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THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

BY

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ABSTRACT

The Republic of Armenia attempts to portray the achievements of the Armenian nation during 1918-1921, and, as much as the available documents and source material permit, to relate the history of the struggles, armed or otherwise, between the Armenian people on one side and the Georgians, the Azerbaijanis, the Turks (Ottoman and Nationalist), and the Soviets on the other.

The Republic of Armenia deals with one of the most crucial periods of the modern Armenian history and endeavours to single out and describe the forces which overwhelmed Armenia. The two-and-a-half years' struggles are proof of the potential national strength of Armenia. They likewise emphasize the futility of Armenian hopes for Western support, and the uprising of new forces which would ultimately rule the Middle East. Moreover, they provide a scale upon which the efficiency of Western diplomacy may be measured.

The account is given in four chapters. Chapter One of this study deals with the story of Transcaucasian racial, national and political frictions, which caused the fall of the Transcaucasian Federal Democratic Republic, and, perforce, led Armenia to declare her independence on May 28, 1918. The chapter also deals with the unique experiment of uniting Eastern and Western Armenia at a time when one half of Armenia proper was under Turkish occupation.

Chapter Two relates the story of the Armeno-Georgian and Armeno-Azerbaijani contentions, and endeavours to point out the forces, secret

at the time, which fostered the Nationalist and Soviet menace to the independence of Armenia. Though mainly covering the military and diplomatic struggle among the three major Caucasian countries, the chapter deals also with the fleeting possibility of an American Mandate for Armenia to safeguard Armenian territory and independence.

Chapter Three focusses upon the most chaotic period in the history of the Armenian Republic. Nationalist Turkey and Azerbaijan on one side, and Soviet Russia on the other, sought to use Armenia for the realization of their schemes. After a brief Turco-Soviet-Azerbaijani honeymoon, clashes marked the implementation of rival plans. The Turco-Armenian War revealed the Turco-Soviet combinations which strangled the delicate entity which was the Armenian Republic. The sovietization of Azerbaijan made Nationalist Turkish victory and the sovietization of Armenia inevitable. The chapter concludes with the account of events which led the Republic to November 29, 1920 and December 2/3, 1920, the sovietization of Armenia and the signing of the Treaty of Alexandropol.

The last chapter is an account of Military Communism at work in Armenia, of the unfounded hopes of the Armenian people, the February 18th anti-Soviet Dashnakist rising, and the final defeat of Armenian nationalism on April 2, 1921.

To provide additional scholarly underpinning to The Republic of Armenia, a compilation and translation of documents is attached. Most of the material consulted was in Armenian, or in languages other than in English, hence the preparation of this section was a necessity for the better understanding and evaluation of the events to which the documents pertain.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	vii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER	
I. ALONG THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE.....	8
II. THE TRANSCAUCASIAN CAULDRON.....	34
III. REVIVAL FRUSTRATED.....	50
IV. SOVIETIZATION AND RESISTANCE.....	73
CONCLUSION.....	89
APPENDICES.....	100
MAPS.....	139
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	143

INTRODUCTION

The years 1918 to 1921 mark the most controversial period of Armenian social, economic and political history, notable for harsh reality, bloodstained background and a hard-fought struggle to save the remnants of the race, and inspired with the hope for self-determination and liberation of the Armenian nation. The period stands in sharp contrast to both the preceding and the following years.

To contend that Armenian nationalism was the product of the late nineteenth century and acquired form and content only at the turn of the present times is utterly wrong. Most peoples of the Middle East, and with them those of the Caucasus, had, as a result of the impact of the West, started a process of national identification in the late nineteenth century. But the Armenians had long since felt the stirrings of nationalism. From the day of the fall of Cilicia this held true. Needless to say that the Armenian nation survived all kinds of calamities and mishaps, in spite of the coarse conditions they were subjected to, just because of their self-consciousness, which, in the span of years, rendered them a different and compact social entity wherever they lived.

Armenian nationalism, of which the Republic of Armenia was a projection, never ceased to exist. It was found in Armenian history under different predications and displayed itself in sundry forms in separate Armenian communities in the Armenian diaspora.

From the fall of Armenian Cilicia to the Ottoman Turks in 1375 (Armenia proper had fallen a prey to the Seljuk Turks by 1080) Armenians

endeavoured to keep their national entity intact in the most atrocious circumstances. They lost materially and numerically, but they stuck tenaciously to their national church, to their own land whenever it was possible, to their folkways, and to their language. The Armenians became a unique people not because the difference between them and others was great but because their will to survive and their obstinacy to cling to their language, national church, and land were great. Wherever they went they carried with them their schools, their church and their Ararat, the symbol of the Armenian nation and history.

They gave life to their country, as opposed to other peoples who acquire life from their fatherland. Though some Armenians wavered and hesitated to make a choice between East and West, nevertheless, when the great day of self-determination arrived, they rallied around the flag of the fatherland and rushed home to give their share of effort to its construction.

The 1918-1921 period bears witness to this fact, and this work is concerned with that testimony. On the other hand, the study of the two years of Armenian independence reveals the following facts:

1. The Armenian people has endured all kinds of difficulties with the hope of facing the day of freedom and liberation. This hope has taken form and content under the names of various political factions each of which has endeavoured to attain the selfsame goal through a different channel. It is an undeniable fact that all Armenian factions have aspired for independence of the country and have not bargained the price. Even those who have taken a different stand and have opposed the established government in Armenia cannot be excluded from this generalization.

It is true that the first opponents of the Armenian State within the country were the Armenian Bolsheviks, but the majority of them either did not comprehend the soul and spirit of the Bolshevism of the early 1920's, and were unmoved by the world-wide schemes of this ideology. Those Bolsheviks, who grasped power in Armenia in December of 1920, were devoid of idealism, and, what was of greater importance to contemporary Armenian history, they were incompetent. The February revolt of 1921 can be explained only by this fact.

The fact that Armenia was bolshevized does not prove that Armenians were Bolsheviks. Bolshevism had no ground in the Armenia of the early twenties by the simple reason that the country lacked a well defined class of industrial labourers. Armenia was an agrarian country.

The Bolshevik conquest of Armenia was carried out with the help of the Eleventh Red Army.

2. To contend that the Armenian governments which succeeded each other were never stable because of the incompetence of the party which backed them is to be very harsh. It is questionable whether any government or party would do better under the conditions which prevailed. The situation which was created after the Russian Revolution produced such far reaching ramifications that the civil polity in the Caucasus was shattered. Not only were nationalities separated but racial and religious differences came to the fore. Political parties, which had more or less been the nominal leaders and had motivated the administrative and social life in the Caucasus, were all confronted with the same fact. More than once, they faced each other and aspired to take the lead. Mensheviks,

Musavatists and Dashnakists, the three major political groupings, followed their own national and racial tendencies. The struggle was concerned with who should be the leader in the Caucasus, rather than anything else.

After the fall of the Transcaucasian Republic the different nationalities rose against each other. The same old tensions and aspirations now presented themselves in various forms. If the three major nations had been left to themselves, most probably they would be able to reach to an acceptable understanding among themselves. But foreign interference shattered all hopes of neighbourly relations. The Republic of Transcaucasia was crushed under Turkish pressure. The three independent republics were no match for the military force and diplomacy of the contending Powers of the First World War. Georgia was backed by Germany. Azerbaijan by Turkey, and Armenia by the British. Later on, when all three of them fell between the narrowing pincers of the Soviets and Kemalists, it was once more proved that their independent existence had no basis as long as the Western Powers waged a diplomatic war on the Soviets and the Kemalists.

Moreover, the Soviet and Kemalist rapprochement, which was the outcome of the European diplomatic and military stand, denied to the Transcaucasian peoples any opportunity for independent status. If Russia and Turkey would fight the West, they had to join hands; that joining could happen only in the Caucasus. Bolshevik Russia's desires to expell the British, plus the Turkish scheme to open the way to the East and to the heart of Asia (with the prospect of establishing a Pan-Turanian Empire extending from the Mediterranean to the Altai Mountains) leave

no room to contend that Transcaucasia could ever find peace and tranquillity.

Any independent government in the Caucasus would be unstable and incapable of withstanding tendencies and Soviet and Kemalist policies. This grave limitation was imposed upon every political party in Armenia.

3. Though economically bound to each other, the three republics of Transcaucasia were geographically divided. This was the sole reason why diversity in outlook existed among them. Baku, Tiflis and Erivan had developed different trends of national psychology, which brought the three major ethnic groupings in the Caucasus to different political orientations. Hence the basis of the struggle was: would Armenia, accused of every kind of transgression, be able to achieve self-determination at a time when all her neighbours endeavoured to expropriate at her expense? The Armenian story between the years 1918 and 1921 is one of efforts to provide self-protection rather than a record of Armenian imperialism. Armenians had long since foregone imperialistic designs — their long past was a struggle to retain a national identity, not to aggrandise. Their only real empire had been that of Tigranes the Second, of the pre-Christian era.

Each republic had a right to existence, but Armenia, utterly blackaded and without an outlet to the sea, was in the most desperate situation. The only possible way was through Georgia, the only other Christian republic in the Caucasus. But Georgia closed the way. Surrounded by her volcanic mountains, Armenia was near strangulation. She had been robbed of her best wheat-producing lands: Turkey had taken

almost all the Kars region, the granary of Armenia; Georgia was fighting for Lori and Borchalo, and Azerbaijan for Zangezur and Karabagh. To cede to Georgia and Azerbaijan what they contested as theirs would result in the starvation of Armenia. Could a starving people form a polity? In the early days of Bolshevik rule in Armenia, when the Revolutionary Committee, the Revkom, disregarded this situation, they were ousted from the country. The stability of Armenia of necessity required a sound economic basis and this was bound up with the general economic stability of the Caucasus. As long as the other two republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan were politically at variance with Armenia, the latter would be manaced by starvation, which in its turn would endanger the stability of any government in Erivan.

4. Ethnically the Caucasus presented a mosaic of races. The Tartars, the kinsmen of the Turks, were littered all over Armenia. Georgia, on the other hand, had a considerable minority of Armenians. Baku was more Armenian than Azerbaijani. This intermingling of races created the worst of situations which would definitely effect the course of events in case misunderstandings arose. And misunderstandings did arise.

It is impossible to grasp the meaning of events in Transcaucasia without considering the ethnological question. No internal peace in any of the three republics would be possible unless the race question was solved. Feuds were bitter and widespread; racial antagonism prevailed everywhere. Moreover, external interference in the name of protection of minorities did the rest. Massacres were commonplace. It was a question of the survival of the fittest.

Racial and ethnological animosity was in some cases exacerbated by religious differences. Armenia was the seat of two major religions; Christianity and Mohammedanism were equally strong in the country; and there came times when the Pan-Turanism, and, later, the Pan-Turkism of the Turks, Ittihadist or not, displayed themselves disguised in religious garments. The Tartars in Armenia, the Azerbaijanis, the Ajarians, and the Turks all had the same purpose; they worked to establish a Turanian Moslem State.

Could Armenia, republican or otherwise, remain unmolested to grow and prosper unless backed by a second Power? The answer is in the negative. Though the word genocide was unknown to the Turks, Tartars and Azerbaijanis, they effected genocide on the Armenian race. The years 1915 to 1921 bear witness to this fact.

This study cannot provide in detail an account of the period 1915-1921. Rather it attempts to tell the story of the years 1918 to 1921 in the light of the above mentioned facts. If I have been able to shed some new light on this most complicated problem, I will be satisfied.

CHAPTER I

ALONG THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

1.

It seems unlikely that anyone in the Transcaucasia of 1917 could have visualized the possibilities of a collapse of the Tzarist Government in St. Petersburg and a resulting fragmentation of the vast Russian Empire of Nicolas II. Transcaucasia was a well-integrated portion of that empire which entered the First World War with loyalty and determination. But the abdication of the Tzar, under pressures too well-known to bear repeating here, brought every kind of social and political discontent into play. The result was an inferno of anarchy no less violent than that which burned in the Russian heartland.

Transcaucasia on the whole responded to the new political appeals; an important page of its political history was turned. The Grand Duke Nicholaevich erred in his contention that Transcaucasia would not fall prey to disruptive forces. Bolshevik propaganda shattered the old solidarity and morale of the army, and by January, 1917, as Kerenski put it, "more than a million deserters were roaming about in the rear of the army (and by) the first weeks of the March revolution the Russian army ceased to exist as a fighting force."¹ Thus the Transcaucasian viceroyalty, with the rest of the Tzarist Empire, ceased to exist.

¹Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs (London, 1930), Vol. I, p. 15.

The Provisional Government of Kerenski decreed the formation of a Special Transcaucasian Committee, the Ozakom, and endowed it with the equivalent of viceregal powers. General Yudenich was entrusted with the military functions of the Grand Duke. The Ozakom was a "collective vicaroy", the only difference being that the Grand Duke had ruled Transcaucasia with an iron fist, while the Ozakom lacked both the power and prestige to bring about a peaceful transformation. Hence Transcaucasia witnessed the growth of sundry organizations, political parties, committees and social groupings, each with aims in conflict with the others. Collisions, turbulence and violence ensued. Old and new feuds brought the country headlong into chaos.² The three major ethnic groupings of Transcaucasia, Georgians, Azerbaijanis, and Armenians, each almost unconsciously developed the will to national self-determination in spite of the fact that none of them revealed separatist tendencies in the early days of the Ozakom period. They all supported the program of all-Russian interests and regarded Transcaucasia as an indivisible part of the Revolutionary Russia, because it was agreed that political immaturity was a bar to separatism.

Those who asserted that the major national groupings of Transcaucasia were sincere in relations with each other and were bound to walk hand in hand were engaged in self-deception. Each one had its own aspirations. What concerned the Armenians most was their national existence which it was felt could only be guaranteed by the solidarity

²Jean Loris-Melicof, La Revolution russe et les nouvelles republics transcaucasiennes: bolshevisme et antibolshevisme (Paris, 1920), pp. 102-103.

of the Russian Republic. No Armenian political faction ventured to think of an independent Armenian State. Located between Turkey and Russia, Armenia was to be dominated by one or the other. A long history of Turkish misrule and atrocities naturally caused the Armenians to prefer the Russians over the Turks under whatever guise the latter presented themselves. Moreover, the Armenians had a number of reasons for trusting the Russians, because on April 26, 1917, the Provisional Government had already given out its statement of policy concerning the fate of Turkish Armenia. Those Armenians who had survived the massacres of 1915 had returned their homes with the advancing Russian armies. "The Armenians were, as a result of this stipulation," concludes Richard Pipes, "completely depended upon Russia and favourably inclined to any Russian government, as long as it was anti-Turkish."⁵ So long as the political situation in St. Petersburg remained stable, Armenians felt themselves secure enough against encroachments, Turkish or otherwise. But it was apparent by September, 1917, that the Provisional Government of Kerenski was not only powerless to meet the needs of the political moment and was on the verge of collapse.

The contention for power in St. Petersburg took some time and it was only on November 8, 1917, that telegrams to the front announced the fall of the Provisional Government and of the seizure of power by the Bolsheviki. "The civil war is beginning, comrades," stated Martov, a Russian Menshevik, in the Second-all-Russian Congress opened on the

⁵Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (Cambridge, 1954), p. 101.

very day of Kerenski's fall. "The first question must be the peaceful settlement of the crisis."⁴

Whatever impact the October Revolution had elsewhere, its results were incomprehensible to the Transcaucasians. To halt the disintegration of the all-Russian army was out of question. Although the Regional Council of the Caucasian army urged the forces to keep order and discipline in the country,⁵ and the Committee of the Caucasian Front took over itself the duty of representing the legal Government of Kerenski, it was too late. A few days later the Transcaucasian Commissariat (Zakavkazskii Komissariat) was organized. It was composed of the leaders of almost all the political parties, with Gegechkori, the Georgian Menshevik, as its president. It proclaimed that the principal of "self-determination of nationalities as proclaimed by the Russian Revolution" would be adhered to, that it would exercise authority pending the convention of the Constituent Assembly in St. Petersburg, that general elections for the Legislative would be held, and that an immediate peace would be signed with Turkey.⁶ But whatever the platform, the Commissariat was not fit to govern a region in which the three major Transcaucasian parties, the Georgian Mensheviks, the Azerbaijani Musavatists, and the Armenian Dashnakists, controlled the real power. Any political success depended upon their cooperation.

The first real work the Commissariat did was to form a delegation to talk peace terms with Turkey. The Turks had started moving into the

⁴A. Moorehead, The Russian Revolution (New York, 1958), p. 250.

⁵Alexander Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian Dzagounn ou Zargatounn (Athens, 1930), p. 16. Hereafter to be cited as Haiastani Hanrapetoutian.

⁶Ibid., p. 18.

heart of Transcaucasia on the heels of the Russian deserters. The armistice talks commenced in Erzincan and ended by the signing of an armistice on December 18, by which stipulation all military activities on the Caucasian Front ceased. Of the huge Russian army there remained virtually nothing, and the protection of the new frontier between Turkey and Transcaucasia was left to the small number of the Armenian forces.⁷

But to their great distress, a few days later the Transcaucasians found that the armistice had been violated. Turkish armies were marching into the country. The Turkish attack was followed by an invitation to begin talks and establish an equitable peace between Turkey and Transcaucasia. The Commissariat, not desirous to conclude a separate peace with Turkey, answered that though it desired peace but it had to concert political movements with the other autonomous all-Russian republics. Moreover, it stated, a definite answer bearing on the question would be given only after three weeks.

The several autonomous republics were consulted but no meaningful answers were received. The Commissariat was compelled to face Turkish demands alone and unsupported, at a time when the Turkish offensive had intensified and the Brest-Litovsk negotiations had failed. Hence it decided to have recourse to higher authority.

It was thus, then, that the Seim, the Transcaucasian Parliament, came into existence. Even the process of formation of this new body demonstrated its fatal weakness. The number of Transcaucasian members

⁷For a complete picture of the Armenian forces at this period see General G. Korganoff, La Participation des Armeniennes a la Guerre Mondiale sur le front du Caucase, 1914-1918 (Paris, 1927), pp. 86-88.

for the previous all-Russian Constituent Assembly⁸ was simply trippled to save time and energy in elections.⁹ The new organ was composed of Mensheviks, Musavatists, Dashnakists, Cadets, Social Revolutionaries, Social Federalists, Ittihadists, National Democrats, and a number of other political groupings. The only grouping which opposed it were the Bolsheviki.¹⁰

The first task the new Legislative gave to itself was the dissolution of committees, councils, assemblies, and societies in the country so as to centralize all power in its hands. Then it organized a Special Committee to study the legality, the possibilities and the bases by which an equitable peace with Turkey could be concluded. On March 1 the Committee drew up its conclusions in the following form:

"1. In the existing conditions the Transcaucasian Seim is competent to make peace with Turkey.

"2. Commencing peace negotiations, the Transcaucasian Seim intends to make a final peace with Turkey.

"3. The peace treaty with Turkey must be based on the restoration of the frontiers which existed between Russia and Turkey in 1914, at the proclamation of the war.

"4. The Transcaucasian Delegation must strive to secure the right of self-determination for Eastern Anatolia and, in particular, to secure

⁸The Constituent Assembly was dispersed by the Bolsheviki on November 8, 1917.

⁹Hovhannes Kachaznuni, Dashnaktsoutiouni Anelik Chouni Ailievos (Vienna, 1923), p. 22. For the numerical representation of each faction consult Simon Vratzian, Haiastrani Hanrapetoutiouni (2nd. rev., Beirut, 1958), p. 78. Hereafter to be cited as Haiastrani.

¹⁰H.M. Mchibekian and A.M. Hakobian, Ourvakedzer Haiastrani Patmoutian (Yrivan, 1954), Vol. I, p. 22.

the autonomy of Turkish Armenia within the framework of the Turkish State."¹¹

On the very day a peace delegation was formed under the presidency of Akaki Chkhenkeli, the Georgian Menshevik. On the next day, March 2, when the delegation would proceed to Trebizond where the peace negotiations would take place, a telegram from Karakhan, a member of the Russian delegation at Brest-Litovsk, arrived in Tiflis to the effect that Bolsheviks would sign the armistice with the Central Powers, and that Kars, Ardahan and Batum were being torn away from Russia under the pretext of self-determination.¹²

It was an unexpected and heavy blow. Two of the three major Transcaucasian peoples were victimized by the treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Georgians were to lose Batum and its region, while the Armenians lost not only the purely Armenian vilayets of Kars and Ardahan but also the most cherished hope of self-determination of the Turkish Armenians.

To oppose the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Seim and the Transcaucasian Commissariat sent a dispatch of protest to the major capitals of the world announcing that the treaty should be considered to be void of any binding force because it was signed without the consent and the participation of the Government of Transcaucasia. The dispatch noted that the Seim had appointed a peace delegation which, according to preliminary talks with Turkey, was to proceed to Trebizond to sign a final peace treaty.¹³

¹¹ Simon Vratzian, Haiastrani, p. 74. See also Kh. Badalian, Germana-Turkakan Ocupantnere Haiastranoun 1918 Tavakanin (Yerivan, 1962), p. 85.

¹² Firuz Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia (Oxford, 1951), p. 91.

¹³ Simon Vratzian, loc. cit., p. 80.

A few days later, when Vehib Pasha requested the Transcaucasian Seim to evacuate the three vilayets, the delegation was ordered to move to rebizond. The peace talks started on March 14 and from the very first moment it was seen that they would lead nowhere: the Turks categorically rejected the idea of an independent Transcaucasia as long as she had not officially proclaimed her independence. Turkey opposed the principle of parity as long as Transcaucasia regarded itself as an inseparable part of the All-Russian Autonomous Republic. This was the position taken by Transcaucasia in the telegram of January 28.

The Seim gave full powers to Chkhenkeli¹⁴ to take all the necessary measures to conclude peace and stop the inhumane activities of the Turkish forces on the Caucasian Front. There the Georgian and the Armenian forces were doing their utmost, to halt Turkish advance into the heart of the country.

The meeting of April 5 proved the futility of the Transcaucasian endeavour for peace. The ultimatum sent by the Turks clearly established that whatever the Transcaucasians refused to give up at the peace conference would be taken by force. The delegation had no other choice but to accept the Turkish requests to which effect the Turks were informed on April 10. Two days later an ultimatum was received by the commander of the Batum fortress demanding that he evacuate and hand the fortifications to the Turks by April 13. This latter ultimatum caused a widespread popular reaction in Transcaucasia. The Seim passed a resolution which stipulated that because the border question between Turkey and

¹⁴ He was also the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Transcaucasia.

Transcaucasia could not be peacefully concluded the peace delegation should return to Tiflis.¹⁵

This was no less than a declaration of war on Turkey.

