(pp.59-60, G. Kennan's Russia, The Atoms and the West)

25. The same story holds of Labriola's "History is the mistress of all us, men, and we are as it were vitalized by History". Quoted by Croce, & W.Y. Elliott, FRP, p.25.

How much of this piece of wisdom is due to history and how much to George Kennan's insight?²⁶

What we have said in connection with "history" can be repeated with equal force in connection with "human nature."²⁷ The just quoted passage also supports this claim.

Our conclusion is, then, that what is referred to by "realism" in the expressive sense is more important²⁸ than, though significantly connected and hence influenced by, what is indicated by its descriptive use. What is the use of knowing the truth when one does not implement it? Simply because it is possible for man to know the truth and ignore its implementation in actual practice,²⁹ (and history provides plenty of evidences to support this view) it is important to insist on the importance of the mental

26. Morgenthau, p. 4 and Thompson, op.cit., pp.11-12.

27. See also p.33 note.

28. "Even national survival itself, it should be added, is a morally compelling necessity only as long as people attach supreme value to it." (Underlining mine). "Statesmanship and moral choice," Arnold Wolfers, in S. Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 283.

29. "There have certainly been occasions when to the objective observer, it seemed clear that war was not a desirable course of action, and yet the elite resisted this evidence." H.C. Kelman, "Societal, Attitudinal and Structural Factors in International Relations," quoted by S. Hoffmann's CTIR, p.210.

attitudes, the habitual inclinations of politicians - in particular their commitments to some values. This importance grows graver when we know, supported by personal experience and the testimony of history, that it is even possible for man to know the truth and still go against it. Civilized and uncivilized peoples have many devices to guarantee the punishment of such anomalies. None of these however is foolproof. All agree, on the other hand that the safest guarantee against such misbehaviours is the inner guardian. It expresses itself in self-commitment.

Basically then, realism is an attitude. Towards the bitter necessities of life and the harsh, complex and perplexing facts of history and human nature it commits itself to an approach characterized by openness, positiveness, and impartiality, an approach that is supposed best to serve some specific stated purposes, foremost among them the dissolution of disagreements without qualification as a minimum aim, and with grave qualifications as a maximum aim. Analysing, understanding, evaluating, affecting and if possible controlling those facts are indispensable techniques of this approach.

Thus there is a deep abyss between realism, as an

attitude, though basically a free choice, and arbitrary decisions or the mere whims or caprice or free flights of imagination. For the understanding of this difference and its significance we have to turn to the study of realism in its descriptive sense. We must always keep in mind however, the integral interplay of the conditions expressed by "realism" and those described by it. For it is exactly this discourse that differentiates between "free responsible choice" from a careless arbitrary decisions!

"Realism" in its descriptive sense, involves us into the discussion of whether politics is a science or not. The discussion of this point will make clearer the expressive sense of "realism." It will also have a very heavy bearing on the stand we take toward political theory - namely that it is far from being a theory in the strict sense.

It is very difficult to answer the first question without settling first the question as to what is the aim of politics. In particular is it a search for truth or something else?

Some people claim that the aim of politics is the

preparation for good citizenship;³⁰ others, that it is to organize collective power and use it for the settlement of disputes.

From the vantage point of these two theses the primary business of politics is not necessarily, though it may be, to find out objective³¹ truth. For it is very possible to propose for "good" citizenship or to settle disputes without due attention to truth, or for that matter justice.

Suppose, though it is the exception rather than the rule, ^{that} truth is insisted upon as a foundation for either or both of these purposes, how would politics fare as a science?

Answering this question will coincide with the explanation of another, a third possible purpose of politics. The difficulties at least are the same for both accounts. What are the difficulties one faces who holds, as responsible statesmen usually do, that the purpose of politics is to understand the political facts and to try to change them for

30. Heckscher, p.18.

31. "This is one place where the value of commitment as one of the reasons of investigation shows itself clearly. Commitment cannot be separated from investigation."
S. Hoffmann, op.cit., p. 187.

the better. If this proves too ambitious an aim, understanding political facts remains important at least for those who, failing to control them, guide their actions according to them.³²

Leaving the discussion of difficulties involved in the normative term "better" for another occasion, let us scrutinize, though somewhat hurriedly, the slippery spots of politics as a mere descriptive enterprise.

We must always bear in mind, however, that we have already avoided - not tackled, one of the most difficult points in connection with our present attempt. It is of the nature of politics to be normative. Choice between two or more policies, parties, or candidates is a simple common, yet typical political choice.³³ This involves, to the extent to which it is, not rational but merely common-sensical, a degree of recognition of norms. Of course sometimes

32. Morgenthau, PAN, p. 4.

33. "Will an alliance provoke war or will the failure to make a commitment tempt an aggressor?" Arnold Wolfers SMC in Hoffmann's p. 284.

this choice is completely irrational.³⁴ This is a fact that must be noticed by political theorizing. Its value lies in the inference that it makes political theorizing a terribly difficult enterprise. It is a mistake however, to deny, on the basis of recognizing it, the normative elements in the more responsible actions of political behaviour.

Let us, however, restrict our present discussion to the other class of difficulties, ^{which} politics, claiming to be or become a science, has to face. *ℓ*

However we delimit the sphere of political action, it remains true to connect political acts with the legitimate

34.a. "The conception of war as an instrument of policy seems to rest on the further assumption that the choices made by the elite are essentially "rational." Cattrell indicates that these choices may be determined by myths, prejudices, and hunches..."
(Underlining mine) H.C. Kelman, op.cit., p.210.

b. "Hobbes 'proves' to his own satisfaction that war conditions cannot last beyond victory - a shrewd and prophetic hunch - by deducing his conclusion from premisses he can hardly be said to have substantiated."
A. Wolfers, The Anglo American Tradition in Foreign Affairs, Rep. in Hoffmann's p. 243.

organization, control and exercise of the collective power of the community. Political behaviour in other words, revolves around the notion of the political unit, a state* or, say something like it - something that functions similar to it in the interplay of forces between the rulers and the ruled.

Phenomena of this behaviour divide themselves into two classes:

a. Public Phenomena. Good illustrations of this type are demonstrations, election campaigns, voting, alliance policy, balance of powers, intervention, pursuit of ideologies, technological, military, and economic developments (industrial revolution, and nuclear revolution), transnational movements³⁵ (international, anti-colonialism, "cultural patterns,"³⁶) "population pressures."

* "What is the state? One author have collected one hundred and forty five separate definitions. Seldom have men disagreed so markedly about a term." (D. Easton, D.S. p. 109)

35. "We know little about how such movements especially the unorganized ones, become active forces in world politics."

36. R. Aron, "Conflict and War", Rep. in Hoffmann's p. 197.

How much are these phenomena subject to quantitative concise measurement? Due to the fact that they do change frequently, that this change is influenced by innumerable variables (some of them known, others known only faintly, some unknown, some rational others irrational); and due to the fact that knowledge, will and preference, ranging between mere caprice and carefully calculated choices, are inseparable elements of them - all these facts and factors militate against the ease and perhaps the possibility of subjecting this category of political phenomena to specific precise study and hence understanding and much less control.

b. Private Phenomena. Ideas, prejudices, myths, hunches, beliefs and emotions³⁷ for one candidate against

37. a. "How does the unit's political culture affect the making of foreign policy? Here I refer both to the judgements beliefs and emotions toward outside units held by those domestic groups which try to influence foreign policy, and to the origin, training, and ideas of the decision makers themselves. What are their views about the ends of their policy, and about the means to be employed?" Hoffmann's, p.181 & 184.

b. "Neither unemployment nor over population leads directly to a policy of aggression, the essential intermediate term is a certain way of thinking or acting in the governing class." R. Aron, in Hoffmann's, p. 205.

c. "There is no evidence, incidentally, that "expectation of war" as a secondary cause (of war) may not have been of only slight importance in certain circumstances (e.g. before 1939), though of considerable importance in 1910-14". Ibid., p. 198.

another, are subject to the same limiting factors of intelligibility or lack of it.

Most of the time these phenomena are unique. This is not to deny the existence of objective rules³⁸ governing man's behaviour including these unique expressions of them. It merely throws some doubt on the possibility of knowing them.

Much less are we in a position to formulate them in such a way that helps us predict³⁹ future political happenings.

38. Morgenthau, P.A.N., p. 4.

39.a. Thompson's p.78.

b. Morgenthau is not clear as to whether or not he considers possibility of prediction as an essential requirement of a theory. His discussion of motives (p.6 & pp.11-12) seems to require this. He discredits motives on the ground that they fail to provide the "one clue" for that prediction.

On the other hand he seems to think that from "what statesmen have actually done," and from "the foreseeable consequences of their acts" he can "surmise what their objectives might have been" (p.5). Of course there is a great difference between "surmising" and "predicting." Which one he will support on a second thoughts is very hard to tell.

The best we can hope for in our present conditions of knowledge is to venture happy guesses and lucky anticipations.⁴⁰ Going beyond this, as Morgenthau does, is ~~over~~stepping the limits drawn by methodological realism. This is the remnant of utopianism in realism.

Interplay between the objective and subjective factors complicates the picture even more.

The natural conclusion of this discussion is the denial of "political theory" and of "political science" in the strict sense of these terms. If political phenomena when

40.K. Thompson writes:

"Listen to these words "it is probable...that the resumed march of Russia towards her age-long objectives, towards an Atlantic port, in the Baltic and the Balkans towards a Mediterranean outlet, in the Middle and Far East, will occupy important pages in what is to come of twentieth century history." (A.L. Rowse, The Use of History pp.262.) They were written by a British historian in 1944. Precisely a decade before the Polish and Hungarian revolutions of 1956, George F. Kennan predicted uprisings in the Soviet empire in about ten years. The grounds for his prediction were a knowledge of Russian history, and of the anatomy of totalitarian regimes." P.R. & C.W.P., p. 11.

uncovered⁴¹ do not usually lend themselves to quantitative measurement, and if this is essential for theorizing, the construction of a satisfactory political theory, and hence the development of politics into a science, become a plan for achievement rather than a description of an already existing fact. Towards this goal great consistent and seriously prolonged efforts are urgently needed.

We are forced, nevertheless, to distinguish between theory and practice,⁴² "principle and necessity."⁴³

41. "We must further reckon with the fact that the scientific knowledge of human personality is only in its infancy. The proper study of mankind is man, but the more intimate study of human personality in the light of, and with the aid of, modern scientific techniques has barely begun, and none are more modest in judgement upon personality than those who have penetrated farthest into the dimly explored domains of psychiatry, psychoanalysis, psychology, psycho-biology, psychophysical constitutionalism, social psychology, in which there seems to lie so much of the secrets of human life." "Political Leadership" from Political Power by Charles E. Merriam, rept. in Roots of Pol. Behaviour, p. 141.
42. "If man in a state of nature be so free...why will he give up his empire? Though...he has such a right yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the innovation of others" John Locke, Second Treatise On Civil Government, p.
43. K. Thompson, PRCWP, pp.7-8, 22, 95, 113, 135ff.

Usually there is a gap between what we preach or believe in and what we practice. This is the case because our actions are bound by many more numerous and more limiting conditions.

It is a sign of practical wisdom to cut your plans in such a way as to be able to implement them, though sometimes with some difficulty. Laziness, from this angle is either not to plan at all or to plan things that you can fulfil mechanically or without exerting^{only} _^ except the minimum of effort. Two dangers are to be avoided definitely if life is to preserve its freshness, thrill and significance on the one hand without suffering frustrations, disappointments, or sad failures on the other. Utopianism is one extreme. It is to posit very high principles and lofty values with little or no regard to the relevant realities. In politics traditional rationalism, moralism, legalism and extreme liberalism tend to commit this mistake. Mechanism, or crackpot realism is the other extreme. It is to stick to traditional trodden^d _^ paths of behaviour - which require from the political agent very little, if any, thinking original or common, and hence very little, if any, efforts, serious or quasi-serious. Extreme

conservatism tends to commit itself to such a political life.

The ideal - ^{the}_n practical ideal - is obviously somewhere in between. Exactly where? We don't know. Nor do we think that a fully significant general answer is available.

This question, though in some forms of it (how to avoid absolutism without falling into cynicism?) perhaps the most significant cultural question of the age, yet has to be answered in full detail by each person for each occasion on the basis of relevant facts. Different persons, even within the limits of the same situation, are likely to answer it differently. But on the basis of their different answers and on the degree of compatibility of between their answers (theories) and their performances, the degree both of their wisdom and heroism will show itself.

If a conceptual framework fails to offer an a priori general answer to that question, we could find very good justifying reasons for that failure. It must, if it is to be helpful at all, provide some legitimate criteria by reference to which we are able to distinguish between men and actions in that respect.

The answers given to such a question and similar significant questions, must be subject to two kinds of consistencies. One is theoretical consistency, the other is factual consistency. Though in practical life there is a kind of integration, a process of mutual relationship between the two - a relationship where failures of anticipations based on suggested hypotheses leads the agent to modify his hypotheses in such a way as to better harmonize with facts (or sometimes even change the facts so as to harmonize with hypotheses) - yet it is necessary for the sake of analysis to distinguish between these two relations.

The first is purely logical. Logicians refer to this kind of relationship - which is the basis of all deductions - between the different symbols (notions) of a conceptual framework, by the notion of self-consistency. It simply means that those notions don't embrace contradictory concepts or assumptions. Each one of the concepts of the framework, taken alone, and all these concepts systematically combined are to be subject to this criterion.

This condition which, by the way, was quite clear

to Morgenthau's mind, does not, so it seems, make except a very faint impression on Thompson's. Otherwise he would not group together authors like H. Butterfield, Judge Charles de Visscher, H. Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr. We don't mean it is impossible to find a few principles on which all of them agree. It is clear, however, that Thompson did not take the trouble to put these principles - assuming that he was successful in finding them out - in a consistent and coherent conceptual framework. In particular his confused stand, derived as it were from the combinations of these contemporary writers, with regard to the absolutes is a good illustration of this charge.

Next to admitting the significance, for political realism, of recognizing that "no problem of agenda of America's relations with the rest of the world is more bewildering, compelling and ultimately decisive than the moral evaluation of foreign policy (p. 135), Thompson gets himself involved in showing the dangers involved in the two opposite extremes in connection with it - cynicism, and moralism. Obviously, and correctly by the way, he is not satisfied with either.

One is tempted to say that his stand will be taken,

wisely enough, somewhere in the middle. As a consequence Thompson fosters our hopes of find^{ing} in him an answer to the very crucial question: How to avoid absolutism without falling into skepticism? These hopes, however, are soon frustrated...and on more than one front.

In the first place, his demand for "standards more objective than those of success," gives the impression that he is attempting to improve on Morgenthau's. But his reference to Morgenthau's as one satisfactory standard lands him into a glaring contradiction or else invites against him the charge of misreading it.

How could Butterfield's theological "Providence" and, "higher law" be reconciled as ideals to De Visscher's secular "international community spirit" into a systematic coherent conceptual framework? The same question could be asked again with regard to Niebuhr's "higher justice" and Morgenthau's "success?"

One way out of this difficulty is to remind ourselves that Thompson is not offering these alternatives as parts of the same conceptual framework. Rather he offers them as different alternatives from which, or from others for that

matter, a choice is to be made. This of course reduces the force of our charge a great deal. It remains true, however, that Thompson is not very clear as to whether he admits absolutes or denies them - a question that is to be settled before that of whether it is theoretically consistent with other notions in Thompson's conceptual framework. The way Thompson expresses his "conviction" concerning absolutes is somewhat confusing. His complaint that "the fourth limitation (to the implementation of the insights and wisdom of any or all of the general principles referred to in behaviour) derives from the fact that there are few if any absolutes in international politics." (Underlining mine) (p. 150.) is very confusing.

I do venture a guess here about the cause of Thompson's failure to make up his mind as to whether he accepts or not absolutes in his version of political realism. Of the four wise men he quotes, two would have recourse to absolutes and two would find it very unhelpful to do so. This is only a part of the story. The other part is the methodological mistake of allowing one's self, consciously or unconsciously, to legislate⁴⁴ for others. How could Thompson pass a

44. Legislation distorts facts.
 "...Just as the exponents of the balance of power theory distort the facts of international

legislation in connection with the absolutes, which legislation will be binding⁴⁵ on all of his four wise men?⁴⁶

Between secularists and theologians, in the context of this particular issue, there is what Heckscher calls "a political predicament."

Thompson's version of realism by-passes this difficulty in a cavalier manner. Morgenthau's will have, sooner or later, to accuse his theologian friends of simply playing the ideologists. I say sooner or later because he distinguishes, as we all know, between ultimate and immediate aims of political actions. But we, some of us at least, also

politics when they regard all Heads of States as Talleyrand, or Bismark, calculating the balance of strength anew each day, so the cultural anthropologist who proceeds more or less directly from the culture pattern and the psycho-analytical interpretation of that pattern to the conduct of diplomacy falls into error." R. Aron, "Conflict and War", Rept. in Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 197.

45. Binding on some one here means (a) that some one accepting it as true and (b) he commits himself to implementing it into his experience.
46. For illustration both of Morgenthau's position and of the fact that he too, like Thompson, would legislate. See p. note

know that this distinction,⁴⁶ though practically sound in general, does not help Morgenthau out of a very serious difficulty. For all ultimate aims, if real at all and attainable, are to become, sooner or later, immediate aims. Otherwise, they are Utopian and merely "ideological". And since according to the version of Politics Among Nations, power is always the immediate aim of political action, it follows that moral principles must always be "ideological." So much for Morgenthau's difficulty. On one level of it, he will be forced to accuse Butterfield and Niebuhr on the basis of his theory not on the basis of the study of empirical relevant facts, of lack of candor and sincerity. The weaknesses of this charge have been discussed somewhere else in this essay.

On another level of it, and here Thompson joins hands with Morgenthau, it assumes illegitimately the posture of legislation. It claims to know how others will act in some determined political situations. This is exactly what is meant by Morgenthau's projective method,⁴⁷ though it is not

47. One must admit that this method has its advantages. It at least tried to avoid, the arm-chair kind of theorizing - the kind that lends itself more to free imagination and abstract thinking than to careful planning based on and connected with, harsh facts and bitter necessities.

Two of its assumptions, however, are questionable.

its only weakness. Although Thompson gives the impression that he tries to avoid the pitfalls of this method⁴⁸ he does not unfortunately apply this sound precaution carefully and consistently enough. Otherwise he would have refused to legislate for others.

The practical methodological principle to which our reconstruction is committed is the rejection of the right of

In the first place it does not allow for the very common fact that different actors, or projectors are very likely to attain, within the same set of circumstances, different results.

Secondly it assumes that the statesman always acts in a rational manner born out by experience. Doesn't the history of mankind rather support the contrary assumption? No one denies the fact that statesmen do sometimes act rationally. But do they always do so? Isn't our experience replete with actions that have very remote connections, if any, with reason? If this is true of people in general, why shouldn't it be also true of statesmen? Nor is Morgenthau unaware of this. (PAN, p.7)

The political realist puts himself in the "position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem" (p.5) under certain circumstances and asks himself "What the rational alternatives are from which a statesman may choose who must meet this problem under these circumstances (presuming always that he acts in a rational manner) and which of these rational alternatives this particular statesman, acting under these circumstances is likely to choose." (p.5)

48. "It enables the disinterested observers" to understand the thoughts and actions "of the statesman, perhaps better than he, the actor on the political scene, does himself." Ibid.

any theorist to legislate. This is a corollary of the principle of methodological freedom. Besides being a methodological principle this implies a "philosophical creed."

In the context of these remarks if Morgenthau, De Visscher, Butterfield, and Niebuhr were made to face the otherwise same situation, a situation to which belief in absolutes is relevant, different policies in kind and perhaps in content will be likely to ensue.

This in turn throws some light on the notion stated somewhere else in this essay that politics is, at least in part, what politicians or statesmen make of it.⁴⁹

We come now to the other kind of consistency to which any theorist of political realism, or any other empirical school, must pay a close attention - the consistency that must characterise the relation between any conceptual framework or any set of notions thereof, and the relevant (corresponding, bearing) facts. This is the relationships of empirical truth.

49. See also p. 53.

Our aim here is not to formulate a theory of empirical truth. Far from it. But we are interested in pointing out a few elementary principles which govern this relation - principles made necessary to mention simply because of the failure of some political realists to notice.

