THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING
THE LEBANESE CRISIS OF 1958

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PREFACE

The object of this thesis as its title indicates is to try to explain the role played by the United Nations during the Lebanese Crisis.

The writer of this thesis found it convenient to include a chapter dealing with the theoretical and the actual roles played by the three organs of the United Nations, namely, the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretary-General from the date of its establishment in 1945 until its involvement in the Lebanese Crisis in May 1958.

Much has been written on the Lebanese Crisis itself. Thus, the writer has not attempted to give a detailed history of the background of the Crisis, but has only tried to review in broad outline the causes of that Crisis. In writing Chapter II of this thesis which deals with those causes, the writer has avoided as much as possible the use of Arabic books written by "Government" officials in Lebanon or by "Opposition" leaders because most of those books were written too near to the heat of the Crisis and often expressed violently partisan points of view. Instead the writer has depended heavily while writing that chapter upon the official declarations and statements made at the time by the leading personalities on both sides as they appeared in the more neutral Lebanese newspapers particularly Al-Hayat.
A great obstacle faced the writer with regard to the extraordinary session of the Arab League in the city of Benghazi in Libya between May 31 and June 6, 1958. Since the meetings of the Arab League are secret, no official record of the Benghazi session was published. After much labor and with the generous help of a distinguished personality, who wishes to remain unnamed, the writer succeeded in obtaining the minutes of the five meetings of that session, and tried to analyse them in Chapter III of this thesis.

The writer has depended heavily on the United Nations documents and publications while writing Chapters IV, V and VI. She was fortunate enough to get hold of most of the United Nations documents concerning the activities of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon in the period between May and December 1958.

The term "the Middle East" was used for the purposes of this thesis to denote the Arab countries of the Eastern Mediterranean including Egypt (the Mashriq).

All the Arab League documents, as well as the extracts from the Arabic books and newspapers used in this thesis were translated by the writer.

The writer would like to express her thanks to Mr. H. Wriggins for being given the opportunity to use his valuable report on "Mediation in Palestine" in Chapter I of this thesis.

This thesis is only a small contribution to the
understanding of the complex situation which prevailed in Lebanon in 1958. The writer, however, has tried to use the available material as objectively as possible for that end.
CHAPTER I
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN MEDIATING BETWEEN DISPUTING STATES

In order to understand the role played by the United Nations during the Lebanese Crisis of 1958, it is helpful to analyse its role, both theoretical and practical, in mediating between disputing states from the date of its establishment in 1945 to its involvement in the Lebanese Crisis in May 1958.

The preamble of the United Nations Charter stipulates that the peoples of the United Nations are determined to work together in order "to maintain international peace and security."^1 Thus, the purposes of the United Nations include the maintenance of international peace and security through "the adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."^2 Article 2 stipulates that Members of the United Nations will act in accordance with the following principles: Article 2, paragraph 3 states "all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means..." According to Article 2, paragraph 4 "all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force

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^1 The United Nations, Charter, Preamble.

^2 Ibid., Art. 1, para. 1.
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

We will attempt to analyse the role of the General Assembly of the United Nations, both theoretical and practical, in mediating between disputing states.

The functions and powers of the General Assembly are many. One of its main functions is the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 11, paragraph 2 of the Charter stipulates "the General Assembly may discuss any question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security..., and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both..." Article 11, paragraph 4, says "the powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the general scope of Article 10." Besides, "subject

\[3\] Ibid., Art. 2, paras. 3 & 4.

\[4\] Art. 12, para.1, of the U.N. Charter reads "While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so requests."

\[5\] Art.10 of the U.N. Charter reads "The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters."

\[6\] The United Nations, Charter, Art. 11, paras. 2 & 4.
to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations..."7

What was the practical role played by the General Assembly in mediating between states?

The first task of the General Assembly is that of expressing general principles as set forth in Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Charter. Under this authority, the General Assembly has discussed general problems of "peace-making and peace-keeping" and has adopted different resolutions.