The "official" war was of a short duration. Batum fell to the Turks only two days later. The Georgians were keen enough to see that it was not the battlefield which would decide the fate of Transcaucasia, but rather diplomacy.¹⁶ The Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, felt themselves not to be included in the question; consequently the task of resisting the Turkish advance in Transcaucasia fell upon the Armenians. To carry out this task the Armenian National Council¹⁷ at Tiflis created a special committee and sent it to the front to confer with the military leaders. While at Sarikamish the committee witnessed the city falling under the direct fire of the Turkish forces. It was soon occupied.¹⁸ The committee moved to Alexandropol where it held a conference to examine the military situation in the light of recent setbacks. While the conference was in session, news arrived from Tiflis that the Musavatists had demanded that the Seim declare the independence of Transcaucasia, accept the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and make peace with Turkey. In case the Seim declined the terms of the Azerbaijani ultimatum, Azerbaijan would feel herself free to declare her own independence and sign a separate peace with Turkey.¹⁹ To avoid any misunderstanding, the committee hurried to

¹⁵Alexander Khatissian, loc. cit., p. 36. See also Simon Vratzian, loc. cit., pp. 99-100.

¹⁶Zurap Avalov, "Batumi Khorherdajeghev," Vem, Vol. II, No. 2 (March-April, 1934), p. 84. See also Firuz Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 102.

¹⁷For the Armenian National Council and its activities see Vahan Papazian, Im Houshere (Beirut, 1952), Vol. II, pp. 438-455.

¹⁸For a detailed story of the fall of Sarikamish see General G. Korganoff, op. cit., pp. 114-121.

¹⁹H. Irazek, Motik Antzialitz; Patmakan Depker ev Aprouner, 1917-1922 (Beirut, 1956), p. 20. Hereafter to be cited as Motik Antzialitz.

Tiflis, where it found the situation worse than could have been foreseen. Georgians were for peace, while the Turks were asking a resumption of the interrupted talks, having already consolidated their hold on territories awarded to them by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

Though the Armenians were hesitant, they had to accept the facts, and at the twenty-second session of the Seim on April 22 they voted for the proclamation of Transcaucasian independence, being well-aware that they "were in need of the Federation of Transcaucasia more than any one else."²⁰

The Seim, now representing a free and independent country, asked Chkhenkeli to form the first Transcaucasian Cabinet. Desirous to stop all armed clashes between Turkey and Transcaucasia, Chkhenkeli ordered the Transcaucasian forces to hand over the Armenian city of Kars to the Turks and suspend all hostilities on the front. On the other hand, he informed Vehib Pasha that Transcaucasia was ready to reopen negotiations for the sake of mutual friendship and understanding between the two countries.²¹

The talks unofficially started on May 6, 1918, in Batum. They only proved that although both sides spoke of Turco-Transcaucasian friendship and goodwill, they were divided upon many issues. On the official opening day of the conference, Khalil Bey, the Head of the Turkish Delegation, put it clearly that the Turks could not accept Brest-Litovsk as a basis for further negotiations, and that if talks were to

²⁰ Hovhannes Kachaznuni, op. cit., p. 28. For the twenty-second session of the Seim consult Simon Vratsian, Haiaatani, p. 105; Alexander Khatissian, Haiaatani Hanrapetoutian, p. 40; Firuz Kazemzadeh, op. cit., p. 105; and Hovhannes Kachaznuni, op. cit., p. 23.

²¹ General G. Kerganoff, op. cit., pp. 138-141.

continue the Transcaucasians had to comply with a Turco-Transcaucasian treaty which Vehib Pasha had with him. Though the Transcaucasian Delegation was adamant, all endeavours were in vain. At last, as Avalov put it later, the delegation agreed to be acquainted with the text of the treaty.²²

The projected Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Ottoman Government and the Confederative Transcaucasian Republic consisted of twelve articles and three appendices. The most important section of the document was undoubtedly that which was related to the Ottoman territorial demands. The districts of Akhaltzikh and Batum (the city was already occupied) were to be taken from Georgia, while Armenia was to be deprived of Alexandropol and most of the neighbouring region, the regions of Echmiadzin, Akhalkalaki, Sharmala, and the Kars-Alexandropol-Julfa railway. To accept the projected treaty meant administering a death-blow to the foundations of the Transcaucasian unity; to oppose it was beyond the power the country could master. The only chance of getting out of the situation lay in asking the Germans to step in and stem the greed of their allies, the Turks. But German mediation was rejected from its very first moment. It was clear that the Turks would not be limited by any compromise conditions. Consequently the Georgians secretly asked for and acquired protection of the Germans. The Azerbaijanis, on the other hand, had nothing to fear from their co-religionist Ottoman Turks, leaving the Armenians as the only people in Transcaucasia who had to confront the marching Turk.

²²Zurap Avalov, op. cit., p. 92.

Meanwhile Armenia was being overrun. Alexandropol had fallen to the Turks and the city was being sacked, while the Armenian inhabitants of the city were butchered to a man. Finding the state of affairs in Armenia utterly helpless, the Armenian National Council at Tiflis asked the Armenian members of the Batum Delegation to ask the German General, Von Lossov, for protection for Armenia. But the Armenians were not given the protection they asked in spite of Von Lossov's promises.

In the face of the Turkish march "to annihilate completely all those hindrances on our way which hamper our national sacrosanct ideals,"²³ as Beha-ed-Din Shakir put it later on May 23, the Armenian general at the front, General Silikian, ordered a general offensive on the Turks. The battle of Sardarapat was thus joined.

The victory on the first day fell to the Armenians. The Turkish forces left the battlefield, but they mustered their shattered forces on the next day and returned to effect a crushing blow on the Armenians. The following few days witnessed the worst atrocities and fighting that the Turco-Armenian war annals have recorded. Fierce Armenian resistance on the Karakilisse, Sardarapat, and Bash Abaran fronts hurled back the Turkish attacks and almost brought about a full-scale slaughter of the Turkish forces.²⁴

²³Alexander Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian, p. 60. See also Zarevand, Miatzial Ankakh Haiastan (n.p., 1928), p. 146.

²⁴Sarkis Atamian, The Armenian Community: The Historical Development of a Social and Ideological Conflict (New York, 1955), p. 206. For an eye-witness account of the May 23-24 contentions see Hovakim Melikian, "Arian Janaparhov," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. III, No. 7 (May, 1925), pp. 71-75; H. Irazek, Motik Antzialitz, pp. 27-33; General G. Korganoff, op. cit., pp. 163-173; and Hay Joghoverdi Patmoution, Vol. X; Sh. Haroutiounian, Hoktemberian Revoloutzian ev Sovetakan Ishkhanoutian Hastatoumn ou Amrapentoume Haiastanoun, 1917-1921 (Erivan, 1960), pp. 27-28.

These Armenian feats could be highly meaningful for the future of Transcaucasia if the Federation could only keep maintain itself. But the deterioration in Tiflis had already started. In the evening of May 26 a telegram from Tiflis informed the Transcaucasian Delegation in Batum of the proclamation of the independence of Georgia. Chkhenkeli was elected the first Minister of Internal Affairs, and Ramishvili the first President.²⁵

On the next day Azerbaijan followed her neighbour and declared the Azerbaijani independence.

Deserted by the Georgians and Azerbaijanis, Armenians were left alone to face the advancing Turks. There was now no hope of succour from any one. The Soviets were busy with civil war and related problems. The Allies were not at hand. Moreover, Colonel Park of the Allies insisted on the necessity of reaching to an agreement with the Turkish authorities to save the remnant of the Armenian people from utter annihilation because the Allies could not help them in the prevailing conditions;²⁶ the Turks, for their part, insisted that negotiations would only be possible after Armenia had achieved political parity with them.²⁷

The question at hand begged for an answer. The meeting of the Armenian National Council on May 28 demonstrated how each person present

²⁵For the last session of the Seim during which the Federation of the Transcaucasian Republic came to an end see Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, pp. 151-152; Alexander Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian, p. 67; Firuz Kazemzadeh, op. cit., pp. 120-121; Hovhannes Kachaznuni, op. cit., p. 30; and Jean Loris-Melicof, op. cit., p. 122.

²⁶Ibid., p. 124.

²⁷A. Babalian, "Echer Haiastani Ankakhoutian Patmoutenen," Hairenik Amagrir, Vol. I, No. 8 (June, 1923), p. 43.

at the conference hall felt about the question. The future of Armenia was of prime importance to all the speakers who insisted on an immediate proclamation of independence. The resolution unanimously passed at the end of the session stated that "by the dissolution of the political unity of Transcaucasia and by the declaration of the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Armenian National Council proclaims itself the supreme and only authority of the Armenian provinces. As a result of various serious reasons, leaving the formation of the Armenian National Government to the near future, the National Council takes charge of all the governmental functions in directing the political and administrative helm of the Armenian provinces."²⁸

Once Armenia was proclaimed to be independent, a delegation was sent to Batum where the first Turco-Armenian talks started on May 30. Vehib Pasha himself drew the boundary between Turkey and Armenia leaving the Armeno-Georgian and the Armeno-Azerbaijani boundaries to be discussed by the parties concerned.

The Turkish plan for Armenia mutilated the country. The Armenian delegates opposed it and requested that Vehib Pasha ask Constantinople for a rectification of boundaries in favour of Armenia. Although the Turks were deeply committed to a Pan-Islamic policy with a concomitant extension of their influence in the Caucasus,²⁹ Vehib Pasha sent word to the Turkish capital. On June 2 the Armenians were informed of "Turkish

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-44. See also Alexander Khatissian, *op. cit.*, p. 68; and Simon Vratzian, *Haiaastani*, p. 153.

²⁹ General Ludendorff, *My War Memoirs* (London, n.d.), Vol. II, p. 620.

generosity³⁰ in the boundary question: Armenia would be given one thousand square kilometers of land more.

Two days later the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Ottoman Imperial Government and the Republic of Armenia (Appendix I) was signed. It comprised of fourteen clauses of which the second delineated Armenia. The new State lost the regions of Kars and Ardahan, the district of Borchale, parts of the districts of Echmiadzin, Sharur and Nakhichevan. The treaty dealt with Turkish military help in case the latter requested it (Article Four); with bandit groups in Armenia (Article Five); with the freedom of Moslem religion in Armenia (Article Six); with ambassadorial representations, trade and railway relations (Articles Seven and Eight); with post and telegraph (Article Nine); with transit and visa questions (Article Ten); with Turkish rights sanctioned by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (Article Twelve), and the evacuation of Baku which was held by the Armenian forces (Article Eleven); with the evacuation of those areas which were not mentioned in the treaty but were occupied by the forces of either side (Article Thirteen); and with the question of ratification of the treaty signed (Article Fourteen).

The Turco-Armenian Treaty of Peace and Friendship had, moreover, three supplements which dealt with various minor questions. Besides the aforesaid treaty another treaty was signed by Turkey, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan which allotted to each her share of the railroad and related property. The Georgians got five hundred versts³⁰ of railway, the Turks

³⁰ A Russian measure of length, 3500 English feet.

and the Azerbaijanis together received seven hundred, while Armenia only thirteen.³¹

The Republic of Armenia now formally recognized by Turkey and its neighbours, was so small that her eleven thousand square kilometers of land were by no means sufficient to meet the needs of her people who were increased by the influx of about eight hundred thousand refugees from Shurmala, Ghamarlu, Kars, Ardahan, Karakilisse, and Turkish Armenia. The districts of Erivan, Echmiadzin and Alexandropol combined had two hundred and thirty thousand Armenians, eighty thousand Moslems of whom five thousand were Kurds, five thousand Lezkis, and six thousand of other nationals. The Armenians of the Republic were only one-ninth of the whole Armenians of the Caucasus.³² They were surrounded by a host of foreign elements, ready to attack them. To the south and west stood the Turks, who, in spite of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, continued to harass the Armenians; the Azerbaijanis on the east were ever-ready to assault and seize the Armenians lands; and to the north were the Georgians, ablaze with their new nationalism and embittered by the thought that the Armenians had been the cause of all their misfortunes.

2.

Once Armenian independence was proclaimed, the National Council moved to Armenia. Its functions began immediately with an increase of the Council's size by tripling the number of representatives of each

³¹Alexander Khatissian, Haiaatani Hanrapetoutian, p. 75.

³²Jean Loris-Melicof, op. cit., p. 125.

political faction in the Council. Representatives from the other peoples living in Armenia were invited to participate. The new Council of Armenia was comprised of forty-two representatives.³³

On August 1, 1918, the first session of the Council of Armenia was officially opened and elections took place. A. Sahakian was elected President of the House, and G. Ter-Khachaterian and D. Zoubian Vice-Presidents. Petros Zakarian was the Chief-Secretary, while Hovhannes Kachaznuni was asked to form the Government.

The first Government of Armenia formed on August 3rd consisted of:

H. Kachaznuni	Prime Minister
A. Manoukian	Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Refugees, Minister of Transportation, and Minister of Education.
Kh. Karjikian	Minister of Finances.
A. Khatissian ³⁴	Minister of Foreign Affairs
General H. Hakverdian	Minister of War ³⁵

To form the first Government of Armenia was no simple task.

³³XX, "Haiastani Hanrapetoutiouni," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. XIX, No. 9 (July, 1941), p. 81. The new organ consisted of eighteen Dashnakists, six Social Democrats, six Social Revolutionaries, six Populists, four Turks, one Russian and one Ezidi. According to Alboyajian the total number was forty-seven. Turks were six, and there were three representatives of no party affiliations. See Arshak Alboyajian, "Ankakh Haiastan," in Teodik, ed., Amenoun Taretzouytze (Constantinople, 1921), Vol. XV, p. 122.

³⁴Khatissian was elected in absentia because he had proceeded to Constantinople to ratify the Turco-Armenian Treaty of Peace and Friendship and seek the evacuation of those regions which were under Turkish occupation in spite of the treaty.

³⁵Gabriel Lazian, Haiastan ev Hai Date: Vaveragrer (Cairo, 1946), p. 297. Hereafter to be cited as Vaveragrer.

All endeavours to form a coalition government failed. All except the Minister of War were Dashnakists. Kachaznuni and his Government acknowledged the fact that Armenia was poverty stricken; that there were no provisions to meet the essential needs of both the civil population and the army; that prices were enormously high and the people lacked all financial means; that all the contacts with the external world were broken and Armenia was utterly isolated; that there were countless refugees who needed immediate succour; that sickness hovered all around and hundreds of people died daily of the lack of medicine; and that the frontiers of the country were insecure.³⁶

The governmental program to meet the needs of the country was the maximum attainable. To achieve it the Government needed the unre-served confidence and the active backing of the Parliament.

A report of the Armenian Government to General Harbord sheds some more light on the state of affairs in Armenia and of the immediate measures the various governments of Armenia took to meet it.³⁷ Though the country needed a complete administrative reorganization, the old system of regional demarcation in the country was kept. Each region was placed under a commissar, the only exception to the rule being that of the region of Kars, which received a commissar-in-chief. Each region was subdivided and these had their sub-commissars. All these

³⁶"Haiastrani Khorherdarani Artzanagroutiounnere," Vem, Vol. II, No. 4 (July-August, 1934), p. 120.

³⁷All the following information on the Administration and the Government of Armenia are drawn from the above-mentioned report. For the complete text see XX, op.cit., pp. 78-83. See also Alexander Khattissian, op.cit., pp. 112-124.

officials were appointed by the Minister of Internal Affairs and were directly responsible to him. The villages elected their commissars.

The relationship between the commissars and the people, and the commissars and the Minister of Internal Affairs, was regulated by the Russian Provisional Law modified to fit the conditions and the needs of Armenia.

The Armenian army was subject to the military laws which were in force in Transcaucasia in the days of the Tsars. The only conspicuous innovation in the army was in the official language it used; in 1920 Armenian was adopted in place of old Russian. The army was mainly composed of Armenians not because the republican governments of Armenia opposed the idea of conscripting non-Armenians, but rather because the latter did not want to be drawn into the army, and, unfortunately, no Armenian government could force them to do so.

The judicial system experienced almost no change: the existing Russian laws remained in force after some minor changes to suit the country, and the Armenian language was introduced into the courts for the first time.

The only innovations in the Government of the Republic of Armenia were the Ministries of Supplies (Economy), of Public Health, and of Foreign Affairs. The first two had not existed in the Russia of the Tsars, and the latter could not possibly have existed in Armenia by the mere fact that the country had always been a part of either Turkey, Persia or Russia.

The Ministry of Education took charge of both Public and National Schools.³⁸ All schools, whether public, private or "national", were nationalized.

The currency in circulation initially in Transcaucasia was the paper-note issued by the Commissariat and the Seim of Transcaucasia. Armenia was obliged to issue her own paper-notes in the spring of 1919, after Georgia and Azerbaijan put their own currency into circulation.

The supreme authority in Armenia was that of the Parliament. The Council of the forty-two continued operating until the April of 1919 at which time the Electoral laws of the Russian Legislative Assembly underwent some changes to meet the local needs of Armenia and new elections were held.

The Armenian Government apparently had all the apparatus of a democratic government and administration, but of prime importance was the fact that she lacked a constitution of her own. It was decided to draft one only after the Armenian Question was finally settled.

Would a country without a constitution survive? No one could foretell.

3.

The Second Turkish Armenian Conference³⁹ in Erivan opened on

³⁸The term National Schools in Armenian history denotes only those schools which are run by the Armenian Apostolic Church and are under its direct control and jurisdiction.

³⁹The first Turkish Armenian Conference was held on May 2-11, 1917.

February 6, 1919, unsanctioned by the Dashnakist Central Committee.⁴⁰ There were fifty-five delegates, all elected by the Armenian refugees from Turkish Armenia. After six days of deliberations the Conference elected an Executive Committee to put into force the resolutions adopted.

The resolution proclaimed the independence of Free and United Armenia and recognized Boghos Nubar Pasha, the Head of the Turkish Armenian Delegation to the Peace Conference of Paris, as the president of the country to be constituted after the Armenian Question was solved. The Conference asked the Executive Committee to take further steps in concord with the Government and the Parliament of the Republic of Armenia⁴¹ to achieve the unification of all Armenian lands, and to officially proclaim the independence of Free and United Armenia. It should participate in the Government of the Republic.⁴² The Dashnakist position was that the existence of the Turkish Armenian Executive Committee in Erivan was an infringement of the sovereignty of the Armenian Government. The Committee, it was stated, created a dual system of administration, at least in principle.⁴³

The crisis between the Government and the Western Armenians lasted until the Dashnakist Central Committee, and subsequently the

⁴⁰The Government in Erivan was ruled by a Dashnakist majority, hence any conference to be held in Armenia had to be sanctioned by the Dashnakists.

⁴¹For the Turkish Armenians no Republic of Armenia existed as long as the Turkish Armenian regions were not included in Armenia, hence the State was called the Republic of Ararat. The writer has used the Republic of Armenia expression all through the thesis.

⁴²For the complete text of the resolution see Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, pp. 257-258.

⁴³Interview with Arsen Kitour, April 21, 1962.

Government, decided to satisfy the Western Armenian demands by accepting Western Armenian delegates into the Council of Armenia. In the meeting of February 25, 1919, the Government agreed to invite twelve Turkish Armenian representatives and charged the Foreign Minister with the task of preparing the necessary documents through which Armenia would be declared united and independent.

On April 27th the Council of Armenia accorded full powers to the Government and dispersed. The Government decided upon the twelve Turkish leaders to be invited to join the Council of Armenia, discussed the last draft of the declaration and called the Council to meet and ratify the document on May 27th.⁴⁴

The declaration (Appendix III) was made on May 28th. "In order to re-establish Armenia in its integrity, and in order to guarantee the people their complete freedom and progress," read the Act in part, the Armenian Government, in accordance with the people's unanimous wish and will, declares as of this date all various parts of Armenia forever united and organized into one independent country."⁴⁵ With this the twelve Turkish Armenian delegates were ushered in and given their seats in the Council of Armenia.

Apparently everything had gone smoothly and the two distinctly separate halves of the Armenian people had solemnly declared their merger into one, so as to achieve the all-national ideal of independence

⁴⁴H. Irazek, Motik Antzialitz, pp. 50-51.

⁴⁵Simon Vratzian, Ankakh ev Miatzial Haiastan (Erivan, 1920), p. 22. Early in December, 1920, the boundaries of that country (Map I) were drawn up by the arbitration of President Wilson, when, in fact, there had almost remained no Armenia.

of all Armenian lands. Yet to hold that the Act of May 28 was accepted by all is to ignore the absurdity of declaring lands under Turkish rule unified with the Republic of Armenia. Boghos Nubar Pasha for one, and the Populists,⁴⁶ opposed this step and rejected the whole affair as an interference with the affairs of the Western Armenians. The declaration of May 28 was described as a coup d'etat.⁴⁷

The story of the period which followed May 28th is that of negotiations and disputes between the delegates of Boghos Nubar Pasha and the Armenian Government.⁴⁸ Although the declaration of the Act had not achieved the desired end, both sides labored at least to reach to an agreement to act as one delegation at the Peace Conference in Paris.

While the two sides were discussing such questions, the Council of Armenia voted a new Electoral Law, designed an Electoral Central Committee, decided on the election days for the First Parliament of Armenia, and transferred its legislative powers to the Government.

The elections were held on June 21, 22, and 23, 1919, and eighty delegates were returned to Parliament. The new Armenian Legislative had seventy-two Dashnakists, four Social Revolutionaries, three Tartars,

⁴⁶The Populists had already opposed the May 28 Declaration and had asked the withdrawal of their representatives from the Council, though these latter did not abide with the party orders.

⁴⁷A. Babalian, "Echer....," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. I, No. 9 (July, 1923), p. 112. See also Hovhannes Kachaznuni, op.cit., p. 36.

⁴⁸For a detailed account of the negotiations see Simon Vratzian, Banaktzoutiounner Azgayin Patvirakoutian ev Haiastani Hanrapetoutian Michev (Boston, 1920).

and one Neutral Peasants' Unionist. This body of eighty was composed of seventy-seven Armenians, two Turks and one Ezidi. Seventy-seven were men and three women; a majority of sixty-seven were Russian Armenians and other Caucasians, while the rest were Turkish Armenians.⁴⁹

Although the elections were attacked and criticized at the time,⁵⁰ the First Parliament of the United and Independent Armenia opened on August 1, 1919. A week later Alexander Khatissian was entrusted the task of forming the first Government, and at the session of August 10, the new all-Dashnakist Government of Khatissian was presented to the Parliament. The Government was composed of:

A. Khatissian	Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
A. Gulkhanderian	Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of Justice
S. Araratian	Minister of Supplies (Economy) and Minister of Finances
A. Sahakian	Minister of Public Health and Minister of Labour
N. Aghbalian	Minister of Education and Fine Arts
Maj.- Gen. K. Araratian	Minister of War ⁵¹

⁴⁹ Arshak Alboyajian, op.cit., pp. 124-125.

⁵⁰ Not only did the anti-Dashnakists criticize the elections, but also Dashnakists. See Hovhannes Kachaznuni, op.cit., p. 36.

⁵¹ For this and the successive governments of Armenia see Gabriel Lazian, Vaveragrer, pp. 297-298.

