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STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOUR
OF
LEBANESE BUREAUCRACY

By

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LEBANESE BUREAUCRACY

Nahhas

To the civil servants of my country

PREFACE

"I believe that institutions largely determine the kind of life society is going to have, and that administrators as a class largely determine the quality of institutions."

Marchall E. Dimock, A Philosophy of Administration (New York: Harper & Bros., 1958), p. 2.

This work follows a new and an ever-increasing trend in the study of administrative systems in their ecological, societal context in advanced or less-developed -- the so-called transitional -- countries. It purports to study the structure and the behaviour of the Lebanese public bureaucracy and to draw some conclusions about their reciprocal interplay and the impact of the social setting on this bureaucracy. The author hopes that it may serve as a stepping stone for further, more comprehensive, penetrating and scientific, research about the public administration system in this country.

This thesis has five parts. Part I involves a theoretical, sociological frame of reference which endeavours to serve as a behavioural context for the analysis that follows in the suc-

ceeding parts. Part II discusses the major administrative developments that took place in the Lebanese administration. It covers the process of growth in bureaucratic size and the development of the role of the State since the Mandate and up till the present; and it follows the present environmental and bureaucratic developments. Part III discusses the structural features and the organizational problems of the country's administrative system. This includes a description of the structural organization of the central administration, the cadre's classification and pay scale, delegation of powers and role conflict and the field administration. Part IV discusses the behavioural aspects of the Lebanese bureaucracy and the Lebanese civil servants per se. It includes a historical perspective concerning these two aspects which covers the various historical phases which they have underwent (1516-1963). It also discusses the country's social setting; the social structure, religious sectarianism, the educational system, the political system and social change and administrative reform. Part V is a summary and conclusion.

The author sufficed himself with mentioning only the numbers and dates of the Lebanese legal documentary material which he used and mentioned in the reference footnotes on account of the abundance of concerned primary sources --

notably, the Official Gazette, certain compilation or collection-of-laws series and publications by various ministries.

The author feels indebted to the following:

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My parents and my personal friends who granted me constant encouragement and assistance.

A good deal of the information secured is based on my own experiences and observations. The shortcomings of this work remain entirely my personal responsibility.

October, 1963

Raymond Ph. Nahhas

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PART I

INTRODUCTION:

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

CHAPTER I

THE THEORETICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE

The purpose of this chapter is to explore a theoretical, sociological frame of reference to serve as a behavioural context for an analysis of the structure and behaviour of Lebanese bureaucracy. A survey will initially be made of research developments in the West including the modal approach, ideas and issues on middle-range theories and cross-cultural analysis.

A sharp expansion has occurred since the last World War in the search for generality in Western and non-Western administrative systems. Many writers concerned themselves with formulating broad cross-cultural theories as an approach to understand the varieties of social settings. Their aim was to identify generalities and uniformities in various social systems.

One of these writers, Frederick Warren Riggs, in his paper "Agraria and Industria-Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration", aimed at providing a "... system of hypothetical categories for the classification and analysis of realities, including patterns of political and administrative transition."¹ He does not claim to have provided a "true" model as it does not picture reality. Nevertheless, his "experiment in methodology" recognizes the importance

¹F. W. Riggs, "Agraria and Industria-Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," as in William Siffin, Toward The Comparative Study of Public Administration (Department of Government, Indiana University, 1957), p. 9.

of factors social, ideological and economic for the study of government and administration. Riggs's main problem at which he directed the attention of his experiment is that of "... how to identify and characterize relationships between public administration and social settings...".²

Another writer, Bert F. Hoselitz, proposed the development of "... theoretical models for different types of societies and different types of transitions or movements from "traditional" to more "modern" forms of economic organization."³ His interest is in the elaboration of a theoretical model which makes possible the analysis of "a process of transition from a social system displaying one form of economic organization to one displaying a different presumably "more advanced" economic organization...", a process involving a reshaping "...not merely of the "economic order" but also a restructuring of social relations in general...".⁴ Underlying his interest is the attainment of some "...understanding of the functional interrelationship of economic and general social variables describing the transition from an economically "underdeveloped" to an "advanced" society."⁵

Robert Vance Presthus also searches for generality and his theme centers on that "...compararative administration needs

²Ibid., p. 30.

³B.F. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), p. 25.

⁴Ibid., p. 26.

⁵Ibid., p. 27.

an explicit synthesis between conceptual theory and empirical field research." He stresses the need for a working theory, a theory organizing the multitudes of data and cultural forms. He does not want a complex theory of 'cosmic dimension' conceptualization of entire social systems, but a "middle range" theory that abstracts a limited segment for analysis and tries to explain its restricted set of relationships. This, for some time, would be used to small "blocs of countries" which possess relatively similar social context (several in the Middle East). Some of the relationships he proposes for study are the "critical variables" for bureaucratic development, the causality between social values and organizational behaviour, and — following Weber — the relationship between the economic system and bureaucracy.⁶ Presthus also emphasizes what he termed the "pattern analysis" which "...focuses upon the interplay among three critical variables: the whole culture of a society, a given organizational situation, and the modal personality type of the society."⁷

Marion Levy stresses three variables which undergo change when a society passes from a traditional, or relatively non-industrialized, stage to one of high industrialization. He singles out, as a minimum, changes in the patterns of family organization,

⁶ R. Presthus, "Behavior and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," Public Administration Review, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, (Winter, 1959), pp. 25-27.

⁷ R. Presthus, "The Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organization," Social Forces, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, (December, 1959), p. 103.

of production units, and of location of authority and responsibility.⁸

Talcott Parsons distinguishes five 'pattern variables' constituting a "system of types of possible role-expectation pattern" three of which are of immediate relation to our concern. They are: "the choice between types of value-orientation standard (universalism VS. particularism), the choice between "modalities" of the social object (achievement VS. ascription), and the definition of scope of interest in the object (specificity VS. diffuseness)."⁹

Daniel Lerner characterizes the transitional society by the spirit of change which, in practice, is the process of modernization and westernization. This process involves the basic challenge of the infusion of rationalism, positivism, participation and mobility.¹⁰ Countries, opines Lerner, appear to change according to two observations: "First, the 'direction' of change is always from oral to media system (of communication). Secondly, the 'degree' of change toward media system appears to correlate significantly with changes in other key sectors of the social system... Hence a communication

⁸M. J. Levy, "Some Sources of the Vulnerability of the Structures of Relatively Non-Industrialized Societies to those of Highly industrialized Societies", in B. F. Hoselitz (ed.), The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 113-125.

⁹T. Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 58-67).

¹⁰D. Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), passim.

system is both index and agent of change in a total social system."¹¹

To go back to Riggs, we see that he makes the assumption that "administrative behavior is not erratic and "uncaused", but constitutes an integral part of the total society and government of which it forms a part."¹² He proposes the use of the distinction between "agricultural" and "industrial" civilized societies with each of these polar types having a predominance of certain characteristics and identifying features. A continuum extends between these two poles of Agraria and Industria wherein the various societies are variably located as if on a scale. The change of society, contends Riggs, along this continuum is from agrarian to industrial settings.¹³ The "underdeveloped" countries afford examples of real settings undergoing a strikingly rapid change in their institutions. Their inescapable challenge is one of 'adaptation': they must industrialize or face extinction.¹⁴

¹¹ Ibid., p. 56. In describing the modernization process of transitional societies of the Middle East and the degree thereof, Lerner used the indices of urbanization, literacy, media, and political participation plus using a dynamic component needed to show the movement from one phase to the next, which component "must connect institutional changes with alterations in the prevailing personal style." p. 69.

¹² Riggs, op.cit.; p. 30. Underlining is mine.

¹³ Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 99-100.

Lebanon, an underdeveloped country and a social setting in transition, can be assumed to be undergoing a process of change and movement along this proposed continuum. We can also assume that Lebanon is located somewhere in the first half of the continuum, hence approximating an agrarian society. According to these assumptions its features will emphasize the following:

1. "Predominance of ascriptive, particularistic, diffuse patterns rather than universalistic, specific, and achievement norms.
2. "Stable local groups and limited spatial mobility rather than a high degree of social mobility (in a general not necessarily vertical sense.)
3. "Relatively simple and stable 'occupational' differentiation rather than a well-developed occupational system, insulated from other social structures.
4. "A 'deferential' stratification system of diffuse impact rather than an 'egalitarian' class system based on generalized patterns of occupational achievement." 15

In agrarian societies primary organization forms the major medium of contact and reception between the government and the governed. The bureaucracy of such societies extends its own premises for decision-making, and the governed are reached through organization of familial type which have no policy.¹⁶ The strength of primary organization helps to reveal the insensitivity of public servants

¹⁵ F.X. Sutton, "Social Theory and Comparative Politics" a mimeographed paper prepared for the Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics, Princeton, 1955, quoted in Riggs, Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 42-44.

to popular pressures. Relationships are personal and thus concerned more with posts than with policies.¹⁷ A framework of beliefs and values where supernatural entities and religious values are stressed rather than research, evidence, and manipulation. Official lore contains strong sacral content instead of secular predominance, administrative ritualism instead of administrative rationalism.¹⁸

Another model analysis of societies and bureaucratic organizations has also been proposed by Riggs in what he termed "prismatic society" based on structural-functional analysis. This model could serve as "...a framework for empirical studies of the actual and unique conditions in any unique setting."¹⁹ He related prismatic society to the empirical image of a transitional society, a less developed country, or a non-Western country possessing characteristics which places it in between agricultural and industrial societies.²⁰ A "fused" model, or an agrarian image, is a society "in which one structure serves all the functions performed in the society"; whereas a "refracted" model, or an industrial image, is "a society in which

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 44.

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 53-61.

¹⁹ F.W. Riggs, "Prismatic Society and Financial Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 1 (June, 1960), p.43.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

for every function there is a corresponding concrete structure."²¹
The transitional prismatic model lies, according to Riggs's "metaphor of light", between the poles of fusion and refraction.²² The central characteristics of such a society in transition are "a high degree of "formalism", substantial overlapping or reciprocal dependence of structures, and marked heterogeneity."²³ According to Riggs:²⁴

"A structure is formalistic to the extent that it prescribes behavior which does not occur. In a prismatic model, economic, political, and administrative structures, for example, may exist on paper and even be given lip service, but effective economic, political, and administrative functions may be performed by more diffuse structures, like those of a fused society. The family or religious institutions, for example, may determine behavior as much as market, political parties, and administrative offices."

²¹Ibid., p. 4. A.J. Toynbee likens some cultures to a beam of white light diffracted by a prism into a rainbow spectrum. Different bands in the spectrum have different speeds of penetration. He gives a "law" which states that "the penetrative power of a strand of cultural radiation is usually in inverse ratio to this strand's cultural value." He asserts that elements in his spectrum are interdependent, despite their seeming autonomy so that a borrower finds he cannot limit his borrowing to one element. A. J. Toynbee, "Psychology of Encounters," The World and the West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 66-84. This tends to confirm the hypothesis of Riggs about "...the functional interdependence of institutions in (his) models and the tension or disequilibrium in transitional settings where dysfunctional elements have been introduced from external sources." in "Agraria and Industria", op.cit., p. 103.

²²Ibid., p. 4.

²³Ibid., p. 4.

²⁴Ibid., p. 5.

On bureaucracy, considerable agreement exists as to its basic organizational characteristics such as: rational orientation; goal attainment; hierarchy of authority; work specialization; professionalism; systematic rules as a basis for operations. These are based on Weber's ideal-type bureaucratic construction which contains the following main characteristics:

1. "The regular activities required for the purposes of the bureaucratic organization are distributed in a fixed way as official duties."²⁵
2. "The organization follows the principle of hierarchy and levels of graded authority; a system of super — and subordination in which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones." 26
3. Operations are governed "...by a consistent system of abstract rules...(and) consist of the application of these rules to particular cases." 27
4. "The ideal official conducts his office... (in) a spirit of formalistic impersonality, 'sine ira et studio,' without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm." 28
5. "Specialized work of organizations usually presupposes thorough and expert training." 29 Employment in the bureaucratic organization is based on technical qualifications and is protected against arbitrary

²⁵ H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1947), p. 196.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 197.

²⁷ Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, translated by A.M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 330.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 340; also in Robin M. Williams Jr., American Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), pp. 177-178.

²⁹ Gerth and Mills (eds.), op.cit., p. 198.

dismissal. "It constitutes a career. There is a system of 'promotions' according to seniority or achievement, or both." 30

6. "Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization...is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency." 31 "The fully developed bureaucratic mechanism compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with non-mechanical modes of production." 32

On bureaucratic structure, Peter M. Blau refers to the basic characteristics of bureaucratic organization as "specialization, a hierarchy of authority, a system of rules, and impersonality." 33 Robert K. Merton has given some Western (if not universal) structural patterns of bureaucracy. Bureaucratic structure, he writes, is a "series of offices, of hierarchized statuses, in which inhere a number of obligations and privileges closely defined by limited and specific rules. Each of these offices contains an area of imputed competence and responsibility.... The assignment of roles occurs on the basis of technical qualifications which are ascertained through formalized, impersonal procedures (e.g. examinations.)" 34 Carl Friedrich

³⁰Max Weber, op.cit., p. 334.

³¹Ibid., p. 337.

³²Gerth and Mills, op.cit., p. 214.

³³P.M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, Inc., 1956), p. 19.

³⁴R.K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 151-52; also in R.K. Merton, Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), p. 361 ff.

gives "centralization of control and supervision, differentiation of functions, and qualification for office (entry and career aspects)" as the three structural elements of a bureaucracy that "order the relations of the members of the organization to each other."³⁵ Dahl and Lindblom thought that bureaucracy is "...an organization marked by certain structural features that cannot be readily called either desirable or undesirable per se."³⁶ Considerable agreement exists on such structural bureaucratic features as "...conscious adaptation of means to ends, hierarchies, prescribed and limited discretion, specialization of skill and function, and separation of ownership."³⁷ Fritz Morstein Marx pointed out that the perspective is on "...bureaucracy as structure of organization," and with "concentration of responsibility, hierarchy and control, jurisdiction and specialization, fixed compensation and permanence, a professional point of view..." as its main features.³⁸ Robert Dubin summarizes the central features of the "bureaucratic form" in formal organizations to be administrative officialdom, objectively defined offices with recruitment thereto according to objective and technical standards,

³⁵ C. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy (rev. ed.; Boston: Ginn and Co., 1950), p. 44.

³⁶ Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, Politics, economics and Welfare (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), p. 234.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 235-36.

³⁸ F.M. Marx, The Administrative State (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 21 ff.

"...a hierarchy and sub-hierarchies that correspond to the levels of administrative authority and the specialization of technical functions."³⁹ Peter Blau defines bureaucracy as "...the type of organization designed to accomplish large-scale administrative tasks by systematically coordinating the work of many individuals.... Since complex administrative problems confront most large organizations, bureaucracy is not confined to the military and civilian branches of the government but it is also found in business, unions, churches, universities, and even in baseball."⁴⁰

The above reformulations concerning bureaucratic structural theory reveal close similarity. Writings by "Friedrick, Dahl and Lindblom, Dubin, Blau, Slesinger, and Morstein Marx... agree substantially on such central elements as a rational orientation toward goal attainment, a hierarchy of authority, work specialization, professionalism, and systematic rules as a basis for operations."⁴¹

Theories concerning bureaucratic behaviour do not enjoy the same consensus and are relatively neglected compared to those on bureaucratic structure. Heady supplies one explanation, that "it is naturally assumed that the structural traits of bureaucracy

³⁹R. Dubin, "Technical Characteristics of a Bureaucracy," in Human Relations in Administration (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), pp. 160-61.

⁴⁰Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society, p. 14.

⁴¹Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. III, No. 4, (March, 1959), p. 516.

considered as a sociological concept will be accompanied by behavior patterns associated with these structural characteristics. The range of these behavior patterns and the question of which particular pattern, if any, should be considered most "bureaucratic" have received much less attention and have produced much less of a consensus."⁴²

The three approaches to the issue of bureaucratic behaviour are best exemplified by the views of Friedrich, Merton, and Blau.

Friedrich refers to the three⁴³ behavioural elements of "objectivity, precision, and consistency and discretion" which he finds recurring "... in a developing bureaucracy in demonstrable institutionalization..." and which "...embody rules defining desirable habit or behavior patterns of all the members of such an organization."⁴⁴

Merton stated that the Western bureaucratic model, behaviourally, tends towards "...a high degree of reliability of behavior, an unusual degree of conformity with prescribed patterns of action." "Discipline" is emphasized which becomes an end in itself and "...develops into rigidities and an inability to adjust readily." Structural devices that promote conformity to the rules such as grading, seniority regulations and pensions "...also lead to an overconcern with strict

⁴²Ibid., p. 517.

⁴³Friedrich's other three elements concerning structure of bureaucracy were cited above.

⁴⁴Friedrich, op.cit., p. 44.

adherence to regulations which induces timidity, conservatism, and technicism."⁴⁵ Morroe Berger concludes that the above usual description of the bureaucratic model by Merton "...implies that the various components of the structure or the behavior are always found together, that they are harmonious parts of a whole."⁴⁶ In this, Merton has analyzed "dysfunctional" or "pathological" bureaucratic behaviour, i.e., some tendencies of behaviour patterns that inhibit the achievement of legitimate bureaucratic objectives, although such behaviour is "...linked to the rational base of bureaucratic organization and related structural devices...".⁴⁷ As such, Merton concludes that "...the very elements which conduce toward efficiency in general produce inefficiency in specific instances."⁴⁸ This implies that

⁴⁵R.K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 151-52, 154-56; also in Merton, Reader in Bureaucracy, p. 367.

⁴⁶Morroe Berger, "Bureaucracy East and West," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. I, No. 4 (March, 1957), pp. 522-23, 526-27; also in Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp.49, 180. Berger mentions three "...dimensions of bureaucratic behavior that accompany corresponding structural features of bureaucratic organization," namely, "(1) rationality and universalism, (2) hierarchy, and (3) discretion." Also, "...the irreducible concept of professionalism" was introduced and analyzed into the three component parts of (1) skill, (2) self-protection, and (3) service.

⁴⁷F. Heady, "Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration," p. 517.

⁴⁸Merton, Reader in Bureaucracy, p. 366. Such specific instances are "buck passing," red tape, rigidity and inflexibility, excessive impersonality, oversecretiveness, unwillingness to delegate, and reluctance to exercise discretion.

too much emphasis on the rationality of bureaucratic organization develops a most typical bureaucratic behaviour whose effects may be dysfunctional.

Peter M. Blau suggested that bureaucracy should be conceived of primarily in terms of achievement of purpose. He recognizes the emergence of bureaucratic practices that may detract from the attainment of legitimate organizational objectives,⁴⁹ but suggests a different brand of behaviour which is "irrational but (perhaps) purposeful." This is based on the idea that proper bureaucratic behaviour is that which contributes to fundamental bureaucratic goals and not necessarily that which is preconceived and assumed to accompany bureaucratic structural components. Dysfunctional behaviour in one bureaucracy might be functional in another.⁵⁰

To increase uncertainty as to the behavioural traits associated with bureaucracy and "to complicate the matter further," Ferrel Heady opines that "... we are hardly prepared yet to say what behavior would be "bureaucratic" in either the western or nonwestern sense."⁵¹

⁴⁹ P. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society, p. 57.

⁵⁰ Ibid., passim. "To administer a social organization according to purely technical criteria of rationality is irrational, because it ignores the nonrational aspects of social conduct." p. 58.

⁵¹ F. Heady, "Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration" p. 523. Heady advises an escape from such "semantic snares" by defining bureaucracy "...in terms of certain essential structural characteristics that are already generally accepted and understood, without attaching the label of "bureaucratic" to any particular pattern or combination of behavioral traits. It would be possible to classify bureaucracies by behavioral patterns into whatever number of types seem required by the data available, without having to decide which behavior is more bureaucratic and which is less bureaucratic.... By making the structural aspect central to the concept of bureaucracy, we can provide a conceptual framework on which there is already a substantial measure of agreement and which offers a basis for comparison in both western and nonwestern states." pp.523-24.

A recurring theme in the above theoretical formulations on bureaucracy points on the one hand to the existence of uncertainty as to the behavioural traits associated with bureaucracy and on the other to considerable agreement on the basic organizational characteristics of bureaucracy.

Weber considered two different developing routes along which bureaucracy could progress. The Western bureaucratic situation grew out of the functional requirements of large-scale organization. Bureaucratic organization, as such, "... triumphed over other means of administration because it was the most efficient, exact, and precise mechanism for handling large-scale tasks. The bureaucratic structure, likened by Weber to a human machine, rests on the minute division of administrative tasks, specialization, technical proficiency, objective standards of recruitment, exact records, strict hierarchy, and clear lines of authority. The typical examples of bureaucracy are, accordingly, the civil service of the modern Western state and the staff of the modern corporation."⁵²

Considerable evidence exist to show the usefulness of Weber's structural and behavioural components for ordering and understanding organizations in traditional societies. However, "... it is very easy to overlook or underestimate the extent to which the Weberian

⁵²Helen Constat, "The U.S.S.R. — From Charismatic Sect to Bureaucratic Society," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 3 (December, 1961), p. 286; also, H. Constat, "Max Weber's Two Conceptions of Bureaucracy," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 63 (1958), pp.400-409.

model rests upon certain normative assumptions about time, man, motivation and society, which are not present in nonwestern societies. While the structural components of bureaucracy are often similar in each milieu, the behavioral manifestations are often quite different."⁵³

Weber noted that bureaucratic structure was not always associated with rationality. Recent findings "... suggest a discontinuity between the manifest structure of bureaucracy, as it appears in many underdeveloped societies, and the rational behavioral elements often assumed to be integral parts of Weber's model."⁵⁴ That is, such bureaucratic elements as hierarchical authority structure, administrative staff units, and income gradations according to office were in conflict with such rational claims as limited objectives, participation based upon mutual limited agreement among members, and compensatory rewards whereby those in authority allocate rewards to members in return for participation.

The West has developed a profession of public administration with certain standards of recruitment and official performance models which emphasize the individual's responsibility towards such moral issues of standards and models.⁵⁵ Western notions of "... honesty,

⁵³ Robert V. Presthus, "Weberian V. Welfare Bureaucracy in Traditional Society," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 1 (June, 1961), p. 2.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 2. This was found in an analysis of "... 150 organizations engaged in the production of material goods in 150 different nonindustrial societies." in Stanley H. Udy, Jr., "Bureaucracy" and "Rationality" in Weber's Organization Theory," American Sociological Review, Vol. XXIV, No. 6 (December, 1959), p. 792.

⁵⁵ M. Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, p. 114.

fairness, and efficiency are the outgrowth of peculiarly Western developments in science and technology, religion, and economic organization. As such, these notions cannot be easily transferred to other societies with different traditions and a different line of social evolution."⁵⁶ In the Near East the religious traditions and economic organization have not combined yet to produce loyalty to a given job regardless of the person's economic relationship to it. This moral commitment to a job is a novelty in this area, for the Near East did not yet develop a "... combination of nationalism and democracy that goes beyond loyalty to a state apparatus and encompasses loyalty to the public."⁵⁷ Berger compares the Western and Near Eastern situations thus:

"A Western public bureaucracy demands (not always successfully) a certain impersonal attitude on the part of the official toward all who come before him, whether in person or by means of a formal document. In the Near East, people are not yet accustomed to looking upon others impersonally in any situation. Their tendency to look upon others as individuals, with families, friends, and communities behind them, is carried over into realms where recent changes have established different formal requirements." 58

Administrative change in transitional countries is faced with several intricate problems. Some of them result from a cultural change through a gradual infusion of western norms of efficiency and

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 114.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 114-115.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 117-118.

loyalty in government vis-à-vis traditional ways of doing things.

The outcome of this is as follows:

"Anomalies are bound to follow when the formal governmental structure is based upon the expectation of responsibility to a remote abstraction called the government or the administration, while the responsibilities that are meaningful to the people are to friends (including political associates), relatives, and others, in their personal roles rather than as citizens or civil servants or elected officials." 59

The immediate question is the "degree to which the more formal roles of citizen, state employee, and elected official have evolved from traditional relationships and the degree to which these newer social roles are supported by other institutions and popular expectations."⁶⁰ As such we have to view the extent to which traditional relationships have evolved to support the more formal roles required by such a change. It may be suggested that people's expectations become different under the impact of changing social and economic factors. Such a change is difficult to measure precisely, except perhaps on the basis of comparative experiences in the West.

If we make a comparison between East and West regarding their bureaucratic set-up and behaviour, we are bound, as we have seen above, to reach the following theoretical formulation: "... there may (exist) differences of attitudes and behavior in spite of the similarity in structure." This is because, "... as in other realms, similarity of structure and form, often the result of cultural

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 117.

⁶⁰ Ibid., . . .

diffusion, does not mean similarity of institutional or behavioral patterns."⁶¹

Based on the above materials, we may present another theoretical formulation: "... The western bureaucratic model rests upon certain implicit judgements about efficiency, objectivity, motivation and authority."⁶² These are found, as was stated above, in such typical examples of bureaucracy as the civil service of the modern Western state and the staff of the modern corporation.

A third theoretical formulation may be stated as follows: since the western bureaucratic model "... with its structural and behavioral elements of efficiency, rationality, and control rests upon certain normative assumptions about time, man, and motivation," and if "... such values are absent or... are sharply challenged by the objectives of "welfare bureaucracy,"" then, "... the mere existence of "highly bureaucratized" organizations, as often seen in traditional society, tells us little about their operational consequences. Where social values do not assign a high priority to objectivity, productivity, and economic gain, the manifest structure of bureaucracy is of little relevance as a guide either

⁶¹Berger, "Bureaucracy East and West," p. 525. Underlining is mine.

⁶²R.V. Presthus, "Weberian V. Welfare Bureaucracy in Traditional Society," p. 5. Underlining is mine.

to its performance or to its "real" goals."⁶³

A central theme underlying studies of bureaucratic organization centers on the "... utility of the ideal western bureaucratic model for institutional analysis and the guiding of change in underdeveloped societies."⁶⁴ The Western model may be a good standard and useful measure in the hands of non-Western countries. This is more so for the great many underdeveloped countries like Lebanon which experienced the rule of some western countries and the aegis of the process of osmosis regarding their legal, political and administrative orientation. For such countries, there is a point of major concern: if they choose to borrow from the West, "... they must be prepared systematically to redirect traditional values and institutions in rather more pragmatic and rational directions."⁶⁵

In the Middle East, and this most definitely concerns Lebanon, "... it seems that extensive modification must occur... in the time-honored social patterns, such as the extended family system or the patriarchal authority system... (if) ethos, behavior and technology of western bureaucratic organizations are to be superimposed upon its underdeveloped societies."⁶⁶

In Lebanon there exists a considerably bureaucratized administrative set-up. This is in the main, a product of French

⁶³ Ibid., p. 24. Underlining is mine. The manifest structure of bureaucracy borrowed from the West in the case of Lebanon is that of France.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 1.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp.3-4.

rule. We shall discuss this aspect in some detail later on when we deal with the Lebanese administrative structure. However, the behavioural consequences and the manifest goals of the Lebanese bureaucracy are a function of the particular social base. This also will be dealt with in more detail in later chapters. For the present our major concern involves the influence of the underlying social values on the Lebanese administrative system.

F. W. Riggs, as seen above, argues that society as a whole has an important interactivity with the public administration system. He also says that such a system is an integral part of the whole society. As such public administration is a reflection of the society in which it exists and is thus a function of the social base. Hence, we may assume that bureaucratic behaviour in Lebanon reflects its social base. Riggs also gives us the notion of change in societies from agrarian to industrial settings. Since this process of change is a product of an interaction governed by causal relationships in an input — conversion — output system,⁶⁷ he proposes the presence of causality in such interaction based on the assumption that administrative behaviour is not erotic and uncaused. If this is true, then the following questions may be asked: Where does the source of change lie? Is it in society itself or in the process of public administration? How are movements of reform and reorganization, in

⁶⁷ Riggs, "Agraria and Industria," p. 95.

bureaucracy and society, explained? Riggs provides material which shows that bureaucracy may not be inevitably "deterministic", even if it is an honest reflection of its social setting. He says that in transitional societies the bureaucracy is still a secure and prestigious occupation and it is the chief employer of people with modern scientific and technical training. It tends, accordingly, "... to be the strong-hold of the "modernized" intelligentsia...."⁶⁸ Changes in the organization inside the bureaucracy tends to alter its power potential more speedily than do corresponding changes outside the bureaucracy.⁶⁹ Accordingly, the bureaucracy "... becomes more functionally specialized, and therefore more centralized and dispersed, whereas the non-bureaucratic population remains organized in decentralized and concentrated patterns. The result is a relative increase in the weight of the effective power of the bureaucracy vis-à-vis non-bureaucratic power centers."⁷⁰ The consequences of this for public administration in Lebanon are important. The Lebanese bureaucracy since the days of the mandate has experienced the influx of a considerable number of the educated elite and modernized intelligentsia who sought security and social prestige through government employment. At first they were the lucky few who came from upper or rich social classes; later they came also from a middle class with modern scientific or specialized education. With increasing control

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 108.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 109.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 110.

over the recruitment of the able and specialized and the rational reorganization of the Lebanese bureaucracy, it may very well be an effective organ with power potential that can conduct not only bureaucratic reform but also social reform.

Such reform and change, however, cannot be achieved in as short a period of time as we may like. Considering the present social, political and economic situation in Lebanon, there are sizable hurdles in front of a planned and democratic change. For change is characteristically and almost always a slow process in a democratic environment. Due to the particular Lebanese social context the means and ends of change and reform must of necessity be only democratic. It is my belief that too harsh and radical a drive towards change might shock the society into inaction or into revolt if the administration is not authoritarian and possessed of a military-like grip. The assessment of the people's disposition and degree of their acceptance of basic and cultural change is a fairly tedious task that require the understanding of the why in the public administration system as related to causes from the society itself, i.e., the "dynamics of transition."⁷¹ The underlying question is the extent to which a bureaucracy can precede its social base.

⁷¹Riggs considers the dynamics of transition from agraria to industria including the capacity of society to accommodate invention occurring either within the culture or being superimposed from without. Considerable strain has been undergone by primary social organizations in this process, and the hopes of elite groups have been threatened in trying to incorporate western organizational and industrial skills while resisting the social structure that produced them. Ibid., passim.

Summarily speaking, Lebanon is attempting to introduce into its administrative system such western cultural values as objectivity of personnel recruitment and selection, more rationality in the organizational set-up as related to social ends, free contract rather than status as the main measure of authority and decision-making, and the use of technical skill and specialization in the administrative process and organizational relationships. The introduction of such values is in fact a process of superimposing upon the traditional Lebanese social context some new patterns of behaviour. As such, the Lebanese society needs to undergo considerable change as a requirement and a basis for having objectivity and rationality in its public administration system. To what extent can we adapt our values in order to progress towards better goals is a problem, not merely of a timetable, but of the degree of acceptability by the society of both traditional and western values.

The central thesis of this work rests on the basic premise that the various administrative reforms in Lebanon were primarily structural in nature. It is the contention of the author that structural changes do not necessarily reflect greater objectivity and rationality in the Lebanese bureaucracy. The values of Lebanese society at present do not assign a high priority to rationality, efficiency and objectivity; so that changes in the values systems must of necessity accompany structural reforms.

PART II

MAJOR ADMINISTRATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

Introduction

Public bureaucracies in the Middle East assimilated themselves, from a structural point of view, very rapidly to Western models. This rapid assimilation occurred most notably in "... the State régime and the social organizations."¹ Developments, such as the creation and the growth of a bureaucracy, required a period of centuries in Europe but, however, it was accelerated and achieved in decades in this part of the world.² The administrative history of Oriental lands since the establishment of the new national States "... manifests an unbroken contest between the forces and tendencies of the old and the new State administration. The promulgation of modern State law, the formation of a Civil Service and increase in officials and the expansion of the functions of the State have not yet of themselves produced the fundamental psychological changes in the people who constitute the official apparatus, and who must lend to the new States their effective power. This

¹Alfred Bonnè, State and Economics In The Middle East (rev. ed.; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1955), p. 30.

²Ibid.

requires a sense of duty to the State which often takes generations to achieve."³

The process of developing a State bureaucracy in this part of the world has had its share of problems, most outstanding of which, perhaps, was "... the (great) distance which had to be bridged on account of differing concepts and institutions. This distance reached from one pole of social organization, the patriarchal tribal community of the Beduin, to its opposite, the socially atomized industrial proletariat called forth by modern capitalist development."⁴ Patriarchal society and government did not imagine the presence of a bureaucracy working under guides and principles; or the presence of salaried civil servants. Administrative decisions under such a structure were made ad hoc and official duties discharged through friends and favourites of the rulers. "The Westernization and extension of the scope of State functions made the differentiation and expansion of the official apparatus and its activities inevitable."⁵

Underlying the western countries' process of modernization is "... a gradual historical development from feudal society through nationhood and the industrial revolution." Non-Western societies "have undergone related changes as a consequence of colonialization and economic exploitation by the West. In most cases change in these

³Ibid., p. 31.

⁴Ibid., p. 30.

⁵Ibid., p. 30, 37.

societies has taken the form of a haphazard transition, with accompanying disharmonies in rate and scale as measured by the classic European evolution."⁶ Exotic societies which attempt to effect a rapid move "... from an archaic to a modern economic and social system has to compress into a few decades a complex, inter-related set of fundamental changes which took place gradually over several centuries in the countries of original industrialism."⁷

Lebanon developed the rudiments of a bureaucracy during the Ottoman rule; and admitted into the State function, during the middle of the nineteenth century, the notion of a salaried official service. The process of modernization, or rather Westernization, which came to Lebanon — practically before any other country in the area — through the diffusion of Western (Latin and French) education and ideas, prepared the social atmosphere and the State to accept the idea of the extension of the role of government and the scope of the functions. This effected the gradual differentiation of the Lebanese bureaucracy and started its process of development. The French mandate brought the country, i.e., its government and bureaucracy, under the spell of many and major changes which included fundamental institutional patterns and structures. It super-imposed upon the Lebanese social and bureaucratic context an image of its administrative

⁶ John W. Bennet and Robert K. McKnight, "Approaches of the Japanese Innovator to Cultural and Technical Change," The Annals, Vol. CCCV (May, 1956), p. 101.

⁷ Eugene Staley, The Future of Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 235.

structures, procedures, and political institutions which were used at home. Independent Lebanon had to continue the process of expansion and development in the role of the State and the functions and scope of bureaucracy, especially under the impact of new functions and needs that arose and were accentuated by the responsibilities of independent nationhood.

CHAPTER II

GROWTH IN BUREAUCRATIC SIZE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE STATE

A. Under the Mandate

Prior to World War II the Lebanese public authorities assumed only the traditional functions usually handled by the 'police-state', namely, the police, the army, and justice. Functions pertaining to the socio-economic needs of the society were limited to fit the requirements which were apparent in that era. The outbreak of war, however, imposed upon the country new dimensions regarding its social and economic structure and role. It made the State depart from its traditional neutrality and start a process of increasing interference in the various sectors of Lebanese national life. The change in the social, economic and political realities pressed the transformation of the role and functions of the State into new spheres. With the accession of Lebanon to independence in 1943, and following the war, the role of the state was visibly enlarged on two major lines, e.g., the political, and the socio-economic. These developments will be discussed below.

The restrained role of the state and its elementary interference in the social and economic spheres did not make for a big and complex administrative machinery like that of the present. The administration was characteristic of a liberal and laissez-faire state wherein little importance was given to socio-economic services as opposed to house-keeping administrative services. Prior to independence, the Mandate partitioned power with the Lebanese authorities. It controlled the army (Troupes spéciales du Levant) and general security forces; the "special informational and tutelary services, the "Services Spéciaux," through which the mandate authority was exercised at every administrative level⁸; and the "Common Interests," which grouped together certain economic functions of both Syria and Lebanon, including customs administration and the control of concessionary companies"⁹; the 'cadastre'; foreign

⁸ "Des officiers de l'armée occupante, faisant partie du "Service des Renseignements" ou des "Services spéciaux" (à partir de 1930) étaient présents dans tout le territoire Syro-Libanais et surveillaient les activités des fonctionnaires locaux.... Il va sans dire que dans cet état de choses l'autorité véritable apparaissait comme étant dans les mains de l'officier français plutôt que dans celles du fonctionnaire local." Moustapha Baroudi, Les Problèmes Juridiques concernant L'Administration des Communautés Sous Mandat (Genève: Imprimerie Genevoise; 1949), pp. 187-88.

⁹ George Grassmuck and Kamal Salibi, A Manual of Lebanese Administration (Beirut: Public Administration Department, American University of Beirut, 1955), p. 7.

representation; "quarantine services; office for the protection of commercial, industrial artistic, literary and musical properties; the general inspectorate of post and telegraph."¹⁰ Accordingly, the Lebanese authorities were confined to the limits of restrained police-state functions.¹¹

The Lebano-French treaty of 1936,¹² which was not ratified by the French Parliament, contained the transfer of these services into the hands of the Lebanese. However, negotiations on this treaty which were conducted in 1937 did not succeed and the French High Commissioner continued to administer these services himself until 31 December 1943. This was mostly a war period and necessitated the creation by the High Commissioner of new services. These were the "Direction Général du Ravitaillement, l'Office des Changes, la Défense

¹⁰ Satah el-Dine Tarazi, Les Services Publics Libano-Syriens (Beyrouth: Société d'impression et d'édition, 1946), p. 13.

¹¹ The real administration of the state was done by the French High Commissioner. According to Arrêté No. 42/s of 1925 the High Commissariat consisted of the following: a) The Office of the Secretary General, b) the Bureau of the Legislative Studies Counsellor, c) the Bureau of the Finance Counsellor, d) the General Inspectorate of Customs, e) the General Inspectorate of Post and Telegraph, f) the Bureau of the Public Works and Companies' Control Counsellor, g) the Bureau of the Public Education Counsellor, h) the Bureau of Archeology and Fine Arts Counsellor, i) the Bureau of the Hygiene and Public Relief Counsellor, j) the Bureau of the Economy Counsellor, k) the Bureau of Consulate Departments, l) the Office of Commercial, Industrial, and Artistic Property Protection, and m) the Office of Local Police Control. Bulletin Officiel des Actes Administratifs du Haut-Commissariat, Vol. IV, 1925, pp. 44-47.

¹² For the Arabic text of the treaty see Al-Bashir (Beirut: The Catholic Press, 19 November 1936), Annex of No. 5102, pp. 3-14.

Passive, le Séquestre Général des Biens Ennemis et l'Office Pharmaceutique."¹³

In the first administration under the 1926 Constitution, Decree No. 5 of 31 May 1926 established seven ministries and the Office of the Prime Minister. The ministries were those of Justice, Interior, Finance, Public Works, Education and Fine Arts, Agriculture, and Health and Public Assistance.¹⁴ "In addition to full financial responsibility for the government's operation, the Ministry of Finance contained the Departments of Post and Telegraph and of Economics. It likewise handled all problems relating to emigrants and immigrants. Post and Telegraph later became the responsibility of a separate ministry, as did the Department of National Economy"¹⁵ and the Emigrants' affairs.

The nature of administrative functions and the relative importance of each activity (anticipated number of personnel and their salaries) of the time can be deduced from the 1927 budget.

¹³Tarazi, op.cit., p. 26.

¹⁴Decree No. 5, dated 31 May 1926. For a listing of the present ministries see Chapter III, below.

¹⁵Grassmuck and Salibi, op.cit., p. 6.

This is presented in Table II-1, hereafter.

TABLE II-1
 REPUBLIC OF LEBANON
 BUDGET OF THE YEAR 1927^{a/}

Title	Personnel to be Employed	Credit Opened (in £ LS) *
I Presidency of the Republic	3	5,601
II Parliament	—	28,551
III Presidency, Council of Ministers	25	6,035
IV Ministry of Justice	598	59,605
V Ministry of the Interior	1802	234,833
VI Ministry of Finance	765	589,633
VII Ministry of Public Works	67	126,735
VIII Ministry of Education	385	51,953
IX Ministry of Agriculture	34	9,594
X Ministry of Public Health and Public Assistance	70	40,604
XI Expenses of Terminating the Year	—	—
XII Contingent Reserve	—	66,126
Total	3,749	£ LS 1,219,270

*Lebano-Syrian Pounds

^{a/}As in Ibid. "The Ministry of Interior maintained a gendarmerie of 1,382, over one-third of the entire government's personnel, and a police force of 347 members," p. 7.

This budget shows that the essential and most important ministries were those of Finance, Interior, Public Works and Justice. These ministries along with the others "... became the core of Lebanese domestic administration."¹⁶

In 1933, a serious depression year, the budget provided for 3600 positions, 1600 of which were for gendarmerie and the police. The Ministry of Public Works had 80 positions; Public Instruction and Fine Arts, 391; Agriculture, 70, plus 9 for economic services, Public Health and Public Assistance, 47.¹⁷ In this year "...Personnel was pared to what the mandatory power considered a minimum, and from this base it began to expand."¹⁸

Following the economic depression of the 1930's, the Lebanese bureaucracy began to develop in size and scope in step with the developing responsibilities of the State. "... The governmental economic responsibilities which the pangs of world-wide depression produced took root in Lebanon as well as in other parts of the world. Another reason for government expansion was the pressure exerted over a long period by international public opinion through the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations for some progress by the French toward self-government for Syria and Lebanon."¹⁹ The French Representative to the Commission justified the reforms and

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁷ Ibid.,

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

economy and efficiency measures taken by the French in the Lebanese administration and public finance during the '30's thus:²⁰

"No doubt, when Westerners set foot in Eastern countries they were inclined to surround themselves with the same administrative machinery they had known in the West. They felt, indeed, that they were thereby doing a service to the societies whose organization and manner of life they were anxious to improve. That appeared to be to some extent an illusion, and experience went to show that the countries in question were possessed of very limited wealth and required as simple and inexpensive a form of organization as possible."

Increased socio-economic needs, however, continued to pressure the expansion of the Lebanese bureaucracy and the government, in the years preceding the Second World War, was repeatedly forced "... to open additional credits and to find additional funds for required operations."²¹ New ministries were created by separating some services found in existing ministries. Post and Telegraph was divorced from Finance in 1934.²² The Economic Services which were a part of the Ministry of Finance in 1927 — and united with Agriculture in the 1936 budget — were separated and set up as the Department of National Economy.

In 1937, eleven years after the 1927 budget cited above, the Lebanese administration had, with the exception of those services

²⁰ League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the Twenty-seventh Session (1935) (Geneva: League of Nations, 1935), p.81.

²¹ Grassmuck and Salibi, op.cit., p. 9.

²² Arrêté No. 76 L/R of the High Commissioner (3 April 1934).

exercised by the Mandate, a total of 3659 civil servants. This figure is divided into one third for the economic and social service and two-thirds for the administrative departments including the functions of internal security.²³ The predominance of the administrative services as compared to socio-economic ones shows the liberal characteristic of the state of Lebanon at the time, despite the rise in the socio-economic needs mentioned above.

