THE ECOLOGY OF STAFFING

IN THE

GOVERNMENT OF IRAN

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P R E F A C E

This thesis follows a new tradition or approach of
studies on non-Western administrative systems. In its general
conception and theoretical framework, it is based on the work
of a growing group of administrative scholars who broke away
from a fruitless formalism and tried to study public adminis-
tration in the context of its cultural environment.

This new method of studying public administration is
referred to as ecological approach. John Gaus was one of the
first to urge the need for such an approach. "Unfortunately,"
says Fred W. Riggs, "few appear to have taken this injunction
seriously."[1] The ecological approach or the theory of inter-
relations between administration and its environment is there-
fore of recent development. It is still in embryonic form but
serious efforts are being made in the area of model-building
and empirical research. Fred W. Riggs stands at the forefront
of this trend; "and the 'ecologically oriented' lable is one
which Heady affixes to Riggs' theory building."[2]

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[1] Fred W. Riggs, "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public
Administration," International Review of Administrative Sciences
XXVIII (1962), p. 14.

[2] Keith M. Henderson, "Comparative Public Administration"
(A mimeograph, Department of Political Studies and Public Adminis-
tration, American University of Beirut, April, 1964), p. 5.

The ecological approach, in short, is concerned with the interrelationships and interactions of public administration with its total cultural setting. This is a useful model of analysis because it tries to relate administrative behavior to non-administrative factors. An attempt, therefore, is made in this study to examine the actual staffing process of the Iranian government; and try to relate staffing practices (administrative behavior) to the economic, social, and political systems of the Iranian society.

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CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION

Public Administration does not work in a vacuum. In fact, no government comes into being unless there exist a group of people and a place for the group to live in. People and place, therefore, are two fundamental prerequisites for any governmental and hence administrative system. Variables such as "ideas and wishes" of the people, technology - both physical and social - national disasters, and many other factors creating and then conditioning administrative systems emanate from and are related to these two basic factors.

In fact, cultures in general are originally the result of man's struggle against nature in his activities of satisfying his needs. As a result of this struggle there develops an interrelationships and interactions between man and man. Thus we have now interrelationships between man and nature - his natural environment - and between man and man. As time goes on this process becomes more and more complex and difficult to grasp. As a sociologist points out :

> Man's first task in any environment is to live. Through trial and error he must learn to provide himself with food and, if the climate is rigorous, with clothing and shelter. In his attempt to meet the needs of life in any environment, he immediately begins to invent.... The knowledge which he gains from his experiments is the beginning of a cultural environment.[1]

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[1] Paul H. Landis, Man in Environment: An Introduction to Sociology (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1942), pp.89-90.

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Culture is then what man has made through centuries. It is the entire man-made environment such as language, religion, science, custom, tools, machines, houses, art, morals, ideas and ideals. Culture passes on from generation to generation with additions and modifications by each new generation.[2]

Different forms of human institutions such as religion, corporations, governments and hence administrative systems are therefore the product of complex interrelationships and inter-actions of man with nature and with his fellowmen. An adminis-trative system, thus, comes into existence as a response to certain environmental - material and non-material - demands and pressures in order to fulfil certain objectives. Since a system of public administration is created as a result and in response to certain environmental demands, it is always affected by its cultural envi-ronment. One cannot therefore "assume that public administration can escape the effects of... or is... independent of and isolated from the culture or setting in which it develops."[3]

The work of a government is therefore determined mainly by its socio-economic and political settings. Quoting Fred W. Riggs: "It is fairly apparent that governmental setting is one of the fundamental determinants of administrative behavior..."[4] Cultural settings, therefore, provide useful raw material for the analysis

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[2]Ibid., pp. 85-87.

[3]Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Administration: Three Problems," Public Administration Review, VII, No. 1 (1947), p. 8.

[4]Fred W. Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration (Bombay, India: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 4.

of governments, politics, and public administration. John
Gaus in his <u>Reflection on Public Administration</u> points out:

> Before we can consider the aptness of political ideas
> or the adequacy of political machinery... we must be
> fully alive to what might be called the raw material
> of political $\underline{}$ and administration$\overline{}$ - the nature and
> extent of the demands made upon the machinery of
> government, and the environment in which it moves.[5]

However, the process of influence is not one way at all.
Government administration is not merely an effect of its societal
environment, having no influence on its setting. It is also a
cause and hence affects its natural and cultural settings. In
fact, government administrations have brought about changes in
the society in which they have operated. Tennessee Valley Autho-
rity in the United States is a good example of how public adminis-
tration can bring about changes in a society.[6] Public administration
therefore plays a great role in shaping and reshaping the environ-
ment in which it moves. As Marshall Dimock observes: "Administra-
tion in the broad sense determines the kind of society we are
going to live in and bequeathe to our children. For administra-
tion deals with institutional goals and objectives, with social
values and individual growth..."[7]

Consequently public administration affects its environ-
ment as much as being affected by it. There is thus an inter-

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[5]John Merriman Gaus, <u>Reflection on Public Administration</u>
(Birmingham, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1947, p. 3.
Quoting Felix Frankfurther, <u>The Politics and Its Government</u> (the William
E. Dodge Lectures on Citizenship, delivered at Yale in May, 1930;
New York: Yale University Press, 1930).

[6]Roscoe C. Martin, "The Role of Public Administration in the
Process of Development",A lecture delivered at the American University
of Beirut, Dec. 9, 1963.

[7]<u>A Philosophy of Administration: Toward Creative Growth</u>
(New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958), p. 1.

relationship between public administration and its social, political, economic and natural or geographical settings. This mutual relationship is called ecology, a term borrowed from and mostly used in biology.

"Ecology", as defined in the Webster Dictionary, is "the mutual relations between organisms and their environment."[8] J.W. Bew states that the word "ecology" is derived from the Greek aikos, a house or home. It refers to all the inter-relationships of living organisms and their environment.[9] Public Administration, like an organism performs certain functions and thus has interactions with its environment.

This is what is meant here by ecology and ecological approach to the study of public administration. The ecological approach implies that public administration, like an organism, is a moving whole. Hence it must be studied in its totality and in reference to its environmental context. In other words, the ecological approach as understood here provides a tool for the study of interactions between public administration and its cultural and natural settings.

Moreover, public administration here is conceived of as a system composed of interrelated parts. Malfunctioning of one part, therefore, may upset the whole system. In fact the whole society is considered to be a system with interrelated sub-systems such as economic, social, and political sub-systems. An appropriate term for such an

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[8] *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., Publishers, 1957).

[9] J.W. Bew, *Human Ecology* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 1. Quoted in John Merriman Gaus, op. cit., p. 6.

analysis is "eco-system" (ecological system) approach. This approach
conceives of public administration, and hence of staffing, as some-
thing dynamic to be studied in its totality and in relation to other
sub-systems of the total system.

As indicated in the preface, John Gaus was one of the first
to talk about ecology of public administration. In his book,
Reflection on Public Administration, he observes that there are
interrelationships between public administration and its setting.
He points out seven environmental factors affecting public adminis-
tration, i.e., people, place, physical technology, social technology,
wishes and ideas, catastrophes, and personality of the administrator.[10]

Robert Dahl shares similar attitude by stating that:

> ... the study of public administration inevitably must become
> a much more broadly based discipline, resting not on narrowly
> defined knowledge of techniques and processes, but rather
> extending to the varying historical, sociological, economic
> and other conditioning factors that give public administration
> its peculiar stamp in each country.[11]

The outline of a bibliography prepared by Lyton K. Caldwell
back in 1955 implicitly reflects on ecological model. Here emphasis
is put upon comparative study of selected public administrative
systems, approached in terms of broadly defined personnel administra-
tion to stress certain general patterns of interaction between public
administrative systems and their socio-cultural environments.[12]

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[10]Gaus, Op. cit., p. 9.

[11]Dahl, op.cit., p. 11.

[12]William J. Siffin, "Toward the Comparative Study of Public
Administration," William J. Siffin (ed.), Toward the Comparative
Study of Public Administration (Blomington: Indiana University Press,
1959), p. 11.

Elsehwere Caldwell talks also about ecology when he says that
an understanding of the environmental situation is necessary for
the understanding of administrative behavior.[13]

Riggs is the most prominent writer in the ecological
approach. "Mere acquaintance", says Ferrel Heady, "with all of
his writings ... is in itself not an insignificant accomplishment."[14]
In his various works Riggs tries to formulate and reformulate close-
ly related concepts, reflecting a sustained effort at refinement
and precision. To illustrate, in his essay, "Agraria and Industria:
Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," Riggs introduces
"agraria" to stand for societies of intense agricultural type and
"industria" for intense industrial societies. He conceives of the
models of agraria and industria as "equilibrium" systems. Interme-
diate between the two models are the transitional settings.[15] How-
ever, "transitional societies in the process of rapid movement
from agraria toward industria show a greater rate of change than
societies nearer the equilibrium models."[16] It may be assumed that

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[13]"Turkish Administration and the Politics of Expediency,"
Siffin, op. cit., pp. 118-19. See also Caldwell's "Environment: A
New Focus for Public Policy," Public Administration Review, XXIII
(1963), 132-39; and "Technical Assistance and Administrative Reforms
in Colombia, American Political Science Review, XLVII (1953), 494-510.

[14]Ferrel Heady, "Development and Status of the Study of Com-
parative Administration," Prepared for Delivery at the 1961 Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis,
Mo., Sheraton-Jefferson Hotel, Sept. 6-9, 1961. (Mimeographed.)

[15]Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria: Toward a Typology
of Comparative Administration," Siffin, op. cit., pp. 27-30.

[16]Heady, op. cit., p. 5

transitional societies will not be in equilibrium, that there does
not exist a high degree of functional relationships among all their
elements, that many disfunctions therefore will exist. Riggs'
theory implies a nne-way transition or development from agraria
toward industrial type.[17]

In his later words Riggs talks about "refracted" and "fused"
societies representing the two extremes. The fused model stands for
"a purely hypothetical society in which a single structure would
perform all the functions necessary for the survival of a society."[18]
In contrast the refracted model stands for a hypothetical society
in which "every function has a corresponding structure that is spe-
cialized for its performance."[19] In between the two polar types
there are the "prismatic" societies in which there exists a mixture
of traditional and modern, industrial characteristics. Then Riggs
goes on to say that the prismatic societies have the following
three characteristics: heterogeneity, formalism, and overlapping.
He calls the administration of the prismatic society "sala model"
of administration which he conceives of being a product of a mixture
but different from both. The three essential features of the prisma-
tic societies also characterize the sala administration.[20]

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[17]Riggs, "Agraria and Industria: Toward a Typology of Compa-
rative Administration," Siffin, op. cit., pp. 99-100.

[18]Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration, p. 94.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Riggs, "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model," Ferrel
Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (eds.), Papers in Comparative Public Admi-
nistration (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, the Univer-
sity of Michigan, 1962), pp.19-23. See also the following works of
Riggs: The Ecology of Public Administration (Bombay: Asia Publishing

There are still others who have in one way or the other talked about the ecology or the interrelationships of public administration with its environmental setting. Among them the following may be mentioned: Morroe Berger, P.M. Blau, Joseph La Palombara, Robert V. Presthus, J.D. Thompson, S. Mailick, Walter R. Sharp, Alfred Diamant, Ferrel Heady, James n. Mosel, and Stanley H. Udy.[21]

(Continued from page 7)
House, 1961); "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model," Heady and Stokes, op. cit., pp. 19-36; "Prismatic Society and Financial Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly, V (1960), 1-46; "International Relations as a Prismatic System," World Politics, XIV (1961), 144-52.

[21]See Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); P.M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1956); Joseph La Palombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Robert V. Presthus, The Organizational Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1962); J.D. Thompson and others (ed.), Comparative Studies in Public Administration (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1960); S. Mailick and Edward H. Van Ness (eds.), Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behavior (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1962); Robert V. Presthus, "Behavior and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," Public Administration Review, XIX (1959), pp. 25-35, and "Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organization," Social Forces, XXXVIII (1959), pp. 103-109, and "Weberian V. Welfare Bureaucracy in Traditional Society," Administrative Science Quarterly VI (1961), pp. 1-24; Stanely H. Udy, "Administrative Rationality, Social Setting, and Organizational Development," American Journal of Sociology, LXVIII (July, 1962 - May 1963), pp. 299-308. The following articles are found in William J. Siffin (ed.), Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1959): Walter R. Sharp, "Bureaucracy and Politics - Egyptian Model;" Alfred Diamant, "The French Administrative System - The Republic Passes but the Administration Remains;" Ferrel Heady, "The Philippine Administrative Systems - A Fusion of East and West;" and James N. Mosel, "Thai Administrative Behavior."

The value of using ecological approach to the study of public administration lies in the relevant use of this approach compared with other approaches such as the traditional and behavioral approaches. Traditional approaches were most fruitful during the period 1887 to the 1930's. The period between the 1940's and late 1950's (1958) may conveniently be called the period of behavioral approaches.[22]

Most of the works in the line of what later came to be known as the "traditional" school of thought were done during the period 1887 to the 1930's. Two distinct trends are discernable in the writings of this period. Beginning with Wilson's essay entitled "The Study of Public Administration" in 1887, "a large group of writers whose training was in law or who were interested in political institutions, discussed the administration of government agencies, concentrating on prescriptions for improvement."[23] The "politics" or "political science" scholars based their approach on a framework of legal rights and duties of government.[24] The proper way of organizing the activities of government in order to achieve efficiency and effectiveness was their main concern, for they wrote at the time when the prevailing attitude toward the government was critical and when

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[22]Keith M. Henderson, "A Brief Guide to American Public Administration for Non-Americans" (A mimeograph; Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut, 1963), pp. 6 & 16.

[23]Henderson, op. cit., p. 6.

[24]John M. Pfiffner and Robert V. Presthus, Public Administration (4th ed., New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1960), p. 8.

there were cries for reform and reorganization.[25] Frank J. Goodnow's Politics and Administration (1900) and Public Administration (1927), Leonard D. White's Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (1926) are among the numerous books and articles written during the period.[26]

The politics-administration dichotomy was the main emphasis in the "political science" trend of the traditional school of thought. The numerous writings of this period emphasized that government administration should be divorced from politics and should only concern itself with the detailed execution of laws laid down by the legislators.

Efficiency and elimination of waste through structural reorganization was a second major concern of the exponents of the "politics" trend. L.D. White, for example, believed that in order to get efficiency structural reorganization was needed to provide a "sensible" relationship of component parts.[27]

In summary, then, the scholars of the early years of public administration discussed what was later called "the politics-administration dichotomy and revealed a predominantly legal-institutional-historical orientation. The common backdrop was widespread, and largely successful, effort to introduce structural,

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[25]Henderson, op. cit., p. 6.

[26]Ibid., pp. 6-7.

[27]Ibid., pp. 8-9.

procedural, and personnel changes into American government."[28]
There were numerous institutional descriptions along with a
plethora of prescriptions for administrative organizations and
reorganizations.[29]

The other trend was "general administration". The concern
here was with administration of all kinds of organization - public,
private, school, church, military, etc., F.W. Taylor, an American
Engineer, and Henri Fayol, a French industrialist, were the pioneers
of this trend. Their writings were a source of inspiration for the
later scholars of General Administration. Most of the writers of
General Administration were practitioners and wrote on the basis
of their own experiences.[30]

Max Weber, a German sociologist, may also be considered
here as one of the forerunners of public administration. He wrote
about the ideal type of bureaucracy which he identified with large
scale organization. Weber believed that an ideal type of bureau-
cracy has to follow and adhere to hierarchy, rules, "rationalized
job structure", formalization, separation of management and owner-
ship, merit as a basis of selection, and special training.[31]

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[28]Ibid., p. 9.

[29]Ibid., p. 10.

[30]Ibid., pp. 6 & 11.

[31]Pfiffner and Presthus, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

Efficiency and the best and cheapest way of accomplishing routine work was the major concern of Taylor. Fayol was mainly concerned with the job of top administrators and he developed fourteen principles[32] for effective administration. By administration he meant planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating and control. All the three scholars were concerned with what may be called the structural components.[33]

J.D. Mooney and A.C. Reily's work Onward Industry[34] (1930) was another classic of General Administration. They talked about principles of administration and put coordination as the first principle of organization.[35]

Finally, we have L. Gulick and L. Urwick's edited work, Papers on the Science of Administration, 1937. This "volume is today considered by many to be the most representative work of the 'classical', 'traditional', or 'orthodox' approach to administration. It reflects the pursuit of a scientifically grounded discipline, confidently prescriptive and applicable to all forms of organization."[36] In the opening paper, "Notes on the Theory of Administration", Gulick sums up the functions of top

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[32]Division of work; authority; discipline; unity of command; unity of direction; subordination of individual interests to the general interest; remuneration; centralization; scalar chain; order; equity; stability of tenure of personnel; initiative; espirit de corps. See Henderson, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 13.

[33]Henderson, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

[34]This book was reissued in 1939 as, The Principles of Organization.

[35]Other principles were scalar, functional, and staff. They believed that there were historical proofs for such principles. Henderson, op. cit., p. 14.

[36]Henderson, op. cit., p. 15.

executives in the coined word POSDCORB, standing for: planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting. Moreover, he postulates four basis of organizing, i.e. purpose, process, place, and people, each having advantages and disadvantages.[37]

It is important to note at this point that the gap between the two trends was not extremely wide. Both trends emphasized efficiency and proper means of control. Both concerned themselves more with formal structure rather than administrative behavior. Both were prescriptive with little call for empirical research. Practical experience and history were thought by the exponents of both trends to be adequate guides for their recommendations which they made with little doubt.[38]

There has been much criticism of the traditional school of thought by the later scholars of public administration, political science, sociology, psychology and anthropology. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss all the shortcomings of the traditional approaches. It suffices to say that the "classical" sholars did not go beyond the formal structure of organizations. Their approach was "mechanistic" and they viewed organizations as a sum-total of distinct components which could be studied and dealt with separately. They separated administration from its settings and believed in the dichotomy of politics and administration. They neglected the impact of culture on administration. Moreover, their approach to public

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[37] Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[38] Ibid., p. 15.

administration was normative. And on the basis of history and limited experience - "armchair speculation" - they developed universal principles and talked of the science of administration or public administration. Finally, the traditional scholars did not go beyond legal structure and ignored many causes of administrative behavior.[39] The traditional approaches are not, therefore, sufficient guidlines for the analysis of the administrative systems in the underdeveloped countries like Iran, where there exists a diffusion of functions and where administration is largely determined by other socio-cultural, economic, and political factors.

The behavioral approach is another way of viewing public administration. The advocates of this approach were largely influenced by the results of Hawthorn's studies and the works of Mayo, Roethlisberger, Dickson, Chester Barnard and Mary Parker Follett. The most flourishing era for this school of thought, if it could be called a school, was the period between 1945 to 1958.[40]

Some of the exponents of the behavioral approach emphasized sociology. Others tried to apply the principles of psychology to the study of public administration. Still there were some who believed that a knowledge of both sociology and psychology was necessary for the study of administrative organization. Individuals, small groups, cliques, "leadership by integration", autho-

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[39]Ibid., pp. 16-17. See also Pfiffner and Presthus, op. cit., pp. 215-17.

[40]Henderson, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

rity based on acceptance, morale, democratic management and informal organizations in general were the focus of analysis for such scholars.[41]

Although some tried to relate administrative behavior to the larger organizational environment, the main concern here was with isolated components of organizations. Like the "traditionalists", they viewed administrative organizations as the sum-total of distinct parts, only substituting human elements for mechanical structures of their predecessors. In other words their approach was a "components" rather than a "system" approach. Elias H. Porter in his article, "The Parable of the Spindle," characterises the behavioral approach to organization

> ... as a 'components' approach which sought changes by adjusting the components to fit the system as designed ... The rush hour overload in the restaurant might best be corrected by changing the system to include a spindle for waitresses' orders rather than instituting a human relations programme incentive towards, or motion studies /_as prescribed by the exponents of the behavioral approach _7.[42]

Moreover, the behavioral approach was often culture-bound and thus of limited value as a model for the study of the administrative systems in the underdeveloped countries like Iran.

Furthermore, we have the "Modern Organization Theory" which

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[41]Administrative Behavior (2nd ed., 1958), by Herbert A. Simon; Public Administration (1950), by H.A. Simon, R.W. Smithburg and V.R. Thompson; The Human Side of Enterprise (1960), by Douglas McGregor are a few examples of the behaviorial approaches.

[42]Henderson, op. cit., p. 32.

is of a very recent origin, starting about 1958.[43] Here in this
approach the general concern is with _systems_ rather than _components_
and the focus of study is upon internal process of organizations.[44]
Not much effort has been made here to relate the internal processes
or organizations to the larger socio-cultural settings. This
approach is also culture-bound and more related to the American
business world than public organizations in the developing nations.
Thus although the usefulness of Modern Organization Theory should
not be denied, especially as applied to the Western societies where
it is more feasible to study organizations in discrete units, it is
of limited usefulness as a tool for the study of administrative
system in Iran. As Waldo points out in the foreword to Ferrel
Heady and Sybil Stokes' (eds.) _Papers in the Comparative Public
Administration_, Modern Organization Theory "tends to be strongly
American in its geography and is oriented toward private organi-
zation: The American factory is its normal research site."[45]

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[43]_Ibid._, p. 30. _Organizations_ (1958), by J.G. March and H.A.
Simon; _Modern Organization Theory_ (1959), by Mason Haire (ed.);
Modern Organization (1961), by V.A. Thompson; _Complex Organizations_
(1961) by A. Etzioni (ed.); _Formal Organizations_ (1962), by P.M.
Blau and W.R. Scott are among the numerous books and articles written
about the subject.

[44]Henderson, _op. cit._, p. 32.

[45]Heady and Stokes, _op. cit._, p. vi.

The ecological approach on the other hand, by trying to relate administration to its setting, explains the real causes of administrative behavior. A direct implication of this is that much of the misunderstanding between the citizens and the government can be clarified. For, as John Gaus puts it, "the citizen blames the 'bureaucrates' and 'politicians' because the basic ecological causes have not been clarified for him".[46] And unless the causes of public administration are clear, there can develop no satisfactory, standard to measure and control a government in its everyday activity.[47] The effort to relate government functions to the environment, therefore, is necessary, and its vitality is recognized by various observers and scholars of politics and public administration.[48]

Moreover, the ecological approach as understood here can be used as a tool in comparative studies of public administration. Comparative studies are necessary for the promotion of a science of public administration to be applicable to diverse cultures and national settings. But comparative studies to be fruitful should go beyond the superficial and try to establish relationships by relating administration of various societies to its cultural

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[46] Gaus, op. cit., p. 14.

[47] Ibid., p. 6.

[48] Ibid., p. 3.

environment. In other words the comparative studies should be ecological.[49] For "there can be no truly universal generalizations about public administration without a profound study of varying national and social characteristics impinging on public administration, to determine what aspects of public administration, if any, are truly independent of the national and social settings."[50] It is true that not much attention has been given to the ecological model and that it is "only on the horizon". But this is a useful method to be used for understanding the politics and administration of the traditional societies like Iran. For in Iran, as in other underdeveloped countries, formal political and administrative institutions and practices remain predominantly formalistic; and "effective behavior is still determined, to a considerable extent by traditional structues and pressures, the family, religion, and persisting socio-economic

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[49] Ferrel Heady in his article, "Comparative Public Administration: Concerns and Priorities," identifies four tendencies in comparative public administration: "modified traditional", "the equilibrium or input-output"or"bureaucratic orientation", and "ecological oriented model". See Heady and Stokes, op. cit., p. 4.
Fred W. Riggs in his article, "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public Administration," discerns three trends in the comparative study of public administration during the past fifty years. "The first", he says, "is by now fairly clear, but the second and the third are only just emerging. The first is a trend from normative toward more empirical approaches. The second is an emergent emphasis on nomothetic / or studies which seek explicitly to formulate and test general propositions/ in contrast with predominantly idiographic /or individual country and case studies/ method. And the third involves a shift from non-ecological to ecological modes of thought." See Fred W. Riggs, International Review of Administrative Sciences, XXVIII (1962), p. 9.

[50] Dahl, op. cit., p. 5.

practices."[51] Moreover, the ecological model is a useful tool
by which one can understand better the Western administrative
institutions even though they are relatively autonomous and free
from environmental pressures.[52]

The comparative study of public administration therefore,
as Riggs observes, "will remain relatively sterile and limited
in its significance unless, and until, it learns how to change
from a predominantly non-ecological to an ecological method."[53]
This is especially important in understanding administration
and hence staffing in Iran - where much can be gained by relating
non-administrative factors to administrative.

An attempt, therefore, will be made in this study
(chapters 4, 5, 6) to examine the actual or effective staffing
process of the government of Iran and try to relate such a pro-
cess to its socio-economic, political and geographic settings.
Personnel laws and regulations may also be included in the ecology,
for they set forth the horizon and the sphere within which the
staffing process must be carried out. The following two chapters,
therefore, will be devoted to the historical and legal framework
of government staffing in Iran. Chapter seven will cover the
conclusion.

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[51]Riggs, "Trends in the Comparative Study of Public
Administration," op. cit., p. 14.

[52]Ibid., pp. 14-15.

[53]Ibid., p. 15.

CHAPTER II

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of Iran (Persia) may arbitratily be divided
into three periods or epochs: the period before the revolution
of 1906, the period between 1906 and 1921, and the period from
1922 onward. The existing system of public administration in
Iran dates from the early 1920's.[1]

THE PERIOD BEFORE 1906

Before 1906 the main function of the persian government
was the maintenance of an army for the enlargement of the empire
at the beginning and the protection of the country in later cen-
turies. Expansion, protection, and the maintenance of law and
order, therefore, were the three major purposes of the Persian
Governments. But the maintenance of an army for the above three-
fold purposes had its expenses and it had somehow to be financed.
Revenues had, therefore, to be collected.

