THE ROLE OF THE MARONITE PATRIARCHATE IN LEBAANESE POLITICS
FROM 1810 TO THE PRESENT

by

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submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Arab Studies Program of the American University of Beirut 1963
MARONITE PATRIARCHATE

Spencer
This essay is an attempt to evaluate the political importance of the Maronite patriarchate in the history of Mount Lebanon since the year 1516. The introductory chapter is concerned with the history of the Maronite sect and its patriarchate prior to the period under study. It is divided into eight sections. The first is an account of the origin of the Maronite sect in the Bekaa Valley during the fifth century of the Christian era. The second deals with the Monothelite doctrine which caused the Maronites to become separated from the main body of the Christian Church. The third is an account of the movement of the Maronite headquarters to Mount Lebanon and the establishment of the larger part of the sect in that area. The fourth section is a summary of the major steps in the process by which the Maronite Church was brought into full communion with the Roman Catholic Church. Section five describes the traditional friendship of France for the Maronites beginning with the Crusader King, St. Louis IX, in A.D. 1250. The sixth section is concerned with the political history of Mount Lebanon until the invasion of Syria in 1831 by Ibrahim Pasha, whose reign is the subject of the seventh section. The final section is an evaluation of the role of the patriarchate in the politics of Mount Lebanon prior to 1860.

Chapters II, III, IV, and V are concerned with the historical development of the patriarchate during the period under study. The role of the Patriarch during the civil disturbances in Mount Lebanon which stretched over a twenty-year period from 1840 to 1860 is the subject
of Chapter II. This chapter is divided into four parts. Part one is concerned with the united effort of the Mountainers of all sects to expel Ibrahim Pasha’s Government from the Mountain and the function of the Patriarch and the Maronite clergy during the revolt. The second part deals with the role of the Patriarch during the Maronite-Druze civil wars of 1861 and 1865. Part three is the story of the part played by the Patriarch in the agrarian revolution in Kisrawan in 1859. The final part of Chapter II is concerned with the massacres of 1860 which climaxed the period of civil war and ushered in the unique administrative system of the mutasarrifiyeh, whereby Mount Lebanon was governed as an autonomous Ottoman province under the joint guarantee of the Porte and the European Powers.

The role of the Patriarch in the political life of the mutasarrifiyeh which lasted from 1861 to 1915 is the subject of Chapter III. This long period is divided into three sub-eras, in each of which the influence of the patriarchate differed. The first period, 1861-1873, corresponds with the rule of the first two mutasarrifs, over both of which the Patriarch had considerable influence. The second period, 1873 to 1883, covers the administration of Rustem Pasha, who endeavored and to a considerable extent succeeded in checking the growing power of the patriarchate. The third period, 1883 to 1915 is a period in which the patriarchate managed gradually to recoup some of its power, lost during Rustem’s rule, although the last half of the period witnesses the beginning of an anti-clerical movement in Lebanon which is checked by the outbreak of World War I and the new problems created by that war.

The loss to the Ottoman Empire of Mount Lebanon as a result of World War I and the subsequent negotiations at the Peace Conference are
the subjects of Chapter IV. In this period the Patriarch emerges as
the spokesman for Maronite independence and as their principal political
leader.

Chapter V deals with the period from 1920 to the present and
includes the era of the French Mandate and the early years of independent
Lebanon. Throughout the period of the Mandate the Patriarch appears as
an important figure in Lebanese politics. With the attainment of com-
plete independence during World War II, however, the role of the Patri-
arch becomes a more passive one.

The concluding chapter briefly reviews the high points in the
political history of the Maronite patriarchate to 1958 and attempts
to explain how that institution had become so powerful. A possible
answer is that the power of the Patriarch has been roughly proportional
to the intensity of the fear of the Maronites for their very existence
as a separate entity. The activities of the patriarchate in relation
to the principal events in Lebanese history up to 1958 are then evalu-
ated in the light of this theory. The chapter and the thesis are ended
with speculation about the role of the Maronite patriarchate in the
future.
PREFACE

This work, insofar as I am aware, is the first study of the Maronite patriarchate as a political institution undertaken to date. Consequently, it is not to be regarded as exhaustive. The primary limiting factor has been time, so that sources in the Arabic language have not been extensively utilized, although several important sources which had been translated into English are utilized in the present work. French sources were used only when the available English and Arabic sources were silent.

I should like to take this opportunity to extend my thanks to Professor Nabil Fares, former Chairman of the Department of History and of the Arab Studies Program at the American University of Beirut, who suggested the subject of this thesis; to Professor John Batatu of the Department of Political Studies and Public Administration at the same university, who supervised the preparation of the thesis; to Father Dennis Mooney, o.f.m., who assisted in several ways; to Mr. Naem 'Id of the American Embassy in Beirut, who translated several passages from the French language; and finally to His Beatitude, Bulus Ma'uni, "Patriarch of Antioch and All the East", who generously interrupted his busy schedule in order to discuss the thesis with me.

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CHAPTER I. THE MARONITES BEFORE 1610

Origin of the Maronites

The Maronites (Arabic Maroninah) are an Oriental Christian sect, the main body of which lives today in the Republic of Lebanon, and more particularly in the northern and central portions of Mount Lebanon. They trace their origin to an ascetic monk named Marun, who lived in the latter part of the fourth and early part of the fifth centuries of the Christian era in the area between Antioch and Cynthus, and who died about the year 410.\(^1\) Shortly after the death of this monk, his disciples migrated to Aconeia on the Orontes River,\(^2\) where they built a monastery, which they named after him Beit Marun.\(^3\) In this area, the community thrived, at least until after the bulk of Syria was won over to the Monophysite cause,\(^4\) but in the year 517 three hundred fifty monks of this monastery were killed in a conflict with the Monophysites.\(^5\) The orthodoxy of these Maronites was rewarded by Justinian the Great (527–565), who caused their ruined monastery to be rebuilt and by Heraclius who paid them a visit after his victory over the Persians in

\(^{1}\) Philip K. Hitti, *Lebanon in History*, p. 287.

\(^{2}\) Ibid., p. 218.


\(^{4}\) The Monophysite doctrine holds that in Christ there is but one nature, the divine. Those who adhere to this tenet reject the dual nature doctrine of the Council of Chalcedon (451), and were at that time separated from the main body of the Church. In Syria they came to be known as Jacobites, though they prefer to be called Syrian Orthodox.

\(^{5}\) Hitti, loc. cit.
the year 628.  

Monotheletism

In the year 628 as the Arab armies were advancing victoriously through Syria, the Patriarch of Constantinople, Sergius, and the Byzantine Emperor, Heraclius, devised a doctrine which they believed would serve as a successful compromise between orthodoxy and Monophysitism and would in turn regain for the empire the loyalty of the Syrians. This new doctrine ignored the question of one or two natures and held that Christ had one will. It made some headway under the influence of authority, but in the end it met with complete failure and was condemned by the Council of 681. It was officially revived for a short time by the Emperor Philippicus (713-713), but again without success. The reason for its failure was that "it was an olive branch presented on the point of a sword. Such a peace-offering could only provoke war."

The otherwise unsuccessful doctrine, nevertheless, found adherents among the monks of Bait Marun. Although later Mononite scholars were to claim that they broke with the Byzantine emperor when Monotheletism was declared heresy in 681 and therefore date their separate existence as a sect from that time, there is a wealth of disinterested evidence which indicates that the contrary is so.

1ibid.
3labour, loc. cit.
4Adeny, op. cit., p. 131.
5ibid.
All the Maronite historians who considered the history of their church were highly critical of the source material which reflected unfavourably on its particular orthodoxy, and accepted favourable evidence uncritically, no matter how unconvincing. Some were even distorted historical facts almost beyond recognition to suit their hypotheses.⁷

**Establishment of the "Nation" in Mount Lebanon**

In the middle of the seventh century there lived in the Amuq range on the Arab-Byzantine march a warlike tribe of Christians called Jarajish. This adventurous tribe had served as scouts and guardians of the passes for the Arabs during the conquest of Antioch,² but later they joined the service of the Byzantines and became a nuisance to the Arabs. Their raids into Syria culminated in 656 and 699 in full-scale invasions of the coastal highlands of the country. They were supported by Byzantine naval units, and both times were able to seize and secure the strategic points in the Lebanese highlands.³ Faced with serious internal problems, the Khalif agreed to pay tribute to the Emperor if he would withdraw support from the Jarajish, but it appears that the latter remained in the mountains of Lebanon and attracted to themselves Christians of the neighboring lands. In fact, they became the qiyasbans (chieftains) of northern Lebanon until the sixteenth century.⁴

⁷St. Germanus of Constantinople in his treatise De Aeresiis et Synodis (ca. 735) mentions "some heretics who, rejecting the fifth and sixth councils, nevertheless contend against the Jacobites. The latter treat them as non and make use, because, while accepting the fourth council, they try to reject the next two. Such are the Maronites..." (quoted in Labourt, op. cit., pp. 606-607 and Archdale A. King, *The Faith of Eastern Christians*, Vol. I, pp. 211-213). St. John Damascus (d. 749) pronounces the Maronites as heretics (Labourt, op. cit., p. 607 and John Potter, *Researches into the Religions of Syria*, p. 107).


³Ibid., op. cit., p. 265.

⁴Ibid.
Mount Lebanon was thus launched on "its traditional course as a citadel of minorities and dissidents and as a home for the lost cause." Among the refugees were Maronites from the Qrontes Valley, who began to infiltrate the Mountain in the latter part of the seventh century because of feuds with the Jacobites. In 694 the Khallif permitted the Emperor Justinian II to punish the Maronites. He destroyed their monastery on the Qrontes, causing the surviving monks to flee to Mount Lebanon, which henceforth was to become the principal center of the sect. According to Maronite tradition, the Christians of the Mountain rallied around their Maronite bishop, Yahanna Marun, and defeated Justinian at Anyun. Whether this legendary saint, who became the first Maronite Patriarch of Antioch (585-707) actually existed is debatable; nevertheless, it is certain that the Christian inhabitants of the Mountain, including the Jarajinah or Mardaites, were converted to the sect, which came to dominate the northern part of the Mountain. Of equal importance is the fact that the Maronites believe that Yahanna Marun united the Mardaites and preserved their independence in Mount Lebanon. He established his see in Kafar Na‘i, in the region of Barrun, which continued to serve as patriarchal residence until 1160, at which time it was moved to the famous monastery of Qamhun in the Qadisha Valley.

The history of the Maronites for the next five centuries is

2Hitti, op. cit., p. 216.
3Ibid., p. 216.
4Ibid. and King, op. cit., p. 220.
is almost entirely unknown. The Moslem power in Syria became convinced that the cost of conquering and maintaining control over the Mountain was not worthwhile, and so they permitted the inhabitants a degree of autonomy amounting to virtual independence under their own mudajadin. The inaccessibility of the Mountain from outside tended to separate its inhabitants from the rest of Syria socially and economically as well as politically and to perpetuate racial differences and prejudices. The lack of roads within the Mountain itself likewise acted to create disunity among the Maronites, whose principal ties were their common religion and their dislike for the Muslims and non-Maronite Christians of the Syrian plains.

Ties with the Vatican

In the twelfth century the hitherto isolated Maronite community was brought into contact with the Crusaders of Europe and their Roman Catholic religion. The occupation of the Lebanese coastal cities by the Crusaders was not destined to be a permanent one; nevertheless, a relationship between the Maronites and the Latin Church, which was to culminate over five centuries later in permanent union, was inaugurated. About the year 1180,

... while the kingdom was enjoying a temporary state of peace, as has been related, a race of Syrians in the province of Phoenicia, near the Lebanon range, underwent a wonderful change of heart. For almost five hundred years these people had followed the heretical doctrines of a certain Maro, from whom they took the name of Maronites. They had separated from the church of the faithful and had adopted a special liturgy of their own. Now, however, by divine leading, they were restored to their right minds and abandoned their heresy.

1Salibi, "Lebanon in Historical Perspective", loc. cit.
2Philip K. Hitti, The Syrians in America, p. 22.
They repaired to Antioch, the patriarch of Antioch, the third of the Latin patriarchs to preside over that church, renounced the error by which they had been so long enslaved, and returned to the unity of the catholic church. They adopted the orthodox faith and prepared to embrace and observe all reverence and traditions of the Roman church.

These people were by no means few in numbers; in fact, they were generally estimated at more than 80,000. They lived, as has been said, in the bishoprics of Jubail, Bizan, and Tripoli, on the slopes of the Lebanon mountains. They were a stalwart race, valiant fighters, and of great service to the Christians in the difficult engagements which they so frequently had with the enemy. The conversion to the true faith was, therefore, a source of great joy to us.

The heresy of Maro and his followers lies and was that in our Lord Jesus Christ there exists, and did exist from the beginning one will and one energy only, as may be learned from the sixth council, which as is well known, was assembled against them and in which they suffered sentence of condemnation. To this article, condemned by the orthodox church, they added many other pernicious doctrines after they separated from the number of the faithful. Now, however, we had been granted, they repented of all these heresies and returned to the catholic church, under the leadership of their patriarch and several of their bishops. By these leaders who had hitherto led their people in the ways of iniquity, now displayed equal zeal in glorious guiding them as they returned to the truth."

The Moslems were finally able to drive the Crusaders out of Syria in 1291. As a result "the ecclesiastical union between the Maronites and Rome tended to weaken, although it was never formally abandoned."

In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Franciscan missionaries were sent to Syria to restore and strengthen the union, and in 1399 the Patriarch, Yohana al-Jasir, was summoned to Rome for

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2 Kamil Salliby, A Modern History of Lebanon (Manuscript to be published in late 1963 by Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London), p. 280. According to Nitsi (Lebanon in History, p. 311) correspondence with Rome was suspended until the time of Pope Eugenius IV (1413-1447).
the Council of Florence, where union was strengthened by Maronite recognition of the supremacy of Rome in ecclesiastical discipline. In spite of occasional Maronite lapses in discipline and faith, all Patriarchs beginning with James of Hadet (1139-1158) are considered to have been strictly orthodox; yet, Pope Pius II, in a letter written to Nebish the Conqueror in 1461, counted the Maronites still among the heretics. The writings of the earliest Maronite historians whose works are still extant indicate that although the "official" Maronite church may have been strictly orthodox, the common run of Maronites were not particularly attached to their Roman orthodoxy and were easily attracted to the heresy of their Monophysite neighbours. The Lateran Council of 1516 cemented the alliance further, and since that time there has been uninterrupted contact between the two Churches. Perhaps the most important milestone in the movement toward unity was the establishment by Pope Gregory XIII of the Maronite College in Rome in the year 1584. Many of the brightest graduates of this seminary returned to Lebanon where they occupied positions of importance in the Maronite Church. By 1713 the influence of the Vatican was so strong that Pope Clement XI was able to declare the deposition of the Patriarch by his bishops null and void, and the latter obeyed his command to render them.

1Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 280-281.
3Leboult, op. cit., p. 687 and Xing, op. cit., p. 225.
4Leboult, loc. cit.
5Salibi, Maronite Historians of Medieval Lebanon, p. 152.
6Leboult, loc. cit.
7Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 102.
selves subject to him.\footnote{1}

The episode which permanently sealed the union took place from the 30th of September to the 2nd of October 1735 at the convent of Deir Aqla in the Kasrawan district of Lebanon. It is known as the Council of Lebanon, because in addition to the Patriarch and fourteen of his bishops, it was attended by two Syrian Catholic and two Armenian Catholic bishops, heads of Maronite monasteries, theologians, deacons, priests, and monks, as well as several important lay Maronites.\footnote{2}

Nevertheless, it was strictly a Maronite affair. The Pope was represented by the famous Ammanani (al-Sin'ani), himself a Maronite. Certain abuses were ordered ended, canon law was revised, and Maronite doctrine was brought into complete harmony with that of the Roman Catholic Church, although traditional practices not in conflict with Roman dogma, such as the ordination of married men, were retained.\footnote{3}

The Maronites are by no means the only Oriental Christians who have embraced Roman Catholicism; indeed, there are Byzantine Catholics, Syrian Catholics, Armenian Catholics, Coptic Catholics, and Chaldeans (ex-Nestorians). The Maronites differ from the others in two important respects, however. First, they tend toward “Latinization”: that is, while the other uniates retain the same liturgies and most of the same practices and customs as the churches from which they have been separated, the Maronites though retaining the Syrian language in their liturgy, have modified the service so that it approaches the Latin Mass. Other Latin practices, some of them discouraged by Rome, have crept in to the Church; in fact, it is impossible to distinguish a Maronite place of

\footnote{1}{Sissi, op. cit., p. 102.}
\footnote{2}{John Hortens, op. cit., pp. 133-134.}
\footnote{3}{Hitti, Lebanon in History, pp. 160-162.}
worship from a Latin one. Secondly, while all other uniate bodies are splinter groups from Eastern Churches, the Maronite Church in its entirety has gone over to Rome. In the words of a Latin scholar who has specialised in the study of Eastern rites, “for centuries, surrounded by schismatics and Moslems, they have been the one entirely faithful outpost of Catholic unity in the East. All are in union with Rome; there is no such thing as a schismatical Maronite.”¹ No greater tribute could be paid by the Roman Catholic Church.

Relations with France

The special relationship of the Maronites to France likewise has its beginnings in the Crusader occupation. The Crusades were in the main led by Frenchmen, and so it was natural for the Maronites who participated with them against the Moslems to develop ties with them. When St. Louis IX arrived on the Syrian coast in 1220 he was set by 25,000 Maronites who provided him with horses and other gifts. He addressed a letter to “the Prince of the Maronites, to their patriarch, their bishops, and the nation”,² in which he thanked them for their assistance. He also commended them for their Catholicism, told them that he regarded them as Frenchmen, and finally promised that he and his successors would extend to them the same protection as that enjoyed by the French themselves.

For a time after the expulsion of the Crusaders this friendship was more apparent than real, but it was never forgotten by the Maronites or by their potential benefactors. From time to time French monarchs,

¹Iaroslav Fortesque, The Uniate Eastern Churches, p. 9.
²For text, see Appendix F (A).
as for example Louis XIV in 1649\(^1\) and Louis XV in 1737,\(^2\) were to renew the promises of St. Louis.

In the year 1535 King Francis I obtained from the Ottoman Sultan Sulaiman the Magnificent the first of a series of treaties which became known as the capitulations.\(^3\) Originally granted as a favor in order to enable French nationals to reside and trade in the Ottoman Empire without being made subject to Islamic law, the scope of the capitulations was gradually extended as the relative power of the Turks decreased until in 1673 France was given the right to protect all Latin Christians in the Sultan's domains.\(^4\) Finally, she was able to carry the process a step further, though unofficially, and claim the right to protect or at least to speak for all uniate Christians in the Ottoman Empire, foremost among which were the Maronites.\(^5\) Her exclusive rights were not unchallenged from time to time by the other Catholic powers of Europe who were also parties to the Capitulations, but France had too many advantages for others to overcome. As first daughter of the Church, France was looked upon as the Catholic power by the uniates, and most of the Catholic missions in Syria were manned by French Jesuits and Franciscans who spread the French language and culture among the uniates. An amazing phenomenon was the ability of the French missionary to survive the "irreligion of the French Revolutionary era, the strong advent

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\(^2\) For text, see Appendix I (B).
\(^3\) For text, see Hurewitz, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Document 1, pp. 1-5.
of anti-clericalism in France itself a century later, and the separ-
ation of Church and State in 1906.1 During all these crises of re-
ligion in France itself, the state continued to support the missionaries.
Clearly, anti-clericalism was not for export. Colonel Churchill says
that the Maronite clergy "make no scruple of boasting of their allegiance
to France, and of declaring the Maronites to be the French of the east."2

Government in Mount Lebanon before 1831

As previously noted, the Crusaders were driven out of Syria in
1291. The following year Mamluk conquerors from Egypt began the punish-
ment of the Shi'ites,3 whose wavering during the Crusades had increased
the antagonism of the Sunnites against them. While the Shi'ites of
Jabal 'Akkar and Danjiya were easily dispersed, those in Kessawan put
up a stout resistance, holding out until 1305. Kessawan was subsequently
divided into fifty and distributed among three hundred Turkoman knights
who were also responsible for patrolling and guarding the Lebanese coast
from Antalya to Tripoli.4 In the Maronite exiles from the north re-
placed the Shi'ites in Kessawan.5 Having conquered Tripoli in 1289,

1Ibid., pp. 41-42.

2The Druzes and the Maronites under Turkish Rule 1810-1860, p. 20.

3Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon, p. II. The Shi'ites are
those Muslams who supported the Shi'afat of 'Ali and his descendants
against the Umayyad usurper Al'awiyyah during the seventh century. Their
political differences caused them to separate from the 'Orthodox' Sunnites
and to develop as a separate sect. Since their early history they have
tended to further subdivide into numerous smaller sects.

4N. P. Pollak, Mamlukes in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, and the
Lebanon, 1250-1900, p. 9.

5Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon, loc. cit.
the Mamluk Sultan Saladin confiscated most of the fiefs of the Maronite chieftains and transferred them to his vassals in Tripoli. Gradually, however, the chieftains were able to recover their lands but held them now as Mamluk officials. These muqaddams, who had led their people in war and managed their affairs in peace, had enjoyed great popularity in North Lebanon, but as Mamluk officials they "degenerated into fiscal agents subservient to the Mamluk provincial government in Tripoli. As tax farmers, the muqaddams became identified with the oppressive foreign rule and grew unpopular with the peasants and clergy alike. Neglecting the interests of their people, they concentrated mainly on carrying favor with their Mamluk masters, obsequiously imitating their manner to the extent of adopting Muslim names and pious titles. This left the Maronite patriarch and his clergy as the only true leaders of the community, and dealt an early blow to Maronite feudal power. The Maronite clergy, coming mostly from peasant origin, were close to their flock, and naturally took up the cause of the peasants against the often cruel and rapacious muqaddams.

