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AMERICAN POLICY AT THE CONFERENCE OF YALTA

by

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ABSTRACT

The Yalta Conference was one of the crucial conferences in the century. The Conference was held in February 1945 when the Axis powers were on the verge of collapse and the international political situation was in a state of flux. The parties to the Conference were the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

The cruciality of the Conference stems from its far reaching decisions which had a great impact on the world.

In view of the wide range of issues discussed at Yalta, the author has limited the scope of this work to American policy only. In a further effort to limit the scope, the author did not touch on the deliberations concerning the creation of the United Nations and other issues not directly relevant to the purpose of this work.

The purpose of this study is to analyze, from a political power point of view, American Soviet policy as manifested at Yalta. In order to have a full understanding of America's policy, it has been necessary to touch briefly and intermitently on British and Soviet policies.

The policy of the government of the United States was influenced by a belief by some American leaders that traditional power politics would not provide genuine security for the future. It was hoped that when the proposed United Nations would come into being, systems of unilateral security would gradually give way to a system of universal collective security. In the author's opinion, this hope led American leaders at Yalta to take insufficient advantage of America's own vast power at the

end of W.W. II. Thus no meaningful efforts were made to block or avoid Soviet expansion into the heart of the European continent or to reduce concessions to the Soviet Union in the Far East.

In the light of its cherished hope of establishing universal security, the government of the United States acquiesced to some Soviet demands which could not be justified from a political power point of view. American acquiescence was partly due to the inability of the American Government to realize the implications of the Soviet system on Soviet foreign policy.

From a political power point of view, the United States was not in a position to alter the dominant Soviet power position in the Balkans and Poland. Its maximum capability could not have amounted to more than adjustments of limited grievances. American commitments to a policy of severe reparations and dismemberment in Germany were not in conformity with the interests of the United States. The demands of the American delegation for Soviet participation in the war against Japan were not necessary. Had the United States refrained from such demands, many concessions to the Soviets could have been avoided.

The personal element of diplomacy had considerable impact on American policy at Yalta. Much of Roosevelt's behavior could be explained as that of a man whose will, memory and clarity of thought had been weakened by fatigue and failing health. His leadership was not a credit to U.S. diplomacy.

In conclusion, American leadership had underestimated its power position. Under the impact of an over conciliatory policy, it failed to extract maximum utility from that position against the Soviet Union.

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CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

A. A General Survey of U.S. Soviet Policy

When the three major allies, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom of Britain found that they were all engaged in a desperate war against Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Japan, they had to give priority to the military needs of the time, to repel and crush the forces of the enemy. In order to win the war the Allies had to keep their ranks solidified, for any serious differences among them of sufficient dimensions to weaken or break their alliance would have certainly been of significant advantage to their enemies.

Therefore, at the initial stages of the struggle, the Allies had to push into the background all political aspects which were not related directly to the conduct of the war. But, as the tide of the war became clearly in favor of the Allies and the more they grew confident of victory on the battlefield, the political topics and discussions which were remotely related to the actual conduct of the war and which were essentially of the post war era began to gain importance alongside the military problems.

The Soviet Union, which had been forced by circumstances alone to ally itself with the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Britain, had an ideology or a dogma which was incompatible with the basic principles of the liberal democracies. On ideological ground the two systems were as much incompatible as Nazism and Fascism were with the democracies.

As the Soviet armies cleared Soviet territories of Nazi forces and as they began to sweep over North Eastern and South Eastern Europe, the Western Allies, (Britain and the United States of America), began to wonder and inquire about Soviet policy in the occupied territories. The British government's anxieties in this respect were more pronounced and severe than those of the U.S. This is clearly understood in the light of Britain's strategic and political position as a European power.

Strategically Britain an island close to the north western shores of Europe, could not tolerate the dominance of a single European power over the whole Continent. Britain whose forces played a significant role in the power arena of Europe, could not and cannot possibly master enough forces to stand against the whole continent. Therefore, in the light of its traditional balance of power policy, Britain was interested to preserve from the hegemony of the Soviets as many European states as possible. In the second place Britain was basically an imperial power. The Mediterranean was one of its vital links with the rest of the Empire. Therefore, it was of utmost importance to secure that link from the threat of a major power. At best, Britain hoped to reduce Soviet influence from all the Balkans, but if that was not possible, then to secure for herself a privileged position in the coastal states; Greece and Yugoslavia, was necessary.

In addition to that, Britain had other political interests which were of importance. British subjects had business interests in almost all the Balkan states. The Balkan states in the pre-war decade were a sphere in which British political interests were not insignificant.

Britain, therefore, was naturally interested to preserve its prestige in the area and make sure that its business interests were not harmed by the Soviet Union. In view of previous unfortunate experiences of certain British business interests in the Soviet Union the anxiety of the British Government in this respect was well founded.

The methods which Britain believed would be most effective against a possible threat of Soviet Russia to its interests in the Balkans, were based on two major concepts.

- 1) That it would prove difficult to co-operate with Russia in the Balkan sphere if no settlement was clearly reached before the war was over.¹
- 2) That it would be necessary to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union with regard to the Balkans while the war was still being fought. As long as the war lasted the Soviet Union would have a reason to co-operate. Furthermore, the Soviet Union would be ready to recognize more of the British interests in the area as long as its forces were not on the spot.

In order to negotiate with the Soviet Union from a strong position, Britain had to get the co-operation of its closest ally the United States. Britain's power potential in comparison to Russia and the U.S. had dwindled

¹ Churchill, Winston, (Memoirs), Triumph and Tragedy, Massachusetts, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953, pp. 72-73.

during the Second World War.¹ Being a junior among the major allies, Britain was dependent upon U.S. co-operation in negotiating with the Soviet Union.

On military grounds Britain repeatedly tried to convince the United States of the advisability of a campaign across the Balkans in the direction of Germany. It was reasoned by the British Government that if such a campaign was made, the power position of the West in the Balkans would improve.

Churchill, in the second Quebec Conference (Sept. 11-16, 1944), was aware that the United States was not in favor of the Balkan campaign; nevertheless, he felt the pulse of the United States' Government again, but in vain, it did not respond. The British Government tried to get the United States forces involved in the Greek Crisis, where British forces were engaging communist guerillas at the time, but the United States detached itself from the struggle.²

Churchill, in a last effort to get the United States behind him, made a bid for United States diplomatic support in his forthcoming conference with Stalin at Moscow (Oct. 9-20), in which he sought agree-

¹ MacNeill, W., (Royal Institute of International Affairs), America, Britain and Russia 1941-46, London, Oxford University Press, 1953, p. 484.

² The Greek Crisis was started in December 3, 1944 by Communist guerilla and lasted until January 11, 1944.

With regard to the United States' attitude towards British action in Greece see:

Churchill, Op.cit., pp. 301-306.

Sherwood, Robert, Roosevelt and Hopkins, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1948, pp. 301-306.

ment with the Soviet Union as to spheres of influence in the Balkans. The U.S. declined again and made it clear to the Soviet Government that it was not committed to any decisions taken at that conference.¹

Britain, therefore, had to negotiate with the Soviet Union at Moscow from a weak stand in the absence of support from the United States.

Why did the United States refuse to support Britain in this region? What were its basic premises on which that attitude was built?

To start with, the United States geographic position differed radically from that of Britain. The United States is not a European power, its territory is separated from the European Continent by a huge body of water, the Atlantic Ocean. Consequently the Americans were not disturbed by the Soviet advance to the Balkans to the same extent as the British, nevertheless, they were curious to inquire about Soviet attitude in that area. But this is not the whole story, other basic premises of American diplomacy towards the Soviet Union differed in kind from those of Britain.

The U.S. Government was more optimistic than Britain, as to its future relationship with the Soviet Union.² The secretary of state, Cordell Hull, wrote in his memoirs:

¹ United States' Department of State, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1955, p. 6. (Hereafter the Yalta Papers).

² Goodrich, L. and Carrol, M., Documents on American Foreign Relations 1943-44, Vol. VI, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1945, p. 30.

"President Roosevelt and I saw alike with regard to Russia. We both realized that the path of our relations would not be a carpet of flowers, but we also felt we could work with Russia. There was no difference of opinion between us that I can recall on the basic premise that we must and could get along with Russia."¹

The question that follows now is that of why did the Government of the United States think that it was possible to co-operate with the Soviet Union when its relationships with that state encountered many difficulties created by unilateral actions of the Soviets.² The answer is that the United States' Government regarded those difficulties as an outcome of Soviet suspicion developed by past experience of isolation and hostility of other major powers. Thus, for example, Harriman, the United States' Ambassador in Moscow at the time, cabled the Department of State on December 28, 1944:

"On analyzing reactions of the Soviets one must bear in mind that since the revolution the nations of the World have been hostile to or suspicious of them and their objectives. Although the Russians realized that they are now accepted as a powerful world power, they are still suspicious of the underlying attitude of most of the nations to them."³

Based on this analysis the United States' policy sought to conduct its relations with the Soviet Union on friendly basis in order to wipe out suspicion from the minds of the Soviets and to induce them to co-

¹ Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948, p. 1467.

² The Soviet Command in Eastern Europe issued orders and was executing them without prior consultation with the allied control councils. An example of such actions was the deportation of racial Germans in Rumania for slave labor in the Soviet Union. See Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 239, 246.

³ Yalta Papers, Op.cit., p. 64.

operate more closely with the rest of the world.

The question now is why co-operation with Russia? The United States sought co-operation with Russia for two main reasons: 1) The highest of the government circles in the United States sought co-operation with the Soviet Union because they were still engaged in a war with Germany. The ratio of Western forces to Soviet forces on the European fronts was one to two. Consequently in an effort to keep the Soviets on their side and in order to exclude the possibility of a separate Soviet-German peace treaty, the U.S. envisioned that co-operation with the Soviet Union was necessary. 2) The government of the United States did not believe that power politics and its implementations of spheres of influence and balance of power were suitable for the establishment of peace and security.

Hull stated in his memoirs:

"It was not, and I am not, a believer in the idea of balance of power or spheres of influence as a means of keeping the peace."¹

Therefore, the United States relied on the establishment of a strong world organization for keeping the peace in the post war era. In Mr. Hull's report to the Joint Session of Congress on November 18, 1943 he said:

"As the provisions of the Four Nations Declaration are carried into effect there will be no longer need for spheres of influence for alliances, for balance of power or any other of the separate alliances, through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote interest."²

¹ Hull, Op.cit., p. 1452.

² Yalta Papers, Op.cit., p. 104.

For the successful establishment and performance of such an organization the co-operation of the Soviet Union was viewed as essential. Therefore, in order to reduce Soviet suspicion and in order to induce the Soviets to co-operate, the United States was willing to meet the Soviet Union more than half way, but was not clear as to what it would do if the Soviets did not comply.

In the light of the above mentioned basic principles, the United States developed the following policy with respect to occupied territories on the European Continent.

It was willing to accept, temporarily and for the purpose of conducting the war efficiently, the military control of the occupying ally. Military control was to be used only for military purposes and to last till the War was over. Simultaneously with military control an allied control commission or council was to assume supreme authority in the country for the purpose of developing the occupied countries along democratic lines.¹

The United States was interested to follow a policy which would lead to the reconstruction, development and independence of the occupied territories. It was urging its allies to think likewise and to co-operate together for the attainment of this goal. The military controls were to give way to an allied civilian council when the military activities of the war ceased to exist. Once elections were held and democratic authorities took over, the allied control councils would give up their powers to the newly elected government at a pace corresponding

¹ Ibid., pp. 233-240.

to the ability of the democratic government to assume firm control of the state.¹

For this purpose the United States was willing to assign to the control councils three major objects.

The first object was that of security. The allied control councils were charged with maintaining peace and security in the occupied territories. They had to locate all Nazi and pro Nazi elements and curb their activities.

The second object was that of rehabilitation, relief and economic aid. In view of the urgent requirements of the war, such functions were to be limited during the war period to the minimum. That is to the extent necessary for the preservation of order, elimination of hunger, disease and other forms of human suffering.²

The third object was that of re-educating the people along democratic lines and the development and encouragement of all democratic institutions and elements in these countries.³

The allied control councils were, furthermore, expected to preside over the execution of the armistice terms concluded with defeated enemy states.

Such a policy was to be followed in all defeated enemy states with the exception of Germany and Japan of which I shall speak later. A

¹ Ibid., pp. 101-102.

² Ibid., pp. 109-110, 278-279, 334-335.

³ Ibid., p. 237.

clear distinction was made between defeated enemy states and reconquered allied states. The latter were to be extended a more generous help and their free governments in exile were to assume authority in their respective countries as soon as possible.

The United States was willing to accede to the desire of its Allies if they chose to have reparations from conquered enemy states provided this was exercised with modesty and provided it did not burden the country to such an extent that would prejudice the development of free democratic institutions. The United States was particularly careful to preserve for the defeated countries a standard or an economy capable of providing the population with the minimum necessities of life. It did not want to find any or all of these countries so helpless and miserable as to create a world problem that might require other states to assume the burden of feeding their populations.

The United States was interested to convince its allies that in the long run it does not help any major power to possess permanent control of conquered territories.¹ Actions of the kind were considered seeds for future conflict and a detriment to world peace and security. Actions of the kind produce similar ambitions among other powers and breed tension. Major states which would follow such a line of policy would end up being completely isolated, for no government could consider them friendly when they embark on expansion policies. The natural tendency of self preservation amongst other states would certainly be

¹ Hull, Op.cit., p. 1466.

aroused and fear would cause them to steer away from co-operation and friendly relations with the expanding power. The United States took particular care to stress and clarify this interpretation to the Russians in an effort to make them abandon their 1939-40 policy of expansion and hostility to other states especially to their neighbouring states.

Hull stated:

"As I left office, the Policy I advocated toward Russia rested on two bases. The first was: Continue in constant friendly discussion with the Russians. Consult them at every point. Engage in no "cussin matches" with them. Explain to them, again and again if necessary, the principles upon which we felt peaceful international relations would prosper. Show them as clearly as possible the superior advantages to Russia of whole hearted co-operation with other nations as compared with the minor advantages of predominance in neighbouring states. Make it clear to them that we do not object to a nation's preaching the merits of its form of government, whether Communism or Democracy, but that we did object to a nation's interfering in the internal affairs of other nations."¹

The United States despite its knowledge that the Soviets were taking certain unilateral actions persisted on its policy of co-operation towards them. As Hull puts it "consult them at every point". They were determined to educate the Russians in the field of international co-operation. They wanted even to teach them by example.

The United States' Department of State opposed the view of its Chiefs of Staff that Pacific Islands acquired from Japan should become United States' property. The U.S. Government expected that the Russians would have no objection if the United States wished to acquire these territories, but it was not hard to see that Russia would use this precedent

¹ Ibid., p. 1465.

to acquire territories for herself.¹ In conformity with its principle that all former Axis territories should be put under the Trusteeship of the United Nations, the U.S. placed the Pacific Islands under U.N. Trusteeship.²

In its efforts not to alienate its Allies and especially the Soviets, the United States postponed any specific decisions or guarantees of the borders of any state.³ Unilateral decisions of the kind were expected to create dissension among the Allies. It was feared that a dissension of large dimensions might create difficulties in the conduct of the war.

The U.S. Government of the time felt that it needed Russia's cooperation badly. The U.S. was still engaged in war with Japan and in China. The position of the Soviet Union towards the Far Eastern Theatre was not clear. The Americans did not want the Soviets to consider even the possibility of concluding a separate peace with Germany. That would leave the Western Allies and especially the U.S. with the burden of defeating the Axis in both the theatre of Europe and the Far East. The

¹ Stimson, Henry, On Active Service in Peace and War, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947, pp. 599-600.

² Goodrich and Carrol, Op.cit., p. 32.

³ Hull, Op.cit., p. 1438.

"The President and I, in talking this over on January 31, 1944 agreed that we should not support any definite frontier recommendations during the course of the war. This was in line with the position I had stated on several occasions, namely that new frontiers should not be fixed during the progress of hostilities except with the free consent of the countries directly concerned."

U.S. felt it was not feasible to take that burden. Beside being a huge military risk, it would certainly entail immense sacrifice in men and material, which the government of the United States was not willing to undertake and would do every thing possible to avoid.

B. The U.S. and the Balkans

1. The Policy of Spheres of Influence

Early in April 1944 as the Soviet armies advanced into Rumania, the anxieties of the British Government, lest the Soviet Union might seize the opportunity to communize the Balkans, mounted. This event precipitated a flow of messages from the British Government to the government of the United States.

The first approach to the United States' Government was made through the British ambassador at Washington, Lord Hallifax. Lord Hallifax approached the Department of State on May 30, 1944, asking for approval by the United States Government of an arrangement to be drawn with the Soviet Union, amounting to an acknowledgement by the British Government that the Soviet Union would have a dominating influence in Rumania, and a corresponding acknowledgement by the government of the Soviet Union that Britain would have a corresponding influence in Greece. Aware of U.S. opposition to policies of spheres of influence, the British Ambassador stated that such an arrangement was made only to facilitate military action. He made it clear that this arrangement was of a temporary nature to last during the war period only.¹

¹ Ibid., pp. 1451-52.

The U.S. Government did not approve of this request and, therefore, the Prime Minister of Britain, Winston Churchill, deemed it necessary to intervene personally in an effort to put his personal experience and weight behind the British request.

Churchill cabled on June 8, arguing very skillfully for the merits of the arrangement. Churchill also argued that in view of the rapid military developments in the area, it became necessary to include Bulgaria and Yugoslavia in the proposed arrangement with the Soviet Union.¹ Roosevelt answered on June 11, 1944: "In our opinion, this would certainly result in the division of the Balkan region into spheres of influence despite the declared intention to limit the arrangement for military matters."² He went further to propose a solution of his own: "We believe efforts should preferably be made to establish consultative machinery to dispel misunderstanding and restrain the tendency toward the development of exclusive spheres."³

The Prime Minister came back on the same day; he refused to accept a consultative committee: "Somebody must have the power to act. A consultative committee would be a mere obstruction, always overridden in any case of emergency by direct interchanges between you and me, or either of us and Stalin."⁴

¹ Churchill, Op.cit., pp. 74-75.

² Ibid., p. 75.

³ Ibid., p. 75.

⁴ Ibid., p. 75.

He went further to push Roosevelt's foot into the door by suggesting a three month trial period.¹ In this he succeeded and the President, on June 13, came back approving of a 3 month trial period but cautioned: "We must be careful to make it clear that we are not establishing any post-war spheres of influence."²

The British immediately conveyed the approval of the U.S. Government to Molotov. The quick transmission of the approval of the President to the Russians was probably an effort to take advantage before he changed his mood, especially since the State Department's view on such arrangements was firmly in the negative.

If the British Government thought along this line it was right, for the President gave his approval on a trial period in the absence of his secretary of state, Hull. The Department of State learned of the President's approval from the British Government. Having sent a cable to the British foreign office refusing the proposed Balkan arrangement, it received a very embarrassing answer.³ The answer stated that the President has already given his approval. This incident supports the arguments of those who criticized Roosevelt as a poor administrator.

Secretary Hull and his assistants in the State Department showered the President with arguments against this arrangement which made him change his mind. He therefore, cabled the British Government expressing

¹ Ibid., pp. 76-77.

² Ibid., pp. 76-77.

³ Hull, Op.cit., pp. 1456-57.

his fear of such an arrangement. However, it was too late, Churchill had already conveyed the approval of the U.S. Government to the Soviets. He therefore, answered with a very comprehensive argument in favor of the arrangement in an effort to convince the President that his approval was right.¹ With this the issue was closed. The political, diplomatic genius of Churchill won the day and secured American approval.

During the second round the U.S. Government pulled the rug from under British feet. When Churchill informed the President that he would visit Moscow and would discuss the Balkan arrangement with Stalin, the President ordered that a cable be sent to London dissociating him from the entire arrangement. Harry Hopkins on his own initiative undertook to stop the cable before it was sent, and later convinced the President that it was not advisable to leave the Balkans totally in British and Soviet hands. He furthermore, explained to the President that the Soviets were likely to consider that the U.S. Government was behind Britain.²

The President, convinced by Hopkins' argument, cancelled the previous cable which Hopkins had already stopped in the Map Room, and with Hopkins' help drafted a cable to the Soviet Government declaring that the U.S. Government was detached from any decisions taken at Moscow.³ He went on to say that he hoped that the conference would amount to no more than an exchange of opinions and that the United States, while

¹ Ibid., pp. 1456-57.

² Sherwood, Op.cit., p. 833.
Harry Hopkins was a special assistant to the President who enjoyed his complete confidence.