Another important role played by the General Assembly "is its function as an organ of political settlement, of peace-making and of peace-saving."8 This role was not designed for the General Assembly by the framers of the Charter. The Security Council, besides being given full power in the field of enforcement, was also given by Article 12 of the Charter, priority over the General Assembly in the case of any "dispute or situation" which might threaten international peace and security.9 Although according to Article 35, states are given the freedom to bring "disputes or situations" before either the

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Assembly or the Council, the expectations in 1945 especially those of the Great Powers were that serious and urgent cases should be presented to the Security Council while the rest would go to the General Assembly. Because the veto power has been used more than necessary from the beginning, the Security Council could not solve even simple cases such as the Iranian (January 19, 1946: the first dispute brought to the Security Council, concerning the presence of the Soviet troops in Iran\textsuperscript{10}), or the Syrian and Lebanese complaints (February 4, 1946: complaint by Syria and Lebanon on the presence of French and British troops brought to the Security Council by Syria and Lebanon\textsuperscript{11}). Thus, in 1947 issues such as the Greek (Balkan) question or the Korean Independence question were brought to the General Assembly because of the fear that in the Security Council they would "run foul of the veto". This process was accelerated by the establishment of the Interim Committee or the Little Assembly. Although it did not function well, yet the idea of holding a special session and (as in 1951-1952) of continuous Assembly sessions to contend with certain crises has gradually developed so that it is now an unusual year in which the Assembly's activities are limited to the duration of its autumn session.\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 10.

\textsuperscript{12} Nicholas, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 106-107.
Mr. Hammarskjold is quoted as having said "the Charter read as a whole, does not endow the United Nations with any of the attributes of a superstate or of a body active outside the framework of decisions of member governments."\textsuperscript{13} Thus, according to Mr. Hammarskjold, the United Nations is "rather an instrument of negotiation among and, to some extent for governments. If member governments fail to use this instrument, that is their responsibility"\textsuperscript{14} and not that of the United Nations.

In 1956 and 1957 many resolutions were passed by the General Assembly with regard to the crises which arose in the Middle East and in Hungary. In both cases it passed resolutions requesting the troops concerned to withdraw from the territories to which they had been sent. But all of those resolutions were recommendations. They could not be enforced if the states to whom they were addressed did not want to implement them.\textsuperscript{15} Those resolutions were not legally binding but they reflected the feeling of the majority of world public opinion and thus had an effect on the invading powers who, in the case of the Anglo-French forces in the Suez war, withdrew the last of their troops in February 1957. In the case of Hungary, however, the Soviet Union refused


\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 34

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 35
to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and kept its troops in Hungary.\textsuperscript{16}

We will now try to analyse the role of the Security Council, both theoretical and practical, in mediating between disputing states. Article 24, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that Members of the United Nations "confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security..."\textsuperscript{17} Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" covers Articles 33-38.\textsuperscript{18}

What was the role played by the Security Council in mediating between states?

"Of all the organs of the United Nations, none has shown a greater discrepancy between promise and performance than the Security Council." The failure of the Security Council to work as expected is due to the absence of the conditions necessary for peace and security.\textsuperscript{19} The Charter permits both, the General Assembly and the Security Council, to contribute to the pacific settlement of disputes. Here the General Assembly was given a "wide power of inquiry and debate" while the Security Council was considered the main

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 37.

\textsuperscript{17} The United Nations, \textit{Charter}, Art. 24, para. 1.

\textsuperscript{18} See Appendix I.

\textsuperscript{19} Nicholas, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 63-64.
operating organ. Thus, Chapter VI of the Charter entitled "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" refers more to the Security Council in this connection than to the General Assembly. According to Article 12 of the Charter the Security Council is given priority in role because the General Assembly is forbidden to deal with issues with which the Security Council is dealing. "The Security Council as a settler of disputes can only recommend."

Article 33 of the Charter mentions a number of methods for the disputing states to follow in trying to solve their disputes by peaceful means, such as "negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to original agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice."