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[1]Jahangir Amuzegar, "Administrative Barriers to Economic
Development," Middle East Economic Papers - 1958 (Beirut, Lebanon:
Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut, Dar el-
Kitab, 1958), p. 3.

In order to collect revenues, there had developed in Persia a system of government administration based on patronage and bartering, the _Shah_ being always the original barterer. Before 1906, as W.S. Haas observes:

> ... the Shah considered country and people his property and acted accordingly .... With the exception of ministerial posts, and sometimes even these, all positions were obtained by bartering. The provincial governors paid fees to the Shah and indemnified themselves by selling the places of subgovernors and others to the highest bidders, and so it went down the scale to the working people, particularly the peasants, who had nobody below them to extort from and who were the ultimate victims.[2]

Persian functionaries of this long period were few in number and lacked professional training. For example, during the Safavid rule in Iran (Circa 1499-1722) the list of the higher offices of the central administration consisted of 112 positions besides which there were a few more officials of middle and lower ranks.[3]

The character of administration, to a large extent, depended upon the person and the will of the officeholder. Administrative functions were therefore based on traditional procedures and common-sense rather than laws and regulations, at least to a considerable degree. In fact, there was little or no distinction between the public treasury and the private purse of the _Shah_. There did not exist, either above or below, an exact account and control, and the budgets were no more than rough estimates.[4]

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[2]William S. Haas. _Iran_ (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), p. 113.

[3]V. Minorsky (trans.), _Tadhkirat Al-Muluk: A Manual of Safavid Administration_ (circa 1137/1725); Persian Text in Facsimile (London: Messrs. Luzac and Co., 1943), p. 110.

[4]Haas, _op. cit._, p. 113.

However, although the <u>Shah</u> could appoint and dismiss officers of all ranks,[5] it was beyond his physical ability to carry out all the functions of the state.[6] So he had to appoint ministers to help him and carry out his orders. Thus came the roles of the prime minister and the ministers in the bartering system of the period, mainly during the Qajar dynasty (1796-1925). The duties and the powers these people, especially the prime minister, had during their terms of office varied a great deal depending on the degree of favor or confidence they enjoyed; their ability and also the ability, energy or indolence, and incompetency of their master, the <u>Shah</u>. For example, the prime minister, who was in general called the "regulator" and the "safety" of the state, held, when he received the favor of his sovereign, great power and exercised great influence over all the branches of government, as in the appointment of officials and financiers.[6] Employments and promotions, therefore, were based on his choice in the upper levels and on the choice of other officials of lower ranks for the lower levels of positions.

"The result of this system of extortion and rapacity was a great strategy of self-defence by which the inferior tried to

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[5] Colonel Sir John Malcolm, <u>The History of Persia, From the Most Early Period to the Present Time: An Account of the Religion, Government, Usages, and Character of the Inhabitants of that Kingdom</u> (2 Vols.; London: Printed for John Murray, Albemarle Street, And Longman and Co., Paternaster Row, by James Moyes, Greville Street, n.d.), II, 429.

[6] <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 435-37.

slip through the meshes of the net thrown around him. There developed a technique of cunning, simulation, and ruse which the Persians learned to master with rare perfection..."[7] This irregular administration had led to intolerable corruption especially during the last century of the Qajar dynasty. The army as a result of corruption and extinction of military spirit in the upper classes had become inefficient and of no use except as a means of suppression and exploitation of the masses. Love of gain and making money had become the only end of the government functionaries at all levels.[8] "The fact that every post was put up to auction... led to terrible acts of tyranny."[9] It was, for example, customary to appoint a man to a position by taking an amount of money from him and then dismiss him a few months later.[10]

By the end of 19th century "the knife had passed the flesh and reached the bone" and thus corruption and the resultant injustices could no more be tolerated. Thus Naser ed-Din Shah (1848-1896) was assassinated in 1896.[11] However, it was not until 1905 that dissatisfaction gained some momentum. There was by then opposition among all classes of people throughout the country,

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[7] Haas, op. cit., p. 113.

[8] Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Persia (2 vols., 3rd ed., London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1958), II, pp. 382-84.

[9] Ibid., pp. 383-84.

[10] Ibid., p. 387.

[11] Ibid., p. 383.

especially in larger cities like Tabriz, Isfahan, and Tehran.
There were cries for reforms, but no response on the part of the
government. This intensified the situation and led to the Persian
Revolution of 1905-1906.[12]

The main elements among the revolutionaries were the ulema
and the merchants.[13] Their real aim was to check the corrupt and
oppressive, but on the other hand weak, government whose major
function was "to manufacture crime and... [send] out bands of
men to rob for [its] benefit."[14]

As a result of this Revolution, which lasted from December
1905 to August 1906, a constitution was granted in August 1906[15]
and thus marked the beginning of the second period of our classi-
fication of the Persian history, i.e., 1906-1921.

THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1906-1921

However, the grant of the constitution of 1906 did not bring
about any actual changes in administrative practices. The period
between 1906-1921 (in fact until 1925) was a period of political
and administrative impotence, economic stagnation, declining
prestige and foreign intervention. As Elgin Groseclose puts it:

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[12]Ahmad Kasravi, Constitutional History of Iran (4th ed., in
Persian; Tehran, Iran: Amir Kabir Publishing Institute, n.d.), pp. 15-47.

[13]Sykes, op. cit., pp. 400-401.

[14]Ibid., p. 384. See also Ali Akbar Bina, A Summary of the
History of Iran (In Persian and French; Tehran: Printing Office of
the Department of Audiovisual, Fine Art Organization, n.d.), p. 26

[15]Sykes, op. cit., pp. 401-403.

The troubles that beset parliamentary government in Iran were not only the lack of political preparation among the people, but the failure of the Constitution to provide either a fundamental law or a system of administration under law. An elective assembly of one hundred thirty-six deputies was instituted, but no election procedures were laid down.

Power remained with various cliques in Tehran which through control of the prime ministry, effectively disposed of public offices. The administration of the provinces remained largely unchanged... and the system of farming out offices to the highest bidder, which had prevailed since antiquity, was hardly modified.[16]

The irregular system of administration of the first period - the period before the revolution and the grant of constitution - thus prevailed without much change during this second period until the time of Reza Shah (the father of the present Shah of Iran) and his reforms. This is "a fact which must be kept in mind in order fully to appreciate his achievement in introducing a modern administration based upon a well-trained bureaucracy with fixed and regularly paid salaries."[17] This leads to the third period, i.e., 1922 to the present.

FROM 1922 ONWARD

This third period is, especially from 1925-1941, the period of reforms, modernization, and centralization of administration in Iran on the line of the Western system of administration. The period begins with the advent of Reza Khan Pahlavi who was later to become the Shah and establish the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran.

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[16]Introduction to Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 63-64.

[17]Haas, op. cit., p. 114.

In 1921 Reza Khan, an officer in the Persian Cossack brigade
and later the commander, led a march against Tehran and together
with a politician, Zia-al-Din Tabatabai, conducted a coup d'etat
in February of the same year. As a result of this coup d'etat
a new government came to power which subsequently brought about
many changes in Iran. It was from this date (1921) that the lot
of Iran, still called Persia, was placed in the hand of a single
man, Reza Khan, Minister of War and the Commander-in-Chief of all
Persian forces in 1921, Prime Minister in 1923, and Shah from
December 17, 1925 to 1941, the time when he abdicated, under the
Allied pressure, in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the
present Shah of Iran.[18]

In 1922 Reza Khan appointed Dr. Arthur Millspaugh, an
American recommended by the Department of State, as Financial
Advisor with complete control of governmental revenues and expen-
ditures. Also an American Advisory Commission was employed to
assist in administrative reforms.[19] "Pahlavi's aim was to elimi-
nate corruption, inefficiency and waste through the use of these

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[18]Richard N. Frye, Iran (2nd ed.; London: George Allen and
Unwin Ltd., 1960), pp. 74-75 & 81. See also Mohammed Reza Shah
Pahlavi, Mission for My Country (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd.,
1961), pp. 39-44.

[19]Hedley V. Cooke, Challenge and Response in the Middle East:
The Quest for Responsibility, 1919-1951 (New York: Harper and
Brothers Publishers, 1952), p. 235. Article VIII of Dr. Millspaugh
contract with the Iranian government states that "The Administrator
General /Dr. Millspaugh/ will, under the supervision of the
Minister of Finance, have immediate charge of the entire financial
administration. He will have full authority to prepare the budget...;
and in case reorganization may become desirable he will ... reorga-
nize the Ministry of Finance and such other offices of the Govern-
ment as are directly concerned with the receipt, accounting for, and

media, and thereby to bring into being a general situation more favorable to his proposed campaign to modernize Persia in a large scale manner and in as short order as possible."[20] The period between 1925-1941 may, therefore, be called the period of reforms in all walks of life and in every field such as communications, transportation, agriculture, industry, army and finally administration to which Reza Shah paid much attention. Many laws and decrees, most of them a priori, i.e., not based on the existing problems, were passed during this period.[21] It was thus during this period that the structure of the European systems of administration, mainly that of France, was transplanted into Iran. And since the country and the people were not prepared for such a relatively advanced system of administration, it is understood that most of the laws and regulations based on the European systems remained on paper only and, therefore, did not correspond to what was going on in the administration of the Iranian Government.[22]

(Continued from p. 26)

disbursement of public funds." "The Law of Engagement of the Administrator General of the Finances, Nov. 12, 1942," Arthus C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia (Washington, D.C.: The Brooking Institution, 1946), p. 270. For a detailed account of Dr. Millspaugh's authority and responsibility see Articles ix, xi, and xiii of the same law.

[20] Cooke, op. cit., p. 235.

[21] Millspaugh, op. cit., pp. 26-34.

[22] W. Hardy Wickwar, "Pattern And Problems of Local Administration in the Middle East," Middle East Journal, XII (1958), pp. 249-57.

With the exception of Dr. Millspaugh's second visit to Iran to help the government solve its financial and administrative problems, nothing of real significance was done during the period between 1941 to 1953. For the government was occupied in the struggle against the problems of World War II and the aftermath, the Azerbaigan and the Kurdish Republics, and finally the oil crises of the early 1950's. From 1941 up to the early 50's therefore the political problems had overshadowed all other socio-economic and administrative problems. Hence there was little time left for the government to think about administration.[23]

Since the early 50's the country and the government have become, to some extent, free from serious political disturbances and there have been attempts at administrative reforms. But due to many cultural factors, as it will be clear in the following chapters, nothing of administrative significance has as yet taken place. Minor laws and decrees have been issued but with little practical consequence. Bills have been prepared, but not approved by the Majlis (the Iranian Lower House). It is not, therefore, surprising to say that at present "the Iranian Civil Service system is based upon the Civil Service Law of 1922. And except for a few minor revisions, it has remained essentially the same since then.[24]

Keeping in mind the above historical background, it is appropriate at this point to examine the Civil Service Law of 1922 and other laws and regulations related to the staffing process. In other words, in the following chapter the formal or legal basis of staffing in the government of Iran will be examined.

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[23] Frye, op. cit., pp. 80-90.

[24] Amuzegar, op. cit., p. 8.

CHAPTER III

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

In January 1963 (Bahman 1341) the High Council of Administra-
tion compiled all the personnel laws and regulations in a volume of
more than 450 pages. According to this compilation of personnel
laws and by-laws, there are at present nine "cadres" in the civil
service of Iran. They are: Administrative, Security (police),
Educational, Medical, Diplomatic, Engineering and Technical,
Judicial, Telephone operators and drivers, and Military.[1] There
is, perhaps except the military and the security cadres, great
resemblence among various cadres as far as staffing is concerned.

The first cadre, the administrative one, consists of four
categories or classes of positions. The first class includes all
those involved in "paper" or "office" works; or in other words,
those working in the executive, administrative and clerical posi-
tions of various kinds. The second class includes the typists.
Custodial[2] employees constitute the third category. The fourth

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[1]See High Council of Administration (comp.) Compiled Employ-
ment Laws and Regulations (In Persian; Teharan, Iran: Bahman, 1342/
January, 1963).

[2]Custodial Employees are defined as persons who are, except
Contractual and daily wage employees, employed in the ministries
for purposes other than "office" or "paper" work. See Article 1
of the "Employment Regulations for Custodial Employees" (June 15,
1936), Ibid., p. 1023.

class consists of the ungraded[3] employees.

For the purpose of convenience and lack of space the focus of this study will be only the first category of the administrative cadre; for it is the author's belief that since there is a similarity among the cadres as far as staffing is concerned, the discussion of this class of employees, which constitute the real and the most important element of the government administration in Iran, will also give a picture about the other classes of positions, as well as other cadres which are not "administrative".

GRADES AND SALARIES

According to Article 15 of the Civil Service Law of 1922 there are nine salary grades in the Iranian civil service, each corresponding to a position:[4]

Grade 1	: Registrar
Grade 2	: Third clerk
Grade 3	: Second clerk
Grade 4	: First clerk
Grade 5	: Chief of section
Grade 6	: Chief of division
Grade 7	: Assistant to chief of department
Grade 8	: Chief of department
Grade 9	: Director general or administrative under-secretary

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[3] Ungrades employees are those who are employed for purposes other than "office" work but their monthly salary is more than custodial employees. See Article 1 of "The Law Concerning the Maximum Salary Increase of the Ungraded and Custodial Employees and Children Allowances" (December 19, 1955), Ibid., p. 1024.

[4] Ibid., p. 1002. Statistics made available by the General

Each grade in turn is divided into three steps, namely: minimum, intermediate, and maximum. The amount of monthly salary is also specified for each grade, as the following table indicates:

TABLE I

Grades and the Corresponding Minimum, Intermediate, and Maximum Monthly Salaries as specified by the Budget Law of June 9, 1958 (In Rials)¢

Grades	Monthly Salaries		
	Minimum Step	Intermediate Step	Maximum Step
1	3000	3000	3000
2	3050	3100	3200
3	3250	3300	3500
4	3550	3600	3800
5	4120	4400	4600
6	4850	5100	5400
7	5600	6000	6400
8	7100	7500	7900
9	8600	9000	9500

¢Rials 78 are equal to one American Dollar.

(continued from p. 30)

Department of Statistics indicate that there are 207,000 employees engaged in the civil service in Iran. Iran Almanac, 1963 (3rd ed., Tehran) Iran: Echo of Iran, 1963), p. 144.

Moreover, there are the positions of the highest rank which are classified above grade 9. Appointment to these positions is by an Imperial decree and the monthly salary is Rials 11000.[5] It should be noted that these are the basic salaries and hence do not include the allowances the amount of which is considerable in Iran.

The above classification is for the administrative positions; hence it does not include the following positions: ministers, parliamentary undersecretaries of ministries, governors of provinces, ambassadors, plenipotentiary envoys, all judges, prosecutors for the Supreme Court of Accounts.[6] These positions are subject to a separate set of laws.

With the above general classification in mind, it is appropriate at this point to give a definition of staffing. Staffing as an aspect of personnel administration, is a process through which positions or occupational categories are filled from any of several practical sources from inside or outside the service.[7] Generally, the following processes or steps are included in staffing:

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[5]"The Decision of the Budget Committee of the Majlis" (June 9, 1958), Articles 1-3, High Council of A dministration, op. cit., pp. 1002-1003.

[6]"The Civil Service Law" (December 13, 1922), Note to Article 15, High Council of Administration, op. cit., p. 1002.

[7]O. Glenn Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (4th ed., New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp, 119 and 143.

recruitment, examination, promotion, appointment, probation, and transfer.

RECRUITMENT

By recruitment is meant the "discovery and cultivation of the best employment market for the positions involved."[8] In other words, recruitment in theory means to search for, discover, and attract the best people to be employed in and by an organization, private or public, for vacant positions.[9] This means that in theory all those persons who possess certain basic qualifications are prospective recruits and may apply for public service. Personnel laws in Iran are a manifestation of this theory.

In general therefore to be an applicant for an "official" position[10] in the administrative cadre (category one, of course) of the Iranian Government one must possess the following qualifi-

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[8] Ibid., p. 60.

[9] Ibid.

[10] By "official" service or position is meant permanent employment in one of the ministries or governmental agencies. Thus contractual and daily wage employees are not considered official employees. See, "The Civil Service Law" (Dec. 13, 1922), Articles 1 and 10, High Council of Administration, op. cit., pp. 1001 and 1002; and "Decree of the Council of Ministers" No. 883 (May 11, 1934), Parviz Daryush (trans.), "Civil Employment Law of Iran, Enacted Ghows (Azar), 1301 A.H. (Solar), Nov. 28, 1922, as amended, and other lgeneral Employment Laws, decrees and regulations, relating to the Government of Iran", (A Memeograph; translated from Persian; Nov. 15, 1958), Appendix 7, pp. 45-46.

cations:[11]

1. Iranian nationality

2. Not less than 18 years of age

3. Without charges of insurrection against the state

4. Absence of criminal records

5. Without record of debauchery or immorality

6. Not addicted to narcotics, and absence of contagious diseases

7. Possession of the third year secondary school certificate or passing of an examination covering the required courses of the third year secondary school.

8. Completion of two years of military service or being exempted from it (this is not stated in the Law of 1922 but in subsequent laws).

These are the minimum requirements for employment applied in all ministries and governmental departments or agencies. In addition, an applicant should "possess the necessary knowledge and the qualifications required by regulations of the ministry or department concerned."[12]

Moreover, a deposit of guarantee or introduction of a creditable guarantor is required by all ministries for those who apply for a position of cashier or collector in cash or kind. Article 13 of the Law of 1933 states that "the amount of guarantee to be deposited and the conditions required for the guarantor shall be determined in the regulations of the ministry or department con-

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[11]"The Civil Service Law" (Dec. 13, 1922), Article 2, High Council of Administration, op. cit., p. 1001.

[12]Daryush, op. cit., Article 3, p. 1.

cerned."[13] However, Article 10 of Decree number 19056 (December 27, 1943) of the Council of Ministers specifies that "all cash collectors are to deposit a guaranty equivalent to 1/4 of the total weekly collection."[14] As to the kind of guarantee, Article 11 of the same decree specifies the following: (1) formal mortgage on estate, or (2) bank guarantee or deposit of cash. Personal guarantee is accepted of the collectors in kind if they are judged honest and trustworthy.[15]

Regarding the methods of recruitment no indication is made in the Civil Service Law of 1922. In practice, however, recruitment to the public service is infrequent and irregular. There does not exist in Iran a central recruiting office or a central civil service agency. Every ministry and governmental department within the above broad limits recruits people for its needs and gives them civil service appointment.[16] Recruiting efforts of the ministries are usually confined to the announcement of their specific openings in a newspaper, mostly Ettela'at or Kayhan or

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[13] Ibid., p. 3.

[14] Ibid., Appendix Z, p. 28.

[15] Ibid., p. 29.

[16] Jahangir Amuzegar, "Administrative Barriers to Economic Development in Iran," Middle East Economic Papers, 1958 (Beirut, Lebanon: Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut, Dar-el-Kitab, 1958), p. 8.

in the radio.[17] However, as it will be clear in the following chapters, "due to the absence of attractive alternative opportunities for new university graduates in private sectors, there are strong political pressures on various agencies to place these graduates in their organizations."[18]

EXAMINATION

In general and in theory recruitment ends with an application. Then follows the examination process. Ideally speaking, examination is a process through which tests are, or should be given to the candidates for vacant positions in order to measure their qualifications for the following twofold objectives. First, examinations are given for the purpose of selecting people who will be efficient in the particular position for which they apply. The second and often forgotten purpose of examinations is to select persons who possess a capacity for growth and development.[19]

Broadly, the examination process includes or should include the following five steps: (1) job analysis for the purpose of determining the abilities and capacities needed for success in the

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[17]However, Decree No. 23766, Nov. 25, 1961 of the Council of Ministers states that governmental agencies which are in need of employing new persons with qualifications higher than a high school certificate are required to refer first to the Agency for Graduate Guidance and choose their needed number from among the graduates who have registered for a public job in that agency. Council of Ministers' Degree No. 23766, Azar 4, 1340 (Nov. 25, 1961), High Council of Administration, op. cit., p. 10090.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Stahl, op. cit., pp. 75 and 84-85.

position to be filled; (2) preliminary preparation of the examining instruments based on duties and responsibilities of the job for which examinations are given; (3) standardization and validation of the examination; (4) administration of the examination; and (5) evaluation of the results of the tests given.[20]

There are different ways of classifying tests. One way of classification is according to purpose, as follows: (1) tests of general abilities; (2) tests of special aptitudes or capacity; (3) emotional and personality tests; (4) achievement tests; and (5) health and physical tests.

Another way of classification is according to the forms of the tests. Here the following may be mentioned: (1) written examination; (2) performance tests; and (3) oral tests which may be of two types: individual and group oral tests.[21]

In Iran, the basic step of the examination process, i.e. the systematic classification of positions, has only recently been started and is not yet in full use.[22] What is more is that there are no provisions in the personnel laws and regulations to set forth the examination procedures to be followed by the ministries. The only legal provision for conducting competitive civil service examinations is Article 4 of 1922 Personnel Law. This Article states

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[20] Ibid., p. 86.

[21] Ibid., pp. 89-107.

[22] Amuzegar, op. cit., p. 8.

that employment to government services should be based on passing
a competitive examination. Moreover, it specifies that each
governmental agency should prepare, according to its organizational
needs, its own regulations governing its examination procedures.[23]
Although, a Ferrel Heady puts it, language about merit as the
basis of choice is set forth in the statute, "the ministry con-
cerned is usually free to apply this criterion as it sees fit."[24]

Certain examination formalities are therefore followed by
the ministries in the selection of their personnel.[25] A written
individual or group examination given by the ministry is one way
of testing the knowledge of the candidates. Here the examinations
are not usually based on the requirements of the jobs. In other
words, they are general and measure the general educational attain-
ment of the individual. Oral questioning or interviews are another
way. This is also done in the ministries and the interviewer is
usually either the personnel officer and/or the prospective super-
visor or employing officer.

However, educational attainment - a college or a secondary
school certificate - is usually the basic, if not the only criterion

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[23]"The Civil Service Law," High Council of Administration,
op. cit., p. 1001.

[24]"Personnel Administration in the Middle East," Public
Personnel Review, XX (1959), 51.

[25]The following two paragraphs are based on the information
gathered from interviews of some Iranian government officials who
participated in a career development training program sponsored by
the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration,
American University of Beirut, during the academic years 1963-64
and 1964-65.

of selecting people to the civil service. Moreover, the degree
is sometimes supplemented by a "pull" or a "push" to back the
candidate in his effort of getting a job. What is more is that
examinations are not popular for the positions which do not attract
many applicants; in such cases candidates are automatically employed
without any examination. As J. Amuzegar points out:

> A legal provision for conducting competitive civil service
> examinations is not assiduously observed. Many positions
> requiring special technical knowledge or background are not
> thus properly filled. And more often than normally is the
> case in most bureaucracies, new positions are created to
> suit the qualifications of favored candidates.[26]

PROMOTION AND SALARY INCREASE

The conditions for promotion or advancement in position
differ from one grade to another. The first condition is that
before an employee is promoted to a higher grade, he should have
served a minimum period of two years in the grade just below in
the case of grades one to four and at least three years in the
case of the other grades - i.e., grades 5 to 9. Promotion to a
higher grade, therefore, is not possible without serving the full
period prescribed for the lower grade.

Moreover, an employee may be promoted when, besides having
served the prescribed period in the lower grade, he has satisfac-
torily performed the duties assigned to him and has observed the

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[26] Amuzegar, op. cit., p. 8.

laws and regulations of his ministry. In all cases, therefore, the ministerial or organizational requirements, method of performance of duties, ability and aptitude, and seniority of service all are essential to promotion. Furthermore, there is preference of promotion for the employees of higher education provided that the other qualifications are the same.[27]

Article 24 of the Law of 1922 states that if a college graduate, whose specialization is in the field peculiar to a ministry, holds a degree higher than a Licence or a B.A., and if such a degree is higher than that required for the position he is assigned to, he will serve six months in grades one and two, one year in grades three and four each, and from grade five upward he will serve as provided in the law. However, the Note to Article 3 of the "Law Concerning the Iranian Students Abroad" (May 22, 1928) states that all those who hold a degree higher than a Licence (B.A.) from a college or a university (inside or outside the country) shall start their employment with grade 3 and upto grade 6 shall be promoted to a higher grade after having served two years in each of of the lower grades. But the Budget Law of November 26, 1942 says that the practice of the ministries promoting the employees, who hold a Licence degree or higher, to a higher grade after having served one year in grade 3 and 4 each and two years in grade 5 is confirmed and may, thus, go on until it is repealed by a new law.[28]

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[27]"The Civil Service Law" (Dec. 13, 1922), Article 23, High Council of Administration, op. cit., p. 1004.

[28]Ibid., p. 1005.

Moreover, if an employee entitled to promotion, as provided by the laws, is not, due to lack of an appropriate vacant position, promoted to a higher grade, his salary will be increased by "an additional sum equivalent to the difference between the minimum and maximum salary of his present grade."[29]

Article 26 of the Employment Law of 1922 provides for two kinds of promotion: (1) formal, and (2) honorary. By formal promotion is meant promotion to a position the rank of which is one grade higher than the previous position being served. If an employee who has served for more than six years in his present position and due to lack of an appropriate vacancy has not been promoted to a higher position he may be awarded by giving him a higher title without changing his position. This is called honorary promotion. As for the salary of such an employee, it should not be below the minimum salary of the rank he is assigned to. And the period of service in the new rank is counted as "official".

Furthermore, Article 27 states that all those who have not, after six years of service in one position, had the ability and aptitude to get a promotion, are entitled to receive an increase the amount of which should not exceed 1/5 of their last salary. However, such an increase, the law says, should not be allowed for more than two occasions.

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[29] Daryush, op. cit., Articl 25, p. 7.