³ Ibid., pp. 833-34.

reserving its position, was of course interested in every issue that was likely to be discussed at Moscow. He asked that Harriman be allowed to sit as an observer, but stressed that he (Harriman) had no authority by any means to commit the U.S. Government at that conference.¹

Harry Hopkins's guess was right, for Stalin's answer to the President on October 8, 1944 revealed that he had thought that Churchill was speaking for both the U.S. Government and the British. Furthermore, Stalin took the President's message as an unfavorable comment on the meeting. He informed Roosevelt that it was Churchill who had proposed to visit Moscow and he, "of course, could not say no."²

Stalin, although surprised by the presidential message, was probably pleased by it, for it gave him a stronger hand against the British, since they were coming to Moscow without American support. Thus, the long skillful manoeuvre of Churchill ended in vain. The U.S. refused to be committed to the Balkans in a game of power politics.

At Moscow Stalin and Churchill reached complete agreement on the Balkan region. The agreement did not only designate the predominance of each power in each of the Balkan states, but also specified the influence of each power in terms of percentages. The influence of each

¹ Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 6-7.

² Ibid., p. 8.

Text of Stalin's message to the President on October 8, 1944:

"Your message of October 5th somewhat puzzled me. I supposed that Mr. Churchill was going to Moscow in accordance with the agreement reached with you at Quebec. It happened, however, that this supposition of mine does not seem to correspond in reality.

power was in the following percentage:¹

Rumania

Russia	90%
Others	10%

Greece

Great Britain	90%
Russia	10%

Yugoslavia 50 - 50

Hungary 50 - 50

Bulgaria

Russia	75%
Others	25%

These figures were given to Stalin by Churchill on a small piece of paper.

"There was a slight pause. Then he (Stalin) took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back... It was settled in no more time than it takes to set it down."²

With the absence of the United State's Government at the conference the old statesmen of Russia and Britain were playing their old game of

It is unknown to me with what questions Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden are going to Moscow. So far I have not been informed about this by either one. Mr. Churchill in his message to me, expressed a desire to come to Moscow, if there would not be any objections on my part. I, of course, gave my consent. Such is the matter in connection with Mr. Churchill's trip to Moscow. In the future I will keep you informed about the matter, after the meeting with Mr. Churchill."

¹ Churchill, Op.cit., p. 227.

² Ibid., p. 227.

power politics and understood each other very well. Churchill wished to hide this fact from the rest of the world; he was afraid that if known it might arouse liberal public opinions everywhere. Stalin, however, did not mind, he had nothing to hide as long as the Soviet Union was safe and secure.

"At length I (Churchill) said: Might it not be thought rather cynical if it seemed we had disposed of these issues, so fateful to millions of people, in such an offhand manner? Let us burn the paper. No, you keep it, said Stalin."¹

2. The U.S. Versus the Soviet Union in the Balkans.

The Soviet Union did not take overt steps antagonizing to the Western Allies. Overtly the Soviet Union did not show any signs that it intended to dominate the Balkans or communize them.

The Soviet Union permitted its Western Allies to participate in the conclusion of the Armistice agreements with the Balkan States. However, the Western Allies were secondary members in the same manner that the Soviet Union was in Italy.

The armistice agreements with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary gave the power of control to the Allied Control Councils, however, the chairmanship of each council was reserved to the Soviet High Command. This Command also was the only agency which undertook to execute the orders of the Council.²

¹ Ibid., pp. 227-28.

² Goodrich and Carroll, Documents on American Foreign Relations 1944-45. Vol: VII, Mass., Norwood, The Norwood Press, 1947, pp. 231-35 - Text of Rumanian Armistice. pp. 244-48 - Text of Hungarian Armistice.

The economic requirements and reparations laid on Rumania and Hungary were very severe. Beside undertaking to supply Soviet Forces with food and other supplies available, each country had to pay in reparations to the Soviet Union the sum of 300 million dollars.¹ The Soviet Union did not ask for any additional territories from these countries beyond its 1940 boundaries.

Overtly there was nothing in Soviet Policy which was alarming to the West. The Soviet Union had agreed at the 1st Quebec Conference to a policy based on democratic principles and pledged that it would allow the peoples of the conquered countries to elect their own governments freely as soon as conditions would permit.

In April as Soviet Armies advanced into Rumania, the Soviets notified the West that it did not seek to annex this country nor to make a satellite out of it.²

The U.S. Government did not contest the leading position of the Soviet High Command in the Allied Control Councils. However, it endeavored to define the rights and duties of its own representatives on the councils.³ Reports received by the Department of State indicated that the Russians had exceeded the rights granted to them by the Armistice terms. They stripped the people of their minimum economic necessity to subsist. They restricted the freedom of movement of the ^{Western} Allied

¹ Ibid., pp. 231-35, 244-48.

² McNeill, Op.cit., p. 467.

³ Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 240-244.

' Representative.¹ Communists were placed in key positions and other elements were reduced to impotence.² Even American property was not given due protection by the Soviets. The Soviet High Command issued orders and executed them in the name of the Allied Control Councils without even consulting/^{the} representatives of the Western Allies.³ The situation became alarming to the British and disquieting to the Americans.⁴ The State Department inquired from Harriman, its ambassador in the Soviet Union, about the intentions of the Soviets in the Balkans. The Ambassador's answer confirmed the U.S. Government's fear of the undemocratic and subversive policy of the Soviets in the region.

On December 28, Harriman cabled:

"From Soviet actions so far, the terms friendly and independent appear to mean something quite different from our interpretation." He went to say "Any political figure...who disagrees with the Soviet policies is conveniently branded as a Fascist."⁵

On January 10, 1945, he cabled that Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe involved the use of a:

"Wide variety of means at their disposal-occupation troops, secret police, local communist parties, labor unions, sympathetic leftist organizations, sponsored cultural societies and economic pressures - to assure the establishment of regimes which, while maintaining an outward appearance of independence and of broad popular support, actually depend for their existence on groups responsive to all suggestions emanating from the Kremlin."⁶

¹ Ibid., pp. 262-63, 246.

² Ibid., p. 262.

³ Ibid., p. 239.

⁴ Ibid., p. 241.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 64-66.

⁶ Snell, J., The Meaning of Yalta, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1956, p. 94.

Therefore, the American Government was perfectly aware of Soviet policy in the Balkans. What did the U.S. Government do about it? It objected to the Soviets on many occasions but never carried its objections to an extent alarming to the Soviets. The American Government was ready to meet the Soviets "more than half way" for it analyzed the overzealous drive of Russia for security as an outcome of world hostility to the Soviets in the past. ~~Its policy on the whole amounted to appeasement.~~

Some of the officials in the State Department spoke of standing firm against the Soviets whenever they went astray of the liberal foreign policy advocated by the West. I could not find, however, a single example of a firm U.S. stand against Russia in the Balkans. Standing firm against a totalitarian state implies the ability and the willingness to use preventive measures when necessary. The U.S. never used or hinted to the Soviets that it was willing to use any stringent measures in 1944. The question, whether the U.S. possessed the means to use such measures, and whether it was advisable to use them shall be answered in a later part of this paper.

3. Gist

Basically the United States was suspicious of Soviet and British intentions in the Balkans. It did not want Britain to establish a sphere of influence, nor did it want the Soviet Union to communize or dominate the area exclusively. Consequently, it did not approve of Britain's demands for a Balkan campaign, nor did it participate in the discussions at Moscow. By refusing to participate in the discussions at Moscow, the

government of the United States allowed a free hand for its allies in the area. At Moscow Britain and the Soviet Union had agreed on their respective spheres and the campaigns were launched accordingly. Britain occupied Greece while the Soviet Union occupied the rest of the Balkans.

If the United States suspected the policies of its allies towards the Balkans, it should have participated actively in both the discussions and the campaign. By refusing to do that the United States had deprived itself of the power to influence the course of events in the area.

C. Poland

1. The Polish Government at London and the Soviets

The problem of Poland was one of the sour spots in American-Soviet relations during the war. Eastern Poland was invaded by Soviet forces in 1939 as a result of the Nazi Soviet Pact. The United States, whose policy was based on Wilsonian liberalism was displeased with Soviet action. The Poles, of course, were humiliated by the Soviets and held, at heart, hatred to the Soviet Regime. Events that took place at a later stage during the war drew the two neighbouring states who were at dagger point, closer than before. These events definitely held a promise for the improvement of Soviet-Polish relations.

When Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Soviet Government and the Polish Government in exile seated at London found themselves in the same boat, enmity had to be replaced by amity. With encouragement from the British Government a Declaration of Friendship

and Mutual Aid was signed on December 4, 1941.¹ Sikorski, the Polish Premier at the time, tried to get the Soviet Government to acknowledge the pre-war frontiers with the Soviet Union, but in vain. All that he could get was a sentence which stated simply that the Russo-German agreements of 1939 relating to territorial changes had lost their validity.²

After the victory of Soviet Forces at Stalingrad in January 1943, the attitude of Russia towards the Polish Government in exile began to change. Enmity was again replacing amity. In the spring of 1943, Soviet-Polish relations reached a low ebb. Disagreement with regard to the Eastern Frontiers coupled with news about the massacre of 8000 Polish officers at Smolensk in the Soviet Union affected the relationship between the two governments considerably. Thereafter, unfriendly Soviet steps began to appear.

In March 1943, it was revealed that the "Union of Polish Patriots", a pro-communist group of Polish citizens was established at Moscow. During the next month, on the 24th of April the Soviet Government severed diplomatic relations with the Polish Government seated at London.³

Soviet actions indicated that they tended to handle the Polish Question unilaterally. The major Western Allies were disturbed by Soviet action and feared that such steps might hamper co-operation among the

¹ Hull, Op.cit., p. 1267.

² Snell, Op.cit., p. 81.

³ Ibid., p. 84.

"United Nations" against the "Axis" during the war and that it might as well extend beyond the war. Consequently the United Kingdom as well as the United States tried to repair the breach between the two neighbouring states but they repeatedly failed. Why? The closer Soviet Forces advanced towards Poland the more uncompromising they became. Their position became stronger as they grew more confident of victory. Soon their forces were bound to occupy Poland, soon they would be the sole arbitrators. On the otherhand the West, in its endeavor to bring about a compromise, used ordinary diplomatic channels and did not back it with sufficient power. The U.S., especially, made it clear to the Soviets that it was using merely its good offices and that its interests in Poland would not lead to war or lack of co-operation with the Soviet Union. The Soviets could rest easy and ignore the pleas of the West, for they themselves (the West) have undermined their own position when they revealed that they were not ready even to take moderate steps for the sake of Poland. The breach was beyond repair unless the Poles acquiesced to the demands of the Soviets. Consequently, the U.S.S.R. increased those demands and stood its ground firmly.¹

In January 1944 Soviet Troops crossed the pre-war frontiers of Poland and as they advanced, handed some administrative powers to a Polish "National Liberation Committee". The National Liberation Committee was an organization which emanated from the "Union of Polish

¹ Feis, Herbert, Churchill - Roosevelt - Stalin, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 301.

Patriots", and which was created by Moscow to carry on Soviet policy in Poland under the facade of nationalism. Its most prominent members were ardent communists in exile at Moscow.

By the end of July the Soviet Armies had already reached the Vistula River about 30 miles from the Polish Capital, Warsaw. The Polish Underground Army at Warsaw, which was under the command of the Polish Government at London, took to arms on the 1st of August, against the Nazi Forces. At the initial stages of the struggle the uprising was a success and the Germans with the exception of few isolated posts were effectively driven out of the city. Although, the uprising was militarily advantageous to the Soviet forces, the Soviets did all they could do to cause its failure. They not only refrained from activities on the adjacent front and refused assistance, but also hampered the delivery of supplies from the West. The Soviets forbade Western aircraft rendering assistance to the insurgents in Warsaw to land in Soviet airfields only about 50 miles away from the city. The heroic struggle of the Underground Army had to die after it lasted about sixty days.¹ The brutal attitude of the Soviets aroused the West at public and governmental levels. But it did not move the Soviets. Their calculations revealed that the success of the uprising would give the Polish Government a strong stand in relation to the Soviets and this they wanted to avoid. They were bound for power. This was what mattered to them ultimately. The death, destruction and misery at Warsaw, while they stood inactive a few miles away, did not move them in the

¹ For a full account of the uprising at Warsaw see: Churchill, Op.cit., pp. 128-145.

least.

The Soviets did not want to appease; the West did not appear to be ready for applying unbearable pressure against them. Consequently, as they swept more of Polish territory they grew more arrogant. In December 1944, after the Soviet Armies had occupied a considerable part of Poland they declared to the world, that they recognized the "National Liberation Committee" as the Provisional Government of Poland.¹ This was done against the objections of the West which were ignored by the Soviets.

2. The United States and Poland

The United States did not suggest a platform on which the two governments could meet. It was not ready to lobby against Soviet demands for the Curzon Line as the eastern border of Poland.² It was not ready to suggest and back up a formula whereby the Poles at London and the Lublin Poles could merge into one interim government and gain the recognition of the Soviets. It was not even ready to guarantee the implementation of any agreement which the Soviets and the Poles at London might conclude.³ All it desired was an understanding between the two governments. In other words it followed a policy of non-commitment and postponement with regard to the Polish Question. This policy was an outcome of two factors.

¹ Snell, Op.cit., pp. 96-97.

² Hull, Op.cit., p. 1438.

³ Ibid., p. 1439.

The first was that the United States did not want to antagonize the Soviet Union by taking a clear stand against its demands in Poland.¹ When the Curzon Line was suggested by Stalin in an informal manner at Teheran, the President did not object.²

On the otherhand, the President did not want to arouse the public opinion of U.S. citizens of Polish descent. Poles in the U.S. were clearly against any appeasement to the Soviets with regard to the Polish Question. If aroused, and elections were coming soon, they might have caused the failure of Roosevelt in the elections.³

Consequently we can conclude that by not having a definite policy towards Poland in 1944, the United States' Government failed to use its maximum diplomatic power to bring forth an understanding between the Poles at London and the Soviet Government. The differences remained. The United States continued to recognize the London Poles while the Soviets recognized the Lublin Poles. The problem of the borders and the nature of the interim government that would exercise authority until conditions allowed for free and unfettered elections remained unsolved. They were to stay so until the Big Three met at Yalta.

¹ McNeill, Op.cit., p. 527.

² Feis, Op.cit., p. 365.

³ Lane, Bliss, I Saw Poland Betrayed, New York, Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1948, pp. 58-62.

"In the Presidential campaign of 1944 both the Republicans and the Democratic Parties considered that the votes of Americans of Polish descent might well be a deciding factor, especially in the key political states of New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio and Michigan."

3. Gist

By the end of 1944, the Soviet Union had already occupied Poland and established a communist government in the country. With support from the Red Army and the Soviet Secret Police, the Provisional Government in Poland had quelled all popular opposition.

Under the circumstances the United States had little power to change the situation. Complaints were not sufficient to induce the Soviets to change their policy, especially that Roosevelt had conveyed to the Soviets that he does not intend to go beyond the realm of complaints for the sake of Poland.

The complexity of the Polish Question should have been handled by direct negotiations at the highest level, rather than by ordinary diplomatic correspondence. Moreover, these negotiations should have been held at the earliest possible date. The earlier they could have been held the more powerful the West would have been. The preferable date for such negotiations should have been in the Spring of 1944, before Soviet forces set foot in Poland. Even as late as October 1944, the United States could have been able to influence the course of events. By refusing to participate in the discussions at Moscow (October 9-11) it had missed the boat. From then on the Soviet position in Poland was unchallengeable.

If early negotiations are recommended, it does not mean that the West would have got the upperhand. Geographically Poland was out of the Western sphere of action. Little could be done by the West for Poland, but at an early date the West might have done a little more.

D. Germany

1. The Circumstances

When we consider the policy of the United States towards Germany, we have to bear in mind that it was made at a time when public opinion was violently anti-German. Public opinion polls indicated that 60 percent of the people in the United States believed that Germany would start preparing for another war as soon as it was defeated. It was also revealed that 80 percent of the people favored a policy of "unconditional surrender."¹ In such circumstances the United States' Government began to plan its policy for Germany. These circumstances are of significance in a country which has a democratic system. The rulers cannot easily ignore the inclinations and the beliefs of the public.

2. A Period of Postponement

In the early period of the war the Soviet Union was the only Allied state which had already developed a plan for Germany. This plan, although in crude form at the time, remained the core of Soviet policy throughout the war. In December 1941 when the German Army was at the outskirts of Moscow, Stalin revealed the following plan to Eden who undertook to inform the United States' Secretary of State about its contents. It proposed that Hitler's Germany be reduced in size and divided into four independent states. The plan gave East Prussia to Poland and demanded from Germany heavy reparations in kind. On the whole the Soviet Plan was

¹ Snell, Op.cit., p. 38.

severe and the Western Allies avoided becoming formally committed to it. However, they encouraged Stalin to carry on his desperate fight against the Germans by promising him that most or all of his plans for Germany would be realized.¹

The United States prior to 1943 did not have a plan or a policy towards Germany. During that period it was not felt that the matter was urgent, for the tide of the war was still in favor of Germany. Moreover, the United States faced a dilemma with respect to the German problem. If its terms for post-war Germany were severe, British anxieties would be aroused, for they feared that the Soviets might dominate the Continent. On the otherhand, if the terms were light, the Soviet Government might become suspicious of American aims. The Soviets might have concluded that the West was trying to allow for the development of Germany as a bulwork against the Soviet Union.²

3. The Desire to Act

It was only in January 1943, one week before Soviet victory at Stalingrad, that the U.S. President informed the Soviet Union of his unconditional surrender policy.³ The Soviet Union received it in a cool manner, for the plan was brief and ambiguous. Moreover, the Soviets were disturbed by the delay of the Western Offensive which allowed the bulk

¹ Hull, Op.cit., p. 1167.

² Feis, Op.cit., pp. 354-55.

³ Snell, Op.cit., p. 40.

of the German Armies to fight on the Eastern Front. Throughout 1943 the tide of the war was turning clearly in favor of the Allies and therefore, the problem of Germany and liberated Europe became more urgent. In October 1943, the foreign ministers of the Three Major Allies established the European Advisory Commission. The Commission was charged with the assignment of studying, concerting and formulating Allied policy on the Continent. Later at Teheran the "Big Three" decided to refer the problem of Germany to that body for it was indivisible from that of Europe.¹

The European Advisory Commission had three basic assignments in regard to Germany. They were the following:

1. To draw an instrument of unconditional surrender.
2. To draw zones of occupation and a plan for the military command in the immediate period after the occupation.
3. To draft a common plan for the treatment of Germany after the war was over.

As it turned out the Commission succeeded in the first two assignments but failed with the third. Its success on the first two assignments was not without difficulty. Its discretionary powers were inadequate to the task. This led to frequent handling of the German problem by other channels. Nevertheless, on the 25th of July 1943, the represen-

¹ McNeill, Op.cit., p. 480.

Members of the European Advisory Commission held the rank of ambassadors. The Commission consisted of Ambassador Winant of the United States, Sir William Strang of the British Foreign Office, and Ambassador Gusev of the U.S.S.R. It was enlarged in 1944 to include the representative of the provisional Government of France. See Yalta Papers, Op.cit., p. 110.

tatives at the Commission initialed the draft of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender.¹ The draft was mainly based on the proposals of the United States. Similarly on the 12th of September the draft agreement on zones of occupation and administration of Greater Berlin was initialed.² It was largely based on the proposals of the British Government. The agreement assigned to the Soviet Union the Eastern Zone which had the largest area and the largest population. However, it was not as industrial as the Western Zones. When the draft agreement was initialed at the Commission, Britain and the United States were not yet agreed as to who should occupy the North Western Zone.

The United States desired the North Western Zone because it was directly accessible by sea. It felt that the allotment of the South Western Zone would imply commitments to Italy, France and Southern Europe. The U.S. felt Britain should get this zone in view of its interests in the area. Moreover, the U.S. felt that if its troops should be withdrawn in a short time from the European Continent, there would be no justification in undertaking such commitments.³ The issue remained pending until the 9th of September when Roosevelt and Churchill met at Quebec. At that Conference the United States accepted the South Western Zone when Britain guaranteed free access through the North Western Zone and in addition recognized the right of the U.S. Government to

¹ For Text of the Instrument of Unconditional Surrender: See Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 110-118.

² Ibid., pp. 118-123.

³ Hull, Op.cit., pp. 1611-13.

administer the Bremen and Bremen Haven enclaves. With these guarantees the U.S. Government felt that its lines of communication were secure enough.¹

4. Trial and Error

Many a time the work of the Commission was hindered by the inability of the U.S. Government to give its representative, Ambassador Winant, clear instructions. This was certainly not due to lack of trying but to unresolved differences among U.S. Government circles. The low prestige of the Department of State was a factor which led to dispute on the German plan.² The Department of Treasury and the Department of War had plans for Germany and the President lent them his ear. Finally in an effort to resolve the differences among the three departments, the President created a special committee to study the German problem. Among its members were, Hull (Secretary of State), Henry Morgenthau Jr. (Secretary of Treasury) and Stimson (Secretary of War). Harry Hopkins, a special assistant to the President was added at a later period.³ The Committee could not agree on a plan. All the parties concerned agreed that Germany should be demilitarized, that the Nazi Party and all associated organizations should be dissolved, war criminals punished, reparations paid to injured countries and that education as

¹ Churchill, Op.cit., p. 1160.
See also Mosely, Philip, "Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn", Foreign Affairs, Vol: XXVIII, (July, 1950), pp. 596-97.

Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 198-201.

² McNeill, Op.cit., p. 482.

³ Ibid., p. 482.

well as communication should be controlled for an indefinite period after occupation. However, they disagreed on economic measures. While the Department of State as well as the Department of War desired moderate economic measures, the Department of Treasury asked for drastic and severe economic measures. The plan advocated by the Treasury, later known as the "Morgenthau Plan", proposed that German industry of all kinds be dismantled and that German mines be destroyed.¹ Its economic measures were severe enough to reduce Germany into a purely agricultural state. These measures, if applied, would have caused starvation in Germany and an economic crisis in post war Europe.² It is perhaps significant to note that both Morgenthau and his assistant Harry Dexter White were jews. There had been assertions also that White gave a Soviet spy ring governmental information during the war.³ These circumstances led some observers to conclude that the Morgenthau Plan was a manifestation of Soviet and Jewish influence.

Both the State and War Departments unlike Morgenthau did not want to divide Germany into separate states. They proposed that only war industry should be dismantled and that control should be exercised on German industry during the occupation period only. They argued that severe measures such as those of Morgenthau would cripple not only the

¹ Hull, Op.cit., pp. 1604-06.
See also Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 160-61.

² Ibid., p. 1617.

³ Snell, Op.cit., p. 44.
See also Hull, Op.cit., p. 1602.

economy of Germany but of Europe also. An agricultural economy could not possibly support Germany and would lead to starvation. A division of Germany into separate states would revive German grudge and facilitate the growth of para military organizations such as the Nazi Party. These and many other arguments were advocated by the opponents of Morgenthau but the President was more inclined to ignore them for he favored harsh measures against Germany.¹

At the Second Quebec Conference, Morgenthau was the only member of the committee called by the President. There Morgenthau proposed his plan to Churchill. The Prime Minister opposed the plan violently but finally after some adjustments had to accept it reluctantly. The primary objective of the Prime Minister was to obtain lend lease for Britain's dwindling economy. He felt he could not afford to refuse the Morgenthau Plan, especially that Morgenthau was the Secretary of Treasury.²

5. Postponement Again

Soon after the plan was initialed by both Roosevelt and Churchill news about it leaked to the press. The press criticized the Government severely at a time when the presidential elections were coming soon. The counter offensive at the Ardenne led some officials to the conclusion that German resistance had stiffened as a result of the plan.³ These

¹ Hull, Op.cit., pp. 1605-20.
See also Yalta Papers, Op.cit., p. 161.

² At that Conference, Churchill and Roosevelt discussed the German Policy. For a full record of what happened at Quebec see: Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 134-141.
Churchill, Op.cit., pp. 146-161.

³ Wilmot, Chester, Struggle for Europe, London, Collins Clear-Type Press, 1952, p. 550.

factors coupled by the ardent resistance of Hull and Stimson led the President to abandon the plan.¹ The British Government was glad to know of this decision and dropped the plan immediately. Having thus burned his fingers, the President refused to consider a definite plan for Germany at the time. He wrote Hull on the 20th of October: "I dislike making plans for a country we do not yet occupy."² This comment was followed by a memorandum to the Department of War asking them to stop all efforts to make plans for Germany for a period of six months. Thus American policy towards Germany sank again into postponement.

The only development of significance that happened with regard to the German Question after the Quebec episode was the appearance of French demands. After the liberation of France, the French Provisional Government demanded a zone of occupation as well as a place on the Allied Control Council. The President of the United States as well as the Department of State approved of these demands, although, at Yalta the President did not stand firmly behind these views as we shall find out at a later part of this paper.³

6. Gist

Throughout 1944, the President had been undecided as to the policy he should adopt for post war Germany. For a short period during the

¹ Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 134-41.
See also Stimson, Op.cit., pp. 578-80.
Krock, Arthur, New York Times, 29 September, 1944.

² Hull, Op.cit., p. 1621.

³ Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 300-301.

autumn, he seemed convinced of the "Mongenthau Plan", but in December he again changed his mind. Having failed to make up his mind the President postponed decisions on German policy until Germany had been occupied.

In the absence of a policy political considerations could no longer affect the conduct of the war. Moreover, no agreement could be reached among the allies as to the post war treatment of Germany.

In war a state which does not have a clear policy is always at a disadvantage. It cannot utilize its military potentials for the attainment of its political goals and for the preservation of its own interests. In war international politics is in a state of flux. Therefore a country which is not clear as to its purpose is liable to drift. Decisions should always precede action, otherwise actions may not turn out to suit the purpose and the state may find itself in a disadvantageous situation which its forces had helped to create.

By having a clear policy a state could not possibly lose. It could participate actively to bring forth a common platform which would concert its actions with those of its allies. If it did not succeed to bring forth such a common platform, at least it would get a clear picture of what its interests are, and what are the interests of its allies. Consequently, it would either adjust its policy to suit those of its allies or it would continue to maintain its policy and conduct its campaigns in a manner more advantageous to its purposes.

By not having a clear policy towards Germany, the United States had lost all the above mentioned advantages.

E. The Far East

1. The War Theatre

The theatre of the war in the Far East was primarily an American theatre. Although, the Government of the United States had given priority to the demands of the European theatre by the Autumn of 1944, it had accomplished decisive victories against Japan. In October 1944 its forces had already penetrated the outer perimeter of Japanese defences and inflicted serious losses on the Japanese in the Pacific area. The campaign on the Phillipine Islands was underway, and the Japanese Navy had been reduced to an extent that rendered it unable to engage the American fleet effectively on the high seas.¹ Japanese communications between the main islands of Japan and their bases were constantly harassed by the United States fleet and Air Force. It was a question of time before Japan would collapse, especially, since American forces engaged in Europe, could soon be diverted to the Far East after the collapse of Germany. American military experts estimated that Japan could not possibly continue the war more than 18 months after V.E. Day.²

However, on other fronts in the Far East the Allied armies were not as fortunate. In South East Asia the Allied forces checked the Japanese advance into India and by October 1944 had already forced the enemy to retreat into the territory of Burma.³ But it had not dealt the enemy a decisive blow. In China, throughout the Autumn of 1944

¹ Feis, Op.cit., pp. 396, 397.

² McNeill, Op.cit., p. 480.

³ Churchill, Op.cit., pp. 162-172.

the Allied forces were on retreat and important American air bases were occupied.¹

The slowness of the Allied advance in Burma and their retreat within China were not enough to balance the astounding success in the Pacific. The tide of the War was clearly against Japan. For Japan is a series of islands and victory at sea could bring about its collapse.

2. American Objectives

The Government of the United States had two main objectives in the Far East. The first was the development of an independent, strong and friendly China² for the purpose of creating a bulwark against a possible revival of Japanese aggression. China was expected to become a stabilizing factor capable of reducing American commitments of keeping the peace in the area.³ A strong independent China was further expected to promote cultural as well as commercial American interests.

A goal of the sort was not viewed to be incompatible with the interests of Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain according to the understanding of the United States' Government, could benefit from such developments in terms of trade and security for its colonies in the Far East. But Britain actually appeared to the U.S. Government to be following a different policy. The Department of State thought that

¹ Feis, Op.cit., pp. 397-98.

² Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 353, 356.

³ Ibid., pp. 353, 356.

Britain for imperial purposes was willing to see China tormented by internal discord and chaos.¹ Therefore, the U.S. Government had to persuade Britain to accept its policy. In this task United States diplomats felt optimistic, for Britain recognized the lead of the U.S. in China.²

As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, the Department of State had thought that it was not impossible to get Soviet recognition to its policy. Governmental circles in the United States had two possible guesses as to Soviet policy in China. The first was that of internal interference for the purpose of communizing China. The second was that of having a friendly China next to their borders. The Department of State was inclined to believe that the primary purpose of the Soviet Union was that of having a friendly China and therefore sought to accomodate this goal by assisting in the development of Chinese-Soviet friendship.³

In an effort to eliminate discord and chaos in China, the United States Government sent General Patrick Hurely to take command of American and Chinese forces operating in the area. In addition, Hurely was asked to bring about agreement between the Kromintang Government and the Chinese communists. Hurely travelled to China via Moscow. At Moscow he felt out Soviet policy in China. He was told by Molotov, that the Soviet

¹ Ibid., pp. 353, 356.

² Ibid., p. 354.

³ Ibid., pp. 351-52, 354.

Union had no special interests in China and moreover had no connection with the Chinese communists.¹ Hurely formed the impression that the Soviets recognized the lead of the U.S. and concluded that he could have a free hand in dealing with the Chinese problem.²

Hurely demanded two things from Chiang: 1) A revision and a re-organization of the Chinese Government for the purpose of reform; 2) An understanding with the communists and an agreement as to their participation in the Government.³ Chiang reluctantly approved, carried out some re-organizations in his government and with the assistance of Hurely opened negotiations with communists. After prolonged negotiations over the leadership of the combined armed forces, the communists withdrew on the 16th of February, 1945. They insisted that if they could not take command of the combined armed forces an agreement with the Kuomintang government could not be reached. Hurely by that time had concluded that it was impossible to co-operate with the communists and recommended that the only course left to the U.S. Government was to support the Kuomintang. Thus by the end of 1944 the U.S. had failed to eliminate chaos and bring about an understanding between the different factions in China.⁴

¹ McNeill, Op.cit., p. 516.

² Ibid., p. 516.

³ Ibid., pp. 517-18.

⁴ For information about Hurely's mission in China; see Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 346-51.

3. Soviet Union v.s. Japan

At Teheran (28 November, 1943) Stalin had already promised to wage war against Japan as soon as the war against Germany was over. However, in the months that succeeded the conference at Teheran the Soviet Union had repeatedly avoided discussion of any arrangements or plans with the United States military mission at Moscow. The Americans were disturbed by this delay and some officials were led to doubt the sincerity of the Soviet promise.

In October 1944, the Americanstook the appportunity of the presence of Churchill and Eden at Moscow to open the discussion again on the Far East. The Soviet Government again agreed to join in the war against Japan, but it had a price. The Soviet Government demanded a new lend lease over and above that of the Fourth Protocol which was given to conduct war against Germany. The total tonnage that was demanded accounted to 1,056,000 tons.¹ Upon the approval of the U.S. Government, the Soviet Union agreed to give bases to the United States Air Force in Siberia and the Maritime Provinces. With some adjustments the Soviet Union agreed also to wage its military campaign according to the United States' logistics plan and to restrict it mainly to Manchuria.² The Soviet Government at Moscow did not discuss any political implications of this war, nor did it present any territorial demands. These were left to Yalta in view of the fact that President Roosevelt did not attend the

¹ Ibid., p. 371.

² McNeill, Op.cit., p. 519.
See also Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 366-67, 370-71, 371-74.

Moscow Conference.

4. Gist

By the end of 1944 the United States had won decisive victories in the Pacific. The final defeat of Japan became a question of time only.

On the Asiatic mainland no decisive victories were won by that time. Factionalism chattered the potential war power of China. All efforts exerted by the United States to bring about an understanding between the main factions of China, the Chinese communists and the Kuomintang nationalists, had failed. The Soviet Government had disclaimed the Chinese communists and did not object to the efforts exerted to bring about an understanding between the different factions under American leadership. The United States' Government at the time interpreted the policy of the Soviets as a recognition of American leadership in the area. It was thought that the Soviets were also willing to develop a friendly policy with post war China if the Chinese were willing to reciprocate with them.

The Government of the United States had repeatedly demanded Soviet participation in the war against Japan. By the end of 1944 Stalin had confirmed his promise to wage war on the Chinese Empire in the shortest time possible after V.E. day. But the Soviets had a price. They demanded additional lend lease in war material and sought political gains which were proposed and negotiated at Yalta.

CHAPTER II

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CONFERENCE

A. Designation of a Place and a Time for the Conference

Throughout the Autumn of 1944 cables and messages were exchanged between London, Washington and Moscow in an attempt to designate a place and a date for the proposed major Tripartite Allied Conference. Churchill and Roosevelt suggested a variety of places which extended from Northern Scotland to Alexandria in Egypt.¹ All those places had their various advantages and disadvantages, but from a political power point of view, they all had one characteristic in common; they were all in Western held territories. Stalin repeatedly refused to meet his counterparts outside Soviet territories. Stalin felt powerful enough to convey to the West that his presence could not be attained beyond Soviet territories, and that in case his counterparts could not come to the Soviet Union, they would have to settle for Molotov, his foreign minister.² Against the persistence of Stalin the West had no choice. It had either to settle for the Soviet demands or run the risk of no conference at all. As it turned out, it chose the former and on December 31, 1944 Roosevelt informed Stalin that he was willing to come to Crimea and Churchill concurred.³

¹ For the texts of messages and cables exchanged with regard to the place of the Conference see:

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955, pp. 3-25.

² Ibid., p. 5.

³ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

What forced the hand of the West in this respect, and why did Stalin feel that he could afford to persist on Soviet territories as a place for the conference? Nothing in the texts of the exchanged messages and cables mentioned any political power considerations. In these messages various reasons such as health, security, climate, commitments at home and other reasons were mentioned but none of them touched on power considerations. However, political power considerations could not be ignored and the reason why they were not mentioned could probably be explained in the desire of each state not to offend the other while they were all engaged in war against Germany.

During the course of the argument on the place of this conference, the United States' Government committed a technical diplomatic mistake which probably encouraged Stalin to persist in his demand that Soviet territories should be the place. As early as October 17, Hopkins had conveyed to the Soviet Ambassador in the United States, Gromyko, that the President was willing to come to Crimea.¹ This information probably led Stalin to conclude that in the long run, the President would agree to come to the Soviet Union, and therefore, encouraged him to persist in his stand throughout the rest of the argument.

Another factor and perhaps the major reason which forced the hand of the West before Stalin's insistence was the change of fortunes on the German fronts. On December 16 the counter offensive of the German Army at the Ardenne on the Western Front was a complete surprise to the

¹ Sherwood, R., Roosevelt and Hopkins, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1948, pp. 844-45.

See also, Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 8-9.

West, which ended by throwing back Western Forces about 80 miles from the Siegfried Line, which their armies had previously reached.¹ The Soviets did not lose the opportunity. While the German Armies concentrated on the Western Front, they launched what they called, the Winter Campaign, on the 12th of January.² From the banks of the Vistula the Soviet Armies advanced across Poland and reached the River Oder only 100 miles from Berlin.³ The West more than ever recognized the need to co-operate closely with the Soviets.

Eisenhower, the supreme commander on the Western Front, reported that close co-operation with the Soviets was a necessity for the success of his spring offensive.⁴ Bedell Smith, his assistant, explained that there was a possibility of the German army retiring to South West Germany for the purpose of waging guerilla warfare against Allied troops. It was estimated that such a war could last for several months and that in order to forestall such a step, the spring offensive of the Western Allied troops must be a success.⁵

Out of these military considerations irritating political conclusions were derived. It was estimated that the position of the forces

¹ For a full account of the Ardenne Offensive see:
Wilmot, C., The Struggle for Europe, London, Collins Clear-Type Press, 1952, pp. 580-602.

Churchill, W., Triumph and Tragedy, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953.

² Snell, J., (ed.), The Meaning of Yalta, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1956, pp. 30-31.

³ Ibid., pp. 30-31.

⁴ Ibid., p. 28.
See also, Churchill, Op.cit., p. 278.

⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

on both the Eastern and the Western fronts, rendered a German collapse at Soviet hands more likely. In the absence of a unified policy towards Germany, such a situation would allow the Soviets to dominate Europe, East of the Rhine. While the advance of Soviet Forces gave a sense of security to Stalin, the above mentioned reasoning made the West more anxious to hold a conference, and, therefore, more ready to accept Crimea in Soviet territory as a place for the Conference.

From a power point of view the timing of the Conference was not to the disadvantage of the West. Originally it was proposed that the Conference be held in November. But the commitments of the President at home did not make this possible. The old Congress was in its last days and the new Congress was expected to convene in a short time. Not until his fourth inauguration on the 20th of January, 1945, could the President prepare to leave for the Conference.¹ As it turned out the Conference started at Yalta, in Crimea, on the 4th of February 1945.

The delay which the commitments of the President at home had caused was to the advantage of the West. By that time the Western armies had recovered the ground they lost at the Aardenne and were again at the gates of Germany, while Soviet Forces stood still on the Oder. Although the Soviet Forces were still nearer to Berlin than the Western forces, the situation was less disadvantageous than before.

No other reasons than the commitments of the President at home were given for the delay of the conference. Whether these reasons were

¹ Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 15, 24.

an excuse used to cover other political power purposes or whether they were genuine cannot be ascertained. What can be ascertained is that by the time the Conference was held, the military situation on the Western Front had improved and the potential bargaining power of the West had been promoted.

In my opinion the aftermath of the Ardenne Offensive should not have created that much anxiety in the West. Allied intelligence had already reported that Germany had, beside throwing her central reserve on the Western Front, transferred some divisions from the Eastern Front.¹ Western statesmen recognized that the set back was temporary, but they should have also recognized that after the Soviet advance in the East, German troops would begin their Eastward journey again. Due to Nazi-Soviet ideological enmity and due to the inhuman brutalities committed by each against the other during the course of the war, Germany could never allow for a surrender solely at Soviet hands. Westerners should have recognized that soon the Soviets would be anxious for their co-operation in order to halt the transfer of troops to the Eastern Fronts. This interpretation materialized at the initial stages of the Yalta Conference. General Antonov asked the West to maintain a constant pressure on the Western Front in order to help reduce the transfer of troops to the Eastern Front.² Both parties needed the assistance of the other. Therefore, the temporary set back at the Ardenne should

¹ Wilmot, Op.cit., pp. 575-579.

² Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 574-75, 583.

never have been allowed to be a cause for giving in to the Soviets, even in relation to designating a place for the Conference.

The Soviets, however, still held some other cards to use in their favor. The majority of Eastern Europe had already come under their control. Their participation in the Far Eastern war, which the West was anxious to have, was also another important factor in their favor. These factors did not only help the Soviets to have the Conference in their territory, but also served their purposes during the course of the negotiations.

B. Discussions at Malta (January 31 - February 3, 1945)

Churchill was aware of the difficult negotiations ahead at Yalta. He was aware that Rumania, Bulgaria and Poland were totally under the control of Soviet armed forces.¹ He was suspicious of Soviet intentions and therefore, was pessimistic of the results. In a message to Roosevelt he said:

"This may well be a fateful Conference coming at a moment when the Great Allies are so divided and the shadows of the war lengthens out before us. At the present time I think the end of this war may well prove to be more disappointing than was the last."²

The Prime Minister, therefore, deemed fit to hold discussions with Roosevelt at Malta prior to their arrival at Yalta. In these discussions, Churchill aimed at two goals:

¹ Churchill, Op.cit., p. 331.

² Yalta Papers, Op.cit., p. 31.

(The quotation is from a letter sent by Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt on January 8, 1945, with regard to the discussions at Malta).

1. To agree with the United States on a common policy to be pursued at Yalta.¹ If this was achieved the West could have had a stronger hand against Stalin.
2. To solve Anglo-American military differences and unify their strategy. These differences had increased during the months of December and January to an irritating extent.²

However, Churchill's hopes were not fully realized despite his diplomatic skill and round about ways of pushing the American foot into the door. Roosevelt was not interested in holding prolonged discussions at Malta. He did not want to demonstrate to Stalin that the United States and Britain were coming to Yalta as a block. Therefore, he stayed at Yalta overnight only. His secretary of state was not allowed ample time to discuss fully with Eden the various topics likely to arise at the Conference. Only on military staff levels were discussions detailed and adequate. Some scholars reported that the British delegation was dissatisfied with the American attitude. They found out that the Americans were no less suspicious of Britain's post war intentions than those of the Soviets.³

¹ Churchill, Op.cit., p. 342.

² Ibid., pp. 339, 341.

³ Wilmot, Op.cit., p. 632.

CHAPTER III

THE BALKANS' QUESTION AT YALTA

A. The Framework of United States' Policy

In order to understand the attitude of the United States regarding the Balkans' Question, we have to consider briefly its policy towards the Soviet Union.

The delegation of the United States, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, came to Yalta with the idea that it was not impossible to co-operate with the Soviet Union. The Americans were aware that they would encounter difficulties in the process, but nevertheless, they thought that with patience and appeasement these difficulties could be surmounted.

Reports of American diplomats and officials which exposed difficulties encountered with the Soviets in day to day contacts, and Soviet unilateral subversive activities in occupied territories, did not leave a permanent impression on those who formulated foreign policy.¹ Rather than adopting a tough policy, the Government continued to adopt a lenient one. A policy of this sort could be understood in terms of the following criteria.

- 1) The traditional dislike of American mentality to the use of power.

¹ Read the reports of Deane and Harriman; U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Papers; The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955.