The techniques which the Security Council has used for the purpose of the pacific settlement of disputes have varied with the cases. Mr. Nicholas classified those techniques under the following headings: "investigation, interposition, conciliation, recommendation, and appeal." He defined investigation as "the process of fact-finding and of arriving at some acceptable substratum of evidence, which is the almost essential precondition of any recommendation which the Council may wish to make." Generally, the Security Council may appoint a committee of its members, or a commission of the representatives of those members such as in the case of the United Nations Commission of Investigation

\[\text{Ibid.}, \text{pp. 75-77.}\]
Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents (established by the Security Council on December 19, 1946\textsuperscript{21}). The commission may be "sent to the scene of the dispute to collect its evidence..."\textsuperscript{22}

We shall discuss the role played by the Balkan's Commission mentioned above as an example of investigation. On December 3, 1946, the Acting Chairman of the Delegation of Greece to the United Nations sent a letter to the Secretary-General stating "a situation existed which was leading to friction between Greece and its neighbors," due to the assistance offered by the latter to the violent guerilla warfare being fought in northern Greece against the territorial integrity of Greece.\textsuperscript{23} That situation, if not dealt with immediately, might endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. The Greek Government asked the Security Council to apply Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter and to send a committee to investigate the situation on the spot. Thus, on December 19, 1946, a resolution was passed by the Security Council establishing a Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents. This commission was established under Article 34 of the Charter to investigate the facts regarding "the alleged border violations" along the frontier separating Greece and its

\textsuperscript{21} Chamberlin, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{22} Nicholas, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 77.

three neighbors, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The
commission was to be composed of a representative of each
of the members of the Security Council. It was given wide
powers to carry on investigation in any part of Greece,
Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia that it deemed necessary.
It was also given the authority to ask for the assistance of the
Government officials and nationals of those countries. When
the committee completed its investigation on the spot, its
members moved to Geneva where it held sixteen meetings. Its
report (S/360) was adopted on May 23, 1947. After much
discussion the United States amended draft resolution was
adopted by the Security Council by nine votes with two
abstentions. It resolved that, awaiting a new decision of
the Security Council, the commission established by the
Council's resolution of December 19, 1946, would maintain
in the area concerned an additional group made up of a
representative of each member of the commission "to continue
to fulfil such functions as the commission may prescribe
in accordance with its terms of reference." During the
discussion of this dispute the Representative of Greece
declared that if the investigation authorised by the Council
showed that peace was endangered, it was the duty of every
Council member to ensure the adoption of suitable measures
by the Security Council.

24 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
25 Ibid., p. 22.
26 Ibid., p. 35.
Another technique used by the Security Council for the pacific settlement of disputes is "interposition". When a situation is critical, when the problem is how to stop a situation from deteriorating, it is helpful if the Security Council can intercede between the disputing parties "the physical presence of some of its own representatives." Sometimes this is combined with the business of fact collecting and reporting. In a critical situation their presence is very useful as a deterrent. Generally those committees or commissions will be officially entrusted with superintending the conduct of a truce or an armistice agreement such as the Security Council Truce Commission for Palestine (established on April 21, 1948\textsuperscript{27}), or the United Nations Observation Group established as a result of the Security Council resolution of June 11, 1958 which, although its function was that of trying to ensure that there was no infiltration of arms or men, yet indirectly, had a deterrent effect on any disputant who might have resorted to force.\textsuperscript{28}

Conciliation, or mediation, is another method used by the Security Council for the purpose of the pacific settlement of disputes. The role which was played in the past by the neutral state, whose detached position made it acceptable to disputing states, is played now by the Security Council. The duty of conciliation may be entrusted to an individual or to a committee. One example is that of the Security Council

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{27}
Chamberlin, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 16.
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\textsuperscript{28}
Nicholas, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 78.
\end{flushright}
Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question (established on August 25, 1947\textsuperscript{29}), which consisted of two members each appointed by one of the two disputing states, Holland and Indonesia. Another example is that of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (established on January 20, 1948\textsuperscript{30}) but its three members were appointed by the Security Council.\textsuperscript{31} Sometimes, an individual may be appointed as a negotiator or conciliator over a committee especially if he is "a man of repute and discretion." Such were Sir Owen Dixon, who was appointed by the Security Council as the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan (on April 12, 1949\textsuperscript{32}), and Dr. Frank Graham, who was appointed in the same position (on March 30, 1951\textsuperscript{33}), and whose services were utilized by the Security Council in connection with the Kashmir Dispute.\textsuperscript{34}

We shall now attempt to analyse the role of the United Nations Mediators in the Palestine Problem (May 1947) as an example of the role which could be played by such mediation efforts for the pacific settlement of disputes.