Ministries concerned with economic and social functions were restricted; their size and scope of activity suffered a hampering exiguity. The Ministry of Public Works and Transport, one of the most important of economic departments, had in 1937 only 82 civil servants including 18 engineers.²⁴ The Ministry of Agriculture had 39 civil servants. The Ministry of National Economy had 13 civil servants.²⁵ The insufficient and small number of civil servants of these ministries at the time is based to a great extent on the fact that the government did not have any economic or agricultural policies. The state did not try to find the means necessary for bolstering the production of fruits and cereals, for it was still very low, or industries for canning agricultural products, and thus no administrative units were created for this purpose. In the sphere of the country's economic life, private initiative was left for itself. The policy, or its absence, was to

²³ Gabriel Ménassa, Plan De Reconstruction De l'Economie Libanaise et De Reforme De L'Etat (Beyrouth: La Société Libanaise D'Economie Politique, 1948), p. 180.

²⁴ Ibid., pp. 180, 191.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 197.

give near total liberty to the activities of the private sector. As such, the Ministry of National Economy had a small number of civil servants and administrative units. These civil servants could exercise the function of protecting the consumers in an elementary fashion and process some transactions of export and import.²⁶ The social sphere experienced a similar situation. The Ministry of Public Health had in 1937 only 31 civil servants.²⁷ Public health service was provided mostly by government establishments and private hospitals, Lebanese or foreign. The State did not participate in the administration of private establishments but reverted to reimburse days of hospitalization of the patients in these hospitals.²⁸ In general, the intervention of the State in the domain of public health had a different size and intensity in the different countries of the Middle East as was the case in Lebanon. This is notably because of the different social and economic milieu and needs of these countries. Concerning medical action in general, Mandatory Powers had to undertake constant and massive measures in these countries because of the total lack of medical and health services. Lebanon was, in this sense, an exception because of certain factors

²⁶Sleiman M. Gemayel, "Evolution du Budget Libanais," (These de License, Université St. Joseph, Beyrouth, 5 Décembre, 1960), p. 44.

²⁷Ménassa, op.cit., p. 180.

²⁸Gemayel, op.cit., p. 45. Out of 3882 patients treated in 1931, according to government statistics, 1698 only were so treated in government establishments. In 1933, out of 3954 poor patients, government establishments received only 1775. République Française, Ministère Des Affaires Etrangères, Rapport à la Société des Nations sur la Situation de la Syrie et du Liban-1931 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1932), p. 145; also, Ibid., (1934), p. 148.

such as its good climate and relatively sophisticated population which maintains a considerably high standing of general health.²⁹ In the field of education the inferiority of the public sector was also well accentuated. The Ministry of National Education and Fine Arts had only 461 civil servants, including teachers.³⁰ In the sphere of education, like that of health, the intervention of the public authorities was not solicited in a large manner; thus not imposing as heavy a burden as found in other similar countries and, consequently, relieving the administration from the full impact of such social needs.³¹ This is perhaps based in the government's laissez-faire policy — or, in the case of education, Open Door policy — towards the penetration of western culture, which started well in advance of the establishment of the French mandate and during the Ottoman

²⁹ Ibid., p. 46. Lebanon did not suffer the diseases of the region such as cholera, typhus, pest and smallpox, but had to fight typhoid, dysentary and malaria.

³⁰ Ménassa, op.cit., p. 180.

³¹ Statistics made in 1933 revealed the existence of 1307 private (including foreign) and public teaching establishments — primary, secondary, and university — including a total of 104,133 students. The State had out of such totals 138 schools and 15,706 students. Bulletin Economique des Etats du Levant sous Mandat Français, Nombre 2, Annexe 23, as in Gemayel, op.cit.

rule, and the large political autonomy which permitted the advent of French, American and British religious and educational missions.

Administrative departments enjoyed a relative importance vis-à-vis socio-economic services, although many services which are of an administrative nature were excluded from the purely Lebanese services and budget.

The administrative units attached to the Presidency of the Republic, to the Chamber of Deputies and to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers contained 23 civil servants in all.³² This small number sufficed to service the functions under Lebanese jurisdiction; the rest of the functions were under the authority of the Mandate's 'Haut-Commissariat'. The Mandate, however, chose the civil servants of its 'Haut-Commissariat' from Lebanese and resident French population. The Ministry of Finance and that of Justice had 357 and 578 civil servants respectively. The Ministry of P.T.T. had 402 civil servants. These three ministries were the best manned ones in the whole state.³³ Internal security forces, the gendarmerie and police, amounted to 1153 and 420 agents respectively in 1937. The civil servants of the Ministry of National Defence and the General Security service, which were both under the mandate and were excluded from the Lebanese budget, totalled 3532³⁴ for both central administration and army. Concerning the question of

³² Gemayel, op.cit., p. 49.

³³ Mènassa, op.cit., p. 181.

³⁴ Ibid.

security in general two remarks may be given. First, the number of civil servants in the Ministry of National Defence before the Second World War was extremely reduced; but it has more than trippled by 1960.³⁵ Then, the security of the boarders was much safer; the western powers, which carefully p^ortitioned the region into several zones of influence, imposed the respect of the status quo. When the different countries under the mandate became independent, they had to face the Israeli situation and the political instability which pressured the increase of military personnel. Second, the expansion of the internal security cadres after 1943 is due in part to the developing needs of internal security.

Generally speaking, the Lebanese administrative services of the day developed into a "... substantial administration, ... a capable administration that might soon operate with a considerable measure of independence.... With expansion, public servants acquired some significance as a group"³⁶ to the extent that the government licensed their "Amicale de fonctionnaires libanais" whose objective was the "d^efense de leurs int^er^ets et rel^ev^ement de leur situation sociale...."³⁷

³⁵ Gemayel, op.cit., p. 50.

³⁶ Grassmuck and Salibi, op.cit., p. 10.

³⁷ Lebanon, Official Gazette, January 31, 1938, p. 894.
Presently no such organization exists.

With the outbreak of the Second World War, government and administrative operations were tightened under the control of the High Commissioner³⁸ for the purpose of stability and for fear of strains and conflict which would be harmful to the war effort. This measure, however, did not neutralize political and economic strains brought by a world war which forced "...governments and administrations to adjust at rates and in fashions unknown to normal government routine."³⁹ Lebanon, in the first few years of the war, experienced "administrative confusion to match the political derangement which the country experienced."⁴⁰

The war brought two major developments on the functions of the Lebanese administration. The first was the creation in 1942⁴¹ of the Ministry of Supply (Ravitaillement).

The functions of this ministry was "to acquire, store, and distribute those products considered necessary to the continued existence and well-being of the Lebanese people. The ministry was empowered to control all imports and exports. It possessed considerable financial autonomy and was exempt from the constitutional requirement of submitting its budget annually. Eventually, as economic problems increased in number and importance, the ministry grew more powerful. It exercised powers of inspection, of price control and enforcement, and of rationing."⁴²

³⁸ See Chapter VIII for more details on this point.

³⁹ Grassmuck and Salibi, op.cit., p. 10.

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

⁴¹ Legislative Decree dated 27 February 1942.

⁴² Grassmuck and Salibi, op.cit., p. 11.

With the end of the war this Ministry lost the ground for its need and emergency powers and its economic functions, other than those of supply and rationing which were abolished, were taken over by the Ministry of National Economy.

The second development was the resuscitation in fact of the nominal posts of Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defence which had existed in name since 1937 but were devoid of power and responsibility under the mandate. These posts disappeared during the 1939-42 war years. As to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a legislative decree was issued in May 1942 giving the ministry "broad duties and responsibilities... and ... establish (ing) it as an essential segment of Lebanon's administration."⁴³

While political independence was secured from the Mandatory Power in 1943, the administration remained in the hands of the French. In Lebanon, as well as in Syria, the "French held on to those administrative and security agencies which enabled them during the Mandate to control affairs in these two countries. Without complete administrative power and freedom, neither Lebanon nor Syria could stand in fact as an independent state."⁴⁴ Lengthy negotiations with the C.F.L.N. (Comité Français de la Libération Nationale),⁴⁵ which was represented by the High Commissioner General Catroux and Mrs. Yves Chataigneau, resulted in the agreement⁴⁶ to transfer to

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 12.

⁴⁵ General de Gaulle's North African headquarters which represented Free France.

⁴⁶ Conferences were held in Damascus and the resulting Convention and Protocols were dated between 22 December 1943 and 5 January 1944.

the Lebanese and Syrians the control of central administrative policy and local government, the internal security agencies and the Common Interests services⁴⁷ which included the customs administration and control of concessionary companies. Also, the entire French personnel of these services were transferred and were maintained in office in order to avoid an interruption of the administrative machinery until they would be replaced by Lebanese personnel.⁴⁸

The transfer of these services involved, however, problems of their division among the two states of Lebanon and Syria. "While the security services and many of the administrative services formerly performed by the Delegate General for both countries could be parcelled out to the two new governments, the Common Interests were not so easily divided."⁴⁹ These services, or at least the most important of them, were operated by the High Commissioner as a single unit from a federal-like level for the benefit of both states.

⁴⁷ Starting as of 1 January 1944. The services were: 1. Customs Department, 2. Control of General Concessions (Light and Power Companies, Beirut Port, D.H.P. Railways, Beirut-Djounieh Railway, Regie des Tabacs), 3. Antiquities, 4. Patent Office, 5. Social Affairs Service, 6. Army Auxillary Forces, 7. Excise Department, 8. Public Security, including Passport and Residence Offices, 9. Maritimes Trade, 10. Post and Telegraph, 11. Veterinary Service, 12. Survey Department, and 13. Gunpowder Monopoly and Arms Licences. Eugenie E. Abouchdid, Thirty Years of Lebanon & Syria (1917-1947) ((Beirut: The Sader-Rihani Printing Co., 1948), p. 204.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 202, 205.

⁴⁹ Grassmuck and Salibi, op.cit., pp. 12-13.

"Le Haut Commissaire se considéra comme un lien fédéral superposé aux Etats du Levant et se proposa de gérer lui-même l'administration douanière constituant un service unique et commun à tous ces Etats." 50

The Convention on the transfer of the Common Services stipulated that "the formalities connected with the transfer of powers were to be decided on by private agreements between the Lebanese and Syrian Governments."⁵¹ These agreements were made after mutual negotiations,⁵² and in view of the difficulty of splitting the Customs Administration, a Supreme Council of Common Interests was created in January 1944 as a solution. The Council was to be composed of three Lebanese and three Syrian delegates and was to hold its meetings in Beirut during the first half of the year, and in Damascus during the second half. The Common Interests' receipts were to be distributed in the ratio of 40% for each country, and the remaining 20% to be divided in proportion to the amount of goods imported by each country starting as of 1944.⁵³

Legislative Decree No. 766 of 26 February 1944 distributed the rest of the administrative services among existing ministries. Common Interests administered jointly by the two States were attached

⁵⁰ Moustapha Baroudi, *op.cit.*, p. 189.

⁵¹ Eugenie Abouchdid, *op.cit.*, p. 203.

⁵² The Lebano-Syrian Agreement is dated 27 January 1944. The Common Services were divided into two. First, those that must be jointly administered by the two countries (customs, control of General Concessions, and Regie des Tabacs) and are spread over the territories of both states; second, all others. (Art. 1).

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 206-208. Receipts of the Customs Services totalled £ L.S. 12,500,000 in 1943.

to the Ministry of Finance (Art.1); the Public Security, Passive Defence and Gunpowder Monopoly and Arms Licences were attached to the Ministry of Interior (Art.2); Public Works services, Control of General Concessions, the study of Geology and the control of vehicles, oils and tyres were attached to the Ministry of Public Works (Art.3); services of Economic Affairs, Department of Maritime Trade, Patent Office, Social Affairs Services and Excise Department were attached to the Ministry of Trade, Commerce and National Economy (Art.4); the Army was attached to the Ministry of National Defence (Art.5); the Financial Department was attached to the Ministry of Finance (Art. 6); the Broadcasting System, Antiquities, the Control of Foreign Institutions were attached to the Ministry of Education (Art.7); the Post and Telegraph Departments were attached to the Ministry of Post and Telegraph (Art. 8). These transfers supplied the Lebanese government with the country's lacking prerequisite, namely, a national and independent administration.

One more important transfer, however, had not been made yet — Les Troupes Speciales. The Ministry of National Defence was practically an empty entity with the French in control of the 5000 or so of well-dissiplined and well-armed local levies which they have recruited and trained in the Levant, and placed under the French territorial command. The Lebanese and Syrian Governments pressed for their formal transfer, "while making it clear that for the duration of the war they would, of course, remain at the disposal of the Allied Command. The French Government was unwilling to transfer them until the end of the war, or at least until a later

stage in it, and was not prepared to give them up unconditionally , but only in exchange for the conclusion of treaties of alliance with France by the Syrian and Lebanese Governments; the possession of the 'Troupes' was, in fact, their only direct bargaining-counter in their attempt to persuade the two Governments to sign such treaties." The two countries refused persistently to accept such terms and stated their right and need to control these forces; "the experience of 1936-39 had shown what a mockery was self-government so long as the Government had not sufficient forces at its disposal to assert its will."⁵⁴ With this position, and with international pressure, France transferred the 'Troupes' in 1945 to Lebanon and Syria. In 1946 French and British armies left the Levant and Lebanon became militarily independent in addition to its political and administrative independence.

B. During Independence

No doubt the Lebanese bureaucracy by 1946 has been supplied with a complete and large administrative set-up; each ministry found itself in possession of nearly all the administrative machinery required for its operations.⁵⁵ The number of civil servants manning this set-up burgeoned from 3674 in 1937 to 7810 in 1946 - an increase amounting to 130%.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ A.H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 291-92.

⁵⁵ Grassmuck and Salibi, op.cit., p. 14.

⁵⁶ Ménassa, op.cit., pp. 389-90. Between 1941 and 1946, which were war years, the number of civil servants has more than doubled from 4239 to 8640. p. 390. Ménassa gives the two different totals of 7810 and 8640 for 1946, the difference of 830 between which goes to the newly created autonomous services at the time, p. 389.

In 7 December 1945, the parliamentary rapporteur on the project of the 1946 budget supplied the totals of civil servants together with the percentage of their salaries' totals between 1937 and 1946. The following table illustrates this evolution:

TABLE II-2 ^{a/}

Year	No. of C.S.	Salaries' Totals in Million L £	% Out of Budgets' Totals
1937	3674	2,446,620	43%
1938	3902	2,843,726	46%
1939	4005	3,062,783	42%
1940	4145	3,071,700	48%
1941	4239	3,932,606	48%
1942	4992	7,149,947	50%
1943	5696	9,125,044	42%
1944	6892	16,137,935	47%
1945	7279	17,673,021	50%
1946	7810	29,322,001	50%
	+ 3520 (army)		

^{a/}Gabriel Ménassa, Plan De Reconstruction de l'Economie Libanaise et de Reforme de l'Etat (Beyrouth: La Société Libanaise D'Economie Politique, 1948), p. 389.

Lebanon and Syria underwent a series of divergences regarding their financial⁵⁷ and economic interests. This started in 1948 and led to the ending of the customs union on 13 March 1950 which operated until this date under the above mentioned Supreme Council of Common Interests. This development had important repercussions on the economy and administration of the country. An equal repercussion on the economy and finance of the country was imparted by the Arab-Israeli struggle of 1948, namely, the Palestine War. Additional appropriations were obligated and special taxes and surtaxes had to be collected. The ephemeral war "...brought few administrative changes in Lebanon other than those contingent upon blocking the border to the south, readjusting the defense plans of the state, and maintaining intensive diplomatic representations to international organizations and to the world powers."⁵⁸

Economic difficulties, corruption, general governmental mismanagement, and disorganized administration characterized the

⁵⁷ Lebanon's financial problems came from the question of its currency's dependency on the French franc at that time; the problem of settling the "...ownership of the telephone system, the broadcasting station, and certain real property including the military airport at Rayak." Grassmuck and Salibi, *op.cit.*, p. 14. In 1948 negotiations settled all these matters such as the perpetuation of currency ties and issue of Lebanese currency by the Banque de Syrie et du Liban whose concession ends in 1963; it would be replaced by a Lebanese State bank for issue of currency. Lebanese currency is guaranteed, today, by the International Monetary Fund and the Lebanese Currency Law.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 15. One important administrative repercussion was the creation of the Directorate General for Palestinian Refugees' Affairs in the Ministry of Interior. Legislative Decree No. 42, dated 31 March 1959.

early 50's in Lebanon. Corruption and malfeasance in office, whether in the government or administrative circles, developed into unmanageable proportions and added to the economic difficulties already existing.⁵⁹ A Bureau of Accounts was created in 1951 and attempted to bring more control on proposed and completed expenditures by the various ministries and other government agencies.

Social needs necessitated the creation of the Ministry of Information in 1949; and the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in 1951. The need to organize and control developmental activities in the country plus the coordination of the works, projects, and socio-economic planning and development effort of all the other ministries and agencies necessitated the creation of the Ministry of General Planning in 1954. The creation of the ministry resulted from the studies of the 1954 government-wide reform attempt. The 1958-59 administrative reform movement created two powerful central agencies attached to the Prime Minister's Office. One is the Civil Service Council which was entrusted with the control and conduct of all aspects of public personnel administration of the country and which included a National Institute of Public Administration to conduct in-service and pre-entry training for Lebanese civil servants. The other agency is the Central Inspectorate entrusted with the task of controlling the administration for efficient conduct of daily

⁵⁹ For a description of the situation at the time refer to the later half of Chapter VIII below.

business and proper administrative ethics; it includes a Directorate General of Public Tenders which controls and centralizes the grant of each and every government purchase or contract with the intention of setting far better professional and ethical standards to a process which hitherto was done by the individual ministries, and a Directorate General of Research and Guidance, namely a central O. & M. office.

Presently, i.e., subsequent to 1954, the total number of ministries which constitute the Lebanese administration is 14. Table II-3 shows the development and growth of the units of the Lebanese bureaucratic structure. The names of the ministries cited are those given them at present. Details are supplied under the heading of each item.

TABLE II-3

CHRONOLOGY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
MINISTRIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS
IN THE LEBANESE BUREAUCRACY

Ministry or Administrative Unit		Date of Establishment	
1.	Prime Minister's Office		1926
	- Bureau of Accounts	1951	
	- Civil Service Council	1959	
	- Central Inspectorate	1959	
2.	Justice		1926
3.	Interior		1926
4.	Finance		1926
	- Common Interests attached in:	1944	
	(Cont.)		

TABLE II-3 -- Continued

Ministry or Administrative Unit		Date of Establishment	
5.	Public Works.		1926
6.	Education and Fine Arts.		1926
	- Lebanese University	1953	
7.	Agriculture		1926
8.	Public Health		1926
9.	National Defense		1937
	-nominal establishment in 1937;		
	-disappeared between 1939-42		
	-army attached in:	1944	
	-the 'Troupes' were received in:	1945	
10.	Foreign Affairs and Emigrants.		1937
	-nominal establishment in 1937;		
	-disappeared between 1939-42;		
	-resuscitated and given duties in 1942.		
	-Emigrants' affairs added in:	1942-3	
	and as a new Department in:	1947	
11.	National Economy		1945
	(post-independence organization in		
	5 October 1945).		
	-Department of Economics under Ministry		
	of Finance	1926	
	-Department of Economics under Ministry		
	of Agriculture	(1936	
	-Ministry of Supply	Budget)	
		1942-45	
	-Also, Ministry of Commerce and Industry	1942-45	
12.	Post, Telegraph, and Telephone		1946
	-Post and Telegraph was under Ministry of		
	Finance till 1934; created as separate		
	ministry in 1946.		

(Cont.)

TABLE II-3 -- Continued

Ministry or Administrative Unit		Date of Establishment	
13.	<p>Orientation, Information and Tourism</p> <p>-The "Service Téléphonique" was transferred from the French army to the Lebanese Ministry of National Defence on 1 April 1946, and to the Ministry of "Post and Telegraph" in October of the same year; On 28 January 1949 it was made a Directorate; on 4 April 1953 it was made a Directorate General in the Ministry of "P.T. and T."</p> <p>-Broadcasting system was under Ministry of Education in 1944; it was under Ministry of Interior in 1947-8.</p> <p>-Ministry of Information created in 1949.</p> <p>-The "Service of Tourism & Estivation" was under the Ministry of National economy (1946-48), disappeared till 1953, installed as "General Commissariat for Tourism, Estivation, & 'hivernage'." from 1953 to 1961; attached to the newly reorganized Ministry of O.I.T. on 7 August 1961.</p>	1949	
14.	<p>Labour and Social Affairs</p> <p>-Labour and Social Affairs Service was under Ministry of National Economy</p>	1946-51	1951
15.	<p>General Planning</p> <p>- approval of its creation in 1954</p> <p>-formulation in 1955</p> <p>-actual operation started 1959</p> <p>-Central Statistics Directorate</p>		1954
	(Cont.)	1959	

TABLE II-3 -- Continued

Ministry or Administrative Unit	Date of Establishment
16. Ministry of State for Administrative Reform	1960-61
- Reform machinery and foreign experts attached to the Prime Minister's Office as of May, 1961	

C. A New Trend: The Independent Agencies and Services

Ministries, basic and dominant as they are, do not, nevertheless, involve all the administrative machineries existing at present. A new trend has developed in recent years which, although necessary, has led to structural proliferation outside the limits of ministerial lines. What was termed as "independent services or agencies" have been created either to cope with arising socio-economic needs or as a result of the nationalization mostly of private water and electricity concessions.⁶⁰ Such services were not incorporated as new services inside the present concerned ministries - most notably the ministries of Public Works and transport; of Agriculture; of Labour and Social Affairs; and of Education and Fine Arts - which could have very well been done and with equal or better results.

⁶⁰See Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Letter of Transmittal of the Project of the 1963 Budget (Beirut: Dar Al-Funun Press, September 30, 1962), pp. 96-98.

It was thought, however, that autonomous financial and administrative status -- but under the control of the concerned ministries -- together with a business-like nature can make these services more productive, revenue-earning, and safe from usual bureaucratic red tape and inefficiency. It seems that Lebanon -- like some other underdeveloped countries, and following the "Cult of Autonomy" -- have developed, perhaps in imitation of Western forms of public enterprise, the "...tendency to create a new "quasi-autonomous" institution for the fulfillment of almost every new need that becomes apparent. So many public corporations, state companies, and analogous agencies are brought into existence -- some for the performance of straight-line governmental functions with only the faintest tinge of the "commercial" about them -- that the ministries become reduced, in Mr. Harold Seidman's phrase, to "hollow shells," and there arises a problem of coordination so sizable that even a highly developed administration would be hard put to cope with it." Enthusiasm for this indiscriminate proliferation may vary from country to country. "In some countries, where political corruption flourishes, it can be a simple matter of "jobs for the boys." Elsewhere, it is often the product of ignorance of sound administrative principles, or of sheer despair as to the likelihood of getting any serious work out of ordinary government departments which are firmly in the grip of an unimaginative, unenterprising bureaucracy wedded to traditional, time-consuming routines. Where the last motive applies, it is often found that the remedy is worse

than the disease; for the new agencies either quickly acquire the bureaucratic characteristics of the old departments or fall under the domination of private vested interests."⁶¹

The budgets of the independent services are not subject to legislative authorization but to the cabinet's approval only. The state's financial and administrative control over these services was organized and established by Legislative Decree No. 150, dated 12 June 1959. This Decree did away with previous administrative disorganization and the disturbed financial affairs in those services. Also, the Ministry of Finance collaborated with the various ministries which control (tutelle administrative) these services and issued general regulations for every service organizing its financial and administrative affairs. The disorganization of these affairs in the independent services was based to a great extent in their inability and failure to collect dues and fees, the inadequacy and low amount of these fees compared to cost of production (of electricity and water) and consequent failure to raise enough reserve to repay government loans.⁶² The Civil Service Council has also formulated

⁶¹ A.H. Hanson, "Public Authorities in Underdeveloped Countries," Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (Autumn, 1961), pp.619-637, as quoted in Public Administration Practices and Perspectives — A Digest of Current Materials (Prepared by The American Society for Public Administration for The Agency for International Development), Vol. I, No. 2 (September, 1962), pp.5-6.

⁶² Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, op.cit., p. 97.

internal personnel codes for the greater part of these services — and it is in the process of doing the same for the rest — to regularize and standardize the personnel administration aspects in them. The idea was to subordinate the employees of these services to rules and regulations which are as near as possible to the general personnel laws governing the civil servants in the ministries. A unified personnel code, however, could not be formulated for all the independent services together because of different and varied statutes and acquired personnel rights enjoyed by their employees since these independent services were private concessions.⁶³

Studies have been conducted by the Ministry of Public Works and the government has been giving some thought to the possibility of unifying or grouping most of these independent services together.⁶⁴ When this step will be taken and what form will it have is still unclear. Table II-4 gives a list of the independent services and government agencies which are, concerning their personnel administration, under the control of the Civil Service Council.

⁶³ See Lisan Al-^{*}Hal (Beirut), No. 19366, dated 29 January 1963.

⁶⁴ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3033, dated 6 November 1962.

TABLE II-4

AGENCIES AND INDEPENDENT SERVICES UNDER
THE CONTROL OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COUNCIL^{a/}

Muhafazah	Agency or Independent Service
<u>Beirut:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Beirut Electricity Service.^b 2. National Litani River Service.^b 3. Beirut Water Service.^b 4. Social Development Service.^d 5. Training for Development Institute (Service).^e 6. Office of Silk.^c 7. Lebanese State Railways and Beirut Common Transport Service.^b 8. Office of Fruits (Agency).^c 9. Board for the Execution of Projects (Directorate General).^b 10. Construction 'Idara' (Directorate General).^b
<u>Mount Lebanon:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 11. Barouk Water Service.^b 12. Matn Water Service.^b 13. Kisirwan Water, and Futuh Electricity Service.^b 14. A'yn Dilbeh Water Service.^b 15. 'City of Sports' Service.^f
<u>North Lebanon:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 16. Tripoli Water Service.^b 17. Tripoli's Permanent International Fair Service.^g 18. Tripoli Seaport Service.^b
<u>South Lebanon:</u>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 19. Sidon Water Service.^b 20. Jezzine Electricity Service.^b 21. Jabal 'Amil Water Service.^b

(Cont.)

TABLE II-4 -- Continued

Muhafazah	Agency or Independent Service
<u>Biqat</u> ^f :	22. Kasmieh and Ras El-'Ayn Irrigation Service. ^b 23. Tyre Water and Electricity Service. 24. Zahleh Water Service. ^b 25. Agricultural Scientific Research Service. ^c

^aCourtesy of the C.S.C. Diwan.

^bUnder the control of the Ministry of Public Works & Transport.

^cUnder the control of the Ministry of Agriculture.

^dUnder the control of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.

^eUnder the control of the Ministry of General Planning.

^fUnder the control of the Ministry of National Education and Fine Arts.

^gUnder the control of the Ministry of National Economy.

D. From Scores to Thousands

The Lebanese civil service has experienced considerable growth since the inception of its nucleus in the feudal era of the Amīr(s) (princes), prior to the year 1840, in the form of their Dīwān (secretariat).⁶⁵ From a score or so civil servants in this era, this number doubled in the period of the Qā'immaqāmiyataya; in the period of the Mutasarrifiyah it became 226 civil servants (and 999 gens d'armé); 3023 in 1926; 5696 in 1943; and 8808 in 1949, including the gendarmerie and the police, and excluding the common services personnel and the army.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ See Chapter VIII for a more detailed discussion on this and subsequent eras in the life of the Lebanese civil servants and bureaucracy.

⁶⁶ Taufīq Awād, "Al-Wazifah fī Lubnān (translation of Arabic title, "Public Office in Lebanon") Les Conférences du Cénacle, Vol. III, No. 5-6 (1949), p. 127.

Table II-5 presents the totals of permanent civil servants' positions every other year from 1950 to 1962 with their breakdown on the basis of ministries and central agencies. The totals presented were taken from the budget allotments of the said years. The figures presented account for all the permanent positions of the "cadres," except those performing military and police functions, the temporary, the daily paid and the contractuelles. The categories excluded are either, sometimes, not cited in the budgets, such as the classified military personnel totals, or are of substantial yet fluctuating nature. Their exclusion would, therefore, reveal a more meaningful measurement of the original figures of the permanent administrative cadres. The teachers under the Ministry of National Education and Fine Arts were included, following the French example, which explains this ministry's relatively large total.

In 1959 the total number of permanent civil servants was 14,103⁶⁷ — more than double that of 1950. The percentage increase in this 10-year period amounts to 129.76%. The general total for 1962 was 16,239; and for 1963 it reached 17,683. The percentage increase of the 1962 total over that of 1950 is 164.56%; the percentage increase of the 1963 total over that of 1950 is 188.09%; the percentage increase of the 1963 total over that of 1959 is 25.38%. Table II-6 shows totals of personnel and pay of all persons employed in the Lebanese administration, whether permanent or non-permanent, as in the 1963 budget. It also shows these totals' breakdown on individual ministries and major units therein.

⁶⁷ Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budget of 1959.

TOTALS OF PERMANENT CIVIL SERVANTS, 1950-1962^{a/}

Name of Ministry or Unit	1950	1952	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962
Presidency of the Republic	13	14	10	10	10	13	11
Chambre of Deputies	27	29	39	35	35	38	54
Prime Minister's Office	21	16	13	13	15	13	23
-Directorate General	—	24	40	56	55	56	61
-Bureau of Accounts	—	7	15	15	15	—	105 ^b
-Central Inspectorate	9	—	—	—	—	—	113
-Civil Service Council	599	637	677	752	896	924	1028
Ministry of Justice	178	182	154	155	169	182	222
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Emigrants	169	177	256	253	258	295	300
Ministry of Interior	743	844	1070	1327	1353	1194	1277
Ministry of Finance	2324 ^c	3759	4056	4936	5379	6103	8254
Ministry of National Education & Fine Arts	491	625	574	556	626	607	604
Ministry of Public Health	—	94	97	94	94	85	77
Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs	41	62	60	59	60	56	229
Ministry of Orientation, Information & Tourism	438	932	971	1004	1088	886	935
Ministry of Public Works & Transport	330	331	529	551	577	373	524
Ministry of Agriculture	137	93	167	189	196	185	165
Ministry of National Economy	605	700	1634	2373	2399	2263	2171
Ministry of P.T. & T.	13	17	42	42	51	60	54
Ministry of National Defence	—	—	—	58	57	19	93
Ministry of General Planning	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
General Total	6,138	8,519	10,364	12,422	13,278	13,352	16,239

^aLebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budgets of 1950;-52;-54;-56;-58;-60;-62.

^bThis includes 60 students in the N.I.P.A. considered as civil servants.

^cTotals of this ministry include the teachers.

TABLE II-6

PERSONNEL AND PAY TOTALS OF THE
LEBANESE CIVIL SERVICE, 1963^a

MINISTRY OR AGENCY	CIVIL SERVANTS			Total of Basic Salaries and Pay (In Leb. Pounds)
	Permanent	Non-Permanent	Total	
<u>Presidency of the Republic:</u>				
-The Directorate General	<u>11</u>		<u>11</u>	<u>90,240</u>
<u>Chamber of Deputies:</u>				
-The Diwan	54	7	61	317,330
-Police	<u>36</u>	-	<u>36</u>	<u>135,630</u>
<u>Prime Minister's Office:</u>				
-The Directorate General	<u>23</u>	7	<u>30</u>	<u>155,082</u>
-Bureau of Accounts	<u>61</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>64</u>	<u>459,810</u>
-Civil Service Council and				
-The D.G. of Personnel	34		34	245,200
-The D.G. of Preparation and Training; & the				
National Institute of Public Administration	<u>77</u> ^b	<u>4</u>	<u>81</u>	<u>368,630</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>111</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>115</u>	<u>613,830</u>
<u>The Central Inspection</u>				
-D.G. of Inspection	17	1	18	123,690
-Administrative Inspection	18		18	120,750
-Technical (Engineering) Inspection	20		20	161,790
-Educational Inspection	21		21	142,320
-Health, Social & Agricultural Inspection	9		9	50,250
-Financial Inspection	26		26	180,750
-D.G. of Research and Guidance	11		11	74,700

(Cont.)

TABLE II-6 --Continued

MINISTRY OR AGENCY	CIVIL SERVANTS		Total of Basic Salaries and Pay (In Leb. Pounds)
	Permanent	Non-Permanent	
	<u>11</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>11</u>
	<u>133</u>		<u>134</u>
<u>Total</u>			
-D.G. of Public Tenders	27	4	27
<u>Ministry of Justice:</u>			
-The Directorate General	25		48,000
-The Council of State	13		387,900
-Judges	1		35,892
-Judicial Assistants (greffiers)			2,112
-Special Administrative Court			35,000
-Civil Courts		21	
-Judges of the courts; of military courts; of the Judicial Inspection; & of the ministry of Justice	227		3,255,300
-Civil servants	570		2,243,620
-Shari'a Courts	67		377,370
-Suni Courts	48		293,430
-Ja'fari Courts	56		246,036
-Departments of Ifta' (Suni & Ja'fari)	30		109,332
-Druze Religious Courts	<u>1064</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>7,179,222</u>
<u>Total</u>			
<u>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants:</u>			
-The Central Directorate General	81	37	457,128
-Missions Abroad	141		1,513,380
-Local Personnel Abroad			1,283,411
-Technical Attachés		8	254,900
<u>Total</u>	<u>222</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>3,508,819</u>

(Cont.)

TABLE II-6 --Continued

MINISTRY OR AGENCY	CIVIL SERVANTS			Total of Basic Salaries and Pay (In Leb. Pounds)
	Permanent	Non-Permanent	Total	
<u>Ministry of Interior:</u>				
-Common Administrative Service	11		11	69,510
-D.G. of Interior	221	13	234 ^d	1,177,278
-Internal Security Forces & Prisons' personnel				23,230,000
-Directorate of General Security				
-General Security Personnel				2,084,375
-Civil Personnel	7	1	8	21,780
-D.G. of Personal Status	67	84	151	508,366
-D.G. of Palestinian Refugees' Affairs	1	26	27	80,708
<u>Total</u>	<u>307</u>	<u>124</u>	<u>431</u>	<u>27,172,017</u>
<u>Ministry of Finance:</u>				
-D.G. of Finance	561	50	611	3,453,160
-D.G. of Customs	1063	5	1068	4,867,944
-Directorate of Land Registry	121	14	135	630,566
-Service de Cadastre'	209	583	792	2,086,752
-Directorate of National Lottery	31	3	34	193,630
<u>Total</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>655</u>	<u>2640</u>	<u>11,232,052</u>
<u>Ministry of National Education & Fine Arts:</u>				
-Common Administrative Service	33	1	34	152,595
-D.G. of National Education	60	5	65	354,990
-Directorate of Elementary Education; & the Service of Private Education	6972	205	7177	24,029,130 ^f
-Directorate of Professional and Technical Education	256	42	298	1,527,485 ^f
-Directorate of Secondary Education	399	18	417	3,084,505 ^f
-Service of Teachers' Preparation & the Service of Educational Research	75)	3}	93	1,334,850 ^f
	75)			

(Cont.)

TABLE II-6 --Continued

MINISTRY OR AGENCY	CIVIL SERVANTS		Total of Basic Salaries and Pay (In Leb. Pounds)
	Permanent	Non-Permanent	
	248	5	253
-Service of Physical Culture & Scouting	17		17
-Service of the National Library	57	66	123
-D.G. of Antiquities	5	9	14
-National Music Institute	<u>8137</u>	<u>354</u>	<u>8491</u>
			<u>32,396,505</u> ^f
-The Lebanese University	25	23	48
-Presidency & central administration	38	4	42 ^h
-School of Sciences			
-daily paid	16	1	17 ^h
-School of Law			
-teachers & lecturers on hourly basis	18		18 ^h
-Teachers' High Institute			
-teachers & lecturers on hourly basis	13	19	32
-Institute of Social Sciences			
-teachers & lecturers on hourly basis;			
and expert			
-School of Arts	25	6	31 ^h
-teachers & lecturers on hourly basis	<u>135</u>	<u>53</u>	<u>188</u>
			<u>1,965,962</u>
	<u>8272</u>	<u>407</u>	<u>8679</u>
			<u>34,362,467</u>
<u>Ministry of Public Health:</u>			
-The Directorate General	569	535	1104
-Central General Health Laboratory	<u>42</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>84</u>
	<u>611</u>	<u>535</u>	<u>1146</u>
			<u>3,676,834</u>
			<u>224,640</u>
			<u>3,901,474</u>
<u>Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs:</u>			
-The Directorate General	59	1	60
-Institute for Juvenile Rehabilitation	<u>10</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>11</u>
	<u>69</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>71</u>
			<u>353,580</u>
			<u>37,800</u>
			<u>391,380</u>

(Cont.)

THABLE II-6 --Continued

MINISTRY OR AGENCY	CIVIL SERVANTS			Total of Basic Salaries and Pay (In Leb. Pounds)
	Permanent	Non-Permanent	Total	
<u>Ministry of Orientation, Information & Tourism:</u>				
-The Directorate General	151	29	180	915,140
-Broadcasting Directorate	292	122	414	1,928,500
-General Commissariat for Tourism	40	74	114	442,370
<u>Total</u>	483	225	708	3,286,010
<u>Ministry of Public Works & Transport:</u>				
-Common Administrative Directorate; & Regional Directorates	56	29	152	1,183,328 ⁱ
-D.G. of Roads, Buildings, & Civic Planning	67	147	347	2,167,193
-D.G. of Water and Electric Works	200	43	100	617,880
-D.G. for Control of Concessions & Exploitation Services	57			
-Directorate General of Transport	24	8	32	246,960
<u>Total</u>	539	31	570	2,724,510
	943	258	1201	6,939,871
<u>Ministry of Agriculture:</u>				
-The Directorate General	504	117	621	2,549,670
<u>Ministry of National Economy:</u>				
-The Directorate General	137	16	153	882,666
-Office of Wheat	16		16	92,580
<u>Total</u>	153	16	169	975,246
<u>Ministry of Post, Telegraph & Telephone:</u>				
-Common Administrative Service	29	2	31	141,570
-Directorate General of Post & Telegraph	729	1387	2116	4,597,025
-Directorate General of Telephone	1641	732	2373	7,362,410
-Workers & foremen				1,571,600
<u>Total</u>	2399	2121	4520	13,672,605

(Cont.)

TABLE II-6 --Continued

MINISTRY OR AGENCY	CIVIL SERVANTS		Total of Basic Salaries and Pay (In Leb. Pounds)
	Permanent	Non-Permanent	
<u>Ministry of General Planning:</u> -The Directorate General	<u>156</u>	<u>88</u>	<u>1,258,334</u>
<u>Ministry of National Defence:</u> -The Directorate General	7	--	43,080
-The Army:			
1-The Military	--	--	(41,797,000)
2-Civil Personnel (Cadre A)	24	--	147,930
-Directorate of Geographic Affairs	35	--	91,680
-Cadre "B"	--	--	(3,066,990)
-The Military Courts	20	--	78,690
	<u>86</u>	<u>--</u>	<u>361,380^j</u>
	<u>17,683</u>		
Total			
Total of Permanent Civil Servants		<u>4,640</u>	
Total of Non-Permanent Civil Servants			<u>22,323</u>
General Total of Civil Servants			
General Pay Totals of Civil Servants			<u>119,475,219</u>
General Pay Totals of Civil & Military Personnel			<u>164,339,209</u>

^a Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budget of 1963.

^b Including 60 students.

^c Salaries given only.

^d Personnel totals not given.

^e Personnel total not given.

^f Including pay of the daily paid and teachers paid on hourly basis.

^g Including pay of ungiven experts and orchestra personnel.

^h Totals not given.

ⁱ Including pay of ungiven ujara (a type of non-permanent civil servants).

^j Excluding the totals of the Military and cadre "B" personnel.

The totals of the permanent civil servants presented in the 1962 and 1963 budgets are based on the 1961 Organizational Decrees which fixed the administrative cadres of the various ministries. These decrees were issued to amend the previous cadres set in 1959, and were based on a sholesale study of all ministries during 1961; an effort in which the author have actively participated in his capacity as "organisateur" and Organization and Methods specialist in the Central Inspectorate. Staring with the beginning of the second half of 1962 plans were laid down to start a process of gradual filling of the empty positions in the cadres which were set by the 1961 decrees. A reserve of L.£. 3 million was appropriated in the 1962 budget, and L.£. 4 million in the 1963 budget to meet the requirements of this scheme. The Civil Service Council, in a report concerning this matter, stated that the above mentioned decrees fixed the number of civil servants in the various ministries — with the exception of the judges of the Ministry of Justice and the teachers of the Ministry of National Education and Fine Arts — at 11,086. Out of this total 83 civil servants are in the First Category, 254 in the Second, 1643 in the Third, 7285 in the Fourth and 1821 in the Fifth.⁶⁸ The C.S.C.'s report also stated that the number of vacant positions according to the new cadres totalled 4457, of which 2699 are actually run, in some cases efficiently, by Cadre "B" civil servants, i.e. the temporary, the

⁶⁸For the Position Classification system of the Lebanese civil service see Chapter IV, below.

contracted and the daily paid. As such the number of positions actually vacant becomes 1,758.⁶⁹ Presently, the C.S.C., with the cooperation of the various ministries, is taking necessary measures to fill the empty positions through examinations based on proper requirements as laid down by the personnel laws.

E. Bureaucratic Cost and Expenditure

Lebanon, like any other underdeveloped country, is being increasingly subjected to the impact of change and all the side-effects that goes with it. The Lebanese state has evolved in the last ten to twenty years from the traditional, quiescent role which is permissive and regulatory to a more dynamic role concerned with the active direction of increased varieties of functions together with enterprises all hitherto in private hands; and the satisfaction of social and economic needs through major projects and schemes. These goals necessitated the expansion, revitalization and reorganization of the Lebanese bureaucracy which until now has reached sizable proportions. The evolution of the Lebanese administrative units and the totals of civil servants have been presented above.

The totals of basic salaries of the permanent civil servants may reveal the trend, general and individual, of the growth of administrative size and expenses. These totals are presented in Table II-7 below. Allowances and indemnities paid to the permanent

⁶⁹ Al-Nahar (Beirut), No. 8058, dated 20 March 1962; also, Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2838, dated 21 March 1962.