- 2) The desire of the United States to install peace in the postwar world based on universal collective security rather than on alliances and balance of power. This desire made it eager to obtain Soviet co-operation.

The United States had brief experience with the Soviets. During the interwar period it had followed a policy of isolation which allowed for little experience on Soviet affairs. Only during the war period did the two states come to close contact; and the necessities of the war rendered all difficulties surmountable. It was this brief experience which constituted a scale of reference in American minds when Soviet policy was under consideration.¹

Different influential circles in the government of the United States had different reasons for advocating a lenient Soviet policy. Some officials believed that in view of the tremendous damage inflicted on the Soviets during the war, the Soviet Government would be primarily occupied with internal reconstruction in the post war decade. Therefore, it was concluded that the Soviet Government would not be interested in, nor could it afford to pursue, an exclusive policy in the Balkans. It was argued that an exclusive Soviet Policy in the Balkans would alienate foreign powers from whom assistance was expected for internal reconstruction and that the Soviets were not likely to forgo needed assistance.²

¹ Dennett and Johnson, (ed.), Negotiating with the Russians, Boston, World Peace Foundation, 1951, p. 173.

² Ibid., p. 172.

It had been considered that the interests of the United States in the Balkans were limited and that the Soviets were entitled to a privileged position in the area. Therefore, the Government concluded that co-operation with the Soviets was possible, if they exercised influence with modesty.

The Government of the United States had some internal factors to consider also. Roosevelt thought that after the war public opinion in the U.S. would demand a return to a state of "normalcy" and a rapid demobilization of the armed forces would have to take place. He had in mind the frustrating experience of Wilson when the American public returned to isolation in the interwar period. Involvement in power politics on the continent implied political, military and economic commitments which the United States' Government could not guarantee if the public in the postwar period returned to isolation. Probably, this reasoning was on the President's mind when he refused to guarantee the presence of American troops in Germany for more than two years after the war.¹ The President and his associates in the government thought that the safest way to secure international commitments from the American public was through international organizations and institutions such as; the United Nations, the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund.²

¹ Yalta Papers, Op.cit., p. 628.

² Dennett and Johnson, Op.cit., p. 172.

Beside considering factors of the postwar decade, the Government had immediate problems at hand. At the time, Germany was on the verge of collapse, but the United States still had another war against Japan. It was expected that immediately after V.E. day American troops were to be transferred to the Far East as quickly as possible. With reduced forces in Europe, the Government had to consider whether it was possible to resist a Soviet invasion in Europe. In this respect reports of some of the high military authorities were discouraging. Admiral Leahy reported that Soviet Forces could not be stopped short of the shores of Britain in case a conflict ensued between the West and the Soviet Union.¹ Moreover, the United States was interested in engaging the Soviets in war against Japan in the shortest time possible after V.E. day. The Government, therefore, had to consider that if it pursued an anti-Soviet policy on the continent, the Soviet Government might refrain from assisting in the war against Japan. It had also to consider that the Soviets might not only refrain from assisting America in the Far East, but might pursue anti-American policy in the area damaging to the war efforts. Soviet assistance in the war against Japan was viewed by some American officials and military generals, who had the confidence of the President, as being a necessity.²

American diplomats at Yalta could not ignore that Soviet Forces had already occupied most of Eastern Europe. Rumania, Bulgaria and

¹ Yalta Papers, Op.cit., p. 108.

² Ibid., pp. 94-95.

substantial parts of Hungary and Czechoslovakia were already in Soviet hands.¹ Having in mind the strategy which their military leaders had devised (to the dismay of the British Government); they could not expect that their forces might occupy what was left of Eastern Europe before the arrival of Soviet Forces.

The above mentioned reasons were the factors which influenced the policy of the United States in the Balkans and Poland at Yalta. They probably account for the silence of the American delegation during discussions on the Balkans.

B. What Happened at Yalta.

1) The Interests of the United States and the Declaration on Liberated Europe

The demands of the United States in the Balkans consisted of a set of liberal principles. As stated in the briefing papers handed to Roosevelt on the way to the Conference, American aims in the Balkans consisted of the following:²

- 1) The right of the Balkan peoples to choose for themselves freely and without external interference the type of social, political and economic system they deem proper.
- 2) The right of foreign governments and private business institutions to negotiate and conduct business with any

¹ Churchill, W., Triumph and Tragedy, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953, p. 331.

² Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 237-38.

or all these countries on equal basis. The United States warned against a policy of exclusion in the fields of commerce and economics.

- 3) The right of access to representatives of foreign countries, press or information agencies. It demanded that these representatives be allowed to collect and transmit information to their governments or agencies.
- 4) The right of access to American philanthropic and educational organizations for the purpose of conducting activities in their own fields on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
- 5) Protection of American citizens and the furtherance of legitimate American interests existing or potential.

Therefore, the United States was primarily interested to establish free democratic regimes and systems in those countries. Moreover, it aimed to insure an equal opportunity for the United States' Government and private institutions to conduct business, educational and other activities on the basis of most favored nation treatment. The United States' Government thought that if those principles were agreed to by the three major powers and if applied by the Balkan States, they would provide adequate protection to existing and potential American interests in those countries. Beyond that the United States had no ambitions in the Balkans.

In order to acquire the approval of Britain and the Soviet Union,

the Government of the United States incorporated these aims in the Declaration on Liberated Europe. Although, no special reference to American interests was made, the provisions of the Declaration safeguarded the above mentioned American interests in the Balkans.

The Declaration on Liberated Europe as amended and approved by the three powers provided for mutual assistance to the liberated countries of Europe. Moreover, it provided for the peoples of those countries the right to choose freely the type of social, economic or political system they desired.¹

In order to carry out these goals the three powers agreed:

"a) to establish conditions of internal peace; b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections."²

Moreover, the three powers pledged to have mutual consultation "when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration", and to "establish appropriate machinery for carrying out the joint responsibilities set forth in the declaration."³

¹ Ibid., pp. 918-19.

² Ibid., pp. 918-19.

³ Ibid., pp. 918-19.

The Declaration on Liberated Europe was the only proposal submitted by the United States in relation to the Balkans. On other specific issues the United States representatives remained silent. Although these representatives had approved of what Britain had to propose at Yalta with regard to the Balkans, they participated passively in the discussions which ensued. American participation was limited to casual approval of Britain's demands.

2.) Bulgaria, Rumania and Greece

Britain proposed that Bulgaria should pay reparations to Greece for the damage it inflicted on that country during the course of the war.¹ Britain also proposed that if the Soviet Union chose to take measures in Bulgaria in the name of the Allied Control Council, it should consult the Western representatives on the Council. If prior consultation was not affected or if these representatives did not approve of the proposed Soviet measures, the Soviet Union had no right to carry them out in the name of the Council.²

Britain moreover proposed that the Soviet Union should cease to remove property belonging to British and American oil interests in Rumania. If the property which had already been removed cannot be returned to its owners, it should be considered a part of the reparation payments from Rumania to the Soviet Union. In that case, the Soviet Government should assist the governments of the United States

¹ Ibid., pp. 891-93, 781-82.

² Ibid., pp. 889-90.

and Britain to bring about an arrangement whereby the Rumanian Government would undertake to reimburse the owners of the property.¹

With respect to the Allied Control Council in Bulgaria after the termination of hostilities on the European Continent, Britain proposed the following:²

- 1) British and American representatives should take their places in the Control Council as full members. They should have the right of direct access to Bulgarian authorities.
- 2) Decisions of the Allied Control Council should be unanimous and its name and authority should be used only where the representatives of all three powers were in agreement.
- 3) British and American representatives must have the right to membership of any sub-committee or executive organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.

Although Britain's demands were reasonable, the Soviet delegation postponed discussing them on grounds that the proposals could be dealt with by ordinary diplomatic channels and that since they were submitted at the end of the Conference, what was left of the time should be devoted to more important questions. As it turned

¹ Ibid., p. 893.

² Ibid., pp. 889-90.

out the Soviets were not merely seeking postponement but wanted to avoid commitment to any of these proposals. Probably, the passive attitude of the United States gave the Soviet representatives the impression that they could afford to postpone discussion on these issues, certainly, by insisting on leaving the Conference on the 11th of February. The President did not help to give ample time for a decision on these issues.¹

3. Yugoslavia

The discussions on Yugoslavia took more time than the rest of the Balkan issues put together. Yugoslavia was still not occupied by any one of the Allied Powers. Soviet Russia and Britain had already agreed to divide foreign influence in that country amongst themselves in the ratio of 50 - 50.² Moreover, Yugoslavia was not far from Western Forces in Italy. When these facts are kept in mind it becomes no longer surprising that Yugoslavia consumed most of the time allocated to the Balkan discussions. By that time it was the only spot where a bargain could be made and Britain did not lose the the opportunity.

In conformity with the Moscow Agreement, Britain had brought about an agreement between the Yugoslav Government at London and Tito, the leader of the partisans.³

¹ Ibid., pp. 911, 925.

² Supra, p. 18.

³ Yalta Papers, Op.cit., p. 781.

This agreement, hereafter, called the Tito - Subasic Agreement was forced on the Yugoslav monarch by the British Government.¹ It was on the basis of this agreement that the interim government in Yugoslavia was established. Nevertheless, with the presence of the armed partisans in the country, Britain was worried about the fate of its share in the bargain. It suspected that the Tito - Subasic Agreement might not provide enough power for the pro-Western elements to rule the country jointly with and equal to the Communists. Therefore Britain proposed two amendments to the above mentioned agreement in an effort to strengthen the hand of the democratic elements. It proposed that after putting into effect the Tito - Subasic Agreement and the formation of a new government, the National Liberation Committee which was dominated by the Communist partisans should be extended to include members of the last Skuptsina who did not collaborate with the Nazis. The extended Liberation Committee would function as a parliament, but its legislative acts would be subject to subsequent ratification by a constituent assembly.² Britain demanded that the Soviet Union should sign a telegram to that effect in conjunction with the other major powers, and that the telegram be mailed to Tito immediately.³ Moreover Britain demanded that the text of the telegram should be included in the communique of the Conference. The Soviet delegation

¹ Ibid., pp. 781-82.

² Ibid., pp. 820-21, 845-46, 900, 908.

³ Ibid., pp. 820-21, 845-46, 900, 908.

tried to avoid such a commitment. It suggested that the interim government should first be formed and that at a later date these amendments would be submitted to that government for approval. Britain disagreed firmly. The Soviets then changed their position slightly. They agreed on the amendments but refused to include them in the text of the telegram to Tito. Again Britain stood firm. The Soviet Union then gave way to Britain and the amendments were included in both the telegram and the communique.¹

Surprisingly the United States, which had disapproved of the Tito - Subasic Agreement prior to Yalta, remained silent during the discussion. When consulted by the British Government on the Tito - Subasic Agreement, the United States' Government had answered on December 23, 1944:

"Stripped out of its generalities the agreement provides for a thorough going recording of administrative, legislative, electoral and institutional procedures, in which one group, even though it may be the strongest in the country (meaning the partisans), would have practically complete and exclusive power. The gesture toward the government in exile, in the person of Dr. Subasic, seem hardly more than a concession considered sufficient to acquire recognition by other governments, on grounds of an apparent continuity."²

At the conclusion of the discussions the President hesitated to sign the telegram. However, he approved after it was read to

¹ Ibid., pp. 846, 851, 874, 900.

² Ibid., p. 256.

him by Eden.¹ Nothing is found in the official minutes of the Seventh Plenary meeting which explains the sudden change in the President's attitude. It is unlikely that the President had found in the amendments introduced by Britain sufficient security for the democratic elements in the country. The Telegram had made it clear that the Tito - Subasic Agreement was the base for the interim government in Yugoslavia. Probably it was either the President's disinterest in the Balkan affairs or his desire not to antagonize the Soviets which encouraged him to sign.

The other major Yugoslav issue at Yalta was that of its borders with Italy and Austria. Britain, whose zone in Austria was adjacent to the Yugoslav borders, and whose forces in Italy were likely to reach the Italian - Yugoslav borders at the end of the war, was worried about Tito's territorial ambitions in both Austria and Italy. In order to curb Tito's territorial ambitions and if necessary to have a free hand in using its forces for that purpose, Britain asked the three Powers to guarantee the integrity of the pre war borders of Yugoslavia until a peace settlement was reached.² The United States approved of Britain's proposals but as usual it failed to back them or argue for them with vigor.

¹ Ibid., p. 908.

² Ibid., pp. 887-88.

C. Conclusion

The demands of the Western Powers in the Balkans were limited. Britain had to limit its demands to the oral agreement reached at Moscow in which Soviet predominance in the region was recognized. Now that Soviet forces were in the area, Britain must have recognized that it could not submit demands with the aim of reducing the Soviet power position. Consequently its demands did not amount to more than a call for adjustment of grievances.

The United States like Britain recognized Soviet preponderance in the area. Furthermore, it considered that its interests in the Balkans were limited and, therefore, chose to adopt a passive attitude in the discussions which ensued.

The passive attitude of the United States could be justified if Britain's proposals were not reasonable, or if they were not in line with American interests. However, this was not the case. The United States received reports of Soviet unilateral actions in the region. The United States wanted to induce the Soviets to abandon these excesses. The British proposals, which the United States had approved at Malta, were on the whole in line with American interests. With the exception of the Tito - Subasic Agreement, the United States had nothing in Britain's proposals that was not in line with its interests. Therefore, it should have played a more positive role in the discussions. A positive role might have convinced the Soviets to accede to the Western proposals. It might have also served as a warning to the

Soviets that an exclusive policy in the Balkans might precipitate American reactions. A positive participation of the United States would have certainly added more weight to the Western proposals. During a period when the Allies were still engaged in war against Germany, the Soviets would have had to consider seriously the possibility of American reactions. I am not saying here that the Soviet Union would have retreated from its position. What I am saying is that a positive participation of the United States in the discussions and a firm stand behind Britain's proposals would have certainly given more power to Western views. It would have "thrown the ball into the Soviet camp" to consider whether it was advisable to communize the Balkans and what would be the reactions of the United States.

The Declaration on Liberated Europe which the United States proposed and which received the approval of the Soviet Union had its merits. From a power point view it certainly did not give security to American interests in the region; nevertheless, the United States could use it in case the Soviets failed to abide by its provisions. The Declaration could be used to arouse the publics of the Balkan States against Soviet excesses. It could be used as a document to indict the Soviets with anti-democratic policies. To that extent the Declaration could be considered as an element of power in favor of the West. Otherwise, the Soviet Union had legally stamped its gains in the Balkans. It is true that the West by that time could not force the Soviets to abandon their privileged power position in

the area. In any case this was not the intention of the United States. But what the West might have accomplished was to induce the Soviet Union to conduct a modest policy in the Balkans. This was the aim of the United States but the passive attitude which was adopted did not suit the purpose. A passive attitude meant to the Soviets that they could have a free hand in the region. It was interpreted as a sign of disinterest in the Balkans.

CHAPTER IV

THE QUESTION OF POLAND

A. The Goals of the U.S. Policy

1. The Problem

To the Western Powers, the question of Poland was among the difficult, complicated and frustrating questions discussed at Yalta. On the eve of Yalta the government of the United States had no illusions of the difficulty ahead. While the United States and the United Kingdom recognized the Polish Government at London, the Soviet Union recognized the Lublin Government as the Provisional Government of Poland.¹ The Soviet Union not only extended recognition to the Lublin Government, but also expressed feelings of enmity towards the Polish Government at London. The endeavors of both the United States and Britain to bring about an understanding between the Poles at London and the Soviet Union, and their demands to delay Soviet recognition of the Lublin Government had already failed. On the eve of Yalta an understanding between the Poles at London and the Soviet Government was most unlikely, for both governments had already accused each other of the ugliest crimes and the behavior of the Soviets in the Battle of Warsaw had already destroyed all hopes of understanding between the two governments.²

¹ U.S. Department of State. Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955, p. 224.

² Ibid., pp. 221-23, 224-25.

2. The Government

In conformity with the principles of its liberal policy, the United States desired a democratic government for Poland.¹ The Department of State was convinced that the Provisional Government which the Soviets had recognized was not representative of the people. Whatever prestige it had was contributed to the subversive activities of the Red Army and the NKVD, the Soviet secret police.² Although the United States did not object to Soviet influence in Poland, it was dissatisfied with the way such influence was carried out. In other words, the government of the United States could tolerate Soviet influence as long as it did not peril the establishment of an independent democratic government.³ The interest of the United States in free independent government could be understood in terms of the following motives:

1. That the United States championed the cause of a world security organization in the post war world and that among the pre-requisites for the success of such an organization in the attainment of peace was the establishment of free, independent democratic governments.
2. That the American public believed that the establishment of democratic systems was among the rudiments of peace.
3. That Americans of Polish descent whose number was not

¹ Ibid., p. 217.

² Ibid., p. 231.

³ Ibid., pp. 234, 235.

insignificant (7,000,000) were particularly interested in the freedom and independence of their mother country.

4. That the United States Government, although not interested in eliminating Soviet influence, was interested in creating conditions which would not allow for Soviet domination.
5. That the establishment of a free independent government would allow the United States to have influence in that country on equal footing with other foreign nations.

It had been hoped that the establishment of a free independent government would provide for "some degree of equal opportunity in trade investment and access to sources of information", and that American influence could be felt through these channels.¹ It was the desire of the government of the United States to extend aid for the purpose of reconstructing Poland.² The development of Poland would not only gain the good will of the population, but also help in creating the social, economic and political conditions for the attainment of a democratic system and the adoption of liberal policies. From an economic point of view, it was in the interest of the United States to create a world market in the post war decade. By assisting the underdeveloped countries, the United States hoped to create the purchasing power and the liberal policies necessary for

¹ Ibid., p. 235.

² Ibid., p. 218.

a world market. The bad memory of the depression in the thirties had encouraged the adoption of such measures as a security against a possible depression in the wake of the War.

Therefore, beside being advantageous to Poland, economic assistance would have been also politically and economically advantageous to the United States.

It was not known to what extent the Soviet Union would allow the U.S. to implement its assistance program. However, the estimates of the Department of State did not exclude the possibility that the Soviets might forbid assistance or reduce the political gains that would accrue from such assistance.¹ The stronger point of view was that the Soviets would not forbid assistance but would try to reduce its direct political gains. It was felt that if the Soviet position was strong enough in Poland, the Kremlin would want assistance given to countries evolving in its orbit, but would demand delivery through international monetary institutions, thus reducing their direct political impact.² Therefore, the United States Government was ready if necessary to deliver assistance through the International Bank or the International Monetary Fund.

The question we should consider now is; how did the United States desire to bring about an independent democratic government in Poland?

Of course the simplest method would have been to conduct elections

¹ Ibid., p. 236.

² Ibid., p. 235.

right away and recognize the leaders who won. The problem, however, was not so simple. The conduct of the war forbade holding free elections at the time. Also while the United States had no faith in the Provisional Government which the Soviets had set up, the Soviet Union had no faith in the Government at London. Therefore, in order to end this deadlock, the government of the United States intended to propose the establishment of a new interim government composed of the leaders of both existing governments plus some other leaders in Poland.¹ It was thought that such a compromise would acquire the approval of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. Moreover, it was expected that such a government of National Unity would be capable of conducting free elections when it became feasible.

In the briefing papers handed to the President before the conference nothing was mentioned about the proportion of communists to non-communists. From a Western point of view, the proportion would reflect on the ability of the interim government to hold free elections. Later this became the crux of the matter and the issue on which the powers could not come to agreement.

3. The Borders

The policy of the United States with regard to the Eastern borders did not differ radically from the demands of the Soviets.

Both countries were in agreement that East Prussia with the

¹ Ibid., p. 231.

exception of Königsberg should go to Poland. Both countries were in agreement that the Curzon Line should be used as a base for the demarcation of the Eastern borders; however, the United States was willing, if possible, to introduce a minor digression in this line for the purpose of including the city of Lwów and the neighbouring Galician oil fields in Poland.¹

Although both powers were in agreement on the Eastern borders, they differed radically in the West. The United States did not approve of the Soviet demands that the Western borders of Poland should extend to the Western Neisse and the Oder in Germany. What it intended to propose was a much more moderate compensation which would include the eastern tip of Pomerania, Upper Silesia and what was known as the Polish Corridor.²

Why were the goals of the two powers similar in the East and radically different in the West? It was not by coincidence that both powers had similar policies in the East. The fact was that the United States acquiesced to Soviet demands. Acquiescence was a result of the following considerations:

- 1) Soviet power position in that area was formidable.
- 2) Soviet territorial demands were considered by the Department of State as reasonable security measures against a possible revival of German military power.

¹ Ibid., p. 230.

² Ibid., p. 230.

- 3) The Curzon Line had been drawn more or less on ethnical grounds.
- 4) Co-operation of Soviet Forces in the battle of Germany was needed.
- 5) Soviet co-operation in the war against Japan was desired.
- 6) Annexation of East Prussia to Poland was regarded as a just compensation for the damage inflicted on the Poles and a punishment for Germany.