In his study of this subject Mr. Wriggins hoped

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{29} Chamberlin, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 15.
  \item \textsuperscript{30} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 16.
  \item \textsuperscript{31} Nicholas, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 78.
  \item \textsuperscript{32} Chamberlin, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 20.
  \item \textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 23.
  \item \textsuperscript{34} Nicholas, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 79.
\end{itemize}
"to formulate certain hypotheses" regarding the role played by the Mediators in Palestine, Count Folk Bernadotte and his successor, Dr. Bunch. According to Mr. Wriggins, the Mediators' aim "was to encourage the adoption of conciliatory policies" by the statesmen representing the disputing states. Mr. Wriggins also hoped to explain the political circumstances behind the acceptance by the Middle Eastern statesmen of the First and the Second United Nations Truces. Another purpose was to help us evaluate "the probable contribution of the Mediator to such decisions." In an effort to investigate the mediation effort in any conflict situation, it may be helpful to clarify the extent to which the Mediator can "alter (a) the incompatible values being pursued or (b) either party's capacity to forego agreement."35

Many problems confronted the Mediator in Palestine, the most significant being, that the Arabs and the Jews had incompatible aims and policies, the most important of which was the existence or the non-existence of the Jewish State.36 Because both protagonists, the Arabs and the Jews, depended on the benevolent policies of certain foreign powers; Britain in the case of the Arabs and the United States in the case of the Jews; their relative capacity to forbear agreement "depended on policies followed by their foreign supporters both private and governmental."37 The incompatibility

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35 H. Wriggins, Mediation in Palestine, A Study of the Role of the Mediator(s) and International Policy Making, (Yale Graduate School of International Relations: May 6, 1950), pp. 1-11.

36 Ibid., p.4.

37 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
of the aims of both protagonists made fighting inescapable.\textsuperscript{38} An understanding of the above-mentioned factors is necessary for the estimation of the Mediation efforts of the United Nations. Soon after the United Nations partition decision in November 1947, guerilla warfare started in Palestine. By the end of March the Jews had developed their own offensive, therefore, the Arabs recognized the need for the intervention of the regular Arab armies if that Jewish offensive was to be stopped and the Jewish State prevented from being established.\textsuperscript{39} On May 14, 1948 the Egyptian troops entered Palestine to liberate it from the Jewish Invador, and other Arab regiments entered the country from the north and the east for the same purpose.\textsuperscript{40} At the beginning initiative in fighting was held by the Arabs. Count Bernadotte's efforts to formulate a truce between the Arabs and the Jews were influenced by many factors such as the intensity of the aims of both parties, their complete dependence upon external Great Powers, and by the consequences of the military operations which his preliminary efforts were directed to stop.\textsuperscript{41} On May 29, 1948 the fourth appeal by the Security Council was accepted by both protagonists. On June 11 the First United Nations Truce for four weeks went into effect. Why did the Arab Governments accept the First Truce? Did the United Nations Mediator contribute to their

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{39} \textit{The Economist}, May 15, 1948.
\textsuperscript{40} Wriggins, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 12.
\textsuperscript{41} Wriggins, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 13.
decision? The May 29 Resolution of the Security Council ordered "the cessation of hostilities" and forbade the importation of armed men or weapons into any Middle Eastern state. The Mediator was given instructions to assist the United Nations Truce Commission to supervise the enforcement of the above conditions during the cease-fire period in order to find a peaceful solution of the problem. The above resolution was proposed by the British delegate to the United Nations and was accompanied by an indirect ultimatum that if the Arab Governments did not accept the Truce they would be submitted to an arms embargo by Britain while the Jews would be given the freedom to increase their military supplies. Jordan, the center of the Arab campaign, was threatened with the cessation of the British subsidy. Nevertheless, the role played by the Mediator was important. When Count Bernadotte asked for instructions from the Security Council he received orders to apply the following principles: "No military advantage should accrue to either side," and that he was to "bring about a cessation of hostilities in Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of either Arabs or Jews." Yet immigration limitations and arms embargo would be meaningless if both protagonists were not sure that an effective supervision agency would guarantee the enforcement

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of the previous agreement. Not one party could provide supervision and be considered adequately disinterested.