Nonetheless, the Lebanese community in North Lebanon continued to exercise a great measure of autonomy. The Mamluk system of jata\textsuperscript{1}, which made fief holding non-hereditary and therefore made vassals more dependent on the central government, was not enforced in the Maronite area.\textsuperscript{2} Fiefs were usually small, one to ten villages, divided among the members of the aristocratic families. The tenant received a fixed share, varying from two-thirds to three-quarters in non-irrigated lands.

\textsuperscript{1}Polish, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
\textsuperscript{2}Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 20-21.
\textsuperscript{3}Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 333.
and averaging one-half of his land were irrigated. Nor were the ten-
ants serfs, strictly speaking. Unlike their counterparts in the Syrian
plains and in Egypt, they were free to move and to select their lorri.¹
In spite of this loose implication of the feudal system, or perhaps be-
cause of it, there was considerable strife in the Mountain. The mukad-
dimun were constantly quarreling among themselves, often over trivialis-
ties. Attempts at mediation by the clergy were generally unsuccessful
in resolving the conflicts.² The result was hardship and dissatisfaction
on the part of the peasants who had to fight the battles of the mukad-
dimun, so that any of them moved further south into the Kfarwan dis-
trict, where they lived under the rule of the Turkmân tribe of 'Assaf.

The 'Assaf clan were relatively lenient overlords and were not
unpopular with their Maronite peasants. They were able to survive the
defeat of their Hamuk sovereign in 1516, by the Ottomans. In 1590,
however, the last of the line died and was succeeded by the Kurd,
Yusuf Safa, who had previously come into possession of the province of
Tripoli. His rule contrasted greatly with that of his predecessors.
His harshness caused many peasants to desert their villages, and in 1609
the tyranny of Yusuf and his Maronite tax-farmers became so great that
"the Maronite patriarch himself was forced to flee the country and seek
refuge with the Druze emir of southern Lebanon."³

The Druzes at this time occupied the territory south of what is

¹Ibid.
²Salih, "Lebanon in Historical Perspective", p. 18.
³Ibid., pp. 19-20. The Druzes are a sect of dissident Shi'ites
whose heresy is such that many Muslims do not count them among the
religious leaders, the muqal, while the followers of Jabbal (ignorant)
neither receive instruction nor participate in any form of religious
exercise.
now the Beirut-Damascus road. Like the Maronites they had come to Lebanon to escape persecution; in like manner they had successfully resisted attempts by Hamlok and Ottoman governments to exert direct authority in their region.\(^1\) The Turkish governor in Damascus served as liason between the Porte and the Druze feudal leaders "who on the whole acted independently in internal affairs, transmitted their fiefs to their progeny, exacted taxes and duties and rendered no military service to the sultan."\(^2\) Several great Druze families ruled over the various feudal domains and in turn answered to one of their number as supreme chief or emir. The emirate had been hereditary in the Ha'in family since before the Ottoman conquest. The power of the emir relative to the other feudal leaders varied according to his ability and circumstances, but the normal state of things was that the ruling emir was a primus inter pares. He had to address every muqata'ali (tax farmer) as 'dear brother', as he was himself practically but one of them, owed his superior position to their election, and only their own consent or the pressure of rival neighbours obliged them to comply with his demands.\(^3\)

At the time when the Patriarch was forced to flee Northern Lebanon, the Druze emir was Fakr al-Din II (1590-1635), a man who was devoted to enlarging his domain and making himself independent of the Porte. The appeals of the Maronites fit in well with the plans of the Druze emir who subsequently defeated Yusuf Seifa in battle and added his territories to the emirate. One of the pillars of Fakr al-Din's internal policy was

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 18 and Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 729.
\(^2\)Hitti, History of the Arabs, p. 729.
\(^3\)Poljak, op. cit., p. 57.
non-sectarianism. As a twelve year old orphan, the prince had been entrusted to the Maronite family of al-Khazin, who had brought him up in Kharwan. Fakr al-Din now appointed Abu Nadir al-Khazin as provincial governor of Kharwan. The old magadhan dynasties in Northern Lebanon gradually died out, and Fakr al-Din replaced them with a new feudal class similar to that of the Druze in Southern Lebanon. The most important of these families were the Khazins, the Habalites, and the Dabbahs. Nevertheless, in Lebanon as a whole the Druze feudal families remained dominant; the new Christian aristocracy became their associates and began to imitate them in their social behavior.

As a part of his liberal and non-sectarian policy, Fakr al-Din encouraged the immigration of Maronites from Jubail, Batroun, and Kharwan to the Druze areas of the south. By the end of the seventeenth century, they were well established in the Matn district and by the end of the eighteenth they formed a majority of the population in the important Druze province of Sunf. The political importance of the Maronites in the Druze areas was by no means in proportion to their numbers, however; almost all of them had come as peasants and had settled on the estates of Druze feudal leaders. The Maronites did, however,
share some power in the new state: a Khazin commanded FA'Har al-Din's infantry and as many as twenty thousand Maronites at one time served in his army. The emir even sent a Maronite bishop as special envoy to the sultan to negotiate an alliance against the Fatimids. 1

FA'Har al-Din failed in his quest for complete independence from the Fatimids, and after his death, the Ma'in dynasty began to decline. The last of the line, Ahmad, died in 1697, but to prevent inter-tribal war he had previously prevailed upon the other chiefs to name his grandson through his daughter, one Husa Shihab as his successor. 2 The Moslem Shihabs continued and intensified their predecessors' policy of encouraging Maronite immigration into the south. 3 The eighteenth century was marked by the grouping of the Druze feudal families into federations who quarreled and fought with each other. The Maronites joined the federations and participated in inter-tribal warfare and in joint campaigns against outsiders. 4 Feudalism was entirely feudal and crossed religious lines. It was in this period that the feudal system reached maturity. 5 Like the Ma'ins, the Shihabs continued as first among equals. Khams, muqaddams, Shaykhs, and other notables participated in decisions relating to peace and war and other momentous problems affecting national interest. 6

1Jurji, Lebanon in History, p. 277.
2Iskander Yaqub Arrari, The Lebanon in Druze, translated and annotated by J. F. Scheil, p. 129.
4Arrari, op. cit., p. 52 and Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon, A Political Essay, p. 29.
5Sattar, 'Lebanon in Historical Perspective', p. 20.
6Sattar, Lebanon in History, pp. 990-991.
About the middle of the eighteenth century several Shihabs of the ruling branch of the family forsook Islam in favor of the Maronite faith. One of these, Yusuf, who succeeded to the emirate when his uncle, Nasir, abdicated in favor of him in the year 1770, became the first Christian emir. In 1788 he was succeeded by his second cousin, Bashir II, also a Maronite.1 This remarkable man although several times forced to take refuge abroad, was able to hold the emirate for most of the following fifty-two years. Often compared to Fakr al-Din II, Bashir II was certainly equal to him in cunning and ruthlessness. "Slyly he played off the surrounding Ottoman walls (provincial governors), generously he bought off suspicion at the Porte and ruthlessly he dealt with the Druze and Christian feudatories, created by his ancestors and now become too strong for a powerful governor-general."2 The stronger of these feudatories were Druzes. Skillfully, Bashir was able to play one Druze feudal family against the other until gradually he had chased most of them out of Lebanon. He confiscated much of their property, which he redistributed, among a "rising class of well-to-do Christian villagers and townsman,"3 Many Druzes left Lebanon with their feudal leaders, and their places were taken by more and more Christians from the north.4

Meanwhile, the Albanian adventurer Mehmet Ali, who had established himself in Egypt following the defeat of Napoleon, cast his eye

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1Ibid., pp. 398-399.
2Ibid., p. 412.
3Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 118-119.
4Hourani, op. cit., p. 27. Their principal refuge was the Hawran area of Syria.
on Syria. He had come to the rescue of the Ottoman Sultan during the Greek revolt in exchange for a promise of the governorship of Oriste and the herce, and had rendered great service in that war before he was finally overwhelmed by the European Powers. Since Greece then received independence, the Morean governorship was lost to Nu Hit Ali, so that he asked the Sultan for Syria as compensation but was refused. He then plotted a quarrel with the Pasha of Acre and ordered his son Ibrahim to invade Syria. The Emir Bashir, correctly believing that the Egyptian army would emerge victorious, threw in his lot with Ibrahim and assisted him in the siege of Damascus. Thereafter Ibrahim occupied the remainder of Syria, crossed the Taurus Mountains, and was on the verge of threatening Istanbul itself when the Russians intervened on the side of the Porte. The Egyptians had to withdraw from Anatolia, but retained all of Syria under Ibrahim as governor. The Emir Bashir was confirmed in Mount Lebanon, but was henceforth to be little more than a lieutenant of Ibrahim.

At first the Egyptian rule was hailed by the Syrians, especially the Christians. Ibrahim established justice, introduced social reforms, and declared Christians equal to Muslims. Syria soon proved to be an economic burden to Hit Ali, however, and he felt constrained to raise taxes to about thrice what they had been; he established state monopolies over silk culture and other industries; and finally, he introduced two measures that were completely alien to the Mountains: disarmament and conscription. "Nothing could have outraged the Syrians, particularly the Lebanese, more than this last measure."1 In carrying out disarmament Ibrahim managed to fan the flames of sectarian conflict, already ignited

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1 Hitti, *The Arabs in History*, p. 734.
by Bashir's policy of favoring the Christians at the expense of the Druze feudatories. In 1834 Ibrahim used Druzes to assist in the disarming of the Maronites, and when that had been accomplished he employed the Maronites as scouts and auxiliaries to disarm the Druzes.¹

The Druzes and Maronites had often fought for their emirs and shaikhs with enthusiasm, but the idea of regular military service, especially in a foreign army, was extremely distasteful to them.² Many of the Druzes escaped to their traditional refuges: Wadi al-Tamm on the western slopes of Mount Hermon and the easily defended Hazran. Unable to subdue them with his own army, Ibrahim ordered Bashir to assist with a Maronite force under his own son Khalil. Bashir, with grave misgivings, finally obeyed but instructed Khalil to use discretion in dealing with the Druzes. Also, Jirjis al-Dibs, a Christian well acquainted with Wadi al-Tamm, was chosen by the Emir to serve Ibrahim Pasha as a guide on the campaign; this Jirjis kept the Druzes whenever possible informed of Ibrahim's movements, and frequently gave the Egyptian army wrong directions.³ Nonetheless, the rebellion was finally put down and Maronite-Druze relations were further strained. Moreover, the Maronites found the campaign distasteful, but were temporarily compensated in that they were permitted to keep the arms which had been distributed to them.

²Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon, p. 87. The regular period of service in the Egyptian army was fifteen years. Few conscripts ever returned to their homes.
³Ibid., p. 98.
The Patriarch's Role Prior to 1840

In an Islamic state relations between the ruling Molesms and the "People of the Book" (the Christians and the Jews) were normally governed by a contract. This was necessary because Islam, at least in theory, is much more than a religion; it is a way of life, and as such dominates all aspects of man's activity, political, social, and economic. Although Islamic law regulates the relationships of non-Molesms to Molesms, it leaves the non-Molesm communities to regulate their own affairs in purely non-Molesm matters. Since there were a number of these communities, the Molesm ruler usually negotiated separate contracts with each community or "nation" (Arabic, milah), and recognized its patriarch or other religious head as the head of the nation. This religious leader was solely responsible to the ruler for the conduct of his flock and the payment of their taxes.¹

The Maronites, who enjoyed autonomy for most of the period prior to Fakhr al-Din's uniting of the whole of Mount Lebanon in the seventeenth century, were little affected by this system. Local justice and tax collection were in the hands of the muqaddsin, but affairs of personal status were always judged by the clergy.² Under the Mamluks it is doubtful if the Maronite clergy had much political power, for although there is mention in official documents of the Jacobite and Byzantine Orthodox patriarchs, nothing at all is said of the Patriarch of the Maronites.³ Patriarchs occasionally attempted to exert temporal

¹See Webb and Bowen, op. cit., Vol. I, Part II, Chapter XIV, passim.
²Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 331.
authority by mediating between quarreling muqaddamah but were usually unsuccessful, and often found trouble even maintaining their spiritual authority. "Many a prelate had to travel the country in search of new quarters because the quarrels among his flock threatened the safety of his original residence."^1 There is evidence that at least one patriarch, however, was able to exercise secular leadership, even if only temporarily. An anonymous biographer of the Hamlok Sultan (Salim) writes:

There happened to be in the land of Tripoli a patriarch who became strong, amiable with pride, and rebellious. The ruler of Tripoli and all the Franks feared him. He won over the people of those mountains and the people of those valleys who had fallen in error; and his power grew until he was feared by every neighbour. He fortified himself in al-Badadh and held his nose high... The governors of Syria tried to get him several times but could not find him. Then the Turkomans sought him in his place and managed to capture him and they brought him back a miserable prisoner... The Muslims were freed from him and were spared his wickedness; and his capture was a great conquest—greater than the conquest of a revolt or a fortress.^2

Under the Ottoman Empire, the official position of the Maronite Community was indeed curious. Beginning with the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottomans had begun a process of regulating their relations with the non-Muslims that resulted in the highest degree of formalization of the ancient millet system. In all, there came to fourteen millets, but the Maronites were the one important non-Muslim

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^1Salibi, "Maron in Historical Perspective", p. 15.

^2Translated and quoted in Nasal S. Salibi, "The Maronite Church in the Middle Ages and its Union with Rome", Origins Christians, Vol. XIII (1958), p. 98. Professor Salibi suggests that the patriarch in question might be an anti-patriarch named Luke, but this is not important to our purpose, since his followers obviously believed him to be a true patriarch.
minority in the empire that never formally formed one. This was because the important function of tax collection, which was the principal concern of the Porte, was handled first by the muqaddams and later by the Christian and Druze nobility through the Druze emir; but the Maronites came to regard their loose bonds with the Ottomans and the realization that their patriarchalone among the Christian Ottoman religious leaders did not need confirmation from the Porte as evidence that they were a special group, and this enhanced the prestige of the Patriarch among them.1

Beginning with the inclusion of the Maronite areas in the Druze emirate, the power of the Patriarch, though often subtle, became an important aspect of Lebanese politics. Although they lacked any official status, the Patriarchs were able to interfere in all civil cases where the interests of their people were concerned.2 The influence of the Patriarch increased still further when the Shihabs adopted the Maronite faith.3 When the first Christian emir, Yusuf Shihab, was a child, the Maronite Patriarch, Sheikh Fadil al-Jasim, was an almost daily visitor to his father's house and personally undertook the education of Yusuf and his brothers. The Patriarch was also influential in having the father of these children place them in the home of the Maronite Sa'id al-Khuri after his death.4

1Outside of Mount Lebanon, the Maronites were represented by the wakil (agent) of the Latin. Their bishops had to obtain from the Ottoman authorities a berat, without which they had no standing with the government and were precluded from sitting in provincial councils. See Labourt, op. cit., pp. 683-684.

2John Wortabet, op. cit., pp. 133-134.

3Hess and Bodman, loc. cit.

4Captain H. Bourbon, Les Druzes, translated and annotated by P. I. Massey, p. 79.
In the 1820's protestant missionaries from the United States began establishing themselves in Lebanon. The Maronite Patriarch, naturally enough, was disturbed with the prospect of these foreigners' proselytising among his people and used every means in his power to combat them. In order to be rid of a missionary named Lewis, who had leased property in Kafrwan, he prevailed upon the Bair Bashir, who sent soldiers to quarter the place until Mr. Lewis surrendered his papers and left.\(^1\) The missionary writers are very harsh in describing the action of the Patriarch against them,\(^2\) and while it is true that some of his methods could be described as un-Christian, it is evident that the majority of his flock sympathised with him. The people of Itdin, for example, on learning that a group of travellers who arrived in their town were "Bible men", mercilessly chased them out. Subsequently, the missionaries complained to the American Ambassador in Istanbul who procured a firman from the Porte against the people of Itdin. Colonel Churchill writes, "It was difficult, however, to persuade the mountaineers that they were under the Sultan's jurisdiction, in such matters as these. 'The Patriarch is our Sultan', was the haughty reply to the summons of their local authorities, demanding compensation.


\(^2\) The Rev. Henry H. Jessup (Fifty-three Years in Syria, Vol. I, p. 158) is perhaps too harsh when he charges that the patriarch was, in the beginning of modern missionary work in Syria, the unscrupulous enemy of light and of God's Word, claiming the right to arrest, imprison, and even put to death any Maronite reading the Bible or leaving the sect. He caused the death of Assad es Shidjak in 1829, the first Protestant martyr in Syria in modern times. These Oriental hierarchies are avaricious, haughty, and full of political intrigue, encouraging their people to oppress other sects. Their policy is to keep the people in ignorance, educating only those in training for the priesthood."
for the losses incurred by the missionaries in their midnight flight. And, indeed, in this expression may be seen the essence of the Maronite religion.  

One of the many European travelers of the early nineteenth century described the power of the Patriarch about the year 1837 as "very great on the mountain—a might, widely extended power, whose ramifications enter into every Maronite convent, hamlet, and home." Writing about the same time, Colonel Churchill says, "His power is despotic, and from his decision there is no appeal, either in temporal or spiritual affairs."  

The lesser clergy, though usually poverty-stricken, enjoyed high social regard among their parishioners, who looked upon them as supreme beings. "Meet a priest when he will the man is sure to run and kiss his hand. Indeed, it is extraordinary the influence the priests (and they are mostly very ignorant) exercise over the minds of the masses. In all things social and political they have an incredible hold over the people. They are de facto their legislators and administrators."  

The power and esteem enjoyed by the Maronite hierarchy and clergy can in part be traced to the fact that the Maronite community as a whole is involved at least indirectly in the selection of its religious leadership. The Maronite hierarchy is organized along essentially the same lines as other Oriental Churches. Parish priests are elected by

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2 W. H. Bartlett, Syria, the Holy Land, Asia Minor, etc., Illustrated with descriptions of the plates by John Carre, Esq., Vol. II, p. 7.
6 Bliss, op. cit., p. 108.
the people, who usually select one from among their own number.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 110-111.} Although priests may not marry after ordination, married men may be selected for the priesthood. Bishops are appointed and consecrated by the Patriarch, but nomination may be made either by the Patriarch or by the people; moreover, the Patriarch should have the consent of his bishops and must take into consideration the wishes of the people. He does this by sending agents to confer with the priests and principal laymen of the diocese.\footnote{Ibid., p. 109.} In 1840, the actual process was as follows: whenever a bishop died, the patriarch would write to the principal people of his diocese, ordering them to assemble and nominate as successor, either a monk or an unmarried priest. If their choice were unanimous, the Patriarch would simply confirm the selection, but if they lacked unanimity, they would submit three names to the Patriarch, who would then be free to choose any one of them.\footnote{Churchill, Mount Lebanon, Vol. III, p. 78.} The Patriarch himself until recently was always chosen by the bishops in secret conclave and by secret ballot, with a shaikh of the Khazin family acting as sentinel at the door to prevent communication with the outside world.\footnote{According to Churchill (ibid., p. 77), an Habashah shaikh has this honor.} The bishops' choice was then communicated to the Pope who could either confirm it or set it aside, in which event he would be free to select his own candidate.\footnote{Popes rarely interfered with patriarchal succession, but in 1955 Pope Pius XII broke with tradition and appointed the present Patriarch, Maronite Jiljul Ma'ashi, without reference to the Maronite bishops.}
In keeping with Eastern Christian tradition, the election of Maronite priests, bishops, and Patriarchs was on the whole quite democratic, but while the priests tended to be selected from among the peasantry, the bishops and patriarchs usually came from the nobility and particularly from the shaikhly Khazin and Husein families.

In summary, it can be said that the role of the Patriarch and the Maronite clergy in general prior to 1860 had developed from little beyond the regulation of personal status to that of considerable influence in the day to day life of the Maronite community and of Mount Lebanon. Unless we consider the legendary account of the exploits of St. John Harun as historical fact, it appears that in secular matters the Maronite clergy was much weaker in the early years of the community's history than were the religious leaders of other Syrian Christian communities. But later, and especially after the inclusion of the Maronite districts in the jurisdiction of the Druze emirs, the power of the clergy developed into a force which had to be reckoned with. During this process, moreover, there developed in the minds of the Maronites an image of the place of the Patriarch and the clergy in Maronite history which, although perhaps somewhat inconsistent with the facts, was to prove important in the subsequent history of Mount Lebanon.

To illustrate this point, it might be well to close this chapter with statements made by two twentieth century Maronite propagandists.

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2 Of possible significance is the fact that St. Louis addressed his letter (see Appendix I (A)) to the Prince of the Maronites before the Vat- riarsh and seems to have the former in mind throughout the epistle, but the later letters of Louis XIV and Louis XV are addressed to the Patriarch.

3 It is interesting that although the Maronites celebrate feast days in honor of both Har Harun and St. John Harun, the Roman Catholic Church has never seen fit to canonize either.
Father Peter F. Sfeir, an American Maronite priest writes:

St. John Maron has therefore been the first of his line of both religious and civil leaders who have continued until our days on the patriarchal throne. As their religion has given to the Maronites their very nationality, so do they naturally rally as they have done in the past, around their Patriarch. As a result their patriotism is measured by their attachment to their Patriarch . . .

Salihon A. Hokarsel, when he was editor of the English language magazine, The Syrian World, wrote:

The Maronite clergy has always played a leading role in the shaping of the destinies of this valiant people. From time immemorial the clergy were looked upon not only as the guardians of the faith but as defenders of the political liberties of the nation as well.

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1. *The Language of Christ in America or the Place of the Syrian Maronites in History*, p. 16.