The governmental declaration made by the Prime Minister revealed Armenia's hopeless situation. Nothing was normal. The country needed an immediate amelioration of its financial plight, promulgation of new laws, free and compulsory education, friendly relations with the neighbouring countries, a solution to the Armenian Question, liberal principles and a complete reform of administration. To increase arable lands meant nationalization of feudal, church and monastic lands. Court and law reforms, a compact and well-equipped army, some military reorganization, repatriation of the Western Armenian refugees, and reconstructing the ruined and devastated country were all necessary.⁵²

Were the Dashnakists equal to these tasks? Exactly ninety percent of the delegates to the Parliament were Dashnakists, and almost all non-Dashnakists were debarred from participating in the Government. There was no opposition in the Parliament, and no question came to it before it was decided upon by the Central Committee of the Dashnakist Party. Kachaznuni is harsh towards his own party when he says that "in fact there was no parliamentary (Dashnakist) faction, because it was subject to the supervision of the Dashnakist Bureau,⁵³ and had to carry its orders. There was no government either, because the Government too was subjected to the Bureau: it was rather a kind of organ of the Bureau in the State. This was the Bolshevick system. But what the Bolsheviks did openly and consistently we attempted to veil with democratic forms."

⁵² Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, pp. 280-282.

⁵³ Hovhannes Kachazmuni, op.cit., p. 38.

Thus the first Government of United and Independent Armenia
had to follow rather than lead, and this was true from the first moment.

CHAPTER II

THE TRANSCAUCASIAN CAULDRON

1.

The collapse of the Central Power's cause in Europe brought in its train the eclipse of the Young Turks in Turkey. October 20, 1918, marked their end.

The Government which succeeded the Young Turks on October 26th signed an immediate treaty with the Armenian Delegation in Constantinople promising the Armenians to evacuate all Armenian lands occupied by the Turkish forces.

The evacuation of the Armenian regions started on November 18th and the British came in "to enforce the terms of the armistice with Turkey, to secure the line of communication between Baku and Batum, to open the oil line between these places, and to maintain law and order in Transcaucasia."¹

To contend that the evacuation of the Armenian regions gave Armenia ample time and possibility to better her lot and flourish in democracy is however to ignore the hard facts. The Armenian regions were utterly devastated, looted and pillaged by the Turkish forces which, while retreating to their boundaries, had taken with them "the waggons,

¹The Times (London), January, 8, 1920, p. 9. Cf. Ibid., January 10, 1919, p. 8.

wheat, cotton, hide, domestic animals, cars, telephonic and telegraphic implements, even the frames of the doors and windows, and had smashed all those which they could not carry away."² Furthermore, Armenia had to fight her way towards self-determination, while challenged by the pretensions of both Georgia and Azerbaijan.

The Armeno-Georgian struggle was of short duration and can hardly be called a war. The roots of friction between Georgia and Armenia took shape early in 1918 when, to stop the Turkish advance towards Tiflis, Georgia had temporarily occupied the Armenian-inhabited section of Borchalo. In June Jordania and Ramishvili solemnly declared that Georgian forces of occupation would evacuate the area as soon as the Turks left the Caucasus.³ But the Georgians established themselves firmly and imposed their administration on the region.⁴ In their endeavour to create a homogeneous national State, the Tiflis Government was not reluctant to resort to arms against all other nationals on the borderland;⁵ the result was the revolt of the Armenian peasants in the Borchalo and Lori districts backed by the Armenian forces of General Dro. The Georgian War Ministry ordered General Goguatze, the Georgian Commander of the armoured column in Sanahin, to command the Armenian forces to withdraw to the other side of the Shahali Station. This action made it clear that the Georgian Government had determined to annex the Armenian districts of Lori and Akhalkalaki relying on the military backing of a

²Arshak Alboyajian, op.cit., p. 119. Cf. The Times (London), January 24, 1919, p. 7.

³Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, p. 206 and p. 210.

⁴Vahan Papazian, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 496.

⁵Richard Pipes, op.cit., p. 212.

third power.⁶ There were statements on the desirability of resolving the border dispute by peaceful agreement, but the contradiction between the deeds and the words of the Georgian Government was transparently clear.⁷ To exert some influence on the Armenian Government, Tiflis dispatched a circular dated October 27 to the governments of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Union of the Mountaineers of the North Caucasus which broached the possibility of holding an all-Caucasian conference in Tiflis on November 10. The circular was more of the character of a circular of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs of Georgia (as Avalov described it later).⁸ Therefore the November 8th session of the Council of Armenia, realizing what Gegechkori and Ramishvili were attempting to accomplish, declined to participate in the conference.⁹

The conference opened on November 14th without the Armenians. Acknowledging the futility of the conference without the Armenians, the Georgians asked the other participants to invite an Armenian Delegation once more. The Azerbaijanis urged the conference to proceed without them. On their part, the Armenians continued to state that they preferred to solve their dispute with Georgia by bilateral negotiations.¹⁰

⁶Jean Loris-Melicof, *op.cit.*, p. 151. See also A. Abeghian, "Verastani Ankakhoutiouné," *Hairenik Amsagir*, Vol. IV, No. 11 (September, 1926), p. 77.

⁷Alexander Khatissian, *Haiastani Hanrapetoutian*, p. 102.

⁸Z. Avalov, "Verastani Ankakhoutiouné," *Hairenik Amsagir*, Vol. XIII, No. 9 (July, 1935), p. 139.

⁹Simon Vratzian, *loc. cit.*, pp. 212-213.

¹⁰Firuz Kazemzadeh, *op.cit.*, p. 175.

The military situation altered on December 4-6, when the Turks decided to evacuate Akhalkalaki. Both the Armenians and the Georgians were informed by the Turks that the territory would be evacuated and asked them to send in troops. But they were given different dates for occupation.¹¹

The Georgians occupied the district on December 4th, while the Armenians were preparing to move in on December 6th. When the latter found that the district was already occupied by the Georgians and that the occupation "could not be a question of contention neither on historical, nor on political and moral grounds,"¹² they submitted an angry protest against this aggression.¹³

The Armeno-Georgian border question was discussed by both the Georgian Parliament and the Council of Armenia. Both held fast to the idea of keeping the district.¹⁴ Military operations commenced on December 13th. Two days later the Armenian Government asked the Georgians to stop all bloodshed and solve the question by a conference after evacuating the occupied areas.¹⁵ The Georgians, on their part, asked the Armenians to meet them in a conference, and, in case the conference failed, to resort to arbitration. Simultaneously, they informed the Allies of the latest developments of the struggle and accused the Armenian Government of declining to bring the question to a conference.¹⁶

¹¹The Times (London), January 24, 1919, p. 7.

¹²Simon Vratzian, loc. cit., p. 216.

¹³Alexander Khatissian, op.cit., p. 102.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 107. See also H. Irazek, Motik Antzialitz, p. 49.

¹⁵Alexander Khatissian, op.cit., p. 108.

¹⁶Firuz Ka zemzadeh, op.cit., p. 179.

Meanwhile the fight continued with the Armenian forces pushing towards Tiflis.¹⁷

In an effort to halt this tragic conflict, Captain Green, a British officer in Karakilisse, offered his mediation to the combatants. The British Mission in Tiflis, on the other hand, asked the Georgians to stop fighting. On December 25th a cease-fire proposal was agreed upon by the British and French representatives,¹⁸ and communicated to Erivan. According to the agreement a mixed commission of Armenians and Georgians, along with French and British officers, would go to the front to supervise the execution of the cease-fire. It would also determine the size of the Georgian and Armenian forces to be left in the north and south of Borchalo respectively. The document read in part that "the Georgian forces will remain at their present line of occupation, while the Armenian forces will withdraw to the Desegh-Jala Oghli Turkish line.

"There will be British guards on the railway between the areas occupied by the Georgians and Armenians. The administration in this area will be mixed.

"An Allied Mixed Commission will supervise the actions of the Georgian administration in Akhalkalaki; the Commission will have representatives from the local Armenian and Moslem inhabitants."¹⁹

¹⁷ A. Babalian states that in ten days all Lori was occupied by the Armenians, the Georgian army crushed, and two thousand prisoners of war taken by the Armenians. See A. Babalian, "Echer..." Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. I, No. 8 (June, 1923), p. 54.

¹⁸ Firuz Kazemzadeh, op.cit., p. 180.

¹⁹ Simon Vratzian, op.cit., p. 225. See also Alexander Khatissian, op.cit., pp. 109-110.

The Allied Mixed Commission, composed of two British, one French and one Georgian officer, reached Karakilisse on December 28th, just as the Georgians, having received reinforcements, launched a general attack. The following few days witnessed the most bloody of all clashes hitherto. The Armenians pressed deep into Georgian territory, Georgians endeavouring to cut off and crush the spearhead of the Armenian forces. Following discussions with Douglas Withers, a member of the Allied Mixed Commission, the Armenians agreed to stop all military operations on December 31st, at midnight.

At the time agreed, all military operations ceased, and the Allied Mixed Commission effected the terms of the Armeno-Georgian Agreement, after which an Armenian Delegation proceeded to Tiflis to confer with the Georgian authorities on the final arrangement of the border question.

The Armeno-Georgian Conference opened in the middle of January, 1919, and three months later a document was signed which included the recognition of each other's independence, provisions for reopening telegraphic and postal communications between Georgia and Armenia, for reorganizing rail and road transport, interrupted because of the armed clashes, and for resuming diplomatic relations. The Armeno-Georgian conflict had been halted for the time being. But the most crucial of questions remained unanswered. Had the contenders learned that peace on the most unsatisfactory terms was preferable to bloodshed--especially in view of major external threats?

2.

From the turn of the century relations with Azerbaijan had not been smooth. Various ideologies came to the fore in the Ottoman Empire and affected the Azerbaijanis as co-religionists. The Armeno-Azerbaijani difficulties in Nakhichevan, Karabagh and Zangezur form but an episode in the vast anti-Armenian crusade launched by the Pan-Turanists of the Ottoman Empire.

With the arrival of the Azerbaijani diplomatic representative in Erivan, the friction between the two countries took a new form. With his first cable Khan Tekinski advised Baku how best to produce financial difficulties in Armenia.²⁰ Later he reported on the Armenian forces,²¹ their movements in the Kars region and requested that his Government ask all the Moslems of India, Turkestan, Afghanistan, Malaysia and the Caucasus to protest against the British who had handed Kars to the Armenians.²² He made inquiries about the means by which Baku would help the Tartars and Turks in case they rose in revolt against the Armenians.²³ Would Azerbaijan be willing to send military help?²⁴

²⁰ Haiastan, Artakin Kordzotz Nakhhararoutioun, Gaghtni Pastategh-ter: Azerbaijani Davadrakan Gordzouneoutounitz Mi Ech (Erivan, 1920), p. 18.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

²² Ibid., p. 19. In early 1918 Tartars and Turks in Armenia had already established their independent government called the Shura of Kars. See A. M. Poghossian, Sotzial-Tentessakan Haraberoutiounnere Karsi Marzum (Erivan, 1961), p. 310.

²³ Haiastan, op.cit., p. 20.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 22.

The question was taken to the Azerbaijani Parliament which approved the dispatch of assistance to the Tartars in Armenia to facilitate a rising against the Government.²⁵ But, in spite of the decision, Baku could not send forces to Armenia because the British, who had gone to Karabagh in aid of the Azerbaijanis, opposed Baku's plans for extending its rule over the region.²⁶ But Tekinski was to receive financial help for a Tartar rising against the Armenians.²⁷

Tekinski had planned the revolt, gathered an army of Tartars, and was waiting for money to start military activities. Azerbaijan, in accord with Tekinski and fearing a general Armenian military movement against the Tartars, assembled military contingents on the Armenian border. Turkey, on her part, had already occupied military positions on the other side of the Turco-Armenian frontier. To make matters worse, the British commenced their evacuation of Kars and Nakhichevan. Some time later Buyuk Vedi revolted and the Sharur and Nakhichevan Tartars followed. On July 8th some bloody clashes occurred but with no definite gains for either side.²⁸ The following few days were quiet but tense. It was evident that great events would soon occur in Sharur, Nakhichevan,

²⁵ Ibid., p. 23..

²⁶ Ibid., p. 26. The British installed Dr. Sultanov, a Young Turkish agent, as the Governor-General of Karabagh. It seems unlikely that they could have been unaware that he would not refrain from violence against the Armenians of the region. See Avetis Aharonian, Sardapatitz Minchev Sevres ev Lausanne (Boston, 1943), p. 28. See also Alexander Khatissian, op.cit., pp. 153-154.

²⁷ Haiastan, op.cit., pp. 297-298.

²⁸ Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, pp. 297-2 98.

Ardebil, and Kars regions.²⁹ On July 21st Tekinski requested that his Government transfer forces to the Armenian border so as to "raise the morale of the Moslems..., otherwise....the condition of the Moslems will deteriorate and will even be endangered."³⁰

By August 1st armed clashes between the Armenian forces and the rebels were renewed, and it was immediately seen that the outcome would not favour the Moslems in Armenia. Tekinski asked Baku to declare official war on Armenia.³¹ He argued that it was the most suitable time to do so.³² Meanwhile the Armenian Government asked the British to compel the Azerbaijanis to recall Takinski. He was succeeded by Hakhverdov, the Azerbaijani nationalist poet.³³ In spite of the change, the armed clashes continued. Consequently, the Supreme Council sent Colonel W. H. Haskell to Armenia "to supervise and advise upon various governmental matters in the whole of Russian and Turkish Armenia, and to control relief and repatriation questions pending the determination of the political destiny of this area."³⁴ But the presence of Colonel Haskell could not ameliorate the situation.³⁵ Writing of Armenia on August 29th the Allied representative informed Clemenceau, the President of the Council of Peace, that the armed clashes were threatening, that Tartar risings

²⁹ Haiastan, op.cit., pp. 31-32.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 36-37.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 39-40.

³² Ibid., p. 40.

³³ Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, p. 299.

³⁴ Great Britain (E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Series I: 1919 (London, 1947), Vol. I, p. 22. Hereafter to be cited as British Documents.

³⁵ By the end of August the Armenians of Karabagh had temporarily agreed to accept the Azerbaijani rule pending the decision of the Peace Conference. See Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, pp. 320-321.

were everywhere increasing and it was imperative to send Allied troops to save Armenians from extermination.³⁶ Armenia was "...on the eve of a combined invasion by the Tartars of Azerbaijan, the Georgians, the Shahsavans and the Turks,"³⁷ as Sazanoff put it on August 16, 1919. For a while the Allies seemed concerned with Armenia's fate, but no practical steps were taken.

In view of the deteriorating situation Haskell proceeded to Tiflis and thence to Baku. In the latter city he signed an agreement with the Azerbaijanis, providing that the regions of Daralagiaz and Nakhichevan were to form a neutral zone under American authority until the time when the fate of the contested territories would be decided in Paris, while Karabagh would remain to the Azerbaijanis, for the time being. But the Armenians induced Haskell to make some alterations in the clauses bearing on Karabagh and Zangezur.

Although the neutral zone was established, Dr. Sultanov with regular soldiers plus Kurdish levies, started the "liberation" of Karabagh. Clashes intensified by November 6th when the Azerbaijani forces were decisively defeated. The Allies stepped in once more. Wardrob, the British Commissioner, and Colonel J. Rey, the representative of Haskell in Tiflis, demanded the cessation of all operations and the solutions of all differences by agreement. Consequently, the Prime Ministers of Azerbaijan

³⁶British Documents, Vol. I, p. 10.

³⁷British Documents (London, 1952), Vol. IV, p. 741.

and Armenia met on November 23rd and eventually signed an agreement.³⁸

But just at this point the massacre of Armenians on a large scale commenced in Gokhtan, one of the flourishing regions of Armenia, in response to the call of the Berlin Sub-Committee of the League of Liberation of Islam.³⁹ The result was the massacre of about fifteen hundred unarmed Armenians.⁴⁰

The reprisals were severe. The Moslem Council of Erivan claimed that the Armenians destroyed one hundred and ninety-eight villages and rendered some one hundred thousand Moslems homeless.⁴¹ Armenia was fighting for her very existence at a time when Azerbaijan was following the directions of the Young Turks, Musavatists and Pan-Turanian leaders of the Berlin Sub-Committee of the League of Liberation of Islam. It was their belief that "for the time being," as Tekinski had put it earlier, "Azerbaijan has no other enemy but Armenia..."⁴² To hold that Armeno-Azerbaijani relations could be bettered under the prevailing conditions was to be unrealistic. Armed clashes between the two countries continued until the time when Azerbaijan fell under Bolshevik control on April 28, 1920.

³⁸For the text of the agreement see British Documents, (London, 1948), Vol. II, p. 563. See also U.S.A., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (Washington, 1946), Vol. X, pp. 6067-67; and Simon Vratzian, loc. cit., pp. 334-335.

³⁹The League of Liberation of Islam was founded by the Eastern Department of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow. See The Times (London), February 3, 1920, p. 14.

⁴⁰The Times (London), April 7, 1920, p. 10.

⁴¹The Times (London), March 19, 1920, p. 15.

⁴²Haiastan, op.cit., p. 31.

3.

In retrospect it is clear that Armenia, to become organized and established as a sovereign State, required a formative period under the protection and tutelage of one of the Entente Powers--England, France or America. As early as December 18, 1918, Boghos Nubar Pasha had asked for a mandatory for Armenia,⁴³ which, as it was formally stated a few months later, had to clear from Armenian territories all the Turkish, Azerbaijani and other alien elements, and disarm the remaining population. Armenians would expect the mandatory power to punish those who had perpetrated massacres, plundered and pillaged the country, and profited from the spoliation of Armenian victims. Moreover, the expulsion of mohajirs,⁴⁴ settled in Western Armenia during the last twenty-five years, and the freeing and reclaiming to Christianity of Armenian women and children, kept in Turkish harems⁴⁵ or forcibly converted to Islam,⁴⁶ were considered to be the responsibilities of any mandatory power.

These were expectations. To Armenians it was unthinkable that there would be no Great Power to take over Armenia. The Powers were manifesting all the suspicions of each other's motives in the Near and Middle East which had characterized their prewar policies. Soon the

⁴³The Times (London), December 31, 1918, p. 7.

⁴⁴Moslem and Turkish settlers.

⁴⁵The apartments allotted to females in the East.

⁴⁶Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, pp. 341-342. Cf. Firuz Kazemzadeh, op.cit., p. 260.

Armenians concluded that only the United States could be expected to act out of sheer humanitarian motives, having no prior entanglements in the Near and Middle East.

Early in August, 1919, Lord Curzon unofficially inquired as to whether the Americans were willing to take over Armenia after the British evacuated Transcaucasia.⁴⁷ Though an immediate and positive answer was not dispatched to Curzon, President Wilson sent Major-General J.G. Harbord, accompanied by a staff of a dozen American officers and civilians, to Tiflis and other towns in Transcaucasia to "investigate and report on political, military, geographical, administrative, economic, and other considerations involved in possible American interests and responsibilities."⁴⁸

The Mission spent thirty days in Asia Minor and Transcaucasia, and interviewed at length the representatives of various governments, as well as individual Armenians, Turks, Jews, Arabs, Greeks, Kurds, Tartars, Russians, Persians, British, French and Americans. After conferring with Nationalist leaders in Sivas in mid-September,⁴⁹ the Mission reached the Armenian capital on September 25, 1919. Interviews commenced on that very night and continued for the next three days. The Armenians quickly learned that their hopes were misplaced,⁵⁰ and that

⁴⁷British Documents (London, 1944), Vol. III, p. 481.

⁴⁸J.G. Harbord, "American Military Mission to Armenia, International Conciliations, No. 151 (June, 1920), p. 17.

⁴⁹Harbord held that the Nationalists aimed at "the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Empire under the mandatory of a single disinterested power, preferably America." Ibid., p. 36. Cf. British Documents, Vol. IV, pp. 817-818.

⁵⁰Vahan Papazian, op.cit., (Cairo, 1957), Vol. III, p. 75.

"...if America would take over any mandate, it had to cover not only Armenia but rather all Asia Minor and Transcaucasia starting with Alexandretta down to the Caspian Sea."⁵¹

The investigations and meetings over, Harbord reported on his findings to the Secretary of State. His report bore on the "history and the present situation of the Armenian people; the political situation and suggestions for readjustments; the conditions and problems involved in a mandatory; (and) the considerations for and against the undertaking of a mandate."⁵² The report did not make any recommendation for or against the mandate; on the contrary, it just gave fourteen reasons why America should accept the mandate, and thirteen against such a commitment. The economic liabilities for the mandatory power were spelled out. The five-year projection of expenditures indicated a total of \$756,014,000 as cost of keeping Armenia viable.⁵³ If the mandate were to succeed in attaining its objectives certain prerequisites were of prime importance. "In our opinion," Harbord put it, "there should be specific pledges in terms of formal agreements with France and England and definite approval from Germany and Russia of the disposition made of Turkey and Transcaucasia, and a pledge to respect them."⁵⁴

Even if the Americans had accepted the mandate over Armenia and the powers had given their pledges, the lack of a trained corp of

⁵¹Alexander Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian, p. 164. Cf. J.G. Harbord, op.cit., pp. 39-40.

⁵²Ibid., p. 19.

⁵³\$275,500,000; 174,264,000; 123,750,000; 96,750,000; and 85,750,000. See Ibid., pp. 51-52.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 47.

American personnel would have militated against the success of a mandatory rule over Eastern peoples. This, as Harbord told Wardrob, the British Commissioner in Transcaucasia, would permit clashes of economic and political interests with the possibility of Moslem predominance and even an uprising surging of the Pan-Islamic movement.⁵⁵ But the personnel question was not the only difficulty which the mandatory power had to face. As Balfour put it on February 24, 1920, "whoever undertakes...to aid Armenia during her formative period must...be prepared to use military force."⁵⁶ It was evident that Armenia was a liability. Would America accept her and bring in forces to maintain Armenia as a political entity? France agreed "to be the mandatory for Turkey under the suspicious and dangerous disguise of international finance;"⁵⁷ England was in "utmost difficulty in carrying out the responsibilities she (had) already undertaken,"⁵⁸ while the other powers had no interest in the question. It was evident that the only country which could carry the burden of Armenia was the United States. Consequently, the Supreme Council at San Remo appealed to her. In response to the official invitation, President Wilson appealed to Congress on May 24, 1920, to "grant the Executive power to accept for the United States a mandate over Armenia."⁵⁹

⁵⁵ British Documents (London, 1944), Vol. III, p. 605.

⁵⁶ The Times (London), March 15, 1920, p. 15.

⁵⁷ British Documents, Vol. IV, p. 819.

⁵⁸ The Times (London), March 15, 1920, p. 15.

⁵⁹ "The United States and the Armenian Mandate," International Conciliation, No. 151 (June, 1920), p. 13.