TABLE II-7

BASIC PAY TOTALS OF PERMANENT CIVIL SERVANTS,
1950; -54; -59; -63^a

MINISTRY OR UNIT	Total Amount of Basic Salaries (In Leb. Pounds)			
	1950	1954	1959	1963
Presidency of the Republic	18,540	49,920	62,520	90,240
Chamber of Deputies	29,700	128,885	187,560	303,410
Prime Minister's Office				
-The Directorate General	28,830	62,100	92,040	137,742
-Bureau of Accounts	--	208,920	348,900	451,110
-Central Inspectorate	10,860	82,980	110,520	882,750
-Civil Service Council	--	--	--	554,830
Ministry of Justice	863,700	3,070,860	4,934,456	9,516,304
Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Emigrants	477,900	958,380	1,408,860	1,880,058
Ministry of Interior	232,080	959,040	1,208,140	1,593,928
Ministry of Finance	688,140	3,895,980	6,246,120	7,411,782
Ministry of National Education & Fine Arts	1,254,880	8,897,290	18,077,490	30,174,192
Ministry of Public Health	355,884	1,191,340	1,865,390	2,393,084
Ministry of Labour & Social Affairs	--	269,580	399,300	375,780
Ministry of Orientation, Information & Tourism	25,620	177,840	258,480	2,321,200
Ministry of General Works & Transport	492,624	2,888,880	4,414,260	4,996,170
Ministry of Agriculture	264,354	1,364,250	1,914,420	2,374,230
Ministry of National Economy	156,660	621,780	853,860	891,156
Ministry of P., T. & T.	2,797,820	4,427,130	7,677,300	9,638,124
Ministry of General Planning	--	--	95,520	657,134
Ministry of National Defence	21,750	147,240	213,980	361,380
General Total	7,719,342	29,193,475	50,020,226	77,004,604

^a Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budgets of 1950; -54; -59; and -63.

civil servants have been disregarded because of their fluctuating and unstable nature — but not because of their amount, which is quite substantial.⁷⁰ The years dealt with have 5-year intervals in between, with the exception of the last interval, in order to allow a realizable difference to emerge. The total salary expenditures for 1950 was 7,719,342; for 1954; 29,193,475; for 1959; 50,020,226; for 1963; 77,004,604. The percentage increase of the 1954 total over that of 1950 is 278.26%; the percentage increase of the 1959 total over that of 1954 is 71.34%; the percentage increase of the 1963 total over that of 1959 is 53.94%.

Totals of basic salaries or pay, together with allowances, of the permanent and non-permanent civil and military servants as in the 1963 budget are presented in Table II-8 below. The total of the salaries of permanent civil servants excluding the armed forces is L. £. 104,803,700; including them, L.£. 150,131,820. The total pay of non-permanent civil servants is 16,304,390. The general total of salaries and pay, plus allowances, of permanent and non-permanent civil servants is L.£. 166,436,210.

The various types of administrative expenditures, their amounts, and their percentages out of the budgets of 1960, 1962 and 1963 — which were L.£. 222,235,000, L.£. 375,000,000 and L.£. 425,400,000 respectively — are presented in Table II-9.

⁷⁰For example, civil servants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who serve abroad receive additional allowances amounting to 100 to 175% of their basic salaries; family allowances, also, fluctuate according to the number of dependents on each civil servant and the general rate of turnover in the whole civil service.

TABLE II-8

TOTALS OF BASIC SALARIES OR PAY AND ALLOWANCES
OF THE PERMANENT AND NON-PERMANENT CIVIL
AND MILITARY SERVANTS, 1963^a

MINISTRY OR ADMINISTRATIVE UNIT	Total of Basic Salaries or Pay & Allowances (In L.£)		Total (In Leb. Pounds)
	Permanent Civil Serv.	Non-Permanent Civil Servants	
Presidency of Republic	113,500	26,500	140,000
Chamber of Deputies	499,500	13,920	513,420
Prime Minister's Office	2,343,720	248,400	2,592,120
Ministry of Justice	8,107,970	90,500	8,198,470
Foreign Affairs & Emigrants	3,931,820	1,705,500	5,637,320
Interior	26,463,620	1,023,300	27,486,920
Finance	11,084,120	1,282,400	12,366,520
National Education & Fine Arts	31,735,620	3,258,00	34,993,620
Public Health	2,826,320	1,547,700	4,374,020
Labour & Social Affairs	440,720	15,600	456,320
Orientation, Information & Tourism	2,637,490	992,270	3,629,760
Public Works & Transport	6,356,120	2,468,300	8,824,420
Agriculture	2,808,120	183,000	2,991,120
National Economy	892,020	85,200	977,220
Post, Telegraph & Telephone	3,812,220	1,474,000	5,286,220
General Planning	750,820	604,800	1,355,620
	<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>104,803,700</u>	<u>15,019,390</u>
National Defence	45,328,120	1,285,000	46,613,120
	<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>150,131,820</u>	<u>166,436,210</u>

^aLebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budget of 1963.

TABLE II-9

TYPES AND PERCENTAGES OF EXPENDITURES,
1960-1962-1963 BUDGETS^a

Types of Expenditures	1960		1962		1963	
	Total Amount	Percent- tage	Total Amount	Percent- tage	Total Amount	Percent- tage
*Salaries & Pay of Public Authorities, permanent & non-permanent civil servants, allowances, etc.	114,220,289	51.40%	159,684,270	42.58%	172,695,200	40.59%
*General Administrative Expenses: materials & adm. expenses, transporta- tion, delegations & conferences, representations, international subscriptions & donations, maintenance, oils & combustibles, secret expenses, & sundry expenses.	24,670,701	11.10%	42,142,080	11.23%	51,956,200	12.21%
*Social, Economic, Educational & other expenses & donations	14,772,214	06.65%	20,767,750	05.53%	24,056,700	05.66%
*Investment Expenses	1,584,000	00.71%	---	---	---	---
*Equipments' & Construction Expenses: materials, new constructions, pay of workers in projects, etc.	48,213,570	21.70%	128,716,900	34.33%	150,582,700	35.40%
*Public Debts: pensions & dismissal allowances, deficit allowances, interest on loans	15,448,000	06.95%	16,897,000	04.51%	18,377,500	04.32%
*Contingent Reserve	3,326,226	01.49%	6,792,000	01.82%	7,731,700	01.82%
TOTAL	222,235,000	100.00%	375,000,000	100.00%	425,400,000	100.00%

^a Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budgets of 1960, 1962 & 1963.

Salaries and pay of public authorities' officials and of public servants reached the percentage of 51.40% in 1960, 42.58% in 1962 and 40.59% in 1963. General administrative expenses were 11.10% in 1960, 11.23% in 1962 and 12.21% in 1963. Equipments' and Construction expenses were 21.70% in 1960, rose to 34.33% in 1962 and to 35.40% in 1963. Public debts were 06.95% in 1960, 04.51% in 1962 and 04.32% in 1963. Contingent reserve was 01.49% in 1960, 01.82% in 1962 and the same in 1963. Investment expenses were 00.71 % in 1960 and nothing in 1962 and 1963. Social, economic, educational and other expenses and donations were merely 06.65% in 1960, 05,53% in 1962 and 05.66% in 1963.

Table II-10 presents the totals and percentages of the general governmental expenditures as in the 1963 budget. The figures reveal that expenditures for Equipments and Construction, being L.£. 164,695,600, amount to 34.95%; while Normal — i.e., all types of administrative, socio-economic and other expenditures — and Military expenditures, being L.£. 306,653,400, amount to 65.06% out of the general governmental expenditures.

TABLE II-10

TOTALS AND PERCENTAGES OF THE
GENERAL GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES,
1963 BUDGET (In Leb. Pounds)^{a/}

TYPE OF BUDGET	Equipments* & Construction, ^b Expenditures	Normal & Military Ex- penditures	Total
General Budget	146,577,000	278,823,000	425,400,000
Attached Budgets;			
-Telephone	11,875,600	11,024,400	22,900,000
-National Lottery	—	12,205,000	12,205,000
-Office of Wheat	5,720,000	1,324,000	7,044,000
-Lebanese University	523,00	3,277,000	3,800,000
Grand Totals	164,695,600	330,653,400	471,349,000
Percentages* Totals	34.94%	65.06%	100.00%

^a Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budget of 1963.

^b Part Two and Four of the General Budget and Part Two and Three of the Telephone Budget.

Table II-11 presents the distribution of the 1963 budget appropriations on the various ministries and units according to the various functions of the state. It also gives the percentage of such a distribution. Out of the total of 425.4 million 6.09% is for state functions, 26.65% for security and order, 8.32% for general services, 18.38% for social services, 34.43% for economic and development services, 4.32% for public debt and 1.81% for contingent reserve.

The Director General of the D.-G. of Finance, Mr. André Tweini, stated in February, 1960 to a newspaper that the Lebanese budget has many inadequacies among which is that most of it is for

TABLE II-11

DISTRIBUTION OF THE GENERAL BUDGET OF 1963
ACCORDING TO STATE FUNCTIONS^a

State Function Or Expenditure	Ministry or Unit	Amount (In Leb. Pounds)	Per-centage
State Functions	-Presidency of the Republic	537,700	
	-Chamber of Deputies	2,838,100	
	-Prime Minister's Office	9,129,800	
	-Foreign Affairs & Emigrants	13,401,300	
<u>Sub-Total</u>		<u>25,906,900</u>	6.09%
Security & Order	-National Defence	67,208,000	
	-Interior	36,919,900	
	-Justice	8,511,400	
<u>Sub-total</u>		<u>112,639,300</u>	26.65%
General Services	-Post, Telegraph & Telephone	7,334,800	
	-Finance	16,342,700	
	-Orientation, Information & Tourism	11,833,200	
<u>Sub-total</u>		<u>35,510,700</u>	8.32%
Social Services	-National Education & Fine Arts	56,223,900	
	-Public Health	13,833,000	
	-Labour & Social Affairs	8,309,900	
<u>Sub-Total</u>		<u>78,366,800</u>	18.38%
Economic & Development Services	-National Economy	2,562,000	
	-Public Works & Transport	131,220,800 ^b	
	-Agriculture	9,164,700	
	-General Planning	3,919,600	
<u>Sub-total</u>		<u>146,867,100</u>	34.43%
Public Debt		18,377,500	
<u>Sub-Total</u>		<u>18,377,500</u>	4.32%
Contingent Reserve		7,731,700	
<u>Sub-Total</u>		<u>7,731,700</u>	1.81%
<u>Total</u>		<u>425,400,000</u>	100%

^aLebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budget of 1963.

^bThis includes L.£. 61.7 million, an installement for long-range, water, electricity and roads^t projects.

administrative expenses.⁷¹ He gave the example that administrative expenses in the 1960 budget totalled L.£ 138,295,690 while the Equipments' and Constructions' expenses totalled L.£. 46,883,570. The difference between the two types of expenditures have its causes in: 1) the consistent expansion of the administrative expenses, 2) the segregation of allocations for long-term construction projects, and 3) the small income for the budget which totalled, in 1960, about L.£. 220 million out of which about L.£. 112 million were allocated for — among the various administrative expenditures — the salaries and indemnities of the civil servants alone.⁷² A study of the Lebanese budgets reveals that most of their amounts are for administrative expenses and that at the same time they allocate a considerable part to Equipments' and Constructions' expenses. The Ministry of Finance conducted studies which revealed an alarmingly big proportion of the administrative expenditures and its possible dangerous inflation in the 1971 budget. The chairman of the parliamentary Committee of Finance, Mr. Joseph Chader, opined that the increase which is supposed to take place in every active and evolving administrative machinery is countered

⁷¹Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2199, dated 26 February 1960. General governmental expenditures are divided — according to Article 19 of Legislative Decree No. 117 of 12 June 1959 — into four types: 1. Administrative, 2. Equipments, 3. Military and 4. Long-range Construction (development) expenditures.

⁷²Ibid.

by increased income which covers the annual rise in administrative expenditures.⁷³

The growth in the size and scope of the Lebanese bureaucracy may also be seen in the growth of the annual budgets' totals.

Table II-12 presents those totals for the years 1929-1963.

TABLE II-12
GROWTH OF LEBANON'S BUDGETS, 1929-1963^a
(In Leb. Pounds)

Year	Estimates	Year	Estimates
1929	6,370,945	1946	60,046,000
1930	5,097,000	1947	58,900,000
1931	5,114,000	1948	67,000,000
1932	5,109,000	1949	75,000,000
1933	4,513,500	1950	83,000,000
1934	4,533,200	1951	89,450,000
1935	4,622,200	1952	94,250,000
1936	4,351,200	1953	112,836,000
1937	4,904,000	1954	123,400,000
1938	5,406,000	1955	137,500,000
1939	6,369,000	1956	151,500,000
1940	6,510,000	1957	170,000,000
1941	6,635,000	1958	194,165,000
1942	12,504,500	1959	206,000,000
1943	21,420,000	1960	222,235,000
1944	34,024,000	1961	273,800,000
1945	43,764,500	1963	425,400,000

^aLebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budgets of 1929-63.

The first budget for the State of Grand Lebanon (by the French High Commissioner) was in Egyptian guineas. Lebanon's budgets between 1922 and 1924 were in Syrian pounds; in 1925 and 1926 in Lebano-Syrian pounds; in 1927 and 1928 in Lebano-Syrian gold pounds; between 1929 and 1939 in Lebano-Syrian pounds; and starting in 1940 all budgets were put in Lebanese pounds.

⁷³ See Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No.3031, dated 3 November 1962.

Table II-13, below, presents the government's income and expenditures for the years 1944-1961.

TABLE II-13
GOVERNMENT'S INCOME AND EXPENDITURES, 1944-61
(In Leb.Pounds)^a

Year	Income	Expenditures
1944	37,741,188	27,666,573
1945	55,151,950	35,920,893
1946	73,915,827	51,993,915
1947	85,988,438	60,722,427
1948	78,754,612	70,067,517
1949	87,367,107	83,401,986
1950	83,317,342	84,521,928
1951	105,307,020	90,051,121
1952	124,927,346	88,509,851
1953	141,231,969	96,327,423
1954	157,444,486	111,181,970
1955	178,863,174	132,376,966
1956	191,979,903	161,348,024
1957	209,941,644	142,466,137
1958	225,473,582	181,622,338
1959	250,902,433	198,571,297
1960	316,556,158	243,087,753
1961	313,446,378	269,260,306

^aLebanon, Ministry of Finance, Letter of Transmittal of the Project of 1960 Budget (Beirut: Dar Al-Funun Press, 1960, p. 37; also, Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Letter of Transmittal of the Project of the 1963 Budget, op.cit., p. 92.

CHAPTER III

PRESENT ENVIRONMENTAL AND BUREAUCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS

A. New Functions, Trends And Changes

Bearing in mind the above discussion of the size and functions of the Lebanese bureaucracy in 1937, together with all the administrative and political developments which occurred since that time, a description of the present bureaucratic size and the present socio-economic situation would certainly throw some light on the problems and the prospects involved in the present and future role of the Lebanese state towards its various basic functions and towards the process of socio-economic development.

Regarding socio-economic development in Lebanon it is clear that it is the function of the state to create developmental opportunities and facilitate access to them. An effective choice of the open possibilities in these opportunities, or in any appropriate combination of them, must be made and developed based on the endowments -- natural, human and others -- Lebanon has. This approach envisages state action on a far greater scale than its previous passive or negligible role and means an increased burden on the public bureaucracy -- as well as the political machinery -- of the country. The Lebanese state has important tasks to perform like any other state. "The maintenance of law and order, national defence, the control of the issue and supply of fiduciary money, and the provision of minimum education and health services are leading examples.... In fact, the adequate performance of these minimum tasks is of vital importance for economic growth and generally a necessary condition

for such growth."¹

Factors that influence the state and its role will be discussed in Chapter IX below. These include the socio-political factors of political sectarianism and political feudalism; and the administrative characteristics of centralization, legalism and authoritarianism -- a great deal of which factors are the legacies and influences of previous foreign rules. These factors produce internal strains and conflicts which affects the state's institutions and hamper radical reform in laws concerning the public bureaucracy or non-bureaucratic power centers and institutions; or even, paralyzes their execution to the point of rendering their effect to naught. In this section, however, the author will review the totals of the civil servants in the various ministries and other central administrative units and link these totals to the new functions as ordained by the requirements of the new house-keeping and socio-economic situations.

Looking at the individual totals of the various administrative units we find that, in almost all of them, trends and changes are identifiable. The most noticeable of these changes are those which took place subsequent to the issue of the 1959 and, later, 1961 Organizational Decrees fixing the cadres of the various ministries and agencies. Tables II-5 and II-6, above, present the detailed totals which shall be mentioned hereafter.

Table III-1 presents the totals of civil servants in 1963 distributed according to the various functions of the state, together

¹P.T. Bauer and B.S. Yamey, The Economics of Under-developed Countries (Cambridge: James Nisbet & Co., 1960), p. 163.

TABLE III-1

CIVIL SERVANTS' TOTALS ACCORDING
TO FUNCTIONS, 1963 BUDGET^a

Function	Ministry or Unit	Total of Civil Servants	Per-centage
State Functions	-Presidency of the Republic	11	
	-Chamber of Deputies	97	
	-Prime Minister's Office	343	
	-Foreign Affairs & Emigrants	267	
	<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>718</u>	3.22%
Security & Order	-National Defence	86	
	-Interior	431	
	-Justice	1089	
	<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>1606</u>	7.20%
General Services	-Post, Telegraph, & Telephone	4520	
	-Finance	2640	
	-Orientation, Information & Tourism	708	
	<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>7868</u>	35.25%
Social Services	-National Education & Fine Arts	8679	
	-Public Health	1146	
	-Labour & Social Affairs	71	
	<u>Sub-total</u>	<u>9896</u>	44.33%
Economic & Development Services	-National Economy	169	
	-Public Works & Transport	1201	
	-Agriculture	621	
	-General Planning	244	
	<u>Sub-Total</u>	<u>2235</u>	10.00%
	<u>Grand Total</u>	<u>22,323</u>	100.00%

^aLebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budget of 1963.

with the percentages of such totals out of the grand total. Reference to such totals and percentages will be made during the following discussion.

B. State Functions, Security and Order, and General Services

Administrative machineries concerned with state functions involve three central units and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants. These have a total of 718 civil servants and form 3.22% out of the total number of civil servants in the whole administration.

The personnel of the Presidency of the Republic and the Chamber of Deputies were practically constant between 1950 and 1960. In 1963 the former had 11 and the latter 61 civil servants and 36 policemen. The personnel total of the Directorate General of the Prime Minister's Office was also practically constant between 1950 and 1960; it went up to 23 in 1962. It now has 30 civil servants including 7 non-permanent employees.

Also, the Central Inspectorate -- which was known, until its revitalization under this name in 1959, as the "State Inspection Board" -- have played until 1959 a dormant role. It maintained the total of 15 civil servants for 7 years consecutively (1953-59) as if no vital and dynamic inspection work has been done or, at least, no widening of this very important function, to cope with the growth of the whole administration, effected. The reasons behind this situation can be limited to the following two major points: the presence of separate inspection units in each ministry before the centralization of this control function in 1959; and the use of the central and ministerial inspection units as a dumping ground for those who fall out of favour; and the paralyzing of this function during the previous corrupt regimes. Today the Central

Inspectorate has 134 civil servants.²

The Bureau of Accounts, created in 1951³ to exercise financial control on proposed and completed expenditures and to bring better morality to the use of government money, started with 24 permanent civil servants in 1952 and had 61 in 1962; it now has 64 civil servants. The Bureau's work expand annually with the budgets' increase.

The Civil Service Council, created in 1959 to control all aspects of personnel administration in the civil service, had 113 permanent civil servants in 1962 — including 60 students in the National Institute of Public Administration considered as civil servants. It has 115 civil servants, including 60 students, in 1963.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants performs, in addition to the central units and agencies, a very important state function. It is entrusted with the advance of Lebanon's relations and ties with neighbouring Arab states, countries of the Afro-Asian group, countries of the European community, North and Latin American states — in short, all countries which are members

² The Chief of the Central Inspectorate, Mr. Abdul-Rāhman Tayara, thinks that he needs 75 more inspectors, in addition to his present 75 inspectors, in order to shoulder the Inspectorate's responsibilities which were further increased after the recent internal reorganization he had conducted in 1962. Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3099, dated 25 January 1963.

³ Although article 89 of the Constitution of 17 October 1927 ordained the establishment of the Bureau of Accounts, the Bureau was created more than a score of years later (Law of Public Accounting of 1951, article 223). In the 1951 law the Bureau could control the completed expenditures only (post-audit). Later laws, notably Legislative Decree No. 118, dated 12 June 1959, gave it powerful pre-audit functions.

of the United Nations. It is also entrusted with strengthening the relations — social, economic and other — of the homeland with about 1.5 million Lebanese emigrants all across the continents.⁴⁷ The ministry had 178 permanent civil servants in 1950, 222 in 1962 and the same in 1963 plus 45 non-permanent civil servants for this last year, making a total of 267 civil servants. The ministry also maintains local personnel in its diplomatic missions abroad whose total is not specified in the budget.

Ministries involved in performing functions related to security and order are those of National Defence, Interior, and Justice. These ministries have a total of 1606 civil servants with a percentage of 7.20% out of the general total of 1963.

The Ministry of National Defence has 86 civil servants; it had 13 civil servants in 1940 and 54 in 1962. The military personnel are not revealed in terms of numbers although the total amounts³ of pay given them are cited in the budget.⁵³ The military personnel has certainly considerably outgrown their little shell of the 'Troupes Speciales' of 5,000 or so back in 1945; however, any count of them is understandably withheld and out of bounds. The size of the armed forces was definitely enhanced by the turbulent state of affairs in the Middle East and the Israeli threat. The ministry

⁴ The ministry has supervised, for this purpose, efforts which culminated in the establishment in 1960 of the l' "Union des Libanais dans le Monde" which organized the Lebanese population, including those from Lebanese descent, abroad in chapters according to their agglomerations in geographic locations. The first continental convention of the Union was held in Boston, Mass., U.S.A., on 21 October 1962.

⁵ Refer to Table II-6, above.

(the armed forces' command) does not implement a policy of general obligatory military service as regards the population. It, nevertheless, follows up an active civil defence programme and, also, a military training programme on a restricted scale for the male students of the top two classes in all secondary schools and the first class in universities.⁶ At present a project law has been sent to the Chamber of Deputies to establish a new cadre of "military intendents" in the army.

The Ministry of Interior has 431 civil servants. It had the total of 169 permanent civil servants in 1950 and 300 in 1962. The internal and the general security forces totals are not given; however, the budget cites their pay totals. The question of internal status quo, peace and order are of primary concern to the Lebanese government. Internal political stability holds precious advantages in view of the political life of the country and its social and economic development.

The Ministry of Justice has 1089 civil servants, with almost half this amount representing the judges of the various civil, religious and other courts. This ministry had 599 permanent civil servant in 1950 and 1028 in 1962. It has now a total of 1089 civil servants.

⁶This programme is effected in collaboration with the Ministry of National Education and Fine Arts. It was established by the Law of 8 December 1953.

Lebanon's judicial system⁷ is heavily influenced by Ottoman and French practices and the organization of the courts. During the Ottoman rule, Lebanon followed the Ottoman system of judicial organization with the exception of the Mutasarrifiyah of Mount Lebanon which enjoyed a special internal autonomy wherein foreigners enjoyed special privileges and Consular Courts.⁸ The French mandate established at its outset the system of Mixed Courts on 16 November 1921 and on 9 March 1925 it joined these courts with the ordinary Lebanese courts. This experience failed, however, and the Mixed Courts system was reinstalled on 17 February 1928. With independence these courts were abolished by a law of 31 January 1946 and the system of Lebanese courts became independent. Its Lebanese judges began to look in on all cases, and citizens and foreigners alike came under its jurisdiction.⁹

The Lebanese judicial system now is composed of the ordinary civil courts and of special courts.¹⁰ The first include the three levels of First Instance, Appeal and Supreme courts. The second include civil status, military, juvenile, judicial council, labour arbitration councils and administrative courts.¹¹

⁷ For a detailed review of the Lebanese judicial system and its historical developments see Subhi Mahmassani, Legal Systems In The Arab States — Past and Present (rev.ed.; Beirut: Dar Al-'ilm Lilmalayeen, 1962), pp.246-258.

⁸ Ibid., p. 246.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 247-248.

¹⁰ After independence, the system was amended in 1950 (Law of 10th of May; which was also amended by Legislative Decrees No. 7 dated 15 December 1954 and No. 121 dated 12 June 1959) and in 1961 (Decree No. 7855 dated 16 October 1961).

¹¹ Mahmassani, op.cit., pp. 250, 252.

The Lebanese citizens fall under the jurisdiction of one body of laws and one judicial system except in what relates to civil status affairs. In these affairs each Christian or Muslim sect follows its own particular laws and its independent courts. The civil status courts include the 'Rouhīyat' courts for the Christian religious sects and the 'Sharī'ya' courts for the Muslim religious sects. The application of secular principles and practice to civil status affairs and the bringing of such under the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts is a highly desirable objective but is, however, a very sensitive and inflammatory issue as regards religious sentiments and the sectarian balance of the country's political life.

Ministries involved in performing functions of general administrative services are those of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Finance, and Orientation, Information and Tourism. These ministries have a total of 7868 civil servants constituting 35.25% out of the general total of 1963.

The Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone had 605 permanent civil servants in 1950,¹² and 2171 in 1962. The total number of civil servants for 1963 reached 4520, including 2121 non-permanent civil servants.

¹² This is excluding the Directorate General of Telephone which was established, under this title, in 4 April 1953 (Leg. Decree No. 62). This Decree fixed its cadre at 900 civil servant. Decree No. 14228 of 1948 fixed the Telephone Service personnel at 1069. The increase in the Ministry's personnel between 1954-5 and 1956 is due to the Law of titularization of the temporary workers (see Table II-5).

The ministry was involved throughout the last few years, and it still is more increasingly so, in the consistent widening of the postal service and its branches; spreading the automatic telephone system to cover the whole country;¹³ the establishment of more telecommunication lines with other countries; and in general to install better methods and means to conduct its operations in view of more efficiency.

The Ministry of Finance had 743 permanent civil servants in 1950 and 1277 in 1962. It has 2640 civil servant in 1963 including 655 non-permanent civil servant. The ministry has a very important central role in the preparation of the annual budget. It instructs the various ministries on how to prepare their budget estimates; it conducts budget hearings to stabilize, or rather equalize, the expenditures' estimates with the income estimates in order to produce a balanced budget; it prepares the project budget in its final form together with its explanatory letter of transmittal for the care of the cabinet's and, later, the Parliament's approval. The ministry is also the central unit entrusted with the conduct of the various operations of tax collection through its central and regional units; and it performs the task of controlling (pre-audit) and effecting the execution of the payment of public expenditures included in the budget.

¹³ L. £. 6 million are appropriated this year to build P.T. & T. branches in 32 important cities and towns of the country.

The increase in the annual budgets, Table II-12 above, reveal the continuous enlargement of the burden of the ministry as regards the above mentioned tasks. The increase in the annual budget is caused, from the point of view of expenditures, by the rise in the administrative expenses, including the salaries of the civil servants and the pensions of the retired; and, from the point of view of income, by the rise in the amount of taxes — especially import duties which amount from 35 to 40% of the annual income.

The Ministry of Orientation, Information and Tourism had 41 permanent civil servants in 1950, held a consistent total of around 60 between 1952 and 1960, had a total of 89 in 1961 and 229 in 1962 after the major reorganization of 1961. In this reorganization a great leap was effected by the ministry in the founding of a far bigger and more powerful Broadcasting system and facilities which strongly covers the Near East and reaches, in special broadcasts, the Lebanese emigrants overseas. Also, the new National News Agency was created in addition to few other units. Finally, the attachment to the ministry of the General Commissariat for Tourism previously in the Ministry of National Economy. The addition of the function of orientation, the consolidation and

¹⁴ Khāttar Shibli, Al-Ulum Al-Maliyat — Al-Muazanah (translation of Arabic title The Sciences of Finance — the Budget) (Beirut: Dar Al-Funun Press, 1962), Vol. I., p. 189. This is due to the increase of trade and transit activities, which increases the burden and, consequently, the size of the D.G. of Customs in the ministry.

deeper interest and more efficient means given to the function of information, and the augmentation and coordination of both with and the vitalization of the function of tourism reveal the new role of the ministry as regards the political effects of guidance and information and the social and economic effects of orientation and tourism.

C. Social, Economic and Development Services

Ministries involved in performing social services are those of National Education and Fine Arts, Public Health, and Labour and Social Affairs. These ministries have a total of 9896 civil servants which constitute 44.33% out of the general total of 1963.

The Ministry of National Education and Fine Arts has the overwhelming majority of this total, namely 8679 civil servants most of which are teachers. The ministry had 2324 permanent civil servants in 1950 and 8254 in 1962. Concerning education, Lebanon has developed a powerful tradition which goes back to centuries of hard work by foreign and local ecclesiastical establishments of the various religious denominations.¹⁵ Educational facilities, as well

¹⁵ "Lebanon's greatest economic advantage lies not in its natural but in its human resources. The inhabitants of this coastal range of mountains have been traditional sailors from ancient times, and through their migrations have kept contact with growing civilizations. This outgoing disposition made easy, during the last century, an early contact with modern Europe which gave Lebanon a lead in the adoption of Western education and led thus to a higher level of education, greater skill and more versatility among the population than can be found in other parts of the region." U.N. - F.A.O., Lebanon-Country Report (Rome: F.A.O., 1959), p. I-2.

as the number of students and teachers, have experienced considerable growth. The number of students, for instance, enrolled in primary schools and pre-school education in the period between 1951 and 1956 rose from 184,000 to about 223,000. The proportion of females out of these figures rose from 40 to 42 percent, a figure considered high in comparison with Jordan's 25 percent, Iraq's 26 percent and Syria's 29 percent for the same category and period.¹⁶ "During the post-war period, the rate of expansion in public education was higher than that occurring in private education, particularly at the primary level. Yet despite this expansion it is estimated that the educational facilities of the country are still inadequate for accommodating all those eligible for enrolling."¹⁷ For the 1955-56 school year a total of 223,000 students, including kindergartens and nurseries, was estimated to be in primary education. For the same year, a total of about 250,000 persons was estimated to be in the 5 to 12 age group. Taking into consideration foreign students and those below 5 years of age, who were in pre-school education and were included in the first figure, at least some 30,000 persons of primary school age were not attending school.¹⁸ This gap is strongly felt by the government and some serious consideration is being given in view of establishing universal primary education.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. II-6.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. II-7.

¹⁸ Ibid.

Statistics of the Ministry of National Education and Fine Arts reveal that for 1962 there was in Lebanon a total of 341,800 persons in the 6-10 yrs age group (elementary school age), and that out of the total 234,000 (55%) study at elementary schools and 107,800 (45%) do not study at any school.¹⁹ The estimated possible increase for the next three years requires the supply of elementary education for 129,760 persons in the 6-13 yrs age group. This would require the appointment of 4325 teachers in the ratio of one teacher for every 30 students which would cost about L.£. 11 million.²⁰ This increase requires an additional L.£. 4 million for associated administrative, technical and supplies' expenditures. As such, the universalizing of elementary teaching would cost an estimated L.£. 15 million divided on the next three years of 1963-65.²¹

Statistics showing the degree of literacy in Lebanon are not accurate, however, estimates range from 80 to 50 percent. The UNESCO's estimates for 1957 gives the ratio of between 50 and 55 percent adult illiterates in the country. "This figure is believed to be rather high, although it compares very favourably with other countries in the region showing the following estimated percentage

¹⁹ Notice the difference between this and the F.A.O. statistics, above.

²⁰ An annual 3% (700 teachers) decrease of turnover takes place in the teaching staff.

²¹ These information are part of a project law submitted by the ministry for the Cabinet and, later, the Parliament's approval regarding the universalization of elementary education in the country. See Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2945 dated 27 July 1962.

of illiteracy; Syria, 70-75; Egypt, 75-80; Jordan, 80-85; Iraq, 85-90; Sudan, 90-95." Regarding schools, statistics for 1955-56 show that there are almost an equal number of private as opposed to government schools, the respective figures being 1,028 private and 1,107 public. The excess of public schools as regards private schools lies only in the field of primary education. For the same year there were 57 more private secondary schools than public schools. Also, there were more teachers and more students in the private schools; the figures being 5,555 to 3472 and 150,114 to 102,738 consecutively.²²

Table III+2 and III+3 present the totals of government and private elementary and secondary schools together with the totals of students and teachers therein between 1955-56 and 1961-62. These statistics are slightly inaccurate on account of their collection and on other accounts and, hence, should be interpreted very cautiously. In 1961+62 there were 1290 government schools with 6004 teachers and 129,154 students. For the same year there were 1397 private schools with 8064 teachers and 180,243 students. On the whole it is well acknowledged that private schools' educational standards are higher than those of public schools. University-level education has been present for quite a time with the presence of the private Université de St. Joseph (1875) and the American

²² Ibid.

TABLE II-I-2

TOTALS OF GOVERNMENT SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS
AND TEACHERS THEREIN, 1955-62^a

Year	SCHOOLS			STUDENTS			Teachers
	Elementary	Secondary	Total	Elementary	Secondary	Total	
1955-56	967	60	1027	80567	6494	87061	3457
1957-57	975	64	1039	81901	6537	88438	3794
1957-58	991	74	1065	82530	6540	89070	4045
1958-59	1033	72	1105	85492	8352	93844	4385
1959-60	1199	91	1290	92350	13572	105922	5001
1960-61	1199	91	1290	—	—	116923	5411
1961-62	1199	91	1290	116295	12859	129154	6004

^aCourtesy of Ministry of National Education & Fine Arts, Section of Statistics, (March, 1963), (mimeographed); also Al-Jaryda, (Beirut), No. 2937 dated 18 July 1962 & No. 2945 dated 27 July 1962.

TABLE III-3

TOTALS OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS, AND STUDENTS
AND TEACHERS THEREIN, 1955-62^a

Year	SCHOOLS			STUDENTS			Teachers
	Kinder- garten & Elementary	Secondary	Total	Kinder- garten & Elementary	Secondary	Total	
1955-56	731	110	841	113024	20911	133935	3764
1956-57	911	117	1028	126589	23523	150114	4142
1957-58	925	120	1045	128947	24340	153287	4397
1958-59	1031	121	1152	132214	24792	157006	4845
1959-60	939	145	1084	126589	25625	152214	5545
1960-61	1078	155	1233	134208	25792	160000	5600
1961-62	1225	172	1397	152192	28051	180243	8064

^aCourtesy of Ministry of National Education & Fine Arts, Section of Statistics, (March, 1963), (mimeographed); also, Al-Jaryda, (Beirut), No. 2937 dated 18 July 1962 & No. 2945 dated 27 July 1962.

University of Beirut (1866) and the recently established government Lebanese University²³ (1953); and university enrollment has been increasing considerably in the last few years, from 3,558 in 1950-51, to 5,263 in 1956-57.²⁴

Vocational education is provided for on an elementary and secondary basis in a government institute in Beirut which has branches in the various administrative districts of the country and by private schools. However, this type of education is not yet considerable and effective in providing high-level and sound mechanical and industrial technology, agricultural training and research.²⁵ New projects, however, are being proposed to build 9 vocational training schools in various towns; a Vocational City at Dikwaneh — few kilometers to the north of Beirut — to house the present Hotel training School, the Vocational School, the workshops attached to them both, and the Educational and Vocational Institute for Teaching. A sum of L.£. 6.5 million were appropriated for these projects.

²³The Lebanese University, like other government machineries, is poorly administered and programmed with a lack of professional faculties like medical sciences, engineering, agriculture, and other sciences.

²⁴U.N.-F.A.O., op.cit., p. II-8; also Ministry of National Economy, Bulletin Statistique Trimestriel (1957), Vol. VIII, No. 4, p. 35.

²⁵Except for A.U.B. which provides a 4-year university degree (B.A.) in agriculture and the diploma of *Engenieur Agricole*.

The expansion in the number of government schools and the enrollment therein and the will to universalize elementary education is also coupled by serious efforts to revitalize the system of education and the profession of teaching. A committee headed by the Minister of National Education, Mr. Kamel Al-Assā'id, was recently formed with the objectives of planning for the general development of government education, the amelioration of the professional and cultural standards of government teachers and the raising of their material status. The committee was given three months, in the first half of 1963,²⁶ to complete its work and submit a general plan for education in Lebanon which would satisfy the evolving requirements of the new sciences and educational techniques. New educational programmes will be made and they would include civics as a compulsory material for elementary and secondary levels.²⁷

Lebanon — true to its traditional role as a centre of culture and education for Arab and some non-Arab Afro-Asian countries — has offered in the last two years university scholarships to countries

²⁶ As-Safa (Beirut), No. 281 dated 10 March 1963. The precise dates for starting and completing the work was not precised in the given statement.

²⁷ Concerned committees are involved in writing textbooks for six school levels (grades). The programme would include morals, civil and national education; it would encourage common national beliefs and outlook and would rid the rising generations from inherited sectarian, sectional and other residues of the reincarnated past.

such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Lybia, the Sudan, some other African countries and Cyprus.²⁸ It is expected that the government will gradually expand this 'Lebanese Technical Aid Programme' for the benefit of neighbouring Arab countries and African countries in which resides thousands of Lebanese emigrants.

The Ministry of Public Health had 491 permanent civil servants in 1950 and 604 in 1962. The total number of civil servants for 1963 reached 1146 including 535 non-permanent civil servants. Concerning public health in Lebanon, the researcher is handicapped by lack of accurate statistics conducive to sound inferences on the state of public health in the country. However, "... it is generally recognized by testimony and observation of persons in the field that much progress was achieved during the post war period in the field of public health in Lebanon. Government expenditure on health services more than doubled in the few years following the end of the war, rising from L.L. 2 million in 1945 to L.L. 4.8 million in 1950. It continued to increase, reaching L.L. 6.7 million in 1956 and over seven million in 1957.²⁹ Physicians, hospital beds³⁰ and other medical facilities, already fairly adequate, increased considerably

²⁸As-Safa, *op.cit.* The government appropriated L.£.1,000,000 for this programme by the Cabinet's decision on 19 December 1962.

²⁹The budget of the Ministry for 1960 was about L.£.8.8 million, for 1963 about L.£. 13.8 million.

³⁰The government reverted until 1962 to subsidize hospitalization beds in private hospitals. It subsidized 2326 beds for about L.£. 3.4 million in 1960; 2555 beds for about L.£ 4.4 million in 1961; 1983 beds for about L.£. 4.3 million in 1962; none in 1963, because the government has built, and is planning to build some more, public hospitals in the country. Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Budgets of 1960-63.

in the post war period. There were 816 physicians in 1948; by 1955 the number had gone up to 1,204. This means that there is one physician for every 1,200 inhabitants, a ratio which is not matched in Asia and Africa and which is better than corresponding ratios in several European countries.... Medical personnel and facilities... exist in abundance compared to other Middle East countries. The striking difference between Lebanon and its neighbours from the standpoint of the supply of medical personnel and facilities is explained by the fact that these facilities service many clients from outside, particularly from other Asiatic Arab Countries. With its two medical faculties, Beirut is looked upon by the neighbouring region as a medical centre enjoying high professional standards."³¹

The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, which was created in 1951, had 94 permanent civil servants in 1952 and 77 in 1962. The total number of civil servants in it for 1963 was 71, including two non-permanent civil servants. This ministry has extremely important functions to perform concerning the manipulation and guidance of the social affairs and the utilization of the Labour force of the country. It is entrusted with preparatory, coordinative and executory functions regarding social and labour legislation. It is also entrusted by law with the tasks of the protection against unemployment, the betterment of labour conditions and the establishment of social security. It also looks after the protection of the

³¹ U.N. - F.A.O., op.cit., p. II-11.

family, youth rehabilitation, the organization of housing and cooperatives and rural development. It aims, in general, at the promotion of every measure pertaining to social development in the country. The author doubts the sufficiency of the ministry personnel to conduct its duties in any efficient or satisfactory manner due to the enormity of the task. For instance, one important duty which is poorly executed is that of controlling and supervizing labour unions and affairs and working conditions in industrial establishments. The ministry has been saved, however, by the fact that the economically active population ³² — true to the singular enterprising qualities and outgoing disposition of the individual Lebanese, and due to some other socio-economic factors — have managed to maintain a comfortable level of employment and standard of living with an extremely minimum demand on government coercion and guidance. An international organization, namely F.A.O., in a 'country report' on Lebanon observed that "there is no evidence of any serious overt unemployment in Lebanon. There has been however, some urban unemployment chiefly among persons seeking white-collared jobs, but it is believed that the extent of such unemployment has not been very great. It is also believed that workers in some rural areas are not fully occupied throughout the year; but no measurement

³² placed at "...800,000 for the year 1957, out of the total population of 1.8 million..." taking into consideration the estimation of the "...size of the population in the age group 15-60 and making allowances for disabled persons, housewives and students undergoing higher training." U.N.- F.A.O., *op.cit.*, pp. II-5 and II-6. The ministry would use the services of a U.N. expert as of 1 April 1963 to study and organize laws concerning labour unions in the country. Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3149, dated 26 March 1963.

has been made of the degree of rural underemployment."³³ Regarding employment in jobs other than in the rural and white-collar spheres, a greater demand is faced by insufficient supply. Mr. Fayez Al-Ahdab, Chairman of the "Board for the Execution of Projects," declared that the Board is facing great difficulties in finding enough labour force for the construction jobs necessary for all the construction projects which are being carried out by the State, which projects have already used up all the labour manpower found in the country and is still in need for some more.³⁴ The ministry's duties as regards social development has been in practice delegated to the independent Social Development Service which was created by the Legislative Decree No. 155 dated 12 June 1959. The ministry controls this service (tutelle administrative) which was given functions, the author believes, which should and must have been handled by the ministry itself.³⁵ The Social Development Service is entrusted by law³⁶ to lay down long-range programs concerning social development in the country, and to control their execution; to execute social

³³ Ibid., p. II-6.

³⁴ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3023 dated 25 October 1962.

³⁵ Refer to the discussion on the independent services which were created outside ministerial lines given above, pp. 55-60.

³⁶ Legislative Decree No. 155 dated 12 June 1959, art. 1.; Also, Decree No. 3127 dated 23 January 1960, art. 2.

projects carried by the State; to give its opinion and suggestions concerning the conduct of such projects and appropriations therefor; to supply in full or in part financial aid and loans destined for establishing new social projects or the strengthening of existing ones; to guide the Lebanese youth towards vocational and professional training needed by the country and the guiding of existing schools in the field. Both the said Ministry and the Service face an enormous task in view of their role concerning labour and social affairs in the country. They both must face and stop, for example, the considerable dislocation in the agricultural population's move away from their areas and towards the Metropolis, chiefly Beirut, and abroad. This situation was described by the Director General of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Mr. Rida Waheed, as a "... near hemorrhage from the veins of the countryside in a most strange March by the people of the Village towards the City or beyond it across the land or over the seas."³⁷ Also, both set-ups — in collaboration with the Ministry of Public Health in the points concerning it — are involved in preparing for the execution of a half-hearted and restricted social security project — a law for which is making the rounds through the various parliamentary committees and joint committees. No less than L.£. 15 million will be appropriated for it.³⁸ The ministry is also considering, in collaboration with the National

³⁷ In a lecture at 'Le Cenacle Libanais', reported in Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2838 dated 21 March 1962.

³⁸ Ministry of Finance, Letter of Transmittal of the Project of the 1963 Budget, op.cit., p. Intr.-b.

Housing Council, a United Nations \$ 100,000 offer towards a housing project for the benefit of peoples in the low-income bracket.³⁹

Ministries involved in performing functions related to the economy and development of the country are those of National Economy, Public Works and Transport, Agriculture and General Planning. These ministries have a total of 2235 civil servants constituting 10.00% out of the general total of 1963.