According to Article 17, the total increments payable
after one year of service in a grade, should not exceed 1/6 of the
salary of that grade. In other words, the difference between the
minimum and maximum salary in a grade may be payed in the form of
increments during the period the employee serves in that grade,
provided that it is started from the second year of service in
the same grade. And the amount of such a difference should never
exceed 1/6 of the total salary of that grade.[30]

As to the administration of promotions and increments,
Article 2 of the Council of Minister's Decree No. 7792 (July 10,
1959) states that the chiefs of the departments and sections of
the ministries in Tehran and other cities are required, every year
by the end of July, to prepare a list of all those eligible for
promotion or increment. They should then submit it to the per-
sonnel office of their respective ministry in Tehran. The list
should also be followed by an evaluation paper for each proposed
employee.[31]

Each evaluation paper is a quarterly report on an employee
and his performance. The report consists of grades given to
employee by their superiors on the following fourteen items:[32]

1. Amount of work

2. Quality of performance

3. Knowledge of the job and method of its performance

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[30]High Council of Administration, op. cit., pp. 1004 and 1005.

[31]Ibid., p. 1026.

[32]Ibid., Article 10, pp. 1027-28.

4. Degree of reliance or confidence

5. Cooperation and dutifulness

6. Initiative

7. Perception and decision-making

8. Agreement with new procedures and methods

9. Ability and aptitude to accept change

10. Personality

11. Ability to speak (as required by his position)

12. Resistance and durability

13. Health

14. Others

Each personnel officer of the ministry, in turn, after receiving the proposals for promotion and increment, and by referring to the employee's files, gives his opinion and then sends the proposals together with his view to the promotion, and increments commission of his respective ministry. The commission then, in the context of laws and regulations, studies the proposals and decides who should or should not be promoted.

Each commission for promotions and increments is composed of the chief of personnel division, the chiefs of two other divisions and one of the directors general of the ministry. They are all appointed by the minister upon the recommendation of the permanent administrative undersecretary of the ministry. The commission holds its meetings during the month of Sharivar (August 23 September 22) of each year and under the chairmanship of the permanent

administrative undersecretary.[33]

With all the foregoing formal requirements and procedures
an important point to bear in mind is that the often expressed
belief about promotion is applicable to and widely practiced in
Iran: "If they want to promote you they can always find a reason
for doing it, and if they don't want to, they can find some short-
comings."[34]

APPOINTMENT AND PROBATION

The last stage of selection is that of appointment.
However, before the appoint is final there are two other legal
requirements to be fulfilled by the applicants. The first require-
ment is the satisfactory completion of a probationary period of
one year which is not counted as official service. The official
service begins with the day the employee is officially appointed
to the position.[35]

The second condition is that of oath-taking. Persons
entering the official service are required to take oath in accord-
ance with religious rites that they shall fully observe the laws

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[33]"Decree of the Council of Ministers", No. 7792, July 10,
1959, Article 5, High Council of Administration, op. cit., p. 1026.

[34]Norman R.F. Maier, Psychology in Industry: A Psychological
Approach to Industrial Problems (2nd ed.; Boston: Houghton Miffin Co.,
1955), p. 58.

[35]"The Civil Service Law" (Dec. 13, 1922), Article 5, High
Council of Administration, op. cit., p. 1001.

and regulations of their agency; that they shall always work for the development of the welfare of the nation; and that they shall never commit treachery against the country, the nation, and the sovereignty.[36]

According to the Civil Service Law of 1922 formal appointment is done by the minister or the head of each governmental agency. However, departmental chiefs, directors general and their equivalents are formally appointed, with due observance of the required conditions, by the minister concerned and with an Imperial decree. The minister concerned also appoints the parliamentary undersecretary and the chief of the secretariat of his ministry. Such appointees are not required necessarily to be official employees, and thus they may be appointed from inside as well as from outside the service. But if they are selected from among the permanent employees the period of their service in such positions is counted as official service.[37]

However, it is important to note at this point that Note 22 of the Budget Law of 1334 (1955-56) states that no new employment is permitted under any circumstances. The law further runs:

> Should ministries or bongahs /governmental corporations/ require additional employees, they shall make use of employees of their ministries or bongahs. Should, however, the required number of employees be unavailable and should a ministry be exceedingly in need of engineers, physicians, ... teachers and

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[36] Daryush, op. cit., Article 7, p. 2.

[37] High Council of Administration, op. cit., Articles 21-22, p. 1004.

judges, employment of such personnel shall be made by authorization of the Budget Committee of the Senate...[38]

Moreover, Article one of the "Law concerning the Employment for the Ministries" (Khordad 27, 1337/June 17, 1958) expresses the same view by saying that no new employment is permitted except, if badly needed and with good reasons, for such technical positions as doctors, engineer, nurses, pharmacists, technicians, translators and the like - i.e., no new employment is permitted for clerical and administrative positions. The employment for technical positions, as required by Decree number 3684 of Urdibehesht 23, 1341 (May 13, 1962), should be based on the approval of the Council of Ministers and upon the recommendation of the High Council of Administration.[39]

PERSONNEL MACHINERY

By personnel machinery here is meant an apparatus through which the personnel matters of the government, especially matters related to recruitment, examination, promotion, and transfer are carried out. In some countries like the United States and Britain most of the personnel matters are centralized in a central civil service agency. In others like Iran there is no central civil service agency; personnel matters are decentralized. Each ministry within broad limits carries out its own hiring and promotion.

Central Civil Service Agency

As indicated above, there does not exist in Iran a central

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[38] Dayush, op. cit., footnote 1, p. 1.

[39] High Council of Administration, op. cit., pp. 10001 and 10001/1.

civil service agency which is in charge of or has a direct control over the personnel matters of the ministries.[40] This does not mean, however, that there is no outside check over the ministries and governmental agencies as far as their staffing is concerned. It is true that each ministry carries out its own selections; that central civil service agencies have been proposed[41] but as yet not established, nevertheless there are certain organizations that have some kind of a control over the selection process of the ministries in Iran. These agencies are : (1) the Personnel Department of the Ministry of Finance, (2) the Budget Committee of the Majlis, (3) the Employment Committee of the Senate, (4) the High Council of Permanent Administrative Undersecretaries (HCPAU), and (5) the High Council of Administration (HCA). It should be noted, however, that the above-mentioned agencies exercise their control in broad matters of personnel and in most cases they are advisory.

The Personnel Department of the Ministry of Finance drafts laws and decrees concerning, the personnel and other matters of the civil service. In some cases it advises the ministries in drafting their laws and regulations, while in others it has to approve their draft laws before being presented to the Council of Ministers for approval.

The Budget Committee of the Majlis and the Employment Committee of the Senate exercise their control through their exami-

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[40] Amuzegar, op. cit., p. 8.

[41] See Ittele'at (airmail edition), No. 4207, Nov. 23, 1963, p. 3.

nation of bills, investigations, and hearings. Moreover, they have sometimes direct but informal control over the personnel matters of the ministries.[42]

The HCPAU came into legal existence on 19 March 1958, although it had practically been established by the end of 1956. The main objective of the Council is to provide administrative coordination by furthering cooperation among the administrative undersecretaries of various ministries. It is, therefore, a means through which administrative problems of the government are discussed and proper solutions are developed. Its functions are to comment on matters referred to it by the Prime Minister or the Council of Ministers. Moreover, it is an advisory organization that may comment on all administrative, personnel and financial matters of a general nature that may be referred to it by the ministries or governmental departments. Furthermore, the Council may prepare necessary drafts and suggestions relating to the personnel as well as other administrative matters to be submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval.[43]

Regarding its organization, the HCPAU consists of the

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[42] Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Barkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 126.

[43] "Law Authorizing Appointment of Stable Administrative Undersecretaries and Creating the High Council," Article 3, High Council of Stable Administrative Undersecretaries (Tehran: Communication Media Division, USOM/Iran, 1959), p. 28; "Regulations Government the High Council for Stable Administrative Undersecretaries, July 1958," Article 1, High Council of Stable Administrative Undersecretaries, op. cit., p. 32.

permanent administrative undersecretaries of all ministries and
the Prime Minister's administrative undersecretary who acts as
chairman of the Council.[44] Moreover the Council has a secretariat
which is concerned with the study of the problems referred to it
by the Council or any of its committees and which reports its
findings to the Council or the committee concerned. The chief
of the secretariat acts as the secretary of the Council. The
chairman and the secretary both sign the minutes of the meetings
of the Council.

In order to carry out its functions properly and speedily
the Council has maintained three permanent committees: Administra-
tive and Personnel Committee; Finance Committee; and Social
Affairs and Initiatiation Committee. Each committee has members
ranging from three to five who are selected from among the members
of the Council. In addition to the above mentioned permanent
committees, the Council may set up special committees, and assign
to them the examination of certain matters not related to any of
the permanent committees.

All matters put before the Council are referred to the
appropriate committees by the chairman of the Council. And these

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[44]The Permanent administrative undersecretaries are appointed
by a royal decree on the proposal of the minister concerned (and by
the Prime Minister for his office) and approval of the Council of
Ministers for a period of five years and are eligible for reselection.
"Law Authorizing Appointment of Stable Administrative Undersecretaries
and Creating the High Council," Article 1, High Council of Stable
Administrative Undersecretaries, op. cit., p. 27.

committtes are required to give their reports within two weeks from the date they receive such matters. Furthermore, the permanent committees may initiate to survey some matters within the limit of their authority and submit their report for the decision by the Council. In the case of surveys or investigations of a matter with technical character, the chairman of the Council may make use of experts by inviting them to give their views in connection with the problem before the Council or the committees. The committees conducting surveys or investigations should report their findings in writing.[45]

Finally, there is the High Council of Administration (HCA) which came into legal existence by the Council of Ministers' Decree number 30600 on 3 June 1963.[46] The main objective of creating this Council was to improve the administrative machinery of the government which had not caught up with the socio-economic developments of the country.

The HCA is an advisory body attached to the office of the Prime Minister. Although legally it has no direct control over

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[45] See "Regulations Governing the High Council for Stable Administrative Undersecretaries, July 1958," op. cit., pp. 32-36. However, Binder observes that the impact of the High Council of Permanent Administrative Undersecretaries, whose duties are restricted to the improvement and standardization of both administrative techniques and management, "on policy making has not been great, nor have the undersecretaries been quite as stable as was hoped." op. cit., p. 126.

[46] The following paragraphs are based on Council of Ministers' Decree No. 30600, January 3, 1963, pp. 1-5, (Mimeographed in Persian)

the personnel matters of the ministries, the HCA increasingly exercises some indirect and informal power over the ministries regarding the personnel as well as other administrative matters. Moreover, its role as a research and public relations office for the government should not be underlooked. The compilation of all personnel laws and regulations is an example of this. The Council therefore supplies the public and the employees of the government with information about the civil service and the personnel matters of the ministries.

As to its organizational arragements, the HCA is made up of an executive committee and a secretary general. The executive committee is composed of the Prime Minister; Ministers of Finance, Justice, and Interior; Prime Minister's Representative at the Plan organization; and the secretary general of the Council. The secretary general is appointed by a royal decree on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. He is chosen for three years and may not be removed until his term is over.

In order to meet its objectives, the HCA carries out research, makes publications, drafts administrative laws, and gives its recommendations to the Council of Ministers. To do these, the Council has five research committees as follows: Employment Committee, Financial Committee, Ceremonies and Procedures Committee, Organizational Committee, and the Committee related to the Affairs of the Cities.

Operating Personnel Offices

Although there is a high degree of centralization in the government of Iran, the personnel system of the government is decentralized, scattered among the ministries.[47] However, personnel administration of each ministry is centralized at the Capital, Tehran and concentrated at the top; real and final orders decisions are taken by the minister or the director general for administration. Each ministry, however, has a personnel department which is in charge of its personnel matters.

Each personnel department is headed by a director, appointed usually by the minister who may also remove him at any time. In some cases the actual selection of the personnel director may be left to the permanent administrative undersecretary or the director general for the administration of the ministry concerned. There are usually no special standards or requirements for selecting a personnel director. Generally, an effort is made to choose persons with a college degree supplemented with some personnel or other administrative experience.

A recent survey of the previous experience of the present directors of personnel shows that about fifty percent of them had worked in the field of personnel before becoming directors of per-

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[47]The following paragraphs are based on Richard W. Gable, "The Public Service In Iran," Public Personnel Review, XXII (1961), pp.31-33.

sonnel before becoming directors of personnel, some of them for as many as 15 to 20 years. On the other hand some had no prior experience in personnel at all. A number of them had been directors of personnel for only a few years, although one person held the position for 18 years.

Each personnel director is responsible to his minister, deputy minister, and in some cases to the permanent administrative undersecretary of his ministry. However, due to the confusion that often exists in the lines of authority the personnel director may report to one or all the three superiors at the same time.

The operating authority of the personnel directors and their departments is derived from the Personnel Law of 1922 and other related laws and regulations. The personnel directors usually take a limited and legalistic view of their authority under the laws and regulations. They often regard their authority and function as that of simply applying the law with little exercise of discretion.

The position of the personnel director is usually a ceremonial one with little significant power because of the limited functions his office has. However, the personality of the personnel director and his relationships with his minister and the director general for administration of his ministry is crucial. In spite of his limited formal or legal power, the personnel director may have a larger role to play if he is aggressive and if his minister knows him and likes to work closely with him.

If he is weak and not much liked by the minister, his role will be limited to the execution of application of the law, if he remains in the office and not transferred.

The function of the personnel director therefore is usually to apply the personnel laws and regulations in his ministry. He is responsible for issuing personnel actions when persons are hired, fired, transfered, and/or promoted. In the name of his ministry and the minister, he announces the vacancies, collects applications, and administers examinations. The personnel department also deals with routine matters of transfer and promotion while the actual decisions for such matters are made by the minister, director general, or other departmental chiefs. If any training is done, it is usually carried out by other departments. In short the personnel director is only responsible to carry out the orders of his minister, director general, perform the routine personnel matters of his ministry, and prepare personnel orders to be signed by the minister or the director general for administration.

The principal problems then for personnel director is the lack of adequate authority. In the case of simple personnel actions personnel directors "often take no action on their own. Such a matter as an internal transfer or a three-day leave requires the approval of the Director-General for Administration."[48]

So far we have discussed in this and the previous chapters

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[48] _Ibid._, p. 33.

the historical background and the legal framework of staffing in the government of Iran. But history is an account of the past and does not tell much about the present existing phenomena. It is useful in throwing some light upon the present; but limited because it does not answer all questions pertaining to the existing facts.

As for laws and regulations they are prescriptive and not descriptive. They lay down what staffing ought to be rather than describing what it really is. In practice, they are usually subject to modifications, and sometimes not followed at all. Any real analysis of staffing or any other aspects of public administration in the changing societies like that of Iran should therefore go beyond laws and regulations and establish relationships among different environmental variables affecting staffing and in turn being affected by it. This what is meant by ecology of staffing as it will be discussed at length in the following chapters.

CHAPTER IV

THE ECONOMIC SUB-SYSTEM

One of the major characteristics of the Iranian society is its economic unproductivity. By this is meant that the country is economically underdeveloped and poor. Iranians, on the average, do not produce or consume much material goods.[1] About 80 percent of the total population lives on land and farming.[2] But only about 10 percent of the total area of 628,000 square miles is used for agriculture, and less than half of this amount is under cultivation at any one time.[3] This is because farming is "wretchedly inefficient" and the situation is getting worse as time passes.[4] There is a lack of modern methods and equipment, and above all there is not much incentive to improve methods and to raise production.

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[1] It has been estimated in recent years that the over-all per capita income in Iran falls somewhere between 100 and 165 dollars. James A. Bill, "The Social and Economic Foundations of Power in Contemporary Iran," Middle East Journal. XVII (1963), p. 407.

[2] Present estimates show that the total population is about 20 million. Aziz Hatami, Iran (Tehran: The General Department of Publications and Broadcasting, 1963), p. 11.

[3] Herbert H. Vreeland (Research Chariman and editor), Iran (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1957), p. 135.

[4] "Persia's Gamble Against the Clock," Economist, CCII (1962), p. 538.

Due to low productivity most of those engaged in agriculture live at bare subsistence and are usually in debt.[5] Moreover, government attempted "reforms and subsidies and the recent presence of the foreign agricultural advisors have as yet contributed little toward changing the fortune of the Iranian peasant."[6]

This economic unproductivity is largely due to "a particular institutional arrangement"[7] which does not encourage rational economic behavior. As a manifestation of the Iranian culture, this institutional arrangement violates economic principles in the utilization of scarce resources of the country. In other words rational economic principles or criteria, as manifested in laws and regulations, are paid lip-service, but effective economic behavior is largely determined by traditional factors such as family loyalty, individual status, religious considerations, and ability to bargain. In order to understand effective economic behavior in Iran, it is important, therefore, to study such traditional patterns and practices involved in the Iranian market systems.

The practice of bartering is the first obvious characteristic of the Iranian economy. In an economy based on rational crite-

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[5] Vreeland, op. cit., pp. 152-53.

[6] Ibid., p. 135.

[7] By this is meant "the economic structure" or more specifically "the market system of a society". See F.W. Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 5.

ria, money is used as the basic, if not the only, means of exchange. But in Iran the dominant medium of exchange in most of the villages is barter. It was estimated in 1957, for example, that about half of the population of Iran used no money at all.[8] This seems to be the case even today since not much changes have been taken place in the villages.[8]

Family status, loyalty and influence, are other traditional elements involved in the Iranianmarket system. The traditional family is almost the core of all activities in Iran. What the individual wants or what he can get is largely determined by his family, which is usually identified with occupational affiliations and class status. "In entering upon any enterprise, be it business or marriage, relatives have first claim as partners or spouses."[9]

Religion is a third non-rational factor included in the Iranian market system, although at present religion is not as strong as it was in the past. Reza _Shah_ reduced the power and influence of religious authorities to a great extent. Yet everyone agrees that at present the average Iranian is religious.[10] For example, the tradition of private charity or almsgiving is strongly rooted in the Iranian society. Many believe the religious code of the country requires that one should not allow his fellow men to

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[8] Vreeland, _op. cit._, p. 177.

[9] Leonard Binder, _Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society_ (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 159.

[10] _Ibid._, p. 62.

go hungry. Many employers therefore take pride in employing more persons than their firm or organization needs.[11] Although this might seem an appropriate way of helping people, especially in the absence of government welfare programs, the fact remains that Islam plays a significant role in the Iranian economic system.

A fourth factor hedging economic rationality is bargaining. Bargaining is involved in economic activities, in politics as well as in the staffing process of government.[12] Bargaining affects the prices and limits economic rationality. This means that economic transactions are affected by the individual bargainer whose ability to bargain is largely determined by his family background, status, and socio-economic power and influence.

Still a fifth factor limiting rational economic behavior and thus contributing to low productivity is the attitude of the Iranians towards work. This is closely related to the other variables discussed above. Unlike the Protestant tradition in the West, work is not of much value in Iran. Although the "lower class Persians toil for long hours at back-breaking task... work is not a positive value in Iran .... The nature of work a person may perform is related to his status in society. Frequently an Iranian will not pitch in to get a job done if he must work beneath his status."[13]

The institutional arrangement - market system based mainly on non-rational criteria - discussed above has led to price indeter-

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[11]Richard W. Gable, "The Public Service In Iran", Public Personnel Review, XXII (1961), p. 29.

[12]Binder, op. cit., pp. 228-29.

[13]Richard W. Gable, "Culture And Administration in Iran," Middle East Journal, XIII (1959), p. 418.

minancy, insecurity of the individuals, preference of short-term
benefits over long-term investments, "intrusive access to the
elite," and socio-economic inequality. Price discrimination is
institutionalized in Iran. There is wide fluctuation in prices
of commodities because the actual price paid by a customer "ref-
lects not only prevailing supply-demand conditions, but also a
superimposed set of inter-personal relationships between the
seller and buyer."[14] As an illustration, rational economic criteria
might dictate that a kilo of strawberry should be transacted at one
dollar no matter who the parties may be. But in practice, the same
kilo of strawberry might be sold at 50 cents to a cousin, at 60 to
a religious man, at 70 to an influential man with high status family,
and at 30 cents to a poor man who must be pitied. Again, a man may
buy it for 80 cents while a woman for 120 or vice versa.

Insecurity is another consequence of the Iranian economic
system. The traditional family-centered way of peasant life has
been disrupted by changes which have taken place. But replacement
of new patterns have not followed or are only superimposed on the
traditional way of life. As a result the individual Iranian,
irrespective of his class in the society, feels insecure and in need
of assurance.[15] As an economist concludes:

> The background... is insecurity: The insecurity of the land-
> owner against the caprice of the government, insecurity in the
> face of attack by hostile elements, whether internal factions
> or foreign invasion, and the insecurity of the cultivator vis-a-
> vis the landowner and others. The law was not backed by a pre-

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[14]Fred W. Riggs, "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model",
Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (eds.), Papers in Comparative Public
Administration (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, The
University of Michigan, 1962), p. 27.

[15]Vreeland, op. cit., p. 138.

dominant and impartial force; effective power therefore rested with whatever wielded the greatest force and, in the absence of control by the law, the exercise of this force depended almost entirely on personal caprice. Insecurity, political and economic, is no less the keynote at the present than the past, although there have been changes in emphasis.[16]

Preference of short-term gains over long-term investments is a third consequence of the Iranian market system. Due to the elements of insecurity and price indeterminancy, there is not much confidence among the Iranians to invest their capital in long-term projects which are essential for the economic development of the country. Iranians, as is the case in most of the emerging nations, prefer short-term profits to long-term advantages.[17] That is why there is a tendency among most of the upper classes in Iran to invest their capital in short-term projects or to deposit their money in foreign banks.[18]

The fourth consequence of the Iranian economic structure is what may be called "intrusive access to the elite". This means that the individual always tries to search for ways and means to get favors from the members of the elite. As it will be clear in the following chapters, individuals try to cut across the governmental or legal procedures and gain advantages by tact and deception.

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[16] Ann K.S. Lambton, Landlord And Peasant in Persia (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 393.

[17] Vreeland, op. cit., p. 176.

[18] Emil Lengyel, The Changing Middle East (New York: The John Day Co., 1960), p. 299.

This is what is meant by "circumvention of governmental procedures".

The last but the most serious result of the structure of the Iranian economy is socio-economic inequality among the different social strata of the society. Lack of distribution of wealth[19] in a potentially rich country has divided the Iranian society into contradictory and opposing camps: the poor and the rich; the peasants and the landlords; the city laborers and the upper class "thousand families"[20] Let us examine this in some detail.

Iran, a leading producer of Petroleum, possesses about 13 percent of the world's oil resources. The production of oil is more than one million barrels a day, with potential wells still to be tapped.[21] The approximate income from oil is 300 million

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[19] Dr. Amini, the ex-Prime Minister, once "blamed Iran's crumbling economy on high living by the rich". Oded Remba, "The Middle East in 1961 - An Economic Survey," Middle Eastern Affairs, XIII (1962), p. 79. Moreover, the Roushanfectre Magazine recently undertook a study of 600 weddings in Tehran. At one extreme they found that in one wedding only the dinner party, excluding all other expenses, cost about 14 thousand dollars. 600 guests were invited to this wedding which took place in the most luxurious hotel in Tehran, the Hilton Hotel. The bridegroom was a student studying in the U.S. who had come to Iran for his summer vacation. At the other extreme the researchers found that the whole expense of another wedding was only about 66 dollars which was to be paid by installment in several occasions. The groom was a handicraft laborer. "Two weddings, out of 600 weddings That Took Place In Tehran During These Days," Roushanfectre, No. 566, Muradad 15, 1343 (Aug. 5, 1964), pp. 11 and 50-51. (In Persian). For classes in Iran see "Social and Occupational Strata" in chapter five, this work.

[20] For a detailed discussion of the "thousand families" in Iran see Binder, op. cit., p. 66; Robert Kingsley, "Premier Amini and Iran's Problems," Middle Eastern Affairs, XIII (1962), p. 195.

[21] Andrew Tully, CIA: The Inside Story (Paperback; 1st Crest Printing; New York: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1963), pp. 77-78.

dollars a year.[22] This is 10 per cent of the estimated Gross
National Product and about 25 to 30 per cent of the governmental
budget.[23]

Another source of income for the government and the country
is the foreign financial aid of different kinds. Since 1953, for
example, Iran has received about one billion dollars from the
United States, let alone other sources such as the United Nations
and the World Bank.[24]

However, as indicated before, there is no proper distribu-
tion of wealth in the country. A small group of upper class people
controls, to a great extent, the economy in Iran. Until 1962,[25]

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[22]Of this sum about 200 million dollars go to the armed
forces. See John Law, "What A Billion Bought in Iran: 'U.S. Aid?
It's Done Nothing for US'", U.S. News And World Report, LI (July,
1961), p. 73.

[23]T. Cuyler Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis," Foreign
Affairs, XL (1962), p. 279. It is interesting to note that there
has been a constant deficit in the budget of the Iranian government
since 1954. Ministry of Finance, Department of Statistics and Survey,
"The History of Budgeting in Iran" (Typewritten in Persian, n.d.),
pp. 7-9. This deficit has been primarily due to the large number of
underpaid "civil servants and military personnel on the public pay-
roll who between them absorb as much as four-fifths of the budget.
Robert J. Pranger, "Political and Economic Balance in Iran," Current
History, XXXVIII (1960), p. 279. The army and the internal security
have been costing about £65 millions a year - excluding the military
hardware given by the Americans. But the Plan Organization has been
costing only about £50 millions a year. "Persia at the Edge," CXCIX
(1961), p. 786.

[24]Tully, op. cit., p. 76., See also, Young, op. cit., p. 280.