The Senate met on June 1st to pass a resolution on the question. The debates over, votes were cast and a resolution was passed. "Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring)," the resolution read, "that the Congress hereby respectfully declines to grant to the Executive the power to accept a mandate over Armenia as requested in the message of the President dated May 24, 1920."⁶⁰ The vote was fifty-two to twenty-three against undertaking the mandate.⁶¹

As early as October 10, 1919, Harding had predicted the outcome of the Harbord Mission. "It is now certain," he had written, "that the U.S. Govt. will not obtain a mandate for any country in the Near East. Consequently some other scheme must be found for peace with Turkey."⁶²

Could such a plan be concerted to meet the political crisis and shield Armenia from destruction at the hands of the Nationalist Turks, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Kurds and Tartars? The success of any plan depended also on the capability of the Armenians for achieving a "stable government, proper protection of individual liberties and rights, and the full realization of the nationalistic aspirations...(of) the Armenian people?"⁶³

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

⁶¹ For a detailed exposition why America rejected the Armenian mandate see Philip Marshal Brown, "Mandate Over Armenia," American Journal of International Law, Vol. XIV (July, 1920), pp. 396-399.

⁶² British Documents, Vol. IV, p. 819.

⁶³ League of Nations, "Communication by Signor Tittoni to the Assembly, November 20, 1920," Official Journal, Vol. II, No. 8 (November-December, 1920), p. 90.

CHAPTER III

REVIVAL FRUSTRATED

1.

Aware that major conflict would cause Ottoman collapse, the Great Powers had planned the partition of that empire from March of 1915.¹ The First World War destroyed all hopes for Ottoman survival, and the Allies dictated an armistice reserving to themselves the right to seize any portion of Turkey in case disorders occurred in the six Armenian vilayets.² In opposition to this disposition, two Nationalist Turkish congresses were held in July (Erzerum) and September (Sivaz) of 1919. Out of these came a declaration, the third article of which stated that the Turks would resist "every movement tending toward the formation, at the expence of the mother country, of an independent Armenia and of an independent Greece..."³

The Nationalist Pact of Constantinople, published five months later (January 28, 1920) strongly restated the Sivaz declaration without taking into consideration the fact that the Peace of Conference

¹Secret treaties to this effect were signed on March 18, 1915 (The Constantinople Agreement); on May 26, 1915 (The Treaty of London); on May 16, 1916 (The Sykes-Picot Agreement); and on April 17, 1917 (The St. Maurienne Agreement). For the treaties see H.W.V. Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (London, 1921), Vol. IV, pp. 4-10; Ibid., Vol. V., pp. 384-393; Ibid., (London, 1924), Vol. VI, pp. 16-18, and 18-24 respectively.

²Eliot Grinell Mears, Modern Turkey: A Politico-Economic Interpretation, 1918-1923 (New York, 1924), p. 625.

³Ibid., p. 627.

of Paris had already decided (January 19, 1920) to confer de facto recognition on the Government of the Armenian State, leaving the final decision of the Armenian frontiers to a subsequent settlement of the Armenian Question.⁴ Moreover, as if to prove to the world that no armistice or Peace Conference resolution was strong enough to prevent the Turks from carrying out their own plans, massacres and persecution continued everywhere in the Ottoman Empire. In response to this, the Allies effected a new occupation of Constantinople, arresting "certain persons implicated in the intrigues...(to) answer for their acts and for any future consequences which those acts (might) produce,"⁵ hoping thus to restrain the Nationalist Turks from committing further atrocities.

Mustapha Kemal's response to the Allied threat was one of disparagement. He held that no non-Turk had the slightest right to assert authority within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire and that there was no power on earth which could deprive the Turk of his essential rights.⁶ But apprehensive of possible Allied decisions,⁷ the Nationalist leader secured a Turco-Azerbaijani Agreement on April 15,

⁴Oliver Baldwin, Six Prisons and Two Revolutions (New York, 1925), p. 255. Cf. British Documents, Vol. II, p. 225.

⁵Eliot Grinell Mears, op.cit., p. 631.

⁶Mustapha Kemal, A Speech, October, 1927 (Leipzig, 1929), p. 360.

⁷The Council of the League of Nations agreed at its Fourth Session "that the constitution of a state of Armenia upon a free, secure and independent basis" was imperative. See League of Nations, "The Future Status of Armenia: Report by the British Representative, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher," Official Journal, Vol. I, No. 3 (April-May, 1920), p. 81. See also Ibid., p. 85.

1920,⁸ based upon the secret Turco-Azerbaijani Treaty of Constantinople.⁹ To improve his position, just after Azerbaijan passed under Bolshevik control on April 28, 1920, he sought a Turco-Soviet rapprochement through the intercession of Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan now mainly depending on Soviet backing for her military designs,¹⁰ and in compliance with the Turco-Azerbaijani Agreement, on April 29, 1920, sent an ultimatum to the Armenian Government to evacuate its forces from the Armenian regions of Zangezur and Karabagh, withdrawing them inside the Armenian borders, and to stop all nationalist-inspired persecutions.¹¹ The Azerbaijani ultimatum was followed by another one from the High Command of the Eleventh Red Army on May 1, 1920. The Government of Erivan, in response to the Azerbaijani threat, appealed to Moscow, but no reply was forthcoming. A few days later, on May 19, 1920, the reason for silence was made public. The Soviet Government, as the Izvestia put it, took cognizance of the decision of the Grand National Assembly to coordinate Soviet activities and Turkish military operations¹² against all forms of imperialistic obstructions barring the

⁸ Simon Vratzian, Haiastan Bolshevikian Murji ev Terkakan Sali Michev (Boston, 1941), p. 58. Hereafter to be cited as Haiastan Bolshevikian.

⁹ For the content of the treaty see The Times (London), March 20, 1920, p. 15.

¹⁰ According to Kiazim Karabekir, the Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Fifteenth Army Corps, the Moslem Tartar tribes of Olti would start clashes with the Armenians thus inviting Armenian punitive forces into the region. This would serve as an excuse for the Turks to intervene against the Armenians. See Kiazim Karabekir, Istiklal Harbimiz (Istanbul, 1960), pp. 664-665.

¹¹ Simon Vratzian, loc.cit., pp. 85-86.

¹² Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1956 (Seattle, Washington, 1956), p. 37. Cf. Kiazim Karabekir, op.cit., pp. 784-785.

natural growth of the two countries. Then a subsequent convention, after the Turco-Soviet rapprochement, made Azerbaijan a party to the Turco-Soviet Military Agreement.¹³

The ground prepared, Kiazim Karabakir cabled to Djavid Bey, a one-time Young Turk leader, now active in Azerbaijan, to cooperate with Khalil Pasha, another Young Turk commanding the Islamic Army in Azerbaijan, to help the Bolshevik Army reach Nakhichevan. After joining with the Islamic Army, the two forces should ensure that Armenia would not be able to offer resistance.¹⁴ The Bolsheviks, on their part, sent their Eleventh and Tenth Army Corpses to the Caucasian Front, where, as Kemal described it later, they found the Turkish help and "lead" they had been promised. After the merger of the Tartar and Soviet contingents, the united force commenced military operations against Armenia and Georgia.¹⁵

Armenia was now confronted by the menace of the combined forces of Azerbaijan, Soviet Russia and Nationalist Turkey, and there was no one to support her in her time of need. The Allies were busy settling their own problems at home and abroad; Georgia herself was in need of help, while Armenia was all but incapable of resisting the surging tide of the Soviets, Kemalists and Tartars. The only chance of survival, the Armenians decided, lay in acquiring Soviet recognition for their State. Consequently a delegation formed of Levon Chanth,

¹³ The Times (London), May 10, 1920, p. 12.

¹⁴ V. Vemian, "Two Little Letters of Enver Pasha Written from Moscow," The Armenian Review, Vol. I, No. 1 (July, 1948), p. 56.

¹⁵ Simon Vratzian, loc.cit., p. 60.

Hampardzum Terterian and Levon Zarafian proceeded to Moscow.¹⁶ The delegation was scarcely on its way before Armenia experienced the first Armenian Bolshevik activity, centred upon Alexandropol.¹⁷ Anti-governmental activities were on a scale and intensity to cause the Government at Erivan to concentrate all her forces to put down the movement. Alexandropol proclaimed its severance of relations with Erivan and required the authority of Soviets in the city. Subsequent rebellions commenced in the regions of Zangezur, Shusha and Aghstafa, and the situation in Armenia seemed worse than ever.

While fighting Bolshevism in Armenia,¹⁸ Erivan informed Moscow of the impending arrival of the Armenian delegation. On May 17, 1920, Chicherin informed Erivan that the Soviet Government was ready to sign a pact and establish friendly relations with the people of Armenia,¹⁹ although only a few days before (May 6th) the Soviets had proclaimed to the Moslems of Russia and the East their refusal of "the treaty partitioning Turkey and creating an Armenia on Turkish territories..."²⁰ Hence the Armeno-Soviet talks were predestined to utter failure, although no Armenian had had the slightest notion about this situation at the time.

¹⁶Hampardzum Terterian, "The Levon Chanth Mission to Moscow," The Armenian Review, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (June, 1955), pp. 4-6.

¹⁷For Soviet Armenian accounts of the May Revolution see H.S. Karapetian, Mayisian Apestamboutiounne Haiastanoun, 1920 (Erivan, 1961), pp. 99-323; and A.Gh. Khanjian, Hodvadzner ev Jarer (Erivan, 1963), pp. 419-459.

¹⁸The first ill-fated Bolshevik movements in Armenia utterly failed and came to almost naught after May 13, 1920.

¹⁹Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, pp. 454-455.

²⁰Kiazim Karabekir, op.cit., p. 709.

On May 11, 1920, the Peace Treaty with Turkey was presented to Damad Farid Pasha, the President of the Turkish Delegation to the Peace Conference at Paris, and in spite of the fact that Armenia was almost on the verge of collapse, there were stirrings of hope for the achievement of self-determination. But the Angora Government flatly rejected the Treaty of Sevres. The Kemalists held that the Peace Treaty jeopardized the independence and integrity of their country. If Turkey was to be independent it must be in every way--politically, economically, legally, militarily, and culturally--unlimited.²¹ The treaty was regarded as a complete negation of Wilsonian principles, which stated that "the Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty..."²² Though the reasons for Turco-Armenian hostility were numerous,²³ the immediate cause for friction, as President Wilson stated, was the Treaty of Sevres,²⁴ which revived all the old feuds between the Turks and Armenians. The inability of the Allies to enforce the terms of the treaty (Appendix II) encouraged the Turks to rally the dispersed Ottoman forces in the interior of Anatolia so as to prepare decisive action on both Greek and Armenian Fronts.²⁵

²¹Mustapha Kemal, op.cit., pp. 525-526.

²²H.W.V. Temperley, op.cit. (London, 1920), Vol.I, p. 434.

²³"Armenia and the Turkish Settlement," The Near East, Vol.XVII, No. 456 (January 29, 1920), p. 146; Ibid., Vol. XVIII, No. 494 (October 21, 1920), p. 554; and E. Sarkesian and R. Sahakian, Hai Joghovourdi Nor Sherchani Patmoutian Nengapokhoume Turk Patmagroutian Mech (Eriwan, 1963).

²⁴League of Nations, "Communication from President Wilson to Mr. Hymans on the Subject of Armenia, January 22nd, 1921," Official Journal, Vol. II, No. 1 (January-February, 1921), p. 81.

²⁵Mustapha Kemal, op.cit., p. 409.

The first Nationalist action against Armenia arose from a demand that Erivan stop all fortifications of Erzerum, evacuate Sarikamish and withdraw the Armenian forces to the east of Novo Selim. The ultimatum informed the Armenian Government that the Eleventh Red Army had already been concentrated between Ganja and Karvansarai,²⁶ and was waiting for the opportune moment to cross to Armenia. Moscow, on her part, despite a stated desire of signing a pact with Armenia, began a diplomatic offensive in support of the Turkish ultimatum.²⁷ Chicherin in this way negated the decree signed by Lenin in 1918 (Appendix III). Erivan held fast to the idea that Armenia had all the right to independence and integrity, supposedly guaranteed by Lenin, at the very time that Soviet Russia helped Soviet Azerbaijan and Nationalist Turkey pursuing the objective of opening the Caucasian line of communication. (The sea route between the Soviet Russians on one part and the Soviet Azerbaijanis and Nationalist Turks on the other was barred by the forces of Admiral Kolchak and General Wrangel, and of the Allies.) The idea of opening the Caucasian route was first expressed by the Turks on July 24, 1920.²⁸ On the other hand, it is maintained that the Soviet authorities induced the Turks to commence military operations against the Armenians and Georgians so as to clear the way. It was the most

²⁶ Kiazim Karabekir, op.cit., p. 763.

²⁷ Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, p. 452.

²⁸ General Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Moscova Hatiralari (Istanbul, 1955), pp. 64 and 67. See also Gabriel Lazian, Haiastan ev Hai Date Hai ev Russ Haraberoutiounnerou Louisin Tak (Cairo, 1957), p. 250. Ali Fuad led the Nationalist Turkish Delegation to Moscow.

propitious time for military action because the Allies were split on policy and could not rush support to Armenia.²⁹ In such manner was, the cordon sanitaire policy in the Caucasus, which was based on the desire to keep the Russians and Turks separated, completely frustrated.³⁰

After some hesitation Kemal gave the order to attack on June 6th and Karabekir began final preparations. However a letter from Chicherin on June 15 prevented the Turks from carrying out their designs.³¹ Meanwhile movements of Armenian regulars were witnessed in Olti where they had gone to break up the Moslem shura³² recently established with the financial and military backing of the Nationalist Turks and Soviet Azerbaijanis. The Turkish note bearing on this point asked Erivan on June 21, 1920, to stop all military activities against the insurgents. Three days later another note was sent to Erivan, in answer to which (on June 28th) Alexander Khatissian asked for negotiations to settle the Turco-Armenian border differences.³³ This proposal was regarded as nothing more than an Armenian maneuver by Karabekir.³⁴

Unfortunately, the Armenian Dashnakist Government never realized the scope and force of the Turkish Nationalist movement.³⁵ Its note of

²⁹Kiazim Karabekir, op.cit., pp. 769-772.

³⁰J.R., "The Background of Russo-Turkish Relations," The World To-day, Vol. II, No. 1 (January, 1946), pp. 63-64.

³¹In opposition to Karabekir's desire, Kemal intended to settle the Armenian Question through diplomacy and avoid a Turco-Armenian War. See "Armenia Overwhelmed by Enemies," Current History, Vol. XIII, No.1 (January, 1921), p. 70.

³²A Turkish city-state.

³³Alexander Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian, pp. 222-223.

³⁴Kiazim Karabekir, op.cit., p. 814.

³⁵Hovhannes Kachaznuni, op.cit., p. 41.

June 30th was inspired by optimism³⁶ because events in Paris and military activities at home were encouraging, and the Armenians were to some extent intoxicated by these minor successes.³⁷ Hence they belittled both the resources and moral standing of Nationalist Turkey. When the Nationalists at last proposed talks for negotiations, Armenians, following the advice of General Stocks,³⁸ refused them.³⁹ It was only then that, holding fast to the clauses of Brest-Litvsk and the "plebiscite" in Olti which gave the region to the Turks,⁴⁰ Khalil Pasha of Nationalist Turkey and Orjonikidze of Soviet Azerbaijan agreed to break all Armenian resistance in the aforesaid region and effect a junction of the Soviet Azerbaijani forces, the Islamic Army and the forces of Nationalist Turkey in a month's time.⁴¹ Meanwhile the Armenian

³⁶The document was signed by A. Ter-Hakobian, Secretary of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Armenia.

³⁷For a classical example of Armenian behaviour see "Arakeloutioun Sourp Patriark Hor Hevropa," in Teodik, ed., Amenoun Taretzouytze (Constantinople, 1921), Vol. XV, pp. 136-142.

³⁸Leo, Turkahai Heghapokhoutian Gaghaparabanoutioun (Paris, 1935), Vol. II, p. 237. For instances of British interference in Armenian affairs see Arsen Kitour, Housher ev Pousher (Beirut, 1956), p. 197; Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover, 1878-1920: Years of Adventure (New York, 1952), p. 388; and Shahan Natali, Verstin Havelvadz, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1957), p. 19.

³⁹H. Amatuni, "Ankara, Moskva, Erevan," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. XXI, No. 1 (January-February, 1943), pp. 91-92. See also Arshak Jamalian, "H. Kachaznuni ev. H.H. Dashnaktzoutioun," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. II, No. 5 (March, 1924), p. 127; Arsen Kitour, "Zoravar Andranik Enker Arsen Kitouri Housheroun Mech," in Mihran Seferian, ed., Azgayin Heros, Zoravar Andranik (Beirut, 1959), pp. 432-433; and Shahan Natali, op.cit., pp. 108-109.

⁴⁰Alexander Khatissian, loc.cit., pp. 223-224.

⁴¹Kiazim Karabekir, op.cit., p. 854.

Government took decisive measures and in a short time settled most of their internal differences. Zangi Basar, Veti Basar, Sharur and Karakilisse were all cleared of disloyal elements. The insignificant Bolshevik forces in Kazakh-Shamshadin and Zangezur regions were expelled.⁴²

The mood in Erivan was now cheerful. The Armenian Army carried its assignments and Armenians had proved themselves worthy of their most cherished dreams, which would surely come true when the Treaty of Sevres established a de jure Armenian State in place of a de facto arrangement.

2.

The Treaty of Sevres was signed on August 10, 1920, and extended de jure recognition to the Republic of Armenia. Infuriated, Mustapha Kemal called on all Turks and Communists to rally around the standard of revolt against the decisions of the Allies and resist the formation of an Armenia on the east of Turkey.⁴³ Karabekir went far beyond Kemal in concluding that the condition of Turkish independence was the annihilation of all non-Turkish ethnic groupings within the country. Armeno-Turkish coexistence was not possible--one must disappear. The Armenians must be eradicated to create the conditions for achieving the Turkish National and racial schemes⁴⁴ which envisioned the establishment of a

⁴²A. Babalian, "Karsi Ankume," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. I, No. 12 (October, 1923), p. 54. See also Karo Sassuni, "Hai Terkakan Paterazme," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. IV, No. 4 (February, 1926), pp. 56-57.

⁴³Ivar Spector, op.cit., p. 38.

⁴⁴Imbued with a Young Turkish background, Kemal and Karabekir followed the policy of annihilating not only the Armenian State but the Armenian people as well. For the Young Turkish policy towards Armenians see Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Morgenthau's Story (New York, 1918), pp. 337-338; and Arsen Jankochian, Dervagner Haikakan Eghernen ev Vera-dzenound (Paris, 1946), pp. 179-181.

Pan-Turanian empire.⁴⁵ Karabekir feared of possible bolshevization of Armenia through which everything could come to naught.⁴⁶ To anticipate this possibility Karabekir asked Angora to allow him to launch an immediate general attack on Armenia. But Kemal was preoccupied with the Greek threat on the Western Front. The friction between Kemal and Karabekir became so intense that Ismet, the Commander on the Western Front, fearing of Karabekir's personal ambitions,⁴⁷ stepped in to bring the two to a compromise. Meanwhile, the Armenians broke all resistance in Nakhichevan and compelled the Tartars to accept the sovereignty of the Armenian Government.⁴⁸

Angora did not remain inactive. It was at this juncture that Nationalist Turkey induced the Soviets to sign the Turkish Nationalist and Soviet Russian Agreement (Appendix IV) so as "to apply the Brest-Litovsk Treaty by force,...to be freed from future aggression, (and) to prove to the Moslem vilayets that Kars, Ardahan, and Batum are essentially Turkish."⁴⁹ The first military operations on the Eastern Front proved that the Turkish forces were not capable of facing strong

⁴⁵ Even in 1911, in Zia Gokalp the Pan-Turanian Empire found its creator. Writing in Genc Kalemler Gokalp held that: "The country of the Turks is not Turkey, nor yet Turkestan, their country is a broad and everlasting land--Turan." See Uriel Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Zia Gokalp (London, 1950), p.126.

⁴⁶ Kiazim Karabekir, op.cit., p. 852.

⁴⁷ The Times (London), July 21, 1920, p. 13.

⁴⁸ Karo Sassuni, "Hai Terkakan Paterazme," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. IV, No. 5 (March, 1926), p. 81.

⁴⁹ "Armenia Overwhelmed by Enemies," Current History, Vol. XIII, No. 1 (January, 1921), p. 70.

Armenian opposition. Moreover, the fear that Armenians might join the Georgians and endanger the Turkish position gave Angora pause. Immediately secret negotiations with Tiflis were opened with the view of isolating Armenia completely.⁵⁰

A fortnight later, on September 26, 1920, the Turkish offensive started, undeterred by the Armenian surprise attack of two days earlier. In the face of Turkish numerical superiority, the Armenian lines broke and Sarikamish, the first Armenian major city to come under the Turkish fire, fell on September 30th. Meanwhile, the Soviets in compliance with the Soviet-Nationalist Agreement, breaking the Armeno-Soviet preliminary peace treaty signed in Tiflis on August 10, 1920,⁵¹ resumed their military operations in the regions of Karabagh, Zangezur and Nakhichevan. Erivan protested to Chicherin, but the Soviet drive continued. Consequently, the Armenians, in a major operation against the Soviet forces and marauding Tartars, cleared all Nakhichevan.⁵² Though successful for the time being, the danger of being encircled by the Soviet Russian and Nationalist Turkish forces was minimized. It was realized that if no Allied help reached Armenia, she would definitely be overrun. The Allied representatives at Tiflis promised to do their best to induce their respective governments to extend a helping hand to Armenia; but

⁵⁰Simon Vratzian, Haiastrani, pp. 464-465.

⁵¹The Times (London), September 30, 1920, p. 9. See also Hampardzum Terterian, "The Levon Chanth...", The Armenian Review, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (June, 1955), p. 22; and Simon Vratzian, Haiastrani, p. 457.

⁵²The Times (London), October 4, 1920, p. 4.

to her great distress, the Armenian Government found that she was neglected by the Allies in general, including the British in whose intervention--as in Transcaspia and Baku--great hopes were attached.⁵³ Abandoned by all, Armenia now turned to muster what strength she could: new volunteers were called, a fresh mobilization was declared, and further reinforcements were sent to the front. The time for the big day was to be October 14th, when a surprise attack would be ordered.

An army of eight thousand, composed of new conscripts, volunteers, Armenian Bolsheviks, and pro-Communists, opened the attack. It was soon clear that it was not equal to the task. The Armenian failure of October 14, 1920, might have a score of explanations,⁵⁴ but the facts pointed the undeniable reality: the Armenians were overwhelmed by the numerical superiority of the Nationalists and none of the Armenian military leaders could compete with Karabekir in military strategy.

While the Turco-Armenian conflict was at its highest pitch, a Soviet delegation headed by Legrand,⁵⁵ arrived in Erivan on October 11th, ostensibly to improve Armeno-Azerbaijani and Turco-Armenian relations, and establish peace in the Caucasus.⁵⁶ Instead, Legrand served the Armenian Government with an ultimatum with a limit of forty-eight hours for reply. According to The Times, "(1) The Armenian Government is to allow the free use of its railways by the troops of the Russian Soviet,

⁵³H.M. Elchibekian and A. M. Hakobian, op.cit., p. 57.