CHAPTER II. THE ROLE OF THE PATRIARCH DURING THE CIVIL DISTURBANCES; 1840-1841

The Revolt of the Mountainers against the Emir Bashir and Ibrahim Pasha

By the middle of 1839, dissatisfaction with the regime of Ibrahim Pasha was general throughout Syria. The Egyptian governor considered the Lebanese Christians as the only reliable faction among the native population. He was so fearful of a general uprising that he ordered Bashir to make ready a force of 1,000 Christians to march on either Tripoli or Damascus in the event of a revolt breaking out in either of those places.¹ Later in the year, Mehemet Ali, believing war with the Porte to be inevitable, began mobilisation in Egypt. He organised a national guard to be manned by general conscription. When this news reached Syria, in January 1840, the population began to suspect that the conscription would soon be extended to include them; even the Maronites were concerned.² These suspicions were confirmed in the minds of the Maronites during the following month when the Emir Bashir ordered them to surrender the 16,000 weapons they had been given during the Druze insurrection.³ They refused to obey the order, stating that the arms had


³Letter to Palmerston, 28 Feb. 1840, Levant Affairs, Part I, Doc. 53h, p. 650. In addition to the 7,000 weapons issued during the
been promised to them in perpetuity for their own defense. Ibrahim was not convincing when he swore that disarmament was temporary measure and that he had no intention of levying conscripts.

The Maronites found common cause with the Druses and began to meet with them and to plan a united resistance. Their first joint action was a refusal to pay their taxes. In May a force sent by Bashir to disarm some Maronites was itself disarmed and their thirty muskets were distributed to the Druses. Under the leadership of their clergy, the Maronites began storing arms and other provisions in the churches. The priests spoke openly against the government from the pulpits. They referred to Druses and Shi'ites as their sons and charged the Christians to consider them their brothers. They addressed the following proclamation to the non-Maronites of Syria:

To all our brothers, without regard to creed, armed for the same cause: We have taken up arms to free ourselves from degradation and despotism; God, who is just, will lend us success; let us be worthy of his divine protection. No pillage and no murder!

And as we will fight to restore the legitimate rule of our sovereign, Abdul Majid, the Sultan who reigns at Istanbul, let it be well known that we desire only justice; and let him who is shaken by fear be proclaimed a coward and be cut to death by Mird God may allow us to die, but he will

rebellion, additional arms were distributed to the Maronites afterward. See Great Britain Foreign Office Handbook No. 60, Syria and Palestine, p. 31.

1Moore to Palmerston, 29 May 1840, Levant Affairs, Part I, Doc. 600, p. 706.

2Katti, Lebanon in History, p. 122.


4Moore to Palmerston, 29 May 1840, Levant Affairs, Part I, Doc. 600, p. 705.
not suffer us to be slaves like our beset! God is just.1

On June 8th, the insurgents held a final conference in Antilyas and took an oath together on the altar of the Maronite church of Har-Ilyas that they would drive the Egyptians out of Lebanon.Listing disarmament among their grievances, they pledged to "fight to restore their independence or die."2

Ibrahim determined to crush the revolt with Egyptian troops, but Bashir desperately prevailed upon him to grant the insurgents' demands. The governor answered: "If your Excellency can become guarantee of tranquility, I agree to your request (for Egyptian troops not to enter the Mountain) and a plenary pardon shall be granted. The peasants must disband. If they cannot, at present, pay their taxes, let them say when they will be in a condition to do so. They may keep their arms, if your Excellency thinks that they will not abuse the concession."3 This neutralized many of the insurgents, but some stayed in the field.

Meanwhile, Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, believing that the balance of power in Europe could only be maintained by the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, decided to check the growing power of Hunnet Ali, whose army had defeated the Ottomans in 1839 at Bashib, and was now threatening to invade Anatolia a second time. On July 15th the four Powers signed with the Ottoman Empire the London Convention for the

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1Quoted in M. Baptiste, Poujoulat, Voyage à Constantinople, p. 286. Translated from the French by Nasr A. Iq.

2Hitti, Lebanon in History, pp. 128-129 and History of the Arabs, p. 731. See also Moore to Henggley, 30 June 1840, Levant Affairs, Part I, Enclosures to Des. 613, p. 720.

3Quoted in Hodges to Palmerston, 17 June 1840, Levant Affairs, Part I, Des. 603, p. 725.
Pacification of the Levant,¹ by which they agreed that the Egyptians should withdraw to Southern Syria. Inasmuch as his position was a vis the Porte was strong and since he had the backing of France, Mehemet Ali refused to yield to the ultimatum. He did not share the view of Palmerston who held that the final settlement would depend, "not upon the chances of the campaign in Syria, but upon the negotiations between the Great Powers and the two parties."² Had it not been for European intervention, Ibrahim might have been able to preserve Egyptian rule in Lebanon,³ but the Powers, and particularly Britain, were determined to subdue Mehemet Ali and rightly calculated that France would not risk a European war by supporting Mehemet Ali with force. Britain began to apply pressure on the Egyptians; she blockaded Beirut, interrupted communications by sea between Egypt and Syria, and encouraged the revolt of the mountaineers.⁴

British and Turkish agents easily capitalised on the insurrection by distributing money and arms and by making promises to the mountaineers.⁵ By the first week in October, 19,000 stand of arms had been distributed.⁶

The British agent, Richard Wood, a Roman Catholic, who had been charged

²Palmerston to the Lords Omans, of the Admiralty, 25 June 1839, Levant Affairs, Doc. 69, p. 63.
³Great Britain Admiralty, A Handbook of Syria, p. 172.
⁴Great Britain Foreign Office Handbook No. 50, loc. cit.
⁵Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 421. See also Palmerston to Pakenham, 21 July 1840, Levant Affairs, Part II, Doc. 10, p. 224; Palmerston to Pakenham, 21 July 1840, Levant Affairs, Part II, Doc. 23, p. 23; and Moore to Pakenham, 16 Sep. 1840, Levant Affairs, Part II, Inclosure 2 to Doc. 229, p. 286.
with establishing and developing a British connection with the Maronites, and with the distribution of arms among the peasants of Karaman, was in close contact with the Maronite Patriarch whose priests were among the leaders of the revolt.

French agents attempted to restore the loyalty of the Maronites to Helmet Ali but in this matter their advice went unheeded, and on September 21, 1810, the principal Maronite clergy promised the Turkish representative, Selim Pasha, that they would exhort the people to increase their resistance to the Egyptians. That night they illuminated all convents and churches as a demonstration of their submission to Istanbul.

The Powers eventually landed an expedition on the Lebanese coast, which heartened the mountaineers, and together they drove Ibrahim from all Syria. The Mdr. Bashir, who had remained loyal to Helmet Ali until the very end, surrendered to the British on October 10, 1810, and was deported to Malta, his fifty-two year siriate finally at an end.

Druze-Christian Wars of 1811 and 1812

The Druze-Maronite alliance, which had helped liberate the Mount-

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1Wood to Ponsonby, 13 Sep. 1810, Levant Affairs, Part II, Inclosure 1 to Doc. 229, p. 28.

2On 21 Aug. 1810 Wood wrote to Ponsonby, "My verbal communications with the Maronite Patriarch, whose influence in the mountains is very great, gave me an opportunity to ascertain, in a positive manner, the feelings of himself and the clergy towards the Egyptians; and I have great pleasure in being able to assure the gentlemen that they are as decidedly inimical to them, as they are favourable to the Sultan." (Levant Affairs, Part II, Inclosure 1 to Doc. 150, p. 192).

3Wood to Ponsonby, 19 Sep. 1810, Levant Affairs, Part II, Inclosure 5 to Doc. 229, p. 289.

4Hourani, op. cit., p. 29 and Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 125.
tain from Egyptian rule did not last. With the foreign enemy gone, the animosity which had been building up in the last years of the reign of Bashir II, came to the fore. The explosive elements had been in the making for years; Druse resentment against Bashir's efforts to undermine the authority of their feudal chiefs and against his son Khmil, whose Maronite troops had helped crush the uprising of their co-religionists in the Hauran.1

Upon the deposition of Emir Bashir the Porte had intervened and had appointed his distant Maronite cousin Bashir III as emir.2 Bashir III had earned the confidence of the Porte by siding with it against Ibrahim and Bashir II. As a politician, however, he was a failure. He lacked most of the attributes necessary for filling the shoes of his namesake,3 and particularly that of tact. The Druse feudal lords who had been exiled by Bashir II and who now returned to the mountaintop expecting to recover their previous rights, found Bashir III unsympathetic. Not only did he refuse them, but he limited the feudal prerogatives of others and even threw a few in jail. Some managed to procure from the Porte firman restoring their rights, but the emir refused to honor them.4

The Maronite Patriarch, Nusuf Hulaish, added fuel to the fire by issuing a circular in 1863 to the Maronite peasants of the inland districts, ordering them to appoint in each village two agents from among themselves who were to exercise the power formally vested in the

1Hitit, Lebanon in History, p. 133.
2Ibid., p. 134.
3Scheltema, op. cit., p. 57.
4Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon, p. 114. See also Jessup, op. cit., p. 130.
Druze feudal lords.\(^1\) In the heart of the Druze district, the people of Dair al-Qamar, which was an overwhelmingly Christian village but which was under the feudal domination of the Druze family of Abu-Nakad, received the circular with great excitement and assumed an insubordinate attitude toward their lord.\(^2\) The Jumblats, the most powerful of the Druze families, sent their leader to ask the Patriarch to withdraw the circular, but he received no satisfaction.\(^3\) The situation became very tense. Colonel Rose, the British Consul in Beirut, reported that "the Maronite clergy show a determination to uphold their supremacy in the mountain at the risk of civil war.\(^4\) Furthermore, when the Patriarch learned that the Druzes were petitioning the Porte for the appointment of either a Druze or Turkish governor, he openly announced that he would lead the Maronites in person to exterminate the Druzes if they persisted in their demand.\(^5\)

The actual incident which initiated hostilities was the shooting of a partridge by a Maronite on the property of the Abu-Nakads. The Jumblats and Imads joined the Abu-Nakads and set fire to Dair al-Qamar on October 11, 1861.\(^6\) That such a trifling incident could produce the disastrous results that followed indicates that Druze resentment was very deep. The Patriarch immediately proclaimed a crusade, armed two

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\(^1\) Churchill, Druzes and Maronites, p. 38.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 39.
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 10.
\(^4\) Quoted in Ibid., p. 39. Churchill also claims (p. 46) that the Patriarch allocated 20,000 lira which he had received from France to prepare for the impending battle. See also Bird, op. cit., p. 348.
\(^5\) Churchill, Druzes and Maronites, p. 46.
\(^6\) Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 131.
of his bishops, and ordered them ... to march at the head of his troops.\textsuperscript{1} The military superiority and remarkable discipline of the Druzes was demonstrated in the easy routing of this large force,\textsuperscript{2} and presently the Druzes rallied forth to burn five more villages. The Ottoman authorities did nothing to stop the destruction, and in fact encouraged the Druzes in order to show the Powers that Lebanon could not be efficiently governed by natives. The Powers finally prevailed upon the Porte, and order was restored, but not before three hundred lives had been lost and about five hundred thousand dollars worth of property damage had been incurred.\textsuperscript{3}

The Patriarch, after the early defeat of the Christians, had demanded to be carried in his sick-bed to the front of the Christian ranks, "there to unfurl the standard of the Cross and die at their head."\textsuperscript{4} In the end, however, he was forced to look himself in his current and then to take refuge on a ship of the British navy.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1}Bird, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 150.

\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.} Bird estimates the Maronite army at 4,000 to 5,000 men. After one of the few Maronite victories, a bishop admonished his men as follows: "We understand you have been helped to a victory over the insolent infidel enemies of the holy faith at Heriste, which victory has been by the favor of God most high, and by the intercession of his mother. We praise to the highest degree your zeal, only you have been faulty in not burning the village. The entire correct course was to have burned it. Hereafter, take good heed, if you are victorious, not to stop short of burning and entire destruction. Our only caution, beloved sons and honored brethren, is that you abuse not the women. Aside from that, burn, kill, plunder, hesitate at nothing whatever. Be ever constant in prayer and confessions, inasmuch as this is a holy war; go on and fear nothing; and we lift up the hands of supplication to the Father of lights that he may assist you and give you victory." (Quoted in Bird, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 351).

\textsuperscript{3}Hitti, \textit{Lebanon in History}, pp 431-435. See also Jessup, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{4}Churchill, \textit{Druzes and Maronites}, p. 49.

\textsuperscript{5}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 51.
With the help or rather the interference of Britain and France, which by now had become standard procedure, the Ottoman government attempted to solve the problems of Mount Lebanon. The French desired the retention of the Shihib Emirate, but the British, having failed to replace France as the protector of the Maronites became spokesmen for the Emir cause. After much discussion, the two powers agreed to approve the transfer of the emirate to the Abu Lam\' princes, who had embraced the Maronite faith at about the same time as their relatives, the Shihibs.\textsuperscript{1} The Patriarch refused to even consider the change. He realised that Bashir III was incompetent, but felt that if he were continued in office long enough, the people would become so dissatisfied that they would forget the past and would demand the return of Bashir II, a strong ruler over whom the Patriarch had had much influence.

He argued that the candidate, Haidar Abu Lam\', was unqualified for the office not only because he had failed to take a stand during the insurrection, but also because his family, in spite of the fact that it was of princely rank, did not command the respect of the lower-ranking aristocracy as the Shihibs did.\textsuperscript{2}

The Porte solved the argument by unceremoniously deposing Bashir III in early 1812 and by appointing in his stead the Hungarian renegade Umar al-Nasawi (the Austrian), thereby instituting direct Ottoman rule.

\textsuperscript{1}There are three princely families in Lebanon: the Shihibs, formerly Moslem, now mostly Maronite with a minor Moslem branch; the Abu Lam\'s, formerly Brune, now mostly Maronite with a minor Brune branch; and the Arslans, who are Brune.

\textsuperscript{2}Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon, pp. 117-118. The charge that the shaihis families did not consider the Abu Lam\'s as their social superiors was not unfounded; Salibi points out that as a Habshe shaiheh himself, it must have been an uncomfortable feeling for the Patriarch to realize that his relatives would have to regard the Abu Lam\'s as social and political superiors, a thing which neither Maronite nor Brune shaikhs had ever done.
government in Mount Lebanon for the first time.\(^1\) This was fully in accordance with the centralization policy of Sultan Abdul Majid.\(^2\) 'Umar immediately set out to neutralize the aristocracy. He returned to the dispossessed feudal chiefs their estates as well as their feudal prerogatives. As advisors and agents he appointed Maronite and Druze shahids and emirs of the Badah, Jisr, and Arsalan families, who became his staunch supporters.\(^3\) He failed, however, to build any support outside of the aristocracy, and before long it became apparent that the favors granted to the aristocracy were more apparent than real. The traditional feudal system of the Mountain was out of harmony with the Porte's policy of centralization.

To help check the deterioration of his position, 'Umar circulated a petition which praised his rule. The petition was widely endorsed by the feudal chiefs of both sects who had been favored by 'Umar and by others who had been bribed. Among the leaders of Mount Lebanon, only the Maronite Patriarch had the courage to denounce the petitions and urge his followers not to sign them.\(^4\)

As the Druzes and Maronites had traditionally cooperated against threats from abroad,\(^5\) it was only natural that they should now work together to oust the unwanted Ottoman governor. Accordingly, the Druze

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\(^3\) Hitti, *A Modern History of Lebanon*, p. 133.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 135.

leaders appealed to the Patriarch to forget the past and to join them in expelling the Ottoman, an action "which alone could stop their common ruin." The Druze offer to agree to the restoration of the Shi'ahs and to indemnify the Maronites for damages suffered in the war of the previous year was a very attractive one, but mutual attitudes of bitterness and mistrust had developed to the point where rapprochement was not feasible; negotiations broke down when each party insisted that the other demonstrate its good faith by striking the first blow. The Druze subsequently rebelled on their own, but were easily put down by the Government, and their leaders were imprisoned in Beirut.

France and Britain, as champions of the Maronite and Druze causes respectively, induced the Porte to recall 'Umar in December 1862 after an administration of less than a year. The French had urged the return of the Shi'ahs but finally agreed to a plan, by which the Mountain was to be divided into two quawamaniyats (sub-governorates), one under a Maronite from a family other than that of Shi'ab and the other under a Druze, both responsible to the Ottoman governor of Sidon. The Porte readily agreed to the plan on an experimental basis, seeing

\[\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\text{Sa'dib, A Modern History of Lebanon, p. 150.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{4}}\text{Ibid., According to Malcolm Kerr (interviews al-Aqiqi, \textit{Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism}, 1860-1869, translated with notes and commentary by Kerr, p. 6.) the Ottomans neutralized the Maronites by promising a guarantee of Christian seigneurial rights and other concessions in exchange for their agreement to accept any governor appointed by the Porte.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{5}}\text{The term governor of Sidon is used throughout this work to refer to the chief executive of the Ottoman province by that name, even though the capital was sometimes in Beirut.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{6}}\text{Text of the Porte's acceptance of the plan in Hurwitz, op. cit., Vol. I, Dec. 51, pp. 128-128.}\]
in it a chance to prove once and for all that the Lebanese could not govern themselves. Had the Christians and Druses resided in distinct geographical areas, the scheme might have had a chance of success, but a glance at the following table will show how impractical was the plan in view of the intensity of sectarian bitterness then prevalent in the mountain.

**POPULATION BY QAIMMAQAMIYAH OF THE FOUR PRINCIPAL SECTS OF MOUNT LIBANON IN 1914**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Christian Qaimmaqamiyah</th>
<th>Druze Qaimmaqamiyah</th>
<th>Total Each Sect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Population Percentage</td>
<td>Population Percentage</td>
<td>Population Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>21,700</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>17,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druses</td>
<td>10,150</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byzantine Catholic</td>
<td>25,600</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byzantine Orthodox</td>
<td>23,100</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Each Qaimmaqamiyah</td>
<td>133,650</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>63,590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first Druze Qaimmaqam was the ineffectual Emir Ahmad Arsalan, whose only reconstruction was he was acceptable to all rival Druze leaders, particularly the Ashtians who correctly believed that they could control him. He was released from jail, where he had been since the collapse of the recent Druze revolt, but returned each night to confer with the other Druze leaders. The Christian Qaimmaqam was the neophyte


2Excludes 12,500 persons of various sects comprising about six per cent of the population.

3Kerr, op. cit., p. 7.
Maronite Amir Haidar, who in spite of the fact that he was an Abu Lom\(^1\) proved to be acceptable to the Patriarch,\(^1\) although he was never amenable to the Christian feudal chiefs. The appointment of the two weak Quinmacans was designed by the Porte to sabotage the scheme.

The Patriarch, still smarting from the defeat of 1861, soon declared that "all Lebanon must be under either Druze or Maronite rule, the blow must be struck, and he who strikes first will have two chances to one in his favour."\(^2\)

Large funds had been received by the Maronite patriarch, from France and Austria, for the purpose of relieving the terrible distress endured by the Christians in consequence of the last civil war. He \(\text{[the Patriarch]}\) at once appropriated them to the promotion of a second; authorising his clergy to pay the combatants four piastres a day to each man, and to purchase arms and ammunition wherever they could be obtained. Knowing that the great body of the Maronites would not engage in a war, simply to destroy the political rights of the Druzes, the justice of which, indeed, the more dispassionate amongst them were ever ready to admit, he made a war of party a war of religion. The Druzes, the enemies of the cross, the infidels, were to be exterminated or driven out of the land.\(^3\)

In April 1865, the Maronites burned fourteen Druze villages in rapid succession.\(^4\) "The Patriarch publicly proclaimed the rising against the Druzes to be a holy war. Bishops organized the plans of attack and the assembling of forces."\(^5\) The Christians then moved

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\(^1\)Churchill \(\text{[Mount Lebanon, Vol. I, p. 102]}\), describing Haidar, says: "Embracing Christianity at the age of twelve years, the priesthood have continued to make the converted Druze the very child and pattern of Jewish superstition. No monk can be more faithful to his vigil and fastings. The bishop confesses is never out of his house."

\(^2\)Leslie, \(\text{op. cit.}, \text{p. 163 and Churchill, Druzes and Maronites, p. 83.}\)

\(^3\)Churchill, \(\text{Druzes and Maronites, pp. 86-87.}\)

\(^4\)Hitti, \(\text{Lebanon in History, p. 136.}\)

\(^5\)Churchill, \(\text{Mount Lebanon, Vol. II, p. 309.}\)
against Mathtara, the ancestral home of the Jumblats where they were checked by the Turks who acted as a Druze reserve. Fighting was confined to the mixed districts: the great body of the Maronites of the north had been too disillusioned by the results of the previous war to assist their southern co-religionists in a fight which promised no visible rewards for them. Although the Patriarch assumed a position of leadership it appears that this war had more the aspects of a feudal than a religious struggle.

The Ottoman Government sent its foreign minister, Shakib Effendi, to the Lebanon to restore peace and to reform the administrative system. He was accompanied by eighteen battalions who occupied the Mountain and began disarming the populace, particularly the Maronites. He created in each qaïmqaqaniyah a council of twelve members: a judge and a tax assessor from each of the Maronite, Druze, Byzantine Catholic, Byzantine Orthodox, Sunni Moslems, and Shi'ite sects, all of whom were to be salaried officials. In judicial appeals, the judge of the same sect as the litigants presided. In mixed cases the judges of both sects sat together in the presence of the other judges. The assessor members sat together in the presence of the judges to determine the distribution of taxes. In all other matters the councils

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1Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 136.

2See Churchill, Mount Lebanon, Vol. II, p. 309. The Byzantine Orthodox Christians of the mixed districts, who were anything but sympathetic to the Maronites and especially to the cause of their Patriarch and who had sided with the Druzes in 1861, this time assisted the Maronites against the Druzes.