It is not enough, as some seem to think, to refer to facts - history, human nature, or objective rules of man's behaviour, in order to safeguard yourself, as an agent on the political scene, or as an analyst of political behaviour, from making blunders and wrong choices. Reference to facts in general remains open to misinterpretation, and misapplications, once used as a positive tool, notwithstanding its negative value, i.e. to warn us against pure utopian rationalism. That is the case because the categories it refers to encompass a great wealth of facts that simply make dizzy, in the absence of further limiting principles, any one who attempts to deal with them in the context of any plan or hypothesis. One cannot help being selective. Some choices however are better than others.

Morgenthau offers three principles of selectivity;

1. Reason expressing itself in "a kind of rational outline, a map that suggests to us the possible meanings (p.5);
2. Power, as the "main signpost that helps realism to find its way through the landscape" of politics, (ibid) ; and
3. The "pluralistic conception of human nature" (p. 12).

All these criteria, however are so general that one's agreement or disagreement with them is of little value. They have to be judged in connection with the results of their application to specific problems and in the light of the kind of consequences they lead to.

Politics Among Nations claims that its version of political realism refers to more limiting criteria. In particular it endows the facts it ascertains with meaning through reason (pp.3-5). It orders them (p.3). It endeavors not only to understand the forces that determine political relations (p.14), but also to comprehend the ways those forces act upon each other and upon political institutions (ibid). It reflects, however imperfectly and one sidedly (p.4) the objective laws that govern politics and that have their roots

in human nature (ibid). Thus we find ourselves pushed back, against our wishes, to general notions which allow for multiple interpretation and hence support different and perhaps conflicting hypotheses.⁵⁰ This, coupled with the principle of selectivity to which Morgenthau is committed leaves the matter somehow hanging in the air.

Of course as a reactionary movement, i.e. as a revolution against utopianism or against indulging into purely abstract idle theorizing these general remarks are, as has been mentioned of great value. Here, however, their value stops. Much more work is needed for connecting these general notions with specific facts of experience in so specific a manner as to allow the derivation, if not of prediction, of suggestive points of guidance.

Another requirement that must be satisfied by any basic notion in a conceptual framework that claims reference, ultimate or immediate, to facts is a positive specific answer to the question: - What facts support it?

50. a. See discussions of illustration in Thompson's PRCWP, on progress on history, pp.8-11 and on "Human Nature," p. 11ff.

b. See also pp.39ff. above

Arguing against the separatists - those who claim a separate ethics - Butterfield denies the differences in kind that are presumed to govern the statesman's choice as distinguished from, say, the poets 'choice' or the businessman's.⁵¹

All the points Butterfield stresses in the quoted passage seem to be sound enough from the angle of this reconstruction of realism. They also go in harmony with its stands and conclusions. One reservation in connection with Providence is to be made. The logic of choices is the same for all who make them. The values of those choices differ with differences in the contexts. Butterfield is the Christians.¹ Nor would there be good reason to prevent

51. a. I don't see why in politics the virtues which I associate with the Christian religion should be suspended: humility, charity, self-judgement, and acceptance of the "problem^{handwritten} sets before one; also a disposition not to direct affairs as a sovereign will in the world but to make one's action a form of cooperation with Providence." Quoted by Thompson, PRCWP, pp.138-139.

b. So does Wolfers.
 "The fundamental discrepancy which seems to exist between the morality of "state" and private behaviour would disappear only if it could be shown that politics conducted in a multi-state system is not necessarily any more immoral than average private behavior, or that the chief difference pertains not to the degree of immorality prevailing in the two spheres of human action but to the circumstances under which men are required to act." Quoted by Hoffmann, p.274.

Butterfield from upholding the Christian virtues, in case he assumes a prominent political office. He could act from that perspective - of course taking the risks involved in his actions. He is also free to think and act on the assumption of cooperation with Providence. One methodological question arises in this context, however. How is this cooperation to be confirmed or disconfirmed by the facts, and what type of experience is relevant to it?

Butterfield himself does not have to answer this question. Most probably he is not committed to impartial empiricism. But Thompson is - or is he? Anyway he has to answer this question. And on the degree of compatibility between his answer and other crucial stands he takes depends the answer to the question of whether he contradicts himself or not. Trying to answer the former question, furthermore, will most probably make Thompson aware of the differences, and perhaps contradictions that exist among the opinions of those different men to whom he turns for enlightenment.

Whether he does or not, however, one principle of impartial empiricism, and political realism is committed

to methodological empiricism, is to refuse admission to meaningful knowledge of any notion unless it is clear of the specific factual circumstances which confirm or disconfirm it.

The value of this principle may be made clearer by raising the following question: How is it possible on Butterfield's grounds to settle a dispute between two opposing claims both of which insists that it is taken on the assumption of "cooperating with Providence?" Nor is this merely a hypothetical case, History abounds with such bloody fights.

A very significant question arises in the context of this suggestion to sift Butterfield's major points. If we have any sceptical doubts, even if they were merely methodological, concerning Butterfield's "Providence", can we at the same time hold, as we do, the soundness of his other virtues? Our answer to this question is a positive one. The defence of it, however, must await another occasion.

What holds true of "Providence" holds equally true of Butterfield's "higher law," and "international order as

the ultimate relevant objective standard against which national interests must be measured (p.139). This remark of ours holds true of these notions, only if they are meant to describe objective hard facts of the world. They will not be seriously affected by it if they are meant to play the roles of posited goals, or postulated values, or ideals that are meant to help man, orient his behaviour. Nor do they need to be stubborn realities or hard facts to play this important role. Even as fictions they may serve these purposes provided that they possess the kind of charm that appeals to the imagination of dedicated and energetic people in such a way as to release their energetic dedicated actions!

Thirdly, it is a mistake to confuse an empirical practical question and a purely theoretical one, though in daily behaviour they are usually integrated, especially in mature behaviour.

Usually when the system on the level of pure theory does not prove to be consistent its application to experience and worldly facts is a methodological mistake, though it might very well be useful. On the other hand, its being's

consistent with itself does not necessarily guarantee its application to facts. And of many consistent systems that apply to facts some are better, in the sense of having more explanatory or predictive power, than others.

It follows that one can criticise a conceptual framework on more than one level. In the first place on the level of pure theory. In the second place on the level of pure fact, or better still, by references to facts. In the third place by reference to the possibility of its application - i.e. by reference to the relationships it justifies or rules out between theoretical constructs on the one hand and the brute necessities and bitter facts on the other. It goes without saying that traditional realism stands in need of many improvements on all three levels.

CHAPTER II

POLITICS

In its descriptive sense, "politics" refers to what politicians qua politicians do.¹ This formulation stands in need of many obvious qualifications and limitations. Methodologically, however, this process of narrowing down a very large area of investigation is tedious and difficult. Our purpose of delimiting politics could be equally, and perhaps even better served, if we started from the center, and as we feel it necessary, enlarge the area of the circle as the nature of ^{the} case requires.

It may very well be the case that there is no such single center. In this case our problem will be to include

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1. a) "The part played by the President in the United States of America changes with the individuals who hold that office", R. Aron "Conflict and War" rept. in Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 200. - 93, 100, 171
 - b) See also p. 53 above and pp. 51, 52 below.
 - c) "It is sufficient to instance two statesmen whose beliefs were saturated with conceptions of Natural Law, and whose politics were grounded on its traditions, Gladstone in 19th century England, and Franklin Roosevelt in 20th century America; nor is it any accident that each of these men in his generation had a moral ascendancy and a power over the public opinion of the world, evolving a trust and loyalty far beyond his own country, which was unapproached by any other contemporary political figure.... This is not to say that Gladstone and Roosevelt were not assiduous, subtle and farsighted power-politicians. But their politics had overtones that are absent from the politics of a Theodore Roosevelt or

all such points of gravity as pretend to be the center around which political behavior revolves. Exclusion of any such factor would be an unforgivable crime - a sin against the spirit and the letter of one basic¹ principle of methodological realism. X

Suppose we will be able to delimit the area, and to include in it all the basic factors around which political behavior revolves - and these enterprises it must be noticed will always be temporary, somewhat relative, and hence subject to further readjustment, reshuffling and rearrangement² - suppose we say, we succeed in performing these tasks, do our problems end? Of course not. We should further handle the questions of relative importance of each. Otherwise we may fall into the mistake of misplaced emphasis. Avoiding this danger, however, should not make us forget that the

a Cecil Rhodes, a Lloyd George or a Clemenceau, a Bismark or a Cavour. When we consider the foreign policies of the latter we think in terms of patriotism, of grandeur of conception, of brilliance, of virtuosity, above all of success or failure." Martin Wight "Power Politics" rept. in Snyder and Wilson, Roots of Political Behavior, p. 139.

1. See p. 4 and pp. 15³⁹ above.

2. Implied in this approach the rejection of the claim of politics to autonomy as a prerequisite to the study of political behavior. Both Morgenthau's PAN, p. 12 and S. Hoffmann's CTIR, pp. 1-4 seem to uphold this claim. We do, on the other hand, sincerely believe that the determination of the area of politics is more the result of a responsible methodology than a prerequisite of the study and analysis of politics.

Though we grant E. H. Carr his point that the state "covers a far larger field of human activities, and demands from the individual a far more intense loyalty and far graver

relative value of each of the central notions of politics is an empirical question which will vary with the circumstances. Hence to settle it a priori or to legislate concerning it would be simply commuting methodological blunders.

What is then the basic feature of political behavior - the feature that is so universal and essential that we cannot locate any political behavior without also finding it? It may turn out to be the case that such a question is a mistaken one. On further analysis we may not be able to identify such an "essential and universal feature." If this turns out to be the result of our investigation, we shall have to abandon the question. Even if we abandon it later on, which might very likely be the case, it is helpful to start with it. To put the same idea differently, our starting point should not necessarily commit us a priori to any definite stand, explicitly or by implication, concerning the nature of politics.

Traditional political realists, whose modern formulation find its most courageous and ambitious expression in Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, answers our tentative question as follows:

"Politics is of necessity power politics" (p. 29), again

sacrifices, (The Twenty Years Crisis in Hoffmann's, p. 265) yet we do not have to accept his conclusion, namely that the state enjoys a morality that is different in kind not merely in degree from that of the individual (See ibid, p. 255). That the difference is only of degree is easily admitted. Also it is easily explained.

"The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power Without such a concept a theory of politics, international or domestic, would be altogether impossible, for without it we could not distinguish between political and non-political facts, nor could we bring at least a measure of systematic order to the political sphere." (Ibid, p. 5).

It is only fair, even before making any comments on those passages,¹ to ask: What does power exactly mean in the context of Politics Among Nations? In particular, what does it mean with reference to its twin notion, interest?

The passage just quoted suggests two points:

1) That because we define "interest" in terms of "power", the two notions are not to be confounded; though there might be, for all we know, a very close relationship between them.

2) Consequently, "power" is more basic or fundamental than interest.

Sometimes, however, Morgenthau talks of "interest defined as power" (Ibid., pp. 5 and 11). This language

1. If the nineteenth century was lead to the depreciation of power politics it is because the philosophy of that century "came to identify the opposition to aristocratic politics with hostility to any kind of politics.... Therefore, politics in its aristocratic - that is open and evident form was, identified with politics as such. The struggle then for political power appeared to be only a historic accident....",/PAN, p. 32.

spells suspicion, if carefully scrutinized, in both points suggested by the quotation just analyzed.

It is possible to get out of the difficulty by claiming that "interest" and "power", stand for two sides of the same coin. The one, "interest", is the subjective side of the coin, the motive attitudinal side; and the other, "power," the objective, factual side.¹

Since we shall admit these two notions as fundamental in the sphere of political activity, it is more compatible with common sense to distinguish between them. That both of them influence political activity in some way and measure or other, depending on the circumstances, is an obvious fact that needs no further elaboration.

That either or both legitimately delimit the sphere of politics is a questionable claim. In the first place, we shall see that other basic notions are equally entitled to play that role. In the second place, it is more the methodology deciding on intelligible questions and on problems that can be responsibly handled that delimits the sphere of politics than it is a notion or set of notions. We can delimit only what falls within our knowledge and our

1. Morgenthau's analysis of the "National Interest" (Reprint in S. Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 73 ff.) into "two elements, one that is logically required and in that sense necessary, and one that is variable and determined by circumstances," p. 73 "... the foreign policies of all nations must necessarily refer to their survival as their minimum requirements. Thus all nations do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations." (Ibid., p. 74); spells doubt in this interpretation.

reach to handle responsibly.

Morgenthau gives the impression that the function power plays in political actions is threefold. It is not clear, however, whether he does distinguish the one from the others^{of} between these three functions.

In the first place, power is something like the cause of action. Drive for power or aspiration for power lies at the basis of political action. "Politics is a system of checks and balances among opposing and conflicting interests." (p. 4).

That aspiration for power may be sometimes a cause of political power cannot be denied by any sensible man. But the claim that it is the only cause lying behind political behavior could be very easily destroyed.

Morgenthau himself refers to two instances, historic ones, where the cause of political behavior was a different consideration than power. In the one it was a legal consideration, in the other a moral one. These instances¹ bear very heavily on the theme of reconstructing political realism.

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1. "In 1939 the Soviet Union attacked Finland. This action confronted France and Great Britain with two issues, one legal, the other political.... France and Great Britain... saw to it that the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations, and they were prevented from joining Finland in the war against the Soviet Union only by Sweden's refusal to allow their troops to pass through Swedish territory to Finland....
- "The policy of France and Great Britain was a classic example of legalism in that they allowed the answer to the legal question... to determine their political actions. Instead of asking both questions, that of law and that of power, they asked only the question of law; and the answer they received could have no bearing on the issue that their

Nor could a realist who commits himself to paying due attention to history ignore such instances.

Another source of "causes" influencing political behavior springs from considerations of human nature. It is true that we know many things about human nature;⁷ but it is also true that we are puzzled by many of its aspects. Some of the things we know are irrational.⁸ Emotions, prejudices, complexes of all sorts affect human behavior, the political behavior included, in more than one way. Any theory of politics that eliminates, arbitrarily, references to such irrational factors as cause of political behavior, will have, sooner or later, to fail.

very existence might have depended upon.

"The other example illustrates the 'moralistic approach'... It concerns the international status of the Communist government of China. The rise of that government confronted the Western world with two issues; one moral, the other political... answering the political question in terms of the moral issues was indeed a classic example of the moralistic approach..." PAN, pp. 11-12.

7. Morgenthau refers, in his "Another Great Debate" to products of man's imagination. "What challenges the national interest here is a mere pigment of the imagination, a product of wishful thinking, which is postulated as a valid norm for international conduct, without being valid either there or anywhere else. At this point we touch the core of the present controversy between utopianism and realism in internal affairs." Nor does the fact that they are mere pigments of the imagination destroy their effects on political behavior. (Rep. in Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 78.
8. a) "The same idea might again be expressed as follows: in the course of history, there have been few great powers who have been able or willing to call a halt. The attitudes of the peoples, the passions of the masses, the political system, and population pressure have exerted their influence on the conduct of foreign affairs." R.Aron,

This argument is made even stronger by paying due respect to the unknowns of human nature, unknowns which may very well influence political conduct in such ways that will baffle any theorist who deliberately shuts them off.

Power alone cannot therefore be the only cause of political actions. Even fictions or figments of the imagination can play that role. What is important is the control of their effects.

Power serves also as an aim or goal. Politics is a struggle for power. "Whatever the ultimate aims of politics, power is always the immediate aim." (p. 25)

The distinction between "ultimate" and "immediate" aims is a practically useful, distinction. For creatures like us only of limited power, and more often than not of high aspirations and lofty plans, this distinction is a

"Conflict and War" rep. in Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 199.

- b) "Fortunately logic is not life and man is not intellect alone. And whilst those same men whose critical faculty is warped are the men **of** passion and imagination, in the life of society the intellect plays a very small part, and with very little exaggeration it may be said that things go their way independent of our actings." Grace, The Historic Materialism of Karl Marx, p. 106 quoted by W.Y. Elliot, The PRAP, p. 25.
- c) "A government retains its sway over a great number of citizens far less by the voluntary and rational consent of the multitude than by that instinctive, and to a certain extent involuntary, agreement which results from similarity of feelings and resemblances of opinion.... Society can exist only when a great number of men consider a great number of things under the same aspect, when they hold the same opinions upon many subjects, and the same occurrences suggest the same thoughts and impressions to

practical necessity. Seldom can one live without recourse to it at one time or another. But in this context of political realism, it seems to be forced in more as a rationalization than as a sign of practical wisdom. Morgenthau invites it in in order to fence off his notion of power. But it is an obvious fact of man's experience that he does not always aim for power. Nor is there any good reason to believe that man's political experience is essentially different in this respect. What is exactly the aim of any action, political or otherwise, is an empirical question which, if truth is what is asked for, can be settled only upon the investigation into the relevant facts. Past experience teaches that these aims could vary from extreme rationality to extreme irrationality. We do not know in advance, what would be the aim of the actors on the political scene. Hence to say that it is always this or that would lead us into committing the fallacy of oversimplification.

This fallacy has two dimensions. The one is to choose, out of many elements only one as an aim. This is the one factor reductionist fallacy. It is this kind of fallacy that is committed by any theory of politics that commits itself to one factor and only one as being always the aim, immediate or ultimate of political action. Insistence on

to their minds." Alexis de Tocqueville, quoted by Snyder and Wilson in Roots of Political Behavior, p. 553.

"power" or "influence" is only an instance of this mistake.

The second dimension of this fallacy is the fact that it conceives of aim as a simple element at a time when it is usually, especially in politics, a very complex one. X

An excellent illustration of this complexity of political aims is represented by Mr. Kenneth W. Thompson in Political Realism and the Crisis of World politics. American foreign policy has been faced with the multiple problem of keeping a kind of harmony between principle and necessity, of choosing simultaneously a wise foreign policy and rallying a people in support of it, of solving the tensions that arise, due to different institutions and different philosophies, between the U.S.A. and the U.K. and avoiding both moralism and scepticism in practice.

What is true of the United States in this respect is also true of other nations.⁹ It holds true also in internal politics as well as in foreign relations.

Therefore just as it is wrong¹⁰ to limit the ^{cases} aims of

9. "The Soviet threat, ... is a combined military and political threat...." George Kenman, RAW., p. 64.

10. For complexity of aims see also Foreign Policy, International Relations, Khouri's, p. One dangerous consequence of this mistake is that it makes its supporters tend to neglect to discuss ends adequately. This is one of the eddities of realism as Hoffmann sees it, PTIR, p. 32. This is especially dangerous in an age, like ours, when emphasis on ends cannot be overemphasized. Ibid., p. 34 (Also H. A.

political behavior to one and only one cause it is equally wrong to limit the aims of political behavior to one and only one aim. Multiplicity both of the causes and purposes of political, behavior squares better with the facts of life and history.¹¹

Kissinger, A World Restored).

"... This middle of the twentieth century may be witnessing the epoch-making shift in the foundation of international politics from the nationalistic balance of power to ideology, evidence of which we shall ignore at our peril." "Ideology and Foreign Policy" from "Ideology or Balance of Power" by W.G. Carleton, Rept. in Snyder and Wilson's R.P.B., p. 552.

- 11.a) "Catlin professes theoretical indifference to ends; yet the end of political action implicit in his analysis is individual freedom in an integrated society balancing liberty with authority." G. Lieka, International Equilibrium, rept. Hoffmann's C.T.I.R., p. 137.
- b) "There are many approaches and intermediate objectives under different names and symbols; the ultimate goal remains the good life of individual men in free communities, great or small." Ibid., p. 148.
- c) "A great power always wants something else and something more than security and power, it wants an Idea, in the broadest meaning of the term." R. Aron, "The Q.P.F.A." rept. in Hoffmann's Ibid., p. 87.
- d) "But in the twentieth century, a great power weakens itself if it refuses to serve an idea." Ibid., p. 91.
- e) "Dominant powers have wielded sometimes an international ideology as their most potent weapon - as the Hapsburg powers were the protagonists of the Counter Reformation, as Napoleonic France was the carrier of the French Revolution throughout feudal Europe, as Britain in the nineteenth century was the champion of liberalism in the same way Russia in the twentieth century has represented the ideal of socialism." M. Wight "Power Politics" rept. in S.T. Wilson's R.P.B.F., p. 138.

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These considerations bear equal weight on the notion of power as means of expressing some cause or helping attain some end. "The Crusaders... Woodrow Wilson.... The National Socialists... since they all chose power to achieve these ends they were actors on the scene of international politics," (p.26) according to Morgenthau. It must be obvious by now that these actors on the political scene would still keep their roles, more^{or}less modified of course, even if they used other means.

It must be granted, however, that power is more of an instrumental¹² notion than it is of a final ultimate goal! Or is it? To be true to our methodology we have to admit that it changes with the persons concerned - the decision makers. Also we must notice that its role has been depreciated at one time in history.