⁵⁴For some see A. Babalian, "Karsi Ankume," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. I, No. 12 (October, 1926), p. 57; Karo Sassuni, "Hai Terkakan Paterazme," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. IV, No. 6 (April, 1926), p. 85; and Simon Vratzian, Kianki Oughinerov (Beirut, 1960), Vol. II, p. 250.

⁵⁵On July 1st Chicherin informed the Armenian Government of his decision to transfer the Armeno-Soviet negotiations to Erivan. The Armenian Delegation returned home on September 14th.

⁵⁶Vahan Papazian, op.cit., Vol. II, p. 210.

the Azerbaijani Soviet, and the Turkish Nationalist Government; (2) The Armenian Government is to denounce the Treaty of Sevres and break off diplomatic relations with the Entente Powers; (3) Armenia has to submit her territorial dispute with Turkey to the arbitration of the Russian Soviet Government."⁵⁷

In the existing military and political situation, the Government at Erivan could not but answer the ultimatum in the affirmative and commence immediate negotiations with Legrand. It was evident that the Dashnakist Government was unable to cope with the crisis.⁵⁸

Fearing of the worst which might befall Armenia, the Government appealed to the Council of the League of Nations to intervene and ensure respect for the Treaty of Sevres. The reply was that the treaty was not yet in force and it was up to the Great Powers to guarantee its execution.⁵⁹ Facing complete abandonment, Armenia appealed to Georgia to align the military activities of both countries. The blunt answer was that Georgia did not expect any Turkish assault and her treaty with the Soviets was guarantee enough to safeguard her independence.⁶⁰

Concomitant to her appeals for succour, Armenia intensified negotiations with Legrand. The draft Russo-Armenian Agreement (Appendix V)

⁵⁷ The Times (London), October 23, 1920, p. 7.

⁵⁸ According to Herbert Hoover, the Government of Armenia was hardly a shadow of government, because the ministers were either incompetent and corrupt, or moved by a variety of politics. See Herbert Hoover, op.cit., p. 387.

⁵⁹ League of Nations, "Communication by Signor Tittoni," Official Journal, Vol. II, No. 8 (November-December, 1920), p. 90.

⁶⁰ Alexander Khatissian, Halastani Hanrapetoutian, pp. 230-231. See also A. Babalian, loc.cit., p. 65.

was signed on October 21st. Legrand took it to Baku from whence, he stated, he would ask the final endorsement of Moscow and return to Erivan to sign the Soviet-Armenian Pact of Friendship based upon the agreement. But he did not return until it was too late.

A few days later, on October 24th, the Turkish general offensive started all along the front from Kars down to Igdir, Ani, Kulpa, Vladi Kars, Markara and Shurmala. For the first few days both the Armenian infantry and the newly organized Air Force did well,⁶¹ but the military situation was not heartening as The Times correspondent saw it. October 30 witnessed the fall of Kars,⁶² and the capture of almost all the military equipment and ammunition stored in the city.⁶³ For the next five days the city was looted and both the soldiery and the civilians massacred.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, Ahmet Muhtar, the Nationalist Commissar for Foreign Affairs, forwarded to Erivan proposing to establish peace between the two countries through Armenian guarantees of abstaining from aggressive designs against Turkey.⁶⁵ While Armenia was informing Ahmet Muhtar of her wish to open peace talks with Turkey, Karabekir started a fresh attack on the Armenian positions, while the Russian Bolsheviks

⁶¹The Times (London), November 2, 1920, p. 12. Armenian Air Force consisted of three aeroplanes bought from the French.

⁶²For some reasons of the fall of Kars consult Karo Sassuni, "Hai Terkakan Paterazme," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. IV, No. 7 (May, 1926), p. 73; A. Babalian, loc.cit., p. 62; H. Irazek, Motik Antzialitz, p.72; and Simon Vratzian, Haiastan Bolshevikian, pp. 169-171.

⁶³For the amount of booty and war prisoners as stated by Karabekir see Kiazim Karabekir, op.cit., p. 897.

⁶⁴Oliver Baldwin, op.cit., p. 25.

⁶⁵Alexander Khatissian, loc.cit., pp. 245-246.

advanced at the rear of the Armenian forces and captured Karakilisse.⁶⁶ Meanwhile the Armenian Communists proclaimed the rule of the Armenian Revolutionary Committee, the Revkom, in Armenia.

Armenian appealed once more to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, France, and Italy, and to the President of the United States to intervene and halt the Nationalist military operations.⁶⁷ No aid, military or diplomatic, arrived. Mr. Harmsworth, the British Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in the parliamentary meeting of November 15, 1920, that the British would act as soon as British interests were endangered;⁶⁸ and Armenia was far from being a British interest.

On November 8th Armenia received Ahmet Muhtar's agreement to open peace talks between Turkey and Armenia. Karabekir demanded that Armenian forces evacuate Alexandropol and retreat fifteen kilometers east of Arpa River. He stated that the city would not be occupied--only the fortress and the vicinity of the railroad station. There would be no firing on the Turkish forces from any quarters on any occasion.⁶⁹

On that very day Ahmet Muhtar sent a letter to Karabekir ordering him to crush Armenia to such an extent that she would almost be liquidated as a state.⁷⁰ Consequently, Karabekir forwarded the

⁶⁶ The Near East, Vol. XVIII, No. 497 (November 11, 1920), p. 662.

⁶⁷ H.M. Elchibekian and A.M. Hakobian, op.cit., p. 58.

⁶⁸ Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. CXXXIV, col. 1513.

⁶⁹ Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, p. 482. See also Alexander Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian, p. 246; The Times (London), November 16, 1920, p. 9; and General Ali Fuat Cebesory, op.cit., p. 94.

⁷⁰ Kiazim Karabekir, op.cit., p. 901.

armistice terms to Erivan (Appendix VI) by the first clause of which Armenia had to accept the principle of self-determination in all the disputed areas. This was no less than leaving all Turkish Armenia to Turkey. With the second and third clauses Turkey promised to safeguard Armenian independence and help the country economically. The next clauses bore on transit and free passage of goods and citizens of both countries, respect for Armenian minority rights in Turkey, and Armenian guarantees no to engage in hostilities against Turkey.⁷¹

In the Armenian Parliament meeting of November 10th it was clear that there was almost total opposition to the proposal. Khatissian endeavoured to bring the Dashankist zealots⁷² to their senses, but he failed.⁷³ The war was resumed on the very day that the Soviets promised to mediate between the two contestants.⁷⁴

On November 14th, anticipating an Armenian attack on Alexandropol, where the Turkish G.H.Q. was located now, the Nationalists launched a general offensive, and, due to their numerical superiority, inflicted a decisive defeat upon the Armenian forces east of Alexandropol, on November 17th. The road to Erivan was now open.

The Turkish armistice terms, rejected a few days earlier, were

⁷¹Ibid., p. 900. Cf. Alexander Khatissian, loc.cit., pp. 248-249. Though what Khatissian and Karabekir give as armistice terms are almost identical, Vratzian quotes another set of terms (Appendix VII).

⁷²Herbert Hoover, op.cit., p. 387.

⁷³Alexander Khatissian, loc.cit., p. 251.

⁷⁴H.T. Petrossian, "Alexandrapoli Dashmagire," Zartok, November 25, 1961, p. 3.

now meekly accepted by the Dashnakist Bureau-Government. On November 22, 1920, the Turks received the war material they had demanded, and were informed that a delegation under the presidency of Alexander Khatissian⁷⁵ was en route to Alexandropol to discuss peace terms.

3.

Defeated in war and facing nation-wide unpopularity, the Dashnakist Government gave way to the Coalition Government of Simon Vratzian who was considered a lukewarm pro-Russian among the Dashnakists. Vratzian believed that any peace concluded with the Grand National Assembly of Turkey was incomplete as long as a pact with the Soviets was not signed. Accordingly, negotiations with Legrand were resumed on November 24th. It was soon evident that the Russian envoy and the Armenian Government had irreconcilable views. Legrand asked Vratzian to cease all negotiations with Turkey, reject the terms of the Turco-Armenian armistice and invite Soviet forces into the country. Suspecting of the intentions of the Soviets, Vratzian did not call back the Armenian Delegation from Alexandropol, where peace talks were making little headway. The personal mediation of the President of the United States,⁷⁶ however commendable as a humanitarian act, did not ameliorate the political situation which was worsened by an order from Stalin to Orjonikidze in Baku

⁷⁵For the composition of the delegation see Alexander Khatissian, "Alexandrapoloun Khaghaghoutian Banaktzoutioun ev Dashnagri Kenkoume," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. IV, No. 11 (September, 1926), p. 91.

⁷⁶League of Nations, "Telegram Sent by the Council of the League of Nations to the President of the United States of America on 25th November, 1920," Official Journal, Vol. I, No. 8 (November-December, 1920), pp. 91-92.

for immediate operations against Armenia.⁷⁷ On the very next day Legrand informed the Armenian Government that "the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Russia has decided to establish the Soviet regime in Armenia. The Revkom has already arrived in Armenia. Any hesitation is detrimental."⁷⁸ On November 29th Soviet forces marched into Armenia and the Revolutionary Committee quickly followed. In Karvansari the Revkom proclaimed to the world that it "...by the will of the insurgent toiling people of Armenia declares Armenia from now on a Soviet Socialist Republic."⁷⁹ On the next day telegrams to Lenin and Orjonikidze informed of the Soviet success. "May it be known to the leader of the World Revolution," stated the telegram to Lenin, "that the peasants of Dilijan and Karvansarai districts, exasperated with the criminal policy of the Dashnakist Government and with the increasing state of anarchy in the country, have raised the banner of insurrection."⁸⁰ The Government and the Parliament of Armenia decided to accept Legrand's note, attesting to the hopelessness of their position.⁸¹ Negotiations were resumed and an Armeno-Soviet Agreement (Appendix VIII) was signed on December 2, 1920. According to the stipulations of the agreement the Government in Armenia would be handed to the Revolutionary Committee consisting of five Communists and two Dashnakists, the latter to be appointed by

⁷⁷Richard Pipes, op.cit., p. 232. Pipes holds that the sovietization of Armenia was planned at the Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East.

⁷⁸Simon Vratzian, Haiaastani, p. 500. Cf. H. Irazek, loc.cit., p. 86.

⁷⁹Hoktember-Noyember, Taregirk, 1932 (Erivan, 1932), p. 605.

⁸⁰Marietta Shaginian, Journey Through Soviet Armenia (Moscow, 1954), pp. 62-63.

the consent of the Communist Party. This Government would remain in charge of affairs until the convening of the Soviets in Armenia. Pending the arrival of the Revkom of Armenia, authority would be vested to the Military Command headed by General Dro, while, on behalf of the U.S.S.R., Silin would be appointed Commissar of the Armenian Military Command.⁸²

Late on December 2nd the outgoing Government published a statement informing the people that "having in view the situation which has been created in the country due to the external conditions, the Government of the Armenian Republic at its session of 2nd December of the current year has decided to renounce authority and to transfer all military and civilian powers to the Commander-in-Chief, to which office the War Minister, Dr, is hereby appointed."⁸³ The Republic of Armenia was no more.

4.

The Turco-Armenian peace talks began in Alexandropol on November 24, 1920. Progress was slow but Armenian hopes were to some extent raised by the promise of Soviet mediation. A change occurred with Karabekir's note of November 26 to Khatissian. The note stated that the Soviet proposal for mediation⁸⁴ was rejected both by Araratian, the Armenian Minister of Internal Affairs then in Alexandropol, and the Nationalist Govern-

⁸² Hampardzoum Terterian, "The Chanth Mission," The Armenian Review, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (September, 1955), p. 101.

⁸³ Firuz Kazemzadeh, op.cit., p. 290.

⁸⁴ For earlier Soviet support for the Armenian territorial schemes see General Ali Fuat Cebesoy, op.cit., pp. 85-87.

ment. In addition it was pointed out that the Turco-Armenian armistice terms were accepted by the Armenians and the delegates of both sides had already convened in Alexandropol.⁸⁵ Karabekir shrewdly foresaw what could befall the Turkish Pan-Turanian schemes in case Armenia went Bolshevik, or accepted Soviet hegemony giving the right of mediation to Moscow. The Soviet mediation was an excuse to cover up the situation then developing in Erivan. Consequently, to anticipate the unexpected, Karabekir issued an ultimatum on December 1st, calling for a resumption of hostilities unless the peace treaty was signed by the Armenian Delegation. To gain time Khatissian asked Karabekir to send Erivan the main points of the treaty and request authorization to sign the treaty. Late that very night Erivan answered Khatissian's request. "The Government resigned," read Simon Vratzian's cable. "Our forces at Dilijan and Karvansarai met Bolshevik forces without any opposition. With Dro and Terterian from the Dashnakists, a coalition government is being formed with the Bolsheviks. We are obliged to accept the Turkish terms. You are authorized to sign the treaty."⁸⁶ But feeling himself lacking the legal power to sign, Khatissian asked Erivan whether he had the authorization of the new government to do so. General Dro, the Commander-in-Chief, informed him in the name of the "Revolutionary Government" to act as he deemed proper.⁸⁷ But Karo Sassuni, one of the central figures in the events of

⁸⁵ H.T. Petrossian, "Alexandrapoli Dashnagire," Zartonk, November 25, 1961, p. 3. See also Shahan Natali, op.cit., pp. 109-110. Later, on November 29 and 30, Khatissian informed Erivan that if the Armenian Government desired peace with Turkey all Armeno-Soviet negotiations should cease. Ibid., pp. 122-123.

⁸⁶ Alexander Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian, p. 270.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

this period, asserts that it was agreed that Dro, in his capacity of the Head of the Provisional Government, should authorize Khatissian to sign the treaty which the Turks presented.⁸⁸

Though extremely harsh, the Treaty of Alexandropol was signed on December 2/3, 1920, under overwhelming Turkish pressure. The following day, Dro and Silin informed Khatissian that the Delegation to Alexandropol had no power to sign any treaty. Moscow, on the other hand, cabled to Angora that any further advance towards Azerbaijan (through Armenia) would be considered a *casus belli*.⁸⁹

The Treaty of Alexandropol (Appendix IX) all but annihilated Armenia. Armenia was truncated to such an extent that it was no more than Erivan with its environs (Article Two). It was left to the mercy of the Turks who took over themselves the protection of Armenia in case she was attacked by a third power (Article Thirteen). All military force in Armenia was subject to Turkish control whenever Angora desired to assert it (Articles Four and Five). The Treaty of Sevres was rejected (Article Ten), and both parties agreed not to ask war indemnities for damages done (Article Eight). Armenia guaranteed the independent community life of the Moslems in Armenia and the right of Turkey to ratify the election of the Great Mufti, the Moslem religious head in Armenia (Article Eleven). The remaining articles made stipulations for transit,

⁸⁸ Karo Sassuni, "Hai Terkakan Paterazme," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. IV, No. 9 (July, 1926), p. 116. For the telegraphic communications between Dro and Khatissian, ordering the latter to sign the treaty, see Shahan Natali, op.cit., pp. 128-130.

⁸⁹ R.N., "The Situation in Transcaucasia," The Near East, Vol. XIX, No. 508 (February 3, 1921), p. 147.

free passage of persons on the roads of the two countries, and the return of the Armenian refugees to their homes.⁹⁰

The Armenian Republic was no more. It was crushed and broken. History had repeated itself--Armenia was once more divided between Turkey and Russia. The territory left as Armenia had now "a government which was little else than a disguise for the dominion of Moscow."⁹¹ The nationalist Dashnakists both as a government and as a party were exhausted and there was no other force in the country to take their place.⁹² The Armenians had expected much and realized nothing from the West. Bolshevik Russia did what the West refused to do, moving in to protect the remnant of the Armenians.⁹³

⁹⁰ Kiazim Karabekir, op.cit., n.p. (Appendix).

⁹¹ Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923 (London, 1925), p. 368.

⁹² Hovhannes Kachaznuni, op.cit., p. 66.

⁹³ William Linn Westermann, "The Armenian Problem and the Disruption of Turkey," in House, E.M. and Seymour, G., eds., What Really Happened at Paris: The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919 (New York, 1921), p. 468.

CHAPTER IV

SOVIETIZATION AND RESISTANCE

Communists everywhere were enthusiastic over the sovietization of Armenia. It was believed that in Armenia, "even with the first sounds of the victorious Internationale the racial and national phantom...disappeared forever and brotherhood (was) manifested in its stead in people's everyday life."¹ Azerbaijanis, who had made claims to Karabagh, Zangezur, Sharur, Nakhichevan, Veti Basar, Zangi Basar, Aghbaba and Ardahan,² declared that they were "giving up in favour of Soviet Armenia the disputed district of Zangezur, Nakhichevan and Mountainous Karabagh."³ Lenin hastened to greet "toiling Armenia, delivered from the yoke of imperialism."⁴ Even the Nationalist Turks did not hesitate to congratulate the Revkom, although Silin called upon them and the Georgians to evacuate the Armenian territory they held.⁵

¹Sh. Haroutiounian, op.cit., p. 137.

²Karo Sassuni, "Hai Terkakan Paterazme," Hairenik Ansagir, Vol. IV, No. 4 (February, 1926), p. 57.

³Firuz Kazemzadeh, op.cit., p. 292. See also Simon Vratzian, Haiastan Bolshevikian, pp. 218-219; The Times (London), December 7, 1920, p. 11; and The Near East, Vol. XVIII, No. 501 (December 9, 1920), p. 794.

⁴Marietta Shaginian, op.cit., p. 65.

⁵"Armenia," The Near East, Vol. XIX, No. 505 (January 13, 1921), p. 43.

To strengthen Soviet rule in Armenia, Legrand compelled General Dro to issue an order to transform "the Armenian Army into an Armenian Socialist Federalive Sovietic Force."⁶ This achieved, the Armenian Bolsheviks commenced taking revenge. Soon it was evident that no one in Armenia was entitled to have freedom and privacy.⁷

On the heels of a contingent of the Eleventh Red Army, the Revkom of Armenia arrived in Erivan on December 4, 1920, and, discarding the terms of the Armeno-Soviet Agreement, proclaimed Armenia a Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Silin was named to replace Dro.⁸ The first decree of the Revkom referred to a future treaty to be based on brotherly accord and reciprocal responsibilities between Soviet Armenia and toiling Turkey,⁹ but no one in Armenia could be optimistic on that account, especially while conditions in the country were deteriorating day by day. To put its house in order the Revkom issued decree after decree. On December 5th Avis Nurijanian, a mere lad of twenty-one, was entrusted the Commissariat of Military Affairs, and the Commissariat of the Red Army of Soviet Armenia was founded. The previous military laws were repealed and Soviet Russian laws introduced in their stead. Armenian officers were replaced by Russians from Moscow and Baku.¹⁰

⁶ Oliver Baldwin, op.cit., p. 35.

⁷ Simon Vratzian, "Housher Motik Antzialitz," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. II, No. 2 (December, 1923), p. 67. See also Armen Sevan, "Peter-var Tasnevouti Heghapokhoutiounne," Vem, Vol. IV, No. 1 (January-February, 1936), p. 91; and Alexander Khatissian, Haiastani Hanrapetoutian, p. 277.

⁸ Oliver Baldwin, op.cit., p. 43.

⁹ Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, p. 518.

¹⁰ Sh. Haroutiounian, op.cit., p. 134. See also H.M. Elchibekian and A. M. Hakobian, op.cit., p. 74.

By December 6th it was evident that the Armeno-Soviet Agreement had no real validity. Arrests, starting in the army now included Dashnakists and pro-Dashnakist civilians. Those who had earlier managed to avoid arrest were now brought to Eriwan in disgrace and barefooted. A Communist saturnalia of looting and pillaging spread everywhere.¹¹ To make the arrests more effective and to stamp out oppositionist elements in the country, the Extraordinary Commission, better known as Cheka, was organized under the presidency of Sh. Amirkhanian. The Commission forbade all publications, closed down all clubs, societies, and gathering places, and ordered the immediate arrest of all those whom it deemed dangerous.¹² Although the Revkom endeavoured to channel and control the activities of the Cheka, it failed, and the Dashnakists realized that it would be far better for them if they had come "to some arrangement with Angora rather than with Moscow."¹³

The external relations of the Revkom were no better. In spite of the ultimatum dispatched by Silin, Turkey continued to hold Alexandropol, and Georgia closed her roads and railways to the transit of goods destined to Armenia. Sheinman, the Soviet plenipotentiary representative in Georgia, wrote to Gegekori that Russia would not remain a by-stander to the sufferings of Armenia,¹⁴ and the Revkom of Armenia demanded that Georgia evacuate the neutral zone. Georgian troops had

¹¹H. Marmandian, "Exile of the Armenian Officers," The Armenian Review, Vol. XI, No. 1 (April, 1958), p. 102.

¹²Sh. Haroutiounian, loc.cit.

¹³The Near East, Vol. XIX, No. 507 (January 27, 1921), p. 102.

¹⁴Firuz Kazemzadeh, op.cit., p. 306.

occupied it during the Turco-Armenian conflict and now the Soviets demanded that Armenian refugees be permitted to return home. But Georgia kept her doors closed.¹⁵

Failing to better her relations with the external world, the Revkom turned to the consolidation of its power in the country, which meant large-scale requisitioning. "The Revkom," as B. Borian, the Soviet Armenian historian, put it, "started a ruthless and detrimental requisitioning without putting any discrimination among people, and without following the principle of class-distinctipn; besides, it was carried on without taking into consideration the economic standing and the psychological constitution of the peasantry...The Revkom decided to confiscate and render state property the food from the city-dwellers, and the grain from the peasantry. Everything was taken and owned by the State in a disorderly manner: military uniforms, tools of artisans, rice mills owned by individuals or by the public, all the water-mills, implements of barbers, bee hives, underwear, clothes, (and) household furniture of the citizens..."¹⁶ All this was carried out with extreme security. If the Bolsheviks had displayed some common sense and political tact, they might have guaranteed an untroubled establishment in Armenia. But, although there were no opposing forces, adverse political currents, or intriguing elements at work, they hunted for counter-revolution where it did not exist.¹⁷

¹⁵ Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, p. 515.

¹⁶ "Petervarian Apestamboutian Patjarnere," Droshak, Vol. XXXI, Nos. 1-2 (January-February, 1931), p. 5.

¹⁷ Hovhannes Kachaznuni, op.cit., p. 46.

Military Communism, as practised in Armenia, and the inability of the Revkom to remove the Turks from occupied Armenian regions would, it was clear, create exasperation and provide a basis for anti-Communist propaganda in the country. The Revkom failed utterly to achieve the realization of, at least, the expectations of the Western Armenians, who had long awaited the liberation of their homeland. Under their pressure, the Revkom was once more compelled to notify Angora and the Commander of the Turkish Armies of the Eastern Front that the Soviet Government at Erivan expected Nationalist Turkey to declare the Alexandropol Treaty null and void and establish friendly relations with Soviet Armenia. But Ahmet Muhtar, the Nationalist Turkish Commissar for Foreign Affairs, saw no reason to repudiate a treaty by the force of which Turkey held districts with a Turkish majority (Map II).¹⁸

In fact, the majority of which Ahmet Muhtar was talking was not yet in being. The Armenian districts were devastated and depopulated. Anything on which the Turks could lay hands was taken away. Massacres did the rest. About sixty-five thousand Armenians were put to death, thirty-two thousand met their end because of starvation, and more than fifteen thousand were driven to Erzerum for forced labour. The regions of Kars and Alexandropol were sentenced to silence.¹⁹ The lot of the prisoners of war was no better. Out of 7600 only 355 returned home, while the rest were butchered to a man.²⁰

¹⁸Firuz Kazemzadeh, op.cit., p. 292. Cf. Alexander Khatissian, Haiastrani Hanrapetoutian, p. 281.