4Kerr, op. cit., pp. 9-10. The Shi'ites were represented in judicial matters by the Sunni judge. The twelfth member was a deputy qaïmqaq, who was of the same sect as the qaïmqaq.
sat as advisory groups. Since members were appointed on the recommendation of the religious leaders by the qaimaqams, and subject to the approval of the Governor of Sidon, their independence of judgement was severely limited. In addition, Shkib, taking a page out of the Patriarch’s circular of 1811, provided for the appointment in each mixed village of an agent (wakil) to represent the peasantry whose religion differed from that of their feudal lord. The wakil had judicial authority of first instance over his co-religionists and was responsible for the collection of their taxes. The wakil was appointed by the qaimaqam in whose district his village lay but was responsible to the qaimaqam of his faith.¹

This cumbersome system had two important effects: first, it increased the power of the Porte so that it was able to interfere in every aspect of Lebanese life; secondly, and this is of greater importance, it delivered a severe blow to feudalism. However, since only the mixed districts, which were mostly in the Brune qaimaqaqimiyah, had wakils, the Maronite aristocracy of the north were much less affected by the new order. Likewise, the peasants whose interests were now protected against the arbitrariness of the aristocracy were only those who differed in religion from their lords, and these were primarily Christians who resided in the Brune qaimaqaqimiyah.

The Agrarian Revolution in Harawani: 1858–1859

The dual-qaimaqaqimiyah system, as amended by Shkib Effendi, appeared on the surface to be working satisfactorily, and the period from 1856 to 1858 was a peaceful one. This was in part due to the

¹Ibid., pp. 9–11. See also Hess and Rodwan, op. cit., p. 13.
death in 1843 of the bellicose Patriarch Yusuf Nabaish. The new Patriarch, Yusuf al-Khazin, lacked the force of character of his predecessor and was unable to fill the role of Haronite national leader created by his immediate predecessor. The dissatisfaction of the peasantry in the Haronite qaimsamayyeh began now to assert itself. The lower clergy, by and large in sympathy with the peasantry, from which class most of them sprang, did not, however, openly align themselves with the peasants during the reign of Patriarch Yusuf al-Khazin, himself a member of the aristocracy.

In 1851, the death of the amiable and conciliatory qaimsamayn, Haidar Abu Lam, brought to light the dissatisfaction of various elements in the Christian qaimsamayyeh. The Byzantine Orthodox Patriarch in Damascus asked on behalf of his co-religionaries for the appointment of either a Byzantine Orthodox or a Muslim qaimsamayn. The Khazin sheikhs wanted either Haidar's "weak-minded and incorporeal" son Isma'il to be assisted by a Khazin as administrative secretary, or a Khazin qaimsamayn, or simply the rule by the feudal chieftains directly under the Sidon governor. On the recommendation of the British and French consuls, Bashir Abu Lam received the appointment. The new qaimsamayn, like Haidar, had been born a Muslim but unlike him was not devoted to his adopted religion.

1Churchill (Mount Lebanon, Vol. III, pp. 72-80) writes: "The power of an ecclesiastical dignity, who is looked up to by the members of his church almost as a temporal prince, may well be supposed to be of considerable weight, and to influence, to no small degree, their general proceedings; and in this respect the present Patriarch, Yusuf al Khazin, presents a most favourable contrast to his predecessor, who sprang from the House of Nabaish."

2Altobri, A Modern History of Lebanon, p. 150; see also p. 21.

3Ibid., op. cit., pp. 11-12.

4Ibid., p. 11.
a fact which cost him the support of the clergy.

Shortly after the appointment of Bashir Ahmad, the Patriarch died and was succeeded by Balus Mas'ad, who unlike his two immediate predecessors was not an aristocrat; in fact, he had been a feudal dependent of the Khasin family who had sent him to Rome for an ecclesiastical education. He had very strong religious convictions and much dislike for the aristocracy. The European consuls applauded the choice of the Maronite bishops. Colonel Rose reported that the new Patriarch had assured him that "he had the greatest disinclination to engage in secular affairs at all, and would never countenance political intrigue; and I really believe him to be sincere in those professions... His Eminence 1, I think, one of the few exceptions among the higher order of the Maronite clergy, or indeed of that of any other Christian communities in this part of Syria." Subsequent events were to show that this evaluation was somewhat optimistic.

The Khasin shaikhs, meanwhile, found reasons other than family pride, for their dissatisfaction with the Abu Fadl qalansuq. The letter replaced certain shaikhs of the Khasin, Nabash, and Dabbab families and arrested others. The common people, too, found his rule unsatisfactory.

1Ibid. and Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon, p. 180.
Churchill complains that the new patriarch "was a peasant, a feudal dependent of the ancient family of Khasin, to whom he was wholly indebted for his education, his subsequent gradations in the priestly office, and even for his ascension to the patriarchate itself. All the feelings of obligation, however, which such benefits might otherwise have produced, were merged in the promptings of innate intolerance, and of that inherent aversion to superior rank and station, which more particularly in the feudal system, is apt to be engendered in the breast of a man of the people." (Bruens and Maronites, p. 122).


3Al-Aqfi Namascript, p. 54, in Kerr, op. cit., pp. 36-39. Al-
overbearing. *For he substituted harshness for mercy, paid no heed to anyone*, and took no notice of his landed clients or other persons. He continued in this path for about six months until the people imagined that the Amir Bashir had risen from the grave.1

The Khasins decided to organize their peasantry for the purpose of petitioning the dismissal of Bashir Ahmad. In March of 1858 they arranged for the election in each village of southern Khasawen of a *shahib shahab* (leader of youth), who was to see to the signing and sealing of the petitions.2 The villagers began to elect the shahibs shahab and to hold meetings for an entirely different purpose, however; instead of petitioning for the removal of the qaimaqam, they formed a large peasant party in opposition to the shahibs. After several fruitless meetings between the leaders of the two classes, the Khasins finally agreed to the principal demand of the peasants which was for the appointment of three *ma'mures* (functionaries) from among the aristocracy, one for each *wuhti* (county) of Khasawen to exercise the feudal authority. All other shaikhs would be socially equal to the people. The peasants then reneged and demanded one *ma'mur* with an assistant whom the people would elect.3

though these families held their fiefs in hereditary tenure, individual fief-holders could be replaced with other members of the same family, although the principle of primogeniture was in general use.

1Al-Aqiqi Manuscript, p. 66 (Kerr, p. 41).
2Ibid., p. 51 (Kerr, p. 33). Bashir II had died in exile in 1850.
3Kerr, op. cit., p. 19. According to al-Aqiqi (p. 79, Kerr, p. 66), a second group of Khasins organized their peasants in a similar manner for the purpose of submitting counter-petitions in favor of the Amir.

3Al-Aqiqi Manuscript, p. 81 (Kerr, pp. 19-50). See Appendix II for a list of the peasants' grievances.
Either just before or just after this incident, the chief sheikh Shabab, Salih Dirja Sbair, resigned for fear that the peasant movement was getting out of hand and was leading to a general disaster, whereupon a blacksmith from Rifun, Tanyus Shahin, was chosen to replace him. This semi-literate ruffian soon made it clear that he would not compromise with the aristocracy. The sheikhs were driven from Kfarawan and their landed properties appropriated by the peasants in early 1859 as Shahin proclaimed a peasant republic with himself as dictator. The Turks, as usual seeing in the disturbances ultimate advantage for themselves, did nothing to stop the revolutionaries and may even have encouraged them.

The lower clergy sided with the peasants as was to be expected. The higher clergy attempted to mediate between the revolutionaries and the aristocracy; yet, it is evident from the material in the patriarchal archives at Beiteddine that the Patriarch and the higher clergy were very sympathetic to the peasants. It is also evident, however, that they disapproved of the methods and ambitions of Tanyus Shahin. The Patriarch had become more influential in Lebanese politics by gaining a voice in the appointment of the Maronite members of the councils; furthermore, the Church had become more independent of the aristocracy in regard to the elections of patriarchs and bishops. In both of these changes, the Church had been the gainer and the Khazins the primary losers. It seems

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1Kerr, op. cit., p. 28-49.
2See Kerr, op. cit., p. 22.
3Some of these letters appear in English translation in Kerr, op. cit., as Chapter III, and three of them are reproduced here as Appendix III.
4Kerr, op. cit., p. 23.
only neutral then, especially in the light of the Patriarch’s own
background, that he should have been sympathetic to the peasants’
movement.

The solidarity between the French consulate-general and the
Maronite Church also played an important part in the Kfarsan rebellion;
it drove the Khazin into the arms of the British consul, who since he
was also the spokesman of the Druzes, caused Britain to become the up-
holder of the feudal aristocracy of Mount Lebanon in general.

The Patriarch’s support of the insurgents actually became open
only after the shaikh had been expelled from Kfarsan. Subhi al-Khazin
had successfully petitioned the Patriarch for an order to the peasants
of his village to restore his property, but when the shaikh appeared in
the village, the populace turned on him and killed him. While deplo-
ring the incident, the Patriarch nevertheless placed the anathema “to
all who shall give evidence upon this subject, or in any way favourable
to the Khazin family,” And later, when the Ottoman Governor of Sidon
determined to send troops to quell the excesses of Tangus Khazin, he

1Ibid. Colonel Churchill claims that “the effects of French
consular pressure on the Khazin were not long in making themselves
felt. The latter, a Druze by birth, as were originally the whole of
his family, held a profession almost nominal, of the Christian faith;
and certainly, by sentiment and inclination, sympathised but little
with the bigoted idiosyncrasies of the Maronite priesthood. The Maro-
nite patriarch was not his idol. Yet was he made to fall down and
worship. He bound himself by oath, in the presence of the French consul-
general, to obey its slightest nod. A triumvirate was thus established,
animated by two principles,—submission of the civil to the ecclcsia-
tical power, and exclusive devotion of both to France.” (Druzes and
Maronites, p. 121).

2In all, a total of three deaths were charged by the Khazins
to the peasants (Kere, op. cit., p. 25).

3Rogers to Dufferin, 14 Jan. 1861, Great Britain Foreign Office,
Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of Syria, 1860–1861 (hereafter
referred to as Syrian Correspondence), Part I, Inclosure 8 to Doc. 122,
p. 577.
was prevented by an appeal of the French consul-general, who in turn was acting in support of the Patriarch.\footnote{Kerr, loc. cit.}

In 1851, the Maronite aristocracy was permitted to return to Hiriwan and to recover its landed property which had been appropriated by the peasants. They did not recover their feudal prerogatives, however, and henceforth were simple property owners, equal to the peasantry before the law.\footnote{Hibz, pp. 25-26.}

The Massacres of 1860

The feudal unrest manifested by the peasant revolt in Hiriwan spread into central and southern Lebanon, but in this area the aristocracy was overwhelmingly Druze, while the peasantry was both Druze and Christian and in many areas predominantly of the latter religion.\footnote{George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, p. 57.} The Druze nobility was at first inclined to side with the Maronite aristocracy against the peasants, who seemed to be the common enemy of the upper class, whether Maronite or Druze. But the fabric of feudalism among the Druzes was more substantial than among the Christians;\footnote{William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors 1801-1923, p. 300. Seven years before the outbreak Churchill had written: "Whereas, in the Maronite districts, the spirit of feudalism is gradually becoming weakened, amongst the Druzes it forms a part of the national character [italics mine]; and the lower orders find in the maintenance of those principles which exact entire submission and deference to the authority of their Sheikhs, an element of union and strength." (Mount Lebanon, Vol. II, p. 125).} There were some stirrings by the Druze peasantry in the late summer of 1859, but the "Druze 'qanun [religious head], acting on behalf of the landlords, warned the peasant Druzes of the imminence
of a Christian danger, counselled them to avoid sedition, and urged them under no condition to renounce their solidarity with their chieftains.\footnote{Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon, p. 206. This is a very important point. It would appear that throughout the history of feudal Lebanon, the religious leaders of the Druze sect, unlike their denounce counterparts, were completely submissive to the aristocracy. Right up to the present time the Druze have shown no desire to become involved in politics. Indeed, the more religious among them will not eat at the table of a government official for fear that the food, at least in part, might represent ill-gotten gain.}

As the Christians of the mixed districts began to exhibit restlessness in response to the Kissawan rebellion, the Druze aristocracy and peasantry became uneasy. In early 1860 the collision of two pack animals, one driven by a Druze and the other by a Christian, led to a brawl among adherents of the two sects in which lethal weapons were used. Both sides appealed for help to their co-religionists and similar incidents occurred throughout the mixed districts. The Patriarch forbade repetition of the affair, but the Maronite Bishop of Beirut, Tanbouh 'Aan, encouraged the Christians.\footnote{Mitti, Lebanon in History, p. 147.}

By the end of April fourteen Christian villages had been completely destroyed.\footnote{Al-Aqsa Manuscript, p. 106 (Kerr, pp. 55-56).} The Druzes, strengthened by the addition to their ranks of co-religionists from Haron, and with the advice and consignment of the Turkish officialdom, and in several cases the armed assistance of the latter, burned and massacred the population of Jezzine, the Christian village of the Mga', the Greek Catholic town of Lahijah, and finally Dir az-Zur itself. The Porte and the Powers finally intervened when in July 1860 the Muslim population of Damascus picked up the anti-Christian fever and, with the assistance of the Ottoman authorities,
turned on their Christian neighbors and massacred 11,000 of them. In Lebanon there were about 12,000 persons killed and $4,000,000 damage incurred.1

While the Maronites were the chief sufferers in this third civil war in less than twenty years, a great deal of the responsibility for it can be assigned to them. It was reported that for months previous to the outbreak, the Maronites were collecting and receiving arms; and that they made no secret of their intention to use these arms in extending their authority, and that they counted upon the aid of France in their projects.2

"Inflammatory missives", purporting to have been written by the Maronite religious leaders were widely circulated.3 These circulars included an admonition to the Maronites against dealing with their Druze landlords; and even against paying their rents.4 "It would moreover appear that . . . the Christian clergy endeavoured still further to animate the courage of their flocks, by telling them that the endeavour to attain undisputed possession of the Lebanon would be warmly countenanced by the Powers of Christendom.5

1Ibid., pp. 137-139.
2Sayer to Russell, 21 Aug. 1860, Syrian Correspondence, Part I, Doc. 130. Customs records show that 120,000 rifles and 30,000 pistols were imported by all sects into the Lebanon between January 1857 and the spring of 1860 (Dufferin to Russell, 19 Dec. 1860, Syrian Correspondence, Part I, Doc. 305, p. 103).
3"Minutes on the Judgments Proposed to be Passed on the Turkish Officials and Druze Chiefs by the Extraordinary Tribunal of Beyrouth", Syrian Correspondence, Part I, Inclosure 2 to Doc. 691, p. 636.
4Ic., p. 637.
5Ic., p. 637.
Although there seems to be little evidence against the Patriarch himself, his failure to restrain his ecclesiastical subordinates certainly compromises him. Foremost among those members of the hierarchy who were principals in the sad events of 1860 was Tublys 'Aun, Maronite Bishop of Beirut. The notoriety of the bishop was such that even the pro-Maronite French insisted on his withdrawal from Beirut "as a necessary preliminary to all chance of peace." The crafty bishop's claim that nothing could be proved against him because he had not committed himself to paper left no doubt in the minds of the European Commissioners that his part in the affair was a significant one. In fact, there was a public disclosure of a letter, in which he attempted to stir up the people of Dair al-Qamar on behalf of the Maronites of Jessin, and in which he spoke of the expulsion of the Druzes. In answer to a Christian of Dair al-Qamar, who questioned the propriety of the bishop's activities, the latter replied, 'If you, people of Dair al-Kara, do not obey, and refuse to go to war, then I will cause the Druzes and Christians together to attack you.'

is true that these observations are largely those of the British who were determined to minimize the responsibility of the Druze chiefs, it is noteworthy that the French Foreign Minister himself allowed that "it was likely that the Maronites had been instigated by certain of their priests to commence the fray, by asserting a sovereignty over the Druze districts." (Cowley to Russell, 23 July 1860, Syrian Correspondence, Part I, Dec. 27, p. 17).


2Ibid.

3For text see Inclosure 4 to Doc. 521, Syrian Correspondence, Part I, pp. 676-677. 

4Habib Akari to Said Bey Jumblat, Syrian Correspondence, Part I, Inclosure 5 to Doc. 521, p. 677. The same letter also reports that
In the summer of 1859, before the outbreak of hostilities, Bishop Tobiya had organized a Christian Committee of Antilys, the principal purpose of which was to provide with arms the unarmed young Christian men of that area, and later of all other parts of the mixed districts. It appears also that he gave one of the grandsons of Khalil Bashir II, the Emir Majid, to understand that he would be given the governorship of the entire mountain if he would lead the uprising against the Druze.¹

Although it was the revolt of the peasants of Kharawan which in large part animated the Maronites of the mixed districts, the northerners did almost nothing to help their co-religionaries; in fact, their promises of assistance, which proved to be empty, undoubtedly did much harm, since it engendered in the peasants of the mixed districts a false sense of security. Two expeditions from the north achieved nothing. The first was sent by the peasant dictator, Tarugia Shabir. The well-led and well-disciplined Druzes had no trouble scattering this mob.² The main difficulty of Tarugia, who seems to have considered his intervention a religious duty,³ was a general lack of interest in

the Maronites ofPAIR al-Qam committed themselves to pay 1,000 purses (£170) for the campaign and also that Bishop Tobiya desired to lead the troops himself.

1Syrian Correspondence, op. cit., p. 150. See also Great Britain Foreign Office, Further Correspondence Relating to the Affairs of Syria, January to July 1861 (hereafter referred to as Further Correspondence), p. 72.

²The people of Kharawan had sent a force to Bābāia, but because they were strangers in that area and because they found themselves without a leader, when the fighting began they immediately scattered and fled. (al-Adiği Manuscript, p. 108 in Kerr, op. cit., p. 53).

³A letter Tarugia wrote to the villages of al-Blahsh and al-Nufar reads as follows: "Since it has been agreed that we all rise with our people to the aid of our brother Christians, to defend them and to
the war on the part of the people of Kiawran. On June 12, 1860, his recruiting officers reported to him on the indifference of his people.1

The other expedition came from further north. Yusuf Bey Karan of Jabal, whose father had been the first sheikh of that family in Jabbat Beharri,2 led his men in an attempt to relieve Zahlah. He was prevented from doing so by the French Consul-general and the Ottoman governor of Sidon who promised to stop the bloodshed with Ottoman troops.3 Realizing finally that the Ottoman governor was stalling for time, he rushed to Zahlah to find it in ashes.4

As in the civil war of 1814, the Christians were to learn soon after the commencement of hostilities that, in spite of their numerical superiority, they were no match for the Druzes militarily. Accordingly,

protect our homes, it is necessary that you send men to carry supplies and also send with your people some clever women to carry water for your people. You must also choose two intelligent individuals to be members of the council in al-Duq. There is no need further to urge your concern and zeal. May your lives be long.

Your brother,

Tanys Shahin (seal)

June 1, 1860
(Postscript): As regards ammunition, we have it, so do not give it a thought.

It is necessary to have the priests come, since this is an undertaking of Christian zeal. (Letter No. XLIV in Kerr, op. cit., pp. 163-164).


2Of the twenty-four magistrates of Mount Lebanon, four, including Jabbat Beharri, were held by muqata'is appointed by the government. The remaining twenty were strictly hereditary. (Kerr, op. cit., p. 151).

3Shitti, Lebanon in History, p. 137.

4Lord Dufferin considered both Tanys Shahin and Yusuf Karan to be tools of Bishop Tubayy (Dufferin to Pelcer, 18 Jan. 1861, Syrian Correspondence, Part I, Inclusions 9 to Dec. 375, p. 219 and Inclusions 10 to Dec. 232, ibid., 15 Nov. 1860, p. 337), although he was later to change his mind concerning Karan.
they were the first to sue for peace. The Ottoman authorities attempted to appear as policemen in the affair, although they were lending significant support to the Druzes, and ordered a cessation of hostilities. They dispatched troops from Beirut but these never advanced any further than Hamiyeh on the outskirts of Beirut. The Maronite Patriarch obeyed the Governor's order and commanded his flock to break off hostilities and to return to their homes, but the animosity which had been building up between the two sects since the latter part of Bashir's reign coupled with the east of the Druze victories moved the Druzes to increase their barbarous conduct.

The Powers became concerned. France, the protector of the Maronites, seized the initiative and recommended the dispatch of an international force of 12,000 troops to restore order. Britain, suspicions of French motives, was nevertheless sympathetic to the plan but temporized until the news of the massacres in Lebanon reached Europe; she then consented to the French plan. The Emperor Napoleon had already begun preparing his share of the expeditionary force, 6,000 troops, and immediately dispatched them to Beirut where they arrived on August 16, 1860. The five Powers and the Ottoman Empire also agreed to establish an international commission in Beirut to determine guilt, assign indemnities, and recommend reform of the governmental system of Mount Lebanon.


2Ibid., op. cit., p. 70. No other European state sent troops, and the French eventually increased their force to 7,000 (Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 439).

3Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 439.
Meanwhile, the Porte, realizing that its position in Lebanon was in jeopardy, had despatched the Foreign Minister, Pa'ad Pasha, as extraordinary commissioner. He arrived with fresh Ottoman troops a month before the French expedition, restored order, executed a number of Damascus and a few Ottoman officials including the Governor of Damascus, and distributed relief money to the mountaineers, so that the French expedition on their arrival were faced with a fait accompli and had nothing to do but to go into bivouac in the Beirut pine forest.

The shrewdness of the Ottoman commissioner and disagreements among the commissioners of the Powers permitted the Porte to make the best of a bad situation. Pa'ad attempted to minimize the responsibility of the Porte, and to this end he used the Druzes as well as Damascene native Moslems as scapegoats, although in the end no Druze suffered capital punishment, even though forty-eight had initially been condemned.