The phrase "other means" than power loses much of its

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12. a) "Also it is dangerous to put in a key position a concept which is merely instrumental. Power is a means toward any **of** a large number of ends (including power itself)" Hoffmann's CTIR, p. 31.
- b) "Power is usually less an end than a means; glory or an idea justify power, which otherwise would be either the instrument of security or the instrument of tyranny." R. Aron "The Quest for a Philosophy of Foreign Affairs." rept. in Hoffmann's p. 87.
- c) "Power is merely the means toward the integration of central values such as safety, well being, and respect" G. Liska, International Equilibrium. Liska seems to be here quoting with approval, Harold D. Lasswell. Rept. Hoffmann's p. 137.

significance in the context of political realism as formulated by Morgenthau. This is the case because his conception of power is so wide that it encompasses many other elements we prefer to dissociate from it. We shall try to show that his conception of power needs serious trimmings. Before this, however, let us discover how wide is the area it covers. The following passage may be of help:

"In view of this ubiquity of the struggle for power in all social relations and on all levels of social organization, is it surprising that ... politics is of necessity power politics?" (p. 28; p. 31)

We need read another passage on the meaning of power, in Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, and the ramifications and the consequences of the doctrine become easier to grasp.

"Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man" (Ibid, p.8)

It is still quite difficult to take a definite stand on this issue. Consider the following passages which bear directly on the problem at hand.

"When we speak of power in the context of this book, we have in mind not man's power over nature, or over an artistic medium, such as language, speech, sound or color, or over the means of production or consumption, or over himself in the sense of self-control. When we speak of power, we mean man's control over the minds and actions of other men. By political power we refer to the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the people at large" (Ibid . p. 26)

"Political power, however, must be distinguished from force in the sense of the actual exercise of physical violence" (p.27)

"Political power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised" (Ibid)

What does Morgenthau mean by those conceptions of "power"? Does he try by reference to them to delimit the political field? or is he trying, having delimited it, to characterize it further? If the latter

interpretation is the closer to his purpose, then a very serious charge is to be levelled at him immediately. In so widening his concept of power, and in making power the essence of politics, Morgenthau invites very serious troubles. A definition so wide as to include every conceivable manouver among people loses for that very reason its significance. For then one fails to distinguish what it covers from what it shuts off.

Does this lead us to the conclusion, held by some prominent thinkers¹³ that difference between politica, or stateways on the one hand and social mores, or folkways on the other is a question that is primarily arbitrary and hence varies with the circumstances of the case? Or, that some basic political activities i.e. choices, including statesmen's, are not, in any significant respect different from other choices made by man. If, on the other hand, the former interpretation is the one Morgenthau would like to submit to, then two comments force themselves upon us; one of them is theoretical the other is practical. (1) You can not define "politics" by reference to "politics" without leaving yourself open to the charge of offering a mere "circular" definition. (2) Try to delimit the political field relying on the criteria offered in these passages. If you are not lost, you only invite confusion.

¹³a. Weldon's THE VOCABULARY OF POLITICS, p.p. 49 - 50

b. Quoted in C.E. MERIAM'S, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY, p.p. 404 - 405

c. Butterfield's quoted in Thompson's PRCWP, p.p. 138 - 139

This is of particular interest to an endeavour that aims, relying on power, at "developing an autonomous political theory (p.12)* and an enterprise "to set politics as an independent sphere of action and understanding apart from other spheres, such as economics, ethics, aesthetics, or religion" (p.5)*. If "the drives to live, to propagate, and to dominate are common to all men" (p.30)*, and if "the tendency to dominate, in particular, is an element of all human associations, from the family through fraternal and professional associations and local political organizations, to the state" (p.31)*, how could one claim to distinguish by reference to the "tendency to dominate" between one sphere (politics) of human activity and others (ethics, say of economics)? The least of common sense guards us against such a blunder.

Power, as Morgenthau defines¹⁴ it, therefore, cannot be the distinctive characteristic of political behaviour; and hence fails to occupy the sole center of a satisfactory political theory - if such a theory is every possible. To try to delimit the field of political behaviour by reference to a notion or to a set of notions is, we think, an unsatisfactory approach. A definite method has a greater role to play in this enterprise.

¹⁴"We must note the significance of the fact that the phrase "power politics" in common usage means, not just the relations between independent powers, but something more sinister. It is indeed a translation of the German word Macht Politik, which means the politics of force - the conduct of international relations by force or the threat of force without consideration of right and justice" Martin Wright "Power Politics" Rept. in Roots of Political Behaviour p. 137.

* Morgenthau, H. PAN

This does not mean, however, that power, or even force, has nothing to do with politics. Far from it. As George F. Kennan has noticed "force is" and perhaps "always will be, an indispensable ingredient in human affairs"¹⁵. It is realism to recognize that it does enter into political considerations. It is equally realistic to admit its limitations - the limitations which determine its proper function. These limitations, it is only proper to intimate, have to be significantly different from what Morgenthau can admit.

This conclusion is made the more valid by the fact that power is self defeating. Morgenthau, to his credit, recognizes this fact.

"... power is a crude and unreliable method of limiting the aspirations for power on the international scene ... "

"Actually ..., the very threat of such a world where power reigns not only supreme, but without rival, engenders that revolt against power which is as universal as the aspiration for power itself" (p.p. 82 and 205)*

Not only does frank aspiration for power lead to waste. It actually invites its own destruction.

"But in the long run philosophies and political systems that have made the lust and the struggle for power their mainstays have proved impotent and self destructive" (p. 206)*

Power drives would either "tear society apart" (Ibid) or else "deliver the life and happiness of the weak to the arbitrary will of those in power" (Ibid). Had it not been for some limitations (law, mores, morality) power would disrupt society and enslave the individual.

Russell's distinction between "naked power" and "tamed power" might help us out of the difficulty. But its help is more apparent than real, unless we admit the real impact of the taming elements. To grant them only the role of mere ideologies is to pay them only lip service.

15. G. Kannan, Russia, the Atom & the West, p. 58

*Morgenthau, PAN

What is the proper function of power in a satisfactory political theory? In case we are convinced of the impossibility, under our present conditions of knowledge, of the latter, what is the proper function of power in a satisfactory conceptual framework of political behaviour? What, to put the question in different words, does significantly limit power? These are questions among others that suggest themselves to the minds of responsible people for careful consideration. Morgenthau can claim the credit, if not of having initiated them, or, as we suggested, of according them due influence, at least of pushing them to the forefront of the modern political scene.

Already we have suggested the differentiation between power and interest. If this is done, at least for the sake of the clarity of analysis, it follows that interest would be the first limiting factor on power in political behaviour. It is true that interest and power could usually claim harmonious relationship of variations - the one increases as the other increases and vice versa. But it is also true that under some circumstances, the relationship between these two factors varies inversely. In such circumstances each will have to play the role of a controlling factor on the other - of course in the context of a reasonably balanced realistic attitude.

Interest is not, however, without methodological disadvantages. In the first place, it is more or less agreed that it is an "ambiguous"¹⁶ notion. In the second, even when it is clear, it is generally held to

16. R. Aron, "Q.P.F.A." Rept. in Hoffmann's CTIR p. 85

be closely connected with ideologies. As R. Aron says: "For most of the nations of the world, the national interest can no longer be defined apart from ideological preferences¹⁷. When it is not completely irrational, furthermore it could be also moral, or "sometimes more moral than the crusading spirit"¹⁸.

Another class of irrational elements must be admitted as influencing political behaviour, and hence as limiting the other factors. We will do well to divide this class into two categories - the unknowns, and the more or less knowns.

Of the unknowns we can say very little indeed. That they do exist is becoming more and more an accepted fact. Any way we can not legitimately deny the possibility of their existence, and be true to our methodological commitments.

The significance of our reference to them is more of a negative kind - we should not be surprised if, and whenever, they crop up to upset our planned actions or our neat theories if neat they can be. None does this, or any other consideration allow us to ignore them. Morgenthau eliminates them in the name of rationality. But this is certainly being unrealistic especially, if they happen to influence, as they sometimes certainly do, political behaviour. Here we put our finger on a serious clash of Morgenthau's - the claim to rationality and the claim to empiricism, both of which are of the basic pillars of his

17. Ibid, p. 88

18. Ibid.

realism. Nor is the presumption " that a statesman always acts in a rational manner" (PAN p.5) born out by experience.

They constitute, on the positive side the frontiers of our directed research - if ever we do care to take positive steps along that progressive line.

Our chances are a bit better with the psychological complexes, religious prejudices, social needs, economic wants, artistic desires or lack of them - which may one way or another push us or pull us in unnoticed or even noticed directions.

To what extent our willful commitment and/or wishful thinking interreacts with these irrational variables we do not know. Nor do we know to what extent our rational thinking, legal training, and moral precepts are able to tame them.

These are some of the basic reasons which drive "political opinions" closer to conjectures, guesses, or better still to "intuitions" than to calculated predictions.

Yet hard and recalcitrant as they are, still they are facts, bitter^d may be, which no political analysis can ignore, without endangering its claims to successful application. Certainly no commonsensical realism can neglect these considerations.

Before we get ourselves involved in the discussion of the rational group of limiting considerations we have to refer to economic conditions.

It is common knowledge in this century that economic considerations play an important role in the integration of society. Hence they cannot

fail to influence political behaviour¹⁹.

Another factor that is likely to limit power and interest²⁰ in the workings of men in the political field is reason.

Moregenthaus's reference to consensus (PAN p.200) implies a tribute, though not very honorific, to reason. His recourse to "ideologies" (Ibid, p.p. 13 & 82) is another tribute to the same.

Of course it is very important to notice two uses of the term ideologies. In the one use it refers to philosophic, political and moral convictions. In the other to the "more or less conscious deceptions and disguises of human interest groups"²¹

Though the recognition of the difference between these two uses is of great importance from the methodological point of view, in connection with the point at issue it is of no significant consequence.

19. "From another point of view, efforts can and should be made to discover how far the economic system, and, more precisely, those in charge of the economy, influence the conduct of diplomacy" R.Aron "C & W" in Hoffman's op. cit. p. 203

"Alexander Hamilton and many other wise men have believed that economic power alone is basic in politics. Power over a man's pocket-book, Hamilton wrote in the Federalist, amounts to control over his will. Madison, too, although at odds with Hamilton on many points, agrees that "the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property". Some of the greatest names in the literature of politics, Aristotle, Machiavelli, Harrington, Burke, Marx, and others testify to the deep impress of economics on politics" A.T. Mason "Politics: Art or Science?" in RPB, p. 116 by Snyder & Wilson.

20. "... the theoreticians of the national interest are right in warning us against a tendency to let ourselves be carried away by blind ideological fury" R. Aron "QPFA" in Hoffman's op.cit. p. 88.

"Despite the continued strength of national sentiment in all parts of the world, there is no reason to assume that people value national benefits only" A. Wolfers "SMC" in Hoffmann's, op. cit. p. 285

21. ~~Karl Mannheim, quoted by Hergenthaus's PAN p. 80, note.~~

See P. 24 above note 7.

Ideologies in both of these senses do limit power and interest as basic drives in political behaviour.

Over emphasising the influence of reason as a guide in politics however is a normal mistake against the spread of which political realism can exert a healthy pressure. As J. L. Brierly says, abstract principles in politics are dangerous guides²². One can safely enlarge the valid applicability of this saying to include other spheres than the political of man's behaviour. But we must always remember that abstract principles, though they may be dangerous, are nonetheless guides. In the form of ideologies these principles exert a much more noticeable influence.²³

22. J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, Oxford, 1949, p. 104

Theory must be judged not by some preconceived principles or concepts unrelated to reality. Morgenthau's PAN, p. 3.

23. "However, it would be a mistake to come to the conclusion that because ideology has not played the leading part in historic international relations it has played no part at all. It has played its part, an important part. Where national interests and dominant ideology within the nation coincide, a national war can be made to appear an ideological one, morale can be strengthened, and enthusiasm intensified The results of international wars seem to have been more significant in their national and balance of power aspect than in their ideological aspect. The Grand Alliance against Napoleonic France checked France and saved the European balance of power but did not succeed in arresting the spread of revolutionary ideas" William Carleton "Ideology and Foreign Policy" from "Ideology or Balance of Power" in Snyder & Wilson's RFB pp 547 - 548.

Again Morgenthau's references to good conscience (PAN p.p. 82, 86, and 230); to consensus (p.200); to "a normative element" (Ibid p. 7) in the autonomous political sphere; and to a "political ethics" (Ibid p. 9), are tributes, though much less than what morality deserves, to it. A more honorific, though somewhat confused homage to it is given by Thomson. (PRCWP p. 135).

Political ethics²⁴ is "an ethics that judges action by its political consequences" (Morgenthau's op.cit. p.9), an ethics which makes "prudence" a "supreme virtue". This makes of morality the hand-maiden of politics. This remains true inspite of the impression created by other passages (especially page 9) of the same book.

Another way of expressing the same point is to say that the rational in the politics of Politics Among Nations is identified with "the good" and the "successful" (pp 7 & 9).

Perhaps Morgenthau's over concern with the notion of an autonomous sphere of politics, the corollary principle to the pluralistic conception of man, led him to this identification. But if this identification is a mistake, our knowing of the motives that led to it would not change its nature. It would still be a mistake even with the best, most moral, highly justified motives behind it.

24. Even as an ideology in the weak sense, it must be remembered, ethics would still serve a purpose - though a negative one. As Julien Benda, the French philosopher says: "mankind has always betrayed its obligations, but so long as it continues to acknowledge and believe in them, the crack is kept open through which civilization can creep". Quoted in Snyder & Wilson, op. cit. p. 140.

The mistake here lies in attempting to pass an a priori judgement on a question of fact. It may occur sometimes that some actions turn out to be rational, good, and successful. But these have to be standied and judged on their own merits not a priori. As a matter of fact the distinction between a statesman and a politician will have to have recourse to such a criterion - the principle insisting on success in the light of rational, legal, and moral considerations. But in the world in which we live, in the context of the frailty of the human nature and its lack of omnipotent power over the affairs of political relevance, and in the complexity of political necessities, such a combination of principles is very rarely satisfied. That explains perhaps why we have very few statesmen.

Also in the historical setting, even if we assume its validity, that identification²⁵ proves to be only applicable in periods when the human race agrees about their overall values.

Be that as it may, admission of moral principles on a par with others - rational principles, legal rules, and even irrational factors - as functioning in such a way as both to influence political behaviour and to limit the motive to power or the struggle of interests is all that we are concerned with at the moment. Re - establishing a balance between these considerations - in the sense of granting them all the theoretical right of being considered, on a par, in the context of analysing and understanding political behaviour is one of the major aims of this reconstruction of political realism.

With this however our positive troubles begin. These however, will prove to be methodological ones.

25. "The idea that the national interest carries its own morality is also one which makes sense almost only in a stable period" i.e. a period of "international consensus". Hoffmann's op.cit. p.33.

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Law is another limiting factor of man's political behaviour. Sanctity of treaties is one of many expressions of international law. Its corollary is the observance of good faith between states.

This, however, must be rooted in the dynamics of the changing circumstances, must pay attention to the known traits of human nature, and to the power elements, among others, of the parties concerned.

Otherwise, "if international law insists too rigidly on the binding force of treaties, it will merely defeat its own purpose by encouraging their violation".

"Every system of law has to steer a course between the two dangers of impairing the obligations of good faith by interfering with contractual engagements, and of enforcing oppressive or obsolete contracts"²⁷.

It is true that there are many instances which show that states irrespective of whether or not they have moral claims to have the obligations of a treaty revised, and in spite of having good reason to believe it unlikely to be able to secure that revision by action within the law, did nevertheless revoke treaties. What is more serious for the point at issue is that some of these "revokings" were condoned.

If this means anything, it means that extreme legalism is self-defeating. On the other hand it does not support the view that law is a mere ideological disguise for "power expressing interest". Percy E. Corbett concludes his realistic study of Law in Diplomacy by the following statement:

"Our study has shown no slackening in the tendency of governments to formulate their mutual relations in terms of law. It has shown considerable progress in the regulation of details involved in those relations and some advances towards acceptance and improvement of

27. J.L. Brierly op.cit. p. 241

"peaceful modes of settling disputes....

"In so far as law operates among states, it is a law of excessive flexibility - a flexibility not mercifully administered by impartial authority in the general interest, but a flexibility at the service of the subjectively defined interest of each state...

"The more systematic study of diplomacy casts no doubt upon the practice of invoking alleged legal rules"²⁸.

Also Prof. A. Nussbaum, after referring to the events of World War I that are relevant to the law of nations concludes by the following:

"Without entering into the moot question to what extent the one or the other of the aformentioned measurers were justifiable under international law, it should be stated that international law was by no means abandoned altogether." Barring minor incidents, not only were the inviolability of envoys and generally the diplomatic immunities respected, but on the whole international law still served the neutral states as a guide and as an accepted justification of their policies. Violations were frequent ... ; mistakes were often in the nature of isolated facts. Undoubtedly international law enjoyed then a much higher respect than in World War II, although in the latter even Hitler government prior to its last months of agony observed in a measure its obligations under the Geneva Red Cross convention and, as far as prisoners of war were concerned, under the Hague Convention"²⁹ (underlining mine).

Consequences:

The results of this reshuffling of the basic concepts of the political realism of Politics Among Nations are worth noting. Already we have referred to the reassigned role of morality.

Another significant consequence relates to the conception of the nature of politics and diplomacy, When power is the immediate goal, and political success the main objective of political actions, "the actor on the political scene cannot help playing an act by concealing the true nature of his political

28. P.E. Corbett, Law in Diplomacy, pp 24, 56-57, 75, 95, 190-191, 252 & 271

29. A. Nussbaum, Concise History of the Law of Nations (New York, 1947) p. 247

actions behind the mask of a political ideology (i.e. more or less conscious disguise of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interest)" (Morgenthau PAN pp 13, 80, 81, 205). This is to avoid the detrimental consequences of the frank admission of power.

Doesn't this throw a very cynical shade on the nature of politics? It makes of it a hypocritic, nasty game.

Two comments on this point invite themselves. A lie or a commonflage remains an effective device for guiding action so long as it is not known to the party whose actions it is meant to orient. Once it is known its effectiveness diminishes - if it does not disappear completely. In the light of this doesn't/^{it} seem naive to make known to all that particular aspect of politics?

Anyway we are better prepared to understand another principle of Morgenthau's realism. It "aims at the realization of the lesser evil rather than the absolute good" (Ibid, p.4). One can very easily grasp the harmony that exists between that conception of politics and such an aim. In such a context realism is bound to be "pessimistic".

But, and this is our second comment, it is very surprising to hear, in the framework of these concepts, what Prof. Morgenthau requires from a successful diplomat.³⁰ Morgenthau would have more consistently required from his diplomat to be rather a magician - or would he?

30. "The continuing success of diplomacy in preserving peace depends ... upon extraordinary moral and intellectual qualities that all the leading participants must possess". Morgenthau, H. Politics Among Nations, p. 534.

One of the advantages of this reconstruction of realism is to save Morgenthau's version from this inherent inconsistency. Morgenthau's conception of politics may have to cease to be so "unhappy" and his notion of its aim "so pessimistic". So much the better. Realism becomes then not only more consistent with itself but also with the facts.

Another consequence of this reconstruction is the creation of closer ties and relationships between realism and science.

Already we have referred to the possibility of regarding realism, in its expressive sense, as identical with the scientific attitude.

It must also be born in mind that the realists references to facts, to history, and to human nature, are tributes to this desideratum.

Some weak assumptions however, vitiated their views. One of these most dangerous assumptions is Morgenthau's conception of the pervasiveness of power. What are the circumstances, factual or imaginary, which he would accept as evidences that would, if correctly analysed, disprove or disconfirm this thesis of his?

If none is provided for, and this is expressive of Morgenthau's attitude towards the issue for all I know, then his is a mere analytic statement, a statement that is true by definition; and hence, it will always be true regardless. Political realism reduces itself in that case to an article of faith. Otherwise stated, it becomes an arbitrary way of looking at the wealth of man's experience in the field of politics. A shift, then is made here, from the descriptive sense of "Realism" to the expressive sense. Any one has the right to use realism in this latter sense if he wishes. But political realism is more than of a "rationalization" than of

a "rational theory".

This reconstruction distinguishes between the expressive and the descriptive senses of realism.

In neither of these senses is it pessimistic. In the latter sense it takes pride in being truly realistic. In the former, and to the extent to which it commits itself to serving ideals - truth, moral principles, legal procedures etc. - ; and to the extent to which politics is a normative behaviour, a behaviour the aim of which is to make the world in which we live a better world; and to the extent to which our determination and commitments of any influence on the course of events; to that extent it is committed to optimism.