¹⁹H.M. Elchibekian, op.cit., p. 32. Cf. A. M. Poghossian, op.cit., pp. 376-377. See also The Times (London), June 1, 1921, p. 9.

²⁰Oliver Baldwin, op.cit., pp. 189-190. See also League of Nations, "Letter to the Secretary-General from the Armenian Delegation to the Peace Conference, July 21st, 1921," Official Journal, Vol. II, No. 2 (October, 1921), p. 896.

The Revkom proved incapable of satisfying the political demands of the moment. Instead of endeavouring to fight disaster and open vistas for a brighter future, it continued attempts to enforce Military Communism at home. Such circumstances explained the creation of a Dashnakist Central Committee under the presidency of Simon Vratzian, with the mission of coordinating all Dashnakist movements in Armenia and leading the country in any forthcoming revolt.²¹ All later events support the assertion that the Committee's existence was made possible by the financial support of the British and French²² to fight the Soviet rule in Armenia and bring forth its final overthrow.²³

The new Dashnakist Central Committee commenced organizing all available forces and established relations with the Zangezur region which had already proclaimed its independence on December 25, 1920. This latter act was tantamount to hoisting the standard of revolt.²⁴

While the Dashnakists were organizing themselves unmolested, the Revkom of Armenia, the Soviet of Baku, and the Government at Moscow were mounting a general diplomatic offensive attack against Tiflis. By December 30th it was evident that any reason, however minor, would be employed by the Soviet bloc to commence military operations against

²¹Karo Sassuni, "Petervarian Apestamboutiounne," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. IV, No. 1 (November, 1925), pp. 83-84.

²²Sh. Haroutiounian, op.cit., p. 147. See also H.M. Elchibekian and A.M. Hakobian, op.cit., pp. 89-90.

²³Leo, op.cit., p. 249.

²⁴Lernahaiastani Karavaroutiounne, Arnot Girk (Gerusi, 1921), pp. 1-53.

Georgia. Apprehensive of imminent danger, in a note dated January 3, 1921, Sabakhtarashvili, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, asked Erivan to send representatives to Tiflis for immediate negotiations. In principle the presence of Russian representatives in the negotiations was accepted with Georgia and Armenia deciding their status. But Russian insistence on a voice equal to the other two ruined any prospect for negotiations. The Georgians continued to keep their borders with Armenia closed.²⁵

Nor did Turco-Revkom relations display signs of improvement. The Nationalist Turks harassed the territories they occupied in spite of Revkom notes on January 7th and 18th, and, to mention just one instance out of the many, out of a population formerly sixty-two percent Christian in Kars, there remained only two percent, and it was non-Armenian.²⁶

Having failed in foreign relations, the Revkom now turned to look after the internal conditions of the country,²⁷ endeavouring to bring the sovietization of Armenia to a successful conclusion by methods employed in Moscow and Petrograd. It had already ordered the dissolution of all the pre-Soviet Armenian delegations, missions and representatives to the Peace Conference of Paris, the United States and the capitals of Europe and Asia²⁸ and had severed all diplomatic relations.

²⁵Firuz Kazemzadeh, op.cit., p. 307.

²⁶A.M. Poghossian, op.cit., p. 380. Cf. Sarkis Atamian, op.cit., p. 246.

²⁷Prior to this some russification in the administration was already achieved.

²⁸Sh. Haroutiounian, op.cit., p. 132.

With the help of the Cheka Communistic ideology was grafted onto everything in Armenia. The influence of Communism was felt in every walk of life.²⁹ Yet the nationalism of Armenia survived all changes and horrors brought about by the nihilism of the early Communism as practised in Armenia and enforced by the Extraordinary Commission. If Soviet rule was to be consolidated, the Revkom and the Cheka realized that they had to enjoy the full support of the Armenian army. To achieve that end Atarbekian, the new head of the Cheka, now turned.

The purge of the Armenian army began in the second half of December with the arrest of several hundred officers. Seventy were sent to Baku, purportedly to specialize in Soviet military tactics, and the rest were sentenced to imprisonment.³⁰ But General Dro seemed to present a real impediment to the Cheka purges. Consequently, early in January, 1921, Hecker, the Commander of the Eleventh Red Army in Baku, asked Dro to present himself to the General Headquarters and report on the military situation in Soviet Armenia. Although some Dashnakists in Erivan urged him to reject Hecker's demand, Dro left the Armenian capital for Baku on January 10, 1921 "in accordance with the decision of the (Dashnakist) Party and with his own consent,"³¹ most probably only after preparing the ground for the imminent anti-Soviet revolt. (Soviet historians explain his exile as a consequence of this fact.³²) Once he had

²⁹ According to the 1922 official Soviet statistics, there were 3828 Communists in Armenia, who constituted not more than 1.02% of all the Armenians in the country. See Richard Pipes, op.cit., p. 268.

³⁰ Simon Vratzian, "Housher..." Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. II, No.3 (January, 1924), p. 88.

³¹ D. Zareh (Dro), "Bolsheviknere Inchpes Derjetzin Irentz Khostounnere," Arevelk, December 2, 1942, p. 2.

³² Sh. Haroutiounian, op.cit., pp. 146-147.

departed, the Cheka started mass arrests and purged the army on a scale not witnessed before. Officers were asked to fill questionnaires by the preliminary study of which some twenty-nine were sent to the dungeons. This served as an immediate excuse for the Dashnakists and the peasantry to move, and, on January 22, 1921, they "rose in revolt in an endeavour to save the remnants of their stores. The natural result followed: the rising was suppressed with the aid of Baku; and...the Armenian peasants were so brutally handled that the Commissar responsible, one Orjonikidze, was actually censured by Moscow."³³

Meanwhile the Cheka ordered all officers to report at the Parliament Building for a general check-up and registration. In obedience to the order, on January 24th, the officers went to the specified place and were arrested to a man. Fifteen hundred were immediately deported to Azerbaijan "without food, without extra clothing, without snow boots, without being able to say good-bye to their families..."³⁴

On the night of February 8, 1921, the exile of the Armenian officers was followed by the mass imprisonment of more than two hundred intellectuals, writers, artists, poets, doctors, professors, students,

³³The Near East, Vol. XIX, No. 507 (January 27, 1921), p. 102. Cf. The Times (London), January 24, 1921, p. 10.

³⁴Oliver Baldwin, op.cit., p. 82. See also H. Marmandian, loc.cit., pp. 103-104; H. Irazek, Motik Antzialitz, p. 100; Armen Sevan, loc.cit., p. 96; Z. Ashkhatuni, "Dervagner Mer Azatoutian Paikaritz," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. III, No. 9 (July, 1925), p. 129. Taking from the Tiflis Slovo, February 10, 1921, Kazemzadeh cites the number of those arrested as 560. See Firuz Kazemzadeh, op.cit., p. 293.

ex-parliament members, ex-ministers, and citizens of various professions. Vratzian made representations to the Revkom, but no change in the purge-policy followed. On the contrary, to get rid of those Dashnakists who had remained unmolested according to the stipulations of the Legrand-Dro-Terterian agreement of December 2, 1920, the Revkom ordered their arrests as well.³⁵

At this point the Soviet attack on Georgia commenced, aided by anti-Menshevik uprisings started in Lori and Borchalo districts. All the circumstances suggest that it was the Kavburo (Caucasian Bureau of the Communist Party) which decided and executed the sovietization of Georgia by military operations, while Armenia provided the immediate cause of hostilities.³⁶ When Armenian Soviet military contingents were dispatched to fight the Menshevik forces, Vratzian and his colleagues considered the prospect of an armed uprising in the country and the seizure of Erivan.³⁷

The revolt was planned in Zangezour. Kouro Tarkhanian was appointed the Chief of Staff of operations. The General Command was entrusted to Mardiros of Bashgiarni, an experienced Dashnakist guerilla fighter.

³⁵ Simon Vratzian, Haiaastani, p. 526.

³⁶ For Sheinman's reasons why Georgia was attacked see The Times (London), February 23, 1921, p. 10.

³⁷ Yervant Hayrabedian, "The February 18, 1921 Armenian Revolt: The Memoirs of Company Commander Mardiros of Bashgiarni," The Armenian Review, Vol. X, No. 3 (September, 1957), p. 146.

Military operations against the Soviet forces in Armenia started on February 12, 1921, and on the next day the insurgents registered their first military success in Keshishkend, Bashgiarni, Abaran, Novo Bayazed, Akhta, and other places. The soldiers of the 180th battalion of the Twentieth Division of the Eleventh Red Army were killed to a man.³⁸ On February 16th, Communist wrote of some "slight trouble with rebel bands in the hills behind Erivan,"³⁹ while a decree ordered the insurgents to stop the revolt or else the Cheka would shoot all the Dashnakist leaders now in prison. But the revolt did not stop and the night of February 16, 1921 witnessed the shooting of the first twenty-five. In the face of the cold-blooded massacre of the Dashnakists, Vratzian implored the insurgents to march on and seize Erivan on the next day.⁴⁰ Due to the severity of the weather the insurgents could not arrive in Erivan in time and a second group of prisoners was put to death by pole-axing.⁴¹

The Dashnakist irregulars reached Erivan on February 17th, and asked Sirit, the Russian Military Commander of the Erivan forces, to surrender. Karo Sassuni, on the other hand, ordered S. Kassian to transfer authority in Armenia to the re-established legal Government of Simon Vratzian.⁴² The surrender refused, the rebels marched into

³⁸Sh. Haroutiounian, op.cit., p. 157.

³⁹Oliver Baldwin, op.cit., p. 101.

⁴⁰Yervant Hayrabedian, "The February 18, 1921...", The Armenian Review, Vol. X, No. 4 (December, 1957), p. 150.

⁴¹H. Irazek, Motik Antzialitz, pp. 103-104.

⁴²Karo Sassuni, loc.cit., p. 96.

the city the next morning and after liberating the remnant of the Dashnakist prisoners, proceeded towards the Parliament Building. A. Nuri-janian and G. Atarbekian, the Commissar for Military Affairs and the Head of the Cheka respectively, took refuge in the two armoured trains at the railway station and left the city.

With the capital freed from the Revkom and its troops, a new coalition government, the Committee for the Liberation of the Fatherland, was formed under the presidency of Simon Vratzian. The decree issued in the afternoon of February 18, 1921 read that "until the formation of the government, all administrative power is vested to the Committee for the Liberation of the Fatherland. Each citizen must abide with law and order. All regulations issued by the Committee for the Liberation of the Fatherland must be unreservedly followed by all the citizens."⁴³

Telegrams were immediately dispatched to the League of Nations and the Great Powers appealing to the conscience of civilized humanity and protesting energetically against all aggression on Armenia.⁴⁴ Dispatches were sent also to Lenin and Chicherin asserting that the armed rebellion was never directed against Russia or Soviet authority.⁴⁵ The telegram to Georgia asked her to extend a helping hand to Armenia. But the latter was herself in need of military help to halt the Bolshevik general offensive which on February 24, 1921 brought about her utter collapse.⁴⁶ It was now evident, as The Times correspondent concluded

⁴³ Simon Vratzian, Haiaastani, p. 528.

⁴⁴ Firuz Kazemzadeh, op.cit., p. 322.

⁴⁵ Simon Vratzian, Haiaastani, pp. 529-530.

⁴⁶ Richard Pipes, op.cit., p. 238.

on February 26th, that "...it is highly improbable that the new National Government will be able to maintain its position."⁴⁷ The fall of Tiflis to the Soviets meant the final fall of Erivan, because it did not take long for the Soviet forces to reach the outskirts of the Armenian capital and heavily shell the city on the 26th of February. But the attack on the 29th was repulsed with great losses. This feat, however, did not mean a final settlement of the conditions, because everybody then in Erivan knew that the Soviets would come back after they reinforced themselves. To oppose them the Dashnakists needed some one to rely on, and, in the circumstances, there was no one but Turkey.

In spite of the prevailing Turcophobia in Armenia, Vratzian and his followers insisted on friendly relations with Turkey.⁴⁸ On March 1, 1921, in his capacity of the president of the Committee for the Liberation of the Fatherland, Vratzian wrote to Beha-ed-Din, the representative of the High Command of the Turkish Eastern Front, to ask of his Government "(1) To return to Armenia all the military prisoners of war now on the front; (2) To give munitions to the Armenian Army, under definite conditions, and, in the first place, Russian rifles, or cartridges for Turkish Mausers, or rifles of Rossi or Liebel brand; and, (3) To inform us whether the Government of the Grand National Assembly could dispatch any military assistance to Armenia and, in case she could, how much, in

⁴⁷The Times (London), March 1, 1921, p. 11.

⁴⁸Simon Vratzian, Kharkhapoumner (Boston, 1924), p. 132. See also A. Petrossian, "Alexandrapoli Dashnagire," Zartonk, December 12, 1961; p. 3; and Leo, op.cit., p. 247.

what ways, and when."⁴⁹ As Vratzian asserted, Armenia stood by the Treaty of Alexandropol. But Turkey did not even take the pains to answer Vratzian, and the Dashnakist-Communist struggle in Armenia continued. Their respective ideologies were definitely inconsistent with respect to the conditions in Armenia. Both parties were visited by destitution and privations. One sought to employ Baku and Moscow to become established in Erivan, and to impose an alien ideology on a people who had no interest other than self-realization. The other stood by itself with the belief that a better day could be created if only one endeavoured for it.

Having received the reinforcements they were waiting for, the Bolsheviks marched on Erivan and surrounded it. By March 9, 1921, the Soviet cordon around the capital was so narrow that it was believed that a few days would be enough to liquidate the "Erivanian adventure of Vratzian."⁵⁰ Vratzian appealed to Moscow "to settle all disputable questions by far more civilized and respectable means"⁵¹ rather than by bayonets and machine-guns, but Moscow did not heed. It was too busy negotiating a treaty with Angora so as to achieve the ideals of World-Communism. The Caucasus held a pivotal position in the whole scheme, and the occupation of Caucasus was imperative because of its oil supplies, which "the Russian workers needed,"⁵² as Radek put it in 1922.

⁴⁹Shahan Natali, op.cit., pp. 134-135.

⁵⁰Sh. Haroutiounian, op.cit., p. 167.

⁵¹Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, p. 537.

⁵²V. Djabogui, "Soviet Colonialism in the Caucasus," Caucasian Review, No. 2 (Munich, 1956), p. 56.

The Kemalist-Soviet Treaty of March 16, 1921, was signed in Moscow (Appendix X) by the terms of which Russia "gave to Turkey both Kars and Ardahan (Map III) while Batum was placed under a Russo-Turkish Condominium...Moscow recognized the Government at Angora, with all territories claimed in the National Pact..."⁵³

By mid-March Vratzian had reached the conclusion that since 1915 the foremost enemy the independent Armenian Government and the Armenian people had was the Russian Bolshevism,⁵⁴ which was now threatening the very existence of the country. On March 20, 1921, Orjonikidze sent an ultimatum to the Committee for the Liberation of the Fatherland ordering it to cease all military operations and lay down all arms,⁵⁵ but hostilities continued. Consequently, with the help of the new reinforcements (received on March 28th) the Bolsheviks commenced a decisive march on Erivan. In the morning of April 2, 1921, they had already reached Kanaker, a few miles north of the capital. Unable to resist the assailants, at noon the Committee forces fell back on Erivan; then panic struck the capital and the people betook themselves to the roads leading out of the city.⁵⁶ On the next day, G. Atarbekian informed Moscow

⁵³Elain Diana Smith, Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Government of the Grand National Assembly, 1919-1923 (Washington, 1959), p. 110. For the negotiations of the Kars Treaty which followed that of Moscow and ratified it see Shahan Natali, Erek Dashmagrer, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1957), pp. 46-52; and Simon Vratzian, "Inchou ev Inchpes Khorherdainatzav Haiastan," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (February, 1941), pp. 88-90.

⁵⁴Simon Vratzian, Haiastani, p. 619.

⁵⁵H.M. Elchibekian and A.M. Hakobian, op.cit., pp. 115-116.

⁵⁶For an eye-witness account of April 2nd conditions in Erivan see V. Minakhorian, "April Erkouki Gaghte," Hairenik Amsagir, Vol. II, No. 2 (December, 1923), pp. 89-97.

that "by the endeavour of the Armenian toiling masses and with the assistance of the contingents of the Red Army, the detestable adventure of the Dashnakist party was today liquidated...Having crushed the bands of adventuresome bandits, the Armenian peasants and labourers occupied Erivan...and hoisted forever the crimson standard of labour. All the population of the city becomingly met the Red Troops."⁵⁷

The Republic of Armenia had once more fallen, this time with no hope of recovery.

⁵⁷ H.M. Elchibekian and A.M. Hakobian, loc.cit., pp. 117-118.

CONCLUSION

Much has been written about the Republic of Armenia. Those writers who participated in helping it to grow and flourish have special and understandable approaches to the period 1917-1921. Others, usually nonparticipants with different orientations, have analyzed and criticized such accounts, often describing the builders of Armenia as little more than adventurers.

The two sets of values by which the period is measured have created a coloured, dogmatized and often unreal history. Logic and common sense have often been overwhelmed by an enthusiasm which has rendered Armenians incapable of evaluating facts and passing sound judgements.

Though the Armenian is in general nationalist, there have been examples of other tendencies, giving rise to factionalism in the Armenian nation at a time when it most needed unity and solidarity.

For forty years which followed the sovietization of the Armenian Republic have already revealed the weakening force of this tendency: the Dashnakists, the Populists, and the Armenian Social Democrats or Henschaks, have never ceased criticizing each other. While most of the contention bears directly on present issues and conditions prevailing in the Armenian diaspora, nevertheless, all of them are either the ramifications of the issues which originated in the days of the Republic of Armenia, or are the offshoots of present political and social

orientations which have their roots deep in the soil of the period of the Armenian Republic.

To understand the present frictions between the Armenian factions, it is necessary to understand the reasons which produced them. These are of two rather distinct characters: first, the internal reasons which undoubtedly were reflections of the external ones; and, second, the external reasons which have their origin somewhere far away from the Armenian polity and social consciousness. These reasons combined brought disaster to the Armenian Republic.

From the first day of independent existence, Armenia was controlled by a host of factors which she could neither anticipate nor alter. To shape a successful national policy called for time and opportunity to concentrate on national consolidation--both of which were denied to Armenia. The two most important factors which effected Armenia were its geographic position and composition. Armenia is a mountainous country surrounded by Turkey on the west, by Iran on the south, by Azerbaijan on the north-east, and by Georgia on the north. Thus, being encircled by other countries, she has neither a direct access to the sea nor any land route to a neutral harbour. The Allied plan of proclaiming Batum and Baku open harbours interested Armenia for a while and engendered hopes of sharing a common window to the open sea with Georgia and other Caucasian countries. There was a time when the prospects of acquiring Trebizond brightened the future of Armenia, but the scheme of taking the harbour from the nationalist Turks was risky and required a force which Armenia could not alone muster. There was no prospect of Western support for their lesser ally on this score.

Armenia had such an isolated position that practically no regular communications between Erivan and the external world existed. Post and telegraph communications were under Georgian control, and, at any time she desired, the Georgian Government could break Armenian communication with others. This at a time when Armenia needed others most.

Geographically not in an enviable position, Armenian stand was worsened by the fact that the country was surrounded by hostile elements. Tartars and Azeris in Azerbaijan, Georgians and Ajarians in Georgia, Kurds and Turks in Eastern Anatolia were all vindictive towards the growing Armenian State which had come to existence after six hundred years of serfdom and misrule. A free and independent Armenia was more than an impediment to the unhindered growth and realization of the Eastern Empire of the Pan-Turanists, Nationalist Turks and the Azerbaijani racialists and fanatics. It was a real danger: an independent Armenia might be a base for the economic, political and military imperialism of the West.

It was at this very point that the interests of the Armenians and those of the Nationalist Turks clashed. Was there a way to coordinate these sundry interests and lead the Armenian State to a safe haven? If there was any it was unknown to the Armenian statesmen and politicians. On the other hand, even if it was found, neither the various governments of Armenia nor the party which backed them would be able to work it out into practicability. Armenia, with her broken and desolate population and with huge numbers of Turkish Armenian refugees,

faced an impossible task. All endeavours to ameliorate the situation in Armenia would utterly fail so long as this host of various hostile elements surrounded the country. The designs and tendencies of the surrounding peoples were imperialistic. Georgia wanted to appropriate Lori, Borchalo, Akhalkalaki, and the Armenian half of Akhaltzikh; Azerbaijan fought for Zangezur, Karabagh and Nakhichevan; Turkey massacred the Armenians of Western Armenia; while the Soviets designed to bring Armenia back to the fold of the Russian Empire.

To cope with these desires, tendencies and appetites, and to work out a means acceptable by all the contenders was undoubtedly a task beyond the capabilities of the Armenian leaders, and, unfortunately, the Armenian was a not match to the Georgian, Azerbaijani and Turkish politicians. The lack of self-rule over six centuries had produced a decline in political acumen, a lack of experience necessary to run a government and establish friendly relations with neighbours.

Armenian foreign policy, perforce, as a consequence of the situation in Armenia, and in the turmoil and chaos of Caucasia achieved but little. Armenian hands were bound on almost all points, and the governments reached agreement with their neighbours only when they could not do otherwise. The agreements with Turkey and the Soviets were the results of deplorable and desperate conditions, both military and political, which Armenia faced. To hold that these were the consequences of a well-balanced and well-planned diplomacy is to hold too much. Armenian administrative machine was poor and the governments which succeeded each other had neither time nor resources to create

the apparatus to run the country. Armenia did not have a Constitution of her own; and she could not drop the Russian laws by which the country continued to be ruled and regulated; she could not have a Legislative representing all the classes of the people of Armenia; the friction between the Russian Armenians and Turkish Armenians was never settled; a coalition in the government was almost never achieved. The elections of June, 1919, displayed how democracy was understood in the country; they proved the political immaturity of the Armenians in deciding on crucial and important questions. The only real coalition had existed in the Council of Armenia, especially after the Declaration of May 28, 1919, but it was short-lived and the Populists opposed it.

The Armenian army, though new and fresh, was never used as efficiently as it could have been. The main difficulty was with its leaders. The Armenian General Staff was composed of those generals who were disciplined in Russian tactics and were accustomed to work with huge armies on large fronts. Some of the generals, though Armenian by birth, did not understand the psychology of their troops who were the sons of the land, while they were newcomers to the country. Some were not bound to the territories for which the battles were waged. Often they did not comprehend the language of their soldiers. The fall of Kars in 1920 was due to these factors rather than to the indifference of the army corps.