The digression in the Curzon Line which the United States intended to propose was regarded as an appeal rather than a demand. The motivations behind this appeal were:

- 1) That the inhabitants of the city of Lwow were predominantly Poles.¹
- 2) That the Galician oil fields were of major importance to Poland's economy.²
- 3) That both the city of Lwow and the Galician oil fields were an insignificant part of Soviet territory and economy, and that Stalin might give them up "on grounds of high morality".

In the West, the following were the factors which led the United States to oppose the expansion of Polish borders to the Oder and the Western Neisse:

¹ Ibid., p. 233.

² Ibid., p. 233.

- 1) Ethnically, the inhabitants of the territories west of the 1939 Frontiers were almost totally German.
- 2) If Poland's borders were expanded to the Oder and the Western Niesse, they would engulf 10 million Germans. The Department of State regarded the transfer of such a large number of people as physically difficult. Moreover, even if the transfer was possible, it was doubted whether what was left of Germany's heavy populated territories could take ten million more inhabitants. On the other hand, it was regarded that what was left of Poland could not swallow such a large number of Germans if the Great Powers left them where they were.¹
- 3) Such large compensations were regarded as causes of irredentism and future friction among the European States.²

From the above mentioned factors it can be concluded that the United States was interested above all in future peace and tranquility in Europe, and that its policy in Poland and the Balkans was limited to the framework of this interest.

However, in terms of power politics, the policy of the United States could be interpreted as an effort to block Soviet domination of the European Continent.

¹ Ibid., p. 232.

² Ibid., p. 232.

If Poland expanded to the West it would have to depend on Soviet protection against the threats of German Irredentism. Under the circumstances Poland would have to maintain constantly an anti-German policy; for German revival would constitute a threat to its territorial gains.

Consequently, the Soviet Union would have achieved the following advantages:

- 1) Promoted the possibility that Poland might become a Soviet satellite.
- 2) Eliminated the possibility of a German-Polish alliance in the future.
- 3) Made the Poles less resistant to the loss of their territory in the East.
- 4) Weakened Germany, which invaded the Soviet Union twice in a span of 25 years.

In case Poland became a satellite, it would be to the advantage of the Soviet Union if Poland's borders were expanded deep into Germany. The Soviet Union could then use Poland as a spring-board into the heart of the European Continent in case of war.

By advocating limited compensation in the West, the United States was actually trying to reduce the above mentioned Soviet advantages.

B. What Happened at Yalta

1. The Government

At the third plenary meeting, 6th of February, the Big Three touched

on the question of Poland. The President spoke of the desire of the United States to allow for the establishment of a representative government in Poland. Since no elections could be held at the time, the President suggested the establishment of ad interim government to carry on the administrative task in the country and to prepare for, and conduct elections as soon as practicable.

"The main suggestion I want to make is that there be created an ad interim government which will have the support of the majority of the Polish people. There are many ways of creating such a government. One of the many suggestions is the possibility of creating a presidency council made up of small number of men who would be the controlling force ad interim to set up a more permanent government."¹

Then the Prime Minister spoke on behalf of the British delegation. He agreed with the President's suggestion that an ad interim government should be created for the purpose of conducting free and unfettered elections at a later period, but he did not commit Britain to the formula suggested by the President, namely, "The Presidential Committee". As if aware that the Soviets might desire to postpone the establishment of an ad interim government, the Prime Minister demanded that before the Big Three separate, such a government should be created.²

The last to speak among the "Big Three" was Stalin. He charged the London Poles with the supervision of subversive activities in Poland behind the Red Army. In his view, only the Provisional Government of

¹ Ibid., p. 678.

² Ibid., pp. 678-79.

Lublin was capable of maintaining order behind the front line. He did not object to the idea of creating an ad interim government, but indicated that the Poles should be consulted before such a government was formed.¹

On the 8th of February, before the 4th plenary meeting, the President delivered a message to Stalin suggesting ^{that} a number of Poles be called to the Conference for the purpose of consulting them on the creation of an ad interim government.² The Soviets, however, (who wanted to hinder all efforts to create such a government at the Conference) told the President at the 4th plenary meeting that they had failed to contact the Poles due to difficulties in communication and that even if they succeeded to reach them later, there would not be enough time to have them at the Conference.³ Thus they avoided a situation whereby they would have had to create an ad interim government in conjunction with their Allies at the Conference.

The Soviet delegation was the first to submit its proposals on Poland. The Soviet proposals appear to have had three major aims:

- 1) To postpone the creation of a new government.
- 2) To ensure that the Western powers would recognize a government created under the supervision of the Soviets.

¹ Ibid., pp. 680-81.

² Ibid., pp. 727-28.

³ Ibid., pp. 711-716.

- 3) To devise a formula which would allow some elements of the London Poles to join the interim government, but at the same time keep the majority of the seats in the hands of communists or pro-communist elements.

The articles of the Soviet proposals which referred to the interim government of Poland were the following:¹

- "3) It was regarded desirable to add to the Provisional Polish Government some democratic leaders from Polish emigré circles.
- 4) It was regarded desirable that the enlarged Provisional Polish Government should be recognized by the Allied Governments.
- 5) It was deemed desirable that the Provisional Polish Government, enlarged as was mentioned above in paragraph 3, should as soon as possible call the population of Poland to the polls for the organization by general voting of the permanent organs of the Polish Government.
- 6) V.M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr were entrusted with the discussion of the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government and submitting their proposals to the consideration of the three governments."

On the 8th of February the United States submitted its counter proposals.²

"In regard to the proposals of the Soviet Government concerning the future government of Poland, it is proposed that Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr be authorized on behalf of the three governments to invite to Moscow Mr. Bierut, Mr. Osuba-Morawski, Bishop Sapieha, Mr. Vicente Witos, Mr. Mikolajczyk and Mr. Grabski, to form a Polish Government of National Unity along the following lines:

¹ Ibid., p. 716.

² Ibid., pp. 792-93.

1. There will be formed a Presidential Committee of three possibly consisting of Mr. Bierut, Mr. Grabski and Bishop Sapieha, to represent the Presidential Office of the Polish Republic.
2. This Presidential Committee will undertake the formation of a government consisting of representative leaders from the present Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw, from other democratic elements inside Poland, and from Polish democratic leaders abroad.
3. This interim government, when formed, will pledge itself to the holding of free elections in Poland as soon as conditions permit for a constituent assembly to establish a new constitution under which a permanent government would be elected.
4. When a Polish government of National Unity is formed, the three governments will then proceed to accord it recognition as the provisional government of Poland."

If we examine the proposals of the United States Government and of the USSR we find that both postponed the establishment of an ad interim government. Both governments had agreed that at a later date, at Moscow, Mr. Molotov, Ambassadors Harriman and Archibald Clark Kerr were authorized to set up such a government. The Soviet Union had already scored its first success in postponement. However, the United States had introduced some specific suggestions and a new formula for the purpose of reducing the chances of the communists to dominate the proposed ad interim government.

Six names were suggested for consultation at Moscow, and out of the six only two were committed to Soviet Policy.¹ Moreover, the formula

¹ Ibid., pp. 792-93.

introduced by the Americans stated that a Presidential Committee would be set up to undertake the formation of a new provisional government. The Presidential Committee had to be formed out of three persons and two of the three persons suggested, Grabski and Bishop Sapieha, were not communists.¹ Only after a "Government of National Unity" had been set up by the Presidential Committee, and only after such a government complied with American demands, did the government of the United States pledge to recognize it. One of the major American demands was that the "Government of National Unity" should have elements from the Lublin Poles, the London Poles and from other democratic parties within Poland.

As to the principal of holding free elections as soon as possible, the two governments did not disagree. They both called for holding free elections as soon as the circumstances of the war would permit.

After analyzing the above mentioned proposals, we find that the United States had given way to the Soviets on postponement but had devised ample precautions against the desire of the communists to dominate the ad interim government.

The Soviet delegation had its objections against the American proposals. It objected to the American formula as such, for it did not see the necessity of creating a Presidential Committee.² On the other hand, it objected to the list of persons which were suggested

¹ See article I of the American Proposals, Ibid., pp. 792-93.

² Ibid., p. 777.

for consultation at Moscow. Molotov maintained that if the persons were to be specified, they should be five, of which three should be from the Provisional Government of Lublin.¹ Again Molotov had to make it clear that the Soviet Government would only accept an enlargement of the existing provisional government at Lublin. He argued that only an enlargement was necessary, for after all elections were coming soon and therefore, the existing government had a short life which was not worth the trouble of creating it new.² Again and again security behind the lines of the Red Army was used as an excuse in favor of the existing Provisional Government of Lublin.

What the Soviets were actually driving for was to secure a majority of seats for the communists and to belittle the importance of the ad interim government in Western eyes. One thing, however, had slipped the censor of the Soviets and that was the introduction of elements other than the Lublin Poles from within Poland.

It did not take long before the Americans complied with most of the Soviet objections. On February 9, at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers, Mr. Stettinius had a new formula to propose. In this formula the Americans had abandoned the idea of a "Presidential Committee" and struck out the specific names which they mentioned in their previous proposals. However, they did not want to abandon the idea of having a new start in constituting the ad interim govern-

¹ Ibid., pp. 777-78.

² Ibid., pp. 777-78.

ment. Moreover, they were aware of Britain's demands that the ad interim government should be representative of all parties in Poland. Therefore, they devised a strange formula which had on paper the three terms which the three governments were arguing about - The Provisional Government of Poland, Representative Government and Government of National Unity.

The formula as proposed read thus:¹

"That the present Polish Government be reorganized into a fully representative government based on all democratic forces in Poland and including democratic leaders from Poland abroad to be termed, The Provisional Government of National Unity; Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibalds Clark Kerr to be authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This "Government of National Unity" would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic parties would have the right to participate and to put forward candidates.

When a "Provisional Government of National Unity" is satisfactorily formed, the three governments will then proceed to accord it recognition. The Ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw following such recognition would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections."

Actually these proposals were near enough to what the Soviet Government desired. However, Molotov in the usual Soviet fashion, began to ask for some more concessions once he had gained what he

¹ Ibid., p. 804.

had already asked for. Even the general vague formula, that the ad interim government should have elements from the London Poles, the Lublin Poles and other representatives from within Poland, did not suit him now.¹ However, the West stood firm on this and Molotov felt that no harm to Soviet interests was likely to happen since the formula was vague enough. After all the proportions of each of the elements to the other was not mentioned. The Soviets at Moscow could insist to give the lions' share to the Lublin Poles. But in order to leave no doubt in the minds of the Western delegations, Molotov mentioned that it should be understood that the formula should be interpreted in the light of enlarging the Provisional Government of Lublin.²

The only serious objection that the Soviets had, to the last proposals of the American delegation stated above, was that no mention of the rights of the ambassadors to supervise the elections should be mentioned. The reason mentioned by the Soviets was that such a reference was insulting to the Poles.³ But the actual aim was that they did not want the ambassadors of Britain and the United States to be entitled by the agreement to watch the elections closely. The ambassadors were expected to report in any case, but if such a right was mentioned in the treaty, it would provide the Western powers with a legal right to declare the whole agreement null and void, if the elections were not conducted properly.

¹ Ibid., p. 805 (Last Paragraph)

² Ibid., p. 806.

³ Ibid., p. 806.

However, the American formula with some minor adjustments in the wording of the text was finally approved by the three delegations at the Conference.

Finally, it is necessary to make a short comment on Britain's role in the discussions on the Government of Poland. On the whole, Britain's policy was furthest from that of the Soviets. Britain demanded that the ad interim government should represent fully all popular elements in Poland. In other words Britain did not want to consider the Lublin Poles as one party and the London Poles as another as the Americans did. It wanted to by pass these governments and start totally from the peoples' level - from the party and pressure group level. It must have been calculated at the Foreign Office that the communists were not popular at all, and that if a representative ad interim government was established, the seats of the communists would be in a small minority.

Compared to the U.S., Britain was less prepared to compromise with the Soviets. On almost all issues, it was the U.S. which yielded or compromised first, with Britain dragging behind. But on the other hand, it could be argued that the Soviet Union would never have yielded on anything had the U.S. taken the same position as Britain. Churchill and Stalin seemed to have had, deep at heart, a well entrenched suspicion and contempt for each other. They spoke to each other with force and got entangled in hot arguments, of which Roosevelt took the pains of getting them out. The mutual suspicion was a reflection of what the

communists thought of imperial systems and what the imperialists thought of the dictatorship of the communists. Sooner or later these shrewd statesmen knew that they were bound to clash; only the war had kept their differences within bounds.

2. The Borders

The question of the borders of Poland did not take as much time as that of the Government. The President, who opened the discussion on Poland at the 3rd plenary meeting, started with his long cherished hope of appealing to Marshal Stalin on grounds of high morality to leave for Poland the city of Lwow and the neighbouring Galician oil fields.

"The Poles would like East Prussia and part of Germany. It would make it easier for me at home if the Soviet Government could give something to Poland. I raised the question of giving them Lwow at Tehran. It has now been suggested that the oil lands in the Southwest of Lwow might be given them. I am not making a definite statement but I hope that Marshal Stalin can make a gesture in this direction."¹

Churchill supported the President in this respect and made sure that the Soviets understood that he was also appealing rather than demanding a Soviet concession.

"I have made repeated declarations in Parliament in support of the Soviet claims to the Curzon Line, that is to say leaving Lwow with Soviet Russia.... In that position I abide. But of course if the mighty power, the Soviet Union, made a gesture of magnanimity to a much weaker power and made the gesture suggested by the President we would heartily acclaim such action."²

But Stalin was not forthcoming, especially as the Allies had

¹ Ibid., p. 677.

² Ibid., p. 678.

appealed to him rather than demanded a concession. Stalin was a realist; he had the power to acquire the territory and, therefore, saw no reason why he should give it away. After an intermission of ten minutes Stalin answered:

"I refer now to our allies appeal with regard to the Curzon Line. The President had suggested modification, giving Poland Lwow and Lwow Province. The Prime Minister thinks that we should make a gesture of magnanimity. But I must remind you that the Curzon Line was invented not by Russians but by foreigners. The Curzon Line of Curzon was made by Curzon, Clemenceau and the Americans in 1918-1919. This line was accepted against the will of the Russians on the basis of ethnological data..... some want us to be less Russian than Curzon and Clemenceau. What will the Russians say at Moscow and the Ukrainians? They will say that Stalin and Molotov are far less defenders of Russia than Curzon and Clemenceau. I cannot take such a position and return to Moscow."¹

Stalin, however, did not want the West to lose faith with his good will, but at the same time did not want to give away a city and a district rich in oil reserves. Therefore, he proposed that the frontiers be delineated 5-8 kilometers east of the Curzon Line. In this way the Soviets sought to demonstrate their good will without losing territory of value to Poland.

Article I of the Soviet proposals which were submitted in the 4th plenary meeting on the 7th of February read thus:²

"It was agreed that the line of Curzon should be the Eastern frontier of Poland with a digression from it in some regions of 5-6 kilometers in favour of Poland."

¹ Ibid., p. 680.

² Ibid., p. 716.

The Western powers did not object to that proposal for they came to Yalta determined to accept the Curzon Line.

However, a controversy arose on the Western borders. The second article of the Soviet proposals submitted on the 7th of February stated that Polish territory should extend as far as the Western Neisse River in Germany.

" 2. It was decided that the Western frontier of Poland should be traced from the town of Stettin (Polish) and further to the South along the River Oder and still farther along the River Neisse (Western)."¹

The United States did not agree to that, but faced with the stubborn attitude of the Soviet Union, it agreed to extend Polish territory to the river Oder. Thus its stand on the Western borders became similar to that of Britain. Beyond the Oder, the Western powers could not go and the Soviets were not willing to compromise.²

In order to solve the question, Molotov again chose postponement. He demanded that the Poles should be consulted before a decision was taken on that matter.³ Of course Molotov knew that the Poles were not going to refuse and consequently he would have his way if any settlement could be reached at Moscow at a later date. The West, however, wanted to keep the matter in its own hands and thus suggested that although the Poles should be consulted, the final settlement would be reached at the

¹ Ibid., p. 716.

² Paragraph three of the American Proposals submitted on the 8th of February stipulated that the United States had accepted the Oder River in Germany as the Western border of Poland. Ibid., p. 792.

³ Ibid., p. 777 (paragraph 2); p. 787 (paragraph 1).

peace conference.¹

There were no differences among the powers on the borders in the North; East Prussia was to go to Poland with the exception of the district of Konigsburg which was given to the Soviet Union.

C. Conclusion

The declaration which emerged out of the discussions at Yalta was general and vague on many points. It did not solve the differences between the West and the Soviets on Poland. Only on the Eastern and North Eastern borders did the powers reach an agreement, and in this case the West had totally accepted the Soviet point of view. The differences as to the nature of the ad interim government and the Western borders remained pending a solution at a later date.

The Western Powers were particularly interested not to depart from Yalta without some sort of a declaration on Poland. Public opinion in the West was very sensitive to the Polish Question and in case of disagreement or no declaration at all, its reactions would have had serious consequences on the governments and on co-operation with the Soviet Union in the war.

The Prime Minister probably had this in mind when he said:

"It is frightfully important that this conference separate on a note of agreement. We must struggle precisely for that."²

The Powers produced a declaration, but it was an imprecise and a

¹ See Protocol of Proceedings at the Crimea Conference, Section VII, last paragraph, Ibid., p. 938.

² Ibid., p. 788.

vague one, meant to camouflage the differences among them.

The Soviets had everything to win by postponement. They had ample time to consolidate the rule of the communist regime (Provisional Government of Lublin) in the country. After the war, when negotiations would be opened again, the West would have lost one of its bargaining powers. The war would exist no more, and the Soviets would be in a stronger position to disagree with the West.

What could the West do then? Not much indeed, when Soviet forces had already occupied the country. Short of war, the Western powers could not have rid Poland of Soviet hegemony and that was impossible at the time. Some commentators had advocated that lend-lease could have been used as a diplomatic weapon against the Soviets. But it was too late for that. Soviet forces had already converged on the borders of Germany and penetrated them on many points. It would have taken several months, before the lend-lease embargo could have affected Soviet military power on the battle field. Even if the lend-lease embargo diminished Soviet capabilities before the war was over, it was not likely to change the trend of Soviet victories on the Eastern Front. Germany's war potential had dwindled to the extent that the Soviets could have dealt it a final blow with what they already had.

Therefore, the lend-lease embargo could not be used as a threat against the Soviets, and would not have forced the Soviet Union to change its policy in Poland. What the embargo would have produced was disorder in the Allied camp and a chance for bleeding Germany to escape

the fate of total defeat and unconditional surrender.

As it was, the vague and general declaration had accomplished two main advantages to the Western Powers:

- 1) It was a temporary face-saving device, which kept public opinion in the West inclined to co-operate with the Soviet Union during the war.
- 2) It reserved for the West the right to complain, when the Soviets broke their promise of holding free and unfettered elections in Poland.

Poland was in the Soviet orbit; nothing short of shattering the nucleus could have cut Poland loose. To shatter the nucleus meant war; the West could not have possibly waged war on the Soviet Union at the time.

CHAPTER V

GERMANY AT YALTA

A. The Problem

The question of Germany was one of the most delicate questions discussed at Yalta. Unlike the Balkans and Poland, the bulk of Germany's territory was not occupied by the forces of the Allies at the time. Both camps in the East and West had touched on the fringes of Germany. The Western forces had occupied some territories on the Rhine and had hit the Siegfried Line, while the Soviet forces had penetrated the border in the East and had reached the Oder. Although it was known that the rest of Germany was apt to fall, none of those who convened at Yalta could guess accurately how far the forces of either camp could advance before the final collapse. At the time, the only reasonable prediction could be that both camps would occupy some parts of Germany, but no prediction could be made on the size of that part. If a more precise prediction could have been made, it would have facilitated the process of negotiations; for each power could have calculated its power position vis a vis the other.

The question of Germany involved many unknowns and variables. It was not known if Germany would continue to fight to the bitter end, or surrender before that time? What would be the economic, political and social conditions in Germany after the collapse or the surrender? How would it allocate its forces between the Eastern and the Western Fronts? All these unknowns made it difficult for the powers that convened at

Yalta to calculate their power position and negotiate accordingly. A delicate question such as that of Germany needed more than an ordinary diplomat. It needed a statesman who was not only capable of assessing the situation as it was, but as it would be. A statesman who could reasonably predict into the future, and who could assess to a sufficient extent all the involved elements of power; his own, those of his allies, and those of the enemy.

Roosevelt came to Yalta having no definite or delimited policy for Germany. Having failed to resolve the differences among the members of the Committee, which was created for this purpose, and having failed to take a definite decision to put an end to the arguments which ensued in the cabinet on German policy, Roosevelt postponed the issue.¹ As it turned out, postponement was advantageous to the Department of State. At Yalta, the advisors of Roosevelt were mostly from the Department of State; thus, they had a chance to influence Roosevelt more than their counterparts in the cabinet. However, Roosevelt did not take whatever the Department of State had to say. He had his greivances against the Germans and therefore, on many points he acted in a more severe manner than the Department of State advised.