The Ministry of National Economy had 137 permanent civil servants in 1950 and 165 in 1962. The total number of civil servants in it for 1963 was 169 including 16 non-permanent civil servants. This ministry is not, generally speaking, under heavy strain to undertake the execution of a highly programed economic policy because the government exercises minimum interference with economic activity. There is no written or declared official economic policy in Lebanon which is central or long-ranged. Clear trends, however, can be identified and construed from the State's policy.

"From occasional official declarations, from the pattern of government expenditures on development projects executed, from fiscal and monetary measures, and from a number of legislative and other indicators, it could be argued that Lebanese economic policy is one which most favoured a commercial and services economy. It is characterized principally by a minimum of government interference in, or control of, economic activity. The Lebanese economy is as close to the classical "Laissez faire" model as one can expect in the modern world."⁴⁰

³⁹ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3128, dated 1 March 1963.

⁴⁰ U.N.-F.A.O., op.cit., pp. I-5 & I-6.

The structure of the Lebanese economy and the economic activity under its framework reveal, thus, a free enterprise system. Basically the Lebanese economy is predominantly one of trade and services. "The proportion of the total national product which arises in the goods producing sectors, namely, agriculture, industry and construction, does not, as a rule, exceed 35 percent. Almost two thirds of the national product, therefore, arises in the form of services, with trade accounting for about half the value of all the services or about 30 percent of the total national income. Perhaps there is no other country in the world where the ratio of services to goods is as high as it is in Lebanon."⁴¹

The Lebanese economy suffers from three main weaknesses.⁴² First, the precariousness of the chief source of national income, i.e., trade and services. A high export of services is vitally needed to offset the large annual deficit in the country's balance

⁴¹ Lebanon's natural endowments — such as its geographical location, its pleasant climate, and its variety of altitudes within a compact area — are extremely conducive to the promotion of services. The exploitation of these endowments is apparent in the development of the country and its capital Beirut into an inter-continental trade and communication centre which is equipped with an excellent sea port; an international airport; adequate storage facilities; transit roads; transport system; banking, insurance and other financial facilities; a vigorous tourist industry and estivation activity; and almost a monopoly, in the Near East, of cultivating a wide variety of fruits. *Ibid.*, p. I-1. Although very essential to understand Lebanon's peculiar economic structure, the author cannot discuss in this work the pattern of resources with which the country has been endowed by nature. Such details would steer the discussion away from its main course.

⁴² There is increasing material which is being published on the Lebanese economy; the author, however, will use the general U.N. source cited at the appropriate places.

of trade. Second, the narrowness of the domestic market due chiefly to the small size of population which imposes serious restrictions on industrial expansion and absorption of the surplus from agriculture labour⁴³; and the high degree of rigidity of the export market. Third, the inequitable distribution of income and the presence of the two extremes of wealth and poverty despite the existence of a very strong and large middle class. This situation leads to social instability and it is being aggravated, instead of being rectified, by the government's fiscal and other policies.⁴⁴

Heavy burdens await the government in encouraging and directing the process of industrializing the country, and more important, to create agricultural industries if Lebanon would like to be freed from a precarious, although temporarily, booming, dependence on a services economy. The country's continuous trade deficit is covered by earnings from services, remittances from

⁴³ Which surplus account for the high rate of emigration — lately dropping considerably — from the country. Official circles are formulating a project law which would exempt industrial establishments built in underdeveloped parts of the country — at least outside Beirut and its suburbs — from income taxes, in an effort to lure capital into such regions and create jobs for the unemployed labour force in them. Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3030 dated 2 November 1962.

⁴⁴ U.N. - F.A.O., op.cit., pp. 1-8 and 1-9.

Lebanese emigrants, and, sometimes, official donations.⁴⁵
The field of manufacturing industry is of special interest, then, to the improvement of national income, standard of living and is of vital significance to the phenomenon of socio-economic change.

"Industrialization is a process that takes several decades, even when planned ruthlessly by communistic authorities. In Lebanon the process is less than a generation old. Beginning feebly under the Mandate, it gathered some momentum during the 'thirties'; but it was the favourable conditions of the War years which gave it a really strong impetus. Most of the firms which began at that time were family establishments set up by merchants and financed from the profits

⁴⁵ "Lebanon's trade deficit was about \$185 million in 1957, the index of such deficit having fallen to 96 in 1958 (1957=100) and risen to 133 in 1960. The export index remained almost constant in 1958 — probably as a result of the political disturbances in that year — but rose sharply to 219 (1957=100) in 1960. The import index, on the other hand, fell to 97 in 1958 and rose to 152 in 1960.

According to the available information, net invisible earnings (services) covered an annual average of 56 per cent of the trade gap between 1957 and 1960 and net private donations (emigrants' remittances), a further 19 per cent. The rest was covered by official donations and private capital inflow (Official donations reached a peak of about \$26 million in 1958 — when Lebanon received special United States assistance of \$ 12.5 million and grain under Public Law 480 — but dropped sharply to \$ 6 million in 1959. These donations are likely to have declined further in 1960 as the United States reduced its aid programme in Lebanon). Good indications of the strength of Lebanon's balance of payments are the accumulation of official gold and foreign exchange reserves — from \$ 99 million in 1957 to \$139 million in 1961 — and the appreciation of the Lebanese pound in the free market from L.£. 3.6 per dollar in 1957 to L.£ 3.02 in 1961. U.N. Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1959-61 (Supplement to World Economic Survey, 1961) (New York: U.N., 1962), p. 79.

due to stock appreciation and inflation. The management of these firms was, and continues to be, conditioned by the merchant mentality, the desire for wide margins and quick profits, with little understanding of the problems of machines and men. The change from the merchant outlook to that of the industrialist is one involving sociological, psychological, and cultural changes of a kind which, owing to the deep strength in the human mind of habit and tradition, cannot be expected to occur in the space of a few years, especially in countries where education is stereotyped and book-bound and where technical and administrative training is minimal." ¹⁴⁶

The share of national income generated by agricultural production may not show a proper reflection of the significance of agriculture to the national economy. "Although not more than one fifth of the national income is attributable to agriculture, at least between 40 and 50 percent of the population depend on it as the main source of their livelihood. This is, however, not necessarily indicative of the level of personal income in the rural sections of the country, because many of those engaged in agriculture have also other sources of income. Further significance of agriculture for the Lebanese economy is to be discerned in the fields of industry and foreign trade. A substantial portion of industrial input comes from domestic agriculture and over 60 percent of total exports consist of agricultural products."¹⁴⁷ The matter of exporting our agricultural products is brought repeatedly to the fore with regard for the difficulty of marketing such and other products and the

¹⁴⁶ Arthur Edward Mills, "Economic Change in Lebanon," Middle East Economic Papers (Beirut: Economic Research Institute, American University of Beirut, 1956), p. 85.

¹⁴⁷ U.N. - F.A.O., op.cit., p. I-3.

amount of competition given by countries of the Mediterranean basin producing the same products and by regional economic pacts and barriers (such as the European economic community).⁴⁸ In a recent extraordinary session of the Chamber of Deputies on 12 February 1963, one of the deputies, Mr. Muhsin Sleem, suggested the establishment of a 'Ministry of Trade' to take care of the marketing of the country's production, agricultural and other.⁴⁹ The author contends that such a step is highly improbable and that no such major structural change is expected to take place in the Lebanese administration in the foreseeable future.

Compared with agriculture, Industry contributes a smaller share of national income and is a much less significant source of livelihood. "This is indicated by the fact that no more than 40,000 persons are employed in industrial establishments of five persons or more. Even when one accounts for those employed in smaller establishments, probably not more than 15 percent of the total population will be dependent on industry as a main source of livelihood. Over 60 percent of industrial employment occurs in the

⁴⁸ Presently Lebanon — through Mr. Najibe Sadaka, the Lebanese ambassador in Brussels, Belgium, — is making efforts at concluding a bilateral agreement with the European Common Market organization; contacts with the concerned officials of the organization's Board and with the individual countries are in progress, although effected by the event of Britain's failure to join the Market. Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3118 dated 16 February 1963.

⁴⁹ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3115 dated 13 February 1963. Lebanon had a Ministry of Commerce and Industry between 1942 and 1945 which became the Ministry of National Economy in its post-independence organization of 5 October 1945.

light consumption industries catering to the primary needs of the population in the way of food, beverages, textiles, shoes and other wear, furniture, and tobacco. The main industries producing investment goods are petroleum refining and cement. These account for about 10 to 12 percent of total industrial employment. On the other hand, chemical and basic metal industries are very marginal providing less than 2 percent of total employment.⁵⁰³ Considerable increase has occurred in the last few years in the total number of industrial establishments and persons employed therein.⁵¹⁴ For 1960 there were 5394 such establishments employing 56,506 persons and having a total capital of about L.£. 588 million. For 1961 these totals reached 5901 establishments, 59,523 persons and about L.£.641 million respectively.⁵²⁵ The industrialists of the country realize the disorganized state of their field from the point of view of government guidance and support, planning and required legislation concerning same. The Association of Lebanese Industrialists' Vice President, Mr. Kamal Jabr, in a press release suggested few solutions which would, initially, ameliorate the existing situation and save it from continued disorganization. He asked for a new legislation

¹⁵⁰ U.N. - F.A.O., op.cit., p. 1-3.

¹⁵¹ The government, in step with its policy of encouraging industrialization, granted licences for establishing about 200 new industrial establishments with a capital of about L.£ 60 million in 1962 and early 1963. Al-Jaryda(Beirut), No. 3114 dated 12 February 1963.

¹⁵² These statistics were released by the Service of Industry in the Ministry of National Economy. Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3053 dated 30 November 1962.

which would organize industrial activity, gear it where necessary to the State's economic development policy, and give it where it needs enough protection and, even, direct government support.⁵³ This, and the will to give industry a recognized position in the State's machinery, requires the creation of a separate ministry for industry and to which the present Industrial Research Institute would be attached.⁵⁴ The French I.R.F.E.D. mission to Lebanon, which is involved in planning the economic development of the country, studied the state of affairs in the Ministry of National Economy and suggested a new structural reorganization for it according to new lines and in step with its impending role of setting a general policy intended at developing commerce and industry at the same time. The mission's report suggested the division of the ministry's Directorate general into two units, namely, a Directorate of Commerce and a Directorate of Industry

⁵³ The Association proposed a project Law to this effect to the Minister of National Economy which resulted from the work of joint committees — composed from government representatives and interested groups — such as the Production and Trade Committee (November, 1962). This year a special committee — headed by the Director General of the Ministry of National Economy and assisted by his Chief of the Industry Service, a foreign expert and representatives of the private economic sector — was formed to lay down the basis of a new law for industry in the country. Al-Jaryda (Beirut), no. 3109 dated 6 February 1963.

⁵⁴ Reported in Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3021, dated 23 October 1962; No. 3030, dated 2 November 1962. See also An-Nahar (Beirut), No. 8242, dated 23 October 1962.

and the grouping of the present services under them both.⁵⁵ The ministry's name, they also suggested, should become: the Ministry of Economy and Industry. The units under such organization were given extensive authority to fit their new role. The acceptance of such a scheme is not clear yet, although the mission's experts pointed out that the Legislative Decree No. 2896 of 16 December 1959 which organized the ministry as it is now did not produce the purported and desired results. The mission's suggestions have been, nevertheless, bitterly protested by the present chiefs of services in the Ministry who thought that such a "distorted" organization would obstruct the public's interests and give some chiefs more authority and annual those of others; it would also meet the difficulty of preparing and issuing a new legislative decree annulling the previous structural set-up, distribution of authority and personnel cadres.⁵⁶ The mission's suggestions are at the Minister's desk, or in one of his drawers.

The Ministry of Public Works and Transport had 438 permanent civil servants in 1950 and 935 in 1962. The total number of civil servants in it for 1963 was 1201 including 258 non-permanent civil servants. The Ministry have certainly experienced a considerable

⁵⁵ They also suggested the transfer of the 'Bureau of Boycotting Israel' to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants.

⁵⁶ See Lisan Al-Hāl (Beirut), No. 19338 dated 25 December 1962; and Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3109 dated 6 February 1963.

transformation from its previous meagre size of 1937, mentioned above, and from its 1944-46 conditions in which it was "...poorly organized, inexperienced and incapable of directing large works alone."⁵⁷⁾ It may not, at present, be a paragon of efficiency or be innocent of considerable disorganization in some of its parts; however, it has turned out to be, together with the Board for the Execution of Projects, the most important tool for the execution of the country's projects and development schemes. The list of projects completed by its direct interference and supervision is quite impressive; the list of what is being done and is planned to be done is no less impressive either. The total number of public works' projects for 1962 is given in the following table:

TABLE III-4

TOTAL NUMBER OF PUBLIC WORKS' PROJECTS
FOR 1962^a

Item	Number of Projects
Roads	1481
Water	853
Buildings	130
Electricity	62
Construction	25
Great Projects ^b	650
Litani River Basin ^c	50
Total	3251

^aParliamentary speech of H.E. Mr. Rashid Karamah, Lebanese Premier, in the Chamber's session of 18 October 1962, reported in Lebanon Today (Beirut), No. 2, 1 November 1962, Annex, p. 7.

^bRoads, Water, Electricity & Miscellaneous.

^cIndependent Fund.

⁵⁷A.E. Mills, op.cit., p. 93.

The implementation of all these projects did certainly throw heavy burdens on the capacity of the Ministry, its technical manpower, its ability at programing and coordinating with development schemes and their execution. In fact, the Ministry has obliged itself, in accordance with the government's directives, with the setting and following of a Ruznamah (Timetable) for executing the various projects.

The Ministry of Agriculture had 330 permanent civil servants in 1950 and 524 in 1962. The total number of civil servants in it for 1963 was 621 including 117 non-permanent civil servants.

The 1959 reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture could be considered — like the reorganization in other ministries — as a very important measure in strengthening and providing administrative unity among the various technical agricultural services.⁵⁸ The significance of agriculture to the national economy was discussed above while treating the main economic features of Lebanon. We saw, then, that agriculture is not the dominant source of livelihood in the country⁵⁹; national income generated in the agricultural

⁵⁸ Legislative Decree No. 2881 dated 16 December 1959 established a Directorate General which includes the following units: the Diwan; Agricultural Resources Service; Forests and Natural Resources Service; Animal Resources Service; Common Technical Affairs Service, which includes the Departments of Rural Engineering and Agricultural Industries, Agricultural Education and Orientation, and Cooperatives and Agricultural Economy.

⁵⁹ "Economiquement, le Liban n'est pas principalement un pays agricole, mais socialement il l'est et le restera: son tissu sociologique, même urban, a de profondes racines rurales et son équilibre futur veut que cette symbiose entre le Libanais et son terroir soit affermie et consolidée." Mission Irfed-Liban, Propositions d'Actions Générales Pour L'Elaboration du Plan-Schéma Agriculture, DAR 209, Novembre 1962, A 18. (Mimeographed).

sector form about one fifth of the aggregate national income. Agricultural commodities, however, constitute the principal export items. Also, employment in agriculture accounts for about 40% of the total employment, although quite a few of those persons engaged in agriculture have supplementary sources of income. "The interesting feature of Lebanese agriculture is the predominance of fruit and vegetable cultivation (51 per cent of the total value) and relative unimportance of cereals and industrial crops."⁶⁰ The establishment of the Office of Fruits in 1959 as an independent public agency entrusted with the task of organizing, controlling and developing the production, exportation and marketing of fruits in the country was an important measure in encouraging and vitalizing of the more predominant type of agricultural production in the country.⁶¹

Out of the total area of 1,040 thousand hectares, Lebanon had, in 1959, a total of 278 thousand hectares of agricultural area, 71 thousand of which were irrigated. Forrested land was 92 thousand hectares; unused but potentially productive land was 364 thousand hectares; built-on area, wasteland and other was 306 thousand hectares. Table III-5 below illustrates these figures of land use in the country.

⁶⁰ U.N. - F.A.O., op.cit., p. II-16.

⁶¹ Legislative Decree No. 41 dated 25 March 1959.

TABLE III-5

LAND USE IN LEBANON, 1959^a

Item	Thousands of Hectares
Total area	1,040
Agricultural area	278
Irrigated	71
Forested land	92
Other area	670
Unused but potentially productive	364
Built-on area, wasteland & other	306

^aU.N., Food and Agriculture Organization, Production Yearbook, 1960 (Rome), as in U.N., Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1959-1961 (Supplement to World Economic Survey, 1961) (New York: U.N., 1962), p. 99.

Taking into consideration the main features of agriculture, the socio-economic factors in Lebanon and the general characteristics of its administration, one can have better understanding of the previous official policy, accomplishments and future planning in the field of agriculture in the country.

In comparison with the Middle East, Lebanon seems to have no pressing land tenure problem. "Of course, Lebanon has not been free from the influence of historical and cultural factors common in the Middle East countries and tending to sanction concentration of land — and of political power — by tribal leaders. However, unlike in other countries of the region the special conditions of Lebanon have prevented the system of large estates with share — cropping to become a dominant feature in Lebanese agriculture." As such, this situation renders it almost unnecessary for the state

to "... embark on a drastic land reform programme."⁶² There still remains, however, considerable burden on the government to formulate a programme which will facilitate and enhance production, the cultivator's security and the economic status and purchasing power of the farm population.⁶³ The country's agriculture has made remarkable technical progress in the past few years in the manner of using improved practices and techniques, modern equipment and the development of new farm enterprises along commercial farming lines.

"This progress of Lebanese agriculture has been supported by many factors including the progressiveness of the Lebanese farmer; extensive research work done by many agencies; agricultural schools and other educational work of the Ministry of Agriculture; the examples of modern farm enterprises conducted by highly educated operators. A noticeable contribution to agricultural progress has come from the trials and promotional work done by companies occupied with trade in fertilizers, pesticides and other farm supplies. An appraisal of these factors connected with the progress of agriculture indicates that expansion and proper organization of technical services for farmers are both very promising and urgently needed in order to sustain further growth

⁶² Ibid., p. II-47-48. The Ministry of Agriculture reports that there are 174,296 persons who own agricultural land in the country; there are some 1500 villages making up rural Lebanon.

The Ministry of Interior has a project law concerning the distribution of state-owned land on the villages most of which land is not fit for agricultural exploitation as a whole. The concerned agricultural circles and farmers' groups made efforts with officials and cabinet members to 'freeze' this project law because no use is expected to come out from the distribution of this land. The Secretary of the Farmers' Union declared that his Union, the Ministry of Agriculture and other agricultural circles agree to the project in principle but advises its execution after the completion of the land reclamation (The Green Project), a part of the planned agricultural development programme. Newspapers, (Beirut) of 28 March 1963.

⁶³ Ibid.

of agriculture and for advancing social integration in the rural sector." ⁶⁴₁₅₇

Lebanon has enough supply of experienced agricultural technicians and adequate facilities for agricultural education. The Ministry of Agriculture "... operated since 1943 a secondary agricultural school — Ecole Nationale d'Agriculture de Beyrouth — providing a 3-year programme of practical and theoretical instruction.... The Ministry operates three more agricultural schools of intermediate level. They offer again a three year course but the programme is more practical and intended to prepare farm foremen." ⁶⁵₈

On the university level the American University of Beirut has provided a 4-year programme in its "Faculty of Agricultural Sciences" established in 1953; this faculty has initiated a programme for graduate study, and it has a farm in the Beqa' valley which is used for practice and experimental work. Also, many students are sent abroad for training and university-level specialization through national or foreign technical assistance scholarships.

Agricultural research was given full appreciation by the Ministry which has established, since 1952, a number of agricultural stations; these stations were brought, in 1957, under the Agricultural Scientific Research Service (in Tall Al-'Amara). ⁶⁶ There are

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. II-51. A law was made which organizes government agricultural schools' system of one 3-year technical school and many 1-year practical schools to provide agricultural technicians and labourers in the various fields of agricultural sciences. Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3109 dated 6 February 1963.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. II-52.

⁶⁶ This central station conducts "...experimental work and research in plant breeding, wheat and flour technology, soils, entomology, plant pathology, horticulture and agricultural engineering." Ibid.

also five regional sub-stations interesting themselves in the various branches of agriculture.⁶⁷ Significant achievements have been reached by the control station and its sub-stations and many comprehensive research programmes have been completed or are now at an advanced stage. The country has received and presently receives much assistance from non-governmental bodies such as the French Agricultural Mission, the A. U. B. Faculty of Agriculture, the "Comptoir Agricole du Levant", the United States Operations Mission and the Near East Foundation.

Agricultural extension conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture has not been as adequate as agricultural education and agricultural research despite the presence of proper means and facilities which were established until now. Although a considerable amount of technical information is being diffused to the farm community through commercial farms and adaptation, however, such information is not reaching all the areas of the country. More energetic leadership by the Ministry is needed not only in extending agricultural progress but also in stimulating community organization which will enable the villages to grow in "self-help".⁶⁸ The Ministry, nevertheless, has followed a new policy of offering technical guidance

⁶⁷ Terbel sub-station works on animal husbandry and fisheries; Bahnino (N.Leb.) on citrus; Abdeh (N.Leb.) on field crops; Tyre (S. Leb.) on citrus; Kfardan (N.Beqa') on horticulture. Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. II-54.

instead of material aid to the farmers. A Department was established to this effect and purpose and a team of twenty-two technical assistants — which number is planned to be increased to Forty-four — were distributed in various rural posts in the country in early 1962. Each assistant served a group of ten to fifteen villages and have served 225 villages up till now.⁶⁹

The Ministry also started to issue in 1962 a publication concerned with agricultural topics and guidance, about 100,000 copies (12 issues) of which were distributed in the same year.⁷⁰ Concerning material aid, the government issued a series of arrêtés which ordains the granting of indemnities to farmers producing wheat and barely according to the areas planted by each farmer. This replaced a previous proposed scheme of buying the farmers' produce at encouraging prices (L.£. 10 million) and selling it at a lesser price (L.£. 9 million).⁷¹

Concerning the creation and encouragement of agricultural cooperatives the following remarks could be submitted. The concerned unit in the Ministry is neither staffed nor financed to

⁶⁹ Four agricultural engineers concerned with guidance were also recently assigned to four Muhafazat (major administrative districts), other than Beirut.

⁷⁰ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3109 dated 6 February 1963; also the declarations of the Director General of the Ministry of Agriculture, Mr. Haleem Najjar, reported in Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3128 dated 1 March 1963.

⁷¹ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3153 dated 30 March 1963.

exercise leadership in the promotion of the cooperative movement in the country. The weak cooperative movement in Lebanon — which is in striking contrast to the farmers' educational level and the general progress in agriculture — reveal the State's insufficient interference 'to-help-the-villages-to-help-themselves.'⁷² Many of the farmers' individual output is not sufficiently organized for purposes of commercial marketing.⁷³ The Director General of the Ministry declared that a new project of a law has been prepared which will enable the "... liquidation of some of the present cooperatives and the starting of an organizational movement which Will push cooperative societies to work in the various fields and according to correct principles of cooperation."⁷⁴ Also, the Ministry is taking steps, with the help of F.A.O., to establish a model project for giving 'controlled agricultural loans' to the farmers to be used by the latter under the supervision of the agricultural advisors of the Ministry and the village cooperative.⁷⁵ The cabinet has approved on 30 January 1963 the establishment of a model Bank for controlled agricultural loans.⁷⁶

⁷²For further detail and analysis see U.N.- F.A.O., op.cit., p. II-50.

⁷³Mission IRFED-Libam op.cit., p. C 15.

⁷⁴Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3128 dated 1 March 1963.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3107 dated 3 February 1963.

A number of projects have been agreed upon or completed with the help of the United Nations' Special Fund. A microbiological laboratory — l'Institut Régional de la Santé Animale au Moyen-Orient — with necessary veterinary staff was established in the Summer of 1962; in five years the U.N.S.F. will contribute L.£. 1,531,890, and the Lebanese Government L.£. 1,618,950. A project for the creation of a 'pilot-centre' for the transformation of milk and its marketing is planned with the U.N.S.F. contributing L.£. 510,000 and the Lebanese Government L.£. 250,000. A 5-year project for the development of the remote mountainous areas through the creation of a centre entrusted with conducting research on the methods and techniques for such development was agreed upon with the U.N.S.F. The latter's contribution is L.£. 2,150,400; the Lebanese Government's contributions is L.£. 4,248,600.⁷⁷

The Ministry is also concerned with the improvement of the livestock industry of whatever size, from its traditional pastoral forms to a better standard where intensive feeding and management methods could be utilized and, also, control of animal parasites and diseases be effected. A 2-year project of building a quarantine park is underway at Tripoli for the satisfaction of this purpose. Total estimated cost of the project is L.£. 1,692,875; the Ministry appropriated L.£. 300,000 for 1963 with other sums of money being

⁷⁷ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3128, op.cit.; also Mission IRFED-LIBAN, op.cit., Annexes Nos. 4,6,7.

also appropriated for the same year from the budget of the Ministry of Public Works and Transport.⁷⁸ The Ministry also is involved in the development of the fishing industry in the country. It will take measures to distribute all necessary equipments and offer all facilities to the fishermen or fishing centres in the various Lebanese ports. The project will save, reportedly, about L.£. 3 million annually in way of hard currency paid for imported fish.⁷⁹

The most important and by far the most basic project conducted in the field of agriculture in Lebanon is, however, the "Green Project" which is a 10-year programme for land reclamation and conservation and general facilities for agricultural development. A project-law for it has been sent to the parliament and is now being studied by the various concerned committees. The project-law provides for the creation of a special board responsible to the Minister of Agriculture for the execution of the project for the first part of which the same project-law appropriates a total of L.£. 27 million to be spent between 1964 and 1973. The project-law permits the 'Agricultural, Industrial and Real Estate Bank' to take up to L.£. 40 million from the National Treasury to be used as loans given to farmers for executing the project in their

⁷⁸ Ibid., Annexe No. 5.

⁷⁹ Lisan Al-'Hal (Beirut), No. 19413 dated 26 March 1963.

land. Studies conducted on the Green Project submit that a total income of about L.E. 130 million will be generated as a result of its execution. The project will include land reclamation and soil preservation in irrigated and unused areas and will involve the afforestation of unused and wasteland areas. It will also create new types of agricultural products and will use up rural manpower as a necessary labour force which is presently unemployed in the various phases of the project such as building roads, afforestation and pastoral development. The resultant increase in the rural standard of living will have a direct effect on emigration from rural areas and would be a positive step at solving socio-economic problems arising therefrom.⁸⁰ The civil servants of the Natural Resources Service in the Ministry of Agriculture have started preparing necessary studies and 'paperaserie' for the execution of the project.⁸¹

The IRFED mission's report suggests that for the execution of the programmes of all these works, the Ministry of Agriculture must possess "... un outil d'intervention; cet outil, c'est un personnel technique et administratif." The report emphasizes the present lack of necessary equilibrium between the administrative and the technical cadres; "cet équilibre ne semble pas assuré pour

⁸⁰ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3136 dated 10 March 1963; No. 3129 dated 2 March 1963; No. 3146 dated 22 March 1963; No. 3150 dated 27 March 1963; No. 3153 dated 30 March 1963.

⁸¹ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3130 dated 3 March 1963.

les emplois de catégorie 3 (88 techniques et 11 administratif)." Since, also, "... plusieurs services sont sous-administrés" and the technical civil servants "...sont anormalement absorbés par de trop nombreuses tâches administratives", the report proposes the necessity of modifying the structure and personnel distribution, "organigramme", of the ministry. The report also advises the establishment of a more rapid recruitment programme, "... la présence sur le terrain des ingénieurs et des agents agricoles" and the offering of scholarships in forestry engineering and in veterinary medicine.⁸²

The mission's report also proposes the establishment of a 2-year programme "...pour améliorer la qualité du travail et la productivité." This would be done through the following measures, which measures, the author submits, can be applied almost in all the ministries:

1. étendre le mouvement, service après service.
2. établir des directives de base pour chaque bureau et section.
3. organiser des courtes sessions de réimprégnation scientifique....
4. décentraliser certaines responsabilités, notamment au niveau régional.
5. proposer la simplification de certaines formalités, et la suppression de certaines autres.
6. étudier, en collaboration avec le Ministère des Finances, une présentation fonctionnelle du budget.
7. améliorer la préparation des projets particuliers en précisant leurs buts et moyens, de façon plus technique."⁸³

⁸² Mission IRFED-Liban, DAR/209, C2-3.

⁸³ Ibid.

The Ministry of General Planning had 66 permanent civil servants in 1955 and 93 in 1962. The total number of civil servants in it for 1963 was 244 including 88 non-permanent civil servants. As in many other ministries, and as noted above,⁸⁴ some of these positions remain vacant.

The Ministry of General Planning is entrusted with the preparation of a general and comprehensive plan for the social and economic development of the country. It must design a unified and harmonized fiscal, social and economic policy in step with this general development plan. It prepares, also, individual programmes, under the general plan, comprising one or more developmental projects and can ask other ministries to do the same. The Ministry controls the steps and operations of executing the long and middle range development projects whether economic or technical. It participates in the formation of financial establishments concerned with development or its guidance; gives its opinion on the country's economic and financial relations with foreign countries; supplies private establishments, through various regional levels, in the agricultural, industrial, commercial, scientific and cultural sectors with necessary information for purposes of their participation in the development effort; contacts foreign and international institutions concerning technical and economic aid. The Ministry gives its opinion on project laws destined for the Cabinet's approval and related to the economic, social and fiscal life of

⁸⁴See pp. 69-70, above.

the country and annual development programmes formulated by other ministries; assigns the necessary researches, related to general development, which is undertaken by the institutions of scientific research, theoretical and applied; guides the 'Service of Social Development' in establishing its programmes under the general development plan, and controls its work in this respect; collects, analyses and publishes statistical informations related to the state's various social and economic effort and coordinates the work of the various statistical administrative units; and, finally, it exercises administrative control (tutelle) over the 'Institute of Training for Development.'⁸⁵ The Ministry's general plan, policy and programmes must receive the agreement of the Council of Ministers.⁸⁶

The Ministry of General Planning has as part of it a Council for Planning and Development which offers guidance, advice and recommendations involving most of the functions and duties entrusted to the ministry itself. The C.P.D. is composed of the Minister of General Planning as president, the Director General of the Ministry as vice-president, and ten members, for a 3-year term, who are prominent personalities in the fields of economic, development and the social sciences.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Law of 12 June 1962, Art. 2-3.

⁸⁶ Ibid., Art. 4.

⁸⁷ Ibid., Art. 30-32.

Prior to the establishment of the Ministry of General Planning in 1954⁸⁸, centralized planning for development was the responsibility of the Board of Economic Planning and Development created by Law No. 32 of 17 February 1953. The B.E.P.D. was an independent technical body, had the Minister of National Economy as its chairman and was composed of a permanent full time secretary with the rank of a director general and the Directors General of the Ministries of National Economy, Finance, Agriculture and Public Works as members plus six other non-government members, namely, three professors of economics, a professor of engineering, a high ranking official in a financial institution and an industrialist. The duties of the Board involved the assesment of the country's resources, the study of development potential, the working out of a comprehensive long-term development plan, and the suggestion of means of financing development. This Board was abolished by the Legislative Decree No. 2 of 30 November 1954 and a new Board was created within the structure of the new Ministry.⁸⁹

⁸⁸The Ministry was established by the Legislative Decree No. 6393 dated 16 September 1954 and organized by Legislative Decree No. 2 dated 30 November 1954.

⁸⁹The abolished Board submitted a report to the Chamber of Deputies on its works covering the period from 5 April 1953 to 30 November 1954, on which date it was attached to the Ministry of General Planning, which showed the Board's general failure to perform satisfactorily in the areas assigned to it mainly for the slashing of its funds by the Ministry of Finance. See Khalil Sanbar, "The Lebanese Economy With Special Reference to the Impact on it of Existing Development Programs," (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of Economics, American University of Beirut, 1957).

From 1954 till 1959 the Ministry's work revolved around the studies conducted by the Board of Planning and Development (B.P.D.).⁹⁰ and the activities of the Service of Combustibles and Control of Oil Companies and Refineries and the Service of Minerals and Public Properties. The other Services of General Statistics, Coordination and Liaison, and the Department of Fairs remained inactive.⁹¹ On 16 December 1959, Decree No. 2863 was issued and it reorganized the Ministry in the light of the experiences of the 1954-59 period. The two Services of Combustibles and of Minerals and the Department of Fairs were transferred to the Ministries of Public Works and National Economy and were redistributed therein.⁹² This reorganization was a part of the 1959 administrative reform movement.

On 23 October 1959 the Ministry of General Planning contracted "l'Institut International de Recherche et de Formation en vue du Développement intégral et harmonisé (I.R.F.E.D.)" of Paris to conduct an extensive study of the Lebanese socio-economic structure with reference to the administrative areas of the country and its needs and possibilities for development. The IRFED mission —

⁹⁰ The Board issued in 1958 its major study entitled, "Five-Year Plan for Economic Development in Lebanon," which was not executed but, however, many of the suggestions it included were subsequently implemented.

⁹¹ Interview with H.E. Mr. Uthman El-Dana, Minister of General Planning, April 11, 1963.

⁹² Ibid.

headed by the Director of the Institute, Abbey Louis Joseph Lebret ⁹³ — after conducting extensive studies in which it collaborated with the various ministries, independent agencies and services, and private organizations submitted its "Etude Preliminaire sur les Besoins et les Possibilités de Developpement Au Liban," (1959-1960, 8 Vols.). The mission was subsequently contracted again on 26 June 1961 to collaborate with the State, in an advisory manner, in the preparation of middle-range development programmes for the country. The contract included, among other things, that the Mission should organize the "... services techniques et d'étude du Ministère du Plan."⁹⁴

⁹³The Institute is backed by a very strong Dominican order which believes, to a large extent, in social reform. The mission's composition and organization in Lebanon is the following:

" I. Mission IRFED-Liban.

- Louis Joseph Lebret, directeur.
- Raymond Delprat, directeur adjoint.
- Anne-Marie Baron, études régionales.
- Antoine Kher, session de formation et études régionales.
- Alain Birou, session de formation.
- Pierre Langlé, études agro-hydrauliques.
- Jean Labasse, études d'aménagement et problèmes financiers.
- Marise Michoud, analyse régionale.
- Denis Goulet, études économiques.

II. Equipes Libanaises

- A. Equipe centrale.
- B. Equipe régionales.
 1. Equipe Urbain.
 2. Equipe Nord.
 3. Equipe Centre.
 4. Equipe Sud.
 5. Equipe Est.

" Mission IRFED-Liban, Etude Préliminaire, 1959-60, Vol.I, Introduction. (mimeographed).

⁹⁴Article 6 of the text, Courtesy of the Ministry's

The IRFED mission, based on its first report and on new studies, submitted in November, 1962 its second report, "Premier Plan Quinquennal, 1964-1968 — Propositions d'Action Generales pour l'Elaboration du Plan" (introduction and 10 parts concerned with Roads, Electricity, Waters, Agriculture, Fisheries, Tourism, Industry, Commerce, Education and Health.) which satisfied what was asked of it by H.E. The President of the Republic: "que puissent être remises aux Ministères et Administrations Centrales la liste, la description sommaire et la justification des actions qui devront faire partie du Premier Plan Quinquennal Libanais de Développement."⁹⁵ The report, Abbey Lebret explains, does not constitute a PLAN but presents ten sectoral schemes which, in the perspectives defined by the President, assures "... la croissance économique générale et sa répartition préférentielle en faveur des fractions de la population jusqu'ici les moins favorisées. Il tend moins à répondre à des objectifs de croissance posés préalablement qu'à créer le dispositif d'ensemble conditionnant le développement."⁹⁶ The plan as envisaged by the Mission aims at and permits the harmonization of the activities of the Lebanese administration and its public expenditures, and a certain degree of the orientation of the activities of the private sector towards this goal through the use of incentives and stimulants.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Mission IRFED-Liban, Propositions d'Actions Générales Pour l'Elaboration du Plan-Introduction aux Schémas, DIR 187, November 1962, A 1. (mimeographed).

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. C5.

As regards the organization of the Ministry of General Planning, the Law of 12 June 1962 was largely based upon the recommendations of the IRFED mission. In this law the Ministry was organized according to scientific basis and in view of the tasks and functions required from a central machinery entrusted with planning for development. The 1962 law organizes the Ministry into one Directorate General and the Council for Planning and Development.⁹⁸

The Directorate General of General Planning is composed of a Diwān (Secretariat) and the two Directorates of Studies and Programming and of Central Statistics. The Directorate of Studies and Programming has the six Services of Economic Studies, Programming for Development, Annual Plans, Regional Activities, Control of Execution, and Technical Cooperation.⁹⁹ This Directorate is still completely void of its allotted civil servants and all of its duties and responsibilities are informally being carried out at present by the IRFED mission which will be pulling out of Lebanon, because of termination of contract with the State, by 26 June 1964.¹⁰⁰ Gradually, and until then, the task of staffing the six services with highly educated and specialized personnel in the required areas is so urgent for purposes of continuity and necessary orienta-

⁹⁸ Law of 12 June 1962, art. 1, as in Lebanon, Official Gazette, No. 24, June 13, 1962, p. 864.

⁹⁹ Ibid., art. 7.

¹⁰⁰ Interview with Mr. El-Dana, op.cit., April 11, 1963.

tion as regards these personnel's new functions. The Directorate of Central Statistics has already started its activities.

Development efforts are functionally decentralized to the field through the setting up of a regional administrative organizations in the various Muhafazāt (major administrative districts) to be concerned with this task. The Service of Regional Activities, which is entrusted with the task of studying the social and economic situations of the various Lebanese regions, has five Departments in the five Muhafazāt of the country. These Departments represent the central Service in the region, helps the Muhafez (Prefect) in studying the developmental affairs in it, assists in the preparation of development schemes and plans and follows up their execution and carries on liaison between the central Service, the Muhafez and the Equipes Polyvalentes (Multi-Purpose Teams).¹⁰¹ These Multi-Purpose Teams are technical units stationed each in a Qada (sub-district), are supervised by the Qaimmaqams (Sub-Prefects) and are attached, as regards technical matters, to the Chief of the Department of Regional Activities in each Muhafazah who acts as the representative of the Ministry of General Planning.¹⁰² Every Multi-Purpose Team is composed of from four to six university educated members in the fields of agriculture, civil engineering, geography, general health, education, statistics, law, economics, social sciences,

¹⁰¹ Decree No. 12416, dated 2 April 1963, arts. 22-24.

¹⁰² Decree No. 12492, dated 9 April 1963, arts. 1, 3 and 5.

administrative organization and municipal affairs, urban and rural planning; plus a specialist and a social worker from the Social Development Service. These persons must also receive special training in harmonized development.¹⁰³ The Team undertakes the study of the Qada's affairs and the possibilities of guiding the various activities in it in order to insure a coordinated and harmonized development in collaboration with the concerned groups.¹⁰⁴ In short, the Team is the eyes, ears and hands of the Ministry of General Planning in the Qada and helps her out in performing its functions of conducting studies, analyzing them and offering reports and programmes of development for the region.

The Muhafez has two bodies concerned with the development effort at the regional level which succour him in this sphere.

¹⁰³ Ibid., art. 2. This training is offered at the Institute of Training for Development which was established in 1961 (Decree No. 7280 of 7 August 1961) and which operates under the administrative control of the Ministry of General Planning. Studies in the Institute started on 15 February 1962. Recently, however, the Civil Service Council proposed to the Council of Ministers a project law to abolish this Institute and attach its units to its own Directorate General of Preparation and Training which includes the National Institute of Public Administration. This measure purports to cut out half of the Institute's expenses, eliminate the possible intermixture of goals between the Council and the Institute and allow the government better programming for Training the Institute's graduates abroad. This proposition, however, creates many technical and administrative problems which must be solved before it could be put into effect. Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3152, dated 29 March 1963.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., art. 6.

The first is the Regional Advisory Council which is chaired by him and is composed of the representative of the Ministry of General Planning in the Muhafazah, the representative of the Social Development Service, the Qaimmaqams of the Qadas in the Muhafazah, and twelve members appointed for 4 years upon the suggestion of the Muhafez and the agreement of the Minister of the General Planning.¹⁰⁵ The second body is the Regional Technical Board which works under the supervision of the Muhafez and is composed of the representatives of the Ministries of General Planning, Public Works, National Education, Public Health and Agriculture in the Muhafazah and of the representative of the Social Development Service.¹⁰⁶ These bodies are not manned yet because of their recent establishment and their contribution to the socio-economic development effort remains to be seen.

The political disturbances of 1958 and the crisis situation generated brought about an extensive breakdown of control and execution in government operations. One reaction to this situation was to hold back on development projects which in turn resulted

¹⁰⁵Decree No. 12493, dated 9 April 1963, art. 1.

¹⁰⁶Law of 12 June 1962, art. 12, sect. 1; see also, Decree No. 12417, dated 2 April 1963.

in the accumulation of large reserves in the national treasury.¹⁰⁷
This created a certain degree of economic recession in the country and it urged the government to launch a 5-year development scheme for construction works to remedy the situation and, also, to answer to the new needs and plans for development. The "L.£. 450 million project" was formulated in 1961; table III-6 details its items of expenditures.

TABLE III-6^b
PLANNED PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES,
1962-1957^a

Item	Millions of Leb. Pounds
Irrigation	64
Drinking water	76
Electricity	72
Roads	124
River beds	9
Antiquities	10
Buildings	20
Reconstruction	75
Total	450

^a Decree No. 7277, dated 7 August 1961. The share of Industry out of public planned development expenditures is L.£. 72.0 million (in Electricity), with a percentage out of the total investment of 16.0%. The share of Agriculture out of public planned development expenditures is L.£. 64.0 million (Irrigation schemes), with a percentage out of the total investment of 14.2%. U.N., Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1959-1961, op.cit., pp. 17 & 43.