Only a man like Count Bernadotte, with such great diplomatic skill, could adjust the United Nations conditions and those of each protagonist to meet the extraordinary requests of both until an agreement on technical matters could be reached. Neither protagonist could ignore his suggestion because he had the support of both Great Powers upon whose assistance both parties were dependent. The Mediator acted "as a go-between for the hostile parties in a particularly complex decision-making context." The Jews welcomed the First Truce because the Arab Armies could not invade the newly established Jewish State during that period. Count Bernadotte started his efforts to mediate the struggle between the Arabs and the Jews as soon as the fighting was stopped by the Truce. He started talks with a Sub-Committee of the Political Committee of the Arab League in Cairo, and with the Minister for Foregin Affairs of Israel in Tel Aviv. It was evident that the time was not suitable for agreement on basic issues. Both protagonists "made it quite clear that they expected to receive [from the Mediator] an indication of [his] ideas as to a basis of possible settlement." The Mediator presented a "tentative suggestion" which carefully combined some aspects of both parties' aims. To a certain extent the proposals were deviations from the November 19, 1947

45 Wriggins, op.cit., pp. 16-18.

Resolution of the General Assembly. Count Bernadotte said:

the primary task of the Mediator is to initiate proposals calculated to harmonize conflicting interests and claims. In the very nature of the case, therefore, the Mediator must strive to encourage compromise rather than strict adherence to legal principles.47

Both parties rejected the proposals suggested by the Mediator as a basis for discussion and stuck to their original positions.48 While the Jews welcomed the prolongation of the Truce, due to the reasons mentioned above, the Arabs refused it.49 Thus, hostilities were renewed on July 9, 1948.

On July 15, the Security Council passed another resolution on Palestine ordering the belligerent states to stop fighting. The Mediator was asked to supervise the application of the Truce which was to remain until a "peaceful adjustment" had been reached by means of continued conversations through the Mediator. Any party failing to comply with that resolution would be subjected to measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.50 The shift of the military balance in the Middle East to the advantage of the Jews was one factor which induced the Arabs to accept the Second Truce.41

What functions did the Mediator perform with regard to the Palestinian mediation effort?

50 S/908, July 15, 1948.
51 *The Economist,* July 24, 1948.
In the case of the First Truce he worked much to make both parties accept the Truce. Another function was that of supervising it. For the Mediator and his staff assured both parties of the strict application of the terms of the Truce. The Mediator seemed to be in a position to precipitate the application of economic sanctions by the Security Council members against the party which repudiated the provisions of the Truce, or which threatened to walk out on any further efforts at negotiation. This applied to the Arabs during the First Truce as well as the Jews during the Second Truce, though much less in fact as far as the Jews were concerned.

In the case of the Second Truce. For the Arabs, the Mediator and his successor represented a means of negotiating with the Jews without their having to recognize Israel. As for the Jews, they represented the only means of negotiating with the Arabs who had refused to negotiate directly. In fact, during each Truce period, the Mediator had provided the Jews with time to increase their fighting strength.

The fourth technique used by the Security Council for the pacific settlement of disputes is recommendation. In some cases a dispute cannot be solved simply by persuading the protagonists to behave or compromise, some changes in the status quo may be indispensable, such as in Palestine and in the Suez Canal disputes. In such cases the Security Council may recommend certain principles or courses of action to the parties to a dispute, or even set up a machinery for implementing them itself. For example, in the case of the Suez

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52 Wriggins, op.cit., p. 34.
The fifth technique of the Security Council is "appeal". When other methods have failed and in an effort to help fact-finding, reinforce a truce, or hasten negotiations, the Security Council may appeal directly to the disputants to stop improper behavior. The appeals vary according to the different situations causing them. An example of this was the Security Council's resolution of March 28, 1955, relating to the Palestine question. The effectiveness of such resolutions depends upon the degree of effectiveness that the disputants are ready to give them. Here the Security Council has no power of enforcement. The closest the Security Council had tried to enforce such a recommendation was its important resolution of July 15, 1948 provoked by the truce violations in Palestine. That was the single occasion on which the Security Council had found that the ignoring of one of the recommendations under Chapter VI

53 Nicholas, op.cit., p. 79.

"Peaceful Settlement of Disputes" led it to the application of Chapter VII "Action with Regard to Threats of the Peace, Breach of the Peace and Acts of Aggression" where its powers of enforcement come into play.\footnote{55}