This optimism must be very carefully distinguished from utopianism . It is committed not to progress, and hence does not necessarily need to take a definite view of progress; but to an attitude of working for it. Whether it succeeds in achieving it or not, and when it does, to what extent it will succeed, are questions that have to be judged on their own merits.

In such a world as we live in, it does expect disappointment and frustration. It does not always blame itself for failures. It considers itself responsible for the failures that lie within the scope of its knowledge, and action, and only when it does not do its best to prevent their occurrence. Altherwise it will have only to reconcile itself to their happenings.

Nor would it commit the methodological mistake of accusing other theories, for the simple reason of choosing another approach or for differently defining basic concepts, of being either mistaken³¹, or simply

31. Morgenthau, H. op.cit. p. 7, 11-12 and 32

exercising their ideological tricks.

It grants to everyone the freedom of choosing a different approach. This grant is the expression of the principle of methodological equality. Yet this grant carries with it the responsibility of explaining coherently, correctly, and without prejudice the complexities of the political behaviour.

Another responsibility, limiting the free choice of approach is the requirement that it should never lead to a dead lock in the settlement of disputes or disagreements. Within its context every disagreement must be, at least in principle, capable of being settled on the bases of settled principles and the relevant facts. Denial of such a possibility by any method is in effect, self forfeiting.

One other consequence of great significance, follows from this reconstruction of political realism - this is the synthesis³² in which it accommodates traditional realism, legalism, rationalism, and morality.

It offers a framework of concepts where all these theses find legitimate influence. It leaves it to the circumstances of each case, and these may vary always, to decide which one(s) of these theses find(s) predominant application - either in such a way as to keep a practical balance between all of them or to make it possible for one of them to overshadow the others partly or completely.

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32. Though this will keep/Morgenthau's claim, namely, "that the difference between the realism and other schools of political thought is not a mere figment of the imagination," (PAN, p. 4) "but is ~~not~~ real and profound" (Ibid, p.10), yet it makes a difference of temperament and orientation.

Though our reconstruction is a bit more flexible, from the methodological point of view at least, than the following passage suggests, it feels quite in harmony with its basic creeds.

"This study of the revolt against the rationalistic theories and the actual control of the constitutional state is aimed at supplying at least an approach to the central problems of contemporary political theory where they intimately affect political practice. It is devoted to an examination of the most important pragmatic political theories and of something at least of their economic and cultural contexts. It is undertaken with the conviction that facts can not be separated from ideas with any more fruitful results than attend the complete abstraction of ideas from facts. Its temper is pragmatic to the degree that it is willing to set all the problems of politics in their historical, their economic, and their cultural environments - instead of trying to work out a "Science of Politics" based on abstractions. It accepts man as a biological creature, functioning in a context of economic needs and at different stages or in different types of cultural development.

"But it insists against the extremists of the revolt against reason that there is a much neglected fact of a validity quite equal to the given of man's cultural, economic, biological, and geographical setting: the fact that he is a purposive animal, even in politics, endowed for his further perplexing with moral needs and a speculative reason. It insists further that facts are shaped and used as they are interpreted".³³

It has been said that politics is what politicians (or statesmen) qua politicians, make of it. Now we are in a position to elucidate this idea a bit more. The actor on the political scene, this reconstruction holds, has a definite role to play in case he chooses to fulfill it, in the orientation of the political process.* At least he can determine, with a degree of success, his own attitude towards the events and facts that face him at any juncture of his career. He may approach them with a sense of determination and a positive attitude or he may let things go as they drift on. Of course he may decide or want to do something significant about them and still fail. Merely to decide or want to do something is no garantee that that thing will

33. W. Y. Elliott, The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics, N.Y. 1928, p. 5

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be done successfully. Yet there is a difference, a big difference as a matter of fact, between trying and failing inspite of all efforts to succeed on the one hand, and just failing on the other.

In this sense at least the actors on the political scene are responsible for political decisions - or rather for what lies behind those decisions of mental attitudes. Positiveness is this attitude of being always prepared to face events with the determination of directing them along certain channels or blocking their way and preventing them from going contrary to what one judges fit.

Lack of it is one of the criteria that we use to distinguish between a statesman and a politician. ~~Deserved~~ success is one that is rooted in such a positiveness. It is true that even statesmen sometimes succeed simply by strokes of luck. But though this might happen once or twice in a life time it is very unlikely that it will happen frequently enough to claim to the credit of its beneficieries the title of statesmen.

This implies that positiveness, as a precondition of statesmanship, must be a habitual propensity and not a temporary characteristic of an attitude taken in the face of an unique occasion - though this latter has its own value.

Being positive, however, is only the first step along the road of statesmanship. If this be all that is required of a statesman, the distinction between him and any other ambitious day dreamer would be a very difficult methodological proposition. Much more is required of a statesman. Only ^a few elements of this "more" are pertinent to our discussion.

Success in his policies though always a desideratum of the statesman, is not, as such, the criterion of final judgement. It becomes such only if

it is achieved in harmony with the commitments of the statesman concerning ideologies, higher principles, and idealistic values. An actor on the political scene may choose to sacrifice one or more of these higher principles to achieve success pure and simple. But then he is only a politician in the dictionary of this reconstruction. To aim at achieving political success at the expense of higher principles and values and to claim at the same time the title of statesmanship is simply a contradiction.³⁴ He has the right of choosing any policy he likes. But any choice he makes commits him, ^{so} or it must, to certain un-avoidable consequences. One of these is the judgement of those who know and are qualified of his choices.

Any "theory" of politics that denies this freedom of choice to the actors on the political scene must be mistaken. The facts face it squarely in the face. Yet this "theory" must be equipped with the tools of judging these choices with the view of separating the meager ones from the more solid.

One other point follows directly from the foregoing. It is a mistake to identify the "successful" with the "rational". For it is possible that success comes as a result of a stroke of luck.

Nor could the "successful"³⁴ be identified with the "good" without leading to unhappy consequences. For we have to distinguish, as we do, between "good success" and "bad success". To fail to make this distinction is a shortcoming of any framework of concepts that aim at explaining or simplifying the understanding of man's behaviour, political behaviour included.

34. See p. 91 above.

Morgenthau, H. Scientific Man VS. Power Politics, p. 13.

Much as it hates to deceive others or to underestimate their efforts or claims, or throws suspicion about their intentions, our realism hates more to deceive itself. The human mind in its framework, is under obligation to look the truth of politics straight in the face. It does not have to disguise, distort, belittle or embellish the truth. Of course if some do these things, and some certainly used to and will always do them, they are entitled to it. It is their privilege; but, and this is the significant point, they will be judged by others, also within the framework of this reconstruction.

Finally, of the consequences of this reconstruction that deserve notice, is the fact that a "theory" of value, or at least a rough outline of a framework of value, is a prerequisite of a satisfactory "theory" of politics. Politics is usually normative³⁵.

35. "In the final analysis, then, it appears that the arms debate concerns, or should concern, a set of values - a system of morality" R.A. Levine "Facts & Morals in the Arms Debate" World Politics, Vol. XIV No. 2 p. 256.

"Thus we cannot assume that the problem of what the world ought to be and how states should morally behave is irrelevant." Hoffmann op.cit. p. 186.

"More and more it is coming to be appreciated that such moral preferences ... are an inescapable starting point for even the most strictly empirical enterprise in matters of national behaviour... The very words that are used - self-preservation, aggression, imperialism, national interest - are loaded with emotional connotations, moral judgment, and prescientific assumptions. There might never have been any study of how to outlaw and prevent "aggressive" war had it not been for the tacit assumption that any status quo is morally preferable to a resort to international violence. It would make no sense to say or assume that nations must seek power adequate for survival if high value were not placed on the existence of independent nations. No expectations regarding the conduct of nations can be formulated that are not affected by either the optimistic hunch of a Locke ... or the pessimistic hunch of a Hobbs... In this sense all students in the field, consciously or unconsciously, belong to schools of moral and philosophical thought." A.Wolfers, The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Affairs. Rept. in Hoffmann's op.cit. pp 244-245.

Especially successful both will be when they provide us with an intermediary³⁶ between absolutism and cynicism.

36. "Indeed if one wants to revive a political philosophy of international relations the two tasks I have just tried to sketch (Historical Sociology and Utopias) should be undertaken and continued together. For if one starts by positing certain values, totally a priori and in the abstract, one risks either getting stuck with well meaning platitudes or proceeding to purely "perfectionist ethics", which brush aside the problem of the difficult and dirty means to utopia. If one starts with a purely empirical study of contemporary world politics, one is in danger of becoming an addict of the kind of policy scientism which believes that what ought to be emerges from what is, or implies that one can decide what policy should be pursued without any previous decision as to what moral objectives should be pursued..."

"

"We must try to build relevant Utopias. By spelling out our views on the purposes, the prerequisites, the possibilities and the procedures of an ideal international order, we would accomplish a triple task. We would meet the requirement of clarifying our personal value positions. We would avoid the piecemeal engineering approach of policy scientism. We would avoid the twin escapisms of "realism" which gloomily assumes the inevitability of the customary, and of "idealism" which postulates an easy road to world progress". S. Hoffmann, op.cit. pp 188 and 189.

CHAPTER THREE

Values and Acts

"It is odd when one thinks of it that there are people in the world who, having renounced all the laws of God and nature, have themselves made laws which they rigorously obey. . . ."¹

Pascal

"Involving responsible choices, politics must be, at least for some actors on the political scene, essentially normative. A conceptual frame work of valuational principles therefore is indispensable for a system of concepts that claims to offer us a good chance of *ordering*, explaining, evaluating, and if possible controlling political actions.

In this chapter we shall deal successively with a general conceptual framework of evaluation, including reference to the minimum essentials of a value situation; with means and ends in connection of the problem of justification; with Weldon's attempt to avoid both absolutism and scepticism; and finally with a few comments on some stands taking by such authors as Pascal, J.L. Brierly, and Glanville Williams.

1. Quoted by A.P. D'Entreves in Natural Law Huchinson & Co., London, 1957.

General

Any act or object considered in isolation is neither good nor bad. Its goodness or badness depends on the context within which it occurs.²

2. Consider the following:
 - a. A young man **picks** up a stone and throws it. Nothing results.
 - b. He performs the same act again. But now the stone knocks down, by chance, three pieces of fruit off the man's own tree.
 - c. He repeats the same act again; but now he does it with the aim of knocking down the fruit. He does it successfully.
 - d. He performs the same act again. Now, by chance, the stone knocks down some fruit off a neighbour's apple tree.
 - e. He repeats the same act again. Now, intentionally, the fruit from the neighbour's apple-tree is knocked down.
 - f. He performs the act again. Now the stone hits, by chance, the neighbour's goat.
 - g. The same act performed intentionally, kills the neighbour's goat.
 - h. The same act, kills, by chance, the neighbour's child.
 - i. The same act, repeated intentionally, kills the neighbour's child.

The act itself bending down, picking up a stone, and through physiological processes in one's body and hand, throwing it is the same in all these different situations. But the value of the act is clearly not the same. In case "a", the act is completely innocent, and in case "b", (on the other hand), the value of the act depends, (on the relation of the result: the apples, to the man's psychological or rather physiological state. It makes a difference) for him at least, whether he likes apples or not, whether he is or is not hungry, and whether the apples are ripe or still green. In case "c", to the foregoing considerations the factor of rightness, fitness of the results (to the end) is added. Hence the

If this conviction is correct, it indicates that acts as such are neutral. Their value is a function of the role they play as components of a particular situation.

value of the act is either enhanced or diminished according as this fitness of the end expected to the end realized does or does not go together with the other factors and relations of the situation. Case "d" puts the act in a fresh light. Here the agent's customs and tradition embodying his concepts of stealing and of respect for the property of others enter into the situation and affect (or put-ting some weight on) the evaluation of the act. But since the result happened by chance in case "d", the ethical breach involved is less than that in the case of "e", where the result is intended. What is said about "d" and "e" may be repeated with a more intense tone about "f" and "g" respectively; and with still more emphasis in the case of "h" and "i". Here the doer's conscience, representing his value-charged tradition (if indeed it is value-charged) and respecting life in general and human life in particular, may impel him, perhaps to regret the goat's death but probably to feel very sorry for the child's death. If these cases are brought against the doer before a court, different judgments, i.e., different evaluations of the act, can be expected.

Examples can be multiplied indefinitely along this line.

The same story that has been told about acts may be repeated mutatis mutandis about objects. The focus of value, in short, is the situation rather than the object or the act. Only situations are in themselves good or bad. Their constituents are good or bad only to the extent to which they do or do not stand in harmonious relations to the other components of the situation in question. If this be granted, we must admit that C.I. Lewis is right in saying that no object is intrinsically good. Only occasions of experience are intrinsically good. But Lewis' doctrine of occasions of experience as we shall see, oversimplifies the structure of the valuational situation.

Our analysis thus far has made use of various concepts which must now be further examined and clarified. (The foregoing section overloads the cart. It pours out many overcharged concepts most of which require further analysis and clarification. These are best introduced in the light of the doctrine to be sketched hereafter.) Let us start with the distinction between an agent and an observer or judge.

This distinction implies no sharp dichotomy. It merely

asserts that to be an agent is to have a different function from that of an observer. These two functions do indeed overlap; the one may even be impossible without the other. Nevertheless, they are distinct. Seldom does the judge, (the observer, or the analyst) of a situation feel or realize the responsibility which an agent and participant in that situation realizes. An analyst is apt to look at the situation from a more objective standpoint; his judgment is therefore more liable to be correct. A judge may also be more aware of the responsibility involved in a situation than is the agent who is actually involved in it. But all this does not weaken my contention; rather, they support it. What is to be noted is that what the judge sees in a particular situation does not necessarily coincide with what the agent sees. The divergence may be less when agent and judge are the same person, but even here some residue of difference subsists between the two functions.

We must also consider the alleged distinction between the valuational and the non-valuational. The problem is to find a valid criterion for this distinction. Can it be found merely by means of an analysis of statements? (The suggestion

of shifting it, spells inconfidence in the method with which the problem is approached by modern thought). Such analysis, important as it is, can not of itself solve the problem. A glance at the literature of the problem, as we shall see in a moment, reveals the confusion and complexity of the results reached by exclusive reliance on statement analysis. I am not hereby repudiating analysis or minimizing its limited value, I am merely suggesting that it is more useful to focus one's attention on agents within experiential situations.

An agent, however, may be in a valuational situation without being aware of it. One measure of the level of civilization in a community may be the number of valuational situations which are taken for granted by the people of that community. Living in a house, having chairs, beds, mirrors, electrical gadgets, and what not, are becoming less and less valuational in significant areas of the world. The more man's attention is kept busy by new valuational situations the more the realized ones withdraw into the background. Hence their values are lost sight of. But in the history of mankind each of these withdrawn situations occupied, for a longer or shorter time, the focus of man's attention and the center of his field of vision. It is

perhaps silly, or trivial, to speak of washing one's hands and face in the morning as a valuational situation. But in the history of the individual, or of mankind, there may well have been a time when the establishment of that habit was a valuational situation either to the individual himself or to his parents. It may seem absurd to say that the statement "he walks" is valuational. But when these words are those of a mother reporting the behaviour of her 17-month old child to her neighbour, they become a valuational report about a valuational situation within which the mother is the person involved. Whether beginning to walk is or is not a valuational situation to the child it is a difficult question to answer. But for the mother, at that time, it certainly is.

Presuming the validity of this analysis, I can now venture the suggestion that every word, gesture, or statement, may be, within specified situational context, valuational. It is indeed difficult to prove this thesis positively. But to hold it seems to me to be not only justified but also plausible. It is at least possible to conceive of situations in which "X is round" and "X is six feet long" are valuational statements. But if this is true, Lewis is

wrong in holding that "X is round" is a prototype of a non-
valuational statement. This gives me another reason for
suspecting the statement analysis approach. In the frame-
work of that method the value theorist is at worst an
analyst of words or structure of sentences and at best
a judge of the situation which is reported by the proposi-
tion, (seldom if ever, an agent).

Our shift or approach, however, does not imply that
we neglect altogether the function of the judge or the
observer. A complete and sharp dichotomy between observer
and agent is quite impractical. No agent is purely agent.
Were this possible, he would no longer be an agent, but
a machine. Yet it makes a lot of difference from which
standpoint we look at the situation. From the standpoint
of an alert judge³ every situation, and hence every statement,
can be interpreted as valuational within the framework of a

3. Sometimes these judges are reformers, and hence
they posit ideals for human behaviour to try and
attain; and sometimes they are simply analysts
trying to find out what is implied in the behaviour
of mankind, and this is the point we have now in
mind when we speak of a judge.

particular set of circumstances. This conclusion is not drawn by those people who restrict themselves to an analysis of value statements. But, I take it, that the fact that this principle escaped their attention lies at the root of the unsatisfactoriness of both their approach and their conclusion.

To put our finger on historical examples and figures is to illustrate this charge in the best possible way. G.E.Moore,⁴

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4. Moore holds a different criterion for the distinction at issue. It is the criterion of "irreducibility." Non-natural properties, values (Moore, Philosophical Studies, p.259 & p. 273), are irreducible to non-value, i.e., to natural properties. In holding this criterion Moore rejects the validity of Ayer's. For Moore both the non-natural and the natural properties are verifiable. The latter by scientific method, the former by intuition. But, is intuitionism a method of verification? The intuitionists themselves believe it is. But a non-naturalistic quality does not disclose itself to non-intuitionists. Or if it does, he is blind to it; it remains for him a fictitious quality.

Again, is irreducibility a distinctive criterion of value-properties over against natural properties? To identify the good with a natural property is, Moore argues, to commit the Naturalistic Fallacy, (Principia Ethica, p.13). "The good is a "non-natural" (ibid.,p.14), non-descriptive (Philosophical Studies, p.274). Property existing outside of time (Principia,p.41). But even if we identify two simple natural properties one with the other the nature of the fallacy is the same (ibid.,p.14).

A.J. Ayer,⁵ and C.I. Lewis, agree that there is a "genuine" sharp dichotomy between the valuational and non-valuational. If my analysis of value situation, as I shall sketch it hereafter, is correct, then that dichotomy is challenged. We do not have value-less experiences. We do have experiences of more or less value. Let us examine, the conclusions of one of those who hold the opposite thesis.

Call it, if you like, with Frankena the definist fallacy (Mind, 1939). The name matters very little. It follows that we can't even reduce one natural property to another. But if this is the case, irreducibility, as a distinctive criterion, must lose its significance."

5. Ayer's criterion for distinguishing valuational from non-valuational statements is the criterion of "verifiability." No value statement, he argues, is verifiable, or indicative. In the first place, this is a conclusion which Ayer can hold only on the presumption of an irreducible dichotomy between value statements and non-value statements. (Prof. J.W. Smith., Ethics, vol. 57, p.282). But the validity of this dichotomy is the question at issue. In the second place, even if value statements are non-verifiable, this does not, on Ayer's grounds, constitute a distinctive characteristic of them, there being some non-value statements which are non-indicative as well. (ibid., p.283). It follows that the given criterion is not a satisfactory one.

It is interesting to note, however, that Ayer, while trying to prove the non-indicativeness of value statements, is himself involved in a valuational situation. And the value of that situation seems to be at least to extend beyond the mere "evincement of his own feeling" which he himself would doubtless claim.

Lewis, it seems to me, rejects Moore's criterion as unsatisfactory. If I am not misinterpreting them, there are three alternatives open to Moore's "good" in relation to Lewis system. The first one is complete rejection. "There is no room in Lewis' theory for "qualities which do not exist in time". (Lewis, A.K.V., p.393). If this alternative is ruled out, the good is either a value-quality, immediately apprehended and belongs to occasions of experience; or else it is resident in and belongs to objects. Moore's doctrine of intuition suggests the former alternative but his doctrine of objectivity of value, i.e., his realistic emphasis, ~~emphasis~~, which is implied even in his doctrine of intuitionism, points to the latter alternative. If the former alternative is accepted, there is nothing in the immediate experience of values as such which makes them different from other qualities such as round or red. Hence it is nonsensical to speak, on this ground alone, in terms of reducibility or non-reducibility of values. If, on the other hand, the latter alternative is chosen, then Moore's "good" corresponds to Lewis' "value-resident." If this is true, and if by reducibility is meant translatability, then value, in this sense, is certainly translatable. Theoretically, non-terminating judgements are translatable

into terminating ones.