[25]At present, land reform is the central aspect of Shah's
"white Revolution". Until the beginning of 1962 some 7,500 villages
were distributed among the peasants. Land reforms still are going
on; but the prospect of this government attempted reform cannot be
predicted. How much progress will be made in this line the future

for example, there were in Iran people who owned 50 to 140 villages. Over 20 per cent of the total 55 thousand villages belong to persons who owned not less than 5 villages.[26]

On the other hand the majority of the people of Iran, as indicated before, live at subsistance. About 80 percent of the population live in small and isolated villages. The majority of the Iranians work for long hours but earn only enough to keep them from starvation. They have neither capital to invest nor good health to produce. James A. Bill observes that the low position of the Iranian peasants and tribesmen can not be denied. Both this class — the peasants and tribesmen — and "the working class are welded together in one exploited, dispossessed amalgam."[27]

ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS

Being a part of the general system, the administration of the Iranian government has similar, in fact the same, characteristics found in the economic system discussed above. The two subsystems are so much interrelated that the same factors responsible for economic unproductivity are also the causes of administrative inefficiency and corruption.

(Continued from page 63)

will tell. Ramba, op. cit., pp. 139-141; "Essays in Land Reform", Economist CC (1961), p. 887. Moreover, official reports state that by end of March, 1963, about 3700 villages were distributed among 120 thousand farm families. Further, the government had put September 22, 1963 as the deadline for the first stage of the land reforms which would mean the distribution of about 17,000 villages. Iran Almanac, 1963, p. 396. However, Ittela'at, a Persian daily paper (airmail edition, in Persian), No. 4496, Nov. 15, 1964, p. 1 states that since the beginning of land reforms until the middle of October, 1964, only 9970 villages had been divided among 340 thousand farm families.

[26] Keesing's Contemporary Archieves, XIII (1961-62), p.18883.

[27] Bill, op. cit., p. 407.

Because the economy is unproductive, it does not provide much opportunities for employment. As a result the government has become to be the main employer in the country. For government employment provides job security as well as salary even when there is no work to perform.[28] There is always a rush for government employment and this is because the supply of labour exceeds the demands. This has led to surplus labour and overstaffing not only in the government but in the National Oil Company, in the Plan Organization as well as in industries.[29] Overstaffing, in turn, has led to lower salaries. Low pay has resulted in corruption or it has forced the employees to take part-time jobs to supplement their income.[30]

When the supply exceeds the demand, people try to circumvent normal governmental procedures of employment and promotion. As a result employment on the basis of patronage and mutual favor-doing has become an institutionalized pattern of administrative behavior in Iran.[31] Insecurity has intensified the situation by encouraging the people to look upon government employment as the only source of security. But the government is overstaffed and does not provide much opportunity for employment. There exists, therefore, little chance of employment through regular channels.

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[28] Gable, "The Public Service in Iran", op. cit., p. 29.

[29] Vreeland, op. cit., p. 158.

[30] Gable, "The Public Service in Iran," op. cit., p. 31.

[31] Jahangir Amuzegar, "Administrative Barriers to Economic Development in Iran," Middle East Economic Papers, 1958 (Beirut, Lebanon: Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut, Dar-el-Kitab, 1958), p. 8.

In fact, there is a common feeling in Iran that nothing can be accomplished through regular channels. Consequently, employment, promotion, and other administrative practices tend to follow irregular channels or exceptional procedures to a great extent.[32] This is what we mean by circumvention of governmental procedures.

Nepotism is therefore one of the characteristics of the Iranian administrative system. Appointments to government positions largely depend upon family and personal connections rather than on the civil service law of 1922 or other personnel regulations. However, it must not be assumed that nepotism is "simply an expression of outright corruption." It is true that corruption is a factor but the belief that one should favor his family and friends when in a position of power is also important, if not more important. Furthermore, it is believed that this is the only and the safest way of employment, because one can trust his own relatives or friends.[33] In the same way it is observed that the element of family enters the economic sub-system and limits rational economic behavior.

Religion is another factor affecting the economic as well as the administrative system of the country. As an observer indicates:

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[32] Gable, "Culture and Administration in Iran," op. cit., p. 411.

[33] Ibid.

The Islamic practices of alms-giving is related to the charity concept of public employment which is prevalént in Iran. A obtains, and continues to hold, a govermental job, not because the government owes him a living. The public employment roles are clogged with the names of surplus persons who do little or no work....[34]

A study, for example, conducted in the Ministry of Finance in 1954 showed that there were about 7000 surplus employees on the payrolls of that agency. Employment in the government owned Railroad Corporation went up from 7000 in 1943 to 32000 in 1957 with little increase in the amount of service provided by that agency.[35]

Moreover, government jobs are not sought after simply because they provide a salary and security, but because they also provide prestige and power in the society, an implication of non-rational criteria existing in the economy. "Holding some sort of government position is a mark of honor and a means of institutiona-lizing access and influence, even though the salary involved may be inconsequential."[36]

The laws provide for some kind, limited as it is, of a merit system for staffing the governmental positions. But "there are few qualification requirements or performance standards. Little attention is given to merit, either in initial hiring or in promotion.

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[34] Ibid., p. 413.,See also Gable, "The Public Service in Iran," op. cit., p. 29.

[35] Gable, "The Public Service in Iran," op cit., p. 31.

[36] Binder, op. cit., p. 69. See also George B. Baldwin "The Foreign-educated Iranian: A Profile," Middle East Journal, XVII (1963), p. 268.

Few persons are trained after they have been employed."[37]

Competence, according to the laws, is the ultimate basis for advancement. But in actual practice advancement in salary is automatic, and thus there is no reward for meritorious work or initiative.[38]

Another characteristic of the Iranian economic system which is carried over to the administration, thus affecting the staffing process of the government is bargaining. It is true that family, close friends, and the class or status of the individual, all are important in employment and promotion. However, once one moves beyond these contacts bargaining becomes a determinant factor.[39] The following quotation illustrates how ubiquitous bargaining is in resolving administrative problems in Iran:

> ...administrative coordination is largely a bargaining process. This is true not only between separate departments, but also within a single department. Each of the higher positions is an independent center of power in the hands of an artful manipulator. Administrative undersecretaries are supposed to remain on the job for five years, regardless of how they get on with the minister. Accountants are employees of the ministry of finance. Legal advisors hide behind their professional achievements. Directors-General may be appointed only with the approval of the prime minister. Personnel managers hold the future of lower employees in their hands and are the key to successful patronage operations. Each of these is a key administrative bargainer, each can seriously embarrass the others, or the minister even, and the cooperation of all is necessary for minimal administrative efficiency. [40]

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[37]Gable, "The Public Service in Iran,", op. cit., p. 30. See also Amuzegar, op. cit., p. 8.

[38]Binder, op. cit., p. 138.

[39]Ibid., p. 258.

[40]Ibid., p. 231.

Since 1958 as indicated in chapter three, no new employment is permitted. This is a rationalizing tendency, but it is only on paper and not of much practical significance, since it is usually violated, if followed at all. Here then comes the role of parti[41] "to find or create exceptions to the rule forbidding the hiring of new civil servants".[42] Instances of this sort have most often led to the employment of people as technical experts on a contract basis when they lack qualifications. The employment of an unqualified person in turn violates Article 4 of the 1922 Law requiring that employment should be based on passing a competitive examination. In practice holding an educational certificate and having parti, the latter more important in some cases, are two basic means for obtaining governmental employment. Competence and need are subordinate to these two factors, especially to the latter.[43]

Article 15 of the Law of 1922 provides for nine administrative positions, each corresponding to a grade. But the grades today have no relationship to their corresponding positions,[44]

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[41]The word Parti is a French term which stands for American colloquial "pull" or the continental "protection" or "influence". Ibid., p. 255.

[42]Ibid., p. 256.

[43]Ibid., pp.255-58.

[44]Daryush Parviz (trans.), "Civil Employment Law of Iran, Enacted Ghows (Azar) 1301 A.H. (Solar), Nov. 28, 1922, as amended, and other general employment laws, decrees and regulations relating to the Government of Iran," translated from Persian, Nov. 15, 1958, footnote 1, p. 4. (Mimeographed.).

another example of discrepancy between formal and effective staffing. This is again an administrative implication, as applied to staffing, of the Iranian economy based on "imperfect-market" or "status-contract" criteria.

Keeping in line with the frame of reference, the staffing process of the government affects the economic sub-system as well as being affected by it. Having discussed the impacts of the Iranian economy on the staffing process of the government, it is appropriate at this point to discuss the effects of staffing practices on the economic sub-system.

THE EFFECT OF STAFFING ON THE ECONOMIC SUB-SYSTEM

Being a part of the total system, government staffing has interrelationships and interactions with the economic sub-system and hence affects it in a number of ways. Traditional factors, such as family, religion, individual status, bargaining, and political influences of various kinds, involved in the economic as well as the administrative sub-system are intensified by the staffing process of the government which is itself affected by them. Family loyalties, for example, grow stronger as the family succeeds in providing jobs for the family members and helping them in promotions and transfers. Employment based on charity encourages the belief that public offices should be distributed among those who have the greatest need and not those needed most. Bargaining involved in the process of selection intensifies bargaining in the society, for individuals try to approach the civil servants

for the purpose of employment not through regular channels but through bargaining. When a person feels that without the use of _parti_ he has little chance of getting a job, a promotion, or transfer then he tries to seek it. The practice of searching for and using _parti_, therefore, becomes institutionalized in the society.

Nepotism, favoritism, overstaffing, and instability along with frequent changes of leadership and policy result in an insecurity,[45] itself being one of the causes of nepotism and favoritism in staffing. Due to patronage and mutual favor-doing in the process of selection, the skill and talent of many persons with specialized advanced education and knowledge are wasted and misused. The initiative of average employees are suppressed.[46] There are, for example, many over-qualified young men and women who are compelled to accept government positions which are below their status and qualifications. These people feel under-rewarded and thus do not like to cooperate with the government.[47] There thus exists, to a large extent, a lack of willingness on the part of the employees to show initiative and take responsibility. But when they are vested with authority they seldom delegate so that

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[45]Vreeland, _op. cit._, p. 137.

[46]Gable, "The Public Service in Iran," _op. cit._, p. 30.

[47]Binder, _op. cit._, p. 268.

little initiative develops at the lower levels.[48] The result is administrative inefficiency.[49] As H.B. Sharabi observes:

> Iran's bureaucratic inefficiency and red tape is notorious throughout the Middle East. The bureaucracy, based on French model, is hampered by a lack of individual initiative and responsibility on all levels; in addition the complete absence of cooperation between the various departments contributes to considerable waste of money and human energy. Nepotism, bribery, and political favoritism are accepted as normal features of the administrative system.[50]

The resultant administrative inefficiency has intensified the economic unproductivity of the country. Clearly, economic development requires administrative efficiency for the optimum allocation of the nation's resources. There has thus developed a vicious circle of economic unproductivity intensifying administrative inefficiency, nepotism and favoritism which, in turn, discourage economic development, and hence economic unproductivity which is one of the major characteristics of the Iranian society.

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[48] Gable, "Culture and Adminisration in Iran," op. cit., p. 417.

[49] Jahangir Amuzegar, an Iranian economist, observes that "Iran's administrative inefficiency, although perhaps widely recognized, has not been realistically appraised. Despite related attempts at administrative reorganizations, efficiency has not yet reached a satisfactory level; there is urgent need for a new look at the persistant obstacles" op. cit., p. 2.

[50] Government and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), p. 78.

CHAPTER V

THE SOCIAL SUB-SYSTEM

As pointed out in chapter four, Iran's is a transitional
society, having the characteristics of both the refracted as well
as the fused societies. It is a changing society moving from a
traditional way of life towards a more rational one. At the
present time, however, the Iranian society is predominantly
traditional. This is best illustrated by the way the Persians
interact and by the way difference groups are formed. In order
to examine the degree of transition (rationality vs. tradition)
of the Iranian society, it is important, therefore, to understand
the nature of the groups or associations that exist in Iran. An
understanding of group formation is also important because groups
are a means through which difference interests are aggregated and
also articulated; and then demands and pressures (inputs) are
put upon the government for the purposes of recruitment, employ-
ment, and promotion.

Related to social interactions are social stratification
and social mobility. In order to examine the degree of social
stratification and its effects on staffing, it is useful to under-
stand the social structure of the Iranian society. In other words,
in order to know what elements (or groups) have more access to and
benefit most from the government it is necessary to study the
social and occupational classes that exist in Iran.

However, the way people interact and the way groups are formed and interests articulated are determined, to a large extent, by the patterns of communication and the media involved. An examinationof the "communication network", therefore, throws some light upon the degree of "unity" or "differentiation" (homogeneity or heterogeneity) that exists among the Iranian population.

The following points then seem to be relevant to the discussion of the staffing process in the government of Iran: primary groups vs. secondary associations; social and occupational strata; and the communication network.

PRIMARY GROUPS VS.SECONDARY ASSOCIATIONS

Unlike the industrial and refracted societies, Iran is a transitional society in which tradition still predominates. Although there are secondary associations, primary groups are the center of almost all activities in Iran. As Leonard Binder observes:

> Primary groups still form the core of interest associations. The extended family stands at the center of Iranian social organization, and it remains the single most important political fact. Of less importance, nevertheless a consistant feature of social organizstion is the primary group dimension of the broad demographic category in which the individual may be classified. Here, reference is to the relationship between the villager and his village community, the tribesman and his clan, the city dweller of the lower class and his neighbours. As one moves up the social scale the demographic category becomes less important and cliques assume greater significance.

Whereas the associations in America, for example, are

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[1] Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp.153-54.

functionally specific, the Iranian groups are functionally diffuse. In Iran, the family, especially the peasant family, is not only a biological unit, but also a center of social and religious activities, a basic political unit in the Iranian power structure, and an "apprenticeship shop" or a "teaching school" for the coming generation.[2]

The same is true of religious associations and other groupings based on locality (geography), language, demographic divisions, neighbourhood and friendship. There exists also a great deal of overlaps among these variables. The particular basis of family influence, for example, is often connected with aspects of broad demographic division among the people of Iran.[3]

Demographically, Iran may be divided into two overlapping concenteric circles. The area covered by the smaller circle is inhabited by Persian-speaking Iranian proper. The larger outer area is encompassed by the Arabic-speaking minority of the southern areas, the Turkie-speaking people of the north-west, the Pushtu-speaking minority of the east, the Kurds who live in or near the mountains all around, and some Armenians.[4] These minorities

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[2]Fred W. Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), p. 63.

[3]Binder, Op. cit., p. 159.

[4]Emil Lengyel, The Changing Middle East (New York: The John Day Co., 1960), pp. 289-90.

of diverse languages and cultures are sediments left behind by
the conquering races attracted to Iran.

Groupings based on each of these variables form the struc-
ture of social power in Iran. It is interesting to note, however,
that each of these aspects of power structure should be conceived
of as the social environment which the individual Iranian tries
to use and manipulate in getting an employment, a promotion, a
contract, a license, title to public lands or membership in the
Parliament. There is little cooperation or joint effort for a
common objective. Instead there exists an involved procedure
of mutual favor-doing, bargaining, lutigari,[5] and clearing of
mutual obligations which holds these groups together.[6] This can
partly be explained in terms of the individualism that exists in
Iran.

Individualism is one of the most obvious characteristics
of Persians. Community feeling is absent among the Iranians.
Distrust and suspicion are widespread. The inclination of an
average Iranian to cooperate with his fellow men does not go
beyond family lines and religious considerations. Persians may

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[5] "Lutigari" is a colloquial Persian term referring to a
kind of chivalric friendship that involves the doing of mutual
favors.

[6] Binder, op. cit., 158.

cooperate to build a mosque or help a member of the family, but no more. Moreover, pressures of personal problems do not leave much time for a person to spend some time on, or even think about, community problems.[7]

Related to the formation and predominance of primary groups is another feature of the Iranian society: subjectivity. Emotions, opinions, traditions, quotations from poets and anecdotes, as well as historical allegories rather than logic and rationality govern social relationships in Iran. In short, thought processes, i.e., the way people think and pass judgements on things, are predominantly subjective.[8]

As for the secondary associations there exists many of them in Iran. There are trade unions, literary clubs, a Chamber of Commerce, a Medical Association, a Teachers' Association, political parties[9] and other types of groups formed on the basis of common economic interests, idealogical affiliations, skills or professions. It must be stressed, however, that all these groups are short-lived, formalistic, and in a sense "polyarchal symbols" to be used and manipulated by certain individuals for personal and particularistic ends. It is not uncommon, for

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[7]Richard W. Gable, "Culture and Administrative Behavior in Iran," Middle East Journal XIII (1959), pp. 413-14.

[8]Ibid., pp. 415-16.

[9]For a discussion of political parties inIran, see chapter six, this work.

example, to see an association appear for a single day or a month
to serve a purpose, say, "to welcome a foreign lecturer," and then
wither away with no signs left behind.[10]

Many of the secondary or voluntary associations are only
"paper organizations". They are formalistic because they do not
function as they are formally or legally supposed to. Family
influence, individual status, bargaining, and other traditional
influences determine their actual goals and effective functioning.
The recognized group leaders exercise a great deal of influence
which they usually use either for their own personal benefits or
to redress their followers' grievances. Rank and file members
of almost all voluntary associations are not generally satisfied
with their government-designated or self-appointed leaders and
are usually disatisfied and critical of their poor organizational
apparatus.[11] Practically all such groups are formed to serve the
interest of the individual leaders. There are no common goals or
objectives, although such goals may appear on paper, such as stated
in a political party's constitution. "Particularism", as opposed
to "universalism" whichh is the characteristic of the secondary
association in more refracted societies such as the United States,
is the main feature of voluntary associations in Iran.

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[10]Binder, op. cit., p. 177.

[11]Ibid., p. 201.

PRIMARY GROUPS AND STAFFING

The associational pattern of the Iranian society - i.e. predominance of primary groups over secondary associations - affects the administration and hence the staffing process of the Iranian government. In Western, industrial societies such as the United States where voluntary associations are strong, bureaucracy is looked upon as an agent to serve the public interests. It is thus measured by its ability to meet the limited objectives specified in laws and regulations. In other words, bureaucracy, like any other voluntary association is based on contract which governs its activities. Civil servants, therefore, in the industrial countries are recruited on a merit basis and on the understanding that they will promote specified objective, otherwise they will not be employed or will be discharged. Consequently, any person who meets the appropriate standards relevant to the goals and requirements of the job in the government is welcome to apply for it. The same norm or standard applies equally to everyone who satisfies a given requirement for recruitment. In other words, recruitment is done universally.[12]

In Iran, on the other hand, due to the predominance of primary groups particularistic interests and influences affect the staffing process of the government. In theory and according

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[12] Riggs, op. cit., pp. 14-19.

to the personnel laws and regulations all those who possess certain qualifications may apply for a position in the ministries or public agencies. But this is largely modified by pressures exerted on the government. Such pressures, particularistic in nature, are related to such primary organizations as family, friendship, and other personal ties like old school ties, neighbourhood, or membership in a clique.

As pointed out earlier in this chapter, there exists a strong family loyalty in Iran. Family is the core of many socio-political activities and hence it has a great role to play in the staffing processes of the ministries. Individual Iranians, especially the younger ones, depend very much on the family, its status and influence. The family including the relatives, especially the close ones like cousins, uncles, etc., are usually expected to think about and find jobs for the individual members. In fact, "individuals derive a sense of security from this situation of others thinking about and looking after them."[13] Family interests, particularistic in nature, therefore, enter the staffing process of the government and modify the universalistic criteria of selection as manifested in laws and regulations. Nepotism which is the characteristic of the bureaucratic organization and behavior in Iran, as in many other underdeveloped countries, is thus a reflection of existing pre-

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[13]Gable, op. cit., p. 410.

industrial family relations in which family loyalties outweigh
the demands of technical skills and objective recruitment, exami-
nation, and promotion.[14] As Fred W. Riggs observes:

> A family does not aggregate specific functional interests.
> It cannot press for the adoption of a policy universally
> applicable to everyone. Instead it seeks to promote the
> particular interests of its family members - an elevation
> in status, appointment as an official .... The administra-
> tive response is not to promulgate policies or promote
> general interests, but rather to make continuing series
> of judgments or choices, favoring this one, punishing
> that one.... And each official, patron, family head, as
> one moves down the social scale, seeks in his turn, to
> maintain or improve his status, to contain his rivals,
> to make suitable alliances, etc. The administrative order,
> in short, /rests_7 on a particular group structure which it
> also /helps_7 to sustain.[15]

Another way by which particularistic interests are carried
over into the administration and hence the staffing process of the
Iranian government is mutual favor-ding. Here officials do favors
expecting to be repaid at some other time. The basis of mutual
favor doing is friendship which usually develops in the school,
as a result of neighbourhood, or in some other ways. "Favours
done by officials for officials establish ... obligations which
are usually honored when occasion demands."[16] Membership in a
religious organization, or in a clique, is another way by which

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[14] John M. Pfiffner and Robert V. Presthus, Public Administra-
tion (4th ed.; New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1960), p. 80.

[15] Riggs, op. cit., p. 65.

[16] Binder, op. cit., p. 140.

particularistic interests enter into the staffing process of the
government. Here the members try to staff the government, or at
least to give favors to other members in matters of recruitment,
employment and promotion. Favoritism in the process of selecting
candidates for public offices is, therefore, an outcome of pre-
dominance of primary groups with particularistic interests over
secondary associations which are usually universalistic in their
goals and objectives.

Due to the predominance of primary organizations, if they
could be called organizations, "civil service appointments in Iran
are frequently based on considerations other than agencies real
needs or the candidates qualifications."[17] In fact, it is the
person and not the office that is considered more important and
has more influence in Iran.[18] As a result employees are usually
classified according to their rank. Little attention is given
to merit and hence there are few qualification requirements for
employment. Moreover, not much attention is given to performance
standards for purposes of promotion and transfer.[19] It is not at

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[17]Jahangir Amuzegar, "Administrative Barriers to Economic
Development in Iran," Middle East Economic Papers, 1958 (Beirut,
Lebanon: Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut,
Dar-el-Kitab, 1958), p. 8.

[18]Binder, op. cit., p. 140.

[19]Richard W. Gable, "The Public Service in Iran," Public
Personnel Review, XXII (1961), p. 30. See also Ferrel Heady,
"Personnel Administration in the Middle East," Public Personnel
Review, XX (1959), p. 52.

all rare, for example, to sit in an official's office and hear
him recommend (or answer to recommendations) a relative or a
friend over the phone to some other agency head who might be a
relative or a friend.[20] It is not advisable, and this is agreed
upon by almost all Iranians, to walk into any office without a
letter of introduction from an influential individual, be it a
friend, a relative, or a neighbour.[21]

Favoritism and nepotism have led to overstaffing. But
the Iranian civil service is at once overstaffed and understaffed.
That is it is overstaffed in general but understaffed in many
skilled positions.[22] T.C. Young observes: "Although some minis-
tries are badly understaffed, others are fat with the idle and
incompetent; the ablest public servants work hard for long hours,
but the majority do not."[23] Experienced managerial and adminis-
trative talents within the Iranian government to marshal and co-
ordinate the present socio-economic developments, therefore,
constitute the manpower bottleneck in Iran. Presently there is
much waste of both material and human resources in the govern-
ment of Iran.[24]

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[20] T. Cuyler Young, "Iran in Continuing Crisis," Foreign
Affairs, XL (1962), p. 283.

[21] Binder, op. cit., p. 139.

[22] Ibid., p. 135.   [23] Op. cit., p. 283.

[24] Ibid., pp. 279-80.

As a result of overstaffing, in large segments of the public service in Iran work hours are short, tardiness and absenteeism are widespread. Moreover, attention to work on the job is not much demanded, and may not be even possible.[25]

Sporatic attempts have been made by the government to devise ways and means to coup with the problem of overstaffing. A unique system worked out by the Iranian government to remedy the malady of overstaffing is that of assigning excess personnel to a category of "waiting for service"[26] employees. "Waiting for service" or "disponible" employees are those who have no assignment but reamin in the payroll at part and sometimes full pay - usually 1/2 or 2/3 regular pay.[27]

However, overstaffing is not the only reason of putting the employees on the waiting list. Another reasons is to punish the unproductive and obnoxious persons. Still there is a third reason which is political in nature and usually applies to the higher positions in the administration. Here employees are placed on disposible list by every new minister who comes to power with the change of the cabinet and who brings his own choices but can

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[25] Heady, op. cit., p. 50.

[26] This is also called "awaiting assignments", "reserve positions", or "disponible list".

[27] Heady, op. cit., p. 50. See also Gahle, "The Public Service in Iran," op. cit., p. 31.

not dismiss their predecessors.[28] And this is usually considered
a disgrace by those who become disponable.

Another way worked out by the government to meet the prob-
lem of overstaffing is to place a blanket ban on new appointments.
New hiring, therefore, except in certain categories such as
physicians, school teachers, and government factory workers is
prohibited by law which is in effect for nearly a decade. But
this is apt to produce other maladjustments in the administration
without accomplishing much by way of staff reduction.[29]

The first effect of the law prohibiting new hiring is
related to the need of skilled personnel in the civil service.
The government in recent years has embarked on many activities
of diverse nature. There is therefore a constant need of skilled
managers and administrators who constitute, as pointed out earlier,
the manpower bottleneck in Iran. But the law prohibits employment
of such people. The result is to depend on less skillful or less
competent persons within the service. This, in turn, means less
efficient administration which is of prime importance for socio-
economic development.

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[28] Binder, op. cit., p. 134. Amuzegar points out that "every
cabinet minister can recruit new candidates into the civil service.
Cabinet changes frequently and since new ministers want to employ
their own people, some of the appointees of the outgoing adminis-
tration lose their status while retaining their civil service
security and continue to receive at least a part of their salaries."
This itself leads to overstaffing and has, therefore, "the undesir-
able effect of adding to the overhead costs of government operations
and lowering the efficiency of the government organizations." p. 10.

[29] Heady, op. cit., p. 50.