Pa'ad asked the Christian bishops to draw up a list of the names of the Druzes against whom they believed a sentence of death should be passed. It was now the turn of the Christians to unleash their fury, and they promptly produced the names of 1,800 or sixty per cent of the adult male Druze population. When asked to supply the evidence necessary to convict them, the bishops balked, claiming that it was unnecessary to "ascend to particulars" in view of the fact that all of the Druzes were "worthy of death." The refusal to supply evidence was motivated by a

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1Ibid. 2Ibid., p. 1160.
4Hufferin to Palmer, 12 Jan. 1861, Syrian Correspondence, Part I, enclosure A to Doc. 377, p. 119.
desire to prevent the court from finding any of the 4,800 deserving of lesser punishments and in part because there was no evidence at all against a great many of the accused. When accused of obstruction of justice, Bishop Tahiya denied that he had had anything to do with the refusal to produce evidence, but witnesses came forth to testify that they had heard him giving orders to the other bishops and notables.

About three thousand of the Druzes, believing themselves otherwise doomed, left the Mountain for Hamra, but many also remained, and several of the leaders voluntarily presented themselves for trial in Beirut. In defending themselves they attempted of course to place the blame for the disaster on the Christians, and it is noteworthy that they assigned principal responsibility to Patriarch Nas'ad, Bishop Tahiya, and the other higher Maronite clergy.

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1 Dufferin to Bulwer, 1 Feb. 1861, Syrian Correspondence, Part I, Inclosure 4 to Doc. 143, p. 559.
2 For text of Tahiya's denial see Inclosure in Doc. 526, Syrian Correspondence, Part I, pp. 712-13.
4 Druze Account of the Late Events in Lebanon, Syrian Correspondence, Part I, Inclosure 2 to Doc. 160, p. 189. The following are excerpts from the Druze account:

"But when the Bishop Mikus Nas'ad became patriarch over the above-mentioned Maronite nation, the idea was again entertained by him, and the hope tempted him to pride (to drive the Druzes from Lebanon). With the advice and approval of Bishop Tuba 'Ann, and others like him, he took and concerted measures necessary for the execution of the same.

"... they [the Bishops] set themselves to work to undermine the consideration enjoyed by these Chiefs, and to abrogate their rights, setting up in their stead persons who entertained similar views with themselves, and who could be mere tools in their own hands.

"The proof that they set to work to secure this confidence (loyalty of the people) consists in their having written and distributed plébiscite documents among the inhabitants of all the villages, binding them to act in concert, and in blind confidence."
The most significant result of the work of Fu'ad and the Commission was their reorganization of the government of Lebanon. Upon his arrival in Beirut, Fu'ad had relieved both qa'immaqsas. He temporarily placed the Druze qa'immaqiyah under direct Turkish rule and appointed Yusuf Bey Karan as acting qa'immaq in the north. The Shihin shaikh, whose family had only recently joined the ranks of the aristocracy, attempted to settle the quarrel between Tangus Shahin and the Khazins. He demanded that the property of the feudal chiefs be restored but that they should pledge themselves to his authority and renounce their feudal privileges. The peasant leader agreed but the shaikhs refused, and elected to remain in Beirut rather than submit to the neophyte shaikh. Tangus then began to show scorn for Yusuf Bey, and when he refused to collect the mrd tax, Yusuf invaded his territory, chased him out, and established his own authority. This action made some enemies for Yusuf Bey among those French officials who had supported Shahin. The acting qa'immaqs had high hopes of having his appointment permanently confirmed, and believing the support of the French military and civil mission necessary, he felt that he could force them to his side by appearing to court the British and accordingly informed the British Commissioner that he would accept British ad-

1Merr, op. cit., p. 72.

2Ibid., p. 29.

3The regular annual tax on land.

Ibid. Al-Aqiq (p. 135 in Kerr, op. cit., p. 73) reports that: "It is said that these developments were instigated by his hostility the Patriarch, because of certain motives." Partial reconciliation between Karam and Shahin was effected by the French military commander, General de Beaufort, at a meeting in Ain Tur. Karan claims that he demanded about attending the meeting until the Patriarch told him to go, whereupon he obeyed. (Inclosure 5 to Dec. 95, Further Correspondence, p. 153).
vice. In this he failed, for although Lord Dufferin was favorably disposed toward Karan, he had become convinced that all of Mount Lebanon should enjoy a single government, and that the governor should not be a Maronite.

The French still favored a return of the Shiabs, or failing that of some other Maronite. General de Beaufort sent his officers through the Mountain to solicit signatures for a petition demanding the return of the Shiabs. While some Maronites favored the ancient family, the Druses and Byzantine Orthodox rejected them offhand. Furthermore, in spite of great pressure, both the acting quiamagan and the Maronite Patriarch refused to sanction the petition.

The commissioners finally agreed on a compromise plan for the administration of the Lebanon on May 4, 1861. They forwarded their recommendation to Istanbul where it was examined by the Ottoman government and the ambassadors of the Powers and was approved on June 9, 1861. Mount Lebanon was designated an autonomous mutasarrifiyah (province) of

1. Dufferin, who seems obsessed with his suspicions of the Maronite Bishop of Beirut, reported: "The cause of this somewhat unexpected demonstration is to be attributed to the fact that Bishop Ruba has discovered Karan to be a less subservient instrument than he had expected, and is therefore occupied in plotting his downfall." (Dufferin to Bulwer, 19 Jan. 1861, Syrian Correspondence, Part I, Enclosure 5 to Doc. 367, p. 143.

2. In Enclosure 15 to Doc. 105, Further Correspondence, p. 191, he writes to Bulwer: "... I cannot consent to deliver up the other communities of the Mountain... to the tyranny of a half-barbarous Maronite who would necessarily be a mere puppet in the hands of a fanatical priesthood;"

3. The Secretary of Yusuf Bey Karan to Moore, n.d. (about 20 April 1861), Further Correspondence, Enclosure 7 to Doc. 95, p. 154; Dufferin to Bulwer, 20 Apr. 1861, Further Correspondence, Enclosure 8 to Doc. 95, p. 155; and Dufferin to Bulwer, 30 May 1861, Further Correspondence, Enclosure 8 to Doc. 132, p. 566.

4. Text in Hurewitz, op. cit., Vol. 1, Doc. 73, pp. 165-166.
the Ottoman Empire, under a Christian governor, selected for a term of three years\(^1\) by the Porte, subject to the approval of the Powers. In practice all governors were non-Lebanese, non-Maronite Catholic subjects of the Sultan.\(^2\) The mutasarrifiyah had its own gendarmerie and its own budget and was indeed autonomous. The fact that the Powers were co-guarantors meant that Ottoman influence would be kept to a minimum. The most important provision of the Regulation was the absolute abolition of feudalism. This did not mean that the former aristocracy would have no influence in Lebanese politics, but it did mean that they were legally to become mere property owners, equal before the law to all other Lebanese. This system was so well-chosen for the Lebanese that it endured until unilaterally abrogated by the Turks during World War I.\(^3\)

On June 5, 1861, the French Expeditionary Force finally departed, but as a last gesture they convinced a part of the Maronites that their departure would signalize a new onslaught by the Druze and advised the peasants to follow the army to Beirut. Bishop Tutiya sent public letters to the villages instructing the people to remain quietly at home and to place their trust in the Ottoman Government, but privately he was calling the Christians to come to Beirut with the army, and even forbade anyone to communicate with the British.\(^4\) The scheme was foiled, however, and Lebanon was launched on a new era.

\(^{1}\) The mutasarrif's term was extended in 1854 to five years.

\(^{2}\) Hitot, History of the Arabs, p. 736.


\(^{4}\) Fraser to Palmer, 2 June 1861, Further Correspondence, Enclosure h to Doc. 163, p. 226.
CHAPTER III. THE ROLE OF THE PASHA PAIR DURING THE PERIOD OF THE MUTASARRIFIYAH: 1261-1315

The mutasarrif was vested with full executive power in Mount Lebanon. He was responsible directly to the Porte and could not be removed without trial. He collected taxes, appointed officials, executed the decisions of the tribunals, and maintained his own gendarmerie. Imperial troops were allowed to enter the mutasarrifiyyah only on the request of the mutasarrif and came under his jurisdiction while in Lebanon. Tax revenue was to be used in Lebanon. Only the surplus was remitted to the imperial treasury; likewise, the Porte was responsible for making up deficits. On the whole, the period of the mutasarrifiyyah was one of political stability and economic prosperity. This was due in part to the strong personalities of the early mutassarifs who built the foundations of the autonomous province and in part to the fact that the Regulation for the Government of Mount Lebanon made direct interference by the Porte and the Powers more difficult. Indirect Western influence continued and even increased through the establishment and maintenance of schools, the expansion of trade, and after 1880 through the beginning of large-scale emigration to the New World and the later return of many of the emigrants to Lebanon.

The Period 1861-1873

The period 1861 to 1873 includes the administrations of the first

1Hitti, Lebanon in History, Ch. XXX, passim, particularly pp. 442-443 and Hourani, op. cit., p. 32.
two mutasarrifs, Da'ud and Hami Frango. This was the formative era in the history of the mutasarrifiyah, and many of the later developments in Lebanese history can be directly traced to this period.

Da'ud Pasha, an Armenian Catholic, was formally invested on June 22, 1861 for a period of three years. He appointed an administrative council composed of members of the principal sects to assist him. He divided the country into six, later seven, qada's, each governed by a member of the predominant religion of the qada'. Each of these had an advisory council, the seats on which were distributed according to the sectarian principle. Subdivisions of the qada's were formed, many of them the same as previous muqata'as. Villages were headed by elected mukhtars whose appointments had to be confirmed by the mutasarrif.

Although the protestant missionary, Henry Jessup, considered Da'ud "a pliant tool in the hands of the priests", it would appear that gives the unsettled conditions of the country at the time of his arrival, he did a noteworthy job of improving conditions for most elements of Lebanese society. One of his first acts was to appoint the Shihab pretender, Enir Majid, who had earlier figured in the plans first

1Herr, op. cit., p. 75.

2Hitti, p. 142. Three sub-governors were Maronites, one a Byzan- time Catholic, one a Byzantine Orthodox, one a Druze, and one a Sunni Moslem.

3op. cit., Vol. I, p. 249. It would appear that Jessup's eval- uation of Da'ud was based solely on his attitude toward the protestant missionary effort. He charges further that "At S'addin-el-Luhah, where the Maronite peasants had been ruined by the Druze and their houses burned, a large body who became Protestants were in turn driven from their newly built homes by the pitiless fury of the monks and priests. Daud Pasha, anxious to please France, gave full liberty to the priests to root out Protestantism." (pp. 289-290).
of Bishop Dhibya and then of General de Beaufort, as sub-governor of Hiram. He ordered Haid to arrange for the immediate return of the former aristocracy and for the recovery of their property, and to react with vigor against anyone who dared interfere. The fact that the restoration of property was speedily accomplished was a remarkable feat when the animosity of the peasants against their ex-feudal chiefs is considered; during the late civil war the sheikhs had not sided with the Christians and had even sympathized with the Druze nobility.\footnote{Se, Churchill, Druzes and Maronites, pp. 173-179.}

Their refusal to deal with the "upstart" qaimmas, Yusuf Bey Karun, whose nobility had been of too recent an origin as far as the Mamluks were concerned, had a good deal to do with their undoing. Their pride necessitated their two year exile in Beirut, where their attempt to maintain their dignity and standard of living drove them into debt,\footnote{Al-Aqlî Manuscript, p. 116 (Kerr, op. cit., p. 71). See also Différin to Balfour, 29 May 1861, Further Correspondence, Enclosure I to Doc. 137, p. 23. It is also noteworthy that in spite of their alienation from virtually all of their co-religionaries, not a single Druze succumbed to the efforts of the protestant missionaries (al-Aqlî Manuscript, loc. cit.).} from which many never recovered. Consequently, many of them were forced to sell their lands, and it was primarily the peasantry of Hiram who bought them. While there are still today several large land owners in Mount Lebanon, particularly among the Druzes, the majority of private land is owned by peasant proprietors.

It is not surprising that the long period of strife which Lebanon had experienced from 1860 to 1866 did not automatically come to an end with the institution of the mutasarrifiyyah. It was only natural that some factions of Lebanese society would not accept the new order.
The Druzes were the hardest hit by the change. Da'ud removed those in Dair al-Qamar, reserving that place for Christians, and forbade the remainder of the Druzes from leaving their areas in order to reduce confusion. Although his orders were effective, yet gradually a number of the Druzes left for Hauran.

Da'ud's most difficult problem in restoring order was the suppression of Yusuf Bey Karam. Throughout the latter's tenure of office as acting qaimaqam he had betrayed his desire to govern Mount Lebanon on a permanent basis. Since the Regulation had not specifically barred a Lebanese Maronite from appointment as mutasarrif, Yusuf Bey had aspired to that office. He refused Da'ud's offer of the qada' of Jezzin, and with the help of Maronite peasants from the north he rebelled against the new government. After several battles between Da'ud's gendarmerie and Yusuf Bey's followers, the insurgent leader was apprehended and deported to Istanbul. During the fighting the mutasarrif had been irked by the support for Karam of some of the peasants of Karam and had decided to send a punitive expedition against their villages, when the Patriarch and his bishops, who were meeting at nearby Bkerki, intervened and dissuaded him from doing so, and convinced him to issue a pardon to the villagers in order not to

1Ibid., p. 138 (Marr, op. cit., p. 76).

2See Syrian Correspondence, passim.

3Marr, op. cit., p. 59 and Nitti, Lebanon in History, p. 138. Karam's public reasons for rebellion were that the governor was a foreigner, that his powers were too extensive, that the Christian qada's were not properly delimited, that commercial cases were settled by a court outside Lebanese jurisdiction, and finally, that the agreement of the Porte to underwrite the budget would result in a loss of Lebanese autonomy; yet it appears that Karam's personal ambition and jealousy of Da'ud were overriding motives.

4Nitti, Lebanon in History, p. 138.
appear provocative.¹

Karam bided his time until 1861, when Da'ud's term was due to expire, but when the Porte reappointed the mutasarrif for a term of five years, Karam returned to Lebanon and began guerrilla type warfare against the government. The now legendary hero received considerable assistance in evading the law from the peasantry but relatively little armed support, so that while he was able to remain at large for several months he was unable to realize his goal. The Patriarch, when Da'ud had originally accused of encouraging the outlaw, pleaded with Karam to surrender, which he finally did after the mediation of British and French officials who met with him at the patriarchal residence. Karam was again exiled and eventually died in Europe in 1888. In spite of several appeals, the mutasarrif refused to allow Isma'il Bey to return. The latter blamed this on the Patriarch, claiming that it was His Beatitude's policy not to permit a civil leader to the people.² He also accused the Patriarch of abandoning him and of supporting the reappointment of Da'ud in exchange for appointments and pensions for his relatives.³

One of Da'ud's most perplexing problems, and one which has never been solved to the satisfaction of all concerned, was a determination of exactly what should be included within the boundaries of Lebanon. Although the boundaries of the mutasarrifiyyah had not been exactly defined in 1861, the province was something less than half the size of the present day Republic of Lebanon. Excepted from the mutasarrifiyyah were the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon,

¹Li-Aqiqi Manusc. p. 140 (Kerr, op. cit., p. 78).
²Kerr, op. cit., p. 30.
³Ibid., pp. 88-89.
and Tyre, as well as Jabal 'Akil and Wadi al-Taym in the south, the entire Bīqa' except for Zahlah in the east, and Akkar in the north.\(^1\) The Maronites felt that these largely non-Maronite areas should be included in Lebanon to make the country economically viable, and the Patriarch was able to convince the mutasarrīf, who seems to have become as Lebanese as the Maronites, of the justice of this cause. Accordingly, Da'ud pressed the case but without success. In 1868 he journeyed to Istanbul on behalf of the project; and believing himself indispensable he threatened to resign if his demand were not met, whereupon the Porte promptly accepted his resignation.\(^2\)

Whether the Patriarch might have goaded Da'ud into resigning is in doubt, but what is not in doubt is that Da'ud's successor was the Patriarch's candidate. Nasri Franco (1868–1873) had served as the Patriarch's secretary the previous year when His Beatitude had paid a visit to Istanbul. The Patriarch had taken a strong liking to Nasri Franco and had sought an appointment for him at that time.\(^3\)

Upon his arrival in Lebanon Nasri Franco renewed his friendship with the Patriarch and established friendly relations with the other Maronite clergy.\(^4\) The new mutasarrīf, a Catholic from Acre, refused to press the demand for the attachment of the Bīqa' and the

\(^1\)Hitti (Lebanon in History, p. 142) pleaded the case rather passionately: "In its geographic delimitation the country was stripped of al-Bīqa' and Wadi al-Taym—whose very fertility was owed to top-soil swept from the mountain by rains and winds and to streams fed from water stored in the homes of the mountain—as well as Beirut and Sidon, "all of which formerly belonged to Lebanon. Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli, its natural ports, were put under direct Ottoman rule. This is clearly not the Lebanon of the Ma'ans and the Shihabs; it is the mountainous part of it."

\(^2\)Al-Qā'id Manuscript, p. 153 (Kerr, op. cit., p. 92).

\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^4\)Ibid.
port cities to Mount Lebanon otherwise, his administration appears to have been varied by a continuation of the policies of his predecessor. In 1873 he took sick, died, and was buried in Hamiye.  

The Administration of Rustem Pasha: 1872-1883

Rustem, an Italian nobleman by birth, former ambassador to St. Petersburg and future ambassador to London, challenged the growing influence of the Maronite clergy, whose Druze had won to the new order. With the decay of the Maronite feudal aristocracy, the ecclesiastical hierarchy became ascendant. Although the Maronite hierarchy would undoubtedly have labelled Rustem as anti-clerical, he proved to be very acceptable to the Protestant missionaries who rank him as the best of the mutasarrifs.  

One of Rustem's favorite projects was the establishment of government schools. The men he appointed as superintendent turned out to be under the influence of the Patriarch, and although instructed to place the schools in areas where private education was not available, the superintendent confined his efforts to inaugurating govern-

1Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 416.
2Al-Aqiq Manuscript, p. 154 (Kerr, op. cit., p. 93).
3Hitti, loc. cit., although the last statement is true, it would be wrong to assume that the Maronite hierarchy had exactly re- placed the aristocracy, because much of the feudal power, such as tax collection, had been transferred to the salaried government administration.
4Jessel (op. cit., Vol. I, p. 397) writes that: "At first he viewed the American schools with suspicion, as he regarded as a par with the 'clergy' who were always engaged in political intrigues, but on a careful study of them, became their warm friend and supporter."
ment schools in the villages which already had protestant mission
schools, and threatened the people who would not transfer their child-
ren to the new schools. The Maronite area, in which the missionaries
had never made any headway, was without a single government school.
When Rusten learned of his director's policy he relieved him and dis-
established the schools.¹

To show the Patriarch that he would tolerate no interference,
Rusten resorted to the unprecedented action of exiling one of his
bishops, Batrus al-Dustani of Bait al-Min, to Jerusalem for intriguing
against the Government, although he was allowed to return home after
a year.² The traveler Oliphant, who was present in the neighboring
town of Bair al-Qamr on the day on which Bishop Rustani returned, found
that there were decided clerical and anti-clerical parties in the town,
and inasmuch as the former group was decidedly the stronger, he was
surprised to find that the populace condemned the conduct of the bishop
and warmly supported the action of the Government.³

Oliphant also found unbelievable the austerity of the sects
in the Bair al-Qamr area, less than twenty years after the massacres.
This he attributed to a relaxation of the absolute hold of the clergy,
who were always working to destroy the good spirit between the sects,
and to the increase in prosperity brought about by the mutasarrifiyyah
administration. The popularity of the priesthood was declining,
partly because of "the unblushing effrontery with which they amass
wealth and drain the country for the maintenance of their ecclesiastical

¹Jessup, loc. cit.
²Laurence Oliphant, The Land of Gilead, pp. 354-356 and Jessup,
op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 217-218. He also banished a Byzantine Catholic
cleric of Zmelah for beating a protestant in the street.
³Oliphant, loc. cit.
 establishments.  

Further north, in the more purely Maronite area, Oliphant found that practically every Maronite village was self-governing and that the ecclesiastical interest was dominant. "To want to extend that influence over Druses and Greeks would be suicidal, and this the more sensible perceive. But the more ambitious among the bishops are absorbed with a craving for complete rule, and are never satisfied unless their control over the governor-general [mutasarrif] is supreme."  

Since it is true that the Maronite monasteries had acquired a large share of the best lands in Mount Lebanon, and since a proportionate share of the Maronite peasantry worked this land as tenants, it might be appropriate to ask the question "Why did the peasants not rise against the monasteries as they had against the aristocracy?" The fact of the matter is that there seems to have been no outward demonstration of dissatisfaction against the monasteries in the entire  

1Ball. At this time Maronite monasteries owned about one-fourth of the land in Mount Lebanon (Churchill, Mount Lebanon, Vol. III, p. 89). Very poetically, Churchill describes the acquisition of land by the Church as follows: "The magic 'power of the keys' is wielded amongst them [the aristocrats] by the Maronite priests, to whom they humbly bow, with a skill and perseverance which have succeeded in making them the tame and unsuspecting victims of a system of plunder which, with heaven as its watchdog, conduces them into the inextricable meshes of a spiritual despotism, whose cravings ought can satisfy but an unconditional surrender of worldly goods to the equitable and disinterested adjustment of the successors of the Apostles" (Mount Lebanon, Vol. I, pp. 357-358). According to Jessup (op. cit., Vol. I, p. 217), the Patriarch and clergy had for ages been appropriating the best lands of Lebanon, by intimidation of men on their deathbeds, and by seizing the property of widows and orphans, so that it is true even today [1910], that all the most fertile land, the finest water rights and the wooded hills of Lebanon belong to the bishops and the monks, and the fellahin are chiefly their tenants.  