If Lewis is justified in rejecting Moore's criterion does he himself offer in support of his "genuine" distinction between value propositions and non-value statements? The distinction of intrinsic and extrinsic, Lewis assures us, "does apply to values, but does not apply to other properties." (Lewis, Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. p.395).

Intrinsic value, Lewis says, is one directly apprehended and immediately experienced. But on this ground alone, it is nonsensical to speak of distinction between good and other qualities. As in Moore's case (see above) so in Lewis'. Both good and red are on the same level within occasions of experience. And if this is all there is to value, Lewis would be forced to accept Ayer's generalization that all value-propositions are unverifiable. (ibid., p. 461).

But Lewis does not stop at this stage. He connects what we immediately experience with qualities resident in object. There is a difference between the relation of value quality to value-resident and the relation between

an apparent natural quality and its real correspondent in the object. The former is the reverse of the latter. A thing is valuable according as it appears valuable; but a thing appears round according as it is round (ibid., p.381). Again, the former relation is more direct than the latter. (ibid., p.380), Realization of goodness in experience is constitutive of any genuine value which is to be found in objects. (ibid., p.388). "Apparent value, a possibility of some experience of value quality in connection with it, is of the essence." (ibid., p.382). But why is it that the expressive meaning of value terms is primary and ruling while their objective meaning is derivative from, and ruled by the former? (Ibid., Ap.381).

The answer to this question introduces us to the function of a person in Lewis' doctrine of the occasion of experience. A prototype of a value statement in Lewis' theory is "X is good for S" (ibid., p.533), where "S" stands for a subject. The goodness of good objects consists in the possibility of their leading to some realization of directly experienced goodness." (ibid., p.387). To bring some satisfaction to somebody at sometime is a primary requirement of a valuable object. "All value in objects

depends on a relation of them to actual or possible experience, and the possibilities of experience depend on the nature and capacities of the subject." (ibid., p. 532). Now, that a subject or person is an essential element in a value situation is a deep insight on the part of Lewis. But reference to a person alone, important and significant as it is, does not seem enough to constitute a distinctive criterion for distinguishing values from non-values and hence value statements from others. Lewis himself, as a matter of fact, conceives of situations where the statement "X is green to me" stands, with reference to that criterion, on the same footing as the statement "X is good to me." (ibid., p. 533). Under such conditions, the phrase "for the sake of a person," which lies at the root of Lewis' doctrine of "intrinsic-extrinsic" values, loses its significance and value.

Lewis destroys the balance of valuational situation by over-emphasizing the function of one of its essential elements (the subject) at the expense of the others¹. Not only does he reduce the function of the object in the occasion of value experience by making the objective meaning of value terms secondary to, and derivative from, their expressive meaning; he also dethrones the ideal and deprives it of its

function as a measure of confirmation. (ibid., p. 381). Indebted as it is to Lewis' general argument, this section is trying, nevertheless, to re-establish the balance of relations and functions of the basic and essential factors of value-situation. This constitutes one of the major implications of the thesis upon whose development we are embarking.

At the core of every value-situation lies an element of discord. And comparison is inevitable whenever there is discord. The sharper the discord the more poignant the comparison and resultant discontent.

Comparison and contrast are relative terms. They are available to conscious beings. Man is certainly capable of them. It makes little difference to the theme of this paper whether other living organisms possess this ability or not. Man, being conscious, does not blindly obey the laws of nature. Possibilities lure his imagination. Comparison and contrast become possible for him. Comparison and contrast are not limited to man's existing situation and the dreams of his imagination. One can compare his pattern of life with his neighbour's, or with another man's of a foreign land. He can compare his present state with his past state. Comparison and contrast can take place between what exists

with what did exist or will exist: between what is and what is not.

"We look before and after,
We pine for what is not."

Seldom does one pattern fit perfectly within the frame of another. Some element is lacking somewhere. Usually the lacking element belongs to the present existing state of the person comparing these patterns. When this is the case, some element of discontent enters the picture. This is a disturbing factor. One index to the tension it creates within the situation is the degree or the amount of claim the envisaged pattern has upon the person concerned. Another index to that tension is the extent to which man is able to realise the ideal pattern whose claim on him is recognized.

Man is not only a conscious being, but also an efficient creature. Man's dynamism and activity are as essential to the valuational situation as is his rationality. Man's rational relation to the ideal may be incorporated in his activity and effort for the realization of that ideal. When this happens action becomes purposive. Purposive action serves the function of a bridge between the ideal and the real. It is through purposive action

that the principle is related to the existing facts. If discord is the essence of the value situation, purposive action is the first and perhaps the last step also towards the resolution of that tension.

Concern, the distinguishing characteristic of the awareness of value situation, is the function of three variables: an ideal; a person; and an object.

The ideal is not necessarily a Platonic Idea. Nor must it be a Hartmannian Essence. It does not need to possess a metaphysical $\overset{t}{\wedge}$ satus. Even a dream can function as an ideal. An ideal may be a Deweyan problem; it may be a natural object; in short it may be any thing. Only one condition is required for anything to be an ideal or standard in a valuational situation. It must appeal to man's mind or imagination. The more it appeals the stronger will be its claim. Accordingly, dreams may, for some, enjoy a notable priority.

At this stage of our analysis an objection presents itself. How is it that a dream often the projection of man's idiosyncrasies, can function as an ideal? The answer is that the only test for distinguishing idiosyncrasies from practical plans is the test of realisation . Prior to the

application of the test, a judgment on any of them is a pre-judgment. The plans of the Hanging Gardens would have been, the strangest of idiosyncrasies if, before being realized, they had been revealed to the common people who lived in the age of the man who first thought of them.

Furthermore, it is a prejudice to think that commands are always received from above. Even if they were so given, man has the possibility at least either to accept or to reject them. Ultimately, man himself is the final source of appeal. No command holds strong and binding on me except when I approve of it. It is true that sometimes man is forced into some situation against his will. But it is also true that whenever he is so forced more than one alternative is open to him. Better alternatives do not force us into worse ones; the worst can merely force us into the lesser evils. Thus there are always alternatives. Whatever the source of commands, man has the right and usually the power, either to appeal or to accept them.

This brings us to the second variable in the value situation, namely, man. It is not necessary to restrict value experience to the human level. Any organism capable of comparing alternatives to the effect of preferring one to

others, and capable of realizing what he prefers, is eligible to occupy that office. Traditions and social standards condition man's behaviour. But they do not necessarily determine it. The more creative the man's mind is, and the more adventurous his heart, the more well tradition and custom serve him as wings rather than shackle him as fetters. They can be made to function as the stored wisdom of his ancestors' experiences rather than as enslaving laws.

The third variable in the value situation is the ideal becoming real through man's efficient power. This variable is an object either in process of being born or already completed. Any realization of the measure or ideal is subject to the laws of nature. But man's ability to recognize that the same material, under different laws produce different results, suggests to him a variety of possible realities among which to choose. In this sense man contributes to the diversity of new things and has a hand and hence a responsibility in reshaping the world. It is an insult to man and a gross denial of his activity and responsibility, to say that God finished (in the past tense) the creation of the world in a limited number of days.

If these are the essential factors of a value situation, it might be asked, what human situation is not valuational? Every human experience implies a person, an end, and an effort towards the realisation of that end. But, if all situations are valuational, it is argued, the phrase "valuational situation" loses significance. Here, however, the relevant presuppositions can be challenged. In the first place, why should there be any non-valuational human experiences? The thesis that every experiential situation is a valuational situation is a perfectly defensible thesis. In the second place, this thesis does not reduce to insignificance the term "valuational." Because the "that" of the situation is not our only problem, or our most significant problem. The question of the "how much" of value in a situation demands an answer.

The same criticism might be made from a different approach. If "concern" is the focus of a value situation, it follows that "indifference" characterises non-value situations (if any). To this our answer is that nothing is ultimately indifferent. Even a grain of sand is not completely indifferent (at least to the law of gravitation). But the grain of sand has no end; and hence no intended effort to the realisation of that end. And if by a far stretch of

^{the} imagination, one insisted on attributing an end and an effect to the grain of sand, it is imperative that he notes that "concern" is rooted in the ability of comparing and contrasting coupled with the ability of performing, without breaking the laws of nature, alternative realisations. This, by the way, gives us the key to answering the question of the "how much" value of a situation.

The more critical the choice, the more is value involved. One criterion of the criticality of the choice is personal involvement. A martyr's decision to accept torture and death rather than change his beliefs is normally more critical than the decision of a young man to go to school rather than marry. (Though the ultimate judgment is to be reserved by the agent himself). We must admit, however that the cases of life are much more complicated and ramified.

The decision, once reached, simply posits the end. It cannot guarantee either its realization, or its value. Even an experienced and wise agent might be mistaken in his estimate of ends and of the relation of an end to himself. He might also misjudge his ability to realize an end. Finally, even if the end is realised, it might fail to fulfil the expectations the ideal promised. Any of these failures

would constitute a failure to establish the particular harmony or consonance relevant to that particular situation. This in turn would mean failure to produce that expected content which lured man's power to action. Seldom, however, is man's failure complete. Some value, is usually realised. This serves as a measure of one's success and satisfaction in life.

It also offers a key to understanding progress in the philosophy of history. Man's efforts to progress resulted in half-step advance. Even this has been achieved hesitatingly and after a tedious struggle. Seldom do we meet with wide strides towards our goals.

Even if complete harmony and perfect balance and consonance are realised in a particular situation, discord is always lurking around ~~the corner~~. People belong to different categories. In the case of some, no sooner is a responsibility fulfilled and a value realised than another and further pattern of life claims their dynamism. For these life is an incessant effort and a continuous struggle for the realisation of value situations, each of which has its peculiar touch of novelty and freshness.

Other people act on impulse. Still others behave

as they are conditioned to; (Making it difficult to decide whether they are human beings or machines.) One can be sure, however, that, so conditioned, they never experience a value situation. It may well be that no one lives a wholly conditioned life. We can assume, however, that many of us, or perhaps all of us, lapse every now and then into such valueless situations. All of us, as a matter of fact, do experience such lapses. If this is true, we are justified in asserting the existence of situations characterised by "indifference." This uncovers, furthermore, the experiential root of the philosophical prejudice to assume a dichotomy between the valuational and the completely non-valuational.

To deny "indifference" could be to overlook at least three major points. In the first place, it assumes the standpoint of an alert judge rather than that of a practical normal agent. Secondly, it involves the extravagant assumption that a man or an organism thinks, at every turn and before every movement, in terms of ends, alternatives, preferences, and ways of realising them. Finally, even if all of these possibilities are thought of at every corner of one's way through life, still "indifference" keeps some touch of meaning and significance. All of us, even after considering all consequences and relevances in comparing two

alternative actions, are impelled to flip a coin.

∧ Much more significant and far reaching criticism might be advanced in criticism of the doctrine of value sketched above. For example, if every value situation is unique and single in its own way, what is the use of custom, tradition, and past experience? Can one prepare for the unknown? I say yes; in a certain sense one can prepare for the unknown. It is true that I don't know what will befall me tomorrow. But whatever befalls me it is always better to face tomorrow's events with, rather than without, a number of honest and intimate friends, a couple of hundred dollars, and a certain kind of skill.

Or again, one might argue that we have a set of universal laws and categorical imperatives which, divine or not, claim universal application and admit of no exceptions. My answer would be that the theory of value here defended recognises the importance of past experience and the significance of general rules only in so far as our experiences do overlap. But it leaves to the sagacity and tactfulness of the agent the question of keeping a balance in dealing with the repeated elements of his past experience when conjoined, in his present experience, with completely new and different elements. It is an art to

keep that balance, and it is our responsibility to cultivate the art. The new elements in our new experience are sometimes negligible. In such cases the rules derived from past experience, may be applied rigidly. But in other cases circumstances make it clear that the new elements are so salient and important as to dictate a drastic change in the application of the rules. Exceptions to the rules are not crimes, though how and when to make such exceptions is hard to determine.

In all this, one thing is clear, namely, that the agent is ultimately the ultimate judge. The ultimate problem of theory of value in general and of ethics in particular is not to formulate universal laws or to enforce their universal application but to build up sound and responsible characters.

Ends and Means

The question: Do ends justify the means? has been a common question in the philosophy of politics. For the sake of clarity and the dispelling of misunderstanding the following few preliminary remarks are called for.

"To justify" stands for making the bad look less evil at least, or better to turn the bad into a good, if that is possible, or better still to turn the bad into a

good or a part of the good, though this is very difficult indeed.

Hence the good does not need to be justified, much less can a bad justify a good. Only the good can justify the bad. If B stand for bad, and G for good, and $\text{----}\rightarrow$ for justify, E for ends and M for means, we have four different combinations of them that are relevant to political discussions.

- (1) GE $\text{----}\rightarrow$ BM ?
- (2) GM $\text{----}\rightarrow$ BE ?
- (3) BM $\text{----}\rightarrow$ GE ?
- (4) BE $\text{----}\rightarrow$ GM ?

Taking seriously our former remarks (3) and (4) are confused questions. That is the case because good ends (3) and good means (4) don't stand in need of justification. That is for one thing. For another, even if they do, bad means (3) or bad ends (4) could not do the job.

We are left therefore with (1) and (2) as the only legitimate clear questions.

So far it is only a matter of language and logic. The

crux of the issue, however, is normative. That is where a responsible political realism have recourse, when it does, to a "theory" of value.

Do good ends justify bad means? Do good means justify bad ends? In A priori⁶ general answer to this question is incompatible with the scientific realistic approach to which we have already committed ourselves.

Or if you insist on a semi-general more or less uninformative answer, then we are bound to say: sometimes they do, sometimes they don't, it all depends.

When do they do, and when don't they? It depends on what?

It depends on the circumstances, of course, and on the careful considerations of the relevant facts. Good ends (or means) do justify bad means (or ends) when, to the best of the agent's knowledge, the amount of their goodness outweighs the amount of badness resulting from the actions concerned.

6. "From no ethics in the world can it be concluded when and to what extent the ethically good purpose "justifies" the ethically dangerous means and ramifications." Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," p. 121.

Of course there are many limitations to this stand. Also it involves its holders into many risks. But we, being what we are, could not do any better. In the face of these, honesty to admit our limitations and courage to face our risks are virtues which recommend themselves to us. We may or may not accept them. This is one point where people differ. Some of us do accept them; others don't. That partly explains why some of us are escapists in life and others look it squarely in the face.

Those of us who accept positively the challenges of life, commit themselves by such acts to the principle of changing the world in which they live to the better, that is to the extent to which ^{this} lies within their power i.e., to the extent to which they are legitimately responsible for effecting that change.

One kind of these limitations is on the level of theory. We simply don't know, at any given time, all the consequences that follow upon our actions. Since evaluating these actions depends on knowing them, we can never have a final certain judgement. Suppose furthermore, that we know all these consequences, we still may be mistaken about attributing ^{to} them their due value. Hence, if by rational

action we mean an action that is guided by the sure judgement of reason, and if we like always to act rationally, then we can never act. The demand for sure, final and rational action therefore is in effect paralysing for action.

We have already relinquished the demands of extreme rationality. Reason, the tyrant we abhor. It is only reason the wise, tolerant, tamer that we vote for.

Certainty is not a pre-requisite of our actions. Of course the surer our knowledge of our conditions and of their relative values, the better. This is one of the essential safeguards that prevents us from "going astray into the dangerous paths of life. But absolute certainty, though a desirable goal to achieve, is not a necessary pre-requisite of any and every action we take. We rather take jumps into the dangerous waters of life on probabilistic grounds or even on mere guesses concerning safety than freeze to death waiting for the sure signal to come from the lighthouse on the shore of salvation.

Nor need judgements be final in order to qualify as guides for action. The process of reconstructing them is an ever going enterprise. Only we hope that it is a

progressive one. We do our best to make it so.

Another kind of these limitations is practical. Even if we know the true and the good, sometimes we fail to implement them.

We have to remember and **this** is an essential element of realism, that we are not always responsible for seeing to it that the kingdom of God is already on earth. What we are responsible for is not to falter, intentionally in serving the truth and the good as we understand them. Furthermore, we are responsible to do our utmost to implement them around us. **But** this utmost of ours, seldom is enough for that purpose. For this kind of failure, we can not blame ourselves. The circumstances or others are to blame. **In this context** all we are asked to do is not to enlarge the area of this type of actions and circumstances or blurr its limiting boundaries with the view of blaming others for failures which are, wholly or partly ours.

Absolutist? This stand is surely not. But isn't it purely relativist? Definitely not.

It has, as it must, if it is to take the relevant facts of life into consideration, some relative traits.

Its basic conception of its knowledge of the truth and the good is, for example relative. But relative to what? Relative to the hard facts, and stubborn rules of logic. Here it roots itself into objectivity.

Ultimately, it makes the individual agent the final judge concerning the validity of the choices he commits himself to. Mistaken he might be. What corrects these mistakes are objective phenomena. That is why it puts equal emphasis on the method by which it attains its creeds or beliefs as it does on the content of these beliefs. Also that is why it insists on that this method must be open for self correction.

Finally, it puts the responsibility of originating the process of improving ones conditions on the individual agent himself. This is the case because this is the place where emphasis lies - as a matter of fact. The source of responsibility and strength is the individual himself. The study of the common masses might give a different impression, it is true. But this wrong impression can be easily explained from the standpoint of this reconstruction. It is a common truism that the owner of a right can delegate it, or part

of it, to some one else or to some specific institution. It is also a truism that the process of delegating this right and the life that follows it are much easier than the exercise of it. The skillful, safe, and sound exercise of this right proves to be perhaps the most challenging task of the most capable minds. That is why people in general tend both to delegate it and to forget that they did so.

The truth, however, remains that external sources of power, though very helpful sometimes, are only really effective when and only when they are accepted and approved by the agent himself.

But this, though subjective and very important, is only part of the picture that claims to describe completely the responsible actions of men. The other part, though not as important, is still significantly influential, and is objective. For there is a very big difference between a wise, balanced sound choice and a careless unbalanced, and unsound commitment. The distinction is even made by the commonest of people.

How to avoid absolutism without falling into scepticism?

Weldon's aim in the vocabulary of politics is twofold. The negative part of it is to discard "some metaphysical

lumber." Its positive side is to show "the genuine grounds of disagreement between Communists and Democratic politicians, and gave at least some indication of the way in which political appraisals are made" (p.15).* Both of these aims are quite relevant to our enterprise.

For the full appreciation of both, a few remarks concerning language are called for. "During the last century there has occurred a great change in the methods and aims of professional philosophers... What has happened is that philosophers have become extremely self-conscious about language." (p.9)*

Symbols "are the products of human ingenuity and are as definite as we want them to be in their application. Clearly some degree of permanence and precision is demanded of them or they will not serve their purpose which is to enable us to communicate with one another, for such communication is impossible unless we can describe with some accuracy what we see and hear. But it is impossible to say that any particular degree of permanence or precision in usage is indispensable. If all language had the precision which is rightly demanded, because of their special function, in

* T.D. Weldon

the symbols which we use in formal logic and mathematics, it would be extremely ineffective instrument for ordinary conversation and enquiry." (p. 22.)*

Not only is natural language different from logical calculus but also from technical language. "We can, if we find it convenient to do so give it a precise or fairly precise meaning, and then it ceases to be vague or ambiguous and becomes a technical or semi-technical word. It is not uncommon, especially in legal terminology, for this to be done and for the ordinary and technical uses of a word to survive side by side as in the cases of 'fraud' and 'property'." (p. 23.)*

Furthermore, "we must distinguish between two uses of 'define'. It can mean either 'provide a verbal equivalent for...' or 'give the ordinary use of...' To define in the first sense is to provide a word or a number of words, which can be substituted for the word in question without affecting the truth or falsehood of any sentence in which that word occurs... To define in the second sense is to give instances of sentences in which the relevant word is used and thereby clear up its logical function." (p. 23.)*

* T.D. Weldon.

The full implication of these remarks concerning language cannot be recognized and appreciated except when applied to specific traditional problems. Philosophers, for instance, "have come to realize that many of the problems which their predecessors have found insuperable arose not from anything mysterious or inexplicable in the world but from the eccentricities of the language in which we try to describe the world." (p. 9.) In order to get rid of so many traditional problems, Weldon will have to have recourse to the principle of verification. But of this later on. Now it is enough for our purposes to point out to some of the consequences of his commitment to natural language. In the first place "words simply have uses" (p. 19.) not "meanings" in a different sense than their uses. Sentences are "almost entirely conventional symbols" (p. 22.), not "magical incantations" (p. 51.) or even "natural signs." Symbols change (p. 23.) hence there is nothing "mystical (pp. 24 & 49) or "sacred or immutable" (p. 22.) or "mysterious" (pp. 164-165) about them. It is true that they have to enjoy some stability. But this does not need "cosmological or theological explanations" (p. 28.). It will be also seen that, as a consequence, "obviously right or true" (p. 16) is much preferable to "self-evident" or "intuitive" because the

latter suggest something "odd" or "mysterious"; and that it is a good criticism against an argument that it has an "unfamiliar sound." (p. 10.)*

Furthermore, to make a point clear, and to support a conclusion about a crucial statement such as "X is important", all that is needed is "consideration of what it means to say '..is important', 'it is important that..' and similar phrases, such as 'that is vital, trivial, essential, etc...'" (p. 155.)*

It must be obvious that a method so characterized has very little in common with the geometric method. We shall deal with Weldon's analysis of the geometric method in a different section of this chapter.