In face of imminent dangers all the Armenian governments were compelled to call all available hands to the colours. Mobilization, partial or general, never ceased in Armenia. At its best the army counted some forty thousand, but most of them were new draftees hastily

collected, hastily armed and hastily sent to the front. Some of them were undoubtedly Communists who helped to lower the morale of the army which was never given the chance to be disciplined and to adjust itself to the requirements of the battlefield. Fight the soldiers did, but the love of the fatherland was not enough. Of prime importance is the fact that the Armenian army was never well equipped. The Armenian governments asked the Great Powers for arms and ammunitions, clothing and equipment, but what they were given did not amount to much and did not reach in Armenia in time.

The history of the Republic of Armenia is rather the story of a continuous war. The Armenian National Council had to fight the Ottoman Turks in 1918; then started the Armeno-Georgian contentions; soon after the Armeno-Azerbaijani struggles commenced. The 1920's saw the clashes between the Armenians and the Nationalist Turkish forces which culminated in the Armeno-Turkish War. The December of 1920 witnessed the transfer of power to the Soviets, but three months were enough to recommence hostilities, this time within the country, against Soviet rule in Armenia. The February Revolt concluded only on April 2, 1921, ending with it both the Armeno-Soviet struggles started in the May of 1920 and the Dashnakist-nationalist Republic of Armenia.

All these wars and contentions meant death, agony, bloodshed and calamity. They were intermingled with destruction, fire and massacre, pestilence, deprivation and misery. Sickness did the rest, and the population, exhausted and in destitution, as it was, gravely declined. Armenia lacked everything essential for keeping life going. Assistance from Great Britain and the United States of America, though of

great help, did not produce relief. The help was microscopic compared to the need.

The country was bankrupt without natural wealth and resources. Industry, where it existed, was in its infancy. The Government Funds raised by the Armenian diaspora were not enough to save the country from economic failure. Taxation was in its first stage. Commerce and trade, exports and imports and all ceased, because, first, the country was blockaded by the surrounding countries, and, second, the prevailing state of war did never give a chance for their growth. Neither the Armenian governments nor the Allied High Commissioner could change the situation. Both Tiflis and Baku held a hostile stand towards Armenia. Inflation was a well known word in the Armenia of 1917-1921. The purchasing value of the Armenian banknote was so low that neither the subsequent issues of the Armenian Republican Bonds nor loans could help raise it.

No government in Armenia, of whatever orientation and composition, could hope much to improve the state of affairs in the country in the given circumstances. The country was a patchwork of sundry social tendencies and different orientations. Moslems revealed separatist feelings and even established their own tiny independent governments. Kars and Nakhichevan had their shuras which accepted the authority of Erivan only through the compulsion of the Armenian forces. The Western Armenians declined to recognize the Republic of Armenia and called it the Republic of Ararat. All the endeavours to bring the Armenian factions together failed; even the Act of May 28, 1919, could not do it, and the question of a United and Independent Armenia, combining the two halves of the Armenian territories, remained unanswered. Consequently the governments

of the Armenian Republic did not present all Armenia and all the Armenians, Western and Eastern.

Factionalism in Armenia was helped and nurtured from without. Moslems were backed by the Nationalist Turks and the Azerbaijanis; the Western Armenians and the parties within their political scope--the Armenian Social Democrats, and the Populists--by the majority of the Armenian diaspora, especially by Boghos Nubar Pasha and his following. The story of the two Armenian delegations to the Peace Conference of Paris is a sad one; who was the real representative of the Armenian people?

To make the situation in Armenia worse Bolshevism spread its influence particularly after the abortive May revolts of 1920. It was an incessant danger hovering over the heads of the governments, and there was no moment in the history of the Armenian Republic during which the haunting figure of World Communism had not shown itself to the baffled consciousness of the administrative circles in Armenia.

If the Armenian State was to survive, it needed the assistance and protection of a Great Power. Russia was in the grip of a devastating revolution. Nationalist Turkey was out of question; Armenians would rather join hands with the devil than with Turkey, Nationalist or otherwise. The latter day Turkish orientation of the Dashnakists would never be forgiven. Consequently, the only hope the Armenians had was in the West. But the political and economic interests of the Western Powers were so diverse, self-centered and conflicting that no one of those Powers, even those which had solemnly pledged themselves to constitute a free and independent Armenia after the World War was over, did not

care to back and protect Armenia against foreign incursions. Armenia needed a mandatory to keep her political existence going at least for the formative years. But no one wanted to extend a helping hand to her, not even the United States of America in whom the Armenian trust was so immense that American rejection of the offer of the Armenian mandate was never comprehended neither by the leading circles of Armenia nor by the individual Armenian. Armenia was poor, and, hence, she was a liability. No one desired to take up the burden. The League of Nations, on the other hand, declined to back Armenia in spite of its good wishes; it had neither the force nor the means, and sympathetic words, expressions and feeling could not save a country and its independence.

Probably the root of all this was the Treaty of Sevres. The terms of the armistice of October 30, 1918, were never put into force, and Turkey was the only belligerent who kept her armed forces in the Anatolian hinterland. No Western Power deemed it necessary to find out what was happening in the interior of Anatolia. The West failed to realize that the Ottoman Empire was not just Constantinople.

When the Treaty of Sevres was signed on August 10, 1920, the same indifference was there. There was no force whatever which could impose the treaty provisions. The Nationalist Turks, on the other hand, rejected the whole idea of the Treaty of Sevres. The result was clear. Five months were enough to prove to the West that neither the League of Nations and the Great Powers, nor the President of the United States was enough guarantee for the working of the peace terms.

The leaders of Nationalist Turkey held that it was the sword which would ultimately decide the validity of treaties, and the West

soon realized the truth of the Turkish maxim.

Soviet Russia soon demonstrated that she would follow the same path and discard the Soviet-Armenian Agreement of December 2, 1920. The Caucasus was to be a part of the Soviet Empire as it had been a part of the Tzarist Empire. The Caucasus had fought for her independence; it was its undeniable right; but rights had to be backed by force, and neither Armenia nor the Caucasus as a whole had the sufficient force to stem the growing menace of the Soviets.

Would the return of the Russians change anything in the Armenian social and political consciousness? Armenian independence, as the Armenian chauvinists had understood it, had been a misnomer; Armenian nationalism had led the Armenians to different orientations and factionalism. Would the new orders in the country produce any change to the better? What Armenia needed most was peace. Would she be given any? Would she be left unmolested to heal her wounds and ameliorate her lot? The only thing the Armenian longed and looked for was the possibility of living the life his fathers had bequeathed to him and to project himself into the future when once more he would be given the chance to be the master of his own destiny.

No one can deny him, the Armenian, his right to believe in his own future. No one can hold him back from following his own destiny. The Armenian believes in the future of mankind, in man's faculties and his independence, and, what is of prime importance, in individualism in brotherhood. This is perhaps the reason why he has been able to survive

under a new form of political life imposed from above and indeed has benefitted from it. He does not hold that with the fall of man's political status he is ultimately to be lost as a political potentiality. Armenians can look back upon a long history of struggle for the fatherland, for freedom and justice, which has endured with hope over twenty-six centuries, and be proud of it.

APPENDICES

	Page
I. Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between the Ottoman Imperial Government and the Republic of Armenia, June 4, 1918.....	101
II. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey, Signed at Sevres, August 10, 1920..	114
III. The Soviet Decree Concerning Turkish Armenia, January 13, 1918.....	117
IV. Russon-Turkish Agreement, August 24, 1920.....	119
V. Russo-Armenian Agreement, October 21, 1920.....	121
VI. Turkish Terms of Armistice, November 8, 1920.....	123
VII. Karabekir's Terms of Armistice, November 8, 1920.....	125
VIII. Armeno-Soviet Agreement, December 2, 1920.....	128
IX. Treaty of Alexandropol, December 2/3, 1920.....	129
X. National Turkish-Soviet Russian Treaty, March 16, 1921	135

APPENDIX I

A.

TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP
BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT AND THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA¹

June 4, 1918

On one side the Ottoman Imperial Government and on the other the Government of the Republic of Armenia, which has proclaimed herself independent, having agreed upon the establishment of neighbourly and friendly relations on political, judicial, economic and cultural bases between their countries, have assigned their plenipotentiaries:

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

His Excellency Khalil Bey, Deputy Minister of Justice, President of the Administrative Council, and the President of the Delegation; His Excellency Major-General Vehib Mehmed Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Forces of the Caucasian Front, Military Delegate.

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Mr. Alexander Khatissian, President of the Delegation;
Mr. Reuben Kachazmuni, Delegate;

¹Kh. H. Badalian, op.cit., pp. 179-185.

Mr. Michael Papajanian, Delegate;

whose credentials are examined and are found legitimate.

The two delegations have agreed on the following terms:

ARTICLE I. Enduring peace and lasting friendship will be established between the Ottoman Imperial Government and the Government of the Republic of Armenia.

ARTICLE II. The following frontier line separates the Ottoman Empire from the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan:

The frontier line starts from that point where the Cholak River joins the Black Sea and corresponds to the pre-1877 frontier line between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, reaches to Shavnabad mountains and proceeding on the line of picks reaches to Khalkhama and Mepiskaro mountains (in accord with the 1856 boundary line); it diverges therefrom to the south, passes over the summit of the Pirsakat mountain and, turning to the north-east, it reaches the summit of Karkhoul Daghi falling two kilometers south of Abastumani; from that point, first heading five kilometers towards north-east and then towards south-east, it reaches the town of Kourgel, crosses the Kura River two kilometers south of Adskhuri, and, running on the line formed by the picks of Gaiapashi, Ortatapa and Garagaia mountains, it reaches the Lake of Tapiskorska, on the immediate south of the monastery of Molita; this line runs in such a way that the portion which remains on the south of the straight line which leaves the nearby south of the monastery of Molita and meets

a point on the opposite bank which is found on a distance of one-and-a-half kilometer on the south-east of the northern end of the lake; this line reaches the Tavkoteli mountain, from where it advances to the South and to the summits of the Shavnabad, Karagouzou and Samsar mountains; then diverging eastward it passes through the summits of the Davagiran range, and then proceeds to the south passing the tops of Aghrikar, Pashkiran, and Nurrahman mountains. From the Nurrahman it continues towards the south and always advancing parallel to the line formed by the mountain peaks, it meets the Alexandropol-Tiflis railway on a point five kilometers west of the town of Akboulag. From there, following the line of summits, it reaches the town of Khanvali, from where, almost in a straight line, it reaches to the highest peak of Alagiaz and, once more continuing almost in a straight line, it crosses the Echmiadzin-Sardarabad highway on a spot lying seven kilometers west of Echmiadzin; then diverging on a point seven kilometers from this city, it follows parallel to the Alexandropol-Julfa railroad on a line about six kilometers to the south, and crosses it on a point sixteen kilometers south-west on that road which joins the town of Bashkieran to the railroad; then it diverges to the south-east, proceeds through a point one kilometer to the west of the village of Ashaghi-Garapaghlar and through the village of Shahablo, Garakhach, and Ashaghi-Chanakhchi and reaches to Elpin-Chai River which it follows till the town of Arpa; starting with this latter point it joins the road by the Arpachai valley, reaches the town of Kayalo, and, following the stream of Gayid, it reaches the summit of Aktapan mountain, then passing over the tops of Karaturna, Arajin and Garanlik mountains, it reaches the flank of Kalianchai, follows the road by the valley so as to reach from

the south of the town of Aza to the town of Alijin which is found on the old Russo-Persian frontier.

The final demarcation of the frontier will be determined on the spot by a commission composed of the members of the two parties.

ARTICLE III. The treaty between the Government of the Republic of Armenia and the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, to define their common frontier, will be communicated to the Ottoman Imperial Government.

ARTICLE IV. The Ottoman Imperial Government promises to bring military help to the Government of the Republic of Armenia, whenever the latter asks for it, to guarantee peace and order in the country.

ARTICLE V. The Government of the Republic of Armenia promises to fight the formation and the arming of any bandit groups within the boundaries of her country as well as to disarm and disperse all those bandit groups which would come to find shelter therein.

ARTICLE VI. The religion and customs of the Moslem inhabitants of the Republic of Armenia will be respected. The name of His Imperial Majesty will be mentioned during the public worship of the Moslems. They will enjoy the judicial and political rights accorded to the citizens of other religions. They will be free to teach in their mother tongue as well as in the language of their religion.

To guarantee the working of worship and charity, Moslem communities will be organized as legal organs, to establish mosques, hospitals and schools.

For the management of religious and benevolent institutions they will have income-producing real and movable estates which will be looked after by especial managers.

The chief mufti will be established in Erivan, the capital of the Republic of Armenia, while the other muftis will live in other centres of the Republic, wherever their presence is necessary.

The inter-relation of these muftis with the Sheikh-ul-Islamate, as well as their rights and duties, will be determined by the tractate attached to this treaty.

ARTICLE VII. Taking into consideration that there exists no treaty, agreement, deed, contract, covenant, or document, international or otherwise, the two negotiating parties agree to sign an ambassadorial agreement, a treaty of trade and documents which they deem necessary to regulate their legal and economic relations. The ambassadorial agreement will be signed within two years after the ratification of this treaty. In this period of transition, the ambassadors, consuls and vice-consuls of the two parties will enjoy, on the bases of general international rights, their privileges and duties according to the most favoured nation treatment, and on the condition of reciprocity. The negotiations for a trade treaty, which will be signed according to the general international rights, will start as soon as the final peace is signed between Turkey on one side and those countries which are now in a state of war with her on the other.

Till then, and until December 31, 1919, the temporary state established by the Annex No. 1 of the present treaty will be held on both sides under all conditions; it can be revoked starting with June 30, 1919, such revokation to be effective six months later.

Railway communication will begin after the exchange of the ratified samples of this treaty.

ARTICLE VIII. The two parties pledge to give to each other any kind of facility for the transportation by railway through establishing and effecting reduced fares. Especially, reduced fares will be used for the transportation of materials for constructing railway or other public buildings, and for their exploitation and management. The exchange of locomotives and waggons on the railway lines will be effected according to the international principles bearing on the subject.

The agreeing parties will start immediate negotiations to determine the details of the previous terms.

ARTICLE IX. Until the participation of the Republic of Armenia in the International Union of Post and Telegraph, postal and telegraphic correspondence will be conducted between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Armenia after the exchange of the ratified copies of the present treaty, according to the stipulations of the conventions, agreements, and regulations of the International Union of Post and Telegraph.

ARTICLE X. The inhabitants and communities of any one of the two agreeing parties, who have rights of ownership and exploitation on the real estate found on the other side of the boundary, will be able to benefit,

to exploit, or to let, to manage or to sell them personally or by an agent.

Unless the question deals with a public enterprise, no one will be deprived of his right to property in the above mentioned possessions; in that case he will receive the corresponding compensation.

No hindrance will be created for the inhabitants and the representatives of the above mentioned communities while they cross the frontier, whenever they present their passports which will be given to them by the authorities of their country and will be given a visa by the corresponding authorities of the other party.

Certain facilities and especial privileges will be accorded to cross the frontier and to trade in the regions by the frontier.

The details of the previous terms will be regulated by the Annex No. 2 of the present treaty.

ARTICLE XI. The Government of the Republic of Armenia pledges to exert all endeavour to evacuate the city of Baku of the Armenian forces therein immediately after the present treaty is signed, and to guarantee that this evacuation will not produce any collision.

ARTICLE XII. The terms of the general peace treaty and its annexes which were signed at Brest-Litovsk between the Ottoman Empire and its allies and Russia will be in force on the two agreeing parts, as much as they do not contradict the present treaty.

ARTICLE XIII. As soon as this treaty is signed, the armies of the two states found in the areas not mentioned in the boundaries determined by the present treaty, will evacuate these areas.

ARTICLE XIV. The present treaty will be ratified, and the exchange of the ratified copies will be done in Constantinople in a month's time, or, if it is possible, in a shorter period. It will start to be in force on the day of its exchange.

On the bases of the above mentioned terms, the plenipotentiaries signed the present treaty of peace and friendship and sealed it by their seals.

Done in two copies in Batum on the 4th of June, 1918.

Signed:	Khalil	A. Khatissian
	Vehib	R. Kachazmuni
		M. Papajanian

B.

SUPPLEMENT TO THE TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP OF JUNE
4, 1918, SIGNED BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA²

Desirous of solving immediately the questions arising from the World War, the Government of the Ottoman Empire and the Government of the Republic of Armenia decided to sign a provisional supplementary agreement which will be in force to the end of the World War, and they assigned the following as their representatives:

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

His Excellency Khalil Bey, Deputy Minister of Justice, and the President of the Delegation;

His Excellency Major-General Vehib Mehmed Pasha, Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Forces of the Caucasian Front, Military Delegate.

²Ibid., pp. 189-193.

THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA

Mr. Alexander Khatissian, President of the Delegation;

Mr. Reuben Kachaznuni, Delegate;

Mr. Michael Papajanian, Delegate,

who after having acquainted themselves with each other's credentials and finding them accurate, agreed on the following terms:

ARTICLE I. The Government of the Republic of Armenia undertakes to disband her forces immediately. The amount of her forces, as well as the military zones where the troops will be quartered, will be decided in accordance with the Government of the Ottoman Empire, for the entire duration of the World War.

ARTICLE II. The Government of the Republic of Armenia is compelled to send away immediately from her territory all the officers and civil representatives of those countries which are in a state of war with Turkey or with her allies, as well as the officers and the representatives of their allies. Moreover, the Government of Armenia will not accept any officer and in general any one from the said warring countries during the entire duration of the World War.

ARTICLE III. 1. The Government of the Republic of Armenia agrees to the military transit of the Ottoman Army (troops, soldiers, uniforms, military equipments, ammunitions, provisions, etc.) (through her territory). It is understood that the transportations will not be directed against the Armenian Government.

2. The commission appointed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman Army, in agreement with the commission appointed by the Government of Armenia, and corresponding to the fullest capacity of the railways of the Republic, will prepare and prescribe the bases and the details of the transportations mentioned in the first paragraph.

The transportation will be done through the means and the personnel of the management of the railways of the Armenian Republic, according to the directions of the Commander of the Ottoman Army through the Ottoman Commission.

3. By the general agreement of the railway commissions of the two parties, an Ottoman officer with a sufficient number of assistants will be assigned to important railway stations so as to guarantee therein the provisioning and ease of the Turkish troops and to supervise the transportation according to the given orders. The officer will not infringe the rights of the station-master with whom he will be related. The Government of the Republic of Armenia will facilitate the acquiring of provisions which the Ottoman officer will buy during the transportation of the troops.

4. The commissions mentioned in the second and third paragraphs will start their work in Erivan at most a week after this agreement is signed. Meanwhile the railway administration will gather and prepare all the necessary informations about the condition of the railways, immovable properties and trains, so as to make it possible to find without delay the full capacity of transportation.

5. The Government of Armenia is compelled to keep in good condition the railway as well as the trains, and to repair quickly the damages and the destruction incurred by casual causes or obstruction.

6. In order to anticipate any intentional loss and destruction, as well as any possible misunderstanding between the two parties, the Government of Armenia is compelled to put guards on those sections of the railroad where she deems them necessary. In case the said Government is unable to protect any section of the railroad, the Ottoman forces, after the consent of the Government of Armenia, will be entrusted with the task.

7. The Government of the Armenian Republic is obliged to disperse any force which tends to mar the said transportations. In case she is unable to do so, the Ottoman forces, by the consent of the Government of Armenia, will intervene to disperse these forces. After the disposal of all hindrances, the safety of the railroad will be guaranteed according to the content of the sixth paragraph.

8. As much as Ottoman military transportations permit it, the Ottoman army will endeavour not to hamper the Republic's military as well as civil transportation on the railways.

9. The above mentioned conditions will hold true for the military transportations on the other routes of the Republic too.

ARTICLE IV. The Ottoman Imperial Government has the right to permit her allies to benefit from the rights the third clause accords her.

ARTICLE V. The convention for the exchange of the prisoners of war signed between the Government of the Ottoman Empire and the former Government of the Transcaucasian Confederation,--a copy of which will be attached to this agreement--, will be in force for the two signatory parties.

ARTICLE VI. This supplementary agreement will enter into force from the day on which it is signed. The ratified copies will be exchanged in Constantinople in a month's time, or earlier if possible, in affirmation to which the delegates signed this agreement and sealed it.

Signed: Khalil	A. Khatissian
Vehib	M. Papajanian
	R. Kachaznuni

C.

AGREEMENT TO PARTITION THE TRANSCAUCASIAN RAILWAY PROPERTIES
BETWEEN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE TRANSCAUCASIAN REPUBLICS³

June 4, 1918

In order to settle the question of partitioning the Transcaucasian railway properties, the undersigned plenipotentiaries of the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian Republic, the Azerbaijani Republic, and the Georgian Republic, having the full power to do so, have agreed upon the following:

³Ibid., p. 204.

The whole amount of the Transcaucasian railway property, which was the former possession of the Russian State, will be divided among the agreeing four parties according to the length of the railroad found in their respective territories.

Done in two copies at Batum, June 4, 1918.

Ramishvili	M. Hajinski	Khalil
Gvazava	M.E. Resultzade	Vehib
Odishelidze	A. Khatissian	
Papajanian	R. Kachazmuni	

APPENDIX II

TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ALLIED AND ASSOCIATED
POWERS AND TURKEY, SIGNED AT SEVRES⁴

August 10, 1920

ARTICLE 88. Turkey in accordance with the action already taken by the Allied Powers, hereby recognizes Armenia as a free and independent State.

ARTICLE 89. Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarisation of any portion of Turkish territory adjacent to the said frontier.

ARTICLE 90. In the event of the determination of the frontier under Article 89 involving the transfer of the whole or any part of the territory of the said vilayets of Armenia, Turkey hereby renounces as from the date of such decision all rights and title over the territory so transferred.

⁴The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), Vol. II, pp. 814-816.

The provisions of the present Treaty applicable to the territory detached from Turkey shall thereupon become applicable to the said territory.

The proportion and nature of the financial obligations of Turkey which Armenia will have to assume, or of the rights which will pass to her, on account of the transfer of the said territory will be determined in accordance with Articles 241 to 244, Part VIII (Financial Clauses) of the present Treaty.

Subsequent agreements will, if necessary, decide all questions which may arise in consequence of the transfer of the said territory.

ARTICLE 91. In the event of any portion of the territory referred to in Article 89 being transferred to Armenia, a Boundary Commission, whose composition will be determined subsequently, will be constituted within three months from the delivery of the decision referred to in the said Article to trace on the spot the frontier between Armenia and Turkey as established by such decisions.

ARTICLE 92. The frontiers between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia respectively will be determined by direct agreement between the States concerned.

If in either case the States concerned have failed to determine the frontier by agreement at the date of the decision referred to in Article 89, the frontier line in question will be determined by the Principle Allied Powers, who will also provide for its being traced on the spot.