A second consequence of the blanket ban on new employment is to resort to the provisions of employing people on contract basis. But highly trained and ambitious young Iranians are disinclined to enter the public service on contract, so that the loophole tends to bring into the government less competent people. Previously some people tried to break into the prestige services by starting out as teachers or employees of the Ministry of Education and then transferring. But lately the Ministry of Education has prohibited such transfers.[30]

Still a third effect of prohibiting new employment is, on the one hand, to increase the burden of work for a decreasing number of employees in some ministries or governmental agencies. And that is the reason why all the ministries, except the Ministry of Education, feel that they do not have adequate personnel - that they are greatly understaffed.[31]

On the other hand, many jobs may simply go undone because there are some employees who are unproductive. What is more is that some positions may even remain vacant when their incumbents are promoted, retired, or transferred. This is also due to the fact that when an employee is promoted to the higher grades he will not belittle himself by performing the work of the lower grades which he may feel to be below his status.[32]

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[30]Binder, op. cit., p. 135.

[31]See Gable, "The Public Service in Iran," op. cit., pp. 31-32.

[32]Ibid., p. 31.

A third technique the government uses in checking the
problem of overstaffing is to create temporary "purge" committees
with great power of dismissal. Dismissal may also take place in
small scales by the minister or the director-general for administra-
tion. The elimination of the excess civil servants is, however,
only one of the reasons for the establishment of such committees.
Another and even more important objective for these committees may
be punishment for corruption through dismissal. A formal purge
committee was at work in Iran in the early 1950's.[33] Moreover,
some small-scale purges are taking place at present in the adminis-
tration. These purges are the continuation of anti-corruption cam-
paigns started by Dr. Amini, the ex-Prime Minister, and his govern-
ment, in the Middle of 1961; and they have been going on to the
present time.[34]

However, the influence of families and friends - an implica-
tion of the predominance of primary organizations - can also be seen
in the anti-corruption campaigns. As Young puts it:

> The Amini government began bravely and authorized clean-ups
> in certain agencies where chiefs were willing and aided by
> some tough assistants. In one agency the deputy for adminis-
> tration, who jettisoned 70 such persons as approved by the
> Prime Minister, complained that he had no time to get on to
> the next category for surgery since a large part of his time
> went to telephone calls from cabinet and other high officials
> pleading for their friends and families.[35]

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[33] Heady, op.cit., p. 51.

[34] Young, op. cit., p. 283. Kayhan International (A Persian daily
paper in English) came out on Tuesday, Oct. 27, 1964 with the head-
line: "Shahanshah warns of top-bracket civil service purge", "New
War on Corruption", "Deep Surgery will be used". Moreover it went
out to say: "His Imperial Majesty told Majlis Deputies ... that
he regretted to say that 'so far some high heads have been caught
in the anti-corruption campaign'but emphasized that corruption
would be eradicated." col. 1, p. 1.

[35] Young, op. cit., p. 283.

SOCIAL AND OCCUPATIONAL STRATA

In order to understand the social mobility, degree of separation between classes, and the degree of political access the individual may have, it is relevant to examine the social and occupational strata of the Iranian society. Utilizing the class, therefore, as a tool of analysis, it is possible to focus attention upon the attitudes and aspirations of defined groups of individuals and to provide a means of examining the relationships that exist between the socio-economic, political, and administrative processes and the social structure.[36] Unfortunately an accurate description of Iranian social classes is lacking. Little work is done on the problem. However, generally three classes maybe identified. The general criteria for such a classification are wealth, prestige, occupation, political access, and political cooperation.

At the bottom of the scale we have the lower class. This class includes the following groups. At the lowest level we have the tribes which vary in size from small clan-like groups to large federations of about a quarter of a million. At present they are about four millions, constituting one-fifth of the total population.[37]

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[36] James A. Bill, "The Social and Economic Foundation of Power in Contemporary Iran," *Middle East Journal*, XVII (1963), p. 400.

[37] Aziz Hatami, *Iran* (Tehran, Iran: The General Department of Publications and Broadcasting, 1963), p. 60.

The second social level of the lower class, consists of the peasants who form the overwhelming majority of the population, about 12 millions at present - that is, 60 per cent of the total population.[38] These are the people who live in villages and get their livelihood from land. The lot of these people, like other Middle Eastern farmers, may best be described by the following words: poverty, ignorance, indebtedness, dependence, disease (including malnutrition) and exploitation. Most peasants are illiterate and respectful of religion. They represent the passive element of the society. Due to poor communication, there exists a physical as well as a social "distance" between the urban intellectuals and the peasants. In short, the peasants do not ask much from the government.[39]

The third category includes in the lower class is the Iranian urban "lumpen-proletariat" most of whom are the new

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[38]Ibid., p. 142. James A. Bill sub-divides the peasants into two categories: (1) the landless peasants, and (2) the "peasant proprietors" who are better off than their comrades who live as tenants. "The ranks of the peasant proprietors", he says, "have been slowly growing due to the initial implementation of land reform, but they still represent only a minute section of the peasant mass". Op.cit., p. 406.

[39]Ibid.; Binder, op. cit., pp. 168-69; the 1956 census indicated that rural per capita income in Iran was less than 70 dollars. "In April 1962, a Soviet journal presented the Iranian peasant's average annual income as 200 tomans ($ 25)." Bill, op. cit. footnote No. 17, p. 407. For a recent account of prevalence of poverty and disease in Iran, see Geoffrey Godsell, "Iran: Is It Really Reform at Last?" Christian Century Science Monitor, May 3, 1961 Sec. 2, p. 1, Cols. 1-5; and Harrison E. Salisburry, "Village Mirrors Distress of Iran," New York Times, November 24, 1961, p. 8, Col. 4.

immigrants from the countryside who often have no fixed house in the city. The majority of those included in this category are not permanent residents of the city for they return to their villages during the winter.

Then come those engaged in unskilled service jobs such as hawkers, peddlers, porters, car washers, newspaper boys and the like. They have regular pursuits which engage them daily but their incomes are irregular, though not as irregular as those of casual laborers.[40]

Unskilled factory labor[41] is on a somewhat higher level of political awareness. Since industry is not much developed in Iran this category is relatively very small. Although their income is not necessarily higher than the preceding group, i.e., unskilled service jobs, the members of this category are politically more active; and sometimes ask for services from the government.[42]

Semi-skilled laborers who enjoy higher wages, status, and security make up the sixth category of the lower class. They include journeymen apprentices in the bazaar, semi-skilled factory labors, drivers, mechanics, and so on. These individuals usually remain aloof from those of lower classes, but they may form micro-groupings wherever the enterprise is large enough. Their dependence

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[40]Binder, op. cit., pp. 68-69 and 169-70.

[41]This group plus the semi-skilled factory laborers (self-employed urban workers and employees engaged in construction and manufacturing in urban areas) number about 610 thousands. See Bill, op. cit., p. 405. This figure is supported by Vreeland's report which states that "Fewer than 2 per cent of the people of Iran work at industrial occupations, and of these at least half are engaged in carpet making, band-boom weaving, and other occupations that are mainly home crafts." Herbert H. Vreeland (Research Chairman and Editor), Iran (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1957), p. 203.

[42]Bill, Op. cit., p. 405; Binder, op. cit., pp. 170-71

on their employer may be stronger, but they are more cautious and more security-oriented than those further down the line.[43]

The last and the highest in prestige among the lower class are the low-grade civil servants. The wages of the members of this category are very low, but they are placed above the preceding categories because of the high prestige the government service offers. They are large in number and include such people as Tobacco and monopoly workers, railroad workers, tea boys, office boys, streetcleaners, postal employees, and police privates. They have more job security and are not required to work hard.[44]

Generally speaking, literary among most of the members of the lower class is rare. They all lack initiative, and perhaps except the last category, they are socio-politically passive and even unaware of their situation. They do not ask much from the government and thus do not care much about how and by whom it runs.[45] In short, this class is the most exploited, alienated, and dispossessed element of the Iranian society.[46]

The middle class, whose members live in urban centers, forms the second major stratum of the Iranian social structure. Small retailers and guild craftmen form the lowest rank of this

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[43]Binder, op. cit., p. 171.

[44]Ibid.,

[45]Vreeland, op. cit., pp. 249-54.

[46]Bill, op. cit., p. 407.

class. These petty traders are usually affected by many of the government regulations; but they are rarely consulted before such regulations are made; and they have little access for purposes of redress. Now, however, they can make themselves heard through the high council of guilds or through the ulama whom they generally support. Apart from this, the only thing they can do is to stop supplying their wares to the public.[47] This is a technique of challenging the system which will be discussed in chapter six under the political functions.

The small landowning people who are better off than the peasant proprietor form the second category of the middle class. Their number is very limited and decreasing. This category is included in the middle class because it wields the amount of socio-political power that is characteristic of ths lower middle classes. In general, those included in this category lack the revolutionary fervor of the other groups included in the middle class.[48]

The next middle class group is composed of white collar intellegents ia, most of whom are government clerks, school teachers as well as white collar and sales personnel employed in commerce. Low army officers and lower ulama may also be included here. They are better educated, enjoy considerable prestige, but are low paid and have little access.[49] In D. Lerner's terminology they are

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[47] Binder, op. cit., p. 172.

[48] Bill, op. cit., p. 409.

[49] Binder, op. cit. p. 172

"moderns", or "transitionals".[50] Perhaps except some of the
ordinary ulama the members of this group are "achievement
oriented" people, have "opinion", and are ambitious. There is
a sharp contrast between their financial embarrassment and their
high aspiration for advancement.[51]

The value of this group stems not from material wealth
or property, but from function, performance, and service. These
non-entrepreneurial middle class individuals form the major com-
ponent of the middle sector in Iran. Excluding low army officers
and lower ulama, they number over 330,000. Government bureaucrats
included in this category number approximately 200,000.[52]

Middle retailers and small wholesalers form the next
occupational category of the middle class. Included here are
also persons engaged in services requiring some technical skills
and knowledge of foreign languages, and others of perhaps less
education but higher income than the white collar intellectuals.
Security and social advancement seem to be the principal goals
for this new bourgeois element of the Iranian society. No strong
ideological convictions, even religious convictions, exist among

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[50]See The Passing of Traditional Society in The Middle East
(3rd printing; Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

[51]Binder, op. cit., pp. 172-73.

[52]Bill, op. cit., p. 408.

the people included in this category. As a group therefore the members of this middle class element usually are not politically active. Although their education and outside appearance warrant more awareness and political participation, they are usually content to protect their current and short-term interests and beneficial opportunities.[53]

The professional and technical government employees, including doctors and engineers employed by contract, constitute the fifth category of the middle class. Individuals included in this group are of higher prestige but not necessarily of higher income than those included in the lower category. They are educated and boast high educational qualifications found among the Westernized segment of the society. They have a good deal of confidence and high aspirations for advancement. Their criticism of traditional methods of administration, of nepotism and corruption is accompanied by activism and optimism and not by despair and withdrawal. They tend to be critical of and impatient with the status quo, but they do not fail to use their convictions for their own private purposes. They can often have a voice in the legislation, "but their organization is poor". In short, they represent the lower level of the governmental elite.[54] In Lerner's terminology they are "modern".[55]

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[53]Binder, op. cit., p. 173.

[54]Ibid.,

[55]Op. cit.

The last category included in the middle class consists of the "professional and technical personnel" that are self-employed. People forming this section of the middle class are both higher and lower in prestige, wealth and organization than those governmentally employed. For various reasons they have chosen not, or have failed, to enter the government service. Accordingly, some of those included in this category are successful, some are not. Some are of good connections, some are not. "Some are satisfied, optimistic, individualists, and some are dissatisfied, pessimistic, revolutionary, leftist.... The successful private professional is usually foreign educated, has a high income, caters to foreign and aristocratic clientele, and enjoys a very high prestige."[56]

The appearance of the middle class in the Iranian society is a very recent occurence. Experts writing between 1949 and 1953 observed "that an Iranian middle class was either totally or practically non-existant."[57] Today, however, it is estimated that this emergent class makes up 10 to 15 per cent of the total population.[58]

The middle class in general is the resultant outcome of the impact of the West and its technical culture. The more articulate

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[56] Binder, op. cit., p. 174.

[57] Bill, op. cit., p. 409. See also Richard N. Frye, Iran (2nd ed., London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 104; Lewis V. Thomas & Richard N. Frye, The United States and Turkey and Iran (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 200; M.A. Djamalzadeh, "An Outline of Social and Economic Structure of Iran," International Labor Review, LXIII (January, 1951), p. 31.

[58] Bill, op. cit., Richard Cotton, "Image and Reality in Iran," Land Reborn, XII (May, 1961), pp. 10-11.

elements of the Iranian society are included in this class. Although

all the elements comprising the middle class make up a small per

centage of the population, this class has a direct impact on Iranian

national life.[59]   For most of the elements of this class desires

wealth, influence, power, status, and prestige that is monopolized

only by the ruling classes. Moreover, most of the members of this

class stand for modernization, industrialization, reform and

revolution.[60]

The upper class, the elite, forms the third and the top

stratum of the Iranian society. "Most of the wealth, power, pres-

tige, and advanced education in Iran have been concentrated within

/ this / small urban group of large families at the top of the

social pyramid (estimates run from two hundred to one thousand

families)".[61]

For the purpose of clarification this upper class will be

broken down into the following major segments. At the low edge

of this higher class, "from the point of view of prestige and

personal influence," there are higher ulama (or clergymen) who

are usually "middle class- traditional in way of life and income."

All classes, except the Westernized middle class groups, respect

this group who are still of considerable influence especially in

the provinces. The higher ulama have achieved their position

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[59]Robert Kingsley, "Premier Amini and Iran's Problems,"
Middle Eastern Affairs, XIII (1962), p. 195.

[60]Bill, op. cit., p. 410.

[61]Vreeland, op. cit., pp. 246-47. See also Ibid., p. 400.

either by learning, social skills and recognition, or by less
learning supplemented by family fame.[62] Most of the high ulama
are also native landowners, and thus there exists a great deal
of overlaps among the groups of the upper class.[63]

Above this group are the Westernized bankers, importers,
and industrial aristocrats and, not far removed from them, the
big merchants many of whom are ligious and traditional in way
of life. Although there have been reports recognizing the exis-
tence and emphasizing the importance of this emergent group,
there are no figures available to indicate to what extent this
group exists within Iran.[64] The basis of entry into this catego-
ry has been through accumulation of wealth. Some have managed to
rise from petty trading, under the unusual opportunities afforded
by each of the two World Wars. Some were (or are):

> ...important landowners who have diversified their interests.
> In most   instances, /‾however/ success in these enterprises
> depends upon cooperation from high officials, and some members
> of this group have acquired their stake as government officials
> .... The organization of these interests through the chamber of
> commerce gives them some official status, but their normally
> good social relations with one another and with high officials
> and the court afford a sound though informal basis for coopera-
> tion.[65]

Close to the very top of the society, and overlapping both
the aristocratic group and big business are the highest government
officials, judges, generals, and professors. This group enjoys
very high prestige. Its members are of great power and influence,

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[62]Binder, op. cit., p. 174.

[63]Bill, op. cit., p. 401.

[64]Ibid., p. 403.

[65]Binder, op. cit., p. 175.

excellent access, and frequently important public policy makers.
Although these top bureaucratic elites are roughly organized on
the basis of the organizations they serve, the family is also
important in their organization. Most of them, especially the
younger and less aristocratic among them, are usually highly edu-
cated and have Western-style higher degrees. It is interesting,
however, to note that this category is not completely closed to
those from below, because government and army service have afford-
ed some opportunity for mobility. Nevertheless, most of the high
government positions are filled by members of the category just
above.[66]

The highest category of the upper class is composed of
the members of the Royal family, the wealthy people of the Qajar
nobility, the tribal nobility, and the large landholding elements
of the society.[67]

In spite of the fact that their monopoly was broken by
Reza Shah, the members of this group have monopolized almost
everything in Iran: wealth, prestige, land, important positions
in the government, industries, etc. Some new comers to big busi-
ness and high government positions have been assimilated and thus

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[66]Ibid.

[67]Walter Z. Laqueur wrote in autumn 1961 that a "handful
of landowners" owned over 50 per cent of the arable land in Iran.
He pointed out moreover that each of these big landlords possessed
"at least 300-500 villages." "Good Intentions in Iran," The New
Republic, CXLV (September, 18, 1961), p. 12.

there exists little friction between the two. Acquisition of land and intermarriage were two important denominators for admission to this group from below.[68] Nowadays, however, as a result of land reform, land is becoming less important for wealth and education are taking the place of land as a factor for social mobility.[69]

The following charts on pages 100 and 101 may serve as an illustration of the Iranian class structure discussed above.

ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS

The first administrative implication of the social structure in Iran is that more than 80 per cent of the country's total population has no access to the government. It is beyond the reach of government and hence excluded from any recruiting program for public services. Geographical or natural barriers have separated this major segment of the Iranian population from the other parts as well as the government. Moreover, due to poor system of communication and transportation there has developed a large cultural gap which further isolates the rural elements from each other and from the city life. Since different segments of the

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[68] Binder, op. cit., pp. 175-76.

[69] George B. Baldwin, "The Foreign-Education Iranian: A Profile," Middle East Journal, XVII (1963), pp. 269.

CHART I

SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN IRAN[9]

Royal Family	Bureaucratic Elites	Upper Class
Qajar & Tribal Nobility	Industrial Aristocrats	2-5 percent
Large Landowners	Higher Ulama	

1. Self-employed Professional & Technical
   Personnel
2. Government-employed Professional & Technical
   employees
3. Middle Retailers
4. White collar Intelligentsia
5. Small Land Holders
6. Small Retailers

Middle Class
10-15 percent

1. Low-grade Civil Servants
2. Semi-skilled Labors
3. Unskilled Factory Labors
4. Unskilled Service Jobs
5. Lumpen Proletariates
6. Peasants
7. Tribesmen

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80-85 percent

[9]The chart is divided into three parts, each representing one of the three classes in Iran. Dotted lines separating the classes stand for the degree of social mobility that exist in the Iranian Society. The categories included in each class are enumerated within each section. Due to lack of accurate statiscal figures no attempt is made to show the number of people each category includes. However, an approximate and somehow doubtful percentage of each of the major classes is given at the right side of the chart.

CHART II

SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN IRAN⁹

UPPER CLASSES

1. Royal Family
2. Qajar & Tribal Nobility
3. Large Landowners
4. Bureaucratic Elites
5. Industrial Aristocrats
6. Higher Ulama

MIDDLE CLASSES

1. Self-employed Prof.& Tech. Personnel
2. Govt-employed Prof.& Tech. Employees
3. Middle Retailers & Wholesalers
4. White Collar Intelligentsia
5. Small Land-Holders
6. Small Retailers & Guild Craftsmen

LOWER CLASSES

1. Low-Grade Civil Servants
2. Semi-Skilled Labors
3. Unskilled Factory Labors
4. Unskilled Service Jobs
5. Lumpen Proletariates

6. Peasants
7. Tribesmen

2-5
percent

10-15
percent

80-85
percent

⁹Each of the three parts of the chart represents one of the major classes in Iran. Dotted lines stand for lack of class rigidity. Different categories are enumerated at the left side of each section, while the percentages of each of the three major classes are given at the right side of the chart.

society know little about each other; each group sticks to its own group and its way of life and tries to protect it from any intrusion. Protection and promotion of primary group interests, therefore, are usually given priority. This has led to administrative and legislative arbitrariness in the system of government.[70] As a result employment of personnel is generally not related to what may be called "management needs".[71] An official, for example,

> ... is named to a salaried position without having to perform corresponding duties, or with only nominal duties. Again, substantial 'fringe benefits' are offered to privileged incumbents beyond the official salary. Others who lack 'influence' or 'pull' find themselves assigned to lowly posts, denied promotion or salary increases, unable to obtain fringe benefits.[72]

The Iranian class structure also implies that only a very small segment of the society controls the government and monopolizes public offices. Most of the administrative posts are filled by the members of those groups who owing to their high degree of access, education and wealth have managed to obtain them. And once these groups are in the government they try to promote their own vested interest. Thus there has developed a vicious circle of administrative arbitrariness caused by

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[70] Binder, op. cit., p. 255.

[71] Richard W. Gable, "The Public Service in Iran," Public Personnel Review XXII (1961), p. 30. See also Amuzegar, op. cit., p. 8.

[72] Fred W. Riggs, "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model," Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (eds.), Paper in Comparative Public Administration (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, The University of Michigan, 1962), p. 27.

the existing class system which in turn is affected - protected and preserved - by the administration.

Still a third implication is that the Iranian society seems to be neither a completely closed system like the castes inIndia, nor open enough to encourage easy mobility. It is rather an intermediate type, something that may be called a "sticky" class system.[73] Social mobility from one class to another or even from one category to the next is not easy, but it is notimpossible either. It is observed, for example, that the army, the administration as well as some unusual circumstances[74] have provided opportunities for advancement.

Applied to staffing, the system is too tight to permit recruitment or promotion on the basis of competitive examination provided in the laws and regulations. However, it is not so closed as to produce a feudal or propertied aristocracy, and/or a ruling caste. The officials of this loosely bureaucratic administrative system constitute, in Riggs terminology, "an elect", enjoying at the same time the most favoured positions in power, prestige, and wealth.[75] As in the "Sala", they "continue to exercise the undifferentiated political-administrative fucntions of the fused model, but behind a facade of administra-

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[73] Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration, op. cit., p.66.

[74] Two World Wars, political troubles and different forms of coups d'etate, and some catastrophes like the Earthquake of 1962 are examples of this kind. As a result of these events many people became rich and climbed upward to hgiher classes while others lost their fortunes and moved downward.

[75] Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration, op. cit., p. 66.

tive institutionalism borrowed from industrial, relatively refrac-
ted societies.[76]

An official while publicly adhering to a modern set of
norms may reject them as meaningless or not binding. He may, for
example, adhere to objective, achievement oriented standards of
recruitment, but privately subscribe to more subjective, ascrip-
tion-oriented standards, and to more particularistic norms. He
may publicly denounce bribery and corruption, but secretly
encourage it. In his ambivalence, he may talk about laws and
regulations and their strict enforcement, but the next moment
he may violate them openly.

The same is true of the public ar large. The citizen
may criticize the administration for its failure to abide by rules
and regulations - modern refracted norms,-but the next moment,
without any sense of contradiction, he may collaborate with
corruption to secure sspecial privileges for himself.[77]

THE COMMUNICATION NETWORK

In Iran, as elsewhere, language is a major element divid-

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[76] Riggs, "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model",
op. cit., p. 33.

[77] Ibid., pp. 29-31. Binder states that "the individual
seeks increased income, higher social status, security... and the
ability to identify with the past and future glories of his nation.
He seeks an end to shameful backwardness, disease, ignorance, and
an end to hypocritical appeals to conflicting ideals, an end to
double standards of justice and value distribution, and an end to
all those forms of authority legitimized by tradition. The indi-
vidual wants all those things, yet remains very much a traditional
himself and in his ambivalence he rejects the system but not all
of its manifestations. He demands that others recognize his rights
as individual or citizen, but he takes advantage of any small per-
quisite afforded him by the rejected system; he may even work the

ing the people into different component of ethnic groups. On
the other hand people speaking a common language and living in
a country tend to share their other attitudes, feelings and ways
of life to a greater degree than those who do not.[78]

Unlike some Asiatic countries Iran does not have a poly-
glot population. In other words there is at present somekind
of a linguistic unity in Iran. The standard Persian (Farsi) is
the official language of the country, and is understood and spoken
by the majority of the population. This is the language taught
in schools and used by almost all newspapers and radio broad-
casts. However, more than half of the Iranians speak some
dialects of Persian not readily understood by speakers of the
standard Persian language especially those living in Tehran.
But most of the speakers of such dialects also understand and
speak the standard Persian tongue.

Moreover, there are other linguistic minorities in Iran
who have their own customs and traditions. Most of them speak
little Persian. Among such minorities the following ethnic
groups may be included: the Kurds, the Lurs, the Arabs, the
Qashgais, the Baluchis, the Brakuis, the Turkmen, the Assyrians,
the Armenians, and the Jews. It is beyond the scope of this study
to go into a detailed discussion of these ethnic groups. For our
purpose it suffices to say that about one-third of the inhabitants

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(Continued from page 104)

system to the best of his ability while soothing his conscience
by righteous verbalizations. This is the educated, modern, urban,
male Iranian who reads the history of his country as a series of
failures or hypocritical maneuvers." Op. cit., p. 61.

[78]Vreeland, op. cit., p. 37.

of Iran speak languages other than Persian proper which is the
official language of the state. It should also be noted that,
perhaps except the Jews and the Armenians, most of the ethnic
groups enumerated above are farmers living in villages, or are
nomadic tribesmen following their flocks from one pasture to
another. Most of them are illiterate and know little or nothing
about newspapers, radios, or even what the government does or
is supposed to do for them. There is therefore a great commu-
nication gap between these groups and the Persian speaking
people of Iran especially those of the larger cities.[79]

Furthermore, as noted earlier in this chapter, Iran is an
agrarian country with about 60 per cent of its population living
in rural areas (villages), and 20 per cent constituting the nomads.
Most of the farmers live in small and isolated villages with little
contact, if any, with the cities and the government; and so are the
nomads. "A typical Persian village or nomadic tribe is made up
largely of people who seldom visit a city and who lack access to
many of its advantages."[80] Family loyalty, kinship, and face-to-
face contact are the only horizon of their interrelationships
and interactions.

Consequently, there exists a wide social gap among
different segments of the Iranian population many of which have
no access to the government. This social gap, however, is not
merely due to differences of language, occupation, traditions and

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[79]Ibid., pp. 37-51.

way of life. There are also other factors responsible for social differences in Iran. Among these the following two important variables may be mentioned: the natural or geographical setting, and the poor technological state of the country.