The role of the veto has often been misinterpreted. Since discussion is regarded as a procedural rather than a substantive matter, to which the veto is applied, therefore, it is not subject to the veto. Thus, the Security Council is free to discuss any issue that seven out of its eleven members vote to place on the agenda. But when a resolution is suggested at the end of the debate, the veto can be applied. In that case the majority of seven should include the vote of the permanent members although a Great Power cannot apply the veto to the peaceful settlement of a dispute to which it is a party. Due to the veto, the General Assembly rather than the Security Council has had the major role in the handling of issues like Hungary and the Suez Canal and as early as the Korean problem.\footnote{56}

At this point it may perhaps be relevant to discuss the role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, both theoretical and practical, in mediating between disputing states.

According to Article 99 of the United Nations Charter "the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the

\footnote{55} Nicholas, \textit{op.cit.}, pp. 80-82.

\footnote{56} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 86.
maintenance of international peace and security.\textsuperscript{57} When he realizes that peace is threatened, the Secretary-General may take the initiative in the General Assembly as well as the Security Council.\textsuperscript{58}

Secretary-General Trygve Lie used his initiative in mediating the Berlin Problem of 1948.

On September 29, 1948, the United States, France and Britain appealed to the Security Council of the United Nations on the basis that the Soviet Blockade of Berlin had threatened international peace. Thus, Mr. Lie began mediating between the disputing parties. He drew up a memorandum containing his conversations with the Soviet and the American delegates and others in the following weeks of intensive efforts to break up the Berlin Blockade.\textsuperscript{59} On November 3, 1948, the General Assembly adopted an "appeal to the Great Powers to review efforts to compose difficulties and establish lasting peace."\textsuperscript{60} Ten days later, Dr. Evatt and Mr. Lie sent a letter to the chiefs of state of France, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain. In that letter they advised the disputants to hold immediate conversations. They said that the Great Powers should support Dr. Bramuglia's, President of the Security Council, efforts at mediating the Berlin dispute. They added that they were

\textsuperscript{57} The United Nations, \textit{Charter}, Art. 99.
\textsuperscript{58} Munro, \textit{op.cit.}, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p. 213.
ready to assist the Great Powers in solving the problem. On November 16, Moscow answered the letter thus accepting the call for "immediate conversation." On the other hand, the three Western Powers insisted on the lifting of the blockade before starting negotiations.

Upon receiving the replies of the Four Powers, Mr. Lie and Dr. Evatt renewed their appeal to them to support Dr. Bramuglia's efforts. Thus, their letter succeeded only in expressing "reaffirmation of the willingness of the parties to the Berlin dispute to accept Security Council Mediation." It was, however, a step forward. What were the causes for the ending of the blockade? The three Western Powers carried on the airlift successfully. Later on the Soviet Union expressed its desire to end the blockade. That move was welcomed by the Western Powers. Thus, the blockade was lifted because of the propaganda and prestige effects of the triumphant airlift as well as the force of public opinion whose influence was exercised by the United Nations' consideration of the problem. The United Nations used its agencies such as the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat as well as weapons of diplomatic method such as mediation, fact-finding, private negotiation and "expertise public airing."

In another case in 1950, when North Korea invaded South Korea, Mr. Lie convened the Security Council. He made the first statement in the meeting and ended it by saying that it was the duty of the Security Council to restore peace to Korea.

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61 Ibid., pp. 215-216.

62 Ibid., p. 218.
When Mr. Dag Hammarskjold assumed office, he had authority as well as precedent for taking initiative, but he was cautious. The first turning point in his attitude occurred in 1955 when the General Assembly, upon the recommendation of the United States, requested the Secretary-General to go to Peking to ensure the release of American Prisoners of War captured by the Chinese in Korea. That mission was a great job to entrust to one person. His influence grew steadily but never as quickly as during and after the Suez Crisis. He and the experts he had chosen were entrusted with the task of clearing the Canal. He played the major role in creating the United Nations Emergency Force (U.N.E.F.), although he was helped by an advisory committee established by the General Assembly. The UNEF was subject to his control, although he remained working in this respect, in the name of the General Assembly. The establishment of the UNEF by the General Assembly in one week was one of the most important achievements in the history of international organization. Many factors had contributed to that measure, one of which was the crisis situation which called for quick action. Furthermore, the Secretary-General's support and guidance of the resolutions was significant to their passage and necessary to their application.