Let us then examine what the Department of State had advised in regard to Germany and what Roosevelt actually stood for at the Conference.

¹ The Committee mentioned above, was an informal committee created by the President to deliberate on policy towards Germany. See Supra.

B. The Goals of the Department of State

1. The Military Government and its Objectives

The Department of State approached the German Question from two angles. The first was similar to that used in devising policy towards Poland and the Balkans: i.e. Germany as a part of the European Continent. All aspects of policy were studied in their European context. The overriding interest of the United States in Europe was the establishment of an enduring peace among its different states.¹

The other angle of approach was that of developing in Germany democratic traditions and beliefs and creating the necessary social environment for the growth of democratic institutions in this country.

It is apparent from the approaches discussed above that the Department of State did not allow the overwhelming hatred for Germany, which prevailed in Western circles during the war, to affect its policy on the German Question.

Germany was considered by the Department of State as the work shop of Europe, and as the heart of the European Continent whose fate was closely attached to that of its neighbouring states. Consequently, the Department of State believed that unless peace and tranquility prevailed in Germany, Europe would remain subject to war and crisis.²

The first object of the State Department was the elimination of

¹ U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955, p. 185.

² Ibid., p. 185.

the Nazi Party, its institutions, ideology and methods of government. By removing the Nazis and their affiliates, and by re-educating the German public along democratic lines, the Department of State expected to facilitate the growth of democratic elements in the country.¹ For the immediate period of occupation the Department of State was willing to approve and recognize the military zones of occupation drawn up at the European Advisory Commission.² It was also willing to approve a military supreme authority to govern Germany during the occupation period. The supreme authority was to be formed of the different military commanders of the zones of occupation. Jointly, the commanders of the occupation zones should act as a central government of the Reich. In order not to create disparity in the social, economic and political conditions between the various zones, the Department of State recommended that the Control Council should be given powers superior to those at the disposal of the zonal commanders.³

The Department of State advised against the immediate establishment of a government composed of democratic and anti-Nazi elements.⁴ An early establishment of such a government would expose it to public scorn and discredit. Beside having to function under abnormal conditions, such a

¹ Ibid., p. 181.

² For the approval of the Department of State on the deliberations of the European Advisory Commission, see Ibid., p. 180.

³ For the draft agreements on the zones of occupation and the Control Council see; Ibid., pp. 121-27.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 182-83.

government would be regarded by the people as a puppet of the conquerers. Consequently, ultra-nationalistic, warlike elements, would have been allowed a chance to agitate against a democratic form of government and might have succeeded in tipping the scales in their favor and have assumed authority in the country once the occupying armies had evacuated Germany.

By establishing a military government, the Allies would have secured the following advantages:

- 1) Driven home to the Germans that they were defeated in war.¹
- 2) Insured that ultra-nationalistic elements had been eliminated or reduced to an insignificant extent.
- 3) Forced Germany to comply with the terms of the peace settlement.

The military government was expected to: demobilize and disband German armed forces; dissolve and prohibit all military and para military agencies; seize and destroy all German arms, ammunitions and implements of war; confiscate military archives and military research facilities; prohibit manufacture of arms, ammunition and implements of war; destroy industrial plants and machinery incapable of conversion to peaceful uses; dismantle air craft industry and prohibit the manufacture of aircraft.²

It was believed that these security measures, coupled with other political measures aimed at the elimination of Nazi influence in the country, would suffice for the establishment of temporary security.

The Department of State, however, was not satisfied with these

¹ Hull, C., Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1948, p. 1619.

² Yalta Papers, Op.cit., p. 181.

negative measures. Other positive measures had to be carried out if Germany should be expected to adopt a successful democratic system. It was recommended that the educational system in Germany should be designed to eradicate Nazi doctrines and inculcate democratic values. In as far as security conditions would allow, responsible Germans should be permitted to use public information media in order to carry out an orderly discussion of political reform.¹ Similarly, political parties opposed to Nazi and other ultra-nationalistic ideologies would be allowed to organize and engage in public discussions if and when security conditions would permit.² It was recognized that the people would need to engage in public debate, organize political parties and use public media before they were ready to decide their future form of government democratically. Since these activities were recognized as necessary pre-requisites, it was deemed necessary that they be practiced under the control and the censor of a military government. In view of the many diversified activities which the Allies had to perform, the Department of State recommended that an inter-allied civilian government should replace the inter-military government as soon as military conditions ceased to be paramount.³

The inter-allied government would continue to function in Germany until the Germans were ready to form and maintain democratic institutions.

¹ Ibid., pp. 183-84.

² Ibid., p. 183.

³ Ibid., p. 183.

Then gradually, and at a pace equal to that of the development of the German public along democratic lines, the inter-allied government would hand to the Germans the authority to exercise self government.

2. Economic Policy

The long range economic objectives of the Department of State were not aimed at the destruction of the German economy. It was deemed desirable that gradually the economy should recover in order to facilitate the attainment of a decent standard of living which was considered essential for the establishment of a democratic system. Moreover, an active German economy was considered as an essential step for the recovery of the economy on the European Continent.

However, the Department of State, wanted to avoid the development of a situation whereby the Germans would exercise a dominant economic control on the rest of the Continent. If such a situation was allowed to develop, Germany could have used its economic power as a means to facilitate military and political aggression.

The Department of State wanted to insure that the economic revival contemplated in the long range objectives would not take place before the German public had demonstrated definite democratic inclinations. Therefore, it was decided that a firm Allied control should be exercised on the economy and that during the occupation period the economy should be reduced to an extent;

- a) compatible with the minimum needs of the German people
for subsistence,

b) sufficient to pay for the current imports.¹

The minimum subsistence level was desired in order to eliminate chaotic conditions created by disease, misery and disorder; and to avoid serious repercussions not only in Germany but on all the European Continent. The Department of State recommended that the current imports of Germany should be charged directly on German exports. A balance between the exports and imports would have allowed the United States to avoid a situation whereby it might have found it necessary to pay for German imports, while other States were reaping the fruits of reparation.²

Although the United States was not interested in claiming any reparations from Germany beyond what was left of German assets on its territory, the Department of State was concerned with the question of reparations.³ The following were its recommendations on the topic:

- 1) That it should be limited to the entire surplus above the output that was needed to maintain a minimum subscribed standard of living, and to pay for occupation costs, relief, and other prior charges.⁴
- 2) That it should have a relatively short duration for the early recovery of normal trade.⁵

¹ Ibid., pp. 191, 193.

² Ibid., p. 193.

³ Ibid., p. 194.

⁴ Ibid., p. 193.

⁵ Ibid., p. 193.

- 3) That it should be payable "in kind" in order to avoid "transfer" difficulties.¹
- 4) That it should be apportioned among the claimant states according to the amount of damage and loss to non-military property caused by the hostilities.²

3. Participation of France

The Department of State advocated that France should be given a zone of occupation carved out of the British and American zones. Moreover, it advocated that the French Government should be allowed membership in the Control Council.³

France, at the time, did not have sufficient power to acquire these privileges. However, it possessed a power potential which was expected to materialize in the post war decade. Consequently, if no privileges were accorded to France at the time, co-operation from France could not have been expected after the war.⁴ Moreover, the United States was not sure whether it would keep its troops in Europe after the war. In case the withdrawal of the U.S. troops turned out to be necessary, France could have assisted Britain in the control of

¹ Ibid., p. 193.

² Ibid., p. 194.

³ Ibid., pp. 293-94.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 302-303.

Germany.

4. Dismemberment

The Department of State advised against the partition of Germany. With a policy which called for temporary occupation, the choice could not have been otherwise. Partition could have been imposed and maintained by force as long as the victor powers had forces in Germany, but after the withdrawal of the forces, partition would have been threatened by the German will to unite.¹ After withdrawal, the only possible control of the drive for unity, would have been in the determination of the Allies to intervene, whenever the Germans endeavored to unite. But it was unrealistic to expect that the Allies would continue to have the same policy towards Germany in the distant future.

Besides, even if partition could have been imposed and maintained, the United States could not have accepted its repercussions. Partition would have provided the ultra-nationalistic elements with a chance to agitate against a democratic system. Also from an economic point of view, partition would have unnecessarily reduced the standard of living in Germany and Europe. In that case the United States would have had to undertake unnecessary assistance to Europe.

From a pure power point of view, partition would have served the interests of the Soviet Union, German power could no longer be a formidable obstacle. Europe would have thus become to a large degree at the mercy of the Soviets. Although nothing in the documents was

¹ Ibid., p. 189.

mentioned about the desire of the United States to develop Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, the Department of State, by advising against partition, had actually allowed for the possibility of developing Germany as a bulwark against the Soviets.

What the Department of State desired was a moderate decentralization of the German system of government. It took particular care to warn against excessive decentralization, for it did not expect that the Germans would accept severe measures in this respect. Besides, a weak government of the Reich would not have been able to suppress provincial governments in case some of them fell under the control of ultra-nationalistic elements.¹ On the other hand, German military power was not likely to be reduced under such a system. The superior German power on the European Continent under Bismark is sufficient proof of German ability to maintain strong power under a decentralized system.²

C. What Happened at Yalta

1. Occupation of Germany and the Participation of France

The Big Three had no difficulty in approving the draft agreements drawn by the European Advisory Commission on the military zones of occupation and on the control machinery. They all agreed that the supreme authority in Germany should be vested in the Control Council

¹ This is derived from the experience of the Weimar Republic with the Nazis.

² Yalta Papers, Op.cit., p. 187.

which would be composed of the military commanders of the zones. In other words, the military commanders as a body-Control Council - should exercise supreme authority in Germany and individually should undertake to execute what the Control Council had deliberated. The three powers approved of a joint administration of Berlin. In this respect the West had certainly made a mistake, for if it was interested in having a foot in Berlin, it should have ensured that the Western zones touched on Berlin at one point or another - as is obvious from today's perspective.

When the question of the participation of France was raised at the Conference, differences among the powers began to appear. Surprisingly enough, the United States and the Soviet Union were on one side while Britain was on the opposite side.

Roosevelt had ignored some of the recommendations of his Department of State in this respect. He certainly was not of much help to France nor to Britain on the German Question. As if determined to weaken the position of both Britain and France in regard to Germany, the President, in an informal private meeting with Stalin, engaged in gossip which was damaging to the position of the West vis-a-vis the Soviets.

The President ridiculed de Gaulle by commenting sarcastically that at Casablanca, de Gaulle had compared himself to Joan of Arc as a spiritual leader and to Clemenceau as a political leader. Moreover, he did not let the opportunity pass without ridiculing Britain - his

closest ally.

"The President said he would now tell the Marshal something indiscreet, since he would not wish to say it in front of Prime Minister Churchill: namely that the British for two years have had the idea of artificially building up France into a strong power which would have 200,000 troops on the eastern border of France to hold the line for the period required to assemble a strong British army. He said the British were a peculiar people and wished to have their cake and eat it too."¹

Regardless whether these statements were true or not, Roosevelt had committed a mistake by mentioning them to Stalin. The political significance of these sarcastic comments was that they might have lowered the prestige of de Gaulle who was the head of the French Government at the time and promoted Soviet suspicions of Britain's intentions in Europe. The Americans throughout the war have suffered from Soviet suspicion. They were doing their best to reduce it by meeting the Soviets "more than half way". They had already observed that British-Soviet relations were to a large degree governed by suspicions and that if a future conflict would develop, it would probably be between Britain and the Soviet Union with the United States willy nilly on the side of Britain.² It was recommended by the Department of State as well as by Admiral Leahy, that the United States should undertake to reduce these suspicions.³ Therefore, the President's sarcastic comment,

¹ Ibid., p. 572.

² Ibid., pp. 106-08, 102-03.

³ Ibid., pp. 106-08.

which he considered as a joke, was against the spirit of the recommendations of his staff and harmful to the interests of the United States.

On the other hand the sarcastic comment about de Gaulle was very inconsiderate of the President, although its effect cannot be considered as serious as that on Britain. It was certainly out of place when the United States delegation came to Yalta inclined to allow France to participate in the occupation of Germany.

The position that Roosevelt held at Yalta in regard to the participation of France up to the 10th of February was that France should be allowed a zone of occupation to be carved out of British and American zones but should not participate in the control machinery.¹ By taking such a stand, the President was helping to create a situation whereby France was likely to refuse any participation at all. France could not be expected to accept the responsibility of a zone when refused authority at the Control Council. Moreover, even if France accepted such a zone how could the President be sure that France would abide by the decisions of a Control Council in which it was refused a seat and in whose decisions it did not participate. The deviation of France from the decisions of the Control Council could not only create difficulties in the administration of Germany but might extend to other important issues and consequently lead to graver consequences. After the expected post war recovery of France, the important issues in which France would take part would be considerable. It has always been a principle of interna-

¹ Ibid., pp. 618, 573.

tional politics that the more powerful a state becomes, the more are the issues in which its interests are involved, provided it does not choose isolation. France, a European power, did not and could not choose isolation.

Putting the merits of policy aside, the President had no intelligible arguments to justify his policy. His role in the discussion which developed around the participation of France was casual. He merely allowed the Soviets and the British to argue among themselves, limiting his role to casual approval of the Soviet point of view. Britain was left alone to fight the battle of the West, while its closest and largest ally, the United States, stood on the other side of the fence. When asked why he thought France should take a zone of occupation, the President answered that "it was out of kindness."¹ There are indications that the President really meant what he said, for throughout the Conference he did not give a single reason why France should be given a zone of occupation. Moreover, the President's refusal to allow France a seat on the Control Council is a further proof that the President meant what he said. To act out of sheer kindness on an issue of vital political importance was certainly poor statesmanship if it could be called statesmanship at all. Furthermore the President did not give any genuine arguments against the participation of France in the Control Council. What his argument amounted to, was a casual and a brief re-iteration of what Stalin had just said.²

¹ Ibid., p. 573.

² This is an observation made out of the sequence of arguments and comments by both Stalin and the President. See Ibid., pp. 616-19.

But luckily enough for the West, the case of France was finally won. Britain held out alone. Churchill and Eden used every possible argument for the participation of France with the expectation of strengthening the West against a future Soviet threat to Western Europe, which they obviously could not mention. When the Soviets lost hope of British retreat, they tried to side track Britain by postponing the question and referring it to the European Advisory Commission.¹ But Churchill was not forthcoming: This was an old trick which he often used himself. He questioned the ability of the European Advisory Commission to succeed where the heads of states had failed in direct negotiations.² He therefore demanded that a decision be taken now, at the Conference, or if necessary at a later stage. The President, in an effort to assist the Soviets on postponement, said: "Would it not be better to postpone it for two or three weeks instead of two or three days?"³ Churchill, however, did not give in, holding that

"once (we) separated after this conference it would be difficult to settle the question."⁴

At the seventh plenary meeting,^{on} the 10th of February, the last in which the Big Three discussed substantial issues, the President changed

¹ Ibid., pp. 702, 707.

² Ibid., p. 710.

³ Ibid., p. 710.

⁴ Ibid., p. 711.

his stand abruptly. He stated that he was now convinced that if France should have a zone, it should likewise have a seat on the Control Council.¹ Stalin then answered briefly: "I have no objection."² This was to Mr. Byrnes, Hopkins and Harriman who undertook privately to convince the President that France should be allowed a seat on the Council.³ A part of the credit should also go to Britain, who held out tenaciously until the above mentioned assistants to the President succeeded to convince him of the merits of the French case.

2. Dismemberment

On the 5th of February, at the second plenary meeting, the Big Three touched on the question of dismemberment. As soon as the discussion started it was apparent that there was a radical difference between the Soviet Union and Britain. While the former advocated dismemberment and asked that at the Conference a method should be devised and approved, the latter (Britain) wanted to postpone the question altogether.⁴

Surprisingly enough the President ignored the recommendations of his Department of State, and supported the Soviet point of view. He declared that in conformity with his policy at Teheran, he was

¹ Ibid., p. 908.

² Ibid., p. 908.

³ Byrnes, James, Speaking Frankly, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947, p. 25.

⁴ Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 611-14.

still in favor of dismemberment and preferred partition into five partite states.¹ Thus the Soviet Union found in the United States an ally against Britain in regard to this particular question. Having made his point, the President seemed content for he did not venture to support his point of view with reasons or to justify his policy. He remained silent while Churchill and Stalin argued the question vehemently. Only when his colleagues reached a dead end did the President choose to interfere; this time in an effort to compromise. He suggested that a decision on dismemberment in principle should be taken at the Conference and that the method be referred to the Foreign Ministers to discuss and report on in 24 hours.² Churchill was in a difficult position as he had to oppose both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he could not bluntly refuse dismemberment in principle when both of his allies had approved it. But on the other hand, he wanted to reserve for Britain freedom of action in the future, for his government could not decide on dismemberment when the circumstances of the post war world were not apparent. He did not want to create a situation whereby Britain might find at some future point that dismemberment was not in its interests without being able to do anything about it. Therefore, he gave way on dismemberment in principle, but held on to postponement on the method.³ Stalin did

¹ Ibid., p. 614.

² Ibid., p. 614.

³ Ibid., p. 615.

not allow the opportunity to pass without trying to pin down the Prime Minister. He immediately suggested that a reference to dismemberment should be made in "The Surrender Instrument."¹ Churchill retreated again. He argued that such a reference was not necessary, for "The Surrender Instrument" gave the allies full authority over the future of Germany.² Furthermore, he added that such a reference would stiffen German resistance.³ But both the President and Stalin were not convinced. They maintained that such a decision was not to be made public and that after all the Germans were no longer susceptible to psychological effects, for they were under extreme pressure and stress. They concluded that if a reference to dismemberment was made in the "Surrender Instrument", the Germans would then shoulder the responsibility.⁴ Churchill gave way reluctantly and the question was referred to the Foreign Ministers for further discussion.

The Foreign Ministers met the next morning on February 6. It was decided that a reference to dismemberment should be made in Article 12 of "the Surrender Instrument". But the wording of the reference was a subject of hot argument between Eden and Molotov. Eden, in an effort to avoid commitment to dismemberment, suggested that the phrase "and

¹ Ibid., p. 615.

² Ibid., p. 615.

³ Ibid., p. 615.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 615-616.

measures for the dissolution of the German unitary State," be added to the second paragraph of the Article.¹ Molotov, on the other hand, wanted to make definite commitments. He therefore suggested the phrase: "In order to secure peace and security of Europe, they will take measures for the dismemberment of Germany."² None could win the other to his point of view. Finally Stettinius suggested the addition of the word "dismemberment" after the word demilitarization in Article 12 of the "Surrender Instrument."³ Both Eden and Molotov agreed to his suggestion and the question was settled in principle.

The next day, on the 7th of February, the Foreign Ministers met again, this time to discuss the creation of a commission to study the procedure of dismemberment. Stettinius suggested that the study of the procedure of dismemberment should be given to the European Advisory Commission; otherwise, the prestige of that body would diminish.⁴ But his counterparts did not agree and he did not choose to pursue his point further. During the rest of the discussion, Stettinius kept silent while Molotov and Eden argued the functions of the commission. Eden wanted to extend the authority of the commission to an extent that would enable it to decide on the principle of dismemberment.⁵ But

¹ Ibid., p. 656.

² Ibid., p. 656.

³ Ibid., p. 657.

⁴ Ibid., p. 700.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 700-701.

Molotov considered that the question of dismemberment in principle had already been approved, and that the commission should limit its functions to the procedure of dismemberment. Eden then tried to get the French into the commission for he did not see that the Americans were of any assistance on that question. Molotov opposed this and Stettinius kept silent.¹

Finally it was agreed that a commission on dismemberment would be set up in England consisting of Eden, Winant and Gusev. The participation of France was left to the consideration of the delegates and the functions were limited to the procedure of dismemberment only.²

The strange silence of the President, while Stalin and Churchill argued the issue vehemently, could be interpreted to mean that the President was not really interested in the power struggle among the European States. He was acting more like the isolationists "back home" whom he chose to fight in the United States. Otherwise his silence would mean that he did not base his dismemberment policy on extensive studies and therefore, had no arguments to offer. In either case the President is to blame.

It was not in the interest of the United States to leave a power vacuum on the Continent of Europe. A power vacuum was likely to disturb the balance of power at some future point and draw the United States into the European arena again. The participation of the United

¹ Ibid., p. 700.

² Ibid., p. 936.

States in both W.W. I and W.W. II should have reminded the President that the United States cannot keep aloof when one power establishes its hegemony on the Continent of Europe. Had the President entertained the idea of keeping his troops permanently on the European Continent, his dismemberment policy could have been excused on grounds that he planned to fill the vacuum with his own forces. But this was not the case. Therefore on dismemberment the President had committed two mistakes:

- 1) His technical diplomatic mistake was that he ignored the extensive studies of his Department of State without studying the implications of alternative policies.
- 2) Had Roosevelt's policies been carried out they would have created a power vacuum on the Continent of Europe which was not in the interest of the U.S.