Iran is a vast country with an area of approximately 628,000 square miles. It is a territory larger than all of Western Europe,[81] or about one-fifth the size of the United States and slightly smaller than Mexico.[82] The dominant landscope feature of Iran is the interior plateau surrounded by high mountain ranges with their peripheral low lands. The encircling mountain ranges forming a triangle are (1) the Elburz mountains on the north (2) the Zagros mountains on the west and south; and (3) the Highlands of Eastern Iran on the east.[83]

Elburz, the great mountain range of northern Iran, is 600 miles long and extends from the north-west of Khaf on the east where it merges into the Eastern High-lands. Its width varies from 40 to 80 miles. It rises for a long distance to over 9000 feet and its highest peak, Mount Damavand, is 18602 feet high. The Zagros mountain range, originating in the Armenian knot of

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[81]Lerner, op. cit., p. 361.

[82]Vreeland, op. cit., p. 28.

[83]Dorreh Mirheydar, "Geographic Factors in the Political Viability in Iran" (Microfilmed; Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation; Graduate School, Indiana University, 1962), p. 2.

Eastern Turkey, extends southward for about 1000 miles. Its
elevation reaches as high as about 16000 feet.[84]

The High-lands of Eastern Iran are the final segment of
the encircling mountains. These are a series of parallel but
discontinuous ranges that bridge the gap between the Elburz
range on the north and the Mokran mountains on the south.[85]

The plateau is divided into two arbitrary parts: the
fertile lands and the deserts. Two large Kavirs (deserts)
cover about 25 per cent of the total area of the country. These
are the Great Kavir and the southern Lut.[86] Gabriele's experience
in the latter Kavir is revealing:

> ... During the winter the country is dominated by what is
> called the Bad Kassif, 'the dirty wind,' a south wind which
> carries with it immense quantities of dust and sand, and
> completely destroys visibility. In summer there is instead
> a north wind which, as a result of having passed over hund-
> reds of miles of burning desert, has, become so dry that it
> absorbs all the moisture of every living organism. The
> geographer G. Stratel-Saver...was of the opinion that the
> hottest region of the earth was not... to be found in Sind,
> or Abyssinia, or in the Death Valley of California, but in
> the Southern Lut.[87]

Only one-tenth of the country's total land is arable.
Seven-tenths of the area is covered by mountains and deserts.
Forest and grazing lands constitute the other two-tenths.[88]

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[84]Ibid., pp. 2-5.

[85]Ibid., p. 5.   [86] Ibid.

[87]Alfons Gabriel, "the Southern Lut and Iranian Baluchis-
tan," Geographical Journal XCII (1938), p. 194.

[88]Vreeland, op. cit., p. 30. See also Iran Alamanac, 1963
(3rd ed., Tehran, Iran: Echo of Iran, 1963), p. 262.

Iran is therefore characterized by vivid contrasts and great
extremes. Its land includes the green shores of Caspian sea
and the most desolate desert of the world. Its climate ranges
from the mountains snowy cold to the intense heart of the Persian
Gulf areas. Its people live the life of the nomad, the peasant
and the rich sophisticated Tehrani.[89]

Furthermore, Iran is a country of relatively low popula-
tion density. The average total population desnity per square
kilometer is about 13 (or 24 per square mile). This is in con-
trast to 37 in Turkey and 83 in France.[90]

This natural setting and population density have greatly,
among other things, affected the communication and transportation
system of the country. Mountain ranges, deserts, and low density
of population have made the construction of roads, highways and
train lines difficult and expensive, especially for a country
like Iran facing many other important and immediate problems
calling for solutions. Poor communication and transportation
system, a technological problem, is therefore a characteristic
of the Iranian society and a major problem for the government.
In 1961, for example, the railway traffic in Iran was about 1.7
billion passenger kilometers, as contrasted to 33.4 billion in
France and 3.8 billion in Turkey. Moreover, in the same year,
while France had, excluding government and diplomatic vehicles,

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[89]Gable, "Culture and Administration in Iran" op. cit.,
p. 408.

[90]United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1962 (New York:
Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, 1963), Table I, pp. 30-31 and 34.

about 6.2 million units passenger cars and 1.7 million commercial
vehicles, there were, in Iran, excluding government vehicles,
only 96.6 thousand units passenger cars and 42.2 thousand units
commercial vehicles.[91]

Moreover, in 1961 Iran had about 140 thousand telephone
sets in use. While in the same year there were about 1.3 million
telephone sets in Turkey and 4.7 million in France.[92] Almost the
same contrasts exist for radio broadcasting, telegraph services
and other means of communication such as daily papers, posting
system and T.V. services.[93] Poor mass media is largely due to
(1) insufficient skill in literacy among the mass in Iran;
(2) insufficient motivation to share "borrowed experience"; and
(3) insufficient cash to consume the mediated product.[94]

As a result of the natural setting and poor mass media
communication the majority of the Iranians "have not been brought
into a large-scale communication net",[95] and thus, in Riggs' termi-
nology, they are "underlying" or "unmobilized" population. The
horizon is set by religion, clan and/or family with whom the
individual has constant, face-to-face contact.[96] This is true

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[91]Ibid., Table 138, pp. 347-48; and 140, pp. 361-62

[92]Ibid., Table 150, p. 417.

[93]For statistical references see Ibid., Table 181, pp.
649-50; and 184, pp. 657-58; and 185, p. 659.

[94]Lerner, op. cit., p. 363.

[95]Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration, op. cit.,
p. 67.

[96]Ibid.

of the Iranian society for in Iran, as in other transitional

countries, messages can not, due to natural, socio-cultural

and technological barriers, be communicated to the large seg-

ment of the population. It is no wonder, therefore, that there

exist so much differences and social distance among different

segments of the Iranian population. As Lerner observes:

> The ecology of Iran provides optimum conditions for the
> prevalence of extremism. The population is dispersed around
> the vast desert, in villages isolated by inadequate or non-
> existent communications. They remain locked in the ancient
> round of daily life eking from their old soil with their
> antique tools (some antedating the Christian era) their
> immemorial produce. Regarding the new world stage, on which
> their national drama now unfolds, they are uninformed and
> uninvolved.[97]

IMPACTS ON STAFFING

The existence of this semi-mobilized population has a

dual impact on the Iranian administration in general and staffing

in particular. It limits the aggregation and articulation of

public interests and thus inhibits or limits any attempt to

impose responsibility or responsiveness upon the government. The

inability of the population to impose responsibility and respon-

siveness on the government had led, as indicated earlier, to

personal and even arbitrary administrative behavior at every

level of the hierarchy from to to the bottom.[98] As a result

"one must fulfil the obligations of loyalty to persons and not

offices. One repays the favor granted by individuals, and one

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[97]Lerner, op. cit., p. 361.

[98]Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration, op. cit.,
pp. 68-69.

fulfils one's bargain with a person not any agency."[99] In fact,
arbitrary administrative action and corruption was (and is) so
much that Dr. Amini, former Premier, rightly called, "'the
curse of Persia.' Several of the security chiefs, when not
busy terrorizing the population, have been building themselves
palaces and acquiring other real estate. The police in the
cities and the petty officials in the provinces have not been
far behind."[100] The processes of employment and promotion there-
fore, instead of being in accordance with the personnel laws and
regulations - universal criteria - are based on personal recom-
mendations, bargaining, compromise, and favors done by officials
for officials.[101]

Another impact of semi-mobilized population on administra-
tion is that it hampers governmental efforts to control the popu-
lation, to lay down policies and regulate their implementation.[102]
Inability of the government to act, nepotism, favoritism, arbitrary
administrative behavior, in turn, intensifies the situation - i.e.,
the unmobilization of the population which itself is one of the
causes of such an administrative behavior. Thus there develops

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[99]Binder, op. cit., p. 140.

[100]"Persia at the Edge," op. cit., p. 786. Dr Amini, the
ex-Premier, once "declared that if all the corrupt were jailed,
the prison would be jammed and the government departments emptied."
Oded Remba, "The Middle East in 1961 - An Economic Survey," Middle
Eastern Affairs, XIII (1962), p. 80.

[101]Binder, op. cit.

[102]Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration, op. cit.,
p. 68.

a"cycle of deterioration" as a result of this interaction - between
society and administration.

Moreover, poor communication system has a direct effect
on the staffing process of the government. If recruitment for
example, means the discovery, attraction and cultivation of best
employment market for the vacant positions by using attractive
recruiting literature and adequate publicity,[103] this then can
not and does not exist under poor and inefficient system of commu-
nication which characterises Iran. A prerequisite to the discovery
of an employment market is access to individuals. But this is
limited in Iran under the present system of communication. For
most of Iran's population live in isolated small communities in
or near mountains where water is available and where there are
poor roads, amounting in many cases to nothing more than tracks
for camel caravans.[104]

If the best men and women are not recruited to carry out
the functions of the government, then it is clear that to the same
extent inefficiency, lack of responsibility and responsiveness
will ensue. Consequently, little will be done to overcome the
natural and technological barriers limiting proper staffing or

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[103]Glenn O. Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (4th
ed., New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1965), p. 60.

[104]Jane Perry Clarke Carey and Andrew Galbraith Carey,
"Oil and Economic Development in Iran," Political Science Quarterly
LXXV (1960), p. 67.

other administrative practices. This is in fact what is happen-

ing in Iran. And it seems that the Iranians are not following

the advice of their ancestor, Kai-Kaus-ibn-Iskandar, who says,

"...When you make an appointment be careful to allot it to the

man adapted to it and not one lacking for needful capacity....

Not every duty can be assigned to every man.... Give the work,

therefore, to one who is expert in it and thus avoid annoyance."[105]

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[105] Stahl, op. cit., p. 83. Quoting "Qabus Nama" (Letters of a Persian Chieftain in 1082 A.D.), trans. Reuben Levy, A Mirror for Princes (New York: 1951), pp. 225-26.

CHAPTER VI

THE POLITICAL FUNCTIONS

It has been customary to study political systems in
terms of formal legislative, executive, and judicial processes
of governments with reference to political parties. In other
words, the emphasis has been on studying the formal aspects of
government rather than political behavior. The intent here is
to explore the actual political operations, starting with a
description of the formal structure of the Iranian government
as the base of analysis.

THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT

Iran has a written constitution which came into existence
as a result of the Revolution of 1906.[1] It was then supplemented

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[1] The following points are based on: "Iran," Amos J. Peaslee
(ed.), Constitutions of Nations Vol. II (4 vols.; 2nd ed.; Nether-
lands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), pp. 393-95; Hassan Fasihi Shirazi
(ed.), The Constituion and Constitutional Law and Amendments (In
Persian, n.p.: Government Publishing Co., 1342/1963), Articles 4,
5, 16, 17 & 18 of the Constitution, pp. 33-38 and Articles 1, 2,
27, 28, 36, 44, 46, 61 & 71 of the Constitutional Law, pp. 51-68;
"Iran," Worldmark Encyclopaedia of the Nations: Asia and Australia
(New York: Worldmark Press, Inc., 1963), pp. 113-14. See also
H.B. Sharabi, Government and Politics of the Middle East in the
Twentieth Centure (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962),
pp. 75-84; and Laurence Lockhart, "The Constitutional Laws of
Persia: An Outline of Their Origin and Development," Middle East
Journal, XIII (1959), pp. 372-88.

by the Constitutional Law of 1907 and amended four times, in 1925, 1949, 1957 and in 1963.

According to the Constitution (including the Constitutional Law and Amendments) Iran is a constitutional monarchy. The powers of the state are divided into three parts, executive, legislative, and judicial. The executive power is vested in a hereditary Shah and his cabinet over which he presides. The Shah appoints and dismisses the members of the cabinet. The ministers are responsible, both individually and jointly, to both houses of the Parliament. Moreover, according to the Constitution, the Shah must be a Muslim. As the head of the state he is not responsible for his action, but the responsibility is assumed by his ministers.

The Constitution vests the legislative power in the National Assembly (the Majlis) and the Senate which came into legal existence in 1950. Members of the Majlis are elected by universal suffrage for four years. The Majlis comprises 200 members each of whom is elected from a single constituency. The Senate comprises 60 senators, half elected by the people and half appointed by the Shah. The Shah may dissolve either or both houses of the Parliament.

All laws must be approved by both houses of the Parliament and signed by the Shah. However, a committee of five religious dignitaries may at any time review the laws passed by the Majlis and determine their conformity with the principles

of Shiite Islam. The committee then may reject any law which
is not in accord with the teaching of the religion, and its
decision is final.

The judicial power is exercised by the <u>Sharia</u> tribunals
in matters related to the religion, and by the courts of justice
in matters of civil law.

Regarding political parties, they are of recent develop-
ment - their history goes back only to the early 1940's.[2] The
establishment of political parties was prohibited during the
reign of Reza <u>Shah</u> and hence until 1941 they only appeared as
secret groups. After 1941, however, a number of parties appeared
in Iran, some withered away, and others emerged under different
names. At present <u>Hezb-a-Iran Navin</u> (the New Iran Party) is the
strongest party controlling the cabinet and the <u>Majlis</u>. This
party came into existence in 1961 and celebrated its first anniver-
sary on February 20, 1962. Its leader is Hassan Ali Mansour, from
a noble family, who is also the present Prime Minister of Iran.

The aims of the New Iran Party are to provide better
educational opportunities, ensure freedom of speech and expression,
promote individual liberty and social rights, strengthen the in-
dependence of the judiciary, enforce compulsory primary education,
reduce unemployment, promote equitable distribution of wealth,

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[2]The following paragraphs are based on: "Political Parties,"
<u>Iran Almanac, 1963</u> (3rd ed., Tehran: Echo of Iran, 1963), pp.92-79;
Leonard Binder, <u>Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society</u>
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 202-26;
Personal interview with Manuchehre Istakhr, Iranian Press Attache
in Beirut, Lebanon, August 27, 1964. See also Sharabi, <u>op. cit.</u>,
pp. 88-91.

support the right of ownership, and encourage private enterprises under the advice of the government.

Other major parties are the National Front and the Tudeh Party. These two parties constitute at present the opposition in Iran. The National Front comprises a number of small groups (or parties)[3] and its honorary leader is Dr. Muhammad Musaddeq, the ex-Prime Minister of Iran who nationalized the Oil Company. The Tudeh Party (the Communist Party in Iran) was uprooted after the overthrow of the Musaddeq Government in 1953. In spite of the fact that the Tudeh Party is not legally authorized, it has some underground activities at present. Its main objective is to work for the overthrow of the existing government and change the present political system.

There are also a number of other political parties in Iran.[4] These parties are not much significance for they are on the decline and are slowly withering away.

As indicated before, any study of political systems, to be fruitful, should go beyond the formal structure, legal processes, as well as formal political parties and try to establish relation-ships among the variables involved. It is beyond the scope of

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[3]The smaller parties included in the National Front are: the Iran Party, the Pan-Iranist Party, the Iranian Independence Movement Party, and some other independent personalities. See "Political Parties," op. cit., p. 93.

[4]These are: the Melliyun (Nationalists') Party, the Mardom (Peoples') Party, the National Force Party, the National Unity Party, Protectors of Freedom Party, and some smaller bodies like Defenders of the Constitution, Friends' Association, Progressive Group, and Afro-Asian Group. "Political Parties," op. cit., pp. 92-97.

this study, however, to elaborate fully on the whole political functions in Iran. Nevertheless, a brief analysis is necessary for understanding the staffing process in the Iranian government. For this reason a discussion of the following processes is appropriate: the legitimization process, the policy-making (decision-making) process, the lobbying process, the system-maintenance process, and the system-challenging process. But before elaborating on these points, it must be noted that one of the principal modes of the Iranian political system is bargaining. A brief discussion of bargaining, then, seems to be advantageous at this point.

BARGAINING

Bargaining as defined in the Webster Dictionary, is "an agreement between parties to a transaction settling what each shall give and receive."[5] The idea behind bargaining is that "each power structure, each interest formation, stands alone in the general struggle judging when and how to act and with whom.... There is no obligation, only a market place where buyers and sellers may bargain."[6]

Bargaining, in Iran, is a basis of granting legitimization, and it is also a technique through which cooperation between independent power structures is achieved and policies made. It per-

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[5]Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1957).

[6]Binder, op. cit., pp. 227-28.

meates all phases of political life in Iran. It is involved in the distribution of seats in the _Majlis_ and the Senate, in budget allocations, in the realm of foreignpolicy, in the implementation of income tax laws, in the administration of justice, and lastly in the staffing process of the government.[7]

Bargaining does not only happen in Iran: it takes place in the "conventional systems"[8] as well. But the difference here is that in Iran it is mostly carried out by persons in legislative or administrative roles and mainly for their own personal interests. While in conventional systems it is mainly done by interest group (party) leaders, not only for their own benefits, but also and mainly for the interest of the group and the party.[9] In Iran, as Binder points out,

> Everyone is a bargainer.... Every wealthy family, every high army or police officer, every mujtahid, every university professor, every tribal khan, every high official... is an important bargainer. And after these... come the more enterprising whose support is less stable but whose potential influence, in view of the weakening of tradition, is great. These are the self-appointed /¯or government-appointed¯/...leaders of political parties... and... of interest or professional associations. In every case, leadership of individuals is stressed because there exists no accepted basis of controlling leaders from within each of the discrete units of power. [10]

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[7]_Ibid._, pp. 228-31.

[8]By "conventional ssystem" is meant a working constitutional democracy; a system whose legitimacy myth is social contract or majority will. See _Ibid._, pp. 40-45.

[9]However, there are in Iran group (party) leaders who enter the bargaining process. But these group leaders rarely press the interest of their groups upon the government; they only represent the grievances of the individuals who sometimes may not even be members of the group at all. Instead they may be relatives or friends of group members. Binder, _op. cit._, pp. 232-33.

[10]Binder, _op. cit._, pp. 228-29.

However, there are many limitations on bargaining. Chief among them is the lack of access by the individual. This means that the individual should be able to reach those in bargaining power before he enters bargaining. The process of bargaining then comes after the individual is admitted or accepted as a bargainer. Access in turn is determined by the individual's family background, socio-economic class, age, and religion. All these ascriptive factors are significant determinants of political behavior in Iran.[11] But the system as noted before, "does permit the admission of new groups or individuals to bargaining status, and it may admit issues in which groups lacking such status... are interested."[12]

Moreover, bargaining in Iran has no normative base and is not affirmatively legitimized. It may not be effective unless greatly restricted and obscured by a degree of secrecy. In fact, the practice is closely connected with a discontinuous and broken pattern of communication. Consequently, bargaining in Iran is not the same as bargaining in the open market where supply and demand mutually adjust and where buyers and sellers are supposed to be free and have complete knowledge. The bargaining under discussion here is more analogous to bargaining in an oligopolistic market where there are a few sellers and a large number of buyers. The bargaining under consideration here, unlike the free market which implies "universalistic-achievement" value patterns, is largely

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[11] Ibid., p. 236.

[12] Ibid. See also United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1962 (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations, Department of Economics and Social Affairs, 1963), p. 269.

defined by the "particularistic-ascriptive" values of the
traditional Iran. This means that rational criteria, as discussed
in chapter four and five, and the achievement or the ability of the
individual are subordinate to such non-rational or traditional
factors as person's parentage, rank, prestige, age, and religion.[13]

THE LEGITIMIZATION PROCESS

By legitimization is meant the permanence, or institu-
tionalization given by the government to certain aspects of the
existing pattern of power relationships in any society or polity.
Government here refers to the structure, personnel, and legal
procedures of governmental institutions. This institutionaliza-
tion of power relationships or legitimization need not be merely
through formal law making, law application, law adjudication, and
law enforcement. There are many other ways of legitimization
which are not quite so formal and vary from one system to another.
These are the kinds of legitimizing actions which are one of the
bases of differentiating the types of systems. Other methods of
legitimizing power may include consultation with different formal
organizations such as bureaucratic and legislative organizations,
the granting of symbolic honors, appointment of key persons to
administrative posts, and decisions by plebicite or referendum.
It should be noted, at this point, that the specific means utilized
for granting legitimacy in any polity may be partly specified in a

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[13]Binder, Op. cit., p. 236. See "The Legitimization Process"
below.

constitutional document or depend entirely upon the institu-
tionalization of cultural values.[14]

In Iran, the formal conventional patterns of legitimiza-
tion - i.e., legislation, execution, and adjudication - as pointed
out earlier in this chapter, are utilized but, as Binder observes,

> ... often only to lend further legality to a position already
> won in the framework of tradition. The pattern of legitimiza-
> tion outside of this formal triad is lacking in orderliness,
> but it is united by the same characteristics which hedge
> bargaining.... The legitimization process consists primarily
> in designating the principal bargainers, and only secondarily
> in implementing by law the results of bargains.[15]

With some exceptions illustrating the rationalizing tendencies in
Iran, the legitimizing functions, therefore, consist mainly of
constantly reaffirming the identity of principal bargainers and
then legitimizing only such bargaining arrangements which are in
accord with traditional principles.[16]

Institutionalization of access is one of the most important
ways in which legitimization is granted. Few people have tradi-
tionally the privilege of access to the Court and to the high
government officials. These privileged people may be the aristo-
crats, the leaders of tribes and minorities, the wealthy, and the
learned. This does not mean that others can not and do not
approach the authorities. In fact, they can and do, but always
in supplication. By tradition, persisted in Iran since medieval

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[14]Ibid., pp. 30-31.

[15]Ibid., p. 237.

[16]The followings may be three exceptions to the above:
planned economic development; concern for the efficiency of the
civil service for the purpose of strengthening the system and the
government; and policy decisions by the government resulting from,
or being the necessary by-product of, the acceptance of foreign
aid and technical advice. Ibid.

times, the _Shah_ is personally available to even the lowest
citizens for audience and redress of grievances. Actually, the
establishment of seven inspectorates and especially, the latest
Royal Supervisory Commission of the Shah, under General Yazdan-
panah, were for this purpose. Because of the impossibility of
all the oppressed to receive private audiences, the Cabinet and
the Ministry of Court have been given the authority to redress
such grievances.[17] The assumption underlying this system is
that everything is well run except some occasional administrative
errors, or for isolated examples of corruption which are corrected
in this way. But true or effective access rests with the members
of the bureaucratic, military, tribal, landowning, and religious
elites. A great deal of overlap exists among these elites and
there is also some diffusion of interest between them and the
big professional and business groups.[18]

Members of these elites are appointed to important public
positions, or they are honored and consulted so regularly that the
positions of power and influence they hold are nearly institution-
alized. With some exceptions taken these are persons who already

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[17] In 1959, for example, the ex-Prime Minister, Dr. Iqbal,
said that his office had received 750,000 letters of complaints
during the year 1958. "Whereas," he went on to say, "if the
ministries and the departments concerned have performed their
duties efficiently and had given their clientele explicit and
satisfactory answers, no one would have called at my office and
no time, manpower, and paper... would have been used unnecessarily."
High Council of Stable Administrative Undersecretaries (Tehran: The
Communication Media Division, USOM/Iran, 1959), pp. 13-14.

[18] Binder, _op. cit._, pp. 236-39.

enjoy access. Their membership in the Parliament makes them the spokesmen for their families, friends, and bargaining partners, and further ensures the success of their efforts.

This form of legitimization is important because it affords the individual concerned a high degree of bargaining power. In return for this guaranteed access, the person shows complete loyalty to the system and its supporters. He is also expected to act, in turn, as a subsidiary channel of access — informal but effective one - for those of lower status who promise him their own support. The weekly open house held for applicants by such individuals, especially the more educated ones, is for this end as well as for the purpose of serving as a source of information and communication facility.[19]

Another aspect of the legitimization process closely related to institutionalization of access is consultation. Legitimization achieved through consultation may often be an obscure procedure as well as being concealed from view. It is also dependent on unequal distribution of information to interested parties.[20]

Appointment to offices of authority is another form of legitimization. Religious ceremonies and welcoming committees to meet the Shah and the members of the Cabinet when travelling around the country on official tours or otherwise are still two other forms of legitimization. Religious ceremonies strengthen

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[19] Ibid., p. 239.

[20] Ibid., pp. 240-41. Consultation is also involved in policy-making process. See "The Policy-Making Process," below.

the religious-legal basis of the regime as well as enhancing
the leadership position of the honored ulama within the religious
institutions.[21] The composition of welcoming committees is
important for understanding which groups as well as which group
leaders are considered legitimate by the government.[22]

THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS

As a manifestation of the Iranian social structure and
due to low degree of access for the majority of the population
only a small group is involved in the policy-making process of
the government. For only a highly restricted group of individuals
are of such political status that must be consulted before policy
decisions are made.[23]

The process of consultation determines, to a large extent,
the tactics of already legitimized political actors. The nature
of the issue calling for decisions, as well as the character of
the legitimate parties involved in the process, determine these
tactics. It is true that the legal requirements determine the
consultants, but the process is not conventional in nature. Legal
requirements may only increase or decrease the bargaining power of
the participants. What is more is that bargaining is involved

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[21] Richard N. Frye observes that "considerable space must be
devoted to religion in Iran because religion for Persians means much
more than theology; it is traditionally their society, their law and
culture, as well as their system of ethics and behavior." Iran (2nd
ed., London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 4.

[22] Binder, op. cit., p. 243.

[23] James A. Bill, "The Social and Economic Foundations of
Power in Contemporary Iran," Middle East Journal, XVII (1963), p. 412.

almost at all levels of this political process.[24]

The consultation involved in the making of decisions includes two groups of people: the major groups, and the minor groups. The military, the bureaucracy, the _ulama_, and the tribal leaders and landlords holding positions in the _Majlis_, the Senate, or the administration, constitute the membership of the major groups. The chamber of commerce, the Oil Company professionals, and the university professors are examples of the minor groups who are of more restricted interests and are less regularly consulted. There are also many other special groups or individuals who apparently have little or no participation in this process. They represent both tradition and non-traditional and rationalizing tendencies. It is interesting to note, however, that the traditionals of those excluded are of low status,[25] while those

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[24] Binder, _op. cit._, pp. 248-49. To illustrate the point, the following are recent examples of this type: (1) the new labor law, (2) the law establishing an irrigation agency, and (3) the law preventing civil servants from doing business with the government. "In the first case employers and representatives of the ILO and the labour division of the ICA were all consulted at various stages, though the bill has been worked on since 1952 in the ministry of labor. In the second, the bill was meant to increase the powers of the government, vis-a-vis landlords, in areas where domain lands exist or where development projects are being carried out. After ten years of work within the ministry the bill was finally brought out, and it met with very severe resistance from majlis members. The third case was one where the lawyers especially sought to find a loophole for themselves in committee." Binder, _op. cit._, p. 249.