Mr. Hammarskjold had negotiated with big and small powers throughout the Suez Crisis like a foreign minister would have done for his country. During the period of the establishment of the UNEF he was "an innovator." Since the Assembly's

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resolutions of November second and fifth were vague, the Secretary-General made significant decisions that committed the United Nations to policies it had not dealt with before. He had to determine whether the UNEF should be withdrawn from the Canal zone after the withdrawal of Anglo-French forces. His decision depended on the November seventh resolution of the General Assembly which had provided that the UNEF could function in Egypt only with the latter's approval, and would help maintain peace during and following the evacuation of non-Egyptian troops. Mr. Hammarskjold decided that since the Anglo-French withdrawal would leave only the UNEF as "non-Egyptian" forces, "the latter should concern itself with the Israelis." That decision had left the Canal under the complete control of the Egyptians. The Secretary-General's primary aim in establishing the UNEF, according to his 1957 Annual Report to the General Assembly, was "the re-establishment of full compliance with the [1949] Armistice Agreements represented a stage that had to be passed in order to make progress possible on the main issues." 

The reason for the ineffective political stand taken by the Secretary-General during the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 was due to the nature of the situation. In spite of the fact


65 A/PV.666, March 1, 1957, pp. 1275-1276.
that he was given as much freedom of action by the General Assembly as was given to him during the Suez Crisis, yet he could not function as promptly and effectively as he had done before. The Hungarian Government did not allow him to visit the country. Besides, the United Nations could not force either of the two world blocs to perform any act against their national interests. In the case of the Hungarian Crisis, the Soviet Union had to choose between "bad propaganda and good geo-politics. It chose the latter." Thus, we can say that Hammarskjold did not fail in preparing a political adjustment in the case of Hungary, but he did not have "a reasonable chance for success." During the Lebanese and the Jordan Crises of 1958, Mr. Hammarskjold took initiative both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. When he announced to the Security Council that he wanted to increase the number of observers in Lebanon, no member objected.

66 Miller, op.cit., pp.154-156.
67 Ibid., pp. 156-157.
68 Munro, op.cit., p. 110.
CHAPTER II

A GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE LEBANESE CRISIS OF 1958
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EVENTS BETWEEN
DECEMBER 1956 AND MAY 1958

The Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company

The fall of the Yafi Government on November 16, 1956, marked the immediate starting point of the Lebanese Crisis of 1958, though it may be further traced back to the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by President Nasser of Egypt on July 21, 1956.¹

After President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company the Lebanese President declared on August 4, 1956, in his annual speech at the celebration of the Lady of the Hills at his home village of Deir El Kamar, his approval of the act of the Egyptian President. He said that President Nasser had the right to nationalize the Canal Company in order to provide money for the building of the Aswan Dam after the United States and Britain had withdrawn their loans to finance it. He warned the West against "losing for the present and the future and probably for ever what trust it still enjoys in this area and every hope of cooperating with its peoples even those with whom it is bound by treaties and other agreements."²

¹ The Department of State, The Suez Canal Problem, July 26 - September 22, 1956 (Department of State Publication 6392 Released October 1956), pp. 29-30.

² The Arab World, August 4, 1956.
On September 30, 1956, Lebanon called for a conference of the Four Arab States bordering on Israel in order to coordinate defence plans against possible aggression. On October 31, 1956, after the Israeli attack on Egypt, Lebanon declared a state of emergency.3

The Yafi Government Crisis

All the Arab heads of States were invited, on November 2, 1956, by the Lebanese President to an urgent meeting.4 The Conference of the Arab Heads of States was held in Beirut between November 13 and 15, 1956. In a statement issued on November 15, the participants5 declared that they unanimously agreed on the need for the application of the United Nations' resolution, demanding the unconditional withdrawal of enemy troops from Egypt and the Gaza strip. They also demanded "the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Israeli forces to the armistice lines." The statement added that if Britain, France and Israel resumed hostilities with Egypt, they would be held jointly responsible for "collaborating to continue their aggression." In that case all the Arab States represented at the Conference would "immediately take effective measures of


4 Ibid.

5 The participating Arab States were: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
legitimate defence" in accordance with Article 41 of the United Nations Charter and Article 2 of the Arab League Joint Defence Treaty. The statement did not mention the severance of diplomatic relations with Britain and France. Yet, it was actually over this issue that the Lebanese Cabinet of Abdallah Yafi, which had assumed power in March 1956, fell on November 16 of that year.