¹⁰⁷With the exception, however, of the Litani river multi-

The principal goals of the Ministry of General Planning — in view of its role in laying and coordinating the country's policy of social and economic development — are the following:

- "1. To raise the national income in order to face the increase in population, and to push up the standard of living of every individual;
2. To utilize fully the human and natural resources of the country, and to develop the sectors of Industry, Agriculture and Services;
3. To provide and ensure social equity and justice for all the social classes in order to prevent any struggle therebetween;
4. To provide 12,000 new jobs every year to absorb the annual increase of surplus labour resulting from increase in population;
5. To provide a more favourable balance of payments."¹⁰⁸

The role of the Ministry of General Planning as regards the elaboration of a general development plan for Lebanon does not merely involve the problem of economic programming but, to be successful, it must also relate to the more serious problem of the necessary change in the social values of the country. Hoselitz's following words illustrate, perhaps, this very important and basic

purpose project which "... is by far the most important development undertaking in Lebanon. The total construction cost of this complex project was originally estimated at L.L. 341.9 million, L.L. 117.1 million of which was to be expended on phase "A" of the project. Upon completion, this project will make possible the irrigation of 26,000 hectares of land. The Lebanese Government was able to obtain a \$25 million loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development towards the foreign exchange requirements of the project. Work on the Litani project started some time ago, but suffered delays due to unforeseen technical difficulties." U.N., Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1959-1961, op.cit., pp. 20-21

¹⁰⁸

Interview with Mr. El-Dana, op.cit., April 11, 1963.

factor: "in practice, i.e., in a situation requiring the elaboration of a development plan for a given country or region, this problem requires for its solution that the plan embrace not only prescriptions for economic adjustments but also for the channeling of associated cultural and social change."¹⁰⁹

D. Conclusion

To recapitulate from this chapter, we note that considerable growth has occurred in the size of the Lebanese bureaucracy and in the socio-economic role of the State. This growth took place as a result of many and varied factors ranging from the continuous expansion of the state's responsibilities in view of technical progress, the development of public needs, administrative reform and reorganization movements, to favouritism, nepotism and patronage. Whether socio-economic factors or corruption had the upper hand in causing this growth, one can use many indications which can facilitate an intelligent guess or ratio although great precision is obviously difficult without the use of penetrating and extensive research. One can point, nevertheless, to several and sometimes paradoxical points regarding this growth. The author assuredly submits — based on his personal experience and data collected in the present administrative reform effort, and the observations disclosed to him by so many high, knowledge-

¹⁰⁹ Bert P. Hoselitz, Sociological Aspects of Economic Growth (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 26.

able and responsible officials -- (that, although growth in bureaucratic size was needed and imperative, there is reason to believe that the Lebanese civil service has about 3 to 4 thousands civil servants too many.) This is, incidentally, about the same number of vacancies, mentioned above, that the Civil Service Council is trying to fill at the present. Due to the low quality of a great many of the old employees, disorganization, lack of precise definitions of duties and functions for the positions, among other factors, many new civil servants are being brought into the service to carry a good part of the normal load of work which the present personnel could perform were most of them not of such low quality.¹¹⁰ The growth in the number of the civil servants and administrative units and, yet, the pursuit of, on the whole, a laissez-faire policy makes the observer tend to underrate the socio-economic factors as causes for this growth and pay more attention to other important factors such as the socio-political ones.

After this preview of the major administrative developments of Lebanon, the size and scope of its bureaucracy and the expanding role of the State we turn, hereafter, to the discussion of the structure (Part III) and behavior (Part IV) of the Lebanese

¹¹⁰ Riggs opines that the reasons for administrative weaknesses which hamper economic development are: "... too many persons are employed, their services are not fully utilized, and they are frequently not qualified by training or experience to do the work that needs to be done." Frederick W. Riggs, "Public Administration: A Neglected Factor in Economic Development," The Annals, Vol. CCCV (May, 1956), p.74.

bureaucracy. There, more light could be directed on the general characteristics of the Lebanese administrative system, its structural features and its organizational problems; and on the Lebanese public official, his bureaucratic history, his major characteristics and the impact on him of the social base. The extent to which Lebanon could acquire an efficient administration and body of bureaucrats and the speed and time limit with which both objectives could be accomplished, and the extent to which its State can satisfy the ever-increasing socio-economic needs could perhaps be deduced from these following chapters.

PART III

**THE ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM:
STRUCTURAL FEATURES AND ORGANIZATIONAL PROBLEMS**

CHAPTER IV

THE BUREAUCRACY

A. The Ministries

The basic unit of organization in the Lebanese central administration is the Ministry. It is very much the counterpart of the French "Ministère", from which it was copied, or the U.S. federal "Department". The Lebanese ministries, presently fourteen in number, are divided -- in view of their purpose and functions and in conformity with the underlying social needs -- in the following manner: (1) Justice, (2) Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, (3) Interior, (4) Finance, (5) Public Works and Transport, (6) National Defence, (7) National Education and Fine Arts, (8) Public Health, (9) National Economy, (10) Agriculture, (11) Post, Telegraph and Telephone, (12) Labour and Social Affairs, (13) Orientation, Information and Tourism, and (14) General Planning.¹

Besides the present fourteen ministries there are around a score of "independent or autonomous services" and semi-autonomous "offices" which operate outside the ministerial framework but under

¹Legislative Decree No. 111, June 12, 1959, art. 1. Ministries are established and cancelled by means of a special law. Ibid.

the tutelage (financial and administrative control) of some of these ministries. Also, there are three central agencies attached to the Prime Minister's Office and involve central financial and administrative control and personnel administration. These are the Bureau of Accounts, the Central Inspection, and the Civil Service Council. The offices of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister involve each a Directorate-General with a limited number of civil servants.

B. The Minister

Each of these ministries is headed by a Minister,² however the number of ministers is not limited by the Constitution or the laws. The minister is in charge of the administration of his ministry. Constitutionally, the minister is responsible to direct the affairs of the state and to apply within his ministry the will and directives of the Parliament.³ He is assumed to be the centre of power in the administration, and formally speaking, he exercises full and ultimate authority over his ministry. As such his judgement and orders are final and must prevail.

²In actual practice a Minister may head more than one ministry; or he may be a minister without portfolio for parliamentary purposes or special missions as for instance, administrative reform.

³Lebanon, Constitution, art. 64. This article reads: "Ministers shall administer the services of the State and the application of laws and regulations, each within his department and in so far as he is concerned." As in The Lebanese Constitution, prepared by the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut, 1960, p. 25.

The Executive can, in the same manner as it can appoint ministers, appoint assistants to the ministers with special powers more than those usually given to the Director-General in a ministry. These may be called 'Secretaries-General' as was once the case in the Ministry of National Economy.⁴ Presently this same title is given to the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Emigrants. However, this did not develop into a practice and no such positions are usually created.

C. The Directorates-General

The ministry is composed of one or more Directorate-General,⁵ depending on the area of service and extent of functions given it. The Directorate-General forms the largest administrative unit and includes all other administrative subdivisions.

D. The Director-General

Each Directorate-General is headed by a career civil servant, the Director-General, who is the highest administrator and the direct head of each and every administrative subdivision and civil servant.⁶ The Director-General is a very

⁴Subhi Mahmasani, Al-Dustur Wal-Dimuqratiyah (translation of Arabic title, The Constitution and Democracy) (Beirut: Dar Al-'Ilm Lilmalayeen, 1952), p. 211.

⁵Legislative Decree No. 111, op.cit., art. 2, sect. 1. The Directorates-General vary in number from one in some ministries to four in others.

⁶Legislative Decree No. 111, art. 7, sect. 1.

important figure in the Lebanese administration. He is usually a very experienced person — sometimes a career man since the days of the French — and with invaluable knowledge of the ministry and its administrative and other problems. He acts as the chief advisor to the minister on all matters pertaining to the ministry and its operation. In many instances he actually determines courses of action which an inexperienced or, perhaps, a weak minister would follow.

It would be of immediate concern to look at the functions given the Director-General by law. He is in charge of administering all units under him, coordinating their activities, and controlling the proper execution of their duties and functions as regards the following:⁷

1. He exercises the authority given him by law.
2. He takes decisions and signs all transactions and correspondence pertaining to his work.
3. He coordinates the activities of the various units and civil servants under his authority.
4. He executes policy in the manner and time ordained.
5. He submits to the Minister matters involving general principles or pertaining to the latter's authority.
6. He prepares instructions regarding work operations, the budget, the annual programme of work and studies which lead to betterment of operations and raising of administrative standards.

⁷Ibid., art. 7, sect. 2.

7. He controls and inspects the units and civil servants under him; takes necessary measures for punishing wrongdoers, corrects the wrongs and provides against future mismanagement; carries out an inspection once every three months in the central units, and once every six months in regional units.
8. He establishes contact with the 'Directorate General of Central Inspection' regarding the reports of the latter's inspectors and suggestions for better management; he may ask the Central Inspection to conduct inspection in his units, in addition to his own inspection.
9. He sees to the proper use of materials and furniture in the units.
10. He is responsible for the execution of laws and regulations through the civil servants under him.

The Director-General signs all project decrees, arrêtés and transactions which must be submitted to the Minister, and he may include his written opinion and suggestions. He makes up a report every six months outlining the programme of his department and specifying what things have been completed and where action is still pending. This report should state what difficulties confronted the execution of the department's programmes. It should also include a statement on the conditions of the civil servants under him. Finally, the report must include plans or programmes prepared to be executed the next year. This semi-annual report is submitted to the Minister and copies of it should be sent to the Civil Service Council and the Central Inspection.⁸

The Director-General is possessed of definite powers given

⁸ Ibid., art. 7, sect. 3 and 4.

him by law and, hence, cannot be taken from him except by law. This point is of importance when discussing the relations between him and his Minister, below. We may note here that a major criticism in respect of such relations, and possibilities of conflict between a Director-General and a Minister, reside in the lack of a clear definition of power between them both in many respects. The Minister may also delegate some of his powers -- except those given to him specifically by the constitution -- to his Director-General.

E. Council of Directors-General⁹

The Directors-General of all the ministries must convene every three months upon the invitation of the head of the Civil Service Council and in the presence of the members of the Board of the Civil Service Council and the Board of the Central Inspection. The purpose of this meeting is to exchange opinions on the affairs of the Lebanese administration and to suggest measures necessary for raising its professional level and betterment of its functioning.

F. A Director-General's Work Day

Generally speaking, the Lebanese Director-General is a very busy man. He is overworked, however, with daily routine, most of which could be done at lower levels. This overconcentration is costly in time and effort and is at the expense of major policy formulations. Thanks to many useless interruptions such as too many visitors and telephone calls, his office becomes a serious bottle-neck to the flow of work since he is at the top of the hierarchy with the flow of work going up to

⁹ Ibid., art. 10.

him, and where innumerable transactions and correspondence wait for his signature or decision.

It would be revealing to take a book of day's work of a typical Director-General:

Being the most important man in the ministry — well, besides the minister himself — he would arrive at his office one or two hours late from the morning official starting hour of 8:00 a.m. He could have used those two hours very fruitfully at his desk. However, he stayed late the previous night at, perhaps, some friend's cocktail party, some minister's dinner, or with the parliamentary deputy from his region at the 'Casino du Liban'. He would be treated first of all to the usual stimulant — a cup of flavoured and boiled Turkish coffee. He would take a glance at the morning papers, perhaps to enjoy a picture of himself featuring the events of the previous night. Then he would start his daily routine battle. He calls his chief of the 'Diwan' for the daily incoming mail, and to get refreshed on that which is still stacked on his desk from previous days. He would place a considerable number of phone calls to other Directors-General, to some agency, to his residence, and to the 'Qasr' (Presidential Palace). Meantime he would order the Hajib (the 'office boy' who is most probably a man in his fifties) not to show anybody in because he is busy. He would start a process of signing, scratching and looking over his mail: sending most of it to appropriate levels under him with remarks and orders; directing the chief of the 'Diwan' to answer some of it; returning some of it to its origin for more information or for correcting an error of form; approving and sending some of it which came up to him to other ministries; laying some aside for a closer look "later". The telephones start to ring. The Qasr is on the line and he talks to its Director-General for quite a time. His secretary sees to the rest of the calls — cutting some off, giving dates to some to call later, taking notes from the rest. The Hajib, after peeping several times, comes right besides him and very politely, even apprehensively, whisper the names of several people waiting outside. He is instructed to show one or two in; the rest he can't see as he is very busy and they have to come later. He instructs the secretary to call one or two service chiefs, and that they should bring certain dossiers which have been with them for quite a time. The Qasr or another Director-General is so worried about their delay. He welcomes and talks to those who came in. They must have nothing to worry about. Everything would be done to their pleasure, and "please give my regards to my Friend Mr. "...!" and tell him to come and honour us with a visit! wan't you have a cup of coffee?!, No!, well, may Allah be with you, Bye Bye." He has to see the Minister now, and he hurries with a

few files to the latter's office. He stays there for more than an hour. One of the Service chiefs who came to his office went back for he can't stay with so much work and so many people waiting for him. He promised to come back after an hour. The other Service chief is glad to wait. He would get rid of all the chaos and people waiting for him in his office. The Director-General comes back. He floods his Diwan chief with things to do. He talks to (or shouts at) the chiefs of his services — but not all of them anyway. It is 12:30 p.m. ..., and he orders coffee. A Director-General, an old friend, from another ministry comes to see him. This fellow's minister went to his second ministry, and he took the opportunity — perhaps, under the pretext of having a committee meeting — to leave the office and come over. He talks with him for quite a time — mostly pleasantries and bureaucratic gossip. Then, he leaves. The Director-General sees that he really must sign some more of those employees' leaves and travel orders; some letters of congratulations, of reprimand, of salary-deductions. At 1:00 p.m. he must go to the meeting of the "Committee on....". He tells his secretary to convey his excuses for not attending another committee meeting somewhere else at 1:30 p.m. Now the Minister calls. He is going to the usual cabinet meeting (on Wednesdays.) with his colleagues and wants to know what happened to a particular case. The know-it-all Administrator informs him in assured tones all about it. After this the Diwan chief informs him that a Muhafez wants to see him, and is immediately ushered in. It is about the Ministry's regional office and some problem there. The interview takes more than half an hour. Then the Muhafez leaves with a satisfied grin on his face. Now the "exhausted" Director-General is definitely late for the first committee meeting, but not too late for the other committee meeting (although he told them he is not coming), and he decides to go there. He packs his fine leather case in order to leave. The Diwan chief rushes with papers for him to sign involving the authorization of some expenditure. After a casual glance, he signs them. And "what about the rest of the mail, Sir?" Well, definitely it will be done tomorrow. He leaves the office, well after 2:00 p.m., and quite a time after a great many of his subordinates have left their offices.¹⁰ He must reach that committee before it ends its meetings. Anyway, he can't stay too long there. He was invited in the morning by telephone to lunch with His Excellency "Monsieur....", and he cannot afford to miss such an opportunity to talk on that latest scandal in the ministry of "...." concerning one of his colleagues of the same rank.

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"Among the last to leave, A reflects with bowed shoulders and a wry smile that late hours, like grey hairs, are among the penalties of success." C. Northcote Parkinson, Parkinson's Law (London: John Murray, 1961), p. 15.

G. The Hierarchy

The organization of the Lebanese administrative hierarchy follows a clear-cut, simple and uniform pattern. The Directorate-General is systematically divided into Directorates; Directorates into services; Services into Departments; Departments into Sections;¹¹ and Sections are composed of Branches or Workposts, i.e., the body of the civil servants.

Chart IV-1, below, presents the typical organization of the Lebanese administrative hierarchy. Cases exist where the Directorate-General is subdivided immediately into Services without the intermediary level of the Directorate; also, Directorates or Services into Sections without the intermediary level of the Department. Whenever there is found both a Directorate and a Service, the former is hierarchically higher although the civil servants heading both are of the same rank, i.e., Category II. The other example of administrative units where there is a difference in the hierarchical level but not in the rank of the civil servants heading them is the Department and the Section. Both are category III employees.

Looking at all these administrative units of the hierarchy we find that although they conform systematically as to structure they do not necessarily so conform as to their size, number and scope. What we mean by this is that we may find an unequal number of similar units in two Ministries. Also, we may find a Service in one Ministry which equals a Directorate-General in another Ministry from the point of view of the total number of civil servants and

¹¹Legislative Decree No. 111, op.cit., art. 2, sect. 1.

the scope of their activities. Similarly, a Section may equal a Department and, in many cases, a Service. From this we may notice that the variations in size and number of these administrative units are directly proportional to the size and scope of each of the ministries.

H. The Advisory Coordination Committee

A ministry which is composed of more than a single Directorate-General has an advisory committee for purposes of coordination attached directly to the minister. This committee is composed of all the Directors-General and heads of smaller units if they are directly attached to the minister and is headed by the most senior among them whether in rank or service whichever is necessary.¹² The recommendations of this committee are reported directly to the minister; and the latter assigns to the committee whatever common problems exist between the ministry's main administrative units. These problems may involve matters of internal organization in the ministry, the budget project and considerations of additional appropriations, purchases and works' programmes and the distribution of funds for these activities, personnel matters which demand a choice such as promotion, specialization and training, and, in general, any difficulties that may develop in the ministerial machinery.¹³ The author doubts whether all the ministries with

¹²Decree No. 2894, January 16, 1959.

¹³Ibid., arts. 19 and 20.

more than one Directorate-General have established their Coordination Committees, or if they did, that they are of any useful and effective help as an advisory body to the minister.

I. Personal Staff Units

For every level of the hierarchy there is provided a staff unit responsible for the personal matters of that level.

At the level of the minister, he may, and most certainly does, designate one or two Personal Secretaries from among the civil servants of his ministry to organize his interviews, communications, private invitations, etc. The service of the personal secretary remains in existence so long as the minister's term in office also exists. On the termination of the latter's office the former reverts to his original position. The secretary is attached to the 'Common Administrative unit' or the 'Diwān' (secretariat) of the ministry.¹⁴ Actually the minister's secretary is somebody who is a supporter of the minister, perhaps his 'protégé', or somebody who was strongly recommended to him by intimate friends or pressure groups. The personal secretary usually develops to be a very influential person and an important private link or 'door' to reach the minister. Many secretaries are known to have utilized such a job very profitably indeed.

Each Directorate-General has a Diwān, a secretariat, which

¹⁴Ibid., arts. 16 and 17.

is directly attached to the D.-G. and is responsible for conducting the day-to-day 'paperasserie' involving mail registry, correspondence, filing; budget accountacy; payroll; personnel matters' files, promotion lists and transactions related to the personnel law; equipment, furniture, clothes, forms (control and inventories thereof); government buildings' care, cleanliness, and protection; legal transactions, studies and advise; statistics; administering all publications, declarations, advertisements; administering the library; receiving complaints and questions from the public, keeping a complaints' record and procuring answers back to the public; and conducting external matters such as cooperating with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to prepare for international, regional, or local conferences, meetings and lectures which take place in Lebanon.¹⁵

The Diwān, burdened with so much work and functions, may be organized in as many units as necessary to meet its responsibilities. However, generally, it involves an administrative, a finance and a legal subdivisions.

In a ministry wherein exists more than one Directorate-General, there is a secretarial unit, besides the Diwān(s) of each Directorate-General, called the Common Administrative Service (or Directorate). This is directly attached to the minister and takes responsibility of secretarial functions common to all the Directorates-General of the ministry. Its duties are similar to those of the Diwān and it divides with the latter many of its duties leaving

¹⁵ Ibid., arts. 2-11.

it the particular functions related to its Directorate-General and taking from it the more common and general of these duties. It can be given more common functions by the minister and in this capacity—like the Diwān in its own capacity — can communicate directly with all the units of this ministry.¹⁶

Down through the hierarchy and at the levels of Directorates, Services and Departments a Qālām, in fact a Diwān on a smaller scale, assumes the functions of a secretariat. At the Section level there may exist a Qālām but if it does not, one or more civil servants are usually entrusted with secretarial functions.

We may note that even in the secretarial units we find an orderly systematic organization similar to the uniform pattern of organization found in the main administrative hierarchy and follows from it.

¹⁶ Ibid., arts. 12-13 and 15.

CHAPTER V

THE CADRE'S CLASSIFICATION AND PAY SCALE

A. The Rational System

The objectives of a rational system of position classification is to provide the means for effective performance which are necessary for the attainment of desired organizational goals. This requires the presence of a differential ranking system of classes or layers of positions with each layer or class having roughly a similar rank; the concept of the "position" used must imply an aggregation of harmonious and related duties and responsibilities; each role content must contain certain aspects which may be emphasized more than others; the ranking (evaluation) must be based, consequently, on the relative merits of quality and performance; the total scale must be grouped into categories reflecting levels of difficulty; and finally, and which is very important, the salaries should be adequate and based on the classification system used.

B. The Lebanese System

The western concept of position classification -- which is of American origin and of recent European (including French) adoption -- was borrowed by Lebanon from the Mandatory Power (1923-1943) "... at a time when it was not yet influenced by American practice. Independent Lebanon has continued this same practice with very slight modifications and without taking notice of the various important developments in this field which were accepted by France itself."¹⁷

The classification system in operation in Lebanon is basically regulated by the 'Law of 7 May 1957' -- which system is the third amended reincarnation of the original one of 1953 and the one of 1955.²¹ Later decrees issued in 1959 added some positions to the present categories, the ranks therein and amended the pay gradations.

¹⁷ Adnan Iskandar, "Position Classification and Compensation," (Part of an unpublished paper on the Lebanese personnel administration system intended as Ph.D. dissertation in the American University, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.), p. 2.

²¹ The system of 1953 was established by Legislative Decree No. 13 of 7 December 1953; that of 1955, by Legislative Decree No. 14 of 7 January 1955.

Table V-1³ presents the general administrative position classification system and salary schedule as set by the 1957 law plus later additions and amendments.

The general cadre — position classification and salary schedule — involve what is termed as the "administrative" positions, i.e., the non-technical or special positions. Every ministry or government agency has its own "technical or special cadre" which involves technical and special positions in line with its functional specialty and nature. The administrative positions, nevertheless, comprise a majority of the civil service leaving the technical and special cadres a comparatively small number of positions.

The present classification system is a simple and almost rigid plan comprising five categories with the first as the highest one and the fifth as the lowest. Each category contains few specified job titles, some categories have two or three ranks and all follow pay steps numbering from 5 steps in Category I, Rank 1 to 8 steps in the lowest category.³ To Lebanon this standard and rigid terminology of positions is not without its advantages. Such terminology facilitates the problem of maintaining this classification plan and avoids the complex problems involved in a more comprehensive one. The crude and uncomplicated plan, together with the absence of

³ Rigid educational requirements — besides examinations and/or others — are set by law for admittance into each category and for promotion from one category to the higher one.

TABLE V-1

GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE POSITION CLASSIFICATION
SYSTEM AND SALARY SCHEDULE a/

Category	Rank	Positions	Steps (In Leb. Pounds)	Total No. of Steps
I	1	-Chief, C.S.C.	1555; 1655; 1755; 1855; 1955.	5
		-Chief, Cent. Inspec.		
II	2	-Director General		6
		-Muhafez		
		-Inspector General	1080; 1180; 1280; 1380; 1480; 1580.	
III	1	-Director		6
		-Chief of Service	730; 800; 870; 940; 1010; 1080.	
		-Inspector		
IV	1	-Q'aimmaqam ^{c/}		6
		-Chief of Department		
		-Chief of Section		
		-Controller		
		-Assistant Inspector		
		-Chief of Common Administrative Service; or Chief of Diwan.d/	505; 550; 595; 640; 685; 730.	
		-Muhar'er (Sr. Clerk)		
-Stenographer-Typist	342.50; 375; 407.50; 440; 472.50; 505.			

TABLE IV-12 ---Continued

Category	Rank	Positions	Steps (In Leb. Pounds)	Total No. of Steps
	2	-Kateb(Jr.Clerk) -Typist -Telephone Operator	205; 232.50; 260; 287.50; 315; 342.50.	6
V	1	-Hajeb (Office boy/ Messenger) -Driver	176; 205; 232.50; 260; 287.50; 315; 342.50; 375.	8
	2	-Guard	170; 187.50; 205; 232.50; 260; 287.50; 315; 342.50	8
	3	-Janitor	117.50; 135; 152.50; 170; 187.50; 205; 232.50; 260.	8

^aLaw of 7 May 1957, art. 1 and Annex No. 1, as in Lebanon, Official Gazette, No. 21, May 9, 1957, pp. 468 and 474-476; the salary schedule was amended by Decree No. 6167 dated 21 February 1961, as in Ibid., No. 8, February 22, 1961, pp. 137-140; also, Decree No. 2893, dated 16 December 1959; Decree No. 2459, dated 9 November 1959, Annex No. 2; Decree No. 2460, dated 9 November 1959, Annex No. 2; Legislative Decree No. 116, dated 12 June 1959; Decree No. 2894, dated 16 December 1959.

^bCategories I, II and III could be considered as Lebanon's "Higher Civil Service".

^cThe Q*aimmaq(m)s could be in category III or II; at present they are all in the former.

^dBoth positions could be in category III or II.

properly qualified personnel to administer a more complicated and comprehensive one, adds to the facility of its management. Another advantage may be the low cost arising from its administration. A third advantage is that it facilitates fiscal control over personnel costs. Finally, such a plan responds easily to adjustments and changes of a general nature such as a certain percentage increase as the ones of 1957 and 1961.

This classification system generates, however, many disadvantages. The great majority of the positions are not classified according to a rational, scientific and comprehensive system. The differential ranking system of classes, the aggregation of positions and their role contents, are all set in an arbitrary manner. The unstudied allocation of job titles to categories and ranks reveal that no adequate consideration was given to either definitions of duties, responsibilities and levels of difficulty or to qualifications needed for such positions.

√ From this we can deduce that no basis or data exists on which a sound, rational and positive recruitment, selection and other personnel administration programmes could be built by the Civil Service Council. Moreover, the salary scale is inadequate and is not based on a sound classification system. √ Gradations of pay do not reveal gradations of responsibility and difficulty in many positions. √ Accordingly, there is no basis for 'equal pay for equal work' √ a principle which is so necessary in a merit system. √ The salary scale, in addition to its inequities, does not provide,

especially in lower categories, adequate compensation by which the civil servants could obtain a respectable minimum standard of living and decency. The pay policy does not rest on a scientifically studied basis that takes into consideration social, economic — in addition to administrative, i.e., recruitment — factors.

✓ The civil servant with a low salary, pressured by the soaring cost of living, is forced to accept, let alone seek, bribery and bakhshish ✓
Accompanying consequences on their morality, integrity, efficiency, productivity and morale are too evident, shaking, and damaging.

✓ Such a pay policy hampers the government's ability to recruit and retain qualified talent and to compete with the private sector in drawing qualified persons to the public service ✓

The law provides for automatic salary increases every 30 months and they are granted indiscriminately to all civil servants. ⁴⁾

"Such practice does not differentiate between the mediocre employee and the superior one. It actually stifles initiative and encourages mediocrity of performance since poor employees know that they will not be punished for poor performance, and superior employees know that they will not be rewarded for superior performance. This policy which ignores the simple principle of punishment and reward can be very damaging to morale." ⁵⁾

During the Mandate and for some time during Independence, a system of performance evaluation based on merit was used but it

⁴⁾ Legislative Decree No. 112, dated 12 June 1959, art. 32, sect. 3.

⁵⁾ A. Iskandar, op.cit., p. 23.

proved to be "... highly arbitrary, subjective and easily abused and as a result did more damage than it corrected and had to be abandoned."⁶

C. Position-Classification Vs. Job Descriptions

The author's experiences in the Lebanese administration -- specially during the latest reform movement, and more particularly in the "Job Descriptions' Committee" of 20 March 1962, and some current reorganization surveys -- revealed to him the fact that job titles may not all the time disclose job contents. Civil servants with similar job titles may be performing different and unrelated tasks, possibly in varying occupational fields; some performing functionally different duties and responsibilities may have the same job title. Also, a civil servant with a job title pertaining to a certain category, say category IV, may be performing de facto duties and responsibilities pertaining to a higher level of difficulty and authority in category III. Examples are too many and are readily obtainable from any ministry.

Although the government was given extensive powers by the Parliament in 1958 to change, among other things, the present classification system and compensation plan nothing was done to this effect. "It is unfortunate to note that the recent reform movement of 1959, inspite of its ambitions and comprehensive aims, has completely overlooked this aspect of civil service reform. What is more disturbing is the fact that the government does not seem to realize the significance of position classification and

²⁶Ibid.

the essential role which it can play in the personnel program and as a result has failed to devote any attention to it."⁷

The primes of 1962 witnessed the birth and enhancement of the idea of carrying out a government-wide study for the purpose of establishing job descriptions for every position, or at least for every civil servant in the central administration and the regional offices. This idea originated in the 'Administrative Reform Machinery' which is attached to the Prime Minister's Office. After much preparatory schemes and squables — Arrêté No. 11 of 20 March 1962 was issued by the Prime Minister and it set the legal authorization for such a move. The Arrêté established a 3-man committee composed of the Administrative Inspector General (Dr. Bashir Al-Bilani) as chairman, and the Director of Studies at the National Institute of Public Administration (Mr. Charles Rizk) and the Chief of the Service of Research and Guidance — i.e., central O. & M. office — (Dr. Azmi Rajab) as members. The 'Job Descriptions' Committee⁸ was entrusted with the task of "... directing and coordinating the works of setting the civil servants' job descriptions and the application of regulations issued to this effect in collaboration with the concerned Idara(s)."⁸ The chairman and the two members of the committee were to "...give this task priority over all their other duties and functions."⁹

⁷ Adnan Iskandar, op.cit., p. 2.

⁸ Arrêté No. 11, March 20, 1962, art. 1.

⁹ Ibid.

The committee was to report monthly to the 'Reform Machinery' of the Prime Minister's Office and it had to complete its work by the end of 1962.¹⁰

About 23 to 25 inspectors from the Central Inspection were initially placed under the disposition of this committee to conduct the needed survey; starting with 1963 they were reduced to 10. The deadline for terminating the project itself was informally extended provisionally till the end of June 1963.¹¹ Work has been completed in about eight ministries and their regional offices in the Muhafazāt. The rest of the ministries — except for two, all the central administrative units (the Civil Chamber of the Presidency of the Republic; the Directorate General of the Prime Minister's Office; the Central Inspection; the Civil Service Council; the Bureau of Accounts; the Council of State) and the immediate offices of the Muhafezeen and the Qā'immaqām(s) are next on the list.¹² The Ministry of Public Health was left to be done by the Inspector General for Health, Social Affairs and Agriculture, Dr. Faraj Saādeh. The Ministry of Orientation, Information and Tourism has been excluded from this scheme because it is undergoing detailed internal organization, a so-called mise en place operation, by a French expert, Mr. Yves Lecompte, and the author.

¹⁰Ibid., art. 2.

¹¹Interview with Dr. Bashīr al-Bilani, Administrative Inspector General and Chairman of the 'Job Descriptions' Committee', May 21, 1963.

¹²Ibid.

The author shall refrain from discussing the details of the inception of the Committee, its operations, its human and technical potentialities and its methodology of operations. Nevertheless, he feels obliged to comment on two major points. The first, is that the setting of job descriptions for all the civil servants in the Lebanese administration is certainly an important and essential primary step towards the initial ordering of the present rather confused state of affairs. Such a step will visibly bring better structuring and clarity to the distribution of authorities and functions among the various administrative units as ordained by both the laws and actual practice, the distribution of duties and responsibilities among the civil servants in these units and the routing of administrative operations and transactions. Efficiency and productivity of civil servants are bound to be considerably ameliorated as a result. The second point to comment upon is that in no way, however, do the results of the Committee's work tackle the more basic and important problem of establishing a more rational and comprehensive position-classification system in the Lebanese bureaucracy.

We may note, as a conclusion, that if the present position-classification system could serve the Lebanese administration perhaps adequately during the Mandate period and for some time during Independence, it could no more do so at present. The significant expansion in the Lebanese bureaucracy up till now and the new socio-economic activities undertaken by it make the installation of a new

plan -- which will necessarily include many new technical and specialized positions and, accordingly, it must incorporate the present separate technical and special classification plans of the various ministries -- a matter of primary and singular importance for the purpose of correcting the present confusion of the different schedules and pay scales and the eliminating of glaring inequities and injustices therein.¹³

¹³ For a relevant citation on the subject see Chapter VIII, p. 217.

CHAPTER VI

DELEGATION OF POWERS AND ROLE CONFLICT

A. Occupational Roles, Personality Types and Strain

An important area of discussion in the subject of the behavior of bureaucrats in an organization is the interplay between organizational structure and personality, the peculiar conditions of elected positions versus non-elected ones and the accommodations made by both minister and civil servant in this regard. The elected politician fulfills a certain occupational role; and so does the permanent administrator. In the working relationships of both, strain and conflict are expected to arise due to differences that may exist in their occupational roles. Some may, however, experience greater or lesser strains due to their particular personality types.¹ Examples and cases showing this will be given below.

¹William C. Mitchell, "Occupational Role Strains: The American Elective Public Official," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. III, No. 2 (September, 1958), pp. 210-211.

William C. Mitchell considered seven general, but primary, sources of strain for the elected public official. They are: "(1) insecurity of tenure; (2) conflict among public roles; (3) conflict of private and public roles; (4) ambiguities in political situations; (5) diffused responsibility and limited control of situations; (6) time and pressure of demands; (7) and status insecurity." ² Role strain was defined by Mitchell as "the resultant of attempts to meet expectations that cannot be fully met either by a person or a social system." ³ He also noted that both social system and person cannot "be free of the problems of adjustment to new and difficult situations." As such, some form of strain will, therefore, accompany any adjustment process. ⁴

As far as our particular discussion is concerned, three points are important:

First, "All incumbents of a particular role will therefore be subject to the same role strains, even though they may respond quite differently to them. (Thus) if we know the role or norm structure of a given social system we ought to be able to predict where and how role strains will occur." ⁵

² Ibid., p. 212.

³ Ibid., p. 211.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

Second, The strains of insecurity on the politician arising from periodic, usually rather short, terms of office.⁶

Third, "The fact that most politicians serve in more than one role as elective public officials guarantees conflicts among norms of performance." The politician's decisions are certainly influenced by a variety of sources and interests.⁷ "Obviously, those offices which combine the greater number of roles will engender the most conflicts, whereas the offices with the fewest number of roles develop the fewest conflicts."⁸

B. The Lebanese Minister Vs. Director-General

The Lebanese minister, and indeed any other minister in any other cabinet, is subject to the same role strains regardless of the way he may respond to them. He is an elected politician, i.e., a member of the Chamber of Deputies. Very seldom is a minister one from outside Parliament. Thus, he is the elected representative of a particular district. In his district he is not merely a parliamentary deputy, as he is not a candidate in the list of an organized party, but, perhaps, an important social leader -- locally known as Za'im.⁹ He must perpetuate and guide the time honoured norm

⁶ Ibid., p. 213.

⁷ Ibid., p. 214.

⁸ Ibid., p. 216.

⁹ He represents confessional and regional groups as well as family and interest group politics. The word Za'im stands for a chief, head, leader, or strongman in Arabic. It is usually an inherited position, with money, influence, power, and the right touch with clients as prerequisite. For more interesting details and definitions see, Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'amā' and parties in the Lebanese crisis of 1958," The Middle East Journal, Vol. V, No. 2 (Spring, 1961), pp. 127-134.

structure of his particular social context. He may be elected from a constituency whose districts have a considerable heterogeneity of religious sects and perhaps races. He may be elected by a religious sect (Note, not by an organized political party) through the support of another Za'im in another district who belongs to and heads this sect. His followers in this second Za'im's constituency are 'ordered' by him to elect the latter, and thus the 'electoral debt' is paid. As such our minister may very well be a member of a regional bloc, and consequently a parliamentary bloc, with rights on and obligations to the other members in it. He became a minister through, perhaps, an intricate coalition of blocs and interests. As such, it is evident that he serves in more than one role and his situation involves the possibility of considerable role conflict. We may add that his term of office is insecure and ephemeral for experience shows that the average life-expectancy of the Lebanese cabinet is around six months.

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The Lebanese Director-General, on the other hand, is a secure, permanent, and career civil servant. He suffers considerably less from the strains of insecurity. He is in a position to avoid

¹⁰M. Majzoub, (Mihnat Al-Dimokratiah Wal-Uruba Fi Lubnān, translation of Arabic title, The Crisis of Democracy and Arabism in Lebanon) (Beirut: Dar Munaimneh Liltiba'ā Wal-Nashr, 1957), pp. 31-33.

entanglement with numerous roles, although he may have one or two roles that may prove to have similar problems as those of the minister. In this case, he himself may be an important local personality or a "petit za'im" somewhere and his people, like his friends or other administrators, look for his support or help in administrative circles, including his own. The D.-G.'s problem in this sphere, however, is much reduced from that of the minister. But he is involved, like any other D.-G. in any ministry, in the norm structure of the Lebanese social system. Perhaps this alone may put him close with his minister, although he can hide behind his neutrality and the impartial application of the laws if he so chooses.

The Lebanese parliamentary deputy — and probably, sometimes, a minister — is supposed to work "directly and at all times for the public interest, ... (unlike) the business man (who) is encouraged to serve his own ends."¹¹ However, reality shows that a great many of our illustrious deputies are 'directly' and 'most of the time' working for their own interests, and some of them are knowledgeable and accomplished businessmen indeed! In the same way, our administrators — including many a D.G. — are such devoted persons that their long public service have brought them considerable fortunes in a questionable manner.

The incumbent of a political role may structure his role as he pleases. But no matter how he does this, the responsibility

¹¹ Mitchell, op.cit., pp. 217-18.

of his office remains diffused. His responsibility is generalized; while in most administrative roles this responsibility is specific. The focus in the politician's role "is upon relationships with other persons rather than upon technical goals to be reached by the most efficient means."¹² The minister needs the cooperation of his cabinet colleagues, of his political bloc and allied blocs and of many other persons, which persons may have different values, interests and goals. The amount of compromise and strain resulting from such relationship is evident.

The Lebanese minister is also pressured in view of demands on his time and influence. He is sought for the latter and in the process he loses a great deal of the former. He must always be ready to receive influential supporters of himself and of his allies, carriers of autographed 'cartes de visite', common 'God-forsaken' and 'back-less' people, and almost always big woufoud (sing., wafd).¹³ In this situation, he is left with little time for decision-making and intelligent study of proposed legislation. Snatching and throwing bits and pieces of patronage becomes the chief occupier of his daily timetable. The Lebanese Director-General is perhaps in a similar situation in his own administrative sphere. This was shown by the description of a typical D.-G.'s work day presented above.

¹²Ibid., p. 220.

¹³Representative delegations from villages or pressure groups.

Mitchell uses Talcott Parsons' pattern — variable scheme¹⁴ to "categorize the premises of decisions in terms of five dichotomous choices...".¹⁵ The different orientations of a politician, he says, produce different decisions by him — hence, the great concern by other persons to shape the politician's orientation.¹⁶ As such, we find that:

"If a politician chooses to accept or be guided in his decision making by one role in preference to another, he is forced to de-emphasize other roles he might be expected by some to perform. This matter of choosing certain premises rather than others brings out the problem of role conflict." ¹⁷

As an illustration, Mitchell characterizes two roles — the administrative and the partisan. He found out that the pattern variables, in terms of which these roles are analyzed, make "the expectations concerning performances... (be) contrary at every relevant choice point."¹⁸ The following table illustrates the characterization:

TABLE VI-1

THE PATTERN-VARIABLES AND ROLE CONFLICT^{a/}

Role	1	2	3	4	5
Admin.	Specific	Affective neutrality	Univer- salistic	Collectivity Orientation	Achieve- ment
Partisan	Diffuse	Affective	Particu- laristic	Self-orien- tation	Ascrip- tion

^{a/}W.C. Mitchell, "Occupational Role Strains: The American Elective Public Official," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. III, No. 2 (September, 1958), p. 216.

¹⁴ See Chapter I, p. 4.

¹⁵ Mitchell, *op.cit.*, p. 216.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 214-215.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

The office of the minister which combine a greater number of roles — as compared to the office of the Director-General — will develop more conflicts. Conflicts arise from the opposition of the premises of action in each role. The administrator (D.G.) is expected to be affectively neutral in the situation, to have a functionally specific role, to employ universalistic standards, to be achievement-oriented and to be collectively oriented; the partisan (the Minister) is expected, respectively, to be affectively involved in the situation, to have a functionally diffused role, to employ particularistic criteria, to be ascriptively oriented, and to be self-oriented.¹⁹ Such conflict has led in some occasions to consider changing the political system involving a separation of powers between the executive and the legislature in that a person may not be a minister and a member of Parliament at the same time.²⁰ This is thought to relieve the minister of many of his partisan roles.

We have noted above that the minister may delegate some of his powers, except those given him by the Constitution, to his Director-General.²¹ This same concept of delegation is carried down through the hierarchy. Hence in the same manner the D.-G. may delegate some of his powers, except those delegated to him by the minister, to the Director or Chief of Service. The latter

¹⁹Ibid., p. 215.

²⁰This was ordained by article 23 of the Constitution of France's Fifth Republic.

²¹Legislative Decree No. 111, op.cit., art. 7, sect. 5.

two may also delegate some of their powers, except those delegated to them by the D.-G., to their Chiefs of Departments or Chiefs of Sections.²²

In actual practice the Minister did delegate some powers to his D.-G. in many ministries and at various times. On the other hand he may have encroached on the powers of his D.-G. which are specifically for the latter by law. These two extremes are governed by three factors:

- First, the previous experience of the minister and his role behaviour;
- Second, the competence of the D.G. and his role behaviour;
- Third, the working relations existing between minister and D.-G., and the degree of conformity between their roles.

An example of delegation of powers which, perhaps, illustrates some excellent formal working relations between a minister and his D.-G. is an arrêté recently issued by Dr. Rafik Naja, Minister of National Economy whereby the D.-G., Mr. Ihsan Baidoun, was given considerable administrative and financial powers.²³

²² Ibid., art. 8, sections 7 & 8.

²³ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2935, July 15, 1962. The powers delegated were: (1) Obligating the expenditures for the Ministry, (2) signing arrêtes of inventions' rights, (3) signing arrêtes of financial penalties concerning adulteration's contraventions, (4) signing leaves for civil servants for whatever period or kind, (5) signing arrêtes for medical and death benefits to civil servants, (6) signing arrêtes establishing prices of school books as determined by the concerned committee, (7) signing arrêtes referring the adulteration's contraventions to the office of the Prosecutor-General, (8) signing arrêtes of registration of insurance companies and its cancellation and imposition of fines in case such companies delay submission of their annual budget, (9) to give public declarations, talks and news concerning all economic and business matters; and publish what the laws allow of researches and writings in the same fields through appropriate means, (10) to permit, when necessary, the civil servants of his Directorate-General the same as in item (9). Such wide powers given the D.-G. definitely illustrate our point.

C. Cases

The author would like to present a few cases that took place very recently and which throw some light on role conflict between both Minister and Director-General. They show, in an intricate interplay of amazing circumstances the extent to which such relations can deteriorate. It must be emphasized that these cases also show many aspects of bureaucratic ills and behaviour in the Lebanese administration. The behavioural aspects were not isolated from the cases in order to preserve the significance of the events and social setting, and to provide an introductory atmosphere to later chapters.

Case A

Time: May-June, 1962.

Place: Ministry of Interior.