[25] Recently, however, the _Shah_ has made "some advances in the direction of increased political participation for the working and peasant classes." Bill, _op. cit._, p. 413. Hopes are expressed that in the future the peasants will have more participation in their own as well as the country's affairs. The _Shah_ once said: "My hope is with our village people, and as I think of their future I believe I see a magnificent vista lying ahead." Mohammad Raza Shah Pahlavi, _Mission for My Country_ (London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1960), p. 216.

of more modern interest orientation usually enjoy high traditional status and also have access in the second acapacity. A good example of the latter is a few bankers in Teheran. This group lacks formal organization and so on rare occasions it engages in cooperative action.[26] Banking is a distinct interest. But individual bankers in Teheran

> ... are not consulted as bankers, in the making of policy, nor are the owners of large amount of urban real estate, middle-sized land owners, nor, at the present time, party leaders, and the professional classes. As for low status groups, labor, the guilds, the peasants, bazaar and small business groups, as well as gield employees of the ministries, are not consulted in the making of policy....
>
> ....
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> In the process of consultation, it is not classes or groups that are consulted, but individuals.... Not only does consultation fall short of including all of the members of a particular group, but the policy decision resulting may benefit only a very few of the group concerned.[27]

Another significant feature of the policy-making process is that there is a general cleavage between the approaches to policy of the four major groups consulted – the military, the bureaucracy, the ulama, and the members of Parliament. These groups are dominated by two major points of view. The tendency among the military and the bureaucracy, so far as they are composed of the Western-educated, non-aristocratic elements, is to prefer rationalized solutions to different problems; for these

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[26] Binder, op. cit., pp. 251-52.

[27] Ibid., pp. 252-53.

elements of the society represent the rationalizing tendencies in Iran; they are western educated, achievement-oriented individuals; and do not have much vested interest in the country. The ulama and the members of Parliament, on the other hand, with some exceptions, prefer traditional answers because they are traditional and have vested interest in the society.[28]

Conflicting tendencies then may be an answer to the question of instability in Iran because the process of decision-making exemplifies the dynamic feature of the whole system. As Professor Frye observes, the Persians are a "people of extremes" and a basic condition of modernization is to remedy "the Persian's lack of confidence in his fellow man."[29] Professor Hoskins also alludes to the political relevence of "the character and behavior of the Iranian peoples, who are as given to extremes in temperament as their habitat is full of contrasts..."[30] Lerner observes that "the extremist temperament leads to extremist politics, in which violence and the frenzy of mobs play a role. This makes conduct of a moderate policy exceedingly difficult, particularly within the limited margins for maneuver left by current world politics."[31]

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[28]Ibid., pp. 253-54.

[29]Lewis V. Thomas and Richard N. Frye, The United States and Turkey and Iran (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 183 & 185.

[30]Halford L. Hoskins, The Middle East: Problem Area in World Politics (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 165.

[31]Danial Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society in the Middle East (3rd printing, Glencoe: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 359.

In summary, then, most legislation starts at the machinery
of rationalization - the Bureaucracy, the Military, and the Cabinet -
then it passes through the consultative process in which it is
modified by a small group of consultants so that the bill will
be least harmful to their interests, and finally legitimization
is granted. This, however, does not mean that no legislation
is passed without having elements detrimental to the interests of
the established high status groups. On the contrary this is not
the case. For example, the law of "where Did you Get It?", land
reform laws, and the new income taxation proposals of 1959 are ins-
tances of this kind. However, it should be noted that in the pro-
cess of consultation and bargaining exceptions or specific comple-
mentary advantages such as licence limitations and contract restric-
tions are provided in the laws for the benefit of the privileged
consultants and bargainers.[32]

THE LOBBYING PROCESS

Lobbying in general is a process through which pressure
groups try to influence policy makers for the benefit of the
group.[33] The Iranian term for this political process is parti.
The word parti stands for the American colloquial "pull" or the
European term "protection" or "influence".

In Iran parti is used for nearly all purposes but usually
for individual rather than group interests. It occurs when policy

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[32]Binder, op. cit., pp. 254-55.

[33]Herman Finer, The Theory and Practice of Modern Government
(Revised, New York: Dial Press Inc., 1934), p. 476.

decisions and regulations are enacted. It is thus directed at achieving exceptions from general regulations for restricted personal benefits such as employment in the government and exemption from taxation. The exploitation of parti is traditionally functional because, in a system where there is lack of statistical data and where both legislative and administrative arbitratiness prevail, it is usually a way by which arbitrariness may be met, haphazard hardship lessened, and injustice reduced. Parti is a means by which individuals may press the government to alleviate the difficulties of their special circumstances. Above all this means is more efficient and effective than the courts and the Parliament in such an area, and also more favorably regarded by the government. [34]

The use of parti presupposes that secrecy is the basis of success in this process; that the most useful results may be expected only when individuals, rather than large numbers, are involved in it; that "the nature of the technique requires special adaptation of the ruling to the requirement of the 'lobbyist'; and finally, $\lfloor$that$\rfloor$ the use of the technique accepts the underlying basis of the privilege upon which the system is built."[35] In addition to sustaining the ideological basis of the traditional system, parti accepts and supports the existing structure of power relationships by working through them. Lobbying by means of parti

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[34] Binder, op. cit., pp. 255-57.

[35] Ibid., pp. 255-56.

thus becomes supplementary as well as complementary to consultation. It can be channelled only through those who have access or are principal bargainers in the system. Specifically, the first major goal of using parti is to find appropriate employment in the government. Another objective for which parti may be used is to win favors - such as the right to purchase public land, the granting of scholarships for foreign study, transfer from one post to another and many other specific goals - from civil servants who administer special programmes.

Other matters for which parti is used are the procurement of licences, distribution of permits to buy agricultural machinery on easy credit terms, and business building permits. Finally parti may be used to win exceptions to established rules. Objectives of this kind are different from others because exceptions are contrary to the rules and require special justification and interpretation of the laws or that someone bear the responsibility. The granting of licences to persons not fulfilling the requirements of the law, and low assessment of income taxes are examples of this kind.

The basis on which the individual seeking to win one of the benefits described above may act is the connection available to him and the persons upon whom he has the largest claim. If such contacts are poor, then friends-of-friends or interest-group leaders may be sought. Social position and access are also limiting factors in this process. They limit the resources of the individual within this general framework. The petitioner may decide on different approaches or channels, depending upon the specific benefits he seeks

and the resources he has.[36]

Relatives provide the first channel of lobbying. The exploitation of relatives is the easiest way and their obligations nearly unlimited. Peer group or clique is another important basis of parti.[37]

As to the technical aspects of the process, bribery is the first and probably most exaggerated of all. There is a widespread opinion in Iran that bribery is all too common, indeed the principal way of expediting the machinery of government.[38] Between the level of major graft and petty bribery the best way of winning parti is by promise of mutual favors. Visiting some potential patron at his home during his Friday morning reception is still another, though not very effective, technique. Another method is to write a carefully-worded letter to the official one desires to approach.[39]

OTHER PROCESSES

The appointment process, the system-maintenance process, and the system-challenging process may be three additional processes involved in the Iranian politics. Appointment is a political process because first, government positions represent legitimization;

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[36] Ibid., pp. 256-58.

[37] However, "once one moves beyond these contacts... bargaining becomes extremely important, which is to say that anyone may initiate a petition, but the ball must be carried by those of higher status, when the play gets close to the payoff." Ibid., p. 258.

[38] Herbert H. Vreeland (Research Chairman and ed.), Iran (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1957), p. 80.

[39] Binder, op. cit., pp. 262-64.

second, the distribution of the jobs themselves are of political value; and third, people filling such positions are involved in policy-making and policy-implementation. The goal of the participants in the appointment process is either to win a job; to increase their bargaining power; to reward supporters; or to staff the government by persons who are bound to the participants by traditional ties, who are willing to bargain, and who are loyal and hold favored views.[40]

In a transitional system like that of Iran there rarely exists a separation between policies and personalities, and thus policy-making may not be distinguishable from the perpetuation of a top official in office. Moreover, there is an insecurity in such offices.[41] Therefore, such officials spend much of their time in protecting their positions. To accomplish this end, the most effective way is not to let any hostile person or member of a rival structure of power relationship get into a position to create embarrassment. There exists, therefore, a great deal of distrust and tension in this, as in other processes, between the rationalizing aspirations and the traditional practices such as nepotism and bargaining. However, despite the existence of such a tension, tradition still predominates in this area, i.e., appointment to government positions.[42]

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[40] Ibid., p. 265.

[41] Richard W. Gable, "The Public Service in Iran," Public Personnel Review, XXII (1961), p. 30.

[42] Binder, op. cit., pp. 265-67. Gable characterizes the Iranian society by saying: "Jealousy, envy, rivalry and intrigue are common. Distrust and suspicion are widespread and pronounced... While frankness, sincerity and trust are valued as virtues, they are not always practices and seldom rewarded." "Culture and Administration in Iran," Middle East Journal, XIII (1959), p. 414.

In a prismatic society like that of Iran there exists, as noted earlier in this chapter, legitimacy confusion[43] and conflicting tendencies. Consequently, there is a constant examination and criticism of the system of the opposing forces. The different conclusions reached by different groups and individuals lead to additional forms of political activity closely related to the problem of system legitimacy.[44] These forms of political activity may be categorized into two major processes: "the system maintenance porcess", and "the system-challenging process".

The system-maintenance process is primarily concerned with the use of symbols. In Iran, being a transitional society, symbol-manipulative techniques fall into two categories. The first category is that of borrowed conventional techniques which have been introduced and become a part of the Iranian political life since the Revolution of 1906. The use of traditional symbols constitute the second category. The goal of using these symbols is to legitimize and maintain the system.[45]

The Constitution, the Majlis, the formation of parties, a plebiscite or refrendum, and, subordinate to them, holding of popular demonstrations are examples of conventional symbol-manipulative techniques. The uses of royal tradition and Shiite

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[43]Fred W. Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), pp.89-90 and 104-106.

[44]Binder, op. cit., p. 273.

[45]Riggs, op. cit., pp. 40-42, 69-73, and 104-106.

Islam, or the ancient imperial tradition of Iran, for example, may be used in the same speech.

Conventional symbols and institutions are used for the purpose of maintaining the system for three reasons. First, because the Shah can trust neither of the major exponents of the two contradictory tendencies - i.e., the traditional and the rational tendencies discussed above - so he tries to maintain the conventional façades. Secondly, these institutions have already been in existence since 1907, especially between 1907 and 1928, and thus their elimination may weaken the shakey legitimacy of the new system. For the traditional classes and the aristocracy have a vested interest in the maintenance of these institutions are used to check the activities of the Military, bureaucracy, and intelligentsia in general.[46]

Traditional symbols are used for system-maintenance purposes because the Iranian society is predominantly traditional. The value of royal and religious symbols, for example, stem from their being still respected by the rural population and the less sophisticated of the lowest urban classes. Although Mussaddiq reduced, to some extent, the sanctity of the royal symbol among the more educated of urban classes he never openly suggested its abolition.[47] In fact, there is, with some exceptions taken, a conviction

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[46] Binder, op. cit., pp. 272-74 and 280-81.

[47] Ibid., p. 281.

that royal government is the only form of government which accords
with the Iranian national tradition.[48] Shiite Islam is not much
believed in by the educated middle, class, but even if they have
rational doubts, they are emotionally attached to it. So any
attack against Islam will not go unchallenged.[49]

The manipulation of conventional symbols in a society which
basically continues to adhere to older traditional norms, formulae
and myths has resulted in a substantial lack of consensus: there
are people who adhere to traditional norms, some embrace modern
substitutes, and others are either polynormative or sometimes of
normless orientation.[50] An outcome of this is the system-challeng-
ing process.

System-challenging process may conveniently be divided into
two different processes: the negative, and the positive. The two
processes differ from each other as to the goals of the actors
and the degree of their alienation from the system. The objective
of the positive challengers is to increase their influence within
the system. Positive challenging is a kind of bargaining tactic

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[48]Frye, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

[49]For the importance and influence of Islam on the daily
life of the Persians see Lerner, op. cit., p. 370; for a more detail-
ed discussion see Ann K.S. Lambton, Islamic Society in Persia (An
Inaugural Lecture Delivered on 9 March 1954 in the School of
Oriental and African Studies, University of London; Oxford
University Press, 1954).

[50]Fred W. Riggs, "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model,"
Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes (eds.), Papers in Comparative Public
Administration (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, The
University of Michigan, 1962), p. 29.

used for a gratification under a mutual arrangement. This means
that when the goal of the positive challenger is achieved, he
will withdraw his threat and work within the rules of the system.
Inconsistancy and hypocrisy are the consequences as well as the
characteristics of positive system challenging, not only on the
part of the challenger but also on the part of those who accede
to his pressure.[51]

Different techniques are used by the positive challengers
in their challenging the system. Refusal to bargain is one of
the forms of political action in this process. Refusal to bargain
as a positive challenging tactic is the same as that of holding
out for better term.

The simplest and least disturbing technique in the positive
challenging process is that of privately representing one's grievance
to a high official, a _Majlis_ member, or merely some person of
influence. If nothing is done, then the petitioner in some cases
may choose to make the threat that he will publicize his grievance
or resign from his office. In any case there is little hope for
recourse to the courts even if such private representation could
be legally justified. And most often the challenge does not
succeed. The result is cynical judgements and criticism of the
government, both of which weaken the stability of the system.

The public statement of a grievance or a criticism of the
government and the administration in the _Majlis_, despite its low

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[51]Binder, _op. cit._, p. 286.

reputation, is of greater significance. This is more readily credited than the praise of the government because the prevailing opinion about the government is negative. However, it should be noted that the Majlis is very limited in its criticism of the government. Foreign policy and the budget, for example, are seldom seriously discussed.

A public protest and its publicity may be another technuque of positive challenging. The closing of the bazaar, and the march of actors and singers, for example, on the Ministry of Finance in protest, say, against the new income tax, may be examples of this. But this area is very limited in terms of the number of partici-pants, subject matter, and the way it is expressed.[52]

A strike or service stoppage is another means of protest which is even more effective - has a stronger-system-challenging effect - than the closing of the bazaar, even though the latter is always more likely to create a situation which large-scale violence may result.[53] A strike of taxi drivers in Tehran, textile-factory labors, brick-kiln employees are examples of this kind of political act. Strikes, however, are usually limited and efforts are made not to report them in the press - in order to prevent general knowledge of their occurrence.

The criticism of administrative scandals by nearly all the newspapers has, in view of the prevailing negative attitude toward

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[52]Ibid., pp. 293-95.

[53]Ibid., p. 296; Vreeland, op. cit., p. 89.

the government, a system-challenging effect.[54]   A positive system

challenging process may also take place within the government and

at all levels. Fixed disagreement and refusal to bargain at the

cabinet level are illustrations of this.

While the goal of positive challenger is to derive greater

benefit from the system, the objective of negative challenger is

to alter the system or at least manifest his unwillingness to

cooperate with the system. Again, while inconsistency is one of

the characteristics of the positive challenging process, the nega-

tive challenger is proud of his consistancy in refusing to cooperate

with the government. Rational solutions and rational legitimacy

are what the negative challengers advocate. They believe that the

conventional institutions have bankrupted themselves.[55]

Including among the negative challengers are the "counter-

elites" who do not associate themselves with those in powever, i.e.,

the governing-elites, and the government. The words "we" or/and

"they" - as used by the counter-elites - symbolize the partial or

total transfer of their participation from the current institutions

of the government (the elite) to the competitive organizations

under their own management. The competitive institutions, run by

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[54] Vreeland observes: "The Iranian views government with
mingled fear and suspicion./ Government agencies /... are not agen-
cies to which he considers going for assistance, but rather those
from which he must protect himself by adroitness or evasion."
op. cit., p. 80.

[55] Binder, op. cit., p. 286.

the counter-elites, may be secret societies, illegal political
parties, legal political parties controlled by a secret apparatus,
or clandestine networks of communication. If the counter-elites
succeed in their withdrawal into these secret institutions, then
they may try to use these organizations as a basis to enter or
reenter the arena of public participation for subversive purposes.[56]

As in the positive challenge, different techniques are
used in negative challenging process. Membership in a subversive
party - a party which works for the overthrow of the regime by
force - is the most extreme form of the negative challenge. In
Iran, there are four ideological orientations attractive to the
negative challengers. These are: the rationalist, the Tudeh
(the communist), the militaristic dictatorship, and the fundamen-
talist-Islamic. But at present these ideologies are upheld by
individuals rather than strongly organized groups.[57]

So most of those who are engaged in a negative challenge
of the system are, at present, unaffiliated individuals. They have
their own informal cliques, and many of them know one another or
related to eath other. An estimation of the number of such challeng-
ers is difficult to make, but casual observation indicates that
there is a widespread alienation among non-government factory

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[56]Lerner, op. cit., p. 369.

[57]Binder, op. cit., p. 287.

labors, guildsmen, students, clergymen, school teachers, govern-
ment professionals, and middle grade civil servants.[58] Negative
attitudes are so widespread that they are expressed by even some
of the greatest beneficiaries of the system. In fact, it is
generally held that praising or justifying the existing system
is an act of extreme simplicity or hypocricy.

Each of these individuals must make his own decision
concerning the extent to which he will try in concrete action to
realize his opposition to the system. But the means at the disposal
of such people is meager indeed. The refused to believe anything
the government says, all official news broadcasts, or speeches by
official party leaders, etc., is the most frequent response these
people have.[59] Rumors, those especially heard on Radio Moscow,
or the clandestine National Voice of Iran are what usually one
turns to for "accurate" information.[60] Rumors used by the tradi-
tionalists to win a reputation or slander a rival's reputation
reenforce this tendency. The more damning the rumors, the more
readily they are believed.

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[58] From January 1960 to January 1963 eleven major demonstra-
tions and riots were reported by different journals and magazines.
See Bill, op. cit., footnote 33, pp. 412-13.

[59] Binder, op. cit., pp. 286-80.

[60] The process is illustrated by "a student... who dislikes
certain Tehran newspapers because their editors 'work for a group
of parasites and are servants of obnoxious imperialism'. He
prefers to get his news from Radio Moscow which exposes 'the
ominous policies of stockholders, bankers, and brokers.' These
broadcasts reinforce the ideology of the Revolutionary Left: 'It
wakes the nation up, so we are not deceived by the pro-foreigners,
parasites, and the subservient ruling class of Iran.'" Lerner,
op. cit., p. 377.

Silent resistence or "not-talking" is also a technique employed in more critical situations. Reputation slandering is still another way of challenging the system negatively.

Publication of unlicensed news sheets complaining of the administrative bungling and corruption, and criticising the Western Powers is what those who are somewhat better organized do. Pamphlets or mimeographed sheets of the Rahe-Musaddeq, or Resistance Groups and university students are specific examples of this.[61]

A policy of non-cooperation is what other groups of better organization follow. Ulama, as a class, are among the more important of these. An alim or a clergyman never gives unqualified support to the government. There is also a belief "that pious cuation requires that ulema and all religious men refuse to associate themselves with political authority."[62]

An important point, however, is that the alienated negative system challenging groups are very pessimistic.[63] In fact, pessimism is an obvious characteristic of the Persians. A deep-rooted and pervasive pessimism can be found among most Iranians. Richard W. Gable observes that the glory of ancient Persia has gone and can never be recaptured. The destruction wrought by the Mongols and the Turks have not been fully recovered from. Iran has suffered the invading armies of two World Wars. Due to her strategic geogra-

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[61] Binder, op. cit., pp. 289-90.

[62] Ibid., p. 290.

[63] Ibid., p. 292.

phical position and her oil, Iran has been the center of inter-
national power politics. At present, power and wealth is con-
centrated in the hands of a few. Many believe that all effort at
reform is superficial and that it will stop if it does not promote
the interests of the ruling elite. "Consequently, a sense of
futility and hopelessness is widespread.... An attidue of 'what's
the use' or 'it will do no good' is often expressed.... This
attitude numbs the will and deadens the initiative to succeed."[64]

Throughout this chapter it has been noticed that the
traditional and conventional processes are not the only techniques
involved in the political functions of the Iranian system. New
problems need new solutions, and the traditional techniques dis-
cussed above are therefore limited in their applicability. As to
the conventional techniques they are largely demonstrative and
not instrumental. Alongside the two processds rationalizing tech-
niques are being used gradually and in a widening sphere of govern-
mental activities. In fact, these hierachical techniques intervene
to limit and restrict the use of both the traditional and conven-
tional methods.[65] However, "Rationalizing policies are not an
independent variable, rather, such policies are themselves limited
by traditional practices and by the need to relate all government
acts to conventional formulae. These are the elements which deter-
mine the transitional character of the Iranian system."[66]

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[64]"Culture and Administration in Iran," op. cit., p. 420.

[65]Binder, op. cit., pp. 296-99.

[66]Ibid., p. 299.

Variety of demands and challenges (inputs) to the system have caused the machinery or rationalization, i.e., the administration, the military and the cabinet, to have the major responsibility for policy proposals. In essence, this is also a form of system maintenance but it is different from the other two varieties discussed above. The latter two were concerned with symbol manipulations, but here the machinery of rationalization is concerned with rational attempts to maintain the system by responding to more demands, by planning and taking some developmental measures, and by increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the bureaucracy (outputs).[67]

This does not mean, however, that rationalizing policies are merely of system maintenance significance. They are also the results of demands made upon the system by certain groups or classes of people. Moreover, "we may... assume that there is among the bureaucracy a high valuation of rational techniques, and a desire to limit traditional interference."[68] Many rationalizing policies, therefore, are in the first instance the result of demands of the bureaucracy rather than being a direct result of the demands made by essentially non-governmental groups.

ADMINISTRATIVE IMPLICATIONS

The first discernible administrative implication of the Iranian political system is that in many cases the public offices

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[67]Ibid., pp. 298-99.

[68]Ibid., p. 299.

in Iran, at least in some higher levels, are not so much responsive
to public interests as they are to serve special, particularistic
interests, particularly those of the principal bargainers. Other
things such as educational and family background of the individuals
taken into account, whoever is in a better position to bargain in
the process of staffing get better chances of employment, transfer,
and promotion. Each key position in the government, as Binder
points out,

> ... represents a key bargaining power... For the most part,
> the minister himself is the prime mover, and it is generally
> felt to be quite just that he puts undesirable bureau chiefs
> and the like on disponible list and raises others of his
> own liking.[69]

The minister, therefore, exercises a great deal of actual power
in staffing his ministry. His choice, however, is limited by
certain factors, be it the original employment or other steps of
selection such as promotion and transfer. Factors limiting the
minister may be due to the limited number of the vacancies avail-
able, the existing employees of the ministry, or the pressures
that may be brought upon the minister by the members of the Majlis,
by his cabinet friends, or the Court.[70]

Another implication is that appointment to public offices
is a form of legitimization. Legitimization, however, is not the
only purpose behind the making of appointments. Appointments are
also made to fill the necessary or at least the existing positions.
Nevertheless there are real benefits to be derived from holding

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[69] Ibid., p. 269.

[70] Ibid.,

government offices. Prestige, access, and bargaining power are only a few benefits one may derive from office-holding. Due to these advantages considerable maneuvering and competition takes place to win government offices or to staff them with one's own relatives or friends. Consequently, there exists a great deal of tension between the demands of the influentials for the benefits of office and the need for qualified and competent personnel.[71]

A third administrative implication is related to legitimacy confusion which is one of the features of the Iranian political system. The shifting symbol system characterises the legitimization process in Iran. The new symbols — myths and formulae — are introduced, but the old ones are still in wide use. Consequently, the new symbol system largely remains an ornamental façade. The same ambiguity of norms characterises the staffing process of the government. In the administration, as in the political system, "old patterns of status relationships, new contract-based and work-oriented situations, and purely personal prismatic situations are mixed together in a complex assortment that can not be easily unentangled."[72] In such a contradictory situation many employees try to follow their own personal advantages. The personnel laws and decrees, like the Constitution, remain formalistic to a great extent.

In spite of the fact that the powers of the state are, according to the Constitution separate,[73] the members of the

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[71]Ibid., pp. 240-41.

[72]Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration, op. cit., p. 90.

[73]Fasihi Shirazi, op. cit., Article 27, pp. 57-58.

Parliament spend much of their time trying to find posts in the
government for their relatives, friends, and political supporters.[74]
In other words the legislators in Iran exercise a great deal of
informal power over the bureaucrats. When such is the case, the
bureaucrats then try to make alliances and join cliques. The
result is that the bureaucrats begin to find themselves involved
in the political struggle and never miss the chance of using
their office for political purposes.