3. Reparations

Before I venture to examine the policy of the United States on reparations from Germany, I shall discuss briefly the Soviet and British policies in regard to this subject. After an account of the policies of the other parties, an examination of the policy of the United States should become more meaningful.

The policy of the Soviet Union on reparations from Germany was most severe, and had the objective of rendering Germany industrially impotent and basically an agricultural country. The Soviets advocated

that what was left of German industry should be reduced by 80% and that its war industry should be removed 100%.¹ In order to avoid the problem of hard currency in payment of reparations, they advocated that reparation deliveries would be made in kind.² Two forms were envisaged by the Soviet Union for the exaction of reparations.

- 1) Removals in single payment from the national wealth of Germany located inside and outside its territory.³ Such removals were to be conducted in the light of military and economic disarmament and were to be completed within two years.
- 2) Annual deliveries of commodities from Germany during a 10 years period.⁴

The total sum of reparations from Germany was fixed at 20 billion dollars out of which the Soviet Union demanded 10 billion and suggested that 8 billion would go to both the United Kingdom and the United States while the rest would be delivered to other members of the United Nations.⁵

The Soviet delegation introduced a system of priorities for the distribution of reparation. Its criteria was that nations which contributed more to winning the war and which suffered the highest material

¹ Ibid., pp. 620-21.

² Ibid., p. 622.

³ Ibid., p. 707.

⁴ Ibid., p. 707.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 702, 707.

losses should have first priority.¹

The Soviet delegation refused to discuss the problem of slave labor from Germany, probably because its figures were so high that it expected ardent opposition from the Prime Minister and the President during the course of the discussion. However, this should be recognized as a mere interpretation, for the reasons mentioned by the Soviets were that they have not studied the problem of labor, and that in view of its complexity it had better be postponed.² The Soviet delegation suggested that a reparation commission be established at Moscow, consisting of three delegates, each representing one of the major allies - U.S.S.R., United Kingdom and the U.S.³ The functions of the Commission were reduced to procedural and technical level, for the Soviet Government wanted to determine the basic principles and amounts of reparation at the Conference.⁴ The Soviets desired to draw specific directives for the commission because they feared that the allies might sabotage their claims for reparations.

The discussion on reparations evolved around the Soviet proposals. The counter proposals submitted by the British and American delegations did not amount to more than amendments to what the Soviets had already

¹ Ibid., p. 620.

² Ibid., p. 704.

³ Ibid., p. 708.

⁴ Ibid., p. 708.

proposed.

As usual, Britain was the adversary of the Soviet Union. It desired to postpone the question of reparations altogether and thus it approved of the establishment of a reparations' commission at Moscow. Britain had two motives behind its postponement policy. (1) It did not want to commit itself to a specific policy of reparations at the time, for it could not vision the contours of international politics in the post war world.¹ (2) Furthermore, Britain was not inclined to approve of what the Soviets had asked for in reparations. The British, therefore, approved of reparations in principle, but endeavored to make the directive very general. In this way they hoped to avoid a schism with the Soviets, who were still their allies, and to reduce their own commitments.

Britain refused to fix any amount of value for the reparations in the directive. Furthermore it indicated to the Soviets that their figures were too high, and that they should not expect to reach anywhere near 10 billion dollars.² As a precautionary measure for the future, Britain advocated that France and other countries from the Allied camp who were damaged in the war should be allowed to participate in the commission. It demanded also that the question of German labour should be discussed at the commission and that the period for

¹ Churchill, Winston, Triumph and Tragedy, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953, pp. 350-51.

² Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 808-09.

the deliveries of commodities should be reduced from 10 to 5 years.¹
On the whole, the tempo of Britain called for easy terms on Germany,
while the Soviet tempo was severe. The following quotations from
Churchill and Stalin sum up the difference:

"Prime Minister.... if you wished a horse to pull a
wagon.... you could at least have to give it fodder.

Marshal Stalin.... but care should be taken to see
that the horse did not turn around and kick you."²

The bulk of the discussion on reparation was between the Soviet
Union and Britain. The United States delegation played a minor role
in the discussions, and presented no arguments. Its main role was
conciliatory.

The President of the United States made it clear that his country
was not willing to assist Germany as it did in the wake of W.W. I.³
He declared that with the exception of German assets in the United
States, he desired no reparations from Germany.⁴ He was willing to
facilitate for Britain an entry to ex-German markets and to allow the
Soviets the maximum reparations possible, provided that enough would
be left for the Germans to subsist.⁵ So far, at least in principle,
the President was in conformity with the recommendations of his

¹ Ibid., p. 875.

² Ibid., p. 621.

³ Ibid., pp. 621-22.

⁴ Ibid., p. 632.

⁵ Ibid., p. 632.

Department of State. But when the conference got down to business, Stettinus, his foreign minister seemed to have neglected all the studies made by his own Department. The American proposals on reparations differed slightly from those of the Soviet Union. The Soviet total of 20 billion dollars was accepted as a basis for discussion rather than a fixed total. The shares of each participant state in the commission was not mentioned at all.¹ It did not take long for the Soviets to gain from the Americans another concession; the Soviet Union should be allowed 50% of the total reparations.² The British were left alone standing against both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

Finally, the directive to the reparations commission, which was to be established at Moscow, was a compromise between Britain and the Soviet Union. Britain, however, reserved its position in connection with the estimated total of reparations which was set at 20 billion dollars and in connection with the 50% share allotted the Soviet Union.³

Before I conclude this chapter a short comment on the borders of Germany should be made. As mentioned in the previous chapter, no agreement could be reached on the Eastern borders of Germany because the Soviet Union desired that Poland's borders be extended beyond

¹ See American proposals on reparation, Ibid., p. 808.

² Ibid., p. 809.

³ See the section on reparations in the Protocol of Proceedings, Ibid., pp. 978-79.

the Oder River, and the West could go no further than the Oder. As to the Western borders, Churchill retreated from his previous promise at Moscow that the Rhineland and the industrial areas in the West should be put under international control. He was now uncertain whether they should be put under international control, handed to France, or remain a part of Germany.¹ He succeeded in postponing the question altogether on grounds of complexity.² The question of the borders took little time at the Conference.

D. Conclusion

The President at Yalta deviated substantially from what his Department of State had recommended on Germany. The President, of course, was entitled to deviate, but in this case he should have based his alternative policy on extensive studies similar to those which were prepared by his Department of State. There is no indication that the President had such studies, for he did not even discuss the merits of his German policy at the Conference. Besides, if the President did not see eye to eye with his Department of State, he should have clarified his views to the Department before the Conference was held, and instructed his aids and staff to conduct their studies and prepare their policies accordingly. Consequently, the American delegation would have arrived at Yalta fully prepared and

¹ Snell, John, The Meaning of Yalta. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1956., pp. 64-65.

² Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 612-15.

sure of what it wanted to stand for. By waiting to the last minute and then ignoring a substantial part of the policy advocated by the Department of State, the President had put his delegation in a difficult position. They were not prepared for the policy advocated by the President. Therefore, the President committed a procedural mistake in this respect.

Putting procedure aside, let us consider the merits of American policy at Yalta in regard to Germany. The overriding interest of the United States was in facilitating the establishment and growth of democracy in Germany and throughout Europe.¹ Neither the dismemberment nor the reparation policy which the Americans approved at Yalta conformed with these interests.

The President approved the proposal that reparations in the value of 20 billion dollars should form the basis of discussion at the reparation commission. Moreover, he agreed that a major portion of the reparations was to be drawn in single payment from the capital equipments and national wealth of Germany, and that what was left be drawn in commodities within a period of 10 years. Although the figure set as a basis for discussion did not commit the United States to a fixed sum, it meant that the reparation figures would have to be in the vicinity of 20 billion dollars, otherwise, the figure would be of no value in the directive. It was not known then, how much would be left

¹ Rosenman, S., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1950, pp. 533-535.
See also Yalta Papers, Ibid., p. 186.

of German wealth after the war. Therefore, there would have been wisdom in refraining from approving such high figures. Such was Churchill's stand but the President did not listen. As it turned out, Churchill's reservations were appropriate for Germany emerged from the war in no position to pay such heavy reparations.¹ The United States was not ready to pay for German reparations either directly or indirectly. Therefore, reparations should have been limited to German capacity, which should have been set according to the following criteria:²

- 1) Maintenance of a subsistence level for the German people.
- 2) Capacity to have enough exports to pay for essential imports, such as food.
- 3) Payment for the cost of occupation forces.

These precautions should have been mentioned in the directive of reparations issued to the reparation commission. The British tried to put them in the directive but they received no support from the Americans. Contrary to the advice of his Department of State, the President approved of the dismemberment of Germany into five or seven partite states. The German people, quite homogenous and closely attached to the Reich, could not be expected to accept partition.³

¹ Byrnes, J. Op.cit., p. 29.

² Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 190-91.

³ Hull, C., Op.cit., pp. 606-607, 1619.
See also Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 302-303, 187.

Of course, during the occupation period the Germans could do nothing about it, but after occupation, the surreptitious activities for unity among the partite states would have created a difficult situation for the Allies. To control such surreptitious activities outside interference would be necessary. Such interference might, however, become hazardous, as unity among the Great Powers could not be secured permanently.

Partition was likely to create an ugly image of the democracies in the mind of the average German. The cries of ultra-nationalistic elements for power and unity were likely to appeal to the Germans at some future point as the only salvation of Germany. Therefore partition would have burdened the cause of democracy in Germany, boosted that of the ultra-nationalistic elements and given no additional security against a possible revival of a drive for unity amongst the
1
Germans.

Similarly, the severe reparations' policy which took no account of a gradual release of German industrial capacity nor of the German capacity to pay, was not compatible with the overall objective of the U.S.-establishment of democracy, peace and tranquility in Germany and the rest of Europe.²

It might be asked, but what of the Soviet Union? Could the United

¹ This line of thinking had been maintained by the Department of State and clearly stated in the Briefing Papers on Germany. See Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 302-03, 187.

² Dulles, Allen, "Alternative for Germany", Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXV, (1946-47), pp. 421-24.

States ignore the interests of its large ally? Would not peace be threatened again by a hostile Soviet Union as much as by the growth of Germany on other than democratic lines?

The United States' desire for Soviet co-operation was understandable but it did not have to buy this co-operation. The Americans had to allow the Soviets reparations but not to the extent of looting Germany. They could have explained and asked the Soviets to approve of their long range policy in Europe which was based on the economic revival of the continent and the establishment of democracy. They could have explained that the United States thought that the economic revival of Germany was essential for such a task and that the only security from German aggression would be its redevelopment along democratic lines.

If the Soviets approved and reduced their demands in Germany to an extent compatible with such a policy, the United States could have offered them generous economic assistance for reconstruction. In this way the reins would have remained in American hands. If the Soviets broke their commitments at Yalta, assistance could be stopped. If they did not, assistance could be used as a means of penetrating the closed doors of the Soviet Union to promote friendly relations and demonstrate that after all it was possible for the U.S.S.R. to co-operate with other than communist states. The German question was a case on which the United States could have put the Soviet approval on the Declaration for Liberated Europe and the Atlantic charter into test. If they were ready to substantiate these ideals by following the lines which were

suggested by the State Department on Germany, co-operation would have been possible. If not, the United States could have conducted its field operations so as to occupy as much as possible of what was left before the Russians arrived. They could have discovered then what they discovered three years later (1948) - that the Soviet Union wanted to establish its hegemony over Europe.

Finally, it remains to be said that if the President did not feel that his European policy could be revealed to the Soviets at this stage of the war, he could have acted on a line comparable to that of Britain - asked for postponement and reduced the commitments on Germany as much as possible. As it turned out, postponement was achieved mainly due to the efforts of Churchill and Eden. Had it not been for Britain, the commitments of the Allies on a severe policy towards Germany would have been greater.

CHAPTER VI

THE FAR EAST

The policy of the United States on the Far East at Yalta has been a subject of controversy among political writers and commentators. The supporters of Roosevelt have found in the recommendations which were available to the President a justification for his policy on the Far East. Therefore, it becomes necessary to discuss fully the recommendations to the President and his actions at Yalta before a proper evaluation is possible. Consequently, the first two sections of this Chapter are descriptive and informative while the third is totally devoted to analysis and evaluation.

A. The Recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff

The recommendations submitted to the President by the Chiefs of Staff were strictly limited to the military aspects of the war in the Far East. They did not discuss the Far Eastern aspect in toto nor did they seek to justify the intervention of Russia politically. They merely described the military advantages which would accrue to the United States from Russia's intervention.

The Chiefs of Staff did not count on Soviet participation in the invasion of Japan proper (home islands). Such a task was reserved to American forces, who alone possessed the naval and airforce superiority necessary for such major amphibious operations. Participation of Soviet forces was deemed desirable on the mainland of Asia, particularly in

Manchuria.¹ It was expected that a Soviet offensive in Manchuria would commit the two million men army of Japan on the Asiatic mainland to the Soviet front.² Moreover, even if Japan could spare some troops for the defense of the home islands, their transportation would become extremely difficult if not impossible.³ In order to sever the lines of communication between Japan and the Asiatic mainland, the Chiefs of Staff recommended that the President should ask the Soviet Government for air bases in Siberia and the Maritime Provinces.⁴ With the strategic air force of the U.S. converging on Japan from all directions, and with the Japanese troops in Asia committed to the Soviet front, the invasion of the home islands was expected to become less costly in material and men. It was estimated that without Soviet participation, the war against Japan would have lasted for 18 months after V.E. day and have inflicted on the United States a million more casualties before the enemy would have accepted unconditional surrender.⁵ With the participation of the Soviet Union, the chiefs of staff expected fewer casualties and a shorter war.

B. The Recommendations of the Department of State

The recommendations of the Department of State on the Far East

¹ The U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1955, p. 396.

² Ibid., pp. 389-90.

³ Ibid., pp. 389-90.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 390-91, 398.

⁵ Kennan, George, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin, Boston, Little Brown and Company, 1960, pp. 378-79.

were restricted to China. Contrary to its recommendations on other questions at the Conference, the Department of State did not discuss the Far Eastern question in Toto. It was perhaps not Stettinius' fault, for the President had kept him out of the picture in the Far East. Stettinius was not even allowed to participate in the discussions on the Far East at Yalta. He, moreover, could not see the document which embodied the agreements on the Far East.¹

Although general Hurely had had no success in bringing about an understanding between the Kuomintang and the Communists, the Department of State continued to advocate the necessity of such an understanding. It was anticipated that with the support of the Soviet Union, the chances of a coalition between the Kuomintang and the Communists would be improved.² Moreover, a coalition government recognized by the Soviet Union was apt to achieve stability and progress in post war China.³

Therefore, the Department of State saw in Soviet participation an advantage to America's policy in China which was based on the development of that country along progressive and stable lines, and the maintenance of friendly relations with the major powers including the Soviet Union.⁴

¹ Stettinius, E., Roosevelt and the Russians, Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1949, pp. 95-96.

² Feis, Herbert, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 507.

³ Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 355, 356.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 356-57.

Consequently the Department of State urged the President to allow the Soviets to participate in the war against Japan, hoping that such a participation would promote a friendly relationship between the Soviet Government and the Chinese Government and hence contribute to the development of a unified stable China in the post war decade.

Moreover, the Department of State had pointed out to the President that there were immediate military advantages in the participation of the Soviet Union. It was argued that the participation of the Soviet Union would preclude collaboration between the Communists and the Red Army, for the Soviet Union would have already pledged to recognize the Kuomintang Government and agreed to support a coalition whereby this government would take the lead.¹ Finally, the Department of State advocated that Soviet participation would promote the possibility of having a United Chinese front against the Japanese troops in China.²

C. What Happened at Yalta

The Far Eastern question took little time at the Conference. Its discussions were restricted to the Americans and the Soviets, for the British considered the Far Eastern war theatre as primarily an American sphere. There was a single plenary meeting on the Far East held on February 8. The duration of the meeting was short and the attendants, beside Stalin and Roosevelt, were Harriman and Molotov.

¹ Ibid., p. 350.

² Ibid., p. 350.

It was conducted with utmost secrecy for the Soviet Union was not then at war with Japan.

Roosevelt almost acceded to every Soviet demand. Contrary to his policy in Europe, which was against territorial annexation, he readily agreed to the annexation of Southern Sakhalin (Karafuto) and the Kurile islands to the Soviet Union.¹ Similarly in China, the President made every effort possible to satisfy Soviet demands. Subject to the approval of Chiang Kai Chek, the head of the Kromintang Government, the President promised Stalin to support his demands to use the Manchurian railways and Port Dairen in Southern Manchuria. It was agreed that the Manchurian railways should be administered jointly by a Sino-Soviet commission and that Port Dairen should be internationalized as a free port.² The President also agreed to support the demands of the Soviet Union to lease port Arthur from China.³

In view of the traditional interest of the Soviet Union in Korea, it was agreed that this country should be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations and that the U.S., China, Britain and the U.S.S.R. should exercise administrative authority on behalf of the international organization until the Koreans were ready for independence.⁴

¹ Ibid., p. 768.

² Ibid., p. 769.

³ Ibid., p. 984. ~~See also Appendix, Infra, p.~~

⁴ Ibid., p. 770.

In return for American concessions, Stalin agreed to declare war on Japan three months after V.E. day.¹ He granted the United States air bases in Siberia and the maritime provinces and instructed his military staff to speed up negotiations with their American counterparts for the purpose of co-ordinating the military campaigns against Japan.²

In China, Stalin agreed to recognize the Kuomintang Government as the cornerstone of a possible coalition between the various factions in that country including the Communists.³ He, moreover, agreed to support all efforts to bring about an understanding between the Kuomintang and the Communists and pledged to conclude a pact of friendship with China.⁴

Contrary to other sessions at the Conference, the session on the Far East involved no arguments and no compromise, for each party readily acceded to the demands of the other. Although Britain took no part in these negotiations, it was invited to sign the agreement concluding the discussions. Now that the recommendations submitted to the President and his concessions and gains at Yalta have been stated, it becomes necessary to analyze and study these facts in the light of power politics.

¹ Ibid., p. 984.

² Ibid., p. 767.

³ Ibid., p. 771.

⁴ Ibid., p. 984.

E. Evaluation

1. Given the Premise that Soviet Participation was Necessary:

Were American Concessions Excessive?

It was obvious that the Soviet Union would expect some concessions in return for its participation in the war. The Soviet Government, motivated by self-interest to participate on the side of the victorious party, had made its demands reasonable. With the exception of the Kuriles, the Soviet Union did not demand anything that it could not have occupied during the course of the war. The Soviet Union had based its demands on good grounds. Southern Sakhalin had been a part of Russia prior to 1905.¹ Similarly, prior to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Russia had a lease on Port Arthur, access to Port Dairen and control over the Manchurian railways leading to the Pacific. Korea also had always been a sphere of Russian influence. Therefore, by restoring the above mentioned privileges in Manchuria to the Soviet Union, the United States was not paying a high price for Soviet participation. Similarly Southern Sakhalin which was a part of Russia and which would have immediately fallen under Soviet occupation was not an unreasonable concession.

The Kuriles, however, went unnecessarily to the Soviet Union. Neither on power or other grounds could the concession of the Kuriles

¹ Ibid., p. 385.

This point was mentioned by Prof. Hugh Borton in a report submitted to the Department of State on Southern Sakhalin. There is no evidence that either Stettinius or the President were aware of this report prior to Yalta.

be justified. The Soviet Union could not have occupied these islands stretching 570 miles into the Pacific. The inferior Soviet navy could not protect the amphibious operations necessary for occupation without the active participation of the American fleet. The Soviet Union was not in occupation of the Kuriles prior to the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, whose losses it sought to redress. Moreover, the inhabitants of these islands were Japanese who had strong economic and cultural ties with the main islands of Japan.¹

Strategically, the islands controlled the entrance to the Okhotsk sea where the bulk of the Soviet navy was at bay.² They also constituted a link between the main islands of Japan and the Soviet Union.³ All these reasons should have been sufficient grounds to deny them to the Soviet Union. It will be remembered that Roosevelt had deliberated in the Atlantic Charter, that the transfer of territories from one state to the other shall take place in accordance with the will of the inhabitants. Therefore, in conformity with the Atlantic Charter, Roosevelt could have denied the islands to the Soviet Union on grounds that the inhabitants were Japanese. If the American Government could justify its concession of Southern Sakhalin (with a population 99% Japanese) on grounds that it could do nothing to save that territory from Soviet occupation, this was not the case in the Kuriles.

The American Government had a tendency to forget the principles

¹ Ibid., pp. 379-383.

² Ibid., pp. 379-383.