The above gives also an indication of Weldon's tending to strip out political terms and hence politics of their traditional mysterious, mystical, and sacred tones. Methodologically, this will prepare the way for him to compare arguments about politics with arguments about games of cricket for example or judging wine or pictures. (pp.160-161).*

Suppose, however, the objector goes on to say 'Even

* T.D. Weldon.

if it is the "law," I don't see why I should obey it? The only further comment possible is 'well this is Great Britain, isn't it?

The position indeed is exactly parallel to that of the cricketer who asks 'Why should I obey the umpire? What right has he to give me out? One can answer only by expounding the rules of cricket, the position of the M.C.C., and so on. Beyond that there is nothing to be done except to say, "This is a game of cricket, isn't it?!" (p. 57.)*

It also helps him set the limits of an argument - the limits beyond which arguments seem to cease to be legitimate and acceptable.

Furthermore, it offers one of the criteria by which to separate philosophical from non-philosophical questions. (p. 160).*

Not only that. "It also sets him on the proper way to political appraisals."

"What needs to be done is to explain the resemblances and differences between 'the political institutions of Switzerland are better than those of Spain' on the one hand

* T.D. Weldon

and 'Smith is a better full-back than Jones' on the other. This as may be seen is a philosophical question.It may be useful to anticipate my conclusion and to say at once that the differences are very slight and the resemblances very great." (p. 160.) *

These resemblances are of great significance.

In the first place they allow him to fulfill his negative purpose: "discard some metaphysical lumber" and not be committed to subjectivism or scepticism. The passage just quoted continues: "in other words, I do not believe that by discarding political foundations or ideologies I am logically committed to political scepticism." (p. 160), and (p. 156.)

In the second place, and as a consequence of the first it saves him from the dishonesty of defending the foundations of democracy at a time when he does not believe in their validity. Because this would be his preferable course of action, should political appraisals become completely relativistic?

"If this were the case, it might possibly be justifiable to make use of persuasive but invalid arguments

* T.D. Weldon

in the hope of convincing readers that the ideology of democracy is superior to that of Communism. This might be more effective than to say without further pretence, 'I like Democratic institutions and I want you to like them too.' But matters are not as desperate as this." (p. 160).*

In the third place they help us better understand the proper nature of politics. Though intelligent performances, yet political appraisals are not "pieces of intellectual theorizing" (p. 161) when "puzzles" are technically defined, i.e., in such a way that distinguishes them from "difficulties" or "problems". pp. 75 ff.*

"It is not even the case that good judges always agree as to what the answer is, as they do in crossword puzzles and bridge problems. Indeed it is a mistake to use the word 'answer' at all, since this suggests that what is involved is the solution of a puzzle, and it is not the job of art critics or teachers to solve puzzles." (p. 161)*

The reflection of this on political theory is far reaching. It gives support to the denial of the possibility of formulating a generic political theory. Traditional political theorists were laboring under a few illusions.

* J.D. Weldon.

Weldon's stand with regard to some of them follows:

First, it is nonsense to ask of a certain infallible criterion.⁷

Second, there is no single test or infallible group of tests.⁸

In the third place there are "few simple psychological laws."⁹

Fourthly, there is no such thing as a universally applicable criterion.¹⁰

Since these resemblances are significant it is only pertinent to ask: "What are they?" A key to the answer of this question is given in the following passage,

"Now just as there are experts whose profession it is to pass judgement on pictures and symphonies, so there are specialists in political institutions. Their function is very similar to that of selection committees in that they have both to predict the probable consequences of political actions and to express a view as to the suitability of such actions at a particular time and place." (p. 168.)

7. Weldon's The Voc. of Politics, p. 150.

8. Ibid., p. 51.

9. Ibid., p. 173.

10. Ibid., pp. 155-156.

What is it that these committees do? "The process through which appointment boards, selection committees, employers, and other appraising agents normally go in order to achieve their aims^{is} twofold." (p. 152).*

First there is what may be called the establishing of dispositions. This is concerned mainly with characteristics such as "industrious," "honest," "intelligent," "reliable" and the like, Put in different words, "it should now be agreed that what they do is first to establish a number of dispositional propositions or if... then...." Propositions about the probable behaviour of prospective players or employees under specific conditions. X will probably work hard, kick straight, add up figures correctly, or whatever it may be." (p. 153).*

Second, comes the "assessment of the relative importance of the factors considered at the first stage. (p. 154).* Nor should we suppose, Weldon holds, there is anything subjective about this assessment. There is nothing noticeably private, secret, or subjective about it. (p. 154)* & (pp. 151-152).* Discussion here is conducted in terms of "I think it is important" not of "I like it." And "I think this important is not at all the same as 'I

* T.D. Weldon.

like this'." (p. 154)*

Weldon's comparison between "Parliamentary Government is a good political institution" and "Jones is a good full-back" or "a good doctor" may be challenged. It could be said that the resemblance is "only superficial"." "The chief reason for this contention is that the latter can be confirmed or refuted by reference to an end or purpose whereas the former cannot be confirmed or refuted in this way." (p. 161)*

In order to get out of this difficulty, Weldon takes refuge in comparing artists with statesmen. (pp. 165 ff.)*

When disagreements occur, Weldon says:

"Fortunately we are not destitute of resources. I can draw your attention to points you may have missed, and we can both study the works of professionals and improve our knowledge of the actual situation by the ordinary methods of research. Certainly there are limits to this process, but it is not nearly as barren or unprofitable as it is often supposed to be." (p. 171).*

How barren it^{is}/is a question of degree. It is, however, certain that Weldon does not claim that it solves

* T.D. Weldon.

disagreements - it does not guarantee their solution. This is indicated by the end of the just quoted passage. Also when discussing the problem of, "When is it legitimate to interfere with the political institutions of other people?" He says: "Hence it is possible for us to differ in the same sort of way as in which selection committees differ as to the relative importance of different factors in an agreed result; and there is much more scope for disagreement in political matters because human beings differ considerably in the importance they attach to long term as distinct from short-term consequences." (p. 178)

It is a deplorable fact may be, but a fact which we have to recognize.¹¹ "I do not see what grounds there are for expecting or claiming any greater degree of certainty than this,"

The same result is led to by consideration of the following:

Ruling out as unphilosophical question: (a) is the

11. "There are no certified general rules or principles which will enable us to say dogmatically which of these occasions are or how much pressure is legitimate, but there are enough inductive generalizations which are helpful." (p. 179).

British legal system a good institution? (b) Is it superior to that of the USSR? and admitting the equally difficult to answer question "Is Communism superior to Democracy?"

Weldon answers by the following the practical question of taking sides, What is to be done? "In fact the situation is not alarming. Each of us has his own tests, which are no doubt rough and crude, but they will serve their purpose, which is to check and confirm the conclusions of experts based on thorough research." (pp. 175-176)

Taking sides, however, without being sure of the fact that one is on the winning side or at least on the side of justice and truth lacks that fervor and enthusiasm which is essential for winning a fight or offering the sacrifices required for such!

Regardless of how sound this stand is, if looked at from the logical or empirical angles, it certainly is not sound psychologically. Hesitancy, due to lack of certainty is a dangerous trait in a statesman. Sometimes it is fatal. This is one characteristic feature that distinguishes politics from art, from games, etc... Weldon attempts to strip politics of its sacred, mystical, and mysterious

trends may have many advantages. But they certainly **need** to a state of psychological fervour and emotional support. This is one characteristic that should be added to the advantages of those political theories whose foundations Weldon tries to undermine.

A statesman who is an analyst à la Weldon, must therefore look, somewhere else, for a source of strength, fervor, and **forcé**.

Nor is Weldon unaware of the importance of this trend in the character of a person who is expected not only to follow the rules but also to follow them in a particular way: "It is well known that a man may **keep** all the rules laid down by the priests as well as those laid down by the politicians and still be regarded as a bad, or at any rate, an unsatisfactory character;It is not a question of following an extra prescription, but one of following recognized prescriptions in a special way." (Underlining mine) (p. 187).

This is one of the many insights and skillful analyses Weldon offers in his book. What he **fails** to notice however is the failure of his philosophical or theoretical analyses to give such "a special way" any foundation - or if "foundation"

is an out of grace word in his language, we may say that he fails to give it or at least one characteristic of it - fervor - any justification!

Another feature of Weldon's standpoint invites comment. Theoretically it is quite consistent with his other claims - such as that no generic political theory is possible, that political truths are not discovered by the study of ideals (p. 33); that politics is not a postulational system with axioms, rules of inference and conclusions (pp. 34, 36, 170). Yet its psychological consequence is such that it gives the impression of being lost or unsupported.

In the final analysis one does not know whether Weldon believes ~~That~~ political truths ~~can~~ be known or not. Of course he refers many times to experts and advisers. "Good colonial administrators are perhaps the people best qualified to formulate," rough inductive generalizations which help us "give useful advice as to political institution and it is sometimes justifiable to bring pressure to bear on other people to follow it" (p. 179). (Also see quotation on p. 42). Yet he claims that each one of us has

his own usable tests." Weldon's own test, to which he refers sometimes as "personal preferences" (p. 15), or "personal view or prejudice" (p. 176) are: (1) the presence or absence of censorship, (2) restrictions on teaching and on intercourse of a country's members with members of other systems (3) the claim to immutable political principles which claim denies the right of criticism and (4) who supports the rulers, the literate, uneducated, or the supersititious. (p. 176). Nor is this only a personal preference, it also fails to be a test for good government. "It does not follow that institutions which successfully pass all these tests are good. The absence of restrictions does not guarantee anything." (p. 176). This is of great interest in connection with the main point of the following paragraph!

Well, we are here face to face with another difficulty of Weldon's viewpoint. To appraise political institutions in such a way as to avoid the bogey of subjectivism, Weldon "has already presented an impressive factual analysis of the appraisals of appointment committees. (see p.41-42)

But the moote of the argument is the notion of "important." Granted that "I think this important" is different from "I like this", it remains to be seen whether

this goes in harmony with the requirements of the argument granted on page 40, namely that (a) there is no single test or group of tests which are infallible that give final incorrigible answer to this type of enquiry (as there almost is for "how tall is Jones"; (b) discussions about such questions are in practice ("entirely or almost entirely factual." (p, 152)

Weldon himself seems to be aware of this objection and deals with it in a way that is puzzling as the following quotation indicates:

"What may easily happen however is that people who have not given much thought to this type of question become puzzled and bewildered when they are asked 'precisely what new fact is asserted' by "X is important" which was not asserted by the if... then statement at the earlier level? For when they can not answer this they are liable to be told "the only new fact in question is your personal preference, for X over Y, so your judgements "X is important," and "X is better than y" really are subjective after all. But this is simply a logical swindle. Nobody supposes that when you have finished constructing a cupboard or a motor car you may be left with just two questions to decide: (a) What colour shall we paint it?; (b) Shall it be good or bad? Obviously these are not questions of the same type, and getting puzzled about them is rather like getting puzzled as to what the extra thing is that you have bought when you buy not just a right-hand glove and a left-hand glove but a pair of gloves." (pp. 154-155).

Two puzzles invite comment. One of them could be

gotten rid of by emphasizing the last sentence of the quoted passage, and connecting it with what we have already explained (p.37 above). There are definite limits for arguing sensibly about issues. When one asks questions beyond those limits, these seem to express one's own ignorance rather than a weakness of the position questioned.

This is to be dealt with in a wider context: the argument between Weldon and his opponents is closely connected with a doctrine of "legitimate evidences" and hence of "legitimate question" and "legitimate explanation?" Raising these issues however, shows that the criticism against Weldon, here, if it proves to be a criticism at all, is an external criticism.

The other puzzle concerns subjectivism. What exactly is Weldon's stand on subjectivism? In the above passage he considers it a derogatory term. It is something scaring. This stand also underlines his attempt at the analysis of political appraisals as has been shown.

Yet one feels differently when he reads the following passages:

"That is just the fallacy of supposing that every difficulty can be replaced by a straightforward puzzle. But ordinary people do not expect to be able to do that, and that is only the subjectivists bogey is just a bogey. It frightens nobody except its inventors." (p. 151.)*

"My aim is simply to show that the subjectivist bogey is an illusion, and that therefore ^{the} dilemma 'either objective principles or subjectivism and chaos, like most dilemmas, is more alarming than dangerous'. (p. 156)*(underlining mine)

"But there is nothing particularly 'subjective' about the various answers which deserve consideration..." (p. 159)*

Similar puzzlements arise for the student who scrutinizes critically Weldon's ~~though~~ concerning "prediction" (pp. 33; 168; 177, and 178) "philosophical question" (28, 37, 38, 155, 165, 166-167, 175) and his exact charge against the foundation of classical political philosophies (p. 36, 39, 41, 110, 111, 138, 142).

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One cannot, however, conclude this part of this chapter - the part dealing with the positive side of Weldon's aim without referring to positive illuminating insights, analyses, and recommendations he offers to his readers.

His reference to dispositions of the second order, (p. 188)* his manifold claim that governing is different from theoretical reasoning, (p. 172)* that calculating is different from acting, (p. 75)* and that statesman is neither a mere engineer, p. nor simply an artist, p. 161* nor a prophet or a visionary, (p. 169)* his intriguing distinction between puzzles, problems and difficulties (pp. 75ff, 151, 160, 166, 167, 175)*, his illuminating analysis of political terms

There are only some of the points that one can not help giving him credit for, and being impressed by.

*T.D. Weldon, Ibid

Turning to the negative or destructive side of his aim, the part of his enterprise in this book which is the more exciting, one has to start with his criterion of meaning or, to talk the language of the logical positivists, which is not by the way completely strange in this context, the principle of verification. Weldon does not use the phrase. Nor is it quite clear which formulation of it is supported by him. But it is also clear that something like it is his main weapon, together with what has already been discussed in connection with language (pp. 136 ff) **above**, for sifting problems or better still for eliminating some of them.

This principle states roughly that the meaning of a proposition is the possibility (logical or actual) of verifying it so that, if there is no conceivable way of verifying or confirming a proposition X, then X must be meaningless (pp. 37-38, 57, 74, 137, 163)*.

With these weapons in hand, Weldon examines the foundations of Democracy, Idealism, and Marxism. All of them prove to be "useless." In addition they suffer from the intellectualist fallacy and three illusions - that of real essences, that of the geometrical method, and that of

*T.D. Weldon, VP.

the absolute standards. Add to these his implied denial of the possibility of formulating a generic theory in politics, and you have a fair idea of the metaphysical "lumber" he aims at discarding.

The Illusion of the Geometric Method

Euclidean geometry is a "postulational system in which some axioms and rules of inference are laid down and conclusions are derived by means of them." (p. 34)* It is not about figures at all either imperfect or ideal. It is possible to choose different axioms and get a system completely coherent with itself. Thought is applicable extensively to matter of fact. (p. 35)* Yet geometry's axioms do not "state necessary or universal truth" about the world. For deductions from its axioms do not give **reliable predictions** for particles traveling at approximately the speed of light. (p. 35)* In other words its applicability is limited.

The supposition that political philosophy is the same enquiry as geometry suffers from a double error. In the first place the nature of geometry is misconceived. "It is not the a priori study of the structure of the real world." (p. 35)* In the second place the analogy between geometry and politics is a very weak one even when the nature of geometry is properly

*T.D. Weldon, VP

stated." (ibid) The doctrine of dictatorship and the organic theory of the state, for example, are "feasible hypotheses". But as compared with the axioms of Euclid, this and other axioms concerning politics are "very unfruitful" or "pitifully useless." (p. 36, also p. 80)*

An absolute standards

Standards, we use; absolute standards we do not need. Galileo used to his own satisfaction his pulse beats for measuring small intervals of time. A more convenient and a more reliable device was the pendulum clock. "Since then other **and more** precise methods have been devised in order to make more accurate observations possible." (p. 31)* Nor did Galileo or any of his successors ever suggest that they had to have or that they did, as a matter of fact have absolute standards in designing chronometers or in regulating their watches.

Since Einstein's general theory of relativity has been universally accepted it has also become clear that the idea of absolute space and time and therefore the idea of absolute measurement could be abandoned without embarrassment.

Political philosophers too seem to have considered the

*T.D. Weldon, VP

actual institutions available to them for study and have suggested some more or less radical alterations in them. Plato, on the whole, was happy enough with the constitution of Sparta, and Rousseau with that of Geneva.

They both suggested modification. Nor do those modifications follow from absolute standards. "Yet in political philosophy the belief that they did, or might have done, ... still lingers on." (p. 33)* To Weldon's mind, this belief is an illusion. The ideas of absolute time and space and hence of absolute measurement are "strictly meaningless, that is, they contribute nothing to the description or explanation of any physical phenomena." (p. 32)* Weldon's answers to people who are tempted to "argue that Galileo and his successors must surely have been in possession of the Idea of an absolute standard of time measurement or they could not have noted either that existing standards were imperfect or that one of them was superior to the others," (p. 31)* is somehow similar. "...it is difficult to see that such seemingly profound pronouncements tell us anything at all, for we may ask what it is like to possess or to contemplate an absolute standard of measurement for time or indeed for anything whatever." (p. 31)* (Underlining mine.)

We are afraid here, Weldon over-shoots the mark. Obviously he is not satisfied to urge against the Absolutists that we could manage without their absolute standards. He means to level a more drastic charge against such standards. They are "strictly meaningless," they hardly "tell us anything at all." But what is meant by that? By "strictly meaningless" he means "they contribute nothing to the description or explanation of any physical phenomena." Suppose they don't. Isn't that exactly what is meant by saying "they are not needed"? Or does Weldon suggest a different "use" of the term?

It is also tempting to argue that they do contribute if not to the description then to the explanation of phenomena. The argument reduces itself then between Weldon and the Absolutists to what is meant by "explanation." We do not need to go into that anyway. It suggests, however, that a whole context, or a language if you prefer, is at stake here.

Instead of saying that those absolutes hardly "tell us anything at all," Weldon would be better off to say that he does not understand them. In a controversy with, say, Plato, who did, presumably, Weldon's criticism is, in effect, that

Plato talks Greek to him.

Wolton, On the illusion of real essences.

Anything which can be an object of knowledge "Plato thought must be sharply demarcated, precisely definable, and immutable." "Thus it comes to be held not merely that nouns are always the names of identifiable things, but also that the things of which they are the names are unchanging and eternal, Both views are mistaken." (p. 20)*

It is true that the sun, Socrates, Sparta and Athens have with some qualifications meanings that are "fixed, demarcated, and permanent." (p. 21)* By analogy, "state," "justice," and "authority" must also, it was supposed, have such meanings. The task of the political philosopher in particular "is to ascertain the true or real meanings of words, or alternatively to become acquainted with the immutable essences or Ideas for which political words stand." (p. 21)*

Keeping in mind what has already been discussed in connection with the nature of natural language and the nature of "definition" "we see that it is no matter of surprise that the uses, that is, the meanings of words change" or are sometimes "discorded." (p. 23)* We change the uses of words both when "we make discoveries about the nature of the world," (p. 29)*

* Ibid.

or when the facts themselves change, thus recommending for the sake of accomodating them a change in the "verbal usage." Hence there is nothing "mystical" (p. 24)* "sacred" (p. 22)* or immutable about political terms. Nor do "linguistic conveniences beget metaphysical entities, though it is fatally easy to suppose that they do especially if we accept the doctrine that words have meanings in the classical sense. (p. 28)* It also follows that the "search for the correct or true meaning or (use of words and sentences is a wild goose chase." (p. 28)*

If ^{it} is true that words have no fixed immutable meanings, does it follow that they are subject to the arbitrary whims of individuals? Of course not. Nor should this be surprising or calling for, "a cosmological or theological explanation." (p. 28)* "Verbal usage is stable because the objects and situations with which people are confronted and which they need to describe, discuss, and alter are also fairly stable." (pp. 28-29)*

In so far as Weldon tries to refute the essentialist theory of meaning he fails. For what evidences and/or reasons does he offer to prove that (1) words have meanings and (2) that these meanings are immutable, are "mistaken views." (p. 20)*

*Ibid

Only the analysis of an alternative view of meaning. Nor is this alternative incompatible with Plato's theory. Plato would only assign for it a place in his realm of "opinion." (ibid)

One could go a bit further here to argue that it is impossible for Weldon and the schools of positivism and empiricism to prove that "essences" do not exist. For what kind of evidence is available to a positivist* or empiricist/^{that} shows the non-existence of such "entities?" (p. 72)

To say, for this reason, that such terms ~~are~~ meaningless, (p. 36, 110) is equally, after analysis, unjustified - unless it means that "we empiricists and positivists" do not really understand them."