2Oliphant, op. cit., p. 440.
History of the mutasarrifiyyah. While the fact that the Maronite hierarchy served as the link between the people and their God might have deterred many people, there is no lack of evidence in world history of discontented peoples rebelling against oppressive clergies. Perhaps the answer is that the Maronite Church was not so oppressive as some Western observers have reported, and there may be a clue to this mystery in Oliphant's final passage concerning the Maronites:

On the other hand, it is only fair to give the Maronite Church its due. It carefully feeds and pampers the goose that lays the golden egg. If it knows how to squeeze a pliable peasantry, it is far too wise to oppress or tyrannise over them. Hence Church farms are eagerly sought for, because in good years the tenants get as large a share of the produce as on private estates; while in bad years the liberality of their priestly landlords insures them against the misery too often in store for ordinary farmers. The administration of Rustom Pasha, whom Hitti regards as the only successor of Da'ud that "measured up to his stature and manifested concern for the welfare of the country," came to an end on April 22, 1893. Britain had been in favor of renewing his term because of his "strong impartial administration, supported by the aristocratic and conservative element of the population," but France, acting on behalf of the Patriarch, strongly opposed such a course, and was able to prevail upon Britain to forego the reappointment of Rustom. It was the hope of the Patriarch that he would be able to

1 Ibid., p. 491.
3 Scheitana, op. cit., p. 173.

1 Ibid. Frederick J. Ellis describes Rustom as "that brilliant and inflexibly just governor of the Lebanon." Rustom once told Daniel Ellis, the President of the Syrian Protestant College: "You and Dr. Post are the only people to whom I can open my heart; with every one
recover his recently lost influence in the politics of Mount Lebanon with a change in administration.

The Period 1883-1915

The period 1883 to 1915, which ended with the unilateral Ottoman abrogation of the mutasarrifiyah and the institution of direct Turkish rule, saw five mutasarrifs in Mount Lebanon. They "coveted primarily the favour of the Porte and were rewarded on their return by higher or more lucrative positions." Taking their cue from Sultan, they relied for their support on aristocratic and conservative elements at the expense of the democratic and clerical elements.

The several Maronite Patriarchs of the period were not able to enter into close personal relations with the mutasarrifs as Bulus Mas'ad had done with the first two. Nevertheless, the power of the Patriarch and the clergy was able to recover partially from the blows.

e else I must be on my guard." (The Reminiscences of Daniel Elias, edited and supplemented by his eldest son [Frederick J. Elias], p. 234).

1. Naşif Pasha (1883-1892)
2. Našir Pasha (son-in-law of Našir Frangio) (1892-1902)
3. Musafir Frangio (1902-1907)
4. Khālid Frangio (son of Našir Frangio) (1907-1912)
5. Khālid Frangio (1912-1915)


it had suffered during Husein's administration, but about the year
1900 it was confronted by a new threat: anti-clericalism, among
a significant portion of the Maronite population.\footnote{Frederick J. Bliss, The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine, p. 112.}

The first decade of the period after the departure of Husein
was "marked by the assumption of serious proportions by Lebanese
emigration to lands beyond the seas.\footnote{Hitti, Lebanon in History, p. 146.} With the institution of
law and order in Lebanon, pressure on the land was becoming a serious
problem, so that there began an exodus which has continued to this
day, as Lebanese sought more economically attractive lands. Many
were encouraged to go to Egypt by the British, who after 1882 needed
administrators who were literate in Arabic and either French or
English; but even more were lured to the New World. Most of these
emigrants were Maronites and other Christians. As World War I ap-
proached, the movement reached its peak: between 1900 and 1914, the
population of the mountain was reduced by one-fourth.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 473-474.} Beside visible
relief of pressure on the land, there were other results from emigration:
one was that most emigrants contributed to the support of institutions
and relatives at home, so that even today the Lebanese government
counts remittances from emigrants among the major sources of national
income.\footnote{Ibid., p. 175. Government statistics for 1952 show emigrants' remittances as $22,000,000 or about fifteen dollars per inhabitant on
the average.} Another result, more important to our purposes, was the
return to Lebanon of those emigrants who had earned pensions or who
had accumulated enough wealth abroad to enable them to return to their...
native land. These people brought more than money with them; they brought ideas, most of which were in advance of the times for conservative Lebanon. They established Freemasonry and the "other popular benevolent associations which have sprung up in the Lebanon since the beginning of the century." The societies were not anti-religious but rather were anti-clerical insofar as the clergy had, in the minds of the societies' adherents, unduly interfered in the secular aspects of Lebanese life. In 1912, Fredrick J. Bliss wrote:

Thus two parties have been lately formed among the Maronites: the one backing the patriarch, who still openly claims territorial jurisdiction over the Maronites and the other antagonizing the claims with all that it involves. The popular party includes some parish priests. The controversy, once started, waxed fierce indeed. Not only was a bitter pamphlet and newspaper war waged, but the patriarch put under the ban the Freemasons and other societies. On the death of the late governor, Hamzafar Pasha [1907], a cable with one thousand signatures was sent to Constantinople, protesting against the appointment of a gubernatorial candidate who might be favorable to the clerical party. At one time the people of Nazir, a hot-bed of clericalism, boycotted the church, threatening to invite the Moslems to build a mosque under the very eyes of the patriarch. The issues are by no means settled, but it is claimed that the popular party has already undermined the clerical influence in the government courts.

This was a period of intellectual and political unrest throughout the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire, and indeed in Istanbul itself. The Young Turks had come to power in Istanbul in 1908 and had deposed the Sultan in 1909; Arabs who had supported the movement were to become disillusioned with the new rulers' policy of centrali-

1 Fredrick J. Bliss, loc. cit.

2 Ibid. Jessup (op. cit., Vol. I, p. 118), writing at this time (1910), says that "in the purely Maronite districts, the priests still try to 'manage' political affairs, but the people have learned their rights and are free to assert them."

3 loc. cit.
nization; Muslim religious leaders, particularly in Egypt, were searching for ways of bringing Islam into harmony with Western ideas. It was only natural that in Lebanon this unrest should take on an anticlerical face, since Christianity more easily than Islam permits of a separation of Church and State.

An idea of the threat posed to clericalism in Lebanon can be garnered from the pages of al-Mashrig, a scientific, literary, historical, and religious magazine, published by St. Joseph’s University, a Jesuit institution established in Beirut in 1875 in response to the Syrian Protestant College, now the American University of Beirut, which opened its doors in 1866. In the issues of 1908 and 1909 there are two articles written by Father Louis Cheikho, a Chaldean Catholic, who occupied the chair of Arabic at the university and edited al-Mashrig. He speaks of certain poets and "seditious and riotous persons who exceed all bounds" and demanded the abolition not only of all authority but also of all differences between men and classes. They ignore "all the natural and moral laws," Cheikho continues, by placing the imam, the priest, and the bishop on the same level as "the vulgar..."

For an interesting treatment of the intellectual movement, see Antonius, op. cit.


3 The Chaldeans are the Uniats, separated from the East Syrian (also termed Nestorian or Assyrian) Church, the main body of whose communicants lived in what is now Northern Iraq and South-eastern Turkey.

market people.\textsuperscript{1} This contravenes the will of God, who alone determines individual and social differences.\textsuperscript{2}

How much influence this movement might have had on the political and social development of Lebanon if the mutasarrifiyyah administration had continued is a moot question, for by 1914 the Ottoman Empire had entered World War I on the side of the Central Powers, and in the following year unilaterally placed Lebanon under direct Turkish rule. The occupation of the country by the Turks and the subsequent peace settlement were to introduce new factors and problems which were to alter the role of the patriarchate.

\textsuperscript{1}equality\textsuperscript{a}, pp. 867 and 869, quoted in Hatata, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.
Chapter IV. The Patriarch's Role during the First World War and the Peace Settlement: 1914-1920

Shortly after the entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War I on the side of the Central Powers, Jamal Pasha was sent by the Young Turks to Damascus to become both Commander of the Fourth Army and Governor of the Syrian provinces, including the Lebanon.¹ In addition to the threat of an invasion of Syria posed by the British army stationed in Egypt, the Young Turks had reason to suspect the loyalty of the inhabitants of the Arabic-speaking provinces of the Empire. These suspicions were confirmed when Jamal seized the records of the French Consulate-general in Beirut. Courts-Martial were hastily convened and several prominent Syrians and Lebanese were executed for treason. The mutassarif was replaced by 'Ali Indif, a Turk, and Lebanon was occupied. Several convents were seized and converted into fortresses and military conscription and requisitioning were introduced into Mount Lebanon.²

Although no military engagements were conducted in Syria until the occupation by Allied troops in 1918, Mount Lebanon suffered considerably because of the tight security measures imposed upon it and because of a shortage of food and the spread of disease. It is estimated that 100,000 of its 650,000 inhabitants perished during the period 1914 to 1918.³ It is doubtful whether any segment of the native

¹Mitti, Lebanon in History, p. 163.
²Ibid., pp. 163-164.
³Ibid., p. 186.
population of Syria and Lebanon retained any sympathy for the Ottoman Empire. The Turks realized this and also that the Maronite clergy were among the leaders of anti-Turkish feeling in Mount Lebanon. Consequently, they scrutinized the activities of the ecclesiastics very closely. The Maronite Bishop of Beirut was exiled to Anatolia where he died; similar plans were made for the Patriarch himself, but upon consideration of the consequences such an action might produce among the Maronite community, the idea was abandoned. 1 Nevertheless, Jezal forced the Patriarch to move from his official residence to a place where he could be more easily watched. 2 The Government even attempted to induce the Patriarch to accept the Sultan's firman of investiture, which would have made of him an Ottoman official, but in keeping with the traditional idea of Maronite independence, the Patriarch pleaded sick, so that it was necessary to transmit the unwanted document to the Patriarch's residence by messenger. 3 Some of the lower Maronite clergy began to preach open revolt, and several of these were imprisoned. 4

In their opposition to the Turks, the Lebanese Maronites were at one with the remainder of the inhabitants of Syria. The Maronites regretted their lost autonomy and prosperity, and the Syrians had become embittered by the centralisation policy of the Young Turks and the hardships caused by the war. The Arab Nationalist Movement, whose original purpose had been to work for decentralisation and a measure

1Ibid., p. 468.
3Hitti, loc. cit.
of Arab autonomy within the Empire, had become more and more hostile to the Young Turks, and after the Sherif Husain of Mecca had declared his rebellion in the Hedja in 1916, the Arab Nationalists began to support the idea of complete independence of the Arab provinces. As Husain's armies, led by his third son Faisal, moved north into Trans-Jordan, serving as right flank of Allenby's army, enthusiastic for the idea of independence grew in Syria. Although the Anglo-Arab successes were applauded by the Maronites, they feared that the privileged position they had enjoyed in the Ottoman Empire would be in jeopardy in any new Arab state in which Lebanon might be included. "In particular, they feared that the Arabs, in the name of Arab secularism, would impose their own Moslem dominance in Lebanon far more completely than the Turks." The Maronites naturally turned for help to their old protector, France.

France, meanwhile, desirous of retaining her interests in Syria, which were both economic and cultural, and also hoping to come in for the spoils in the event that the war would end in the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, had obtained recognition by Britain of her predominant position in Syria. By virtue of the secret Sikes-Picot Agreement, France was to have priority of right of enterprise and local loans as well as the right to supply advisers to an "Arab State or Confederation of States" in an area covering a portion of the Ottoman Empire which included the Syrian provinces. In the coastal area including Lebanon, moreover, France was to be permitted to establish such direct or indirect rule as she saw fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation of

3Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon, p. 352.

2For text see Hourwitz, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 18-22.
of States. As the King-Oran Commission, 1 sent by President Wilson in 1919 to determine the desires of the Syrian people, was to later make clear, and as the French Government already knew, there was little love for the French in Syria, except among the unites and particularly among the Maronites, France realized that in order to establish and maintain her control in Syria she would have to exploit her Maronite connection to the maximum possible extent. She therefore established close contact with the Maronites, but because of the war her principal effort necessarily had to be exerted among Maronites abroad. "... Committees of Lebanese and Catholic Syrian exigrants were formed throughout the world, which persistently pleaded with the Allies to oppose the Pan-Arab claims. These committees, with their predominantly Francophile sentiment, willingly cooperated with France and supported her claim in Syria; France consequently encouraged them, and in 1917 a central committee, the Comité Central Syrien, was formed in Paris to coordinate their activities." 2

By the beginning of summer 1918, it became clear to the Turks that they would not be able to hold Syria against the Allied armies and accordingly they began making plans to retire to the north. On September 30th, the Turks turned the Government of Beirut over to its mayor, 'Umar al-Da'uni, and that of Damascus to Sa'id Bey al-Jaza'iri. 3

The latter, apparently believing that he would be confirmed by Faisal, raised the Arab flag in Damascus, declared his allegiance to the Hashimite King of the Hedjas, and began to act in a manner which can only

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1 For text of their report on the Arab States, pp. 65-74.
2 Salibi, A Modern History of Lebanon, p. 357.
3 Zeine N. Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence, pp. 25 and 27.
be described as presumptuous. Among other things, he telegraphed
the Patriarch that very day, asking him to establish an Arab govern-
ment in Mount Lebanon. The Patriarch decided to ignore the summons
and await further developments. 1

The Government of Mount Lebanon had meanwhile been handed over
by the departing Turkish wakil, Mustak Bey, to the mayor of Ba'abda,
which at that time was the seat of the Government of Mount Lebanon. The
mayor summoned the Lebanese officials of the government, who thereupon
selected the Maronite Malik Shihab and the Druze 'Adil Arslan as tempo-
rary heads of a provisional government for the Mountain. The Patriarch
was immediately informed of this action by telegraph. In reply he said
that they should carry on the Government with "firmness and wisdom",
and that they should notify the people to "restrain from communication
with anyone concerning the affairs and the future of the country until
such time when it would be possible for them and the Patriarch to ex-
change views on those matters." 2

The Allied Commander-in-Chief, General Allenby, had decided,
pending the signing of a peace treaty with Turkey, to treat Syria ac-
cording to its legal status: that is, as enemy occupied territory.
As a temporary measure the Arab Government of Faisal was entrusted
with the administration of Syria east of the Jordan and the Eiqas',
the British with Palestine, and the French with the coastal area north
of Acre, including Mount Lebanon. Accordingly, on October 8, 1918,
when the British army entered Beirut, it deposed the Arab government
which had been installed there by a mission from Faisal's Government

1Ibid., pp. 36-37. Sa'id Bey al-Jazzari was deposed by Colonel Lawrence on the following day, 1 Oct. 1918.
in Damascus, struck the Sacred Flag, and turned over the government to the French, who appointed military governors in all the principal coastal cities.  

Captain Coulonire acted as Deputy High Commissioner pending the arrival of M. George Picot.

M. Coulonire made no secret of the ultimate intention of France to establish herself in Lebanon, and on one occasion publicly announced that France had come to Lebanon primarily to protect her Maronite friends and uphold their interests.  

On October 23rd, he paid an official visit to the Patriarch in order to discuss with him the future government of Lebanon. The two agreed to leave the administration temporarily in the care of the Administrative Council under a French officer as temporary governor.

The final disposition of Mount Lebanon, as indeed of all the Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire, was to be made at the Peace Conference. The various secret agreements concluded during the war for the sole purpose of the successful prosecution of that war were impossible of fulfillment in view of their many conflicting provisions. 

Delegations representing all parties with an interest in Syria proceeded to the Peace Conference at Versailles in February 1919 to have their views aired. The Maronites realized that the first order of business was to see to it that French influence was assured a predominant position in Syria. To this end several "Syrian" delegations were mustered by the

1Ibid., p. 39.

2Saliby, A Modern History of Lebanon, p. 360.

3Zeine, op. cit., p. 161.

4Much has been written concerning these agreements. The reader is referred particularly to Antonius, op. cit., and Zeine, op. cit.
French, consisting primarily of Maronites, but including also some non-Maronite Francophiles to give the appearance of truly representative opinion. Foremost among these delegations was the Comité Central Syrien. Though a year later they were to appear as ardent Lebanese Nationalists, they now insisted on the distinct character of Syria and asked for it to be separated from Arabia and placed under the guardianship of France. This Syrian state should include not only Lebanon but also Palestine, where the Jews could enjoy autonomy.\textsuperscript{2}

A "Lebanese" delegation, headed by Emad Bey Husain, President of the Administrative Council, and including Maronite, Druze, and Moslem delegates also spoke before the Peace Conference on behalf of a French protectorate.\textsuperscript{3} This delegation desired the creation of a Greater Lebanon to include the areas "stripped from Lebanon" in 1860.\textsuperscript{4} The expenses of these delegates were paid by the French Government.\textsuperscript{5}

Other delegations, more truly representative of Syrian opinion had also made their desires known. To get to the bottom of the matter, President Wilson suggested the appointment of an Inter-Allied Commission to go to Syria and ascertain the views of the people on the spot. France and Britain at first agreed to this idea but later backed out. Only the American delegates were ever appointed, but Wilson decided to send them anyway. Messrs. King and Crease arrived at Jaffa on June 10, 1919, and proceeded to investigate. On August 28th they submitted their report which was never utilized, nor was it even made public until several

\textsuperscript{1}Harry N. Howard, \textit{The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1917-1921}, p. 225.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., op. cit., p. 88.

\textsuperscript{4}Howard, loc. cit.
years later, but the gist of the Commission's findings became fairly well known to all interested parties. They recommended the assignment of a Syrian mandate to the United States of America, or if that were not possible then to Britain. The mandate should be assigned a time limit and under no circumstances should it be assigned to France who was unacceptable to all segments of the Syrian populace except the Maronites of Lebanon.1

Meanwhile, a new delegation was formed to plead the Lebanese case. Headed by the Patriarch himself, and conveyed in a French naval vessel,2 it arrived in Paris on August 22, 1919, and immediately began to pursue the task of realizing the aspirations of the Lebanese people.3 Those aspirations were clearly set forth in a letter by the Patriarch to French Premier Clemenceau dated August 25, 1919: "(1) the recognition of the independence of the Lebanon with full sovereignty, 'internal and external', (2) the restitution of her historical and economic frontiers, and (3) the help and support of France for the achievement of those aspirations in the light of the tradition of friendship which the Lebanon had always maintained toward France."4

Two days later a memorandum embodying these aspirations was presented

1 The Maronite Patriarch told the Commission that Lebanon desired full independence, but if assistance were necessary, then only that of France would be acceptable (Nicola Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon, p. 143).

2 Congriss, loc. cit.

3 Zeine, op. cit., p. 122. See also Steir, op. cit., p. 19, Hitti, Syrians in America, p. 56, and Mokarres, op. cit., p. 7. This last permits his imagination to control his pen when he says, "On that occasion, he [Patriarch Illyas Huras [Hawayik] was given by common agreement of all elements of Lebanese society, who for once forgot their petty differences for the sake of the common weal, the significant and all-inclusive title of the 'Lebanese Patriarch'."5

4 Zeine, loc. cit.
to the Peace Conference.\textsuperscript{1} The Patriarch spent the following month in Paris conferring with President Poincaré, Prime Minister Clemenceau, the Foreign Minister, and other members of the French Government. Having received assurances that his desires would be fulfilled in principle he took the delegation home, arriving in Lebanon on October 10, 1919.\textsuperscript{2}

One month later, on November 10th, M. Clemenceau went on record in a letter which he wrote to the Patriarch, in which he assured His Beatitude that his Government was in complete accord with the aspirations of the Lebanese and would do everything possible to help Lebanon to realize them; however, there would necessarily be "certain limitations with which this Lebanese independence was going to be exercised. They could not be defined for the time being before the mandate over Syria had been granted to France."\textsuperscript{3}

The Versailles Conference adjourned without having made final provision for the Arabic-speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire, but the handwriting could be seen on the wall when Britain agreed with France in September 1919 to withdraw all of her troops in Cilicia and northern Syria to Palestine, leaving the French to occupy the coastal region and the Arabs of Faisal in the cities of the interior of Syria. The Arabs complained bitterly to Britain about this agreement, and in answer Faisal was advised to come to an arrangement with the French. He was able to arrive at a tentative agreement with Clemenceau by which the French Government recognized the Syrians' right to inde-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Longrigg, loc. cit.
\item \textsuperscript{3}Zeine, loc. cit.
\end{itemize}
pendence and unity under the protection of France. The agreement was never carried out as Clemenceau’s Government fell and was replaced by that of M. Millerand, whose Eastern policy was even less sympathetic to the Arab cause than its predecessor’s had been.1

Faisal’s faith in the integrity of Western diplomacy began to wane, and as it did the voice of the extreme Arab Nationalists in Damascus became dominant. With the likelihood of a workable arrangement between France and the Arab Government in Damascus fading, the Maronites became anxious. The Patriarch, in February, 1920, therefore dispatched a new delegation to Paris, this time headed by Bishop ‘Abdullah Khuri, and including the Druze hair Tawfiq Arslan and the Maronites Yusuf Gezayyal and Emil Eddé.2 On February 11th, the delegation arrived in Paris and immediately presented itself at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to “save the independence of Lebanon.”3

Meanwhile, the Arab Nationalists had summoned a General Syrian Congress in Damascus. The Congress included delegates from Lebanon and Palestine. On March 7th, they drew up a resolution in which they declared the Governments of the Enemy Occupied Zones in all Syria dissolved, to be replaced by a constitutional monarchy under Faisal. Mount Lebanon was to be included in the kingdom, but its traditional autonomy within the boundaries of the mutasarrifiyyah was to be guaranteed so long as the Lebanese refrained from foreign entanglements.4

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1Millerand, op. cit., pp. 52-53.
2Zeine, op. cit., pp. 133-134 and Lengrigg, loc. cit.
3Zeine, op. cit., p. 134.
4Ibid., p. 135.
The news of the resolution jolted Mount Lebanon. The Patriarch's residence was besieged with petitions rejecting the claims of the fifteen prominent Beirutians, who were members of the Syrian Congress, that they represented Lebanon. These protests categorically rejected the inclusion of Lebanon in an Arab kingdom, especially since its inhabitants had not even been consulted. On March 15th, the Patriarch telegraphed M. Hillard in protest against the proclamation of Faisal as "King over Lebanon." The Lebanese delegation in Paris had increased its efforts, and the previous day had telegraphed the Patriarch that the French Government had assured them that France had not and would not change its attitude toward Lebanon. The telegram was delivered through the French High Commissioner and military commander in Beirut, General Jouaud, who sent along with it a letter of his own in which he expressed his pleasure at his Government's renewal of its intention to stand by its Lebanese friends. On March 17th, Bishop Khuri appealed to the French Prime Minister to "protect the interests of Lebanon, which were so closely tied with those of France." On March 20th, the Prime Minister received the Delegation and assured it that his Government considered M. Clemenceau's letter of the previous November 10th as absolutely binding, but that the French Government could take no immediate steps to incorporate the Biqa' and the other territories claimed by the Patriarch in the Government of Mount Lebanon. This step would require further consultation with the other Powers.1

Meanwhile the Peace Conference had reconvened at San Remo, Italy. Faisal, having lost all hope in a just settlement of the Syrian question,

1Ibid., pp. 114-116.
had boycotted the new conference and had declared that he would not recognize foreign rule in any portion of Syria including Palestine and Lebanon. Whether a less intransigent attitude might have availed the Arabs is doubtful, but with their failure to be represented at the Conference, the final disposition of the Syrian question was expedited. On April 24, 1920, Syria with the exception of Palestine and Trans-Jordan was assigned as a Class A Mandate to France.