For quite a time up till May, 1962 inherent conflict existed between the Minister and the Director-General. Such conflict erupted and was made public at the start of May. The D.-G. revealed that the Minister was encroaching on his sphere of authority and that he was taking actions which definitely needed his agreement or at least the right to be informed about them. Three major factors were involved in such conflict: First, The minister took many arbitrary measures concerning what he termed 'matters of internal security' some of which related to municipal elections in areas in which his own electoral district is located. The D.-G. protested for not being informed and pointed out the illegality of some of the measures taken.²⁴ Second, The Minister wanted to include some of the names in the lists of municipal councils appointed by the government. The D.-G. whose signature is necessary to validate this refused to countersign and by so doing stopped the appointments. Serious conflict resulted

²⁴Undisclosed source. This has also resulted in serious conflict between the Minister and another minister who is also a deputy from the same area and sect; and the supporters of the latter staged many demonstrations in protest against the Minister's partisan policy regarding the municipal elections. The Minister took security measures against the demonstrators and protested to the P.M. asking him to make his rival stop such provocations. Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2977, September 1, 1962.

between them and the press knew about it. Much pressure was directed at the D.-G. who started to prepare a certain scheme. He himself had contacts and ties with influential people in the areas concerned with such appointments. They have pressured other Ministers against their colleagues' lists of names and tried to introduce some desired names of their own. The other ministers fortified by the stand of the D.-G. pressured their colleague into a compromise with the D.-G. The latter did not agree to the compromise until these ministers promised that they in their turn would block such appointments when discussed at the Ministerial Council meeting. Then he signed.²⁵

Third, The Minister, under pressure from his own political party and allied za'ims, wanted to recruit some of his men into the ministry. But he had to have vacant positions and good reasons for vacating some more. He had both. He planned at ousting many high civil servants — including, if he could succeed because of their mutual conflict, the D.-G. and many other lower grades employees under charges of corruption, inefficiency, nepotism, and suspicious connections with previous regimes. Also, he charged some other civil servants of membership in some political parties — most notably the one which attempted very recently a coup d'etat in Lebanon — and for operating and acting against public welfare and security. He contended that such civil servants must be dismissed for their potential and future danger in holding their present positions; and that it is timely to do it now while the Civil Service Council is planning to fill all vacant positions in the various ministries. The charges of the Minister could in many cases hold true and be very close to reality. However, the Minister was most certainly heading for trouble with parliamentary deputies and other ministers even if he planned or could transfer some of these civil servants from their positions, let alone dismissing them. He entrusted his private secretary to conduct a secret investigation with the intention of proving the charges. The secretary did so and used opposing and bickering civil servants who were not very fond of each others as sources of information. The Minister reported these information to the 'Central Inspection' and asked it to inspect the Ministry and further investigate the accused civil servants in the light of his charges. When the Inspectors came to investigate, the D.-G. did not remain silent, but — although he facilitated their mission — he provided specific explanation as regards the desires and goals of the Minister.²⁶ (Note — The author cannot disclose any further

²⁵ Undisclosed source.

²⁶ This part of case "A" was constructed from undisclosed sources, and from news made available to the press such as in Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2846, March 30, 1962.

information regarding the content of the Inspector's report and the settling of the case.)

Case B-

Time : May (and following months), 1961

Place: Ministry of Public Works and Transport.

Prior and up to the year 1959 and the establishment of the Civil Service Council, in which agency all aspects of personnel administration were centralized, a considerable number of civil servants (about 500) — the subject of this case — were in the Ministry in the temporary and daily paid status. They filled, among others, positions of chiefs of Sections and Departments and engineers. These people have been "squeezed" into the Ministry through the process of patronage existing between the za'im — deputy and the minister. The Ministry had no need for their services. Also, their ability, expertise and production were all at a very low degree. A considerable ratio of the permanent civil servants also enjoyed these same characteristics. These civil servants, however, formed — with the high officials of the Ministry (up to and including the D.-G.), the deputies and the ministers — an important ring and link by which all contracts for the ministry's national projects were rigged and "executed" according to elaborate "Profits' Distribution" ratios. As such, the D.-G. and his high officials and "engineers" administered, protected and profited from these civil servants; and the deputies and ministers wrung their lions' shares out of the government contracts and projects.

When a new cabinet was formed in May, 1961, the new Minister for Public Works Mr. Kamal Jumblāt — a supposedly professed anti-corruption fire-breather — came to his ministry and soon discovered the situation of the "temporary," the daily-paid and permanent civil servants. He found out that a great many of them were of no credit to the Ministry whatever; and definitely a debit on the monthly payroll. He could not very well arbitrarily dismiss them all since this was not within his powers. So he decided to make them sit for an examination for the purpose of, first, testing their ability, competence and expertise as regards their positions and, second, for the clear intention of failing and consequently dismissing as many as possible. The Minister issued, for the first time in the history of the Ministry, necessary regulations for the appointment of the Ujara, the daily paid and the temporary civil servants. This was done in accordance with the Personnel Law which require that examinations be conducted for such appointments in participation with the Civil Service Council.

The Minister, in a press conference (August 14, 1961), revealed all the shortcomings of the Ministry. He said, "The Ministry experiences a great deficiency in the number of technical staff needed for technical studies for the various projects. Most of the civil servants are careless and unproductive; they don't know the laws, or they don't apply them; they are the remnants and leftovers of the patronage, and supporters of the za'im(s) who employed them in government services." He gave an example that he discovered some 450 transactions, unsettled and accumulated in the Ministry since 1940! Mismanagement and inefficiency was not the only ailment. Corruption, graft and illegal enrichment were among the worse problems. "These would not end unless all responsible personalities (political and administrative) be taken to a special court and the way of thieves be cut off," continued the Minister, "and we would no more have a civil servant leaving the service and setting up a cement factory!" When asked about the 'Litani River project' scandal and consequent law suits, he pointed out that the I.B.R.D. report revealed many discrepancies in the construction of the dams and spending of the money. He added, "It may be enough for you to know, concerning the extent of criminality in this case, that our losses will not be, in any circumstance, less than L.£. 820 million because of collusion in the execution of the works!"

The intentions of the Minister immediately brought him into conflict with one D.-G. (and other D.-G.(s) in the Ministry) who was the brother of the Prime Minister. The Minister's intentions endangered many vested interests, and the D.-G., even if he did not represent them all, certainly represented the most influential and important part. The 'alliance' of the high civil servants and some of the deputies and ministers immediately reacted. The Minister, meantime, contacted the Civil Service Council and requested that it administer the noted examinations. A committee was formed for the purpose and was composed from high officials of the Ministry and a representative from the C.S.C. Also, the Minister reserved the right to appoint daily paid employees in his person and started to ignore the lists of such personnel which were prepared, according to usual routine up till then, by the D.-G. and the Directors under him. It was charged by the latter's circles that the Minister himself started to fill these lists from among his own people. The D.-G. started to fight the Minister by not signing or deciding on transactions and matters that needed his signature or action; 'freezing' matters which are important to the Minister such as projects in the latter's electoral district; the use of the pressure of his brother the Prime Minister over his Minister; and using the pressure of other ministers who had some of their men among the civil servants under discussion. The D.-G. was not fighting for all the men, and whose quality he knew. He merely wanted to save the few who were important to him. The Minister, on the other hand, was given his satisfaction to dismiss a considerable number of civil

servants; and since he could not afford the "War" of his D.-G. and Co., he saved for him his precious few. The C.S.C. was also satisfied in relieving the Lebanese bureaucracy of a sizable number of inefficient and corrupt do-nothings. The Examination Committee failed few hundreds civil servants and they were dismissed. 27

Case C- The "Ghadir" Land Case

Time : August, 1960 — and still going strong.
Place: *Ministry of Public Works;
*The Lebanese Cabinet;
*The Lebanese Conseil d'Etat.

The Beirut International Airport was officially inaugurated on April 23, 1954. Several times till now new amendments and enlargements had to be effected in it to meet the demands of the developing jet age and unique position of Beirut as a link and transit station between East and West.

One of these enlargements brought to the Lebanese bureaucracy and political life one of its most interesting, and yet shocking experiences. This case reveals, not only a situation of conflict between a Minister and Director-General, but the way the civil service and political power are corrupted, manipulated and prostituted to serve the private interests of the Rulers and their entourages.

The decision to build the Beirut International Airport at Khaldeh, south of the city of Beirut, was taken by and during the regime of President Bisharat El-Khuri. The process of expropriating the required pieces of privately-owned land by the government continued from 1945 till 1960. In these 15 years a sharp increase in the value of real estate in the Beirut city and immediate suburbs took place. This happened because of the building boom of housing apartments and factories necessary for a fast developing metropolis. However, the value of land in the Khaldeh area remained stable and low because, first, it became a sort of "sanctuary area" for the airport under permanent danger of expropriation by the government; second, because of this fact, the presence of the airport and low-flying air traffic, and its sandy land which makes it unfit and highly undesirable for building houses or factories. Hence, the government could always pay for land in this area prices which are equal to its decreased value,

²⁷This case is constructed from undisclosed sources. Also, see the newspapers of the period, notably, An-Nahar (Beirut), No. 7867, August 4, 1961; Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2644, August 4, 1961 and No. 2653, August 15, 1961, and others.

and very much lower than the soaring prices Beirut city and other suburbs.

As a prelude to this case itself, which case followed in the same spirit and manner, we may note George Britt's description which provides the initial setting of the case.

"Beirut's major enterprise in those days was the construction of the airport, that great class A international base which was to become a main line stop on the world's airways. This had been initiated largely by the vision and energy of Minister of Public Works Gabriel Murr, who, furthermore, had levied on foreign official engineers for gratis contributions of technical service and was obtaining the great construction at minimum cost. The estimates set total expenditures at about L.L. 25,000,000, or under \$ 8,000,000. Murr, however, was transferred to another ministry, and his staff replaced. Resigning from the cabinet, he departed on a six-month visit to America, and on his return the cost was up to L.L. 52,000,000. It is now expected to exceed L.L. 60,000,000.

"Revised estimates, for example, had brought up a single item of electrical equipment from \$420,000 to more than \$1,000,000. There were startling increases for grading and dirt removal, also for concrete, but the main rise was for land condemnation.²⁸ There had been a sudden teeming activity of real estate deals around the airport site; land was sold and resold to turn up finally in the hands of prominent political favorites; a new appraisal committee had done its work so well that a tract of seashore sand formerly priced at L.L. 0.60 per square meter had been bought for L.L. 11.70, and an owner who had contracted to sell an orange grove for L.L. 1.73 per square meter had now reopened the case in court with a claim, in view of prevailing prices, for L.L. 20. A seaside runway had been extended, contrary to engineering advice, for 600 meters north-eastward, into the holdings of deserving friends. The Airport Commission had for its chairman one of the wealthiest and most eminent of citizens, the head of the cement trust and of other large enterprises, Shaykh Fuad al-Khuri, another brother of the President. When Murr began asking pointed questions, he was sued for libel, the complainant being the director general of civil aviation, himself one of the President's nephews.²⁹ Filing of the suit was the only answer to questions, and here was the verdict — damages of 1000

²⁸ Italics mine.

²⁹ Italics mine.

pounds (about \$275) for defamation of character and a punitive fine of 100 pounds." ³⁰

The Salam brothers inherited the "Ghadir" (Water Source) estate situated in Khaldeh (airport area). When they found out about the plan of building the airport, they went through a process of acquiring large pieces of land neighbouring their own through, reportedly, illegal means with the connivance of some of the Land-Registry employees. It is reported that this was the achievement of Mr. Misbah Salām, one of the brothers. This created a scandal, then, and resulted in legal prosecution. However, the whole matter was "patched up" and its outcome was unknown.

When Sa'ib Salām, one of the brothers, came to power and formed the cabinet of August 1, 1960 — the famous "Cabinet of the XVIII" (members), the highest agglomeration of ministerial positions in Lebanese history — he gave the Ministry of Public Works to Mr. Uthman El-Dana. This latter was given this ministry for several reasons, notably, being a neutral person from Beirut city (whose public works are effected by the Municipality) as a solution out of the fight by two politically strong deputies from the Muhafazāt having mutual doubts of using this post to effect more projects in certain regions, including his own, and not in others, including that of his rival. Another reason, that Mr. El-Dana is from the Premier's electoral district and was on his electoral list — a factor that was instrumental in making Mr. El-Dana win his parliamentary seat. So the Premier secured one of his supportees to the Public Works ministry.

At the same time one Directorate-General in the Ministry of Public Works was headed by one of the Premier's brothers, Mr. Malek Salām, thus greatly increasing the chances of success of the plan for land grabbing and windfall profits.

The D.-G. influenced the Airport experts to write and submit to him a report stating the technical need of enlarging the airport to include the neighbouring Salām-owned Ghadir land and some other pieces (about 70,000 sq. m.). The Ministry decided to act in accordance with the report and expropriate the required land. The Ministry formed a committee to establish the price of the square meter of this land. The D.-G. pressured the committee to give the desired price which, although not to the extreme satisfaction of the Salām brothers, gave the high price of L.£ 59 per square meter. The Salām brothers refused this price and asked for L.£ 102.50 per square meter. The D.-G. "convinced" the State's lawyer of the Ministry of Public Works to mediate and issue a

³⁰George Britt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolution," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Winter, 1953), pp. 9-10.

"reasonable" and acceptable price. He fixed the price at L.£. 99.25/sq. m.. Also, the Minister of Justice, Mr. Naseem Majdalani — a staunch supporter of the Premier and an electoral ally in the Beirut district — offered to the land owners to buy from them the expropriated land for the price of L.£. 99.25/sq. m.. The Salām family accepted. This agreement — later referred to by the Council of State as a "judicial contract" — bound the Government. The Minister of Public Works, on the recommendation of the D.-G., also agreed to this price. (Note the difference and the rise in the price from about L.£. 0.60 to 1.73/sq. m. and the present one of L.£. 99.25/sq. m.).

Meantime, some serious conflict was developing between the Minister of Public Works and his Premier — electoral allies up till now. Due to the influence of some external factors on local Lebanese politics (especially among the Muslim electors of both Salām and El-Dana) and a developing low tide in the status of Salām vis-a-vis such external influence and, consequently, his electoral district as a Za'im, El-Dana tried to use this advantageous situation to gain a more prominent place for himself in order to build popular support and avoid being dependent on his inclusion in the Salām electoral "List", or even become Premier himself. El-Dana was also starting some conflict with the other brother, the D.-G., regarding the employment of the former's supporters in the Ministry. El-Dana wanted to use this as a tool to show his electors his power at influencing their employment, however with no success. The Salām clan reacted violently both administratively and politically.

The Minister tipped the opposition on the Ghadir deal and the latter turned the heat on the Cabinet, mainly on its Premier. Because of this and many other factors unrelated to the Salām-Dana conflict, the Cabinet resigned. Mr. Sa'ib Salām formed his second "Cabinet of VIII" (members) on May 20, 1961, which was in fact an amendment to the first cabinet with the alienation of El-Dana and few other ministers from it. The Ministry of Public Works — because of many political factors beyond the control and will of Salām — was given to Mr. Kamal Jumblāt, who was Minister of National Education in the previous cabinet.

Mr. Jumblāt did not command totally all the details of the Ghadir case although he was in the previous cabinet; or if he did, he had kept his peace for various reasons. However, as Minister of Public Works he became more acquainted with the intricacies of the case whose complete file he read. If Salām could go on very nicely with El-Dana at the start, he could not do so now with Jumblāt, from the beginning. Jumblāt, a professed anti-corruption politician, started some warring relationships with the D.-G. of the Ministry because of the case of its inefficient and corrupt civil servants

and his intention of dismissing them from service (see Case B, above). He also was angered by the Ghadir case and, hence, conflict about it started between him and the Salām brothers, the D.-G. and the Premier. Jumblāt dismissed the State's lawyer in the Ministry because he connived with the Salāms and issued the mediatory price of L.£. 99.25/sq. m. against the law and formal procedures — thus proving himself to be the "enemy" of the State instead of being its defender. The Premier, known for his political skill and maneuvers, fomented a public opinion "psychological war" in the press against his Minister with stories about the latter's inconsistent thinking and political platform (professing progressive socialism and being elected by his Druze sect and his familial feudal base) and his imminent resignation. If Jumblāt could be angered or pressured enough, he may resign. The Premier, then, can amend the cabinet and continue with the deal. Jumblāt, nevertheless, countered with sharp attacks on his Premier and revealed the plan to the press in repeated conferences in which he outlined the Ghadir Case. At this point the case itself was brought to public light under press and parliamentary opposition, and stopped being the vague subject of political inter-Za'im(s) conflict. Under such public pressure and the very possible chance of losing the Chamber's confidence, the other ministers in the Cabinet pressured the Salām brothers, including their Premier, and the latter agreed, to accept the price fixed by the committee, i.e., L.£. 59/sq. m. The deal — despite many serious illegalities such as the formal agreement of the Cabinet Council and the consent (pre-audit) of various financial control bodies, most notably, the Bureau of Accounts — was effected and the Salām brothers sold the Ghadir land to the State, cashing around L.£. 5 million. However, they reserved their legal right to the price of L.£. 99.25/sq. m. on which the government, in the person of the Minister of Justice and the State's lawyer, has already agreed. Accordingly, they filed a law suit at the 'Conseil d'Etat' against the State asking for the rest of their money (around L.£. 5 million). The 'Conseil d'Etat', based on insufficient legal evidence, decided the case for their benefit and awarded them what was supposedly their "right". There were few rumors on the circumstances accompanying the taking of this favourable decision by the members of the Council of State.

The conflict between Jumblāt and Premier Salām became so severe that the latter asked the former on October 18, 1961 to resign, but he refused. On October 20th, Jumblāt laid his oral resignation under the pleasure of H.E. the President of the Republic. The next day Salām asked for the dismissal of Jumblāt if the latter did not resign yet. The President refused to do this or to interfere with the proper working of the country's democratic process. On October 23rd, Salām submitted the resignation of his cabinet and it was accepted. After a 9-day ministerial crisis, Mr. Rashīd Karamah formed the present 'Cabinet of XIV' (members) and secured parliamentary confidence on November 17th.

The new Premier, the traditional rival of Mr. Salām for this post, was faced with the law suit and the decision concerning the Salām-owned El-Ghadir land. The State had to defend itself. The Ministry of Justice -- now itself headed by a political foe of Mr. Salām, Mr. Fuad Butros, with previous mutual grudges and injuries and the present opportunity for Butros to "pay back with interest" -- asked the State's lawyer of the Ministry to take charge of this. The latter filed a counter law suit against the Salām brothers at the Conseil d'Etat asking it to reopen the case, stop the execution of its decision, and consequently refuse the law suit of the Salams and charge them with the usual fees. He based his demands on legal and official documentation revealing that: (a) the legal agreement between the Salāms and the government are not lawful because they lack the prior agreement of the central Bureau of Accounts, which factor renders them ineffective and null and void (according to article 29 of Legislative Decree No. 118 dated 12 June 1959); (b) there are some known present and former officials who connived in the deal -- hence, could be severely punished under various laws -- and forced some government departments to evaluate the Ghadir land at L.£. 99.25 per sq. m. together with processing the necessary administrative operations aiming at executing the payment of public money against administrative and financial rules (including the D.-G.); (c) land owners, other than the Salāms, whose neighbouring lands were also expropriated and priced by the concerned committee between L.£. 30 and L.£. 40 per sq.m., are also asking for L.£. 99.25 per sq.m. similar to their neighbours. The whole case is waiting the judgement of the Conseil d'Etat. The author came to know that at a date later than the "99" one some land at the same airport area, and owned by Mr. Nuhad Irsalan, was expropriated by the government for a figure far less than L.£. 99; however, the deal totalled thousands of Lebanese pounds. We can assert the idea of the "political price" attached to the land in the expropriation deals, whose value is proportional to the power wielded by the political beneficiaries and the extent of cooperation extended to them by government officials.³¹

³¹ Undisclosed sources. See also, Al-Jaryda (Beirut), 2709, October 19, 1961; No. 2711, October 21, 1961; No. 2712, October 22, 1961; No. 2877, May 8, 1962; No. 2878, May 9, 1962; No. 2883, May 16, 1962; No. 2928, July 7, 1962; No. 2935, July 15, 1962.

CHAPTER VII

LEBANESE FIELD ADMINISTRATION

A. Administrative Areas: The Muhafazāt

For purposes of field administration Lebanon is divided into five main administrative areas called Muhafazāt. These are Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Northern Lebanon, Southern Lebanon and the Biqa'¹; and they correspond to the "Departement" in France as the basic unit of regional administration. Each Muhafazah is subdivided into a number of Qada (s); there are twenty-four Qadas in the country.² These units are similar perhaps to their French counterparts, namely, "Les Arrondissements".

B. Area Administrator: The Muhafez

Each Muhafazah is headed and administered by a civil servant called the Muhafez³ who is a Category I employee⁴ and may correspond to the "Prefect" of a French department. Each Qada is headed by a civil servant called the Qa'immaqam⁵ who must be at least a Category III employee⁶ and may correspond to the French "Sub-Prefect".

The Muhafez represents the central government in his region and all the ministries, except that of Justice and National Defence.⁷ He is directly responsible, however, to the Minister of Interior. The Muhafez is responsible for administering all the affairs of his

¹Legislative Decree No. 11, December 29, 1954, Annex No. 1.

²Ibid.

³Legislative Decree No. 116, June 12, 1959, art. 3.

⁴Ibid., art. 5.

⁵Ibid., art. 27. The capital of the Muhafazah and its surrounding area forms a Qada but it does not have a Qa'immaqam and is directly headed by the Muhafez. Ibid., art. 26.

⁶Ibid., art. 29.

⁷Ibid., art. 4. This includes the judicial courts and army units.

Muhafazah and the regional offices of the various ministries in it.⁸
Table VII-1, below, shows the ministries' regional offices in the
Muhafazah. In the capacity given him the Muhafez inspects and controls
all the offices and the civil servants and he administers the
personnel matters of the latter in accordance with the Personnel
Law.⁹ As regards the regional civil servants of the Ministries of
Justice and National Defence, he has the duty of informing their
ministries, whenever he sees fit, on any irregularity or mismanagement
in which they are involved.¹⁰ All correspondence between the regional
offices and the central administration must pass through the Muhafez.¹¹
Since he is responsible for the execution of laws and regulations
in his region, and to do so in the best manner, he is entrusted
to take all necessary measures for the coordination and proper ex-
ecution of work of all the regional offices whether by separate or
joint meetings or other means such as his personal inspection.¹²

An important function of the Muhafez is to observe the
political and economic conditions of his region and convey

⁸ Ibid., art. 7.

⁹ Ibid. He gives administrative and medical leaves and imposes
disciplinary measures.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., art. 8.

TABLE VII-1

THE MINISTRIES' REGIONAL OFFICES IN THE
MUHAFAZAH^{a/}

Ministry	Regional Offices
Interior	* Gendarmerie * Judicial Police * Judicial Record
Interior	* General Security * Statistics and Personal Status * Technical Office for the Municipalities.
Justice	* Court of Appeal
Finance	* Department of Finance * Land Registry Office
Agriculture	* Agricultural Engineering Department * Department of Veterinary Medicine
Labour & Social Affairs	* Department for the Execution of Social Programmes
Public Health	* Department for the Execution of Health Programmes and Control of Health Regulations
Public Works	* Roads Branch * Buildings Branch * Water and Electricity Branch * Mechanical Branch
National Education	* Department for the Supervision of Public Schools
National Economy	* Weights and Measures Section * Consumers' Protection Section * Section for Control of Gold Jewelry * Section for Tourism, Estivation and "Hivernage". ^{b/}

(Cont.)

^{a/}Legislative Decree No. 116, June 12, 1959, Annex No. 2.

^{b/}This function has been transferred to the Ministry of Orientation, Information and Tourism in the laws of which there is no provision for such a regional unit.

TABLE VII-1 -- Continued

Ministry	Regional Offices
Post, Telegraph and Telephone	* Department for Studies, Execution and Maintenance of the Telephone net. * Regional Department for Post and Telegraph. ^{c)}

c) As amended by Decree No. 2886, December 16, 1959, art. 1.

his observations, monthly or whenever necessary, to the Ministry of Interior.¹³ Similarly, he is responsible for the maintenance of public security and order, personal freedom and immunity of private property. To do this he may ask internal security forces, which are placed under his orders for such purposes, to take any measure circumstances may dictate.¹⁴

C. Central-Field Relationships

Relationships between the field and the central administration are highly centralized. The Muhafez refers continuously to the Ministry of Interior for instructions and guidance in the discharge of his duties and responsibilities.¹⁵ This is imperative in formulating decisions involving important matters. Also minor matters are referred, sometimes by telephone, to the Minister for advice and the Muhafez is, therefore,

¹³ Ibid., art. 9.

¹⁴ Ibid., arts. 10-11.

¹⁵ The need for coordination in between the Muhafazāt has been realized and the Minister of Interior, by means of meetings with all the Muhafezeen of the various regions, is trying to achieve better results especially as regards internal security and administrative relations. Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2973, August 28, 1962.

left with little discretion and authority. The latest reform movement tried to effect some deconcentration in law, but with little practical success.

D. The Muhafez's Role Difficulties

The Muhafez, in the manner of the Director-General's situation, experiences serious role difficulties. His position occupies a unique role in the region. He is, to a considerable extent, a "political" civil servant in that he is a political appointee who is recruited through choice,¹⁶ and not through examinations. In the exercise of his functions, the Muhafez needs, besides a strong character, tact, caution and diplomacy. He has a double duty to perform. He is under pressure from the central government -- as its representative and agent -- to carry out its orders. As the "prime minister" of his area he is subject incessantly to relentless pressures from local Za'im(s) and the parliamentary deputies of the region. He cannot very well ignore their demands and wishes; and such wishes are not always lawful, admissible and in the public interest. Many a Muhafez who had troubled relations with local politicians found that he could not keep his position too long, and was transferred. However, this has not been the case in every instance and some strong Muhafeezen have been noted for their bold resistance to local pressures.

¹⁶The Muhafez is chosen from the civil service or from outside and must possess a 'license en droit' or its equivalent. Legislative Decree No. 116, op.cit.; art. 5.

The following case which the author had the opportunity to observe at first hand perhaps illustrates well role conflict the Muhafez experiences in his daily relationships.

Case D

Time : 5 December 1962.

Place: North Lebanon's Muhafez's Office, Tripoli.

The author was on a mission to the Muhafazah of North Lebanon regarding the reform and reorganization of the immediate office of the Muhafez and his Diwān at Tripoli on 5 December 1962. When I presented myself and was ushered in, I found that the Muhafez was being subjected to a heated and emotional discourse from a local Za'īm who is a priest and an unsuccessful parliamentary candidate in the last elections, and whom I have immediately recognized.

This politician — the sole priest in Lebanon who deals publicly with politics and runs for elections — has time-honoured bloody feuds with his political rival, and presently a minister, and they both live in the same town but in different quarters separated by the town's square. Both their own families and other allied families live in the opposite quarters of the town and in various villages of the immediate area. Their electoral rivalry and vengeful killings have become legendary in the North. Once they even participated in a machine guns' battle inside the church of one of area's villages — the famous "Tuerie de Miziara" (June 16, 1957). No possible means of mediation, local or national, proved successful in their conciliation and peace — making. The present regime, whose head they both respect, imposed peace, law and order in the area.

Due to the long and unsettled argument in the office of the Muhafez, the author had the opportunity to sit down and listen to the lively discussion. The matter revolved around the problem that the Muhafez's guest and his supporters refused to send the latter's children to the public school at the town's square because the school is located just to the side of his rivals in the town. They feared that their opponents would kidnap their children and torture them or do something worse, and they demanded a change in the location of the school to a neutral zone. Until this was done they went on strike, and sent their Za'īm to the Muhafez to solve the problem by meeting their demands. The Muhafez sent internal security forces and some army units to the town and surrounding area, occupied it, and waited for developments and orders. He informed Beirut and received specific orders on preservation of general security and peace, and that the strike should terminate.

He was using all his diplomacy, forcefulness and assurances with his guest to convince him that nothing undesirable is going to happen, that nobody dares to kidnap the children of anybody else and, in his words, "... no solution is possible under the threat of a strike, because I don't operate under pressure!" "Suppose they do a filthy act?" said the man of God, "Nobody is going to do anything, and you must go and tell the "boys" to go home and assure them that only then will I, and I definitely shall, solve the problem in a way that would please everybody." After that, and with some more give and take, the man left, seemingly unsatisfied, escorted by the Muhafez to the door. After this tense experience the Muhafez and myself began to discuss the reorganization of his office and Diwan.¹⁷

E. Council of the Muhafazah

In every Muhafazah, except the city of Beirut, there is a Council headed by the Muhafez and composed of the head of the Finance office of the Muhafazah, all the Qā'immaqām(s) of the Muhafazah, and two representatives for each Qada' chosen from the various professions and syndicates. The individual regional offices of the Muhafazah can, when discussing a matter related to them, have one representative as a member.¹⁸ The Muhafazah Council, an advisory body to the Muhafez for purposes of regional administration, is entrusted to study and give its opinion on all matters pertaining to the development of the Muhafazah as regards physical development, economy,

¹⁷ Interview with Mr. Munir Takiyedeem, Director-General of the Ministry of National Defence, Acting-Muhafez of Northern Lebanon, Tripoli, December 5, 1962. Mr. Takiyedeem -- one of the most successful of the Muhafezeem, perhaps, in the country -- was transferred in May, 1963 to the Foreign Service. This was reportedly the wish of the most important politician in Tripoli, and the country's Prime Minister at present, and whose brother could not have his own ways in the city without getting into conflict with the Muhafez.

¹⁸ Legislative Decree No. 116, art. 47.

agriculture, health and social welfare.¹⁹ It is also entrusted with preparing necessary appropriations needed for the improvement of the villages which lack municipalities.²⁰ It may be called upon by the Muhafez to give its opinion as regards any matter which he thinks is of public concern and benefit.²¹ The planning and advisory role of this Council has not been felt in any observable degree due to its recent establishment and, in some cases, its lack of full staffing. However, it possesses an important role which is increasingly being utilized for regional administration and development and helping the Muhafez in improving his region and supervising the execution of development projects formulated for it.²²

F. The Qa'immaqam

The position of a Qa'immaqam is similar to that of a Muhafez, as devolved to the Qada. In the Qada he is the chief civil servant and heads and administers the affairs of his area and its civil servants. His role is identical with that of the Muhafez who is his immediate chief and from and through whom alone, he receives orders and exchanges communication.²³ His

¹⁹ Ibid., art. 48, sect. 1.

²⁰ Ibid., art. 48, sect. 2. Such appropriations become effective only after it is signed by the Minister of Interior. Ibid., art. 50.

²¹ Ibid., art. 48, sect. 5.

²² Ibid., art. 48, sect. 3.

²³ Ibid., art. 30.

qualifications, appointment, and its characteristics resemble those of his chief.²⁴ Table VII-2, below, presents the regional offices in the Qada that are under him.

TABLE VII-2
THE MINISTRIES' REGIONAL OFFICES IN THE QADA^{a/}

Ministry	Department
Interior	* Gendarmerie * Statistics and Personal Status
Justice	* Court of First Instance
Public Health	* Doctor of the Qada and a Public Assistance Squad
Finance	* A civil Servant for Finance * Assistant Secretary for Land Registry
Agriculture	* Agricultural Engineering Section * Veterinary Medicine Section

^{a/}Legislative Decree No. 116, June 12, 1959, Annex No. 2.

²⁴ As regards role conflict, the following event is illustrative: Conflict was renewed between the Minister of Interior and the Qa'immaqam of 'Aleih' (Mount Lebanon) because the latter continues to refuse the legality of the election of the municipality members of the town of Aleih (Note Case A presented above). When the Minister sent him some strict instructions regarding the matter, he disregarded them. Then the Minister issued an arrêté deducting ten days' pay from the Qa'immaqam's salary. Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2973, August 28, 1962.

G. Schemes and Changes

The number and areas of the Muhafazāt has been receiving much more attention recently with the intention of making some changes in them. The Minister of Interior proposed a project law to the Council of Ministers to establish a second Muhafazah in the Biqā', and explained that the reason for this is, "primarily, the fact that the Muhafazah of the Biqā' constitutes one third of the area of Lebanon and, also, for insuring the public interest."²⁵ Few parliamentary deputies of the area backed up this proposition when they heard of it and reawakened a previous project -bill which they have submitted to the Chamber on 10 June 1961.²⁶ Other deputies questioned the increase in the number of the Muhafazāt as opposed to increasing the Qa'immaqamiyāt²⁷; others proposed to cancel the positions of the Qa'immaqam(s) and establish eleven Muhafazāt.²⁸ However, such schemes are not fully substantiated as purely of public and not electoral interests.

The Muhafez and the Qa'immaqam, in the manner of the Director-General in the central administration, are considerably overburdened

²⁵ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2937, July 18, 1962.

²⁶ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2943, July 25, 1962; also, Lisan al-'Hal (Beirut), No. 19297, November 6, 1962.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 2935, July 15, 1962. They have asked the Minister of Interior to "freeze" his project till they introduce theirs to the Chamber. This project was proposed during the previous regimes.

with their functions. A glance at the regional offices under their supervision, together with the fact that they have been entrusted with running scores of municipalities which have been dissolved for one reason or the other²⁹ and that they have been given added functions regarding regional socio-economic development programmes and administrative set ups therefor, would throw enough light on this aspect. Since their primary concern in most of their working hours is with security, order and other political matters, their contribution to their administrative tasks suffers to a considerable extent. One Muhafez fervently talled the author the following:

"I consider that my primary work is to Go On The Street, to be with the people and observe and supervise the execution of things at first hand. I have so many problems of security and public order. I spend most of my time haggling with people and politicians (See Case D, above). This is, perhaps, the biggest problem of every Muhafez. As such I cannot look into all these stacks of transactions and paper on my desk. Most of it pertains to spending large sums of money and has been here for a long time. I am sure that there are many irregularities and stealing in them and I cannot, I will not, allow such things and sign on them whatever. I need a 'chief accountant', whom I keep asking for, to go through them and be responsible for agreeing on expenditures. I will sign on a paper only when I see his signature on it. You Reform and Inspection people must do something about it and you must organize my office and my Diwān, and please do it fast!"³⁰

The wish of the Muhafez was satisfied. The Minister of Interior proposed to the Council of Ministers a project-law which

²⁹ There has been no municipal elections in the country for about the last ten years. A new law for municipal elections has been passed by the Chamber in May, 1963 on the basis of which new municipal elections are to be conducted.

³⁰ Interview with Mr. Takiyedden, op.cit., December 5, 1962.

seeks to amend the present cadres of the Muhafazāt and Qa'immaqamiyāt together with the cadres of some central units of the Ministry in Beirut. The project law suggests the establishment of the position of "Assistant Muhafez" for four Muhafazāt, excluding that of Beirut, and the positions of Chiefs of Section to assist the Qa'immaqam(s) in the various Qada(s). The reasons stated for establishing these positions are: the increasing backlog of administrative work in the immediate offices of the Muhafezeen — especially in what concerns financial (budgetary) accounting and personnel files, the increasing work resulting from the application of decentralization to regional offices, and the new tasks entrusted to the Muhafezeen and Qa'immaqam(s) regarding the execution of the development programmes and the distribution of the "Equipes Polyvalentes" on the various regions.³¹

The establishment of the four posts of Assistant Muhafez must yet meet the agreement of the Council of Ministers and, ultimately, that of the Chamber. There, it is bound to be met with resistance and it may create considerable political squabbling with reference to the above-mentioned schemes concerning the optimum number and area of the Muhafazāt and Qa'immaqamiyāt.

³¹ Courtesy of the Common Administrative Service of the Ministry of Interior, May 24, 1963; see also, Al-Jaryda (Beirut), No. 3200, May 28, 1963.

PART IV

THE LEBANESE PUBLIC SERVANTS

CHAPTER VIII

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A strikingly reciprocal and sensitive interplay exists between Lebanese bureaucrats and their social setting. Their behaviour, informal relations, status, interaction and general characteristics as a body resembles to a great extent those of the Lebanese social base. The diffusion of human resources into the Lebanese bureaucracy from its social setting conveyed such a strong impact on the body of the civil service. In fact, the major problems and characteristics of the Lebanese civil service are those of the Lebanese society itself.

While Lebanon has had good laws in various fields,¹ the problem tended to be one of practical application. It appears that in agricultural societies a considerable gap exists between the laws and their execution. For instance, the Lebanese civil servants have had, for some time, personnel codes regulating their work procedures and behaviour.

A. 1516-1845

Before the existence of any personnel codes, however,-- and in the feudal era from 1516 to 1840 when Lebanon

¹The judiciary, local government, public service and labour laws.

enjoyed some measure of local autonomy — the country was divided into districts and each was governed by a national Amīr (Prince) who was recognized and appointed by the Ottoman Sultan. The Ottomans kept the country in much the same conditions as it was previously under the Mamlūks. With slight modifications the Mamlūk administrative divisions were preserved. For taxation purposes Sultan Salim reserved a considerable area of fertile lands, i.e. the plain of al-Biqā', and retained the rest of the country under the Mamlūk procedure of farming out tax collection to the highest bidder (talzim).²

The national Amīr had a Dīwān (secretariat) which was "composed of national advisors, clerks, treasurers and soldiers."³ The Amīr and his Dīwān constituted "the highest executive and legal power in the country." The Amīr appointed the governors of the sections (Khitat), to which his district was divided, together with their assistants.⁴ The Dīwān formed the civil service of the Amīr and was his executive tool. He appointed the civil servants, imposed taxes, and administered justice.

This governmental structure continued until 1842 when a different governmental system was installed. The situation of this

² Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History (London: Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 359.

³ Umar S. Lababidi, "Public Personnel Administration in Lebanon," (unpublished M.A. thesis, Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut, 1959) p. 2.

⁴ Ibid.

era, following the general decline and decadence of the Ottoman empire, was affected by the general disorganization and corruption which was found in the offices of various governors of neighbouring Vilayets, which offices were obtained through sale and bribery and used for quick personal enrichment. The chaotic state of affairs helped to produce anarchy in the administration. "The corruption in the financial, judicial, and the whole administrative system and the indifference of the central authorities⁵ resulted in economic decline, negligence of public works, and in poverty, ignorance and demoralization among the subjects of the empire."⁶

In such a state of affairs one can visualize the conditions of the civil servants who served in such an atmosphere, with no code except the will and pleasure of the Amīr, who at times may have been a good and efficient ruler and at most other times hardly so.

B. 1845-1861

During the middle of the nineteenth century the first legal code constituting the basis of a civil service was the "Instructions of Shakib Effendi"⁷ of 31 October 1845. This document specified "the powers of every Qa'immaqām; the appointment of a vice Qaimmaqām; the formation of a council to assist him in governance, and specified the powers of this council, the manner of electing its,

⁵The Sultan in Constantinople, and the governors of the vilayets of Damascus, Aleppo, Beirut and Acre to whom, interchangeably, the local Amīr(s) were responsible.

⁶George Haddad, Fifty Years of Modern Syria and Lebanon (Beirut: Dar al-Hayat, 1950), p. 29.

⁷He was the Special Delegate of the Sublime Porte in the period of the Qa'immaqamiyatayn.

members, their dismissal and replacement, the procedures of their meetings and making decisions, their salaries, that they were forbidden from engaging in another work, that they should reside at the place of their positions, etc...; and limited the powers of the regional governors to the collection of taxes."⁸

A second document — derived of the first, but which has a special standing — is the "Decision" taken by the Amīr (Prince) Hāidar Ismaīl Abī El-Lama', who was the first christian Qā'immaqām,⁹ on 13 May 1853. "This century-old code constitutes — in its naive composition and strong spirit — the first written personnel law" in Lebanon.¹⁰ Its writing was entrusted to a 3-man Dīwān and they came out with a short, simple and concise Dustur (regulations) which was composed of two parts: the first defined the powers of the ruler over his assistants, and the second defined the rights of the latter.¹¹ The ten articles of this "decision" reveal a most interesting and amusing regulations. One cannot help but quote:¹²

"His Excellency the Qā'immaqām is asked to confer for one hour at the beginning or end of the day with his aides and be graceful to their argument and accepting the right opinion; ... he is also asked not to give any order through an alien except in writing or through

⁸ Taufiq Awad, "Al-Wazifah fi Lubnān" (translation of Arabic title, "Public Office in Lebanon") Les Conférences du Cénacle, Vol. III, No. 5-6 (1949), p. 120. Author's translation from Arabic.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 120-121.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Mīlād Rizqallah, "Min Tārīkh Lubnan al-Mu'asir" (Translation of Arabic title, "From Contemporary Lebanese History") Majalat al-Mashriq, Vol. XXXV (1937), pp. 562-563.

¹² Ibid., pp. 563-566. Author's translation from Arabic.

his aides; ... he is asked to read the letters and complaints in person and give the appropriate time for this so his conscience may not be burdened with negligence; ... he should read his mail and sign it, or have it read to him without the presence of an alien, and is asked not to be inconvenienced or bored when the work load increases, for his conscience is under Heavenly Justice.

"Civil servants must be faithful, secretive, must give the right opinion and be far from every human wish, and they must be careful against inclinations towards their flesh and blood.... They should not decide or end any matter unless agreed upon by His Excellency, and they should not open the closed mail of the latter.... They should be alert and full of vitality and let no one be injured through their negligence, knowing that God shall ask them for this for they do not deserve their salaries except if they work for it.... They shall not retard in giving answers to the mail to anyone and in the correct time, especially to commissioned officials and representatives of Foreign Powers, and the rest of the mail accordingly, for its owners are poor and are injured by negligence.... God controls their work and rewards it.... They shall not be bribed nor receive gifts whether in person or through their households, children, servants nor from alien hands, whether internally or externally, secretly or openly under the penalty of severe punishment. God revenges from those whose faults are not discovered.... They shall come to work daily starting one and a half hours after sunrise and ending two hours before sunset except on Sundays and holidays and on Wednesdays in weeks that do not have holidays. Whenever there is important or heavy work, they shall work at night also. There shall be always one official on duty until sunset, and officials shall change turns."

C. 1861-1918

This situation persisted till the institution of the organic statute (*règlement organique*) for Lebanon which was signed at Constantinople on 9 June 1861 and which reconstituted the country (*Jabal Lubnān*) as an autonomous Mutasarrifiyah to be governed by a Christian governor-general (Mutasarrif). This was the solution of the Powers to the massacres between Maronites and

Druzes in 1860 which created a situation of chaos, conflict and disorganized government. Under this 17-article code, which code experienced a revision of few minor matters on 6 September 1864, the Mutasarrif was directly responsible to the Porte with a 5-year tenure subject for renewal.

"As chief executive he collected taxes, appointed judges, executed tribunals' sentences and maintained security and order. An elective administrative council (majlis idarāh) of twelve representatives from the different religious communities assisted him. Of the representatives five were Christians.... (Lebanon) was divided into seven districts (sing. qadā') each under a qā'immaqām. As determined by the prevailing religious denomination in each district, three of these sub-governors were Maronites, one Druze, one Moslem, one Greek Orthodox and one Greek Catholic.¹³ Each qā'immaqāmīyah was subdivided into mudiriyaḥs (small counties),¹⁴ The administration of local justice involving minor cases was left in the hands of government - appointed or popularly elected shaykhs. Ecclesiastical jurisdiction over cases in which only clergy were involved was maintained. The new constitution abolished all feudal privileges, bestowed equal rights on all citizens and provided for a census of the population and a survey of the land. The government of the mountain maintained its own judiciary and preserved order by local militia. No Turkish troops were quartered in the land, no military service was incumbent on its citizens and no tribute was due the Porte. Local taxes were so levied as to meet local needs, only the surplus would go to the imperial treasury which, however, had to make deficits good."¹⁵


¹³ "This apportionment sanctified sectarianism within the shrine of Lebanese politics." Marwan Iskandar, "Constitutional Features of Lebanese Democracy," The Middle East Forum, Vol. XXXVII, No. 6 (June, 1961), p. 31.

¹⁴ The number of mudiriyaḥs totalled 43. Bulus Masa'd, Lubnān Wal-Dustur Al-Uthmani (translation of Arabic title, Lebanon and the Ottoman Constitution) (Egypt: Al-Ma'arif Press, 1909), p. 3.