Moreover, the contest over appointments and promotions
among the members of the Majlis, and between them and the bureau-
crats reinforces the power of appointing officers. For the situa-
tion grants them a considerable latitude to play the politicians
and the laws against each other. If they prefer, for example,
to employ an applicant on the basis of competence they do so and
tell the legislator that they had no choice, i.e., they had to
follow the rules. But if they prefer their own favorite, they
manipulate the rules and take him. They advise him, for example,
to satisfy the technical requirements. They can also advise him

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[74] Binder, op. cit., p. 269. J. Amuzegar talks about the
same thing by saying that "there are strong political pressures on
the various agencies.... As a result, civil service appointments
are frequently based on considerations other than the agencies
'real needs or the candidates' qualifications.... Many positions
requiring special technical knowledge or background are thus not
filled. And more often than is normally the case in most bureau-
cracies, new positions are created to suit the qualifications of
favored candidates." "Administrative Barrier to Economic Devel-
opment in Iran," Middle East Economic Papers 1958 (Beirut, Lebanon:
Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut,
Dar el-Kitab, 1958), p. 8.

to go and seek a recommendation from a <u>Majlis</u> member. Then if
a politician recommends his protegé, the personnel officials can
say that the position is taken by the candidate of another poli-
tician. So the office of the employing officer – in fact the whole
administration – becomes an arena for political struggle, and more
so since there are few other employment opportunities in the
society. The appointments and promotions, therefore, are made
with some exceptions taken, with a view to strengthen the position
of the employing officers rather than to seek the best qualified
persons for a given position.[75]

Ritualization of personnel procedures is another counter-
part of politicization of administration. This means whatever
formal ties or rules and regulations as well ad administrative
habits have developed in the past tend to be followed as practices
of intrinsic value. For nearly four decades, for example, says
Richard W. Gable, an employee worked in a file room where file
drawers were labled by tags hanging from string. He never tried
to change them because filing system was that way when he took
over the job.[76] Unnecessary proceduralism is followed because
one does not have a clear sense of goals to be accomplished. There
is a lack of criteria by which one can judge what is essential and

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[75] Riggs, <u>The Ecology of Public Administration</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>,
p. 106-111. See <u>Binder</u>, <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 129.

[76] "Culture and Administration in Iran," <u>op. cit.</u>, p. 416.

what is unnecessary to be discarded. The only safe course of action then, especially for the lower personnel officials, is rigid adherence to the rules and procedures with undeviating attention to details.[77]

Another paradox is rigid adherence to the letters of the law in contrast to the ability of the official to ignore the law if he wishes. This is possible because, as noted in chapter V, the autonomous power of associations and public opinion is weak in Iran. The bureaucrats, therefore, exercise a great deal of "naked power" in the country. In other words, they may sometimes, make their own decisions without being much subject to effective political control by the poeple. They can often manipulate personnel laws and regulations the way they wish. They may insist on the details of rules ritualistically if it is to their advantage, otherwise they may disregard the laws as meaningless façades. In short they become formalistic.

Formalism in turn leads to corruption. The ability of an official to stick to the letters of the personnel law gives him a weapon to deal with the applicants the way he desires andoften for his own advantage. Since the official is able to violate the law, then he can facilitate employment procedures for his favorites and for those who are aready to offer him a quid pro que. Consequently, bribery becomes one way of expediting the machinery of government.[78]

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[77] Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration, op. cit., pp. 108-109.

[78] Ibid., pp. 110-11.

Graft and bribery are two time-honored practices in Iran. They are found at every level of the administration. For centuries government positions and even favors have been bought and sold in Iran. Recent conventional forms have not supplanted this practice, but have increased the number of positions and favors available in the market place.[79]

Morally and according to the religion, bribery is considered a wrongful action, yet it is a common practice at all levels of the bureaucratic life. Like bargaining the bribe is never offered or accepted openly. It is usually used by tacit and informal agreement in situations ranging from small routine business to larger matters such as appointment to a position, exemption from taxation, or a pardon for a crime. Delays and "come tomorrow" (Farda Bia) are two major characteristics of personnel administration in Iran. But, once a bribe is produced by the applicant, these difficulties suddenly disappear as if by magic. The amount of bribe, which is never discussed but arrived at informally and secretly, depends on a balance between the value of the service, say, appointment to a particular position, sought by an applicant and his ability to pay.[80] Bribery then is related to bargaining because it involves bargaining as to the amount to be paid as well as to the form and time of payment.

Furthermore, bribes need not be taken in an outright

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[79] Vreeland, op. cit., p. 4.

[80] Ibid., p. 80.

manner. Suppose a merchant recommends his son to a personnel
official to get him a position in the government. The official
is a customer of the merchant. He finds a job for the merchant's
son. The officer then is able to buy goods from the merchant at
a reduced price, and more so since, as noted in chapter IV, prices
are not fixed in Iran. Thus the officer gets his bribe indirectly
in that manner. The shopkeeper, however, makes a loss on such a
deal, but considers the loss a small price to pay in order to get
his son into the government. What is more is that the merchant
recovers his loss by raising the price of the goods for other
customers, especially those who do not know the price and who
do not bargain him down to a lower price.[81]

Mutual favor-doing is another way of expediting the
machinery of government in Iran. This means an official does a
favor to another official in a given situation, expecting to be
repaid in another. A personnel officer of a ministry, for example,
facilitates employment procedures for the cousin of another official
in the same or other ministry. The other official, say an accountant,
in turn, facilitates pay procedures for the uncle of the first
official. This is what is meant by a quid pro que. Like bribes,
mutual favors are given on the assumption that if one does not
somebody else will do.[82] However, mutual favor-doing usually
takes place among friends who feel they have obligations towards
each other.

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[81] Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration, op. cit.,
p. 135.

[82] Gable, "Culture and Administration in Iran," op. cit.,
p. 415.

A fourth administrative implication is related to the use of _parti_. In the political functions _parti_ is used to find exceptions to the laws for the benefit of the individual. In the same way _parti_ is used for purposes of appointment, promotion, and transfer. Its main objective is to find exceptions to the personnel laws and regulations in order to get an appointment, a promotion, or a transfer. More specifically, however, _parti_ is used to find or create exception to the rule forbidding the employment of the new civil servants.[83] _Parti_ is also used in the employment of technical experts when they lack qualification.[84]

As to the technical use of _parti_, a certain degree of caution is usually exercised by the applicant. He exploites, for example, the best possibility and tries to work his way upward toward a person who can really help. He does not use several persons connected with the same office of administrative function. For, if two rivals are involved, there will be little chance for his application to get through. Moreover, caution is often exercised not to go over the head of the official concerned for the official may either resent it as an insult and evade orders from above, or he may grant the request in such a way as to make the result useless. Moreover, he is a better judge of how anxious

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[83]This had led to overstaffing and understaffing as discussed in chapter V, this work. Sharabi observes that "nepotism, bribery, and political favoritism are accepted as normal features of the administrative system" in Iran. Moreover, he goes on to say that about 50 per cent of those employed in the government are "superfluous appointments made on the basis of political interest rather than on administrative requirement." Op. cit., p. 78.

[84]Binder, op. cit., pp. 256-57.

his superiors are in granting favors.[85]

The fifth administrative implication of the political functions in Iran is related to the policy-making process. Policy decisions, as noted above, are in many cases made by a few groups of people who enjoy a high degree of access. These privileged people usually do not approve a policy proposal which is against their vested interest. Personnel laws, therefore, may be prepared but never approved by the final policy-makers. The following unsuccessful attempts to reorganize the personnel administration of the government are example of this kind.

In 1925 Dr. Millspaugh commented on the inadequacy of the civil service law of 1922. Accordingly, the government made an attempt to change the law in the 1930's, but the idea was dropped later. In 1945 William Brownrigg[86] prepared a new personnel bill and urged its enactment. The following year a book was written by a prominant Iranian, Dr. Ahmad Moghbel, who recommended a complete reorganization of the personnel system of the government. But little action resulted from these policy proposals.[87]

In 1953 a high council of personnel was appointed to draft a new civil service bill. But little action took place because the members of the council were not certain whether the new central

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[85] Ibid., pp. 262-64.

[86] William Brownrigg was the Director-General of Personnel in the Ministry of Finance in the second Millspaugh Mission to Iran. Gable, "The Public Service in Iran," op. cit., p. 33.

[87] Ibid.

civil service agency should be related to the Ministry of Finance or the Prime Minister's office. In 1956 Dr Moghbel, who was then a Minister Without Portfolio under the Ala Government, prepared a new personnel bill which would created a strong central personnel agency attached to the office of the Prime Minister. But a few weeks after the bill was presented to the Majlis, the cabinet changed and Dr. Moghbel lost his position.[88]

The succeeding cabinet indicated its desire to introduce changes in the personnel system of the government. The Moghbel bill was taken back from the Majlis and sent to the High Council of Permanent Administrative Undersecretaries for study.[89] But the idea of a central personnel agency was objected by the members of the Council who were not ready to accept any supervisory or control agency outside their ministry. In other words, the members of the Council disliked the idea of giving up some of the privileges they had in the personnel matters of their respective ministries. The Council, therefore, after some deliberation discarded the Moghbel Bill and drafted another new measure. The new bill provided for a central personnel agency under the Prime Minister's Administrative Undersecretary.[90] In 1958 the new personnel bill was introduced to the Majlis for its approval. But gagain the Iqbal cabinet changed and the bill was pigeonholed in the Majlis.

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[88] Ibid., pp. 33-34.

[89] See pp. 48-50, this work.

[90] Gable, "The Public Service in Iran," op. cit., p. 34.

At present a general reorganization bill is under considera-
tion for all except the Ministry of Imperial Court, the Ministry of
War, Railroad Corporation, and other public corporations which run
on a profit basis. This new bill was introduced to the Majlis on
November 17, 1963. The next day the following comments were pub-
lished in the Ettela'at:[92]

> Yesterday, finally the New Employment Bill was presented
> to the Majlis... For years the people of Iran, especially
> the government employees and their families were waiting for
> this day. This bill had been under preparation for several
> years. Many a time it went back and forth from the High
> Council of Administration to the Council of Ministers before
> it was finally sent to the Majlis.... Now it is for the
> Majlis to determine the fate of this bill....
> If the honorable members of the Majlis refer to the files,
> they will find that several personnel bills are stored in that
> building. They were the bills which were sent from one commi-
> ttee to another and were finally buried in the record-rooms.[93]

A year has elapsed since the draft bill was presented to
the Majlis, yet no one can foretell when it will be approved.
However, optimism prevails that the present bill will not meet
the fate of the previous ones and will soon be enacted as a law.

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[92]Ettela'at (Information) is one of the oldest and strongest
Persian newspapers in Iran. Its circulation in 1957 was between
25,000 to 35,000. Vreeland, op. cit., p. 103.

[93]"On the Employment Law," Ettela'at (airmail edition),
No. 4203, Nov. 18, 1963, pp. 1 & 4.

CHAPTER VII

C O N C L U S I O N

The Iranian society is slowly changing from a traditional
way of life to more modern patterns and practices. The country
is, therefore, in a transitional stage that has the characteris-
tics of both traditional and modern, industrial societies. Its
stage of development may be described as "traditional-rational",
a term used by Leonard Binder in his book, Iran: Political System
of a Changing Society (Berkeley, 1962).

In terms of F.W. Riggs "prismatic" society and "Sala"
model of administration, the following three characteristics may
best describe the Iranian society. These features are "heteroge-
neity", "formalism", and "overlapping". They are the result of a
mixture of the practices of traditional Iran and the new elements
borrowed from the West.[1]

HETEROGENEITY

By heterogeneity is meant the simultaneous presence, side-
by-side of entirely different kinds of systems, viewpoints, and

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[1]For an explanation of Riggs' "Prismatic" society and "Sala"
model of administration see the followings: "The Ecology of Public
Administration (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1961), pp. 91-102 &
136-43; and "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model," Ferrel
Heady and Sybil Stokes (eds.), Papers in Comparative Public Adminis
tration (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute of Public Administration,
The University of Michigan, 1962), pp. 19-36.

practices. This means that in a heterogeneous society like that
of Iran there exists a mixture of traditional, "fused" elements
and modern, "refracted" traits. The presence of heterogeneity
in this way makes it difficult to describe a system in terms of
generalizations that are applicable to the whole society.[2]

More specifically, heterogeneity is present in economics,
politics, social activities, as well as in the administrative
system of the country. In economic sphere, for example, there
are in Iran laws and regulations - rational criteria - fixing the
prices and defining the way transactions should take place. But
at the same time, as pointed out in chapter IV, family ties and
influences, status of individuals, the element of charity (religion),
and bargaining - all representing traditional criteria - are present
in economic activities and determine economic behavior. Moreover,
there exists, vis-a-vis banking and money, as a convenience means
of exchange, the traditional practice of bartering. The coexist-
ence of modern economic elements with traditional economic and non-
economic factors is what is meant by heterogeneity in economics.

Heterogeneity is also present in the social and political
systems. Modern institutions such as secondary associations,
political parties, and Western type schools are being introduced
into the country. But side by side with these there are in Iran

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[2]Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration, op. cit.,
p. 91.

primay groups based on such things as neighbourhood, religion, family loyalty, face-to-face contact, and old school ties.

As pointed out in chapter VI, Iran is a constitutional monarchy with two houses of parliament. Nationalism exists among many Iranians, especially the more educated ones.[3] But simultaneously there exists the tradition of Shahanshah (the king of kings) that has, according to some newspaper statements, remained unbroken for 2,500 years.[4]

The Shiite branch of Islam has been the established religion of the country since the accession of Shah Ismail (1499-1525 A.D.), the founder of the Safavid Dynasty. It is true that Reza Shah weakened the power of the Ulama,[5] but it has lately been repeated in the Majlis and by the government that Iran is an Islamic state and that all laws should be in agreement with the tenets of the Shiite faith. The phrase "God, Shah, Fatherland" is posted at every public place and can be seen in

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[3] Leonard Binder, Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), p. 77.

[4] His Majesty, the Shah states that "during the many centuries since Cyrus's day, we have suffered invasions as well as having ourselves invaded other lands and controlled vast territories; but the continuity of our monarchy has remained essentially unbroken.

"Over this great-span the monarchy has brought unity out of diversity. We have always had differences of race, ... creed, and economic and political situation and conviction; but under the monarchy the divergencies have been sublimated into one larger whole symbolized in the person of the Shah." (Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, Mission for My Country (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1961), p. 327. See also Binder op. cit., p. 64.

[5] H.B. Sharabi, Governments & Politics of the Middle East in Twentieth Century (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 81-82.

many offices, public and private.[6]

Two contrary sets of legitimizing symbols (conventional versus traditional symbols) are used to legitimize and maintain the system. Conventional symbols such as the Constitution and parliamentary government were borrowed from the West; while the traditional symbols such as the institution of Shahanshah and religion belong to the old Persian Empire.[7]

The presence of heterogeneity is even more obvious in the administration and hence the staffing process of the government. There are personnel laws and regulations prescribing staffing procedures to be followed by all ministries. But at the same time, as noted in the foregoing chapters, there exist traditional practices of mutual favor-doing, bargaining, use of parti, religious consideration, and family or kinship loyalty. In short, rational criteria of administration as manifested in laws and regulations coexist with the traditional patterns of employment, promotion, and transfer.

FORMALISM

High degree of formalism is the second characteristic of the Iranian society. Formalism is the most appropriate single

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[6]Binder, op. cit., pp. 70 & 75-76.

[7]It should be noted, however, that "the necessity of appealing to two sets of legitimizing symbols has been imposed upon the government by historical circumstances, rather than by any free choice of the Shah...." Ibid., p. 347.

term characterizing the Iranian system of economics, politics, education, and administration. Formalism, as used by Riggs, refers to the degree of discrepancy that exists between norms and realities, between what ought to be and what really is, between the constitution, laws, rules as well as organization charts and the actual behavior of the society in general and administration in particular.[8]

According to Article 8 of the Constitution all the inhabitants of Iran are equal before the law.[9] But this equality does not exist in practice. Formally, there are in Iran political parties, special groups and other voluntary associations. But actually they function on the basis of traditional primary loyalties and influences. In theory they are supposed to serve the interests of their members, but in practice they serve the interest of only few individuals.

The same is true of the staffing process of the government. Personnel laws and decrees state that merit should be the criterion of recruitment, employment, and promotion. But effective staffing procedures are, to a great extent, based on such criteria as the individual's family background, neighbourhood, old school ties, religious considerations, and the use of parti. The employment of new civil servants is forbidden by law, but rarely followed in practice. The result is overstaffing of unqualified people and

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[8] Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

[9] Hasan Fasihi Shirazi (ed.), The Constitution and Constitutional Law and Amendments (In Persian; Tehran: Government Publishing Co., 1342/1963), p. 53.

understaffing of competent personnel.[10]

OVERLAPPING

Overlapping is the third major characteristic of the Iranian society. The term overlapping again is used by Riggs to characterize the prismatic societies. It is used in a special sense meaning, as put by Riggs:

> ... the extent to which formally differentiated structures of a refracted type co-exist with undifferentiated structures of a fused type. In other words, it is typical in a prismatic situation for new structures ... to be set up, but the effective functions of administration, politics, economics, ... continue to be performed, at least to be a considerable extent, by older, undifferentiated structures, such as the family, religious bodies, ... New norms or values appropriate to the differentiated structures are given lip-service but the older values of an undifferentiated society still retain a strong hold.[11]

Like formalism and heterogeneity, the phenomenon of over-happling is present inthe economic system, social activities, and in the political functions. In the economic sphere, there exists formally a price-making market system, but actual economic behavior in Iran is governed by many non-economic as well as economic factors. In other words, the distribution and appropriation of goods and services are not only governed by economic motives, but also by religious, social, or kinship motives. Prices, for example, are determined not only by the relationship between supplies and demands, but also by other factors such as socio-political relationships of

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[10] For a discussion of overstaffing and understaffing in the Iranian government see chapter IV, p. 65 and chapter V, p.83 this work.

[11] Riggs, "An Ecological Approach: The 'Sala' Model," op. cit., pp. 22-23.

buyers and sellers, i.e., family status, bargaining power, and political position one may hold. As a result there exists in Iran a wide fluctuation of prices depending on the identity and positions of the parties involved. Since prices are not fixed, then transactions are based on bargaining. But bargaining is determined not by the scarcity of supplies and the intensity of buyer's demands, but by the socio-political status or position of the buyers and sellers in the society.[12] The result of such a system is price indeterminancy.[13]

The same is true of the political system. Defined goals and public interest, for example, are not the real basis of most policy decisions, although such goals and interests are paid lip-service. In the process of policy-making not much attention is paid to statistics. Instead there is the process of consultation with different privileged individuals, religious personalities, and leaders of interest groups. Moreover, policies are made through bargaining and mostly for the benefit of the principal bargainers. In other words, "a new set of norms, political for-mulae, and myths based on experience in more refracted settings"[14]

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[12] Bargaining and its limitations are fully discussed in chapter IV, p. 59 and chapter VI, pp. 119-122, this work.

[13] See Chapter IV, pp. 59-60, this work.

[14] Riggs, "An Ecological Approach: The 'sala' Model," op. cit., p. 29.

are superimposed on the traditional Iranian society which still
continues to adhere, to a large extent, to older traditional
norms, political formulae, and myths. The consequence is a subs-
tantial lack of consensus which in turn gives rise to a great deal
of tension between the traditional and non-traditional elements of
the country.[15]

The phenomenon of overlapping is also present in the admi-
nistration. Administrative rationality, as pronounced by the per-
sonnel laws and regulations, defines the procedures that must be
followed in appointments, promotions, and transfers. But a large
network of reciprocal obligations which are highly particularistic
in nature are the basis of effective staffing. These mutual obli-
gations "are widely recognized as compelling, even though in con-
flict with other responsibilities, such as those imposed by public
office. Consequently, a man in office often feels as much duty
to help relatives /⁻and friend⁻/ obtain positions as he does to
carry out official policies."[16] The results are nepotism and
favoritism.

It is interesting to note, however, that nepotism is only
the characteristic of a prismatic society like that of Iran. In

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[15] See pp. 128-30, 134, 137, this work.

[16] Riggs, The Ecology of Public Administration, op. cit.,
p. 137.

a completely traditional, as well as completely refracted society, nepotism would have no meaning. For in a completely traditional society there would be a fusion of all functions in one institution such as the religion or the family. In a completely refracted society, on the other hand, there would be a separation of different functions. Every function would be assigned to an organization with defined goals and objectives. In other words, there would be homogeneity in a completely traditional or refracted society. But in a prismatic society there is heterogeneity and hence "it is the incompatability between an administrative and a conflicting family code which creates the problem of nepotism."[17]

THE PROSPECTS

Faced with a changing society, i.e., various and often contradictory demands and challenges, the Iranian government has embarked on the adoption and implementation of various modernizing policies. In other words, reforms are being attempted in almost all walks of life including the administration. The major purpose behind the adoption of such policies is to maintain the system by satisfying more demands, by providing for development, and by increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the administration.[18] However, the maintenance of the system is not the only objective of the attempted reforms. Modernizing policies are also to be

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[17] Ibid.,

[18] See Chapter VI, p. 145, this work.

seen as a response on the part of the government to meet demands
made upon the system by certain classes and groups.[19]

The Shah's "six-point program", community development and
decentralization bills, land reform laws, the establishment of the
Health and Education Corpses, and finally the preparation and
presentation of the New Civil Service Bill to the Majlis are all
examples of the new measures being taken by the government to
introduce changes in Iran.[20] It is difficult to foretell the
extent of success such attempted reforms will have in accelerat-
ing the already occurring changes in Iran. However, this much is
certain that most of the recent reforms have been formalistic
(superficial) in nature and hence have not as yet altered the old
patterns and practices of the society.[21] This being the case,
what are then the prospects of improving government staffing in
Iran?

Keeping in line with the frame of reference, staffing is
intimately interrelated with socio-economic and especially the
political sub-system. The prospects of staffing in Iran, there-
fore, depend, to a large extent, upon the future of the political

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[19] Binder, op. cit., p. 299.

[20] For an account of recent reforms in Iran see: "Land Reform
in Iran," Iran Today, II (No.9), pp. 4-7; "The Land Reform Program,"
Ibid., II (No. 11), pp. 5-7; "Referendum," Ibid., II (No. 13), pp.4-8;
Robert L. Moore, "A New Dimension in Life," Ibid., II (No.14), pp.8-
13; "New Democracy in an Ancient Land," Ibid., II (No. 15), pp.5-14;
"Iran's Building Era," Ibid., II (No.16), pp. 8-12; "On the New
Employment Bill," Ettela'at (airmail edition in Persian), Nos. 4210
(Nov. 26, 1963), 4211, 4212, 4213 & 4214; and "The Establishment of
Village Councils," Ettela'at (airmail edition in Persian), No. 4211
(Nov. 27, 1963), p. 1.

[21] Binder, op. cit., pp. 95.

system of the country.

Although any prediction concerning the prospects of a change in the political system is difficult to make, one should look for the possibilities in the following areas: drastic political change through a military coup, strengthening of the political parties, increased economic prosperity, and well planned attempt to improve the Cabinet and the bureaucracy.

A radical change in the political system through a successful military coup may be the first possibility. This is, in fact, the trend in the developing nations, especially the Middle Eastern countries. But as the analysis throughout this study reveals, a successful military coup cannot bring changes in the whole system. It may change the superstructure of the political system; it may alter the power structure of the society. But it cannot change the whole structure of the society overnight. This is in line with Binder's point that "there are possibilities... of a successful military coup, or even an assassination which might intervene and alter certain aspects of the transition... Such events... will not alter the basic question, nor will they effect the completed transition of the system overnight."[22]

Moreover, violence breeds violence and thus once coups start they never end and can never be stopped. The cases in Syria and Iraq provide a tangible example of this point. Stability is the first pre-requisite for socio-economic development. But coups

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[22] Ibid., p. 349.

in general generate political instability which in turn disrupts continuity in economic development. What is more is that successful military coups are economically wasteful besides the bloodshed they might create. Military coups also create hatred and suspicion none of which are conducive to socio-economic and administrative growth.

The second possibility is to strengthen political parties, especially the New Iran Party; for at present political parties provide an effective means through which the people can control their government. In fact, the effectiveness of the _Majlis_, depends, to a great extent, upon the strength of political parties. Political parties aggregate and articulate interests and hence increase the effectiveness of the _Majlis_ as a policy-making body as well as an organ of checking the executive branch of government. But again this is not feasible in a country where primary loyalties and influences still predominate and where there is general insecurity; for political parties as well as other associations are very much influenced by traditional factors and hence are manipualted to strengthen traditional bounds and enhance particularistic interests.

Increased economic prosperity may be a third possibility for the existence of a more rational political and administrative system. But economic behavior is closely related to the political and administrative systems; and hence it is not easy to induce economic prosperity under the present traditional system of politics and administration.

Modernization of the cabinet and the bureaucracy – the
executive branch of the government - may provide a fourth possibi-
lity. In fact, well planned attempt to improve the cabinet and
the bureaucracy is necessary, for at the present time it is only
through the executive branch that one can conceive of possible
social and economic reforms that may lead Iran out of its present
conditions which are not much different from those of the middle
ages "... an increase in bureaucratic efficiency is almost indis-
pensable because the government is by far the largest supplier of
$\boxed{}$different$\boxed{}$ services"[23] in the country. But again this is not
easy to effect because the cabinet and the bureaucracy are not
isolated from their societal setting. They are like wheels within
wheels or small circles within larger circles. Improvement in
these areas depends, to a large extent, on changes in the society
at large, i.e,, on the culture, level of education and health,
economic prosperity and political stability. Changes in the Iranian
plane of living, education, health, and security are, therefore,
prerequisites to improvements in the executive or legislative
branch of the government. None of the above possibilities there-
fore seem to provide substantial hopes.

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[23]Jahangir Amuzegar, "Administrative Barriers to Economic
Development," Middle East Economic Papers, 1958 (Beirut, Lebanon:
Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut, 1958),
p. 15.

It is important to note, however, that the society can not be altered overnight. Those who seek reform should, therefore, recognize that time and patience are needed to effect changes in the societywwhere tradition still predominates. What is needed more are good intention and foresightedness on the part of the government and the ruling elites. For "men of /foresight_7 intelligence and good will find little difficulty in working together for a given purpose even without an organization."[24]

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[24] Luther Gulick "Notes on the Theory of Organization," L. Gulick and L. Urwick (eds.) Papers on the Science of Administration (2nd ed., New York: Institute of Public Administration, 1947), p. 38.

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