The award of the Mandate to France was one thing; the enforcement of it was another matter. The details of that story can not be told here, but a few words seem necessary. It must be mentioned that the French had played an insignificant part in the winning of the war in the East; only a small French detachment had accompanied Allenby's army in its Palestine-Syria campaign. But between the Armistice with Germany in November 1918 and the award of the mandate, seventeen months had elapsed. During that time France had been able to build up her forces which included both French and imperial troops in Lebanon, so that by July 1920, she was finally able to challenge the forces of King Faisal. On July 11th, General Gouraud sent Faisal an ultimatum, the provisions of which called for the virtual submission of the young kingdom to the French Government in Beirut. In spite of that, and against the desires of the overwhelming majority of the Syrians, the king accepted, but his answer failed to reach Gouraud before the announced time limit, and the general began marching on Damascus.

1 Houri, op. cit., p. 51.
2 Ibid, and Attit, Lebanon in History, p. 185. The text of the mandate was not approved by the League of Nations until July 1922 and technically did not take effect until September 1923. The United States of America recognized it in 1924 (Houri, op. cit., p. 55).
ing of the advance, Faisal sent an envoy to Gouraud's camp to ask that the advance be stopped, whereupon the general revealed a new series of demands which the king could not accept. The French army advanced to Khan Naisalun in the Anti-Lebanon Mountains where it was met on July 21st by a hastily organized force of regular Arab soldiers, Damascene townsman, and bedoins, which it was able to defeat. The following day the victorious French entered Damascus.

Faisal left Syria, his kingdom at an end.¹

The remainder of the Syrian interior was occupied by the French in a matter of several days.² The way was now open to reward the Maronites for their loyalty by the establishment of an enlarged黎巴嫩 State. On September 1, 1920, General Gouraud proclaimed the State of Greater Lebanon.³ The area of the mutasarrifiyyah was approximately doubled by the addition of the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre; the Jabal 'Aanil area to the south; Wadi al-Ya'id and the Hîqa to the east; and the Akkar area to the north. Although this had been one of the goals for which the Patriarch had labored, it is questionable whether in the long run such a move would benefit the Maronites. In the short run it served to increase the dependence of the Maronites on their French benefactors, for the new areas were largely non-Maronite and even non-Christian in composition. The population of Mount Lebanon in 1913 had been estimated at 111,800 souls,⁴ of which fifty-eight per cent were Maronites and an additional twenty-one per cent adherents

¹Haurani, op. cit., p. Sh. For a detailed account see Zeine, op. cit., Ch. II.
²Zeine, op. cit., p. 228.
³Mitti, Lebanon in History, p. 149.
⁴Tbid., p. 150.
of other Christian sects. Only twenty per cent were non-Christian. 

The addition of the new areas reduced the Christian majority to barely more than one-half. The Maronite majority was cut to a simple plurality of twenty-nine per cent, and indeed Sunnite and Shi'ite Moslems togeth-er easily outnumbered them. 1

The idea of a Greater Lebanon, more economically viable than the Mutasarrifiyyah, which had had no granary and no port, was contrary to the desires not only of the Moslems who now found themselves Lebanese nationals, but also to many of the non-Catholic Christians, and particularly the Byzantine Orthodox. These people felt that a Maronite-dominated state would be no better than one controlled by Moslems, and that in the long run the minorities would be well-advised to identify themselves with the majority. The Maronites had either to win the

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2The following statistics are based on the results of the census of 1932. No other census has ever been taken in Lebanon. Official estimates are published from time to time but are liable to more than mathematical extensions of the 1932 statistics. For example, in the 1943 estimates which give the population of Lebanon as 1,092,421, only the Armenian Orthodox sect changes more than one per cent (from 2% to 3%).

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<td>Christians</td>
<td>392,581</td>
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<td>Maronites</td>
<td>226,378</td>
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<td>Byzantine Orthodox</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Shi'ite</td>
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</table>
the other sects over to their idea of an enlarged Lebanon, independent of Syria or a Greater Arab State, or else to rely on the good will and support of France. With the situation as it existed in 1920 there was clearly no choice. Unless, however, the French mandatory period was to last forever, the Maronites had to reach an understanding with their neighbors.
CHAPTER V. THE PATRIARCHATE SINCE 1920

The demand of the Patriarch for the restoration of the largely non-Maronite areas of what is now the Republic of Lebanon, was crowned, as we have already seen, with early success. But the addition of these territories, while making Mount Lebanon more economically and strategically viable, changed the numerical strength of the Maronites from a fifty-eight per cent majority to a twenty-nine per cent plurality and threw them upon the mercy of the French mandatory regime. They were soon to find out that "all that glitters is not gold."

Along with the creation of the State of Greater Lebanon on September 1, 1920, a provisional statute for the government of the state was promulgated. The principle of sectarian representation in the Chamber, developed during the period of the mutasarrifiyyah, was adopted, and the mandatory felt that the governorship would have to be entrusted to a Frenchman "since communal rivalry and suspicion threatened to render any native Lebanese candidate unacceptable to a majority of his fellow citizens."

In actual fact this made little immediate difference because the governor was subordinate to the French High Commissioner, and although the Lebanese Government had legislative as well as executive powers it was subject to the control of the High Commissioner and his delegates. In addition, French "technical advisors" were attached to all departments of the administration, and exercised a control which

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1Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, Vol. 1: The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement, p. 357.
at times deprived the Government of almost all freedom of action.\footnote{Hourani, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 171-172.}

The newly added populations of Lebanon, and particularly the Sunni Moslem communities of Beirut and Tripoli, who were desirous of reunion with Syria, at first took little part in the administration of Lebanon. The Maronites never ceased to strive for assurances that "all of Lebanon" would permanently remain completely independent of Syria. In a public speech in January 1923, the Patriarch declared against any form of union. This led the French to create a new institution, known as the common interests, whereby such activities as customs, posts and telegraph, certain concessionary companies including rail and public utilities, and the little army of Syria-Lebanon were placed directly under the High Commissioner. An agreement to this effect was signed on January 31, 1923 between the Governor of Greater Lebanon and the President of the Syrian Federation.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 170-171 and Younsee, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 360.}

The excessive "supervision" by the mandatory power was resented by Lebanese of all sects, who felt that France was not acting in accordance with the spirit of the mandatory idea which was based on the principle of preparing the natives for eventual complete self-government. In 1925 General Sarrail arrived in Beirut as High Commissioner and proceeded to alienate all segments of the Syrian and Lebanese populations. Sarrail had no use for sectarianism or clericalism, and apparently failed to realise their importance both to the Maronites and to France-Lebanese relations. He refused to observe the traditional religious ceremonies which had become almost obligatory to the senior representative of France.
in Lebanon. The general also decided to give Lebanon a native governor and began to prepare for the election of one, but then he discovered that the results were "destined to go against his anti-clerical policy, he appointed a temporary French governor and brought about the dissolution of the Council."  

Hardly had the bitterness generated by Sarrail’s ecclesiastical blunders subsided when his French governor managed to raise it again by advocating in two public speeches the introduction of secular education. The religious educational system of Lebanon being one of the pillars, not only of Maronite strength, but also of that of the other Christian sects, it was not surprising that this idea caused an uneasy 

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1 The protectorate [of France over Ottoman Catholics], however, had been traditionally signalled by certain liturgical honours, with which representatives of the French government had been received by representatives of the Catholic Church in the Ottoman Empire, and the payment of these honours has been especially conspicuous in Beirut, as the center of the most considerable body of Catholic and Maronite population within the former Ottoman frontiers. When Ottoman sovereignty in Syria was replaced by the French mandate, and the representative of France came to Beirut no longer as a Consul-General under the capitulations but as a High Commissioner under the mandate, the local representatives of the Catholic Church had not ceased to offer the traditional honours; and, on the French side, General Sarrail’s predecessors—conscious that local support of the Catholic Church was an important political asset for France in administering a mandate which was not popular among the population of the mandated territory—had taken pains to signify their appreciation of the courtesy by which the old ceremonial was continued. In this particular fragment of the former Ottoman dominions, General Sarrail, too, upon landing at Beirut on the 2nd January, 1925, duly received his invitation to the customary reception in the parish church of the Latin community in the city; and he broke a French tradition of several centuries standing by returning a refusal.

state between the Government and the religious leaders. The Maronite Arch-bishop of Beirut refused to invite the Governor to the traditional Easter Monday high mass, and in spite of the pleading of the Governor’s secretary, the arch-bishop, supported by the Patriarch, persisted in his refusal. Governor Gayla in the end had not only to drop this project but was also required by his Government, which felt that it could not afford to antagonise the Patriarch, to pay a personal call on His Emminence at which time he informed him that he did not, nor did he ever have, any intention of founding secular schools in Lebanon.

Sarrail’s blunders in Syria were even more disastrous. His bombardment of Damascus in order to put down a rebellion led to his recall after less than a year in office. He was succeeded by W. Jouvenel, the first civilian to hold the post of High Commissioner. It was now decided to grant Lebanon a constitution, and this was formally promulgated on May 22, 1926. Meanwhile, the Syrian Government, on December 22, 1925, had reopened the question of the return to Syria of the territories annexed to Lebanon in 1920. On February 23, 1926, the Patriarch presided over a meeting at Baalbek which protested the discussion of the matter in Damascus. Accordingly the new constitution, in its first article, declared the frontiers as already established by the mandatory power, as inviolable. In the subsequent elections for the presidency of the Lebanese “Republic”, the Patriarch very wisely avoided the trouble that would invariably have ensued had a Maronite attempted to win the

1It is typical of sectarian jealousy in Lebanon, that the other sects, while equally disturbed by the announced policy, nevertheless attempted to take advantage of the Maronite refusal by inviting Governor Gayla to their own Easter Monday celebrations.

2Trombe, op. cit., pp. 420-421.

3Ibid., pp. 430-430.
post, and threw his support to the Byzantine Orthodox Charles Dabba.  
His move was rewarded on June 13th, when the new President stated in  
a public speech that Lebanon would not cede an inch of her territory.  
This statement was naturally ill-received in Damascus, where the Pro-
visional Head of the Syrian State felt obliged to register a formal  
protest.  

When M. Dabba's three year term was due to expire in 1929,  
there developed much speculation as to who would succeed him, but when  
the Patriarch decided to back his bid for reelection, other aspirants  
dropped their candidatures. 2 The importance of the Patriarch's support  
was so obvious that M. Dabba lost no time in calling on His Beatitude  
at Beirut after his reelection in order to thank him. 3  

In spite of the democratic machinery set up in Lebanon by the  
French, the High Commissioner retained veto power, which he was not  
reluctant to use. The slow progress toward real independence, coupled  
with the adverse effects of the world depression, tended to decrease the  
popularity of the mandatories. The French, who had come to Lebanon as  
the friends and protectors of the Maronites, were slowly becoming the  
object of Maronite fear and distrust. Nor was this trend alleviated  
with the death at Christmas 1931 of His Beatitude Ilyas Butrus Hawawiyik  
after a thirty-three year reign. The French found his successor, Bulus  
Arida, to be an "uncompromising and strongly political prelate." 4  

2Ibid., p. 150. The same situation arose in 1923. This time  
the entire Maronite parliamentary delegation camped at Beirut under  
the leadership of the Patriarch (Syrian World, Vol. III (July 1928), p. 51.  
3Ibid., Vol. III (February 1928), p. 50.  
5Langrigg, op. cit., p. 203.
The year 1935 witnessed a remarkable rapprochement between the more extreme politicians of Damascus with no other than Mgr. Arida who... easily found allies and admirers in the highest Muslim circles. His attitude was based in part upon irritation with French policy in general—it is refusal of true independence, its infinite range of interference, its failure to combat the economic crisis or to reduce taxes—, in part upon a pronounced mutual antipathy between himself and M. de Martel [The High Commissar], and in part also upon a specific item of contention, the Tobacco Monopoly. . . . the Patriarch declared himself the Monopoly’s most determined enemy, in the interests (as he conceived them) of Lebanese growers and owners. He telegraphed to Paris, received malcontent delegations, threatened strikers for their efforts, addressed letters to the lebanese communities in five continents, joined forces with Syrian national leaders in protest and agitation—and even some alleged, in vague projects of Syro-Lebanese unity. With the far from unanimous support of his flock, he pursued his vendetta against M. de Martel, adding thereto sweeping political claims for Lebanon and a dozen connected grievances. His attitude to the Mandatory itself was for a time critical and fluctuating; he and High Commissar ceased to meet, and attempts at mediation by Bishops or senior functionaries had no success. It is noteworthy, because entirely typical, that no pretense existed that the whole matter had any religious or spiritual content; Mgr. Arida was acting, like every Middle Eastern community leader, solely as a politician. 2

In the following year when Syrian Nationalist leaders were ar-

1The Patriarch, who had accompanied his predecessor to Paris in 1919, claimed that a specific promise of independence had been given by the French Government at that time.

2The Tobacco Monopoly (at that time a common interest French-owned concession) is a very powerful economic interest in Lebanon (and formerly in Syria). Its powers included the right to determine the amount of tobacco grown by farmers and to destroy any oversupply. 3

3Longrigg, op. cit., pp. 206-207. See also I. Ghizik, “Political Parties in Syria”, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XXII (1918), pp. 526-555, who says “Today the most influential party is that of the Maronite Patriarch. In spite of its comparatively small membership it is the unchallenged leader in lebanese politics. Indeed, as a result of the granting of the Tobacco Monopoly, this group has been recognized as the most important in all Syria.” (p. 561).
rested in connection with a general strike directed against the policy of the Mandatory. Demonstrations and sympathy strikes were organized in Lebanon; participants included not only Muslem elements but also Maronites and other Christians. The Patriarch himself sent messages of sympathy to the arrested Syrian politicians. 1 This rapprochement was in effect no different from that of 1930 when the Maronites joined forces with the Druzes to free themselves from the alien Government of Turkey, which like the French Mandatory regime had been initially welcomed by the Maronites for the protection it afforded against the potential local enemy. This time, however, the Maronites, though just as intent upon retaining their identity, were somewhat more compromising.

Although there existed a wide range over which Maronite political opinion was spread, most Maronites subscribed to either of two schools whose respective spokesmen were Emile Abbe and Bishara al-Nuri. The first was strongly Francophile and desired an independent Lebanon with French protection. The second also desired an independent Lebanon, and while exhibiting a considerable French orientation culturally, was nevertheless more willing to recognize the valid aspirations of the non-Maronite segments of the population. 2 It was this last school of thought which eventually came to prevail. In 1941 when the Free French replaced the Vichy Government in Lebanon, they declared Lebanon independent, but it soon became apparent that in spite of nominal changes, the French were still unsympathetic to aspirations of real independence. The "Delegate General" wielded no less power than had the High Commissioner before him. The ineffectual Alfred Naqqash was retained as President in an

1 Hontinger, op. cit., p. 216.
obvious rebuff to the al-Khuri faction, but the latter was able to win the support of the Patriarch and his newly-formed Maronite Council.¹

In 1943 the French, acting in response to pressure exerted by Great Britain, restored the Constitution which had been suspended in 1939, and consented to the election of a new Parliament. The election, though its conduct would not bear inspection by the standards of a sober parliamentary democracy, was certainly the fairest and freest that had ever taken place in the Levant ...² and resulted in a victory for a group whose sentiments were in harmony with those of al-Khuri, who was their President of the Republic. The new President offered the premiership to the Mleeh Hashem al-Sult, who had been an outspoken Arab Nationalist during the entire period of the mandate.³ The new Government submitted a bill to Parliament calling for the amendment of the Constitution in order to remove from it all those clauses which referred to France as mandatory or which admitted any special French rights. The mandatory objected that such unilateral action was illegal, because of France's responsibilities to the League of Nations, but in spite of repeated warnings, the Parliament complied with the request of al-Sult's Government and amended the Constitution on November 8, 1943. The French reacted three days later by arresting the President and the entire Cabinet except two ministers who took refuge in the Mountain and claimed to

¹George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1942, The Middle East in the War, p. 121 and Longrigg, op. cit., p. 325. Longrigg considers the Patriarch to have been the real political head of Lebanon at this time.

²Kirk, op. cit., p. 275.

³Ibid. and Eugenie Bii Abochlid, Thirty Years of Lebanon and Syria, p. III.
be the legitimate government of Lebanon. Raie el-Khe comprimised his political future by allowing the French to appoint him as head of the Government, for almost the entire population of Lebanon united in protest against the imprisonment of its elected leaders. The Patriarch gave open support to the rum government in the mountain, which issued decrees that were obeyed by the Lebanese. Popular and British pressure forced the hand of the French who finally released the prisoners on November 22nd and permitted them to resume office on a basis of the status quo ante.2

The united stand adopted by the Lebanese was made possible by an informal agreement between President al-Khuri and Prime Minister al-Safih, which has come to be known as the "National Covenant" (Arabic, al-Watan al-Watani). The less intransigent among both the Arab Nationalist and Maronite factions supported the covenant, which agreed to the maintenance of an independent Lebanon with its enlarged frontiers, but on two conditions: (1) that Lebanon follow a course of true independence; that she not be subservient to France or any other Western power, and (2) that the Arab character of Lebanon be recognized and that she cooperate with the other Arab states.3 In addition, the presidency was to be reserved for a Maronite, the premiership for a Sunni Moslem, and the speakership of the Parliament for a Shi'ite; other posts in government and the administration would be allotted on a sectarian basis in accordance with the size of each sect. By this agreement, the Maronites retained most of the power, but they were forced to share much of it with the other sects, and

3Hourani, op. cit., p. 298.
particularly with the Sunni Moslems. Although there was still some feeling among the Maronites for France, they were committed to the liquidation of the French position in Lebanon and were generally loyal to their countrymen during the process which was finally completed in 1945 with the withdrawal of the last French Forces.¹

Thus was the confessional principle of Lebanese politics developed to its ultimate end. So long as this system continued to operate, the active political life of Lebanon would have to function on a basis of personal rather than ideological leadership, and a democratic party life could not be maintained. For example, in order to aspire to the presidency, a Lebanese would have to be a Maronite and would necessarily have to compete with other Maronites for that post. The same situation exists for the Sunni Moslems in regard to the premiership, and for the other sects in regard to other Government posts and jobs. Also, if a Maronite President is to rule the country, he must have the cooperation of at least some of the leaders of the other sects. In practice, what happens is that to form a Government it is necessary to include a relatively large number of

¹Once the Maronites were convinced that they no longer had any reason to fear France, some of the old admiration for that country resurfaced itself, but this was and is expressed primarily in the cultural rather than the political field (see George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs, The Middle East, 1946–1950, p. 113 and Longrigg, loc. cit., p. 195). The Maronites felt it difficult to forgo their Western political orientation completely, however, and when King Abdullah of Trans-Jordan advocated his Greater Syria scheme in 1941, the Maronite Patriarch replied not only that Lebanon wanted to remain independent within her own frontiers, but that France, Great Britain, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R. should collectively guarantee that independence (Gladah, Syria and Lebanon, p. 95). A curious sequel to the liquidation of the French position was the solution of the question of the Consular Masses. The Government looked upon the institution as inconsistent with the independence of Lebanon. The Arch-bishop of Beirut was willing to discontinue the custom, but the Patriarch intervened to resolve the matter by transferring the Mass from the Cathedral in Beirut to his private chapel in Bkerke (Kirk, loc. cit., pp. 113–114, and Longrigg, loc. cit.).
ministers in the cabinet in order to obtain a majority in Parliament. Those deputies whose leaders are not represented in the government then form the opposition, which, like the Government, is usually composed of diverse factions who manage from time to time to form blocs in order to accomplish limited objectives. Within this structure there still exists a wide range of opinion concerning the nature of Lebanon, varying from the extreme Maronite position which holds that the Lebanese are a non-Arabic people descended from the Phoenicians to the extreme Arab Nationalist position which still desires the complete absorption of Lebanon in a Greater Arab State.