¹⁵ Philip K. Hitti, op.cit., pp. 442-443. For the organization of the government and administrative system under the 1861 statute see chart VIII-1.

CHART NO. VIII-1

GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM OF LEBANON
 UNDER THE CONSTANTINOPLE ORGANIC
 STATUTE OF 1861



The Mutassarif was the head of the administrative system, and the ruler of the country's internal affairs. In this capacity he appointed and dismissed all the civil servants under him such as the qā'immaqāms, the Mudirs, the judges, et al. These government officials were small in number; they were Lebanese and paid from the Lebanese treasury. The Mutassarif also appointed the soldiers.¹⁶

Many important factors influenced the Lebanese civil servants of this period. They were under the mercy of the Mutassarif and their security of tenure subject to his pleasure. Favoritism had an outstanding role in their appointment, promotion and discharge. Also, article 11 of Constantinople's Protocol of 9 June 1861 stated that if any civil servant is bribed he shall be subject to dismissal or other disciplinary measures in proportion to his misdeed.¹⁷ Yet the Mutassarifs were generally incompetent and successively decadent with very few exceptions. The third Mutassarif (1873-83), an Italian nobleman by birth, by the name of Rustum Pasha, "Collected the national deficit from the imperial treasury, amounting to 25,000 Turkish pounds a year, until he was instructed to suppress that demand, necessitating radical reduction in the officials' salaries to about half and opening the way for a period of backshish (bakhshish) that flourished during the régime of his successor,

¹⁶ Lababidi, op.cit., p. 6.

¹⁷ Salim Butrus Usabius, Dalīl Marāhil Lubnān 'Abr at-Tārikh (translation of Arabic title, Guide to Historical Developments in Lebanon Through the Ages) (Beirut: ad-Dar al-'Alamiyyah lil-Tiba'ah wan-Nashr, 1955), p. 63.

Wasāh Pasha (1883-92). Even Wawāh himself was not held above suspicion. His rule was marked by the assumption of serious proportions by Lebanese emigration to lands beyond the seas."¹⁸ Under the sixth Mutasarrif (1902-7), Muzaffar Pasha, who was of Polish origin, "... corruption registered a new record. Even members of the governor's family were charged with exploiting the land and the people. Muzaffar promised economic and judicial reforms but did not realize them."¹⁹ Accordingly, we can realize the gap between the law, or even its spirit, and practical application which was corrupted by the chiefs of the civil service. We may note that "the Ottoman State adopted a large number of the western civil, judicial, and military laws, among which were regulations for public employees. Unfortunately, these laws were not enforced in all cases neither in Lebanon nor in the other Wilāyāts."²⁰ The regimes of the last two Mutasarrifs were marked by serious "... agitations concomitant on the Young Turks' revolution of 1908."²¹ In August, 1915, the last of the Mutasarrifs, Ohannes Koyoumjian (Armenian), was replaced by a Turk. Lebanon continued under direct Turkish rule until the end of the Great War in 1918. In this period the commander-in-chief of the Turkish

¹⁸Hitti, op.cit., p. 446.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 447.

²⁰Lababidi, op.cit., p. 7.

²¹Hitti, op.cit., p. 447.

Fourth Army and military governor of the Levant, Jamal Pasha,²² abolished the Lebanese autonomy and administered the country directly in what was a bloody dictatorial "reign of terror" that made all previous reigns seem a paradise.

D. 1918-1926

The French government, whose forces occupied the country in 1918, resuscitated the Lebanese Grand Administrative Council which functioned till 1920 when it was abolished by the French in July of that year.²³ The State of Greater Lebanon was declared on 1 September 1920, with the addition to Mount Lebanon of the areas which were severed in 1861, namely, Biqa', Tyre, Sidon, Tripoli and Beirut.²⁴ According to a decree of the same date a Governor was to be appointed by the High Commissioner and was vested with executive powers. The H.C. would also appoint the seventeen

²²Better known as Jamal al-Saffāh (blood-shedder).

²³Nicola A. Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1957), p. 49, 173.

²⁴Moustapha Baroudi, Les Problemes Juridiques Concernant L'Administration des Communautés sous Mandat (Genève: Imprimerie Genevoise, 1949), pp. 148-49. The first measure taken by the mandate to create the present Lebanon was to detach four "Q'adās (cantons) from the Vilayet of Damascus and attach them to the Sandjak of Lebanon under the title of "The Autonomous Territory of Lebanon" through Arrêtè No. 299 of 3 August 1920 of the High Commissioner. On 31 August 1920 the H.C. issued Arrêtés No. 320 and 321 dissolving the Vilayet of Beirut and the Autonomous Territory of Lebanon. Arrêté No. 318 instituted the State of "Grand Lebanon," (1 September 1920).

members of the Administrative Council upon their nomination by the Governor and this latter would receive from them legislative advice and consultation. The Governor was authorized to appoint Lebanese officials, subject to the approval of the H.C., to handle the recognized general state services of Interior, Finance, Justice, Public Works, Post and Telegraph, Public Education and Fine Arts, Economics and Public Health.²⁵

The Governor of Greater Lebanon, and before the declaration of the Republic, regulated the affairs of the Lebanese civil servants by two arrêtés - No. 3021, dated 9 March 1925, and No. 3195, dated 6 July 1925.²⁶ These Arrêtés laid the foundations of a civil service system, and they "are considered the first personnel regulation established since the termination of the Ottoman rule."²⁷ They regulated the appointment, promotion, discharge and discipline of the civil servants. However, such regulations could not correct the state of affairs very much for "...nepotism and favouritism were to a large extent widespread before that time in the employment policy, and despite this regulation it remained dominant during and after the mandatory period.... Personnel regulations were not strictly applied and the decisions of the High Commissioner and

²⁵G. Grassmuck and K. Salibi, A Manual of Lebanese Administration (Beirut: Public Administration Department, A.U.B., 1955), p. 4.

²⁶Lebanon, Ministry of Justice, Majmū'at al-Qawanin (translation of Arabic title, Collection of Laws) (Beirut: Al-Jamhuriyyah al-Jadidah Press, 1928-1954).

²⁷Lababidi, op.cit., p. 11.

of the French advisors were the final word. Appointment, discharge, promotion and likewise, were subject to sectarian balance and favouritism."²⁸

The Lebanese civil servants at the time were exposed to administrative practice which oriented their behaviour along subservient and centralistic lines the characteristics of which remain until the present.

"The Lebanese administrators were paralleled by French advisers who planned and directed early central administrative action along lines acceptable to the Governor and High Commissioner, and likewise in keeping with French administrative principles and traditions. With considerable alacrity the formation of an administration for Lebanon got under way. Placing early emphasis on centralized authority and on the need for initiative, advice, and approval from above, the mandate arrangement shaped an administrative hierarchy that, from the start, allowed the lower echelon administrator little opportunity to make decisions on his own. Even such questions as office-keeping and records management required consultation with an approval by higher officials, including the French advisers."²⁹

The mandate over Lebanon was entrusted to France at the San Remo conference on 26 April 1920 and approved by the League of Nations in September 1923.³⁰ The first Representative Council came into existence, with a membership of thirty members, in 1922.³¹

E. 1926-1943

A Constitution for Lebanon was promulgated on 23 May

²⁸Ibid., pp. 12, 14.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰N.A. Ziadeh, op.cit., pp. 49-50.

³¹Ibid., p. 51.

1926 and the Representative Council became the Chamber of Deputies.³²

On the 25th the High Commissioner appointed the members of the Senate (Higher Chamber). On the 26th the two Chambers³³ elected the first President (Charles Dabbas) of the Lebanese Republic. On the 31st the first Cabinet was formed. Thus Lebanon was established as a parliamentary republic.³⁴

The creation of this parliamentary facade did not, however, bring the exercise of actual power and administration to the hands of the Lebanese. The French High Commissariat maintained representatives in the Lebanese government and a French "advisor" in each of the departments.³⁵ The High Commissariat itself was staffed by French and some Lebanese personnel and included departments and services bigger than those of the Lebanese Republic, and obtained all the revenues of the joint services (with Syria) such as the customs, tobacco regie, and various other state utilities.³⁶

The situation of the Lebanese administration and civil servants became the following:

"...the national government system was under another government system of advisors distributed throughout

³²The constitution, in its article 95, institutionalized the differences in Lebanese political life through stressing the equitable representation between sects in the cabinet and in public employment.

³³Later incorporated into one House on October 17, 1927.

³⁴Ziadeh, op.cit., p. 51

³⁵"L'Organisation du 1er Septembre 1920 consistait à créer des postes de conseillers à côté des ministres ou des directeurs généraux dans le centre et à côté des préfets dans les départements. (Arrêtés Nos 330, 336 et 337 du 1er Septembre 1920)." Moustapha Baroudi, op.cit., p. 187.

³⁶Lababidi, op.cit., p. 9.

all the government departments of Beirut and the Muhāfazāte. The advisors dictated their will to all the Lebanese employees who were obedient instruments in their hands." 37

The Lebanese civil servants "became — through a sudden change of the public service during the mandate from a simple to a complex system — a part of a big, branched, vague and noisy machine. The public official, even, was like a fish in a great net grabbed by its mouth by the higher authorities in a strong centralism."³⁸ We can perhaps sympathize with the Lebanese officials of the day when we realize that the French officials under whom they served "... were irritable and irritating in attitude and behaviour."³⁹

The mandate gave the French complete dominance over all aspects of Lebanese national life - foreign relations, judiciary system, economy, development and supervision of education and social welfare. The spirit of the mandate obliged the French to train the Lebanese in these fields. They, instead, "regarded Lebanon as an area of exploitation, where French capital, French colonial expansion, and French culture should be developed. The interests of the people themselves were a matter of secondary importance."⁴⁰ The French themselves were experiencing a shortage of efficient personnel which

³⁷ Ibid.,

³⁸ Awād, op.cit., p. 124.

³⁹ Ziadeh, op.cit., p. 51.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 50.

situation "led to corruption in certain branches of the administration which, though less widespread than that to which the country had in Turkish times been accustomed, was a bad advertisement both for France and western methods."⁴¹

Furthermore, a particular grievance against the French — which led to the failure of their rule — was their failure to provide a reasonable standard of administration. "The French officials were too often corrupt, avaricious and arbitrary; while the... Lebanese officials were not wisely chosen, properly trained, or given a due measure of responsibility."⁴² The indictment against the French also involved, besides inefficiency irresponsibility and corruption, their adoption of "a harmful attitude towards those whom they ruled," and that they "...did not grasp the special obligations of the Mandate, but treated the country as if it were a French colony."⁴³ The consequences of this were definitely very harmful to the Lebanese administration and civil servants. "The development of public services, even in spheres far removed from controversy and where the necessity of advance is generally recognized, was unsatisfactory."⁴⁴ Although the French incorporated into the Lebanese

⁴¹Robin Fedden, Syria, An Historical Appreciation (revised ed; London: Robert Hale Limited, 1955), p. 215.

⁴²Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 176.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Ibid.

administration, both in text and spirit, much of the practices and systems of their country, yet they did not organize or set up an administrative system that was in line with the development of Lebanon and the needs of the state.

At the outbreak of the Second World War, the French High Commissioner, G. Puaux, declared a state of siege in the Levant, suspended the constitution, dissolved the Chamber of Deputies, and installed a Lebanese Secretary of State as the senior administrative officer of the land and liaison between the H.C.'s Office and the administration.⁴⁵

F. 1943-1952

With independence Lebanon faced a mass exodus of its civil servants with harmful effects on the efficiency, quality and morale of its civil servants. The implications of this factor on the Lebanese bureaucracy, for example, personnel recruitment and the sad application of existent personnel codes, at the time and which produced serious repercussions at later stages are well stated by Georges Fischer. He said:

"Le départ massif, au moment de la proclamation de l'indépendance ou immédiatement après, de fonctionnaires ressortissants de l'ancienne métropole, crée des vides difficiles à remplir. Les nouvelles autorités sont amenées à procéder à un recrutement hâtif; la quantité et la qualité du personnel, surtout aux échelons supérieurs, peuvent en souffrir. Les postes à pourvoir sont attribués moins en fonction de la qualité des candidats que de leurs relations avec le parti

⁴⁵ Arrêté No. 246 L/R of the High Commissioner. (21 September 1939); see Grassmuck and Salibi, op.cit., p. 10.

politique au pouvoir. L'efficacité de l'administration semble décliner et ses relations avec les usagers sont quelquefois loin d'être satisfaisantes. On cite également des phénomènes de corruption."⁴⁶

The rules and regulations governing the civil service in Lebanon -- contained in a number of separate laws and regulations -- continued in use, with slight modifications, from 1926 to 1952. With independence in 1943, the Lebanese government inevitably inherited an inadequate and inefficient civil service. Because of preoccupation with pressing and immediate political problems of a country fresh out of a mandate, the civil service was left as it is, if not made worse. This state of affairs continued for ten years until 1953. The need to correct this situation became very apparent throughout the decade prior to 1953, in which year "... the first codification of rules for the civil service of Lebanon appeared."⁴⁷

G. 1953-till the present

Legislative Decree No. 13 dated 7 December 1953 held special significance to the Lebanese civil servants. In combining all personnel rules in one single code this Decree "... constituted a step toward improving the standards of personnel and the conditions."⁴⁸ Furthermore, it provided the civil servant in Lebanon -- and for the first time in the history

⁴⁶M. George Fischer, "Quelques réflexions sur la Fonction Publique dans les Etats Nouveaux, "Revue Action" (Juillet, 1959), p.649.

⁴⁷Lababidi, op.cit., p. 73. The draft of this law was prepared in 1946 and it was later revised by a special committee headed by Mr. Kamil Sham'un before his election as President of the Republic.

⁴⁸Ibid.

of this service — "...some guarantees to which he was not accustomed before,"⁴⁹ The decree came as a result of the movement of reform that was conducted in the administration at the beginning of the second regime (1952) in independent Lebanon.

A second and third reform movements brought new and improved personnel laws to govern the Lebanese civil service. They are, consecutively, Legislative Decree No. 14, dated 7 January 1955 and Legislative Decree No. 112 dated 12 June 1959. The latter is presently in operation.

Professor Heady describes the situation of personnel administration in the Middle East, which is perhaps true of Lebanon, thus: "The cost of this pattern of inequities is hard to calculate, but it is tragically high. Governments operating under conditions of basic poverty of resources realize far less output than could be achieved even under these limitations. Potentially promising candidates refrain from entering the civil service, able public officials often leave and the mediocre and poor ones find it possible and profitable to stay; lines of hierarchical supervision and responsibility are blurred; morale and esprit de corps fall; efficiency of performance is low; and public regard for the public service drops. However, ways for coping with this dilemma are not easy to find, and no Mid-East state has as yet succeeded in devising a satisfactory system for dealing with rank and pay problems."⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ferrel Heady, "Personnel Administration in the Middle East", Public Personnel Review, Vol. XX, (1959), p. 53.

The 1959 personnel law came as a result of the third reform movement. Its stipulations embodied many basic changes in the field of public personnel administration of the country. Prior to this date, the civil servants in Lebanon had their personnel matters administered by the individual ministries, in harmony with European (mainly French) departmentalized practice. The manner in which these personnel affairs were administered was in a sad state of affairs. In general, these ministries were not in the least capable and able to carry on such a task. A considerable degree of non-uniformity, of duplication of efforts, and consequent high cost were among the lesser evils of such a departmentalized practice. The greater evils were that any ministry was open to be overstaffed with civil servants in response to political and, more importantly, sectarian pressures in payment for electoral and patronage debts. This was done with no regard to the ministry's needs and goals, or the ability and competence of those appointed. These pressures were applied similarly to other personnel aspects such as promotion, transfer, rewards and penalties.

The government gradually began to realize the harmful effects of such a situation — particularly personnel matters and structural problems; and the question of establishing a merit system. Thus it attempted to centralize personnel administration once in 1942 (Directorate of Personnel) and another time in 1955 (Permanent Civil Service Council). Both were half-hearted, ineffective attempts; the units being merely advisory in nature and never went into actual

application.

It was during the third (1958-59) reform movement that decisive steps were taken to build up a nucleus of a merit system under a strong and able central machinery, namely, the Civil Service Council.

H. The Pre-1959 Bureaucratic And Employees' Conditions

The studies which were conducted during the third reform movement revealed many of the ills and weaknesses of the pre-1959 administration and the personnel system. In statements (10) which were labelled "The Talks of Administrative Reform"⁵¹ and released to the press for public relations purposes these weaknesses were as follows:⁵²

**In general, the Lebanese administration has three ills -- political interference, disorganization, and inefficiency of the civil servants; more particularly the reform studies revealed specific findings, below.

**Some of the ministries or idaras (sing. Directorate-General) therein were overstaffed while others were considerably understaffed. The former did not know what to do with the useless surplus, the latter were busily trying to fill its ranks.

**A strange and ridiculous mixture of types of positions

⁵¹Prime Minister's Office -- Administrative Reform Machinery, Hadith al-Islah' al-Idari (translation of Arabic title, The Talks of Administrative Reform), 12 to 30 September 1961 (mimeographed).

⁵²As adapted by the author.

existed: permanent, temporary, daily-paid. An illogical and unnecessary shortage in one type or surplus in another created much uncertainty and consequent corruption in all the types and throughout the service.

* *Employing and dismissing civil servants was in many instances done arbitrarily thus placing them under the aegis of political and sectarian influences with resultant serious depression in their morale and production and consequent effects on the public.

* *The salary scale was seriously inadequate. Also some permanent positions received only their basic salaries whereas civil servants in the same or other types of positions received additional phenomenal supplements and allowances amounting to many times their basic salaries. This created grudges, envy and chagrin in the hearts of the civil servants and produced most serious and regrettable effects on their morale, conduct and production. Also, this situation burdened the treasury with wasteful administrative expenses which the taxpayer could benefit from in other vital services in a country which is, until it proves the contrary, underdeveloped.

**Examinations for recruitment to the service were not competitive and their standards, even for the same jobs, differed in the various ministries and sometimes in the various units within the same ministry. The top names of those who passed the examinations were not necessarily appointed. Choice was allowed from all the list of those who passed in order to accommodate sectarian and political distribution of positions. The better of these candidates used to be appointed to secondary positions, and those of limited abilities used to fill important supervisory positions. As to appointment in 'category two' positions (chiefs of services) no examinations were conducted or required and considering the circumstances, the able and the qualified inside the service if any were disillusioned and those outside it were disheartened and barred from entering government service. As such, with passing days, the service was stacked with worthless elements far from those needed in a changing and developing country and an administration with added responsibilities and spheres of operation.

**Training facilities or programs were non-existent for the civil servants. Some of them, taken from one ministry or the other, were sent abroad, sometimes to be trained all in a single field or in areas where other employees have already been trained. Upon their

return they were dumped in unimportant clerical positions totally unrelated to their training. Some civil servants were adequately trained and requested consideration that their training be taken into account in the reform movement of 1958. Also, despite its obvious need, no in-service training existed to raise the performance standards of these civil servants.

**Administrative procedures and activities were disorganized, and there were no set and standardized regulations specifying or properly distributing duties and responsibilities among the various positions of anyone Idara' (Directorate-General, or an Administration). Furthermore, no proper routing of administrative operations and transactions existed inside the ministry or across ministerial lines. This was coupled, in many instances, by a lack on the part of the civil servants of authority commensurate with their responsibilities, of proper knowledge concerning their duties and responsibilities, and of satisfactory management of work and routing procedures.

**Personnel files and records were either completely lost or non-existent. In cases where they were available, pertinent information was incomplete and inadequate. The personnel history of the civil servant as such could not be known, i.e., his past deeds or misdeeds, training,

abilities, etc. Since promotion, transfer, rewards and penalties were not based on the past record of achievement of the person, so keeping records was useless.

These conditions set the stage, to a considerable extent, for what was termed in the reform 'talks' a suffocating atmosphere in the Lebanese administration whose evil sources and results could be eradicated through the creation of a single central agency to control all aspects of personnel administration in the civil service. Legislative Decree No. 114 dated 6 December 1959 created the central Civil Service Council to handle the task.

A prominent politician and former prime minister (See Case "C", Chapter III) described the situation of the Lebanese civil servants as such:⁵³

"The abundance of civil servants is matched by the meagerness of their salaries and is definitely related to the situation resultant in their lack of competence, confusion of conduct and ethical behaviour. This makes it plausible to consider the civil servant in Lebanon to be one of three: either an honourable man relying for his modest living on his inheritance, the number of these is small; or the honourable man overburdened with debt, these are also few in number; or the third man who has descended to the lowest levels of anyone made responsible for the welfare, money and ambitions of the people by sacrificing the public good

⁵³ Sa'ib Salam, "Hawl Binā' ad-Dawlah al-Lubnaniyah" (translation of Arabic title, "On Building the Lebanese State") Les Conférences du Cenacle, Vol. VIII, (1954), p. 160.

on the alter of his desires, susceptible to and receiving bribes from any source and completely disregarding the interests of the people."

The general public sympathize with the Lebanese government official since they consider the corrupted political atmosphere as a way of life and they experience the various ills that result from the misuse of a mixed political culture, confessionism and political feudalism. They realize his helplessness and the pressures being exerted upon him and point to a common enemy — the politicians and Za'ims. However, the general public consider the government official as the representative of the central authority; but because of painful experiences during the Turkish and French rule, present excessive red tape, 'Discrimination at the Reception Desk' in the various administrative units and the use of "Wastā'" (pressure and 'piston') by the influential, the government official is considered a discriminating formalist, a petty tyrant. Of course this may not be true of every civil servant, except that "the few spoil the reputation of the many." The man on the street is at a loss to understand the presence of so many government employees and such little service offered him. Even, sometimes, when he receives some service he is expected or pressured to give little rewards — and he marvels at the prevailing lack of integrity and higher control. The citizen fears the unpredictability and impartial protection and application of the law 'because' it is applied by these government officials.

The civil servants themselves, at least those filling the lower echelons, are visibly disgruntled on more than one account.

Their pay, working atmosphere, arbitrary controls, discriminations of rewards and promotions, political and sectarian interferences, all combine to make them disheartened, demoralized and disinterested. Thus, no esprit de corps binds them and their main cohesive quality, perhaps, is directed at self-protection. Their general inefficiency is aggravated by the disorganization of their work procedures and poorly defined duties and responsibilities. Lack of proper on-the-job training makes them lack full command of their job and thus refrain from taking decisions, even minor ones, but refer such matters up the hierarchy. Many of them, in higher and lower echelons, regard their positions as sinecures. Also, in all the ministries there are, apparently, a number of these government officials who never appear at all in their jobs except periodically to draw their salaries. Of those who do attend regularly, a significant proportion turn out very little work, either from incompetence, or inertia, or from lack of proper control, supervision, and organization. In all, their personal incentives are not strongly identified with organizational and governmental goals for which they are working, at least nominally. The weakness of effective pressures for performance make such civil servants become preoccupied with procedural formalism and legalistic ritualism vis-a-vis goal-oriented behaviour. En masse they might be fully aware of their status and rights, but not so much so of proper conduct and service. One tends to think whether a "Crisis of Conscience" has taken hold of the values of the individual civil

servant. The behaviour of civil servants "...is a matter of official cognigance."⁵⁴ Officially, their positions are imbued with legal expectations together with moral obligations.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, they have been — especially in higher positions — the benefactors as well as the victims of political and sectarian meddlings. They used whatever means available to safeguard their interests and well being including that of their political and sectarian groups. They paralyzed the law to the latters' benefit, and consequently to their own, and such groups have never been too ungrateful.

In western government "the legislatures, the party battle for votes, the pressures of organized clientele groups and professional societies, combine to prod the public administrator to produce results if he would keep his post and win promotions.

"In contrast, in many countries bureaucracy seems to lay down its own terms for survival. Seniority, patronage, strict tenure rules, part-time employment, corruption — these are signs that the dominant pressures on administrators are not directed toward production. They suggest rather the importance of connections with influential families and cliques, of timeserving, of catering to those with standing and money, and so forth. Alternatively these signs may be taken as indications of political weakness in government, as evidence

54 William G. Torpey, Public Personnel Management (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1953), p. 266.

55 Functionally speaking, and in addition to its institutionalization, the moral criterion is needed for a merit bureaucracy as normative guide and a basis for motivation. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., Ltd., 1947), pp. 55-56, 156.

that the bureaucracy has become a politically dominant rather than a subordinate organ of government, that administrators deal with their clientele as "officials" imposing orders from above rather than as "public servants" responsive to articulate needs."⁵⁶

James T.C. Liu in his classification of eleventh-century Chinese bureaucrats provided a sound description of types that closely fit the Lebanese bureaucracy. He said:

"Career-minded bureaucrats can be divided into two specific types: the conformist and the executive. The conformists are probably the majority in any given bureaucracy. Their career interests are best protected by a routine mode of operation. They tend to object to policy changes and drastic innovations; and they are usually on the conservative side in opposition to reforms. However, when a reform becomes well established, they are likely to conform to the reform policies just as they had previously conformed to the old policies. The executive type, on the other hand, is energetic, ambitious, and aggressive, with superior administrative ability. Such bureaucrats are by temperament impatient with the routine operation which they feel buries their talent and also impatient with the routine promotion which requires time and length of service. They see in policy changes and administrative innovations an opportunity to use their talents, to distinguish themselves, and to move up rapidly."⁵⁷

A third general type of bureaucrats are the abusive ones. These "do not really concern themselves with political principles, although some of them are quite learned. Nor do they really identify themselves with

⁵⁶Frederick W. Riggs, "Public Administration: A Neglected Factor in Economic Development," The Annals, Vol. CCCV (May, 1956), pp. 78-79.

⁵⁷James T.C. Liu, "Eleventh-Century Chinese Bureaucrats: Some Historical Classifications and Behavioral Types," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 2 (September, 1959), p. 222.

the bureaucracy, although they are all eager to remain in it. Their chief value orientation is a personal selfish interest in power, influence, and materialistic gain. Their career is the means to such an end rather than an end in itself. They are roughly identifiable, if not identical, with the unworthy person in Confucian theory. However, this general type can be divided again into two specific types: the corrupt and the manipulative. The corrupt type is the usual kind of self-debasing bureaucrat; the manipulative type is the less common kind who, as energetic and capable as the executive type, turns his talent to political maneuvers, consolidating his power so that he can indulge in dishonest practices on a scale beyond the ordinary."⁵⁸

The evolution of civil service systems in western countries has shown that "...the creation of a profession of public administration, the transfer of loyalty from the individual ruler to the collective and changing government, from personal ties with groups outside the government to the obligation to serve the entire nation through serving the state, is a long process and an uneven one."⁵⁹ The long-run creation of a profession of public administration and a merit system in Lebanon is perhaps the most valuable and immediate need at the present. The satisfaction of this need is certainly the primary task of the Civil Service Council, its National Institute of Public Administration, other control agencies such as the Central Inspection including its O. & M. office and D.G. of Public Tenders, and the Bureau of Accounts. The Lebanese government

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 222-223.

⁵⁹ Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, op.cit., p. 145.

employees must be trained to look for a meritorious and professional career, and not a profitable one, in their public service. The C.S.C. must plan recruitment and try to develop, if possible, the nucleus of an elite corps -- perhaps, and if goals are needed -- similar to the British 'administrative class' or the French 'grands corps d'état.'

I. Bureaucratic Structure and Behaviour

The Lebanese civil servant is now in the midst of a merit-patronage paradox. Professor Preathus's opinion that, "perhaps the divergence of contemporary Middle Eastern bureaucracy from the ideal model is most clearly apparent in the precarious position of civil servants"⁶⁰ may certainly hold true for Lebanese public officials. At present, they are being subjected to the grind of a 'near-merit' system. Yet they still look around and see imperfections, flaws, and ills that lead to serious repercussions and drawbacks.

Legislative Decree No. 112 dated 12 June 1959, along with other laws, is concerned with personnel administration of the Lebanese civil service. There is quite a gap, however, between its stipulations and its real application. A comparison between the ideal, or the law, and the actual in the various processes of

⁶⁰Robert Prethus, "Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organisation," Social Forces, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 (December, 1959), p. 109.

personnel administration is valuable in drawing the distinction — or, rather, showing the gap — between Lebanese personnel laws and the actual behavioural setting of the civil service. However, to conduct such a survey would lead us away from our main course as this work is not specifically one on public personnel administration of the country.

An influential independent and liberal newspaper in a review of the last ten years⁶¹ described the sad state of affairs in the Lebanese political life and governmental and administrative practices of the previous 'regimes'; under the title "From a "Ranch" State to a Real State" it wrote:⁶²

"Lebanon saw in the last ten years a series of experiences during three regimes. Some part of it is remembered by the Lebanese with more grace and satisfaction. The other parts - perhaps the larger parts - are remembered but with curses. Naturally, such experiences effected some basic developments involving the State, the meaning of governance, and the mentality of the governor.

"The state, before the beginning of the last ten years and during the first few years of this period, resembled a foresaken ranch profited from its riches by those who enjoyed the favour of its master. Cabinets, in general, used to be composed from persons known for their excessive and strong allegiance to the regime. Most of these people looked at government as means for profit and enrichment in the first place. For example, one premier used 'Point Four' experts and equipment and work groups and facilities of the Ministry

⁶¹ Al-Jarida, (Beirut), annex to No. 2788, January 21, 1962, p. 6.

⁶² As adapted by the author.

of Public Works to provide himself with orchards and plantations. And so did many of the Ministers and Directors-General. Also, recruitment to the administration was open for use by these people. For they prided in the number of their men which they have employed by a single scratch of their pens, and made them receive respectable salaries without doing much work or taking the trouble of visiting the offices they were supposed to work in.

"Included among such ministers were some which "covered money swallowing" did not suffice. One of them issued and signed an arrêté giving himself few thousand pounds as overtime allowances for his tiring ministerial work. This same minister, and some of his 'honest' colleagues and Directors, ordered government workshops to furnish their homes with the latest à-la-mode furniture.

"This type of ministers, however, used to fall from office for such a reason as the transfer of a telephone booth or its operator from one 'Dai'a' (village) to another. This is what happened to one of the cabinets of premier Riad El-Sulh. Two of his ministers quarrelled over the transfer of a telephone operator and the premier backed one of them while the other was backed by an extremely influential personality, called the 'Sultan'.⁶³ Instantly the cabinet's atmosphere was electrified, for there was more than a minister who paid homage to the 'Sultan'. The premier found that he faced a crisis, and when he mentioned the matter to the master of the regime he was advised to resign. He, God forgive him, was not interested in resigning but the wish had to be fulfilled.

"Most of the parliamentary deputies and 'Za'im's were busy obtaining illegal profits. Some of them were given some quotas by the Ministry of National Economy which they manipulated in the business circles to obtain the most profits. Some others got marginal profits in the form of commission for convincing ministers to sign arrêtés involving licensing the

⁶³ He is Mr. Selim El-Khuri, brother of President Bisharat El-Khuri, named after the Ottoman Sultan Selim, and generally all Ottoman Sultans, who were noted for their corrupt practices. - The author.

sale of land or buildings, decrees of acquittal for the guilty, and importation permits for goods - besides big deals whose profits they partitioned proportionally according to rank. All, however, were involved in the development of favouritism and influence in the state which did not stop at recruitment of civil servants but, surpassed it to the protection of criminals, smugglers and gangsters, and woe to the men of law who should even produce a little grimace or frown. The State was non-existent! Nobody could pursue a thief and there was no trace of real inspection or control to the extent that everybody became convinced that there was no punishment for those who steal the State. It is not reasonable to ask the thief to be honest while everybody and everything around him encourages him to steal.

"The honest civil servants - and they were a minute proportion - could do nothing. They, and the State, lived in different worlds. Even worse, their services were never considered and appreciated. At the same time their colleagues were being rewarded for their misdeeds. News of collusion, for example, of the engineers of the Ministry of Works with contractors are many and sometimes strangely interesting. An engineer who was supposed to control the execution of the repair of some roads, partitioned the appropriated money with the contractor and no repair was done to the road. When the affair was discovered and the engineer investigated with, he appealed to a high official. The result was that, instead of being punished, he was promoted.

"Projects which were carried were only those yielding the most profits or respectable real estate deals for those with unsatiable bellies. This may be one cause of energizing the movement of executing projects, for in as many projects as are executed, their profits would increase. This involved gains for the country in spite of its wrongs and torts.

"Politically, the public atmosphere was marred by the attempts of 'Zua'ma' to entice sectarian antagonism to reach for cabinet posts. They have many a time organized popular meetings and demonstrations to show how much arms their supporters had. They were answered in the same manner by the premier and his ministers who used to be seen with their men around them carrying pistols, rifles, and machine guns. As such the regime used to offer its support and as such did the "cocks" of politics defy each others.

"Electoral laws were not stable with parliamentary seats fixed at 55, 57, 44 and 66 to bolster the regime and elect some desired persons and alienate others; and sometimes to destroy the influence of the feudal lords.

"The citizens complained from all these things. They complained from the misuse of sectarianism; from the chaos and lack of prestige in government; of killings and shooting; of corruption and bribery in the administration."

This quotation needs little comment, if at all. With these conditions, "agitation for reform was increased, and an analysis of the Lebanese press during 1950 shows that hardly any aspect of public life escaped accusation. Corruption, traffic in influence, negligent administrative machinery, political feudalism, and lack of security and justice were accusations thrown at the Government, most of which government circles could not disclaim."⁶⁴ These sad conditions serve as a major premise for the reorientation of the Lebanese bureaucracy. They have fomented a 'white revolution'⁶⁵ — a public cry against inefficiency and corruption — culminating in the alliance of reformists and opposition leaders at the 'Meeting of Dayr al-Qamar' (August 17, 1951) and the overthrow of the regime of President Bisharat El-Khuri through his forced resignation in 1952, and subsequent reform movements.

We may conclude from the materials in this and the previous chapter that the dead hand of tradition behind the behavioural setting of the Lebanese bureaucracy and society still exercises considerable

⁶⁴Nicola A. Ziadeh, op.cit., p. 111.

⁶⁵It was labelled also as the "Rosewater Revolution."

hold in hampering the application of the ideal. We may also conclude that the structure of the Lebanese administration is an inadequate guide to bureaucratic behaviour.

We noticed that the Lebanese bureaucracy was supposed to provide for the needs of its foreign masters during the Ottoman and, more importantly, the French rule. However, with the advent of the era of independence it had to be reoriented to serve the new social, economic and political needs. This implies and involves the question of reforms.

CHAPTER IX

THE SOCIAL SETTING

One cannot be precise in measuring, in quantitative terms, the real contribution of the Lebanese civil servants to fundamental bureaucratic goals. Extensive scientific research must be conducted if any sound and reliable generalizations are to be deduced concerning the behaviour of these public officials. This research is outside the scope of this work. Nevertheless, a general understanding of bureaucratic behaviour in the Lebanese administration could be had through observation and insight concerning the social structure of the country involving the economic structure,¹ the social structure² and the framework of beliefs and values.³

It appears that specific traditions and historical aspects of these various structures determine, or at least greatly influence, attitudes and work behaviour.

¹Discussed in Chapter III, above.

²Involving the family system, religion and education.

³Involving attitudes towards authority, tradition and precedents, religious values, educational values and the political factors.

A. The Social Structure

Concerning the social structure of Lebanon, we may look at it as part of the general "culture area" of the Arab Middle East. Countries thereof -- although they cannot be equated or bracketed socio-politically -- could be considered as roughly comparable on the general basis that they are found in the same cultural area, setting and that they share a common history and traditions.

As such, they share some common social determinants and characteristics such as the "... patrilineal, patrilocal, patriarchal, endogamous and extended family (system); ... the subordination of the individual to his family and his participation in larger social groupings on a family basis; larger social units based on kinship lines; tribal organization among nomads and semi-nomads; kin-groups among settled villagers; triple-class structure in towns; indication of a "dual organization"; ... leadership (religious, educational, economic, artistic, literary, etc.) concentrated in the urban middle and upper classes; Westernization centered on towns, strongest in upper class...."⁴

Also, we may observe the dominance of primary organizations,

⁴Raphael Patai, "The Middle East as a Culture Area," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VI, No. 1 (Winter, 1952), pp. 20-21.

such as the traditional family system, over secondary ones which is characteristic of agrarian societies. In such societies primary groups tend to perpetuate themselves by maintaining a strong relationship with those of its members that join secondary organizations. "... The relatively few secondary organizations tend to resemble large primary organizations, somehow wrenched out of their natural rural setting. Thus "secret societies," guilds, and, most significantly, the government itself, the bureaucracy, resemble a greatly extended joint family or clan. Important features of administrative behaviour become comprehensible if we see that members of a bureaucratic organ behave toward each other in ways appropriate for the relations of fathers and sons, or of brothers, to each other."⁵ No corresponding or reciprocal interplay exists, however, to the extension of the primary group power into secondary organizations in the form of sensitivity and responsiveness on the part of its members towards the public. It seems that "in the Near East, people are not yet accustomed to looking upon others impersonally in any situation. Their tendency to look upon others as individuals, with families, friends, and communities behind them, is carried over into realms where recent changes have

⁵Fred W. Riggs, "Agraria And Industria - Toward a Typology of Comparative Administration," in William J. Siffin (ed.), Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1959), p. 41.

established different formal requirements."⁶

In the Middle East, the family acts as the medium through which religious values are transmitted to the members of the society, i.e., determining traditional basis of authority and structure. The basic orientation of religious values in this area is toward the supernatural. Since God's will is supreme according to this basic orientation, all happenings depend on Him. Where Islam prevails, this religion will serve as the primary motivating force of a society's culture. The islamic religious system and the revelations of Mohammad emphasize charismatic type of leadership. Also the Sunna (precedent) in islamic teachings stresses tradition and custom rather than pragmatism or rationality. "Thus, Islam means more than a number of rituals, prescribed prayers, ablutions and prostrations. It is a way of life, a direction to the higher values and a guide for social and human behaviour."⁷ Where the whole life cycle is viewed in a religious context -- e.g., such as the solid core of the principles and ideas involved in Islam -- then that particular religion will remain an overriding cultural factor and administrative behaviour will tend to reflect this type of

⁶ Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt -- A Study of the Higher Civil Service (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 118.

⁷ Ilse Linchtenstadler, "An Arab-Egyptian Family," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VI, No. 4 (Autumn, 1952), p. 391.

religious orientation. Under this situation, administrative behaviour will remain committed to irrationality and a religious orientation which presents itself, perhaps, as an obstacle to the adoption of new Western administrative practices and innovations. Thus, what is right and proper concerning behaviour is not what is considered expedient and efficient under the circumstances but that which conforms to tradition and customs, i.e., to the basis of authority structure.

The family in Islam was first conceived as a religious institution and that "... both Islam and the family systems in fact reinforce each other."⁸ As such the decisions of the family head and behavioural patterns and values are legitimated on this religious basis. So when an individual leaves his familial primary group to join a secondary organization, say the public bureaucracy, he will tend to carry over this legitimization of the authority of the family head to his bureaucratic chief towards whom he will develop an attitude of subservience. This acceptance of authority is based not on the ability and competence of the administrative supervisor but on the ascriptive qualities of age, status, family name, etc., which qualities are followed and respected in his previous primary group.

⁸Emile S. Shehadeh, "Culture and Administrative Behaviour in Lebanon," (M.A. Thesis, Graduate School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell University, 1959), Chapter III, p. 1.

Any analysis of administrative behaviour in areas where religious beliefs permeate the various aspects of the individual's life, must allow -- when dealing with Christian elements⁹-- for the consideration of different value orientations and responses to such variables as technical innovation, secularization and rationality. For instance, although authoritarianism of family and local community exists in various religious groups of the traditional Arab society, "... there is some reason to believe, however, that these tendencies are beginning to weaken somewhat among Christians, who are in the minority, and who naturally look toward the West and Christendom more than the Moslems do. For them, then, democratic ideas may conflict with the established culture and the patriarchal family system may be weakened. Although the Christians certainly live in and participate in an authoritarian culture, it is reasonable to expect them to be slightly less authoritarian than their Moslem countrymen."¹⁰

Research conducted in Lebanon shows that there is a greater orientation toward traditional values among the Muslim elements than among the non-Muslim ones. With respect to the Christian

⁹These elements amount to about half the resident population of Lebanon.

¹⁰E. Terry Prothro and Levon Melikian, "The California Public Opinion Scale in an Authoritarian Culture," in David C. McClelland (ed.), Studies in Motivation (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955), p. 290.

elements, an "... analysis of individual items used in the measurements of values indicates interesting relationships with religious and occupational factors including a higher 'modernity' score in favor of the Christian group and the non-agrarian occupational categories on a majority of items."¹¹ This research also revealed that there is a gradual undermining of traditional values, due to greater receptivity to values of efficiency and objectivity, by both religious groups.

A favourable inclination towards modern (Western) value orientation would perhaps allow greater permissiveness in administrative situations requiring the exercise of initiative, self-determination and independence of thinking.

The question remaining is whether resistance to Western values is also present among the Christian groups. One way to determine this is to examine closely the social organization of the various Christian sects in Lebanon. In view of strong sectarian loyalties and values of group solidarity, this may create strong resistance to change. Sectarianism in Lebanon is part of the basic political structure of the country, as will be illustrated below. The religious communities are all "warped by old memories and emotions into habitual non-cooperation. The division

¹¹ Lincoln Armstrong and Rashid Bashur, "Ecological Patterns and Value Orientations in Lebanon," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XXII, No. 3 (Fall, 1958), p. 414.

is not merely formalized by law. It is the Lebanon itself."¹² Accordingly, a strong tendency exists, perhaps, for a sect once formed to become a closed community and to maintain a conscious attitude of being different in its religious beliefs, customs and traditions from the surrounding world. This is so because a sect is a social force and, in essence, it is a faction, which is defined by James Madison as "a number of citizens whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community."¹³ It appears that whenever sectarian values act as an overriding cultural factor, this will tend to manifest some resistance to rational values. We may also note that while Max Weber's assumptions emphasize the legal norms for efficiency and rationality in bureaucracy, there tends to be an inconsistency if sectarian values are of a traditional nature.

A full treatment of the relevant theories concerning group solidarity and sectarian loyalties would be pertinent to

¹²George Britt, "Lebanon's Popular Revolution," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VII, No. 1 (Winter, 1953), p. 2.

¹³James Madison, "The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Factions and Insurrection," in The Federalist (New York: The Modern Library, 1937), p. 54.

this discussion but not, however, to the short compass of this chapter. Likewise would the treatment of the question of the psychological needs and the conformity between individual and group needs be -- the greater they are, the greater is group solidarity and loyalty. Two essential requisites are needed for bringing about the feeling of loyalty or solidarity as influenced by sectarian life. First, the existence on the part of two or more persons of similar orientations towards persons, symbols, values and language used. Second, the formation of religious sects or factions of similar or different religious represents the outcome of attempts on the part of the group to create certain relationships that correspond to 'psychological needs' for similar orientations about important and group-relevant objects. The loyalty to the sect creates an inconsistency in so far as the loyalty to the state is concerned. The Lebanese individuals' sectarian vs. state loyalties illustrate a very near situation. Since psychological needs are satisfied, then trying to bring about changes will be feared because of fear of breaking the solidarity and the ensuing satisfaction.