³ Ibid., p. 383.

of the Atlantic Charter when the territories concerned were in the Far East. Contrary to its policy in Europe, which advocated restraint in territorial aggrandizement and postponed the delimitation of boundaries during the course of the war, the American Government had deliberately planned and accepted the annexation of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles to the Soviet Union.¹

Given the necessity of Soviet participation, the agreement on the Far East which was concluded at Yalta, had its credits from an American point view. Soviet participation and American bases in Siberia and the maritime provinces, would certainly have helped to bring about an earlier defeat of Japan. The million American casualties which were expected to fall in the battle of the home islands would have been reduced significantly. Moreover, the bulk of China was saved temporarily from a Soviet invasion, for it was agreed that Soviet forces would operate in Manchuria. The pact could be regarded as a factor which would promote the possibility of an understanding between the Communists and the Kuomintang Government which the United States had earnestly desired. Therefore, given the necessity of Soviet participation, the Americans did not commit grave mistakes in the Far East. Their concessions, with the exception of the Kuriles were reasonable. After all, the Soviet Union had given guarantees for the independence of China which the United States had sought to protect from Soviet occupation. Only in Manchuria were the Soviets allowed to conduct their war, and that was a limitation

¹ Kennan, Op.cit., p. 373.

to their military expansion. However, if the premise of the above mentioned analysis is challenged (i.e. the necessity of Soviet participation), then the rosy picture of the agreement on the Far East would fall apart.

2. Was Soviet Participation Necessary?

The United States had consistently urged the Soviet Union to participate in the Pacific war. Before 1943 the subject had been brought to the attention of the Soviet Government many a time to be met with the staunch refusal of the Soviet Union.¹ But after 1943, as the Americans began to advance and occupy vital strongholds in the defensive perimeter of Japan, the Soviet Union began to lend an ear to American demands for participation. It was obvious to them that if the Americans were able to inflict defeat on Japan while the war in Europe had priority on American resources, Japan had no chance of winning the war. Consequently Stalin at Teheran promised Roosevelt that the Soviet Union would participate in the war against Japan as soon as the war in Europe terminated. In October 1944 at Moscow, Stalin again affirmed his promise to participate in the war against Japan. This time, however, Stalin began to ask for military assistance in lend lease over and above those that were handed to the Soviet Union for fighting the war in the European theatre. The Americans readily agreed to the list of items demanded for Soviet forces including weapons which were at that time in the possession of the United States alone, such as the heavy four engine long range bombers,

¹ Ibid., pp. 372-73.

See also, Snell, The Meaning of Yalta, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1956, p. 133.

However, the discussions at Moscow remained in the realm of promise, for Stalin had some other political demands which he had postponed until Yalta in view of the absence of the President.

The major incentive for the Soviet Union to participate in the Far Eastern war was its desire to have a hand in the spoils after the final defeat of Japan.¹ It was strange, however, that the American Government, although victorious in the Pacific, kept insisting that the Soviet Union should join in the war against Japan. Before 1943, when the trend of the Pacific war was not in favor of the United States, the motives for Soviet participation were justified. The U.S. wanted assistance against what then appeared to be a formidable enemy. But after 1943, when the trend of the war was irrevocably in favor of the U.S., at least the zeal for Soviet participation should have subsided. If the Soviets desired for reasons of their own to participate in such a war, America should have waited for a Soviet approach and in that case could have saved many concessions to the Soviet Union. Aside from possible saving in territorial concessions, the United States could have saved itself the expense of giving Soviet Russia 3/4 billions tons of armaments and the expense of maintaining hazardous pacific routes to Russia against Japanese attacks. If the United States had played the role of a disinterested party, which it could have afforded after its victories in the pacific, its bargaining position against the Soviet Union would have been considerably improved, for the Soviets could not

¹ Ibid., p. 376.

hint as they did at Yalta, that unless their demands were met the Soviet Government would not be in a position to participate in the Far Eastern war theatre.¹ The persistence on the Soviet Union to participate in war against Japan, despite the fundamental change in circumstances, was due to under-estimation of political factors. The President had relied heavily if not solely on the recommendations of his Chiefs of Staff when he deliberated on the necessity of Soviet intervention. The mistake was not in the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff; their military anticipations that Soviet intervention would bring about an early collapse of Japan was militarily sound. The military advantages enumerated to the President that would accrue from Soviet participation were true. It was likewise true that the participation of any power against Japan would contribute to the military defeat of that state. The basic mistake was that of relying too heavily on military considerations. Political elements which were beyond the scope of military considerations were either ignored or reduced to secondary importance. Consequently, the desire of the United States to avoid the loss of heavy casualties was solved by military measures. Political considerations were used only as a means of achieving those measures.

3. On Unconditional Surrender and Power Politics

Actually, there were two alternatives for American policy which

¹ Beloff, Max, Soviet Policy in the Far East, London, Oxford University Press, 1953, pp. 26-27.

See also Yalta Papers, Op.cit., p. 769.

would have led to its primary desire of reducing casualties in defeating Japan. The first was of course in Soviet participation, and the second was in asking for less than unconditional surrender from Japan. The American Government pursued the former alternative and totally neglected the latter. War to the government of the United States seemed to have a moral connotation. It was not regarded as a means for achieving political gains but as an instrument for uprooting the evil in favor of the good.¹ It was this mistaken understanding of war which led the United States as early as 1943 to declare that it demanded from Japan unconditional surrender, and to persist on that demand throughout the war.² It was, it is and it always will be a mistake of the victorious power to regard the defeated enemy as a party of no assets at all. As long as the enemy exists, no matter how weak is his position, he would still have an asset at his disposal. That asset is his ability to inflict further casualties on the victor in the final battle of the homeland.³ Japan, although defeated, had a good asset in its "residual power" to inflict heavy losses on the enemy in the battle of the home islands.⁴ The losses might have measured up to the army estimates of one million casualties. Therefore, a policy of less than unconditional surrender would have allowed a chance to dis-

¹ Kennan, Op.cit., pp. 383-84.

² Ibid., pp. 383-84.

³ Kecskemeti, Paul, Strategic Surrender, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1958, p. 16.

⁴ Ibid., p. 158.

arm Japan of its residual power and to save the million American casualties. Had the government of the United States given this alternative serious consideration, it would then have had to weigh it against that of Soviet participation in the war.

In order to judge which of the above mentioned alternatives was more suitable from an American point of view, it would be necessary to consider the interests of the United States in the Far East and then give the preference accordingly.

4. On Balance of Power

Traditionally the United States had been interested in keeping balance of power in the Far East.¹ The balance had to be maintained between Russia and Japan, who were by far superior to any other power in the area. Thus in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 the United States supported Japan against Russia.² In the 1930's, the United States had resisted the expansion of Japan in Manchuria and at a latter period in the South Pacific.³ The balance of power policy was not an end by itself but a means to an end defined in terms of interest. The United States' interests in the Far East had two criteria. The first was that of promoting commercial and economic interests in China on the basis of the "Open Door" policy. The second and the most important was that of security. Traditionally,

¹ Dallin, David., Soviet Russia and the Far East, New Haven Yale University Press, 1948, p. 380.

² Ibid., p. 380.

³ Ibid., p. 381.

the United States had regarded the dominance of either the Soviet Union or Japan in the Pacific area as a potential threat to its security. In fact, what motivated Japan to strike at the United States was its relatively free hand in the Far East when the Soviet Union was occupied in the European war theatre. In pursuit of its balance of power policy in that area, the United States had traditionally supported an independent strong China.¹

The question which should have been asked was; who should fill the vacuum left after Japan's total defeat and disarmament? Could China take the place of Japan in balancing Soviet power in that area? What would be the possible effects on China's power position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union if the latter should be allowed to participate in the war and to acquire privileges in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia? If these questions were asked and considered by the American Government, the loopholes in the agreement would have been obvious. The Soviet guarantee for an independent China was fine but who would guarantee the "guarantee". In other words, what sort of a security did the United States have against a possible change of Soviet attitude at some future point. The only security would be in the ability of China to redress any possible Soviet aggression in the future. But was China capable of that undertaking? The answer is of course in the negative. Beside its chaotic conditions, China had to put up with a strong

¹ Ibid., p. 381.

Communist faction capable of paralyzing the country at any time. The Soviet Union, in a clash of interest with that country, would simply have to instigate the Communists in order to obtain concessions. Moreover, the Soviet Union could use direct intervention if the Chinese Communists failed to accomplish a Soviet mission successfully. It was obvious that a country which needed the support and the guarantee of the Soviet Union to stand on its feet could not possibly be expected to challenge or resist Soviet aggression in the future. In the past, the role of an independent China in keeping the balance was secondary. The role consisted in tilting the balance in favor of one power or the other. But in the absence of Japan, a profound change would come into being. China's role would become a primary one; that of undertaking to balance Soviet power single handed. It was this profound change which the United States Government had missed and which had led to the tragic results in the Far East.

Had the United States considered these factors, the merits of a negotiated surrender with Japan would have appeared clearly in favor of the United States.

Japan, contrary to Germany, was not dominated by a Schizophrenic government. Ever since the defeat of Japan at "Midway" on June 7, 1942, important political figures such as Yoshida and Kido began to advocate a negotiated peace with the United States.¹ In March 1944 Admiral

¹ Kecskemeti, Op.cit., p. 155.

Takagi, who was asked by his government to study the war situation, had reported that Japan had no chance of winning the war and that its only alternative was in a negotiated peace.¹ In July 1944, after the fall of Saipan, Tojo, the leader of the pro-war group in the government, resigned.² Thereafter, the elements in favor of surrender to the United States participated in the government and had the sympathy of the Emperor himself.³ Had the United States given Japan a reasonable chance of escaping unconditional surrender, peace in the Far East might have been achieved prior to Soviet entry into that theatre. With the conclusion of the war prior to Soviet entry the United States could have dictated its terms to Japan, and stripped it of all its empire without allowing any concessions to the Soviet Union. Even after the atom bombs were used against Japan, and even after the Soviet Union had joined the war, the United States had to settle for less than unconditional surrender to disarm Japan of its "residual power". Japan did not surrender before the U.S. had guaranteed the safety of the imperial institution and that was short of unconditional surrender.⁴

5. On the Axioms of American Policy

It was not strange for the American Government to refrain from

¹ Ibid., p. 155.

² Ibid., p. 156.

³ Ibid., pp. 169-176.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 169-176.

considering the above mentioned factors. The balance of power and spheres of influence policy was no longer considered suitable. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, was quite explicit when he stated in his memoirs:

"I was not, and am not, a believer in the idea of balance of power or spheres of influence as a means of keeping the peace. During the First World War I had made an intensive study of the system of spheres of influence and balance of power, and I was grounded to the taproots in their iniquitous consequences. The conclusion I then formed in total opposition to this system stayed with me."¹

When America approached the Soviet Union at Yalta asking for Soviet participation in the Far East, thereby neglecting the principle of balance of power and spheres of influence, the Soviet Union demanded concessions on the very terms which the United States had neglected. Had the United States framed its policy on the principles of balance of power and spheres of influence, Soviet entry in the war against Japan could have been avoided by accepting a negotiated surrender with Japan.

After all, history was full of examples whereby allies had turned to enemies and enemies to allies.

¹ Hull, C., The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. 2, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948, pp. 1452-53.

CHAPTER VII

EVALUATION

A. On American Concessions in Eastern Europe

American concessions to the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe could be justified in terms of power politics. Soviet forces had already occupied Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and substantial parts of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Only Yugoslavia remained unoccupied by Soviet forces. If the American Government found no alternative but to approve of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, it should have recognized that it was out of acquiescence rather than agreement. Roosevelt, was aware of the Soviet subversive activities.¹ He was also aware that the Soviet Union had annexed the Baltic States and was seeking territorial aggrandizement at the expense of its European neighbours. It was obvious that these actions were against the principles of the Atlantic Charter - Roosevelt's cherished hope for a brave new world.

If Roosevelt had to acquiesce to Soviet demands he should have responded by following a policy of containment to further Soviet expansion.

B. On Misunderstanding the Soviet System

Many American officials, including the President, were not entirely unaware that much in the Soviet system and ideology makes for expansionism and suppression of democracy. Yet this awareness seems to have been

¹ Supra., p. 21.

dulled during and after Yalta by hopes that Western friendliness somehow would transform Soviet behavior. The American Government interpreted Soviet annexations, subversive activities and unilateral actions in terms of past hostilities towards the Soviet Union.¹ It expected that in the future when the hostility of foreign powers towards the Soviet Union would cease, the Soviet Government would change the course of its policy.²

As it was, the American interpretation implied that the foreign powers were to blame for Soviet foreign policy. It could perhaps be said that there was an element of truth in this analysis, but it could also be said that the analysis was superficial. In analyzing relationships, it is essential to examine the factors in each state which led to the existence of the particular relationship. Had the American Government gone that far in its analysis, it would have found that the Soviet system had its share in creating the past hostilities towards the Soviet Union. The Communist system, as interpreted by Lenin and Stalin, excluded the possibility of peaceful coexistence between the "socialist states" and "non-socialist states."³ Moreover, the Soviet leaders believed that the Soviet Union should endeavor to bring about the collapse of all "non-socialist states."⁴ Therefore, Soviet excesses

¹ Hull, Cordell, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1948, pp. 1464-65.

² Ibid., pp. 1464-65.

³ _____ "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXV, 1946-47, p. 572.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 575-579.

were not merely reactions to the hostilities of others. There was an element of will in Soviet hostility fermented by the Communist system and ideology as conceived and applied in the Soviet Union. Had the government of the United States gone that far in its analysis, it would have discovered that a stable basis for peaceful co-existence with the Soviet Union could not be achieved until a fundamental change took place in the Soviet system. Since there were no indications that such a change was taking place, it was an illusion to rely on the Declaration of Liberated Europe to insure liberal policies in Eastern Europe. The Soviets could not afford to conduct free elections in Eastern Europe either on theoretical grounds or on practical grounds. On theoretical grounds, the Soviets did not believe in free elections and on practical grounds free elections were apt to bring about regimes hostile to the Soviet Union.

C. On American Policy and Failures at Yalta

A policy of containment against the Soviet Union was incompatible with the premises of America's policy of that time. A policy of containment would imply action in terms of power politics. But the United States Government seemed at least partially under the illusion that power politics would decrease rapidly once the United Nations would come into being. Allowing for rhetorical licence, various statements of Hull and Roosevelt reflected the influence of such an illusion.

On his return from a conference at Moscow in 1943, which laid the groundwork for the United Nations, Hull declared, "that the new inter-

national organization would mean the end of power politics and usher in in a new era of international collaboration."¹

Similarly, on his return from Yalta, Roosevelt declared before a joint session of the Congress:

"The Crimea Conference was a useful effort by the three leading nations to find a common ground for peace. It ought to spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries and failed. We propose to substitute for all these a universal organization in which all peace-loving nations will finally have a chance to join."²

This illusion under which American policy functioned reduced the will of the American Government to utilize its power position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Roosevelt's behavior at Yalta can perhaps be partially explained and justified as an attempt to use his personal and political skills to persuade Stalin to accept as in his own and Russia's interest a practical arrangement along the lines actually reached at Yalta - and to abide by it. Yet, here again, less optimism about his own skills and about the *spirit* of the United Nations and more concern about the realities of power politics and the Soviet system might have moved the U.S. to prompt consideration of alternative policies in case Stalin did not abide by the agreement.

¹ Morgenthau, Hans, "A Realist Theory of International Politics", Contemporary Theory in International Relations, Ed., Paul Hoffman, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1960.

² Rosenman, S., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Vol. 1944-45, New York, Harper and Brothers publisher, 1950, p. 586.

Roosevelt's mental and physical condition at Yalta has been the subject of vehement arguments. Certainly much of Roosevelt's behavior at Yalta could be explained as that of a man whose will, memory and clarity of thought had been weakened by fatigue and failing health. Thus he frequently was undecided and several times abandoned decisions almost as soon as ^{he} made them.¹ His failure to read his briefing papers and his strange silence when vital issues were under discussion denote that the man was not alert.²

An American Government laboring under no such deficiencies would have become alarmed at Yalta, when it was possible to salvage some territories from Soviet hegemony. A policy of containment would have dictated a consideration of replacing the policy of unconditional surrender by one of strategic surrender. The case for unconditional surrender was

¹ On February 4, 1945, at 4 p.m., Stalin had told the President very clearly that de Gaulle had told him at Moscow that the Rhine was the natural boundary of France and that the French wanted to station troops on that river permanently.

The next day, February 5, 1945, at 4 p.m., Roosevelt seemed to have forgotten what Stalin had said the previous day. "He said that he had understood from Marshal Stalin that the French definitely did not wish to annex outright the German territory up to the Rhine."

"Marshal Stalin replied that this was not the case...."

Similarly at the same meeting on February 5, the President made another blunder which cannot be explained except in terms of failing clarity of thought. "He showed a map to those at the table and said that was what he and Prime Minister Churchill discussed at Quebec. He amended this statement when it was explained to him privately that the map had its origin in the protocol on the zones of occupation and the European Advisory Commission.

U.S. Department of State, Diplomatic Papers: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1955, pp. 572, 616, 624.

² Byrnes, J., Speaking Frankly, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1947, p. 23.

based on two points: 1) The need to eradicate German militarism and the possibility of its rising again as after W.W. I. 2) The importance of continued co-operation with the Soviets in the destruction of German power and to lay the basis for post war co-operation and compromise. These considerations, though important, should not have blinded the Allies to the increasing evidence that Soviet expansion was apt to be a greater threat than German militarism in the post war world. The same evidence increasingly suggested after Yalta that the possibilities of co-operation and compromise with the U.S.S.R. were severely limited, i.e. that a containment policy was increasingly advisable. A strategic surrender policy would have disarmed a hopeless foe of his "residual strength" or at least reduced his resistance considerably. The piecemeal surrender of German forces to the Western Allies, and the last ditch resistance to the Soviet forces indicates that Germany would have surrendered to the West had there been a strategic surrender policy.¹ In any case, in the last days of the third Reich, Donitz, who assumed command after Hitler, had asked for surrender on Western hands and was not only refused but forced to surrender to Soviet Russia as well. Eisenhower, who felt that Donitz was playing for time to admit the Western armies in and hold tenaciously in the East, threatened that unless an unconditional surrender was made to the Soviets as well he would refuse to allow German refugees in flight from the Soviets to pass through the

¹ Eisenhower, D., Crusade in Europe, New York, Doubleday and Company Inc., 1948, pp. 423-26.

See also, Montgomery S.K., Memoirs of Montgomery, London Collins Clear-Type Press, 1958, pp. 331-33.

Western lines.¹

Similarly in the Far East a strategic surrender policy might have produced an earlier collapse of Japan. In any case, as was mentioned earlier, Japan did not surrender until the U.S. guaranteed the security of the Japanese people and the Imperial Institution.

On military grounds the positions of Western forces in Europe on the eve of V.E. Day testify that the West was in a power position to forestall Soviet advance. Had Roosevelt caught alarm at Yalta and responded to British demands to conduct the final campaign so as to occupy a maximum of territory ahead of the Soviets, Western armies might have met the Red armies further East.

In the Far East, as well, the power of the Western Allies was underestimated. The estimates of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that the surrender of Japan would require 18 months of war from V.E. Day turned out to be 3 months, only 7 days after the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan.² Furthermore at Yalta, the President knew that the atom bomb was nearly completed. He had received reports from the Scientists that the bomb would be produced not later than August.³ If he could not rely on these reports and could not then assess the military significance of this weapon, he could have played for time by postponing the

¹ Eisenhower, Op.cit., p. 426.

² V.E. Day was 1945, 8th of May.
V.J. Day was in 1945, 15th of August.
Soviet Union declared war on Japan on the 8th of August, 1945.
See Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chronology of the Second World War, Oxford, the Alden Press, 1947, pp. 350, 366, 367.

³ Yalta Papers, Op.cit., pp. 383-84.

request for Soviet participation. He could have afforded postponement, for his armies were victorious on the battlefield and the Soviet Union was in no position to participate before 3 months from V.E. Day. From the discussion above, a strong case can be made that:

1) The government of the United States should not have asked for Soviet participation in the Far East at Yalta.

2) Had the Soviet Union asked to participate, the United States would have been in a better bargaining position.

3) Had the invitation been postponed, there was little risk of Soviet uninvited participation until at least three months after V.E. Day.

4) Under the above circumstances Soviet expansion might have been more limited than was the case.

In Europe several conclusions can be drawn:

1) The United States, at Yalta, could have done little if anything to reduce Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe.

2) The United States should not have agreed on the dismemberment of Germany nor on heavy reparations to the extent of rendering this country an economic burden on the West.¹

3) Had the United States caught alarm, at Yalta, and responded with a policy of containment, the advanced positions of its forces on V.E. Day could have been used to promote its bargaining power in regard to central and eastern Europe at the conference of Potsdam.

In conclusion, American leadership had underestimated its power position. Under the impact of an over-conciliatory policy, it failed to extract maximum utility from that position against the Soviet Union.

¹ Had the Yalta agreements on these points been carried out, Germany might have long been such a burden.

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