ARTICLE 93. Armenia accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principle Allied Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by these Powers to protect the interests of inhabitants of that State who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion.

Armenia further accepts and agrees to embody in a Treaty with the Principle Allied Powers such provisions as these Powers may deem necessary to protect freedom of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of other nations.

APPENDIX III

THE SOVIET DECREE CONCERNING TURKISH ARMENIA⁵

January 13, 1918

The Council of Commissaries of the People declares to the Armenian people that the Government of Workers and Peasants of Russia upholds the right of the Armenians in Turkish Armenia occupied by Russia to make free choice of country and even to choose independence. The Council of Commissaries considers that this right may be realized by drawing up a list of preliminary guarantees, which are absolutely requisite for a referendum on the part of the Armenian people. The Council of Commissaries recognizes the following conditions to be partial guarantees to this end:

ART. I. Evacuation of Armenia by the Russian troops and immediate formation of any army of Armenian militia in order to guarantee the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants of Turkish Armenia.

ART. II. Return to Armenia, without hindrance, of the Armenian fugitives, as well as of the Armenian emigrants dispersed in different countries.

ART. III. Return to Armenia, without hindrance, of the Armenians driven out by force during the war by the Turkish authorities into the interior of Turkey. The Council of Commissaries will insist on this condition in the peace negotiations with the Turkish delegates.

⁵Jacques de Morgan, The History of the Armenian People (Boston, 1918), pp. 394-395. See also The Times (London), January 17, 1918, p.5.

ART. IV. An Armenian provisional government will be created in Turkish Armenia in the form of a Council of Delegates of the Armenian people, elected on a democratic basis. Stepan Shahumian, who has been appointed Provisional Commissary Extraordinary for Caucasian Affairs, is entrusted with the task of giving all assistance to the inhabitants of Turkish Armenia for carrying out Articles II and III, and for the creation of a mixed commission, in order to appoint a date for and means of evacuation of the Russian troops in accordance with Art. I. The geographical frontiers of Turkish Armenia will be determined by the representatives of the Armenian people elected according to democratic procedure in agreement with the Moslem and other inhabitants of the border provinces in dispute, also with Commissary Shahumian.

APPENDIX IV

RUSSO-TURKISH AGREEMENT⁶

August 24, 1920

ARTICLE I. The signatories decline to recognize any treaty or agreement which is imposed on the other party. The Russian Republic declines to recognize any agreement concerning Turkey and which is not ratified by the Grand National Assembly.

ARTICLE II. The signatories agree that all the treaties which they have reciprocally signed and are in force until the present, do not correspond to their national interests, and, consequently, they agree to consider them abrogated.

ARTICLE III. To secure in all instances unhindered relations and their incessant continuance between the two countries, the two signatories guarantee each other to take all necessary measures to this effect and to ensure the traffic of goods and people, free of all impediments.

ARTICLE IV. The subjects of one of the signatories will benefit from all the accepted local laws in the territory of the other signatory, and will accept to carry out all obligations defined by these very laws.

Exceptions are only those laws which bear on national defence.

⁶Ali Fuad Cebesory, op.cit., p. 80.

Family and inheritance questions also do not fall within the scope of this article. A especial agreement dealing with these questions will later be prepared.

ARTICLE V. The signatories agree to give to the subjects of the other party inhabiting their territories the assistance and privileges possible.

ARTICLE VI. With the purpose of giving free passage to all mercantile ships of all nations, the signatories agree to ratify the international regulations for the Straits and the Black Sea, on the condition that the terms of these regulations will not prejudice the integrity of the Turkish sovereignty and the safety of the capital city of Constantinople.

The drafting of these regulations will be entrusted to a conference to be convened in the future by the representatives of the interested States.

ARTICLE VII. After the ratification of this agreement consular and ambassadorial relations will be established and a new agreement will be signed.

APPENDIX V

RUSSO-ARMENIAN AGREEMENT⁷

October 21, 1920

1. The Soviet Government recognizes the independence of Armenia and pledges herself not to interfere in the internal affairs of our State.

2. Zangezour shall be included in the boundary of Armenia, while the regions of Karabagh and Nakhichevan shall be settled by the arbitration of Soviet Russia.

3. Soviet Russia shall intercede to put a stop to the Armeno-Turkish war and the Armeno-Turkish boundary dispute shall be settled through the friendly mediation of Soviet Russia.

4. In case of repudiation of the Sevres Treaty, the Soviet Government pledges itself to bear pressure on the Turks to cede to Armenia certain territories from the Province of Erzerum.

5. Small units of the Russian army would be allowed to cross the Turkish border via Armenia and 30 percent of the military supplies to be delivered to Turkey would be placed at the disposal of the Armenian Government, to be in storage as a trust, and to be used in case Turkey made use of the said military supplies to attack Armenia.

6. Soviet Russia agrees to pay to Armenia a sum of two and a half

⁷Hampardzoum Terterian, "The Chanth Mission...", The Armenian Review, Vol. VIII, No. 3 (September, 1955), p. 99.

million gold roubles as compensation for losses sustained by the Armenian workers as a result of the World War started by the imperialists.

7. Armenia would receive a sufficient quantity of fuel oil at cost price.

8. Armenia would receive gratis various agricultural implements, a certain number of locomotives and freight waggons.

9. To utilize the cotton of Armenia for local use, Armenia would receive, likewise gratis, the necessary number of spinning mills and two textile plants with complete equipment.

10. The treasures of Echmiadzin stored up in Moscow, the Armenian manuscripts preserved in Armenian populated cities of Russia, historical archives and all works of literary or artistic value were to be transferred to Armenia.

11. Soviet Russia volunteers to permit the repatriation to Armenia of all Armenian immigrants, as well as all the Armenians who live in Armenia, with all their movable effects, and a number of other things.

APPENDIX VI

TURKISH TERMS OF ARMISTICE⁸

November 8, 1920

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia

1. The question of the Turco-Armenian frontiers, in compliance with the principles of self-determination proclaimed by President Wilson and the Bolsheviks, has to be one of census and plebiscite. The population of all the disputed regions will be invited to decide upon their political future. They are free, without any directions given them by any one, to decide to form their independent state or to express their wish to adhere to any one of the two countries. To guarantee the complete freedom of your people, we accept to guard the disputed regions by your and our joint militia forces. Definitely, the plebiscite has to be done as soon as possible. The Government of Angora has the deepest and the most sincere conviction that this way of solving the problem is the most suitable and that it corresponds to the interests of all, as well as those of the Armenian and Turkish peoples, who inhabit in the disputed areas. But, unfortunately, we think that, for the sake of remaining in friendly terms with the imperialists of the West, and, especially, to please England, the Government of Erivan will oppose to this means, which will utterly damage the political ideologies exhortated and materialized by the protectors of the West against the peoples of America and Asia.

⁸Ibid., pp. 248-249. Cf. Kiazim Karabekir, op.cit., p. 900.

2. Turkey pledges herself to help her neighbours with all the means under her command, so that they may progress in complete independence and safety.

3. We will, with our own means, help the rationing of Armenia and the establishing of a normal economic situation in the country.

4. The two signatories accept a free transit of goods and persons pertaining to the other party, on their railways and on all other means of communication, and they will not prohibit communication between the signatory and the sea, as well as other countries.

5. Turkey takes over herself to repatriate in their steads all those Armenians, who, because of the World War, deserted their properties, and pledges herself to offer them the greatest number of privileges which are accorded to social minorities in the most civilized countries.

6. Turkey asks of Armenia to give her the necessary guarantees for the safety of Turkey. Our delegates are waiting for yours at Alexandropol. These latter must have on them all the credentials necessary to negotiate and sign the peace treaty.

7. The terms of the cease-fire during the negotiations will be handed to you by the General Commander of our Eastern Front.

Ahmet Muhtar

Commissar for Foreign Affairs

APPENDIX VII

KARABEKIR'S TERMS OF ARMISTICE⁹

November 8, 1920

1. For the time being, two thousand rifles with all their equipments and transport animals, twenty heavy and forty normal machine-guns, three mountain cannons, four thousand mules, one thousand cases of bullets, six thousand cannon-balls, two locomotives and fifty waggons must immediately and completely in usable condition be handed to us. Armenian regular and irregular forces must withdraw to the east of Arpa River--Alagias station--Kirmislo-Kolijan--Nalband station--Vorontzouka line. The railroad on the western flank of this line must be left unharmed and in good shape.

2. At most in three days time the Armenian regular and irregular forces must withdraw to the east of Shurmala-Arax Station--Kizilcho-Aret--Mount Alagias-Tanagermaz-Novo Michaelovka-Lori Kend-Shermoud-Yalmantagh line.

3. Immediately after the signing of the armistice the transport of all military goods must stop on the Sanahin Station--Alexandropol line. To check these transports, the Sanahin Station and Karakilisse will be sent a mission each. The Armenian Government must guarantee the inviolability of the above-mentioned missions as well as their safe and regular relations with the Commander of the Eastern Front while they are in the region of Alexandropol.

⁹Simon Vratzian, Haiastrani, pp. 482-483.

4. By the evening of the third day from now, the delegates of the two parties must convene in Alexandropol to start peace negotiations, and if the first and second terms are fulfilled by then the peace negotiations will start immediately.

5. During the armistice period, our military forces will not cross eastward the Arpa River--Nalband Station--Vorontzovka line and will not proceed from where they are now in the other regions as mentioned in the first clause.

6. Immediately after the signing of the armistice all unfriendly acts from both sides must cease.

These terms of armistice will be in effect from the moment they are handed to the Armenian advance forces, and the time limit for an answer, if needs be to be extended later, is seven days.

APPENDIX VIII

ARMENO-SOVIET AGREEMENT¹⁰

December 2, 1920

December 2, 1920, on behalf of the Government of Soviet Russia Plenipotentiary Representative Comrade Legrand for the First Party, and Comrade Dro and H. Terterian representing the Government of the Republic of Armenia for the Second Party, have signed the following Agreement:

1. Armenia hereby is declared an independent Socialist Soviet Republic.

2. Until the invitations of the Convention of the Soviets of Armenia a temporary Government called the Military-Revolutionary Committee shall take full charge of the Government of Armenia.

3. The Government of Soviet Russia agrees to the admission into the boundaries of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia, as indisputable territories, the Province of Erivan with all her districts, a part of the Province of Kars which, from the strategic viewpoint, insures the domination of the railroad line from the Station of Djadjour to the Station of Arax, the district of Zangezour of the Province of Gandzak (Ganja) and a part of the Province of Kazakh, and by the agreement of August 10, those parts of the Province of Tiflis which were under the rule of Armenia until September 28, 1920.

¹⁰Hampardzoun Terterian, loc.cit., p. 101.

4. The High Command of the Armenian Army is not held responsible for the actions of the Army until the declaration of Armenia's Sovietization.

5. The members of the Armenian Revolutionary Federative (Dashnak Party) and other Socialist parties (Social Revolutionaries and Social Democrats) shall not be persecuted for their association with these parties nor for their participation in the fights against the Communist Party before the declaration of Armenia's Sovietization.

6. The Military-Revolutionary Committee shall consist of five members appointed by the Communist Party, and two members from the leftist faction of the Dashnakist Party, with the assent of the Communist Party.

7. The Government of Soviet Russia will take immediate steps to concentrate the necessary military forces for the defence of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia.

8. After the signing of this agreement, the Government of the Republic of Armenia shall withdraw from power. Until the arrival of the Revolutionary Committee, the Government will temporarily be held by the Military Command headed by Dro. On behalf of the USSR, Comrade Silin is appointed Commissar of the Armenian Military Command.

Done in two copies.

For the USSR, signed by plenipotentiary representative Legrand.

For the Government of the Republic of Armenia signed by

Dro and Terterian

APPENDIX IX

TREATY OF ALEXANDROPOL¹¹

December 2/3, 1920

1. The state of war between Turkey and the Republic of Armenia is over.

2. According to what the attached map indicates as the frontier between Turkey and Armenia (starting with the estuary of the Lower Kara Su until the Arax River--Arpa River until Gegagh towards the north, from there to Garahan Valley--Eastern Teghnis--Eastern Greater Gemel--Kiziltash--Greater Aghpapa Mountain) forms the frontier. The final drafting of the boundary will be decided by a mixt commission on the spot two weeks after the signing of the treaty.

Armenia will not interfere in the form of the administration to be decided by a plebiscite either in the Kouk mountains, 10283-8022--Kamasour, 8160--the village of Kourtoulak--Saat Mountain, 8760--the houses by the Arpa River, 3080--Kemurlu Mountain, 6930--Serai-Bulak, 8071--the Ararat Station--the south of the estuary of the Lower Garasou by the Arax River (Nakhichevan, Shahtahti, Sharur), or in the territories found under the sovereignty of that administration. Under the patronage of Turkey a local administration will be established in this region.

¹¹A.T. Petrossian, "Alexandrapoli Dashmagire," Zartok, December 2-7, 1961. See also Kiazim Karabekir, op.cit., n.p. (Appendix), and Shahan Natali, Erek Dashmagrer, pp. 25-32.

3. In order to effect the wish of the Government of Armenia to repatriate completely the local people, the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey accepts the return, during the next three years after the ratification of the treaty, of those to the territories now occupied by the second article and found in the Ottoman boundaries, and on which Turkey has irrefutable historical, racial, and legal rights. A mixt commission will decide the form of transfer.

4. In view of restraining the dangerous activities and movements of those elements who exist as the result of the provocation and inciting of the imperialist states, and in view of protecting the frontiers of the country and to guard the internal peace, the Erivan Government pledges herself to have a military force not more than a militia armed with sufficient light arms, eight mountain or field cannons, twenty machine-guns, and an army of one thousand and five hundred mercenaries. To protect the country against external enemies, the Republic of Armenia is free to build as many strongholds as she pleases and to have therein as many heavy cannons as she likes. These latter may consist of infantry cannons of 15 cm. diameter or even of smaller calibre. No arms of a greater calibre will be found.

5. After the treaty is signed, the Government of Erivan will permit the political representative, or the consul, of Turkey, residing at Erivan, to examine and verify, at any moment he wishes, the things mentioned above, instead of which, in case of internal and external danger, the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey promises to bring Armenia military succour if asked by the Government of Armenia.

6. The two signatories permit all the refugees to return their homes which are found in the old boundaries, save those who, passing to the enemy lines, fought their governments during the Great War, or those who took part in massacres. They guarantee reciprocally to those returning to their countries the rights of minorities in the most civilized countries.

7. All those refugees, as mentioned in the sixth article, who do not return their homes in the period of one year after this treaty is signed and ratified, will not be able to benefit of the favour incurred by the clause mentioned; on the contrary, their legal rights will be extinguished.

8. Turkey, in spite of the great expenses of her army, because of the defensive war of the last two years and of the compulsory war started against Armenia, declines to ask her legal demands of war indemnity in order to respect the principles of human rights; so also because of changes introduced in the rights of indemnity for the damages caused during the Great War, the two contracting parties decline of asking any war indemnity from each other.

9. The Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey promises, as indicated in the second clause, to show genuine assistance and sincerity for the complete reconstitution and guarding the government in the boundaries of the Republic of Erivan.

10. The Government of Erivan absolutely accepts as null the Treaty of Sevres which is absolutely rejected by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and declares it so, and calling back her delegations

in Europe and America, who have been an instrument for some of the imperialistic governments and governmental circles, expresses the sincere desire to settle peacefully all misunderstandings from now on. To guarantee peace and concord and to display the sincerity to respect the neighbourly privileges of Turkey, the Government of Erivan promises to keep away from the governmental circles of all those pugnacious people, who running after imperialistic objectives endanger the peace and concord of the two nations.

11. The Armenian Government accepts and guarantees the privileges of the representative of the Sheria Committee of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to ratify the election of the Chief Mufti who will be directly elected by the local murti's, who, in their turn, will be elected by the Moslem population of the territories of the Republic of Armenia. This right is accepted and guaranteed with the purpose of improving and protecting, respecting and advancing the feelings and wishes of the said population.

12. Each of the two signatories pledges herself not to hinder within her own boundaries, as well as generally on all means of transportation, from sea to sea or from one country to another, the free passage and transit of persons and goods belonging to the other party. The Government of Turkey guarantees the freedom of transit between Iran, Maku and Armenia on Sharur, Nakhichevan, Shahtahti and Julfa road.

The Government of Armenia promises not to impede the transit of goods, cars, waggons, and general merchandise between Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia and Turkey.

The Government of Turkey being forced to oppose the fraud directed against the territorial integrity and being, and with the view of prohibiting the import of arms more than the quantity stated in the fourth clause, will, on the condition of not deranging the freedom of means of transportation, take under her control and inspection, until the general treaty is signed, the railroads and the means of transportation found in the Republic of Erivan.

The two parties will prohibit the sabotage and disturbances of especial official and unofficial functionaries and missions of the imperialistic (Entente) Powers now found in the Republic of Armenia.

13. On the condition of not spoiling the rights of the Republic of Erivan, the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey can, through the dispositions of this treaty, provisionally take prohibitive measures in Armenia against all attacks threatening her independence and territorial integrity.

14. The Republic of Armenia considers all those clauses of treaties concerning and detrimental to Turkey, and signed between Armenia and any other state, null, and guarantees this consideration.

15. Immediately after the treaty is signed by the signatory powers, commercial transactions will start. Ambassadors and consuls will be appointed by both parties.

16. According to the terms of this treaty, telegraphic, postal, telephonic, consular and commercial demarcations will be decided by mixed commissions. Simultaneously to this treaty, when the treaty

concerning the railroad, telegraphic and postal communications between Armenia on one side and the occupied territories and the neighbouring state on the other is signed, Turkey will officially permit communications.

17. After the ratification of the above mentioned treaty in a month's time, the confirmed copies will be exchanged in Angora. The authorized and affirmed right honourable representatives have signed this treaty of peace and demarcation.

Done in two copies on 2-12-36 (December 2, 1920) at Alexandropol. In case of dissension in interpretation, an accord can be reached by having recourse to the Turkish original.

APPENDIX X

NATIONAL TURKISH - SOVIET RUSSIAN
TREATY¹²

March 16, 1921

Sharing the principles of the brotherhood of nations and of the rights of the peoples to self-determination, and conforming the solidarity which united them in the struggle against imperialism, as well as the fact that any difficulties arised before one of the two peoples are liable to complicate the situation of the other, the Government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, on the one hand, and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, on the other, animated by the desire to establish lasting and cordial relations, and by a continuous and sincere friendship based on their mutual interests, have decided to conclude with one another a treaty of friendship and brotherhood, and have appointed with this object as their plenipotentiaries:

The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. (Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic): GEORGE VASSILIEVITCH TCHITCHERIN, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs and Member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, and DJELLAL-EDDIN KORKMASSOF, Member of the All-Russian

¹² Eliot Grinnel Mears, *op.cit.*, pp. 645-648. Here are given only those articles which directly bear on Armenia.

Central Executive Committee; and YUSUF KEMAL BEY, People's Commissary for National Economy of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Deputy from Kastamuni to the aforesaid Assembly; Dr. RIZA NURI BEY, People's Commissary for Education of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Deputy from Sinope to the aforesaid Assembly; ALLI FUAD PASHA, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and Deputy from Angora to the aforesaid Assembly.

These plenipotentiaries, after having exchanged their respective credentials, which were found to be in due and legal form, have come to the following agreement:

ARTICLE 1 - Neither contracting party will recognize treaties or international acts which are imposed by force on the other party. The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. agrees to recognize no such international acts concerning Turkey that have not been recognized by the National Turkish Government as represented by the Grand National Assembly.

The frontiers of Turkey are understood in this treaty to include all the territories enumerated in the National Turkish Pact which were agreed to and proclaimed by the Chamber of Deputies on January 28, 1920 (1336 Turkish calendar), in Constantinople. The text of this pact was communicated to the press as well as to all the powers.

The northeastern boundary line of Turkey is specified as follows: This line starts from the village of Sarp on the Black Sea coast, crosses the mountain Kedis-Mta, and follows the watershed line of the

mountains Shavshet and Kanni Dagh. Thence it follows the northern administrative frontier of the Sanjaks of Ardahan and Kars, and the bed of the rivers Arpa Chai and Arax, thus reaching the mouth of the Lower Kara Su (Appendix I, A and B).

ARTICLE 3 - The two contracting parties agree that the district of Nakhichevan, the frontiers of which are specified in Appendix I (c) of the present treaty, shall form an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, provided Azerbaijan shall cede this protectorate to no other country.

The triangular territory of Nakhichevan is formed by the line which follows the bed of the river Arax, and passes by the mountains Dashna (3829), Veli Dagh (4121), Bagargik (6587), Kemurlu Dagh (6930), and Serai-Bulak (8071). Thence it reaches the station Ararat, and rejoins Arax at the crossing with Kara Su. A commission of delegates from Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia will fix this line laid down above.


ARTICLE 8 - Both contracting parties undertake to allow on the respective territories the formation and the sojourn of groups that would lay claim to the role of government in the country of the other party, or in a part of it, as well as of groups that intend to struggle against the other party. Russia and Turkey assume analogous obligations based on the principle of reciprocity with regard to the Transcaucasian Soviet Republics. It is agreed that Turkish territory, as defined in this article, is understood to include only that part of the country which is under the direct military and civil administration of the Government of the Grand National Assembly.

ARTICLE 11 - Both parties agree to accord the most-favored treatment to the citizens of each party residing on the territory of the other party. The stipulations of the present article apply neither to the citizens of the Soviet Republics allied to Russia, nor to the citizens of the Moslem countries allied to Turkey.

ARTICLE 15 - Russia undertakes to take all steps necessary to secure the recognition by the Transcaucasian Republics, in special treaties which they are to conclude with Turkey, of such stipulations of the present treaty as related directly to them.

MAPS

	Page
I. Armenia of the Wilsonian Boundaries.....	140
II. The Armenian Vilayets and the Distribution of the Armenian Population.....	141
III. Turco-Transcaucasian Boundary lines of 1918 and 1921.....	142



REPORT

THE ARMENIAN VILAYETS

The six Armenian Vilayets shown here indicate the approximate population ratio (in percentages) of the various ethnic or religious groups inhabiting these areas.


These percentages are deduced from the data compiled by the Armenian Patriarch at Constantinople in 1912, whose figures are probably the only reliable indications of the ethnic populations in terms of their respective vilayets.


Unfortunately, there are no available data which might indicate the ethnic-vilayet ratio for the latter part of the nineteenth century. In view of this, the 1912 figures must serve as a rough approximation for the earlier period. However, it must be remembered that the Armenian population in some vilayets, notably in Sivas, may have been higher were it not for the 1895 massacres.

Only the more important centers of Armenian population are indicated on this map.

LEGEND

- ▲ Armenians
- Turks
- ◐ Kurds (Sedentary and Nomadic)
- ◑ Islamic Minorities (Persians, Lazes, Kizilbashis, Circassians, Yezidis, Zaza-Timlilichurikis, Gypsies)
- △ Christian Minorities (Greeks, Nestorians, Jacobites, Chaldeans)





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