Also, a full discussion of the history of the evolution of sectarianism, sectarian conflicts and strife and its various

social and political manifestations is very important at this stage; however, this is too much ploughed ground in innumerable writings concerning Lebanon's political history.¹⁴ Some very relevant and general landmarks, nevertheless, could be cited.

B. Religious Sectarianism

Sectarianism in Lebanon is a phenomenon associated with it throughout its history. Lebanon has never been inhabited by a religiously homogeneous population. This small mountainous region around Mount Lebanon, from which the considerably larger modern state of Lebanon derives its name, was a place where persecuted or unorthodox sects formed semi-autonomous social groups. Here they enjoyed a considerable measure of freedom and safety, which was possible because of the mountainous nature of the country that made it difficult for access and thus placed its inhabitants in a strong defensive position.

Under the rule of the Ottomans the Empire itself was "... a non-national system of Muslim provinces and dependencies whose non-Muslim subjects were organized in religious, not territorial communities."¹⁵ The nature of the Ottoman Empire

¹⁴For an informative, yet compact, discussion of sectarianism and its political history see, Clyde G. Hess, Jr. and Herbert L. Bodman, Jr., "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1954), pp. 10-26.

¹⁵R.I.I.A., The Middle East (London and New York: R.I.I.A., 1955), p. 16.

itself provided the sectarian environment and basis of Lebanon.

The Lebanon of the time was ruled by a combination of feudalism (the Amīrs) and sectarianism. The "Millet System" which prevailed during the Ottoman rule -- and which continued to prevail, to a lesser extent, afterwards -- is an embodiment of sectarian semi-autonomy. The word "millet" means a sect, and so the system has a theocratic basis. From the political point of view it was a device by the central government to ease the relations of the subjects with the Porte. More than that, "as human cattle, the conquered were to be milked, fleeced, and allowed to live their own lives as long as they gave no trouble."¹⁶

In all matters that concerned one of the sects, the government always referred to the head of that particular sect. The spiritual leaders of the sects possessed civil as well as judicial functions. They administered the property and institutions of their sects and they handled matters of personal status (which they do up till now). "Since the Moslem law (the Sharia^t) was not applicable to the non-Moslem majority (in the Lebanon), they were left under the jurisdiction of the civil code which had obtained before the Conquest, such jurisdiction being now placed in the hands of their own religious dignitaries. This was the origin of the system of

¹⁶ Philip Hitti, History of Syria (London: Macmillan, 1951), p. 667.

self administering religious communities or millets (which) still survives for the purposes of civil law in that majority of Middle Eastern countries which have not yet undergone a thorough secularization."¹⁷ As such the theocratic state gave the religious minorities freedom to conduct their affairs as their religion dictated. So, by virtue of the Millet System all sects were self-administered so to speak, which situation widened the gap more and more between the various religious communities.

The Ottoman millet system set up all the religious non-Muslim groups into separate entities having each of them under its own religious heads. These heads administered the laws related to divorce, marriage, inheritance, adoption and other aspects of personal status, and supervised religious education and religious foundations. "This amounted to a provision for a minor government within the larger government. It was a formalization of the traditional Moslem practice of attempting to solve the problem of minorities."¹⁸

The French Mandate "... emphasized the 'confessional'

¹⁷ George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1952), p. 18.

¹⁸ Philip Hitti, Lebanon In History (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1957), p. 362.

nature of the 'State', and thus succeeded in creating a diversity of interests which drove people into enclaves."¹⁹ Under this mandate, "the traditional jurisdiction of the communal courts were maintained in some matters of personal status, although a large proportion of such matters were transferred to the civil courts. An attempt was made in 1936 to define the whole position of the communal jurisdictions. The High Commissioner issued a decree in which the historic communities were given explicit legal recognition. Their statutes were given the force of law, and the application of them placed under the protection of the law and the control of the public authorities. They were to possess corporate personality, and to be represented in their relations with the public powers by spiritual heads. Members of the communities would be obliged to conform to the communal statutes in matters of personal status, and to the civil law where the statutes of the communities were silent. Anyone who attained his majority would be at liberty to leave his community and enter a new one; and provision was made for individuals who were not members of any religious community."²⁰

¹⁹Nicola Ziadeh, Syria And Lebanon (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1957), p. 50.

²⁰Hitti, Lebanon In History, op.cit., pp. 181-182.

Religious authorities opposed this decree so it was replaced by a slightly modified one in 1938 which in turn aroused opposition from several sides.

Because of sectarianism and that it was drafted on a European basis, the Lebanese Constitution, being more liberal than all neighbouring constitutions, had no provision for any state religion or the head of state religion, thus enabling the freedom of worship to be a reality. Also, "the time-honoured tradition giving the corporate religious communities the right of jurisdiction over matters relating to the personal status of their members -- be they Christians or Moslems -- was retained."²¹ In modern Lebanon this state of affairs was assured by article 9 of the Constitution, which says: "There shall be complete freedom of conscience, While acknowledging the Most High, the Government shall respect all creeds and safeguard and protect the free exercise of all forms of worship on condition that public order is not interfered with. It also guarantees that the personal status and religious interests of the populations, to whatever creed they belong, shall be respected."²²

²¹Ibid., p. 492; also, Bahige B. Tabbarah, "Les Forces Politiques Actuelles au Liban," (Ph.D. dissertation, Université de Grenoble, 28 Avril, 1954), p. 47.

²²Helen Miller Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States In The Near and Middle East (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1953), p. 292.

The 16th, 17th and 18th centuries witnessed the slow shaping of the fundamental political characteristics of Lebanon as a sheltering enclave for small religious minorities, thus forming its poly-confessional population.

"Lebanon is a high, narrow mountain range overhanging the sea on the borders of the Arab world. From time immemorial nonconformists of all faiths and dissidents from all temporal dominions have used it as a refuge. Within it, they have been constrained to live together and jointly to defend themselves against outside enemies with the result that, in spite of their differences, Christians and Moslems of all sects have been driven by their mutual desire for independence and stability to develop a tolerance which is to be found no where else in the Middle East."²³

It was in the 19th century that the principle of confessional allotment of seats within a given administrative or electoral district was founded (Statutes of 1845 and 1861). Later legal changes by the French -- as of Spring, 1920, when they were awarded the Mandate over the country -- deeply affected Lebanon's political development along sectarian lines and with the addition of the factor of regionalism (the territorial additions to the original area of Mount Lebanon which territories had a sizable Muslim population).

The law determines the confessional system which ordains the proportional representation in the Chamber, as well as employment in the public service, to be according to religious

²³Pierre Rondot, rev. ed., The Changing Patterns of the Middle East (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), pp. 15-16.

faith. This has become a most durable political, and administrative, institution in Lebanon.

The French laid some regulations, as of 1922, which had primary impact on the country's political institutions. Arrêté No. 1304- bis of March 1922, which established a new elected Representative Council, became the precursor of the Constitution of 1926, several articles of which were carried over almost verbatim to this latter organic law.²⁴ "A companion decree (Arrêté No. 1307, March 10, 1922) establishing electoral procedures for Lebanon has similarly exercised its influence on all later Lebanese electoral laws. Many of its administrative provisions, especially, have been faithfully carried over through all the mutations which the law has undergone. As in the past this decree provided for an apportionment of the seats in each electoral district on a confessional basis. It is also interesting for the impetus it gave to what may be called "feudality" (the incorporation of "feudalism" into the electoral system) in Lebanon."²⁵

The Constitution, promulgated on May 23, 1926, stated in its 95th article (as amended on November 9, 1943) that: "As a

²⁴Hess, Jr. and Bodman, Jr., op.cit., p. 15.

²⁵Ibid.

provisional measure and for sake of justice and concord, the communities shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of the Cabinet, such measure, however, not to cause prejudice to the general welfare of the State."²⁶ This provision effectively weakened, if not contradicted, the 12th article of the same constitution which stated that "All forms of public employment shall also be open to all Lebanese citizens in accordance with the conditions laid down by law, preference being given solely to merit and capacity. The conditions applicable to State officials shall be embodied in a special Statute, according to the department to which they belong."²⁷

In the abortive Franco-Lebanese Treaty of 1936 -- which was never ratified by the French -- the following guarantee was affirmed: "A fair and just representation of the various elements of the population in the Public offices of the state."²⁸ In the letter of General Catroux, the Free France representative, to H.E. Alfred Naqqash, the President of the Republic, in which he declared the independence of Lebanon in November, 1941, this promise was reaffirmed -- almost as a condition for the country's independence -- thus: "The Lebanese government will ensure an

²⁶ H.M. Davis, op.cit., p. 304.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 293.

²⁸ An-Nahar (Beirut), No. 965, dated 15 November 1936.

equitable allotment to the various elements of the country of the high offices in the state and in the 'ensemble' of government employment."²⁹

At the dawn of independence the question of confessionalism and sectarianism received its modern reaffirmation in the form of the so-called Al-Mithāq Al-Watani (The National Pact) of 1943. This was an unwritten agreement between the two "heroes of independence" President Bisharah al-Khuri, representing the Christians, and Premier Riyad al-Sulh, representing the Mohammedans.³⁰ The Pact purported to serve as a perpetual Entente Cordiale among the various religious communities of Lebanon. This extra-constitutional agreement ordained that both groups of sects should live in concord and in the belief of an everlastingly independent Lebanon wherein the Christians would no longer look upon France as their protectress and the Mohammedans would renounce thoughts or plans of merger with neighbouring Arab states, notably Syria; that the Lebanese should accept identification as of the

²⁹Ad-Diar (Beirut), No. 36, dated 25 November 1941.

³⁰This took place probably after these two, plus few other political leaders, were rounded up by the French on 8 November 1943 (on account of amending the Constitution to cut out everything related to the Mandate) and were, shortly thereafter, released on November 22nd of the same year -- which date was ordained to be the National Independence Day.

Arab world and race; that the high political posts be distributed among the principal religious sects in certain defined ratios. The Lebanon of the Pact constitute, the author thinks, a sort of a "federation of sects" wherein, according to it, the Christians have an unchallenged majority of 6 to 5 in the Chamber; the Maronite Christians are entitled to the Presidency of the Republic; the Sunni Moslems are entitled to the Premiership; the Shi'ā Moslems are entitled to the Speakership of the Chamber; the Greek Orthodox Christians are entitled to the Vice-Premiership and to the Vice-Speakership; the Druzes and the Greek Catholic Christians are each entitled to at least one ministerial post.³¹

As regards recruitment to the civil service the 'sectarian equation' has always been in use -- sometimes tilting to the interest of one sect or the other, most of the time being used as an instrument of power politics and patronage by the political leaders (zaims), all the time misused and prostituted. Even after three reform attempts and three personnel laws no serious move was taken to correct this situation; on the contrary, the latest personnel law of 1959 (Legislative Decree No. 112 dated June 12th) states in its 96th article that in the appointment of civil servants article 95 of the Constitution must be taken into considera-

³¹See Hitti, Lebanon In History, op.cit., p. 492.

tion. The Civil Service Council and the Cabinet stick literally to this policy.

C. The Educational System

Concerning the educational system in Lebanon, much could be understood from the observation of the impact of the tradition of free education. This freedom was extensively used by the religious communities,³² and foreign religious missions in establishing what developed to be a powerful sector and an important ratio of the educational activities in the country. Many of the Lebanese intelligentsia -- together with most of those who entered government service -- were educated and trained, during the Mandate and up till now, in the classical tradition of France. It looks that the traditional educational philosophy dominant in this agrarian society, helped by the above mentioned factors, tended to emphasize religious teachings and the liberal arts. This traditional philosophy of this culture area "... tends to devalue practical training and this constitutes a barrier to bureaucratic evolution, ... university training is legal and historical, sprinkled with a generous dash of philosophy, ... field research tends to be concerned with law and structure rather than with process. The Western idea of higher learning

³² Education by religious communities is guaranteed by article 10 of the Constitution.

as a preparation for a career tends to be pushed aside by viewing the degree as conclusive evidence that one has arrived."³³

If the assumption is accepted that Lebanon approximates agrarian society, then there is a lack of specialists and technicians in bureaucratic organizations. We infer from this that this lack of reliance on specialized knowledge -- which is a fundamental characteristic of rationality in Max Weber's bureaucracy -- is a direct outcome of the traditional emphasis on religious teachings and the liberal arts. Based on the above mentioned assumption, we may propose that, were such a situation prevails, education per se will be looked upon as a factor of prestige in an administrative situation rather than as a means to enhance the quality of administrative performance. For instance, where a society approximates the agrarian type and where economic opportunities are lacking, the educated elite tend to look upon their education as a sure means of a government position or at least a place in society that recognizes their talents and skills.

Research findings on education in Lebanon³⁴ indicate that education ranks high as a major value based on the question of "how would you spend your money?" However, based on the question

³³Robert Presthus, "Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organization," Social Forces, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2 (December, 1959), p. 107.

³⁴Lincoln Armstong, "A Socio-Economic Opinion Poll in Beirut, Lebanon," Public Opinion Quarterly, (Spring, 1959), pp. 18-27.

"What qualities, traits, and conditions a person should have as the means necessary to acquire wealth?" the result suggests a relative low ranking for education as a means to acquire wealth. Such matters as luck and pure chance, hard work and perseverance were considered more instrumental. We may conclude that these, limited findings, although not representative of the whole society, suggest that we are dealing with a traditionally oriented society where ascribed rather than achieved statuses are the criteria for prestige and social standing; that education is not highly regarded as a means for acquiring wealth, but rather contains a prestige element which overshadows considerations of type and quality of education; that where this situation prevails, the educational system itself tends to be geared to a traditional system where training is of a generalized, historical, legal type (liberal arts and law) instead of an emphasis on specialized training for bureaucratic organizations (the scientific, the technical and the vocational). Yusif A. Sayigh illustrated the situation when he wrote that, "the system of education is in fact many private and public systems, with foreign-mission schools of various leanings, but on the whole scholastically of superior quality. It has produced a relatively high level of literacy, but of doubtful value. The emphasis has all along been on liberal arts and law, to the detriment of the scientific, the technical, and the vocational. Largely modelled on the French "baccalauréat" system, the curricula

stuff the student with factual knowledge but equip him poorly for individual, independent thinking... In recent years, especially since the war, the trend has shifted and the emphasis has definitely changed. But this is not saying that the supply of scientists, engineers, and economists is nearly as adequate as that of lawyers and poets."³⁵

D. The Political System

Much of the nature and institutions of the political system in Lebanon was revealed while treating the question of religious sectarianism in the country, above. A detailed description of the machinery and branches of Lebanese government at this stage, although it may be informative and enlightening, is replaced by a continuation of the discussion of the underlying theme.

Lebanon's political system is tremendously influenced by existing social systems to the extent that it could not operate as an identifiable total system but as highly intermixed "systems" of politics in a mixed political culture. "Within the country the preservation of the balance has contributed to the survival not only of the socio-political role of the religious communities (Islam draws no sharp distinction between the political

³⁵Y. A. Sayigh, "Lebanon: Special Economic Problems Arising From A Special Structure," Middle East Economic Papers - 1957, p. 65.

and religious spheres, and the Christians of the Middle East have been obliged to accept this concept), but also of the influence of semi-feudal notables and clans. The party system and parliamentary regime have taken hold only formally and partially. Public opinion has not yet outgrown family and cantonal divisions sufficiently for the men at the top to resist the temptation, at election times, to pull fatally easy strings, for which all sorts of justification can be made, often enough in good faith. Indispensable links with the West must be preserved because this transit country lives on them in the crude material sense, as well as deriving intellectual and cultural sustenance from them; at the same time the interests of the Arab world have to be protected because 'Arab Lebanon' must show solidarity or else it impairs a significant aspect of its unique nature, not to mention its commercial contacts with its hinterland."³⁶ Sayigh summarizes the country's main political problems, together with their repercussions, thus: "The combined implications of political feudalism and political confessionism have been to divide the community; to push the unqualified man forward if he is of the right sect and has the necessary backing; to produce inefficiency and superfluity in the civil service; and to give the laws of the

³⁶ P. Rondot, op.cit., pp. 16-17.

land less authority and effectiveness -- in short, to retard far-reaching reform in all aspects of society's life. Although the public at large is aware of the necessity of, and is eager for reform, it is generally kept so busy with its community rivalries that it has left the field free for narrow vested interests."³⁷

E. Social Change and Administrative Reform

With the advent of independence, Lebanon faced some fundamental issues concerning its administrative structure. The economy and the role of the state expanded, as it is still doing, and the new state of things created many problems. There was a growing recognition and awareness that the Lebanese administration was not well equipped and trained to deal with increasing functions and responsibilities. It became clear that the bureaucracy which served the needs of its foreign masters, be they Ottoman or French, had to be reoriented to serve the new socio-politico-economic needs of a rising democracy. This growing awareness of the need for reform began to be reflected in turn in inefficiency, corruption and public dissatisfaction. The days of President Khuri's regime, especially the later half, afforded many and serious illustrations as regards the political and administrative scene. "While creating the Bureau of Accounts

³⁷Y. A. Sayigh, op.cit., p. 64.

in 1951 was an effort to curb administrative irregularities, there remained the popular feeling, not already unfounded, that the substantial expansion of government offices in the past decade had enabled them to outgrow their controls. It was difficult to know what offices and agencies existed and what their functions and duties might be. This lack of definition, in turn, produced a lack of control over administrative action and a lack of responsibility on the part of the government official. Journalistic charges of corruption and malfeasance in office at all levels of the administration added to the unrest that already-existing dissatisfaction with electoral procedures and results had stimulated. Nor can we forget the economic disorders... which further increased popular belief that government administration might be improved."³⁸

Instigated by the prevailing pitiful conditions and enticed by the spread of more liberal and democratic ideas which were imbued with the spirit of change, the 1952 'constitutional coup d'etat' took place and a new regime was installed with Camille Sham'un as President of the Republic. The new President, a strong former opposition leader, came to power on top of a popular reformist wave -- just like President Khuri came on top of the national independence wave of 1943. The Lebanese expected, as

³⁸George Grassmuck and Kamal Salibi, A Manual of Lebanese Administration (Beirut: Public Administration Department, American University of Beirut, 1955), p. 15.

in 1943, miracles -- social, political and economic -- to happen and a new glorious phase of independence to start. They were in a highly positive state of national psychology that would have accepted, perhaps, almost any change. They were ready to stand with their President against any reactionary forces, traditions and precedents, to wash away corruption and inefficiency, even to amend, outright, administrative and political institutions such as the dictates of sectarian representation in the Cabinet, the politico-feudal electoral system, the sectarian personal status system and the sectarian appointment to the administration. The man, however, never did rise to the level of the expectations and goals of his society.

During Sham'un's regime two half-hearted attempts at reforming the administration were taken between 1952 and 1957.³⁹ The first was during the mandate of Mr. Khaled Chehab's cabinet (15 October 1952-15 April 1953); the second was during the cabinet of Mr. Sami El-Sulh (15 October 1954-15 January 1955). Both cabinets were empowered by the Chamber to issue legislative re-

³⁹For an informative description and critique of the pre- and post-1958 reform movements see Crow and Iskandar, "Administrative Reform in Lebanon, 1958-1959," International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, 1961; see also, Iskandar Bashir Shalhub, "Planned Administrative Change In Lebanon," (Ph.D. dissertation, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, August, 1962), pp. 80-123.

organization decrees for a specified period of time, six and three months consecutively. The first cabinet, in as far as administrative reform was concerned,⁴⁰ had a mandate to reorganize all ministries and public agencies, revise personnel laws and cadres, reorganize the judicial system, accounting system and the Bureau of Accounts, decentralize administrative functions and establish a planning and development board. Ninety legislative decrees were issued covering these aspects, which decrees were approved by the Chamber. "Beyond this about 600 employees (mostly contract, not cadre) were dismissed from their jobs, but it was charged that within a week more than this number had been hired."⁴¹ The second cabinet, two years later, was granted powers which authorized the complete revision of the basic laws (including the Personnel Law) and the structure of all the administration. This second reform attempt was intended to revise, in a more comprehensive manner, all the laws and the reorganization that were issued and applied by the previous Chehab cabinet. It merely succeeded, however, at introducing minor changes that would help eliminate the inapplicable and insure smoother administrative operations.

⁴⁰ It was also empowered to legislate in some major policy matters concerning elections, municipal organization, customs tariffs, etc.

⁴¹ Crow and Iskandar, op.cit., p. 296.

Sham'un's regime dwindled from the crust of a sensational start wherein a sudden, almost natural, national unity had crystallized, into, towards the end of his regime in 1958, internal strife and almost a "sectarian civil war". The crisis of 1958 could not, perhaps, all be blamed on the man on account of a multitude of factors local and external to the country. Nevertheless, he is responsible for continuing the legacy of the Khuri regime -- perhaps in tastelier forme, but the same spirit -- in meddling in and corrupting the administration and in foully, not constructively, interfering in local power (inter-zaïms) politics. Sham'un, like Khuri, did not face the reality of epochal change.

General Fuad Chehab, Commander of the Lebanese army and a person of great integrity and prestige, was elected in 1958 as President of the Republic. Chehab, a compromise choice who was, and still is, respected by all warring factions (the so-called "revolution" and the "counter-revolution"), came to power amid considerable political instability and social, economic and above all, administrative disorders. He found that the country's national unity was extremely strained and the governmental machinery at a near-standstill. He set out to re-establish security and order and to revitalize the economy which had experienced some considerable recession. The need for the socio-economic development of the country could never be felt more urgently than at that time.

However, the new President had to have a healthy and efficient administration to undertake such an effort. The Lebanese, coming out of a serious civil conflict, could be united for the attainment of better goals, namely, a better socio-economic situation and an important pre-requisite, a neutral project, that of reforming the administration. The intention to reform the administration coincided with the demands of the opposition front which was responsible for the incidents (actually armed rebellion) that were purported to overthrow Sham'un's regime.

The newly elected President -- a military man who is impatient with inefficiency, patronage and malpractices, and a rising, widely acclaimed national saviour who held himself, and still does, aloof from and above all factions and rivalries -- earnestly threw his weight and will into the reform of the administration. He still does take great personal interest and supervises in person administrative reform efforts and processes up till this minute.

Generally speaking, the post-1958 administrative reform attempts (or phases) are considerably more serious and better organized for than those conducted under the previous regime. The author shall refrain from discussing the details of the various movements and the organization of their set-ups and machineries as this will take us away from the brief and quick line of discussion in this section.

The Chamber granted on 12 December 1958 the cabinet of Mr. Rashid Karamah, former opposition leader, powers to issue legislative decrees for a period of six months in a wide variety of fields. These included, for example, the economy, finance, general security, judiciary, budget law, arms, traffic, independent services and funds and the administration. Concerning administration proper, the government was empowered to reorganize the entire administrative system, all ministries and public agencies, to establish new cadres and to revise all personnel laws and regulations.

The main outcome of this reform attempt and its various phases between 1958 and 1963 (which produced 162 legislative decrees and 65 regulatory decrees and adjustments thereof; and used such organs as the Central Committee for Administrative Reform, the Central Committee for the Implementation of Administrative Reform, a Minister of State for Administrative Reform, the Directorate General of Research and Guidance and the Reform Machinery attached to the Prime Minister's Office as well as the Central Inspection and the Civil Service Council) was centered on producing a better organizational structure which included transfers of units among ministries and the creation of others; defining administrative units and specifying their duties and responsibilities; establishing or revitalizing central control

agencies such as the Civil Service Council and the Central Inspection which included units for central purchasing and O & M; regulating some grades, ranks and pay schedules; and creating a National Institute for Public Administration for purposes of in-service and pre-entry training; writing a new Personnel Law; establishing better coordination and communications systems between units and ministries; establishing better accounting, auditing and budget control systems; simplifying work procedures and methods; mechanizing work processes where possible and necessary; establishing a better filing system and creating a Central Archives Service in the P.M.'s Office for permanent records and documentation service; introducing the use of statistics, its scientific use for planning and development and the creation of the Central Statistics Directorate; clarifying relationships and spheres of authority between the central control units of the P.M.'s Office; establishing new job descriptions for all civil servants; deconcentrating authority in the central hierarchy and between the central and field administration; et.al. This list perhaps includes the major efforts of administrative reform during the present regime and it may not be all-inclusive.

Attempts at administrative reform together with the possibility of their success are tied up to a great extent with the

personality, will and leadership of the President of the Republic. There are no short-cut roads towards a good administration. To achieve this end the crucial factors of leadership, time, sustained and incessant attention and a generous supply of trained men, money and material must be found. In Lebanon, the President, is constitutionally, one of the strongest presidents perhaps in the whole world. Socially speaking, he wields tremendous influence and powers to guide. As such, it is his own choice to reform the administration or turn it into a corrupt and inefficient tool, to advance his society and lead it to better goals or pursue his own private interests and aims.

"The president holds a communications and power fulcrum between bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic groups, such that by throwing his weight in either direction he can strengthen one side against the other. Thus it is precisely because the presidency is a representative role that it commands vast influence as well as power in the control of bureaucracy."⁴²

All signs seem to indicate that President Chehab has endeavoured, since he took office, to turn the Lebanese public administration system into a power center, to fill its top managerial positions with the new qualified generation, the country's intelligentsia, in order that it may become, as far

⁴²Fred W. Riggs, op.cit., p. 90.

as existing factors and institutions permit, a meritocracy and an efficient tool of execution. Now that his term of office is running short and there is a very dim chance that he may accept another term of office, what the new situation will be or what the new regime will do along these lines remains to be seen.

We may generalize that administrative reform attempts affected mainly the structural aspects and the formal processes of the Lebanese bureaucracy. At present the country's administration enjoys a high standard of modernization in its formal institutions and techniques. It has modern laws and regulations as well as sound organization. Yet these reform attempts did nothing serious regarding the informal and behavioural aspects of the bureaucracy. The main problem at present seems to center around the effectuating of the new changes which were wrought into the formal structure of Lebanon's bureaucracy, and at the conciliating adjustments that need to be made between the formal and the informal in it; in other words, closing the big gap which exists between the formal organization and its actual operation. In any case one point remains essential, "... that changes in power and in structure do not mean that the basic values governing behaviour in a given situation have changed. Generally speaking, changes in cultural habits and values come very slowly.⁴³

⁴³ John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, Administrative Organization (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 252.

The Lebanese bureaucracy is itself a unit or a member of a much larger system -- the social system. It most definitely influences (by its outputs) and is influenced by (through its inputs) the physical, ideological, social, economic, political and psychological environment of the country. As such, an important interactivity exists between the society as a whole and the Lebanese administration which forms an integral part of its society. The Lebanese public officials are also members of the larger social system and of several of its subsystems -- primary and reference groups, families, religious sects, political groups, etc. Thus, they bring with them into the Lebanese administration a surfeit of roles, expectations, inter-personal relations, norms, beliefs, values and prejudices. These they cannot lay aside in their bureaucratic behaviour. Up till now it proved impossible to call upon their services, imagination and conceptual abilities without calling into play, simultaneously, the products of a lifetime of beliefs and expectations which have the tenacity of historic tradition that is still a living force in Lebanon.

"Developmental psychologists agree that national cultures tend to produce typical personality structures. It seems equally clear that personality structures are not discarded like snake's skins when one enters the bureaucratic arena; rather the patterns of bureaucratic authority and deference reflect the values of institutions through which the bureaucrat has grown, primarily the family. For example, cultural parochialism has obscured the fact that the

nepotism and subjectivity seen in bureaucratic systems of many less-developed societies are a manifestation of their pattern of family relations in which personal loyalties outweigh the demands of technical supremacy. Without some theory which relates social values and organizational behavior, this phenomena is explained only in irrelevant moral terms. In the West, a similar conflict -- bureaucratic needs vs. family and political loyalty -- exists, but the demands of objectivity usually persist; in the Middle East, the breakdown of the extended family which permits this solution has not yet occurred."⁴⁴

It looks that Presthus's opinion that "social change is required to provide the basis for objective and rational patterns of organization"⁴⁵ holds much truth for the Lebanese situation.

⁴⁴Robert Presthus, "Behavior and Bureaucracy in Many Cultures," Public Administration Review, Vol. XIX, No. 1 (1959), p. 27.

⁴⁵Robert Presthus, "The Social Bases of Bureaucratic Organization," op.cit., p. 103.

PART V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The weaknesses in the Lebanese public administration system, as well as in the economic, political and social fields, are to a considerable extent symptoms of the underlying social base and its ills. Superficial reforms which do not solve the basic ills could achieve only ephemeral results of the same nature.

✓ From a structural point of view, the Lebanese public bureaucracy assimilated itself very rapidly to the Western types. It has quite a number of the ideal or basic organizational characteristics. It has an administrative hierarchy which is clear-cut, simple and uniform; it has levels of graded authority and jurisdiction, a differential ranking system, and a clear system of super- and subordination wherein control and supervision are centralized (in fact, overcentralized); the official duties of the various ministries, the basic unit of organization, are fixed together with those of the subunits; the individual civil servant knows his duties and responsibilities in a general manner, and action is being taken at present to provide him with a job description; administrative operations are governed by strict rules, although numerous flaws exist in

the routing and coordination of transactions and in the "signature system"; the spirit and practice of formalistic impersonality is tremendously increasing in the officials' conduct of work, but serious contradictory overtones remain as a result of many factors, socio-politico-economic and others; the idea of training and specialization is gaining ever more ground and is reflected in the establishment of the National Institute of Public Administration (1959) and the specification of positions whose occupants need to specialize abroad for some specified period (1963); employment requirements emphasize degrees -- besides the satisfaction of the "sectarian equation" -- in related specializations for the ministries' technical cadres, and in the liberal arts and law for the general administrative cadres; employment is protected against arbitrary dismissal, it constitutes a career, follows a system of fixed compensation with automatic salary increase, and has a system of promotion wherein achievement promotion is recognized and regularized, Accordingly, the "Lebanese government has modern organization, and applies many modern techniques in conducting its administrative... affairs. There is ground for believing that some of its procedures are more advanced and more efficient than are those

of larger and more publicized states of the Western world."¹ The structural aspects of the Lebanese bureaucracy mentioned above may, nevertheless, be imperfect.² Some outstanding and central elements, for instance, still need to be made stronger and better felt such as the rational orientation toward goal attainment, work specification, efficiency, professionalism, et.al.

From the behavioural point of view the Lebanese bureaucracy experiences many weaknesses. There is quite a gap between the stipulations of the personnel laws and their real application. It may seem that the Lebanese civil servants are subjected to the grind of a "near-merit" system. They feel that complete merit in all aspects of the administration has not been accorded to them. Their presence in the midst of an insecure atmosphere -- where a mixed political culture, sectarianism and political feudalism have collaborated since many decades, and up till very recent times, to interfere with and dominate their service and their souls -- have taxed their ingenuity for administrative survival. This situation -- plus their individual social ties with and loyalty to groups outside the government, i.e., their

¹G. Grassmuck and K. Salibi, A Manual of Lebanese Administration (Beirut: Public Administration Department, A.U.B., 1955), p. 1.

²For a concise description of the structural, and some behavioural, ills of the Lebanese bureaucracy up till 1959 -- some of which, perhaps, continue to exist -- refer to Chapter VIII, pp.

families, clans, religious sects, politico-feudal patrons, etc., being the same source of their appointment, promotion and administrative support and protection -- have deprived the Lebanese civil servants of much esprit de corps. The country's economic situation, during the War and after, and the ensuing rise in the cost of living -- while the civil servants' pay did not undergo significant adjustments -- placed their "probity" under a severe test. Their inefficiency and lack of morale can be also attributed to the fact that they have, up till this minute, no adequate, equitable and rational system for rank and pay which may be conducive to merit and to effective performance in view of organizational goals. The loss of the moral criterion in a merit bureaucracy did away with a factor which is badly needed as normative guide and a basis for motivation. Work attitudes are on the whole very unsatisfactory. ✓ The superiors' attitudes to their civil servants are authoritarian and ones of superiority. ✓ This master-serf mentality seriously undermines efficiency, productivity and morale among the civil servants. ✓ Also, their type of education, mainly in law and the liberal arts, to the detriment of the scientific and the technical, retards very considerably work specialization and professionalism in the service. We may note here that it is the primary, if long-run,

responsibility of the Civil Service Council (and perhaps other control bodies) to create, through in-service and pre-entry training as well as through other means, a profession of public administration and a merit system in Lebanon -- thus, in practice, rising to the full meaning and intent of the law.

Based on material discussed in previous chapters certain generalizations could be made concerning the Lebanese administration. In it we observed that too many persons are employed; that their services are not fully realized and their standards of quality, competence and performance are at an unsatisfactory minimum; that there is a high degree, recently decreasing, of favouritism, nepotism and sectarianism; that the personal incentives of government officials are not normally strongly identified with the goals of their public Organization; that institutions, associations and pressure groups are not mobilized as in an industrial society to drive the individual to exert himself to achieve certain organizational goals. The consequences of such a situation on the Lebanese administration and its civil servants are many and serious. There tends to be a lack of confidence and little or no reliance on the competence and loyalty of the civil servants which in turn necessitates

ways and means to check their performance in every detail and at every level.³

The presence of these administrative difficulties which strongly contribute to the inefficiency of the Lebanese bureaucracy is, perhaps, due to many other causes -- besides the administrative one -- such as the social and political attitudes in the country's governmental structure and institutions. It appears that these elements point to a bureaucracy in Lebanon wherein administrators deal with their clientele as masters rather than as public servants. It is perhaps in this area that profound and drastic changes must be effected as an essential step towards a competent and efficient administration.

The author would like to isolate, further, what may be considered as being the basic features of the Lebanese administration. They are the following:

1. The existence of excessive centralization and authority resulting in undue concentration of work and decision-making at

³This is evident in the controlling and auditing of minute activities, very strict hierarchical control and supervision by central units such as the Bureau of Accounts and the Central Inspection created for these purposes, non-delegation of authority and responsibility, etc..., thus creating much red tape and unnecessary routine.

the senior levels of the administrative hierarchy, and an undue concentration of authority at the centre of government in Beirut. There is a limited deconcentration and devolution of administrative work and authority within the ministries and between these ministries and their regional offices in the Muhafazāt.⁴ ✓ The field's chief administrator, the Muhafez, continuously refers to Beirut for instructions and guidance in the discharge of his functions. The ministries tend to be overstaffed at the lower levels and understaffed at the top. This situation generates congestion of work in the offices of the Director General and the Minister. This, plus the fact that decisions on routine work and, sometimes, trivial operations have to be made at the highest levels, creates the dysfunction of overburdening top civil servants with unnecessary details and leaving them with little time to deal with major policy.

✓ When mentioning the subject of centralization, reference must be made to the central role of the Ministry of Finance in preparing the budget and in exercising a comprehensive and total pre-audit on all government expenditures. Also, ✓ reference must be made to the comprehensive pre- and post-audit powers of the central Bureau of Accounts. ✓

⁴This is so despite the attempts made, which were partly successful, since 1959 at correcting this situation.

High centralization is due, perhaps, to the smallness of the country and the advantages of focusing authority in one place. This is coupled by the thought that it is not either very efficient or administratively reassuring to delegate authority on more than one ground. As such governmental wheels move slowly, heavily and, in many instances inefficiently.

In this regard Riggs' following remarks may be very true of the situation in Lebanon: "Because of overcentralization and lack of delegation, those close to the goals of action cannot easily cooperate with their colleagues in other agencies whose work directly affects the success of their own efforts. Characteristically, we find lack of coordination and cooperation. Moreover, to overcome this stagnation, new agencies are often set up in the hope that, outside the bog of established structures, action may be possible. But the new agencies simply add to the intrabureaucratic conflict and competition, increasing the burden on the top of the hierarchy to impose coordination."⁵

⁵Frederick W. Riggs, "Public Administration: A Neglected Factor in Economic Development," The Annals, Vol. CCCV (May, 1956), p. 77. For a discussion on the independent agencies in Lebanon and the problems thereof see Chapter II, pp.

2. The existence of a high degree of "legalistic" orientation, mainly the application of the law in its narrowest sense with relatively little attention to the long term objectives of the law and the social objectives of the ministry or agency. "Regarding administrative procedures per se, little recognition has been given to the role that might be played by positive management and personnel practices. As an example, the Personnel Law itself gives greatest emphasis to the legal responsibilities of the civil servant and the sanctions and penalties to which he is subject should he fail to "observe the regulations."⁶

3. The existence of excessive departmentalization whereby every ministry is to a great extent a self-contained unit acting independently of other ministries and with minimum coordination and lateral communication -- except through the Director General. Although the law (Legislative Decree No. 111, dated 12 June 1959, art. 9, sect. 5) provides that the Directors or Chiefs of Services can communicate directly across ministerial lines provided that they are not dealing with matters involving a general principle, these officials seldom use this authoriza-

⁶ R. E. Crow and A. Iskandar, "Administrative Reform in Lebanon, 1958-1959," International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol. XXVII, No. 3, 1961, p. 294.

tion or, if they do, they use it with reserve.

4. The influence of and emphasis on academic and theoretical background in the recruitment and selection of civil servants. Candidates for the five categories of the general administrative cadre⁷ are required by law⁸ to have certain specified academic diplomas or degrees as an essential condition, besides others, for entrance into the service. Most notable is the minimum of a Baccalaureat- Part I (or its equivalent: the Sophomore diploma) for Category IV,⁹ the minimum of a Licence en Droit (or its equivalent: the Master's degree) for Categories III and II and higher specialized degrees for Category I. In general, degree-holding civil servants have them in Law and the liberal arts.

⁷The 'Technical cadres' Positions have definite specialized educational requirements involving, in Category III and above, university-level degrees.

⁸Legislative Decree No. 112, dated 12 June 1959, arts. 4, 6-7, 11-12.

⁹Nevertheless, positions of stenographer, typist, postman, telephone operator and the like of this category -- in which positions the practical emphasis is more than the theoretical -- the requirement of this diploma is relinquished. Ibid., art. 7, sect. 2.

5. The premises of decision-making tend to be extended less, although increasing, by public pressure and more by the high officials and administrators; these latter are pressured by ministers or politicians, helped by local or imported experts and specialists and coaxed, if and whenever it wishes, by higher authorities. The civil servants have developed considerable lack of responsiveness and sensitivity towards the public. This was, perhaps, the deep influence of the Ottoman rulers and later the French who were more anxious that the Lebanese administration and civil servants be more sensitive to them as masters rather than to the people, their needs and expectations. Also, the government appears at present to some Lebanese (i.e., the former population of the southernmost and north-easternmost regions) as something distant, an abstraction, with no relations with them in what concerns their problems and their means and conditions of livelihood. The conditions are as such despite the government-publicized talks of regional development and projects. In these remote areas the government's ability to deal with and serve its public tends to be limited. Reciprocally, the people's expectations, in spite of their urgent needs, towards the government tend to be likewise limited.

6. The presence and use of personal relationships and contacts rather than the official channels in the administrative

process. This grew "... out of the fact that primary loyalties tend to be given to the family, clan, village or religious community, which has broad ramifications for the entire administration. ✓ It is axiomatic that when any Lebanese citizen finds it necessary to approach the government, he first seeks out "some one he knows" or "some one who knows some one he knows" ✓ that is, some one with whom he shares at least one of the above relationships. ✓ Civil servants respond to this type of relationship willingly and quickly and occasionally just as quickly when induced by some material reward even when no such relationship exists." ¹⁰ ✓

7. Lack of qualified and specialized civil servants, generally speaking. Qualified human resources, the most essential factor in any organization, are still badly needed to play a vital complementary role to the efficient functioning of modern organization and modern laws. An abundance of unqualified personnel, due to many causes which were mentioned in earlier chapters, forming a veritable Old Guard majority, has yet to be drained out of the administration and replaced by the qualified and the specialized. This is the main responsibility of the Civil Service

¹⁰R. Crow and A. Iskandar, op.cit., pp. 294-295.

Council and its National Institute of Public Administration which must provide a more positive and sound personnel policy and an active pre-entry training programme which is more pragmatic and less imbued with a rigid legal orientation. Unless this is done no significant change may be expected in the productivity and efficiency of the Lebanese administration.

8. Lastly, is the presence of religious sectarianism, which is recognized by law and in practice, and its manifestation in the public administration and composition of the State's political posts, in the electoral laws and in the personal status laws. As regards the administration, a scrupulous distribution of high administrative posts among civil servants from the various sects, in an equitable manner, is followed; also, this 'sectarian equation' is strictly observed in appointments to the various categories of the service. We may note that, although incompatibility between sectarian appointments and a merit bureaucracy can, theoretically, be avoided, this policy constitutes, in fact, a barrier to the ingress of the "best qualified" to the public service. The absence of a more positive recruitment and appointment policy, on account of sectarianism, may be -- and in fact is -- very disadvantageous as far as better efficiency and morale in the service are concerned.

We may conclude that an inconsistent relationship exists

between bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic behaviour in the Lebanese administration. What the outcome will be remains uncertain.

Also, the expansion in the role and functions of the Lebanese State vis-à-vis the inadequacy of its public administration has created an imbalance between goals and present performance, an administrative lag. These goals revolve, on the whole, on the growing responsibilities of a service state and the demands for socio-politico-economic progress and change. This progress can only be satisfied through the full development of the administrative capacity to implement the necessary programmes for such progress and development. Reform of the public service and the establishment of a competent one must, therefore, have priority among all other development programmes.

At present the following trends can be identified as taking place in the Lebanese bureaucracy: 1) Increase in the protection of the administration and the civil servants against political interference as of 1959; 2) The almost total acceptance of the notions of the islamo-christian (or multi-communal) nature of the State, the resolution to have the religious sects live tolerantly in democratic unity and constitutional peace, and the preservation of the equalitarian sectarian formula in appoint-

ments to the civil service; 3) The considerable increase in the role of the state, in bureaucratic size, in annual national budgets, and in the socio-economic functions over general administrative house-keeping functions; 4) The introduction and acceptance of more and more new ways and techniques in the bureaucracy and the use of scientific planning for social and economic development.

The non-structural ills and ailments that are found in the Lebanese bureaucracy cause the behavioural setting, perhaps, to deviate from contributing to the "proper" and fundamental bureaucratic goals. Such ills -- for instance, sectarian appointment to the public service; sectional and familial feelings and loyalties; tensions and role conflicts; non-delegation of power and authority caused by such factors; discipline by sanctions and subserviance; stiff control and timid adherence to law and regulations; etc. -- are highly dysfunctional as far as the Lebanese public bureaucratic goals are concerned. They are, also, considerably negative to the achievement of rationality, objectivity, precision, consistency and discretion. These bureaucratic ills are, on the whole, a product and a function of the Lebanese social base the values of which do not assign, perhaps, a high priority to these desired behavioural goals. Traditional values and institutions in Lebanon must be channeled into more rational and pragmatic directions if the adaptation of Western

bureaucratic organization to the Lebanese context is to be successful. Or, even, time-honoured social patterns must undergo drastic modification if the behaviour and technology of western bureaucratic organizations are to be fully adapted and incorporated by the Lebanese society and bureaucracy. There are, nevertheless, sound reasons to believe that the winds of change in the Lebanese bureaucracy are beginning to blow in the direction of a better behavioural futurity.

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