* Ibid, pp. 65-66.

- We better say "analysists"

Evaluation.

Weldon's brilliant analysis of language presents us however, with an interesting alternative of explaining the relevant facts. But all he can legitimately claim is that it is possible to ignore reference to essences, i.e., immutable, eternal, well defined meanings. He may even claim for his approach some advantages over the other approaches. This resolves the puzzlement of Socrates and perplexities of Plato (pp. 29-30)*

Therefore, we are logically faced with two approaches, two languages if you prefer, both of which explain our political behaviour. We can legitimately choose either one without exposing ourselves to the blame that we support falsehood. If we know them and we decide to accept them Weldon cannot accuse us of being either "fools or knaves." (p. 148)*

We could be accused of bad taste, primitiveness, "backwardness" (p. 30)* but not of being mistaken. Also there follow some consequences of this choice. Like any other choice, this one has its own practical repercussions and theoretical consequences.

*Ibid

It is time now to turn to the intellectualist fallacy. Part of what it means, to Weldon's mind, has already been discussed with the three illusions already treated. "This is one side of the general intellectualist fallacy about political organization which will be considered in detail in the next chapter." (p. 82)* i.e. The chapter dealing with political foundations.

At the risk of being redundant we quote ^a few passages to make this fallacy clear and to uncover its implications.

"Plato's mistake here as so often was the typically Greek mistake of over-intellectualization. He never wavered in his belief that deductive theorizing was the only human activity which was perfectly respectable and appropriate to a gentleman and since statesmanship was obviously respectable, it must in the end be found to consist in some kind of theorizing. So ruling had to be ^{an} exercise of a kind of theoretical activity, and therefore, there had to be a special sphere named 'the idea of the good' about which this type of theoretical activity was concerned. It would be most unfair to blame Plato much for this mistake. It is still commonly made by examination boards, interviewing committees, and believers in I.Q. tests as reliable evidence of powers of leadership." (p. 141)*

* Ibid

And "of course if we start by saying 'I will accept nothing but a numerical statement or a logical deduction from agreed axioms as a satisfactory answer to my question' (i.e. demanding an "objective" standard in politics) ~~w~~e are doomed to get into trouble fairly soon unless the world is much simpler and tidier than we have any reason to suppose that it is. That is just the fallacy of supposing that every difficulty can be replaced by a straightforward puzzle." (p. 151)* (Underlining mine)

"The generalizations (of what is important) fail because they leave out all reference to context, to a degree, and often to persons. It therefore, makes no sense to look for a universally applicable criterion of importance, and nothing but our addition to the fallacy of absolute standards leads us to suppose that it does." (pp. 155-156)* (Underlining mine)

And finally, "promotion of freedom" and "restriction of freedom" are significant and useful phrases but they are also difficult and complicated to analyse. There is no simple a priori method for answering the question 'which will this proposed measure tend to do?' (p. 159)*

On the other hand, anyone who thinks that Weldon is preaching anti-intellectualism will do him a great injustice.

* Ibid

For the "alternative to intellectualism is not anti-intellectualism. Hitler was not the first to notice that clever puzzle solving is not the only qualification for dealing with difficulties. His mistake was supposing that it was not a qualification at all." (p. 82)*

These remarks have the credit not only of being correct and wise but also of bearing significantly on the nature of politics.

Bearing on the same subject is Weldon's careful stand concerning the distinction between social associations and political organizations. There is no sharp definite line between the two. And if there is, it is not philosophically as important as some would like it to be. "There really is a difference between 'state' and 'society', but it is not philosophically important and not at all what the exponents of Social Solidarity would like it to be. 'Society' is used to stand for something less organized than an association. We talk more here of customs, habits, and traditions and less of rights, laws, and obligations. The position is not yet formalized and the relations between individuals are not clearly defined. But there is no hard and fast line to be drawn, as is indicated by the fact that in ordinary speech 'association' and 'society' are interchangeable words."

*Ibid

It is perhaps convenient to make a technical distinction of this kind between less and more highly organized groups of people, but there seems to be nothing more to it than that. We do not need the fiction of a social contract to explain the transition from society to state." (p. 50) (61, 69, 107, 89, 141 and 80)*

In view of the difference "the State" is to be, for practical reason, a bit solemnized. (p. and p. 189)** There is a danger however, of overdoing this. The mystical ingredients and overtones of "the State" are better cleared up. Nor are we justified to think of "the State" as a unique association (p. 48)** The arguments from (1) involuntary membership, (2) its being concerned with the value of our life, are equally unconvincing to Weldon's mind. The arguments, or quasi-arguments he offers to support his stand are unconvincing.

It is important to notice, however, that his stand concerning the state is dictated upon him by his doctrine of "political appraisals."

That stand is also determined by his rejection of all formulations of political theories and his efforts to avoid scepticism.

* Ibid

When the state is stripped of all charm sacredness and mysticism, when its metaphysical foundations are undermined, when appraisals of it end in wide disagreement and hesitant uncertainties, though it is logically still possible to avoid scepticism, yet psychologically it is quite unlikely. At best therefore, Weldon's standpoint is satisfactory ^{only} for uninterested spectators or very impartial judges. For agents, however, it is quite unsatisfactory. The heat and energy that is to feed up those who take the risk of action and the dangers of sacrifices, is not provided for in Weldon's attempt.

If politics is normative, and if one significant sense of this is the fact that we commit ourselves to changing the world in such a way as to make our dreams come true, or better still our plans be realized, and if this is impossible without the emotional heat and psychological fervor that drives to heroic deeds, then Weldon's notwithstanding his great insight into and significant contributions to the understanding of politics, falls short of a satisfactory functional approach. Not only does he fail to provide reasons for such fervor, his analysis attempts, consciously or unconsciously, to kill it. To face the realities of the world we live in, we need,

if we **are** to benefit from Weldon's deep insights and critical analysis, to provide both room and support for the drive that is essential for the success of our commitment to make the world better.

Two further comments invite themselves in connection with our treatment of Weldon's thought. He asks:

"But what is to be done when disagreements occur?"
 (p. 170b)* Fortunately we are not destitute of resources. Draw our attention to points **we** have missed. Study the works of professionals and improve our knowledge of the actual situation by the ordinary method of research. "Certainly there are limits to this process, but it is not nearly as barren or ~~un~~profitable as it is often supposed to be."
 (p. 171)*

The question, however, is whether it is as fruitful as Weldon supposes

Anyways, on the rational empirical level, ~~one~~ cannot do any better. This is the best we ~~can~~ afford.

The residue of disagreements may very well be due to irrational psychological causes, complexes, overtones. About these Weldon did not say anything. He limited his enterprise

*Ibid

in such a way as to eliminate them. This he is justified in doing.

But this might very well have tended to make him forget about these irrational elements that are certainly ingredients in our attitudes to action - and more likely than not to knowing. Not to ever refer to them as relevant to dissolving disagreement, gives reason for one to claim that Weldon, inspite of the fact that he referred to them in another connection (Hitler, pp. 88)*, is another instance of those figures in the history of the civilized thought who fell victims to the "philosophers fallacy."

The second comment concerns itself with his list of criteria on p. 176.*

- a. It is not necessarily connected with his analysis of selection committees. (Process 2 levels)**
- b. Suppose two people or schools of thought draw different lists? Then we are driven back to our first comment.
- c. It, has to be fenced off by a lot of qualifications,

* Ibid.

** See also p. 145 above.

e.g., in times of peace or absence of war... etc.

d. It is very likely that in a hundred years, the power political composition of the world would change in such a way as to make this list or something very close to it, very obsolete.*

One of the significant consequences of our stand, bears on International relations.

J.F. Erierly, commenting on Grotius' distinction between bellum justum and bellum injustum, says: "But he was well aware of the difficulties of making it prevail in view of the obstinate fact that states persisted in treating the making of war as a matter of policy and not of law. He summed up these difficulties under two main heads (De jure belli se pacis, iii, 4.4.) One was that of knowing which of the parties to any particular war had the right on his side; the other was the danger that other states incur if they presume to judge of the rights and wrongs of a war and take action to restrain the wrong doer. Any scheme for eliminating war has still to grapple with these two difficulties; the first

* (1) ^{Therefore} not to adopt this list is a more convenient principle of methodology. It offers you a freer hand; (2) yet a list is required for political appraisal, (3) but the drawing of the list in the light of "X is important" has to be closely connected and relevant to all important factors in the studied circumstances.

is our modern problem of determining the "aggressor," and the second is that of 'collective security,' of somehow placing behind the law of the United force of the society of states, while ensuring at the same time protection to the states which lend their help. Neither Grotius nor the writers who followed him in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries could see any way of overcoming these difficulties, and he fell back on the lame conclusion that the only practical course was not to ask third states to judge of the lawfulness or otherwise of a war, but to leave that question to the conscience of the belligerents." (The Law of Nations, pp. 34-25) (Underlining mine)

Again he says:

"...Yet for the voluntary law, which was the only part of Vattel's system which had a real relation to the practice of states, he provided no sound basis in theory, for he was unable to explain, the source of the obligation of states to observe it." (Ibid, p. 39)

Consent fails to explain why law is binding? (p. 53)
Does also self-commitment fail? We don't think so. Same too may be Grotius' conclusion. Still it is the true description of the relevant facts!

Nor is the relativity of values upheld by Glanvill Williams*, for example, be justified from the standpoint of a framework of values such as ours. Nor do we need to remunerate the advantages of such a standpoint.

It ceases, furthermore, to be odd that some men obey laws which they themselves made, as Pascal^x puts it. It is odd from the standpoint of an approach that misplaces the source of strength that is binding on the individual - instead of locating it with the individual concerned it places that source somewhere outside him⁺

*"Admittedly it may be asserted that there was a significant issue between Austin and the historians, namely an issue as to the 'central feature' of "law" and that the issue was whether this 'central feature' was the force of the governor, or the consent of the government. Put in this way the question does sound as though it is a factual one. But the difficulty is that a question so formulated cannot be significantly debated unless the debators agree upon the meaning (i.e. the referent) of the word 'law'. This the Austinians and such of the historians as debated the issue stubbornly refused to do. Had they come to a working agreement upon the meaning of the word 'law' for the purpose of their debate, they would instantly have discovered that there was practically nothing left for them to debate, for there were no facts in issue between them. The most they could have debated would have been whether this or that feature of an agreed referent of 'law' was 'central'. But this debate again would have verged upon meaninglessness, for 'central' in this context is simply synonym for 'important', and what is 'important' is a subjective matter, Importance lies in the eye of the beholder. No operation can be performed to test whether one feature of a referent is more important than the others, nor is such an operation conceivable. To debate what is important and what unimportant is, therefore, to enter upon a controversy that can only be settled by the emotional conversion of one of the parties" G. Williams, "The Controversy Concerning The Word 'Law'". Memiographed from Philosophy, Politics and Society. p. 5 and 9.

^x See quotation at the beginning of this chapter, i.e. p. 105 above.

⁺ "If we are to explain why any kind of law is binding, we cannot avoid some such assumption as that which the Middle Ages made, and which Greece and Rome had made before them, when they spoke of natural law. The ultimate explanation of the binding force of all law is that man, . . . , is constrained in so far as he is a reasonable being, to believe that order and not chaos is the governing principle of the world in which he has to live". J.F. Brierly, op. cit. p. 57.

C O N C L U S I O N

It has been said that politics is the art of compromise. * This is true in more than one sense. In a pluralistic society national politics is the balance of the influences exerted by the different group interests. This is more true in ^ademocratic² context than in ^adictatorial one. Even in dictatorial totalitarianisms however it remains true that the balance of interests, at the time, is the sectional picture of the politics of the country concerned.

According to the principle of ^{the} continuity of domestic and international politics, ^{to} which we shall refer shortly, the same holds true of international politics too.

Reconciliation is politics not only on the level of interests. Politics is also a compromise between interest and principles - ideational, moral, or legal ³.

* K.W. Thompson, op. cit., pp 13 & 14.

2. "Group interests exert, of course, constant pressure upon the conduct of our foreign policy, claiming their identity with the national interest". H. Morgenthau, "The National Interest". Rept. in Hoffmann op.cit. p. 75

3. "The insight and the wisdom of the four observers (Butterfield, De Visscher, Niebuhr, and Morgenthau) stand out most clearly against the background of four of persistent problems or limitations that lie at the roots of most of our modern confusion and uncertainty regarding principle and necessity. When we try to apply general principles such as those put forth by Butterfield and de Visscher, these limitations are present to confound us". They are national self-righteousness; its effects on the resolution of international tensions and conflicts, the nature of collective morality, and the existence of "few if any absolutes" in international politics. K. Thompson, op.cit. p. 150.

On another level, yet subject to the same principles as in national politics, international politics is a kind of compromise. This is a corollary of the principle of continuity in politics.

It is implied in this passage that private behaviour and public behaviour are subject to the same principles but the application of those principles has to meet with different circumstances. "Collective morality"⁴ insisted upon both by Niebuhr and Morgenthau becomes the study of the effects of these different circumstances on man's behaviour.

Also it is implied that national and international⁵ politics are subject to the same principles but to different settings. Traditional realists claim that the basic rule to which both are subject is the rule of adjustment of claims, pressures, interests, or powers. Hence realistic is a system of checks and balances⁶ in a pluralistic society.

4. K. Thompson, op.cit. pp 148 - 149

5. "The issue this theory raises concerns the nature of all politics. the essence of international politics is identical with its domestic counterpart". Morgenthau, H. op cit. p. 31.

6. "As regards the conceptual identity or else disparity of domestic and international politics, any inquiry may attempt to isolate relevant principles and other variables common to all politics, and to differentiate their respective place, weight, and manifestation in the different types of the two major areas of politics ". G. Liska, International Equilibrium Rept. in Hoffmann's op.cit. pp 147 - 148

".... an understanding of political phenomena, whether international or domestic, is inseparable from a clear picture of human nature". K. Thompson, op.cit. p. 11.

"Just as no one would imagine for one moment that policy on the domestic scene is a given quality but must be sought ...with the adjustment of rival claims of political parties and pressure groups, so international policy, say within the United Nations, must be studied as the result of the pressures and the claims of nations on the international scene". Ibid, p. 20

6. H. Morgenthau, op.cit. p. 4

Political behaviour then is to be explained, and if ever possible, predicted, on the basis of causes techniques or means, and purposes. A very long and incomplete list of variables that affect that behaviour in any form of these three categories include, values, law, rational principles, irrational factors, economic and psychological, and power elements. The arrangement of these in a scale of more or less value depends on the decision-makers themselves - among other things. It is in this sense that we are justified in saying that politics is what politicians, as politicians, do.

Even the same person is likely to rearrange these variables either due, to past⁷ experience or only to different circumstances⁸. To that extent

7. "Medieval history" said the historian Stubbs, "is a history of rights and wrongs; modern history as contrasted with medieval is a history of powers, forces, dynasties, and ideas... Medieval wars are, as a rule wars of right: they are seldom wars of unprovoked, never wars of absolutely unjustifiable aggression; they are not wars of ideas, of liberation, or of glory, or of nationality, or of propagandism".

"The change that culminated in the Reformation (it had begun about two centuries earlier) was fundamentally moral and psychological". M. Wight, "Power Politics". Rept. Snyder & Wilson, op.cit. p. 136.

8. It is conceivable that conflict and competition, for example, cease to be primary much less the only, source of equilibrium.

"Once the balance of power among states is controlled by means of effective international organization, the distribution of security, welfare, and prestige (within the existing conditions of the military - political, socio-economic, and institutional equilibrium) ceases to be the result of conflict and competition only, or even primarily." G. Liska, op.cit. p. 142.

This conviction goes counter to the presupposition of power politics as Morgenthau mistakenly understands it:

"The concept of the national interest presupposes neither a naturally harmonious, peaceful world nor the inevitability of war as a consequence of the pursuit by all nations of their national interest. Quite to the contrary, it assumes continuous conflict and treat of war, to be minimized through the continuous adjustment of conflicting interests by diplomatic action".

H. Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate ..." Rept. in Hoffmann, op. cit. p. 79

an inevitable thing,

~~the 2nd~~

the politicians' policies are conditioned by many external considerations - cultural patterns, ideologies, systems of government, public opinions, national interests, balances of power and what not.

In this wide frame work is offered a kind of a synthesis between traditional realism and traditional rational - moral^{ism} and legalism. Though this synthesis is conditioned by the choices of the concerned decisions-makers. They may, in other words, take advantage of a very useful synthesis or they may choose to go to extremes.

There are also many possible syntheses. That is why, though politics is a compromise, it is still the doing, at least in part, of the politicians or statesmen.

Finally, this framework offers a chance for statesmen to set the course of political behaviour, or analysis, somewhere between cynicism and moralism.

Two very important corollaries follow.

The first is that ethics does not have to be always the hand-maden of politics. Moral values in other words do not have to be subsidiary, even in the autonomous sphere of politics, to considerations of power or the national interest. As a matter of fact political questions on the one hand and legal questions or moral questions on the other do not even have to be separated⁹.

9. "It is not surprising that authors who believe that international politics is essentially a struggle for national survival should reach very pessimistic ethical conclusions. Thus N.J. Spykman, American Strategy in World Politics ... bases his case on the proposition that "the struggle for power is identical with the struggle for survival" and that states can survive only by constant devotion to power politics. Although the use of power "should be constantly subjected to moral judgements" (p.12), Spykman concludes that the "statesman can concern himself with values of justice, fairness and tolerance only to the extent that they contribute to or do not interfere with the power objectives" meaning the quest for survival. (underlining mine) Hoffmann, op.cit. p. 282 note 10.

The political question could, for purposes of analysis, be divided into its basic components: the power component, the legal component, the moral component and so on. The implementation of the over all political question also could be divided into different activities - expulsion from the international organization (the league of nations), going to war or refraining from going to war with the Soviet Union; dealing or not dealing with the Chinese Communist government and etc. But all of these activities and the policies are much better off when directed by an overall plan of policy and action - a plan that expresses the answer to the political question as understood and formulated by the decision makers at the time.

The second corollary of the convictions already discussed is that "interest" in all the previous discussions meant "national interest". Some of its shortcomings as a basic notion in international theory would be automatically removed once it is used to stand for "world interest" ¹⁰.

10. This presupposes a world community. This world community once a fiction is becoming, due to developments in technology and military, economic processes more and more of a reality.

"There is a world community because as Señor Madariaga puts it, "we have smuggled that truth into our store of spiritual thinking without preliminary discussion (S. de Madariaga The World's Design, p.3)

"On the other hand it would be a dangerous illusion to suppose that this hypothetical world community possesses the unity and coherence of communities of more limited size up to and including the state. If we examine the ways in which the world community falls short of this standard of coherence, we shall have a clue to the underlying reasons for the shortcomings of international morality. It falls short mainly in two ways (1) the principle of equality between members of the community is not applied, and is indeed not easily applicable, in the world community, and (2) the principle that the good of the whole takes precedence over the good of the part, which is a postulate of any fully integrated community, is not generally accepted." E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis. Rept. in Hoffmann, op.cit. p. 267

The "common good" a criterion suggested, though in the context of the city state by Plato, still serves as a criterion. But only theoretically. It is left for the future of mankind to implement it.