During the civil war of 1958, President Chamoun (Sham'un) received most of his support from the Phalanges Party, which is composed primarily of the extremist Maronites, and from the majority of the adherents of the Maronite Church. The opposition was composed of those Lebanese politicians whom the President had managed to eliminate from active participation in the Government and of their supporters which mainly included, but was by no means limited to, those who held to the Arab Nationalist line. In fact, the opposition included or was supported at least by most of the influential Maronite political leaders as well as by the Patriarch, Bulus Ma'ush, who had succeeded Bulus Arida upon the latter's death in 1955.

1 Also supporting the Government was the Syrian National Socialist Party (usually known by its initials in French: F.P.S.), which is a non-sectarian party standing for the idea of a Syrian nation including Iraq, Cyprus, and Sinai, as well as Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan, but distinct from the Arab nation. While Lebanese independence is contrary to the ideology of the party, it is considerably less harmful to its aspirations than is Arab nationalism, particularly if led by Egypt, and during the lebanese civil war, Arab Nationalism was ranged in support of the opposition. The stand of the F.P.S. during the civil war is an excellent example of the temporary alliance which the Lebanese system fosters.

2 See Fahim I. Qabain, Crisis in Lebanon, pp. 101 and 50.
The causes of the 1958 civil war were many and complicated, nor is the evidence available at present entirely conclusive. Involved are national and inter-Arab factors as well as the international implications of the cold war. What is of significance to our purposes, however, is the strange picture presented by the fact that most of the Maronites stood on one side, the President's; that most of the Moslems stood on the other, that of the opposition; and that the Patriarch, instead of leading Maronite opinion, was found lending his support to the opposition.

It is perhaps too early to try to decipher this riddle, but an attempt will be made in the concluding chapter to do so.
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION

In the preceding five chapters, we have seen how the political power of the Maronite patriarchate grew from near insignificance in the northernmost part of Mount Lebanon to one of the most important forces in the French-mandated State of Greater Lebanon and in the Republic of Lebanon. We must now ask why the head of this Oriental religious sect should be so powerful. In the narrative as told to this point there have been certain forces and circumstances at work which have enabled the patriarchate, and in some cases forced it, to assume a position of leadership.

When Fakr al-Din II incorporated the Maronite districts into his emirate in the early seventeenth century, he suppressed the Maronite mugaddamin whose subservience to alien rulers had already fairly well discredited them. Power was then shared between the emir and the new Maronite aristocracy which he created. This new aristocracy soon identified itself with the Druze aristocracy, who, because of the immigration of Maronite peasants into their districts, eventually came to have more Christian than Druze tenants. Both Christian feudatories and peasants sided with the various Druze confederations and participated on both sides in inter-tribal warfare.

In the early nineteenth century, the Kair Bashir began a process of weakening the feudatories, who were mostly Druze. Since Maronites were beneficiaries of this policy, animosity between the two sects was created. The policies of Ibrahim Pasha only intensified the sectarian tension, while at the same time weakening further the traditional feudal system. When Bashir and Ibrahim fell, a vacuum was created. The feud-
tories attempted to reconquer it but were unable to do so because of Turkish and European intrigue, the ambition of the Maronite clergy, and the restlessness of the peasantry.

Because of the subservience of the Druze religious leadership to the Druze aristocracy and because of the strong feudal tradition of Druze society, the Druze peasantry was not prepared to rise against the feudal chieftains and viewed the attempt by the Christians to do so as a threat to the existence of the entire Druze community. The Maronite clergy, drawn primarily from the peasantry and largely in sympathy with it, easily assumed a leading position in the anti-feudal movement when a member of its own class succeeded to the patriarchate in 1855.

It was the Maronites' close ties with Catholic France that saved the sect from complete ruin in 1860, and although Mount Lebanon was subsequently subjected to the rule of a foreign autocrat, the mountaineers retained considerable autonomy, and within the structure of the new government, which was predominantly sectarian, the Maronites had the greatest voice because of the predominance of their numbers. The sectarian nature of the new society was such that the Patriarch was bound to have a predominant influence, for he was the only figure in the Maronite "nation" to whom all classes owed allegiance.

After World War I, France was able to exert her influence on behalf of the Maronites, although she also felt that this role was in her own interests. In the negotiations between France and the Maronites it had to be the Patriarch who spoke for the latter, because only he could command the loyalty of most of Maronite society. During the war, France had had to direct her main effort through emigrant groups who were by this time an important element of support for the Maronites of Mount.
Lebanon. These exiles were bound together by little more than religious conviction, and the visible sign of the faith was the Patriarchate.

During the period of the French Mandate, the patriarchate continued as the principal voice of the Maronites, at first in cooperation with the Mandatory Government; but later, when it became obvious that France was reluctant to permit the realization of Maronite aspirations, the Patriarch and his coreligionaries opposed the French regime. When a basis for cooperation with the non-Maronite elements of Lebanese society was found in 1941, the Patriarch supported the "National Government", and a united Lebanese people was able to prevail against France.

With the establishment of a truly independent Lebanon, the nature of which appeared outwardly acceptable to both Maronites and non-Maronites, the role of the patriarchate became passive, but there was no guarantee that it would remain so permanently; for the Maronites are unique among the Christians of the Arabic-speaking world in that they are the only one of the many sects who can be considered a compact minority. All other sects, Byzantine Orthodox, Byzantine Catholic, Jacobite, Syrian Catholic, Coptic, and so forth, are spread out over the entire area or over a large part of it, but nowhere do they form groups more compact than a few villages. This difference is what makes the Maronites so self-conscious of their identity as a separate people. Since the breakdown of the miliš system, the other Christian minorities outside of Lebanon have had to come to terms with the majority, especially since the end of the mandate period when they all became completely un-

1Writings in 1924, Professor Atti remarked that "The Syrians are loyal to their church because of the national aspect of its character, and it, therefore, forms an integral part of the constitution of their community wherever they may be." (Syrians in America, p. 35).
protected. Most of the minorities, and the Byzantine Orthodox are
the best example, have taken great strides in adjusting to the situation
by subscribing to the Arab Nationalist idea. But the Maronites, living
in an almost solid block, are more able to resist such a trend, and
generally they have done so.

A glance back at the preceding five chapters will show that
the support given by the Maronites to their patriarchate has differed
in intensity from time to time, and during one period there was even
fairly open opposition to it. It is not possible to say categorically
why the enthusiasm of the Maronites for the patriarch as a political
leader has varied so, but it might be possible to find a clue in the
anxiety of the Maronites from threats to their existence, which are
posed by what they would term "outsiders." The cause of their fears
may be real or imagined.

In the two decades of civil strife (1860–1880) it was the fear
of the Druze, in combination of course with the feudal unrest, which
drove the Maronites to rally around the patriarch. Poor military
leadership and the absence of Druze aggression against the purely Maronite
districts kept the people of those areas rather lukewarm. With the es-
establishment of peace the Maronites depended on the patriarch to maintain
their autonomy and security, but when it became obvious that these would
be maintained and that economic prosperity was possible without the help
of the patriarchate, enthusiasm for that institution as a source of
civil authority waned.

It was the birth of Arab Nationalism during World War I which
checked the anti-clerical movement and united the Maronites behind their
religious head once more. The possibility of a resurgent Moslem movement
under the guise of secular Arab Nationalism was a very real fear in
the minds of the Maronites, and so they naturally gathered together
behind their national symbol, the patriarchate, and went all out to
stem the tide of Arabism by supporting the idea of a French Mandate
for Lebanon and Syria, because they had no resources of their own
with which to maintain an independent or autonomous existence.

When it became obvious that French and Maronite interests were
not so compatible as the Maronites had previously thought, the Patriarch
led the way in affecting a rapprochement with the other inhabitants of
Syria-Lebanon, and when an effective basis for the maintenance of an
independent Lebanon was found by al-Khuri and al-Sulh in 1913, the
Patriarch supported it.

As the French left the country, however, the old fears of the
Maronites began to reassert themselves, and when civil war broke out
in 1958, these fears came to dominate the response of the majority of
the Maronites.

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In early 1945 when the French had almost completed their with-
drawal from Lebanon, there appeared in Beirut an anonymous pamphlet
titled "Lebanon, the Christian National Issue", in both English and
Arabic versions. Written in the form of an open letter to the United
Nations Organisation, it fairly represents the extreme Maronite position,
by whose adherents it was obviously composed. It states in part: "For
the Muslims, 'Nation' means Mohammedianism and the supremacy of one re-
ligion. For the Christians, 'Nation' means equality of all citizens
bound together by the same patriotic feeling and free in the inapproachable
fortress of their conscience." (p. 37). In 1951 a Muslim pamphlet was
also published anonymously in English, Entitled "Moests Lebanon
Today", it lists first among its several conclusions, "The Maronite sect
of Lebanon and some of the other Christian groups in our country do not
feel or sympathise with the Arab national spirit, but on the contrary,
are prepared to fight it in every possible way and to impose by force
their Christian civilisation on all of the Lebanon and to violently
separate Lebanon from the rest of the Arab World. ... This threat
should be a warning to us to organise ourselves for resistance, using
every legal means at our disposal; otherwise we will face the same fate
as the Arabs of Palestine." (p. 15).
If our theory, that the patriarchate is the visible symbol around which the Maronites rally whenever they feel their existence as a separate entity jeopardized by outsiders, is correct, then we should certainly expect to find the Patriarch and all the Maronites standing together against the Pan-Arabs. As we saw in Chapter V, this was not the case; the large majority of the Maronites supported President Chamoun, while the Patriarch threw his support to the Pan-Arab dominated opposition.

The answer to this apparent dilemma is to be found in the belief of the Patriarch that the real issues in the conflict were primarily personal and not sectarian and that the President, on behalf of his own interests, was using the sectarian argument to drum up some much-needed support among his co-religionaries. Six years earlier, Chamoun had described himself as an Arab Nationalist, but in 1958 he was the defender of "Christian Lebanon." His arguments were highly successful, particularly among the Maronite masses, both lay and clerical. "Most of the lower clergy and several of the bishops deserted the Patriarch and refused to obey his commands. In some instances—it is reported—priests exhorted their flock to support Shammun during Mass."

In addition, the Patriarch and other Maronite leaders seem to have felt not only that the opposition did not present an immediate threat to the independence of Lebanon and the Maronite community, but also that the time had come when the Maronites had to give up their minority mentality, and that Lebanon's existence as an independent

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3 Lebasin, op. cit., p. 83. See also p. 42.
state depended upon her active cooperation with all of the Arabic-speaking people, and upon identifying herself with them and with their welfare.\textsuperscript{1} Admittedly, this argument ignores the fact that there was personal ill-feeling between Chamoun and the Patriarch and between the President and other Maronite leaders in the opposition, but in the case of the Patriarch it would be ridiculous to believe that he would permit these personal feelings to completely outweigh his traditional responsibility of protecting his flock against outside threats.

On the other hand, there are a great many Maronites who believe that the Patriarch really did sell them out, and it may be difficult or even impossible for him or his successors to ever again attain the political significance of a Nas'ad or a Hlawyik. The fact that the present Patriarch was not elected by the bishops but was appointed by the Pope is an additional factor working against him. Nevertheless, the potential power is there, dormant though it may now be, and so long as the Maronites consider themselves as something more than a religious group, it is highly possible that a Patriarch who envisions a threat, real or imagined, to the Maronite entity, might be able to lead the sect against that enemy.

The only way by which the Maronites or any other minority in the Arab World\textsuperscript{2} will ever feel completely secure is for them to become completely identified with the majority. This, however, is a two-way proposition, and initiative must come from both sides simultaneously;

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 61.

\textsuperscript{2}By minority here means any group of people which differs from the Sunni-Arab majority in (1) religion, which includes non-Muslims as well as heterodox Moslems, (2) ethnic origin, as the Sunni Moslems Kurds, Turkomans, Circassians, and Berbers, or (3) both of the above, such as the Armenians.
not only must the minorities accept the fact that Arab Nationalism is not a Moslem movement in disguise, but the Sunni-Moslem Arab must show the minorities that he is not bent on Moslem dominance. Words are not enough; action in accordance with the letter and spirit of the secular principles of Arab Nationalism is necessary. The minority attitude of the Maronites, as well as that of other groups, is based on centuries of exposure to a "majority attitude" manifested by the Sunni Moslems.

To expect either of these traditional attitudes to disappear overnight is wishful thinking, but the task could in time be accomplished; however, it will require much good will on the part of all sects, levels, and classes. The role of the Patriarch who has the long-range interests of his sect at heart will be to do everything in his power to inject this spirit into his flock. This role will be difficult, painful, and perhaps even thankless, but it must be undertaken.
Republic of Lebanon

Showing the geographical sub-regions most frequently mentioned in the text.
Dotted line indicates approximate boundary of the mutasarrifiyah
APPENDIX I (A)

LETTER OF ST. LOUIS IX "TO THE PRINCE OF THE MARONITES, TO SIMON PATRIARCH, THEIR BISHOPS AND THE NATION"¹

Our hearts were filled with gladness when we saw your son, Simon, leading 25,000 men, coming to meet us in your name, bringing us the expression of your feelings and offering gifts besides the fine horses which you have sent us. Indeed the friendship that we began to feel with so much auctor toward the Maronites during our sojourn in Cyprus, where they are established, has grown more and more. We are convinced that this Nation which we find organized under the name of St. Maron, is a part of the French Nation. Your friendship to the French people is like the friendship which the French have for one another. Therefore it is proper that you also enjoy the same protection that the French themselves enjoy on our part, and that you may be admitted to the same positions, to which they are entitled. We entreat you illustrious Prince, to work with them for the happiness of the inhabitants of Mt. Lebanon. Select with care those of your Nation who are worthy, and raise them to the rank of nobility, as is the custom in France. Even now, Lord Patriarch, Lords Bishops, all the clergy, all the Maronite people, and you, noble Prince, we realise with great contentment your firm attachment to the Catholic religion and your respect for the head of the Church, the successor of St. Peter in Rome. We urge you to keep this respect and cling persistently to your faith.

¹Sfeir, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

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For us and all those who will succeed to the throne of France, we promise to extend upon you and your people our protection as upon the French themselves. We will perform all that is requested for your happiness.

Given at St. John of Acre, May 21, 1250, the 25th year of our reign.
APPENDIX I (B)

LETTER OF PROTECTION GRANTED TO THE MOST REVISED PATRIARCH OF ANTIOCH, AND TO THE MARONITE NATION, BY THE EMPEROR AND MOST CHRISTIAN KING, LOUIS XVI, 12TH APRIL 1737

Louis, by the grace of God, Emperor, and Most Christian King of France and Savarre, to all who shall read these presents — salutation. The Patriarch of Antioch, and the Maronite Christians as established in Mount Lebanon, have represented to us, that for an indefinite period, they have been under the protection of the Emperors and Kings of France, our glorious predecessors, of which they have experienced the beneficial effects on various occasions; and they have most humbly petitioned us to be pleased to grant these our letters of protection and safeguard, after the example of the late King, our most honored King and great-grandfather who granted them the like, on the twenty-eighth of April, 1689. And inasmuch as we are desirous on our parts to treat favourably the petitioners, for these causes and other considerations to the same purpose; we declare that we have taken and placed them, as by these presents, signed by our hand, we take and place them under our protection and safeguard. We desire that they may feel the effects thereof, under all circumstances; and to this end, we command our faithful and well-beloved Counsellors in our Councils, our Ambassadors at Constantinople, Consuls and Vice-Counseuls of the French nation, established in the ports and roadsteads of the


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Levant, present and to come, to favour with their care, offices, and protection, the said Sieur Patriarch of Antioch, and all the said Maronite Christians of Lebanon, whenever need may be, to the end that they may experience no ill treatment, and that they may, on the contrary, continue freely their spiritual exercises and functions; for such is our good will and pleasure. Pray and request the Great Emperor of the Masselmen, our most dear and perfect friend, and the illustrious Pashas, and other officers of His Highness, to favour and assist with their protection the said Patriarch of Antioch, and all the said Maronite Christians, offering to do for all those who shall be recommended to us, on their parts. In witness of which we have placed our seal to these presents. Given in our Imperial Château of Versailles, the twelfth day of April, in the year of grace, one thousand seven hundred and thirty-seven, and of our reign the twenty-second.

(Signed) Louis
APPENDIX II

DEMANDS OF THE PEASANTS OF KISHAWAH AGAINST THEIR FEUDAL SHAIKHS

Statement of the items requested by which peace may be secured for us and for Their Excellencies the Shaikhs.

First: that the collection of the [dirhams] tax money be in accordance with principles, and likewise the head tax, falling on the great and small according to the register instituted by His Grace Shakib Pasha, so that even the Shaikhs shall be obliged to pay what is apportioned to them in the collective and head taxes, without the people having to bear an excessive head tax.

Second: Whereas oppressions, wrongdoings, exaction of extras from travelers and servants, and the money transfers (Hamalat) taken from the people by the dissimulations of Their Excellencies the Shaikhs, are contrary to the laws of the Sublime State and the benevolent decrees, when these deeds are ascertained by whatever body is designated, whether the present judicial council or another, the doer of these offenses and of violations of the law, after confirmation, must return and repay what he has taken in its entirety.

Third: the presents and marriage taxes currently paid to Their Excellencies the Shaikhs in certain places, or the presents to the Shaikhs attached to the sale of their goods to the people, must be discontinued and removed in their entirety.

Fourth: As for the question of the office of ma'aur, which is of the greatest importance, having to do with governing the people and

removing grievances and violations, the ma'mur must govern in accordance with justice and law so that there shall be no further disputes between us and Their Excellencies the Shaikhs. Whoever is appointed to deal with our affairs, we pray that he will be deserving of this position and worthy of it, and possessing all the conditions suited to the authority and activities of ma'murs. Similarly it is incumbent on all the people to render their due obedience and consideration to the ma'mur, he being distinct from the mass of the people, and there must be great efforts made to keep his commands. For every village one or two representatives (wakils) should be instituted, according to the large or small size of the village, so as to achieve peace and facilitate the ma'mur's orders and to facilitate his work and interests without hindrance.

Fifth: Whereas the Sublime State—may the Lord of Creation preserve it!—has granted us universal equality and complete freedom, so that there should be no distinctions or degradations in addressing persons, and so that all the old principles should be changed in regard to the registers, and whereas new taxes have been levied on all, we pray that all this may be kept in mind by Your Beatitude.

Sixth: The submission of the question of ma'murs in Kismayn to the decision of Your Beatitude is done on condition that the authority of the ma'mur be effective on everyone without exception in accordance with the reform measures taken, so that from now on no one will be set apart and distinguished from the general public except for the ma'mur himself. As for those remaining of their Excellencies the Shaikhs, if any offenses on their part occur against the people, they shall be punished in accordance with the laws upon confirmation by the council, as it shall be done also to offenders from among the people.
APPENDIX III

EXCERPTS FROM LETTERS RELATING TO THE KISRAWAN REBELLION

A. From certain villages to Patriarch Bulus Mas'ad, December 17, 1859

Since Your Beatitude is considered to be a spiritual father to us, we present to Your Beatitude this petition, which we beg you to examine with a generous eye, with an explanation of the headings listed above, so that by force of your superior wisdom you will be obliged in conscience to secure the return of our rights to us, not only for the present but for always. Since your children who are presenting this are unable to secure for themselves the foregoing and Your Beatitude will feel obliged to inquire about that, we therefore repeat our plea, knocking at the gates of your paternal justice and compassion, saying: look at our weakness and save us from our oppressor. As for the question of the office of māzur, this we entrust to the command and the wish of Your Beatitude. Whomsoever you consider suitable to deal with our situation and able to restore the general peace, we shall recognize his orders.

B. To the Patriarch Mas'ad from Your children, the people of the villages of Kisrawan, January 3, 1859

It is not hidden from Your Beatitude at this time that there prevails a great uneasiness over the presence of the Shaikhs in the seat of the Maronite faith, on the part of the people. We beg Your Beatitude

1Eorr, op.cit., pp. 96-97.
2Ibid., p. 101.
most earnestly to remove them from the said place, for the chief reason [for the trouble] is their presence there, as is known. It is not possible to put off and delay the people except by [the Shaikh's] removal, by bringing a large land of men. In any case, Your Beatitude does not wish this cause [of trouble], so far be it from your wishes that it should happen.

C. To Patriarch Nas'ad from Your servants, the people of the villages, March 1899

News has reached us that you convened some of the wakils and talked to them concerning three matters, one for each district (‘ubda). Formerly they used to receive their authority from the government, since they were government officials. It is not as we who sanction their authority, and we shall not make any written acknowledgment of their authority over us. We beg Your Beatitude, inasmuch as you are seeking [their appointment, to wait till] after they go with us before the court of Justice, and in accordance with its decision, we shall accept whatever you command. For if they do go to Beirut [to the court] it will only be by your issuing an order to them. It is not expected that you will destroy the rights of your poor children. We wish you had proceeded with this action, before impositions and losses befell us, by doing what would have been more suitable. For now some of them have returned to their places and are full of insults and derision. From the beginning, had we employed their methods, we would have secured peace rather than respecting Your Beatitude, your prosperous council (Mawar), and the commands of His Grace [the Wā‘ím Maqās], may God support him. For it appears that our

\[^{1}\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 107-108.}\]
obedience to him [the Wa'ia Maqam] has led to the destruction of our houses, as signs indicate to our people. We have presented to Your Beatitude and to the Government a general wakil who will represent what we request from the Hashim family and will consult us on anything new that arises. When we heard this news we went to him because he was sick, and these things were unknown to him. Because of this reply of his we have dared to submit this petition. And if your reply is issued to our general wakil in Kaifun [Tayyab Shahin] we shall do what you command. With all deference and respect we again kiss your feet. May God prolong your life forever.
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