The political structural circumstances and setting of the world has changed, and still is changing, towards making this world of ours one world. This is partly due to forces operating beyond the sphere of man's willful decisions. Yet man's - or at least some key men's decisions - could very drastically affect both their existence and their development. All this goes to show that the possibility of implementing the criterion of the common good,¹¹ in its widest interpretation, is becoming with the times, though still a very

11. "Whereas the philosophy of necessity tends to lead to resignation, irresponsibility, or even to the glorification of amorality, the philosophy of choice lends itself to excessive moralism and self-righteousness as if the leeway for choice were unlimited and were of the same dimension for all. What saved most of the theorists of England and America from the pitfalls of such excesses was the core with which they defined to themselves the limitations that they need for national self-preservation - or the duty of self-defence as they might call it - sets on the freedom of choice. Nations were not being advised to sacrifice themselves on the altar of humanity or human liberty or to set the general interest above the national interest of self-preservation. There was no inclination to forget the rules of prudence for the rules of morality, prudence that taught men to use common sense and wise judgment in deciding where the duty of self-defence deserved primacy over other duties. Prudence also meant husbanding ones means and staying within these means even through the pursuit of good causes. There was room for hypocrisy in this argument.... On the whole it will be found, however, that the moral philosophers in question.... placed themselves in the creditable role of serving as the conscience of the nation, reminding statesmen of the dictates of justice and reason". A. Wolfers, op. cit. pp 249-250 (underlining mine)

difficult enterprise, much more possible than before¹². The world could be driven to the abyss or else to a safe station. With the assumption of common sense - the least of it on the part of decision makers - one cannot fail to hope for, and hence ~~a~~with, the view of saving it from a disastrous war. (~~if~~ the other course is taken, it must either by mistake or by an act of foolishness).

Man must be heading towards world government. This might look like a utopia from the standpoint of the conditions, as we know them, prevailing in the world today - clashes of ideologies, of national sovereignties, and interests. Yet it is a relevant utopia.

Its relevance lies in the need for it as one alternative for saving mankind the fate of complete destruction¹³ of himself and of the civilization his ancestors helped build.

12. Even Morgenthau's attack on the standard of action identified with the U.N., weak as it is if applied to the actions taken by decision makers, is even weaker if applied against what we are arguing for in this section. For it could be interpreted as the expression of a standard reflecting the supra-national interest.

"Here we are in the presence of that modern phenomenon which has been veriously described as "utopianism", "sentimentalism", "moralism" the "legalistic moralistic approach". The common denominator of all these tendencies in modern political thought is the substitution for the national interest of a supranational standard of action which is generally identified with an international organization, such as the United Nations. The National interest is here not being usurped by sub- or supra national interests which, however inferior in worth to the national interest, are nevertheless real and worthy of consideration within their proper sphere. What challenges the national interest here is a mere figment of the imagination, a product of wishful thinking". (underlining mine). Rept. in Hoffmann op.cit. pp 77-78.

13. "On November 3, 1953, prime minister Winston Churchill told the House of Commons "When the advance of destructive weapons enables everyone to kill everybody, nobody will want to kill anyone at all" Parliamentary Debates Vol. 520, col. 30". (See also J.L. Brierly, op.cit. pp 267 & 269.

More than relevant it is. It is rooted in the present situation of the world: - the economic, military, cultural interdependence of one part of it on the others.

That is part of the reason why the world is becoming more and more integrated whether the politicians like it or not.

Statesmen are supposed to help this integration with all the means at their disposal. But how to implement it?

One way, though a piece meal way, is by Diplomacy. This has been defended, especially by Morgenthau.¹⁴

Another is to help develop the United Nations become

14.a. "The permanent values in the old Diplomacy," in Diplomacy in a Changing World, pp. 10 ff. & PAN, pp. 505 ff.

b. It is recognized that the task of achieving disarmament agreement, of solving major international controversies, of stabilizing the power equilibrium, and of reducing international tensions, are problems for diplomacy. Ibid., p. 62.

a world government.¹⁵ Nor would sovereignty stop in the way completely.¹⁶ Since this is closely connected with the principle of collective security - a principle that is looked at with disfavor by political realists, we do well to analyse their analysis of it.

15. In his state of the Union Message, January 14, 1946, President Truman said that "the security of the United States," required that the United Nations be more than a "process of consultation and compromise," but become "the representative of the world as one society," and that it was the continuing policy of the United States, "To use all its influence to foster, support and develop." it in its purpose of "preventing international war."

This is a change in the concept of national interest which "can be expected to take place gradually, often with local or general setbacks, but the conditions of the contemporary world suggest that each state can save its sovereignty only by losing it in some measure in an effective international legal order."

Quincy Wright, The Role of International Law in Contemporary Diplomacy, Rept. in Kertess and Fitzsimon's DCW, pp. 74-75.

16. Its (sovereignty) invalidity was brought home to us only with the development of modern communications. To try to defend it against the facts of modern life would be unrealistic and dangerous. Nor would we thereby be preserving freedom."

W.L. Willkie, "Our Sovereignty: Shall we use it?" Foreign Affairs, vol. 22, 1944. (see also N.Hill International Organization, Harper, New York, 1952, pp. 6-12.

Introducing collective security, Thompson writes: "Perhaps partly because of the excesses and rigidities of isolationists, the proponents of collective security lost sight of the changeless truths underlying this ancient creed and in so doing perpetrated a new philosophy rooted less in impulse than theory - but a theory distorted, exaggerated, and ultimately enfeebled by its own excessive rationalism and utopianism."¹⁷

One is led legitimately to expect that this is the theme of his treatment of collective security. - a new theory in international relations, a theory that tries to mend the shortsighted actions of nations of the old in not meeting the conflict directly and turning back aggression at its sources.

"The rock-bottom principle upon which collective security is founded provides that one attack on any one state will be regarded as an attack on all states. It finds its measure in the apparently simple doctrine of one for all and all for one. War anywhere, in the context of Article II, of the League of Nations, is the concern of every state."¹⁸

17. Thompson, K., PRCWP, p. 189.

18. Ibid., p. 190.

It goes without saying that the United Nations charter provides also for such a principle.

"Self help and neutrality, it should be obvious, are the exact antithesis of such a theory."¹⁹ In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries this system was fashionable and war, although not eliminated, was localized whenever possible. In a more integrated world, a conflict anywhere has some effect on conditions of peace everywhere."²⁰ This idea is simple, challenging, and seemingly novel."²¹ It would do for the international society what police action does for the domestic community: i.e., "it would prevent war by providing a deterrent to "aggression." It would defend the interests of "peace loving" states in war if it came, by concentrating preponderant power against the "aggressor." These two ends have been goals of both the League and the United Nations."²²

So far Thompson's job is quite descriptive. Criticism

19. Ibid., p. 190.

20. Ibid., p. 190-191.

21. Ibid., p. 191.

22. Ibid.

follows immediately. "This doctrine of collective security bears little resemblance to the *m*march of events from 1919 to 1960. The real issue concerning collective security from the beginning has had little to do with charters or precepts or institutions. Consequently, the past forty years have witnessed in rapid successions two tragically destrudtive wars.... Their cause must be sought less in the doctrines of the time than in the apparently irreconcilable clash between the foreign policies of certain major powers."

"Collective security in practice has been hampered by three persistent problems, all stemming from one fundamental source. In a word, this source is the fatal divorce of the theory from political reality. First, if peace is to be maintained there must be some minimum consensus regarding the territorial arrangements **that** are to be preserved. Second, the strength of international organization for the foreseeable future must rest upon the frail need of a collection of separate national interests sometimes compatible but oftentimes conceived of as divergent with one another."²³

23. Ibid., p. 191-192.

"Third, international government can give reality to collective security only when authority within the organization is commensurate with that outside."²⁴

In connection with the first point, Thompson is correct in saying: "the peace-enforcement agency must have a peace to defend."²⁵ Thompson's further analysis emphasizes the fact that the different major powers responsible for the enforcement of peace gave the doctrine "different content."²⁶ Each of England and France understood by the "status quo" something that serves their different interests. Their interpretations, hence, differed.

Then it is not the political reality or the divorce of the theory from political reality that is to blame. Rather they are the interpretations, different and contradictory, of political reality. You may, if you like to do so, call ideas or impressions in the minds of statesmen "political realities." But this is very confusing. "The status quo", the political reality is something; and the interpretation of it, the ideas and impressions of it, is something quite different -

24. Ibid., pp. 195, 198.

25. Ibid., p. 192.

26. Ibid.

though there is a kind of a relation between the two.

In connection with the second point, Thompson's analysis exposes the application of the rationalist school to international organization. This school assumes that states through reason and persuasion could be made to see that "selfish national interests could always be served best by embracing...the international interest."²⁷

This is partly true and partly false. A satisfactory political theory will have to draw a line, if this is possible at all, between the area where persuasion helps and that where it usually proves impotent. A positive suggestion to this effect, in the context of political realism, is the following. The more reason and interest go hand in hand the more influential is the argument. Reason against interest is very seldom of any impact. The effects of disinterested reason depend on other categories.

But interest is a variable. It is of more or less degrees of intensity. That is why Mr. P.H. Sparks suggestion "that there must be a hierarchy of international

27. Ibid., p. 193.

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27. Ibid., p. 193.

obligations,"²⁸ is correct. The closer the event to us, the more we are likely to stir our interests. Nor is geographical contiguity the only factor that affects the intensity of the interest. The kind of the problem the degree of threat it creates, our standard of power - all these are pertinent factors.

To connect this discussion of ours with the doctrine of collective security, we should raise the question: Does this doctrine assume that all nations be equally interested in preserving peace. On the bases of the way it was just exposed, the answer to this question is certainly in the negative. All it requires, is that all nations recognize their selfish interest in preserving peace. Now when the question of how much is raised, the answer to it may, in harmony with the doctrine of collective security, be given in a hierarchical set of obligations.

This leads us to another charge^{which} Thompson urges against the doctrine. He says; "The chief trouble with the theory of collective security is that in seeking a generalized and normative pattern, it assumes too cavalierly

28. Ibid., p. 194.

that nations with needs and interests will act as policemen whether or not they see their own interest challenged."²⁹ But is this true? Thompson's own words follow: "In this sense all states have an interest in checking even small wars before they fester into big ones."³⁰

Thompson may say in rebuttal. "Yes, nations have this interest, yet they may not see it." In that case which is possible, the blame is not the theory's, rather it is ^{that of} those who fail to appreciate it.

One might add that this rebuttal of Thompson, if at all it happens in fact, is out of the question. For all nations who signed the covenant and the charter, have already recognized that interest and its implication.

But if we do not ask nations to act "wholly in a disinterested and international way," then it is very likely that those interests "diverge" and clash. This is the force of Thompson's second point, though he seems to have forgotten it at the end of his analysis. This is a genuine

29. Ibid., p. 195.

30. Ibid.

difficulty. Many times it also leads to war - even destructive wars. But to blame the principle for it is to commit the mistake of the rationalist school. This blame implied that you expect the principle to solve your problem. Nothing is further from realism.

Finally the friends and extreme supporters and spokesmen of the principle may commit many mistakes in implementing it - being "unaware that what is most needed is a poultice to draw the infectious poison from a conflict, not a sword drawn in punitive action;" & of waiting until a breach of the peace occurs..."³¹ Again you cannot blame the theory for that.

It is true that Thompson gives some credit ³² to collective security. The point of the above analysis is that it deserves much more credit than he is willing to attribute to it. More than that none of his attacks on it prove to hold water.

We come now to his exposition of the third point.

31. Ibid., p. 195.

32. C.S. "When conceived of as the successor of peaceful settlement when conciliators have failed in their task can be a way of meeting this problem. (p. 145). *it*

The crux of the issue/^{is}that centers of gravity in world politics/^{do}not always correspond to the centers of power in the international organization. The Holy Alliance, the League of Nations, and the United Nations suffered, and still suffer from this fact.

One dimension of this problem, however, is that the source of trouble arises from powers that do not join the international organization. How legitimate is it on the part of Thompson to blame the principle of collective security for the actions of those who do not commit themselves to it?

This however does not hold of the other dimension of the problem. This case is peculiar to the U.N. The powers in the U.N.—The Arab Asian bloc, who hold the balance of power, partly due to the shift of power from the security council to the general assembly, "can determine the context of resolutions that sometimes strike at the heart of the vital interests of other powers while safeguarding India's vital interests in Kashmir and Egypt's control over Suez."³³ What makes this fact more tragic especially to a political

33. Ibid., p. 196.

realist like Thompson, is the fact that these powers do not possess physical might. Their weight in the international organization, in other words, is disproportionate to their power.

Again, this is a fact - even if it is illegitimate at all, a question that has to be handled on its own merits - does not show that collective security is a weak principle.

One further remark is called for at this point, ~~This~~ time in connection with the three points Thompson mentions as stemming from one fundamental source - the fatal divorce of the theory from political reality - the word "divorce" here is very vague and perhaps misleading.

If "divorce" means "separation" in the sense of difference, then what Thompson says is true. But it is true not only of collective security but also of all principles and theories. It is, in short, a truism. In this sense it does not help Thompson establish his case. For he cannot from this conclude that it is "utopian."

In another sense "divorce" might mean "has no relation to." In this sense Thompson's charge becomes false. He

himself sees the relation of an "integrated world" especially in an "atomic age", and the principle at hand.

Finally "divorce" might mean that the march of events did not substantiate the principle. This is most likely what Thompson means. The following bears this interpretation out. "This doctrine of collective security bears little resemblance to the march of events from 1919 to 1960,"³⁴ and "The Holy Alliance failed because the concert of Europe lost contact with an objective political situation created by states whose interests were at odds with the aristocratic regimes of Europe united under an ideology of legitimacy."³⁵ Does not this imply that a sound principle must guarantee the confirming march of events? Even the ~~extremest~~^{most} rationalists cannot go so far. "Neither (isolationism or collective security) has been in itself a cure nor substitute for war."³⁶ Also "despite the rich intellectual resources devoted to its defence, isolationism has failed to supply a lasting and reliable theory of international relations."³⁷

34. Ibid., p. 191.

35. Ibid., p. 196.

36. Ibid., p. 197.

37. Ibid., p. 200.

More criticism, against collective security are referred to at the end of this analysis.

Two of its basic assumptions are exposed. First, is the assumption "that the hostile act with which the world would be confronted would be an overt military one, clearly identifiable as aggressive."³⁸ But this, though difficult to clearly define, is becoming somehow obsolete or secondary in value. More common are the methods of "concealed aggression" and economic and political threats.

Collective security does not have to make that assumption. It may cover any kind of threat through any conceivable manner. Of course, the more subtle the act the more difficult becomes the process of defining it and hence of recognizing it. But this is a practical problem for which the principle is not to blame.

Of a similar character are ~~the~~ criticisms^{which} Thompson levels against the second assumption made by collective security, namely, "that combined military strength of the members

38. Ibid., p. 197.

and their effective coordination will be adequate to deter or meet aggression."³⁹ Thompson is right in saying "there hangs over a coalition a law of diminishing returns. It appears to be true that the wider a coalition, the more difficult becomes the problems, of harnessing armed action to a single strategy, preserving secrecy and suddenness of decision, taking advantage of bluff and surprise and rapid maneuver, and showing restraint." Granted that all this is true, does it follow that C.S. is a weak policy? At least⁴⁰ these show that the implementation of it is difficult. To admit this is only realistic.

It is mere realism also to admit that the world community is not so integrated that it is possible in it to determine unambiguously "aggression", "right and wrong" "law," and "violence." Given such an integrated world the handling of C.S. for preserving its peace perhaps will produce more desired results. But even then, we still have to expect some difficulties. But this is not a limitation of C.S. as such, it is one of the natural limitations of any principle whatsoever. Forgetting this seems to constitute one major weakness of Thompson's whole argument. Nor does it help,

39. Ibid., p. 197.

40. Ibid., pp. 197-198.

him or us, to oversimplify the case of explaining why nations go to war? People and nations go to wars for conscious and unconscious reasons⁴¹ - reasons that are beyond any genius to explain and systematize. Whatever the cause, whether contending over what the law is or over what it should be or over any other point, makes little difference to the validity of collective security.

Thompson's major criticism against it is that it does not solve our problems for us.⁴² Of course it does not. It is perhaps naive, so to think or make such a demand on it.

41. "It is unhappily the case that however persistent-ly man may seek for some blanket code of percep-tual rules, compliance with a code would auto-matically ~~do away with~~ such realities as the immense variety of the human family, the inescapable conflicts of its members as they seek influence and power and the fact that human behaviour is only partially calculable by man himself, by reason of the facts that he lacks both the means and the moral courage fully to understand himself." (PRCWP, pp. 201, 210-211).

One cannot ~~but~~wonder whether Thompson was aware of this piece of wisdom all the way when making his attack on C.S.?!

42. C.S. has "failed as has left ~~us~~ with problems it could never solve."
Ibid., p. 200.

As compared with the balance of power alliances which are formed by certain individual nations against other individual nations on the basis of what these nations regard as their national interests, collective security recognizes the respect for legal and moral duty to consider an act of aggression by any nation against any member of the alliance an act of aggression against them all. Alliances of balance of power are against specific nations; those of collective security are against aggression **whoever** is the nation committing it.

Notwithstanding the failures⁴³ of the practice of this doctrine, and not claiming that it will automatically⁴⁴ guarantee collective action against the law breaker, - a requirement which no theory whatsoever can guarantee; notwithstanding that the "odds are strongly against the po

43. "...The two attempts that have been made to put the idea of collective security into practice - Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations - fall far short of the ideal."

Morgenthau, PAN, p. 274.

44. Ibid., pp. 175 & 274. also
 "If the balance of power is/a persistent feature of international politics it is not as Canning among others realized - a fixed and unalterable standard." International Equilibrium, in Hoffmann's, p. 141.

possibility" of realizing the three⁴⁵ assumptions underlying the successful implementation of collective security, still we hold that it is a very strong theory.⁴⁶ The validity of this theory cannot be affected⁴⁷ by the admitted fact that it is very difficult, and perhaps impossible to be made to work under the conditions prevailing on the international scene.

If politics is normative, which it is; and if one

45. "For collective security to operate as a device for the prevention of war, these assumptions must be fulfilled: (1) the collective system must be able to master at all times such overwhelming strength against any potential aggressor or coalition of aggressors that the latter would never dare to challenge the order defended by the collective system; (2) at least those nations whose combined strength would meet the requirement under (1) must have the same conception of security which they are supposed to defend; (3) those nations must be willing to subordinate whatever conflicting political interests may still separate them to the common good defined in terms of the collective defence of all member states." H. Morgenthau, PAN, p. 389.
46. "As an ideal, collective security is without flow, ibid., p. 274.
47. This denies what Morgenthau seems to imply by saying: "...the logic of collective security is flawless, provided it can be made to work under the conditions prevailing on the international scene." ibid., p. 389.

essential feature of its being normative is the possibility of changing the prevailing conditions, which it is; and if the prevailing conditions do not help the implementation of a valid strong, flawless theory, which they do not; and if the change, if we can make it, is for the better, which it is; then we are under obligation to **do** our best to effect that change;⁴⁸ otherwise both our knowledge and our freedom are of no significance.

If traditional realism is pessimistic in the expressive sense, then the difference between it and the attitude expressed by this reconstruction is only a difference of original commitment. Both of these attitudes are,

48. This reconstruction starts like Morgenthau's but does not stop where his stops.

a. "This theoretical concern with human nature as it actually is, and with the historic processes as they actually take place, has earned for the theory presented here the name of realism." op.cit., p. 4.

b. Besides understanding these facts **this** reconstruction aims at evaluating them and **controlling** them, including changing them if possible.

b. "political realism is fatalistic only in assuming that politics of a particularly intense and unrestrained character is a necessary concomitant of present-day international society. Its fatalism falls short of assuming that war is inevitable; indeed its main preoccupation is the search for reasonable, if limited measures for the prevention of war." K. Thompson's PRCWP, pp. 248.

c. The aim of this approach was not to "appraise or condemn but to understand the recurrent world problems." Ibid., p. 19.

See also Morgenthau's PAN, p.

on purely logical grounds, equally valid. One practical grounds, however, optimism is the better policy, since it promises more fruitful consequences.

If, on the other hand, traditional realism is deterministic, as some of the statements of its proponents suggest, then it commits a double blunder, judged from the standpoint of this reconstruction. In the first place, there is no justifying evidence, on the level of our conscious experience, to support complete determinism. Short of complete determinism, on the other hand, traditional realism has either to fall in the lap of this reconstruction, or else to suffer the legitimate accusation of being an escapist philosophy of life. This charge of escapism against traditional realism holds true if it is true that there is a minimum of freedom allowed for man's behaviour. This much experience supports. Do men dare take the responsibility of making the best use of it? Here lies the basic challenge before man not only the political animal but the human being who has to face life. He may ~~show~~ courage in this encounter. Also he may play the role of the coward. If history has taught civilized man any lesson at all, it surely has taught him ~~that~~ cowardice

is another name for suicide.

Politics like life is a struggle.⁴⁹ Sometimes it is a struggle for power; sometimes a struggle for values. Nor are there any reasons that prevent it from being a struggle for other cherished ends too.

49. Though we are given sometimes the impression of a "passive politics."

Weldon's The Vocabulary of Politics, pp. 173-174.

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