In explaining the reasons for the resignation of his Government, Dr. Yafi said that his Government had agreed with Chamoun on the severance of diplomatic relations with Britain and France immediately after the Tripartite aggression on Egypt. They also had agreed to invite the Arab heads of States for further discussion of the matter. Therefore, when, according to Yafi, Chamoun changed his mind during the Conference, the Prime Minister felt that he should resign.

Mr. Emile Bustani, Lebanese member of Parliament and a close associate of President Chamoun at the time, confirmed Yafi's version of the story. Bustani stated that, before the Conference mentioned above was held, Chamoun had said in the

6 Art. 2 of the Arab League Joint Defence Treaty stipulates "The Contracting States shall consider that an armed aggression committed against any one or more of them, or against their forces, to be an aggression against them all. For this reason, and in accordance with the right of legitimate self-defence, both individual and collective, they undertake to hasten to the aid of the State or States against whom an aggression is committed..." cited in Muhammad Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League (Beirut: Published by Khayats, 92-94, Rue Bliss, 1962), II, 102.


8 Interview with Dr. Abdallah Yafi, November 9, 1962.
presence of Yafi, Salam and Bustani himself that diplomatic relations should be severed.\(^9\)

According to Mr. Saeb Salam, Minister of State in the Yafi Government in 1956, the decision on the severance of diplomatic relations taken by Chamoun and his Cabinet was communicated to the Arab States by the President and by Salam himself.\(^10\)

Mr. Bustani explained that Premier Yafi had said that Salam had promised the Syrians to sever diplomatic relations when the latter visited Damascus after President Chamoun had expressed his agreement to the principle of severance. This was on November 14, 1956. Mr. Bustani, however, criticized Mr. Salam's action because the latter made the promise to the Syrians without prior consultation with the Lebanese Government.\(^11\) Mr. Salam's own answer to this point is that President Chamoun had himself asked him to communicate his suggestion of the severance of diplomatic relations "to an Arab Government."\(^12\)  

As Mr. Salam saw it, Yafi had not sprung the resignation of his Government on Chamoun. Only when Yafi was placed in a critical situation and felt that Chamoun did not seriously desire


\[^10\] See Chamoun-Ghaleb meeting below.

\[^11\] "Bustani's Article," *op.cit.*

\[^12\] Syria, according to Bustani.

to sever diplomatic relations, did he tell the President that he could not continue in office until the Arab Heads of States' Conference was over. It was at this point that President Chamoun asked Mr. Adel Osseyran, the Speaker of the Lebanese Parliament, to tell Yafi to present the resignation of his Government.\textsuperscript{14}

According to Bustani, a meeting was held between President Chamoun and Ambassador Ghaleb of Egypt, attended by Bustani himself, following the Lebanese President's invitation for the Conference of the Arab Heads of States on November 2, 1956. The Egyptian President had not answered the invitation because of the breakdown of communication during the hostilities. During that meeting, however, President Chamoun apparently told Ambassador Ghaleb that he was waiting for the Egyptian answer to the invitation. Ghaleb allegedly asked Chamoun if there was an intention, on the part of the Lebanese Government, to sever diplomatic relations with Britain and France, and promised to communicate the message to President Nasser, when possible. Chamoun, according to Bustani, answered "Yes and even more than that." When Ghaleb asked whether unanimity between the members of the Conference of the Arab Heads of States would be a condition for the severance of relations, Chamoun allegedly answered, "No, not in the case of Lebanon."\textsuperscript{15} The above mentioned conversation was confirmed by Dr. Yafi.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} "Bustani's Article," \textit{op.cit.}

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{16} Interview with Dr. Abdallah Yafi.
Following the declaration of the cease-fire by Britain and France on November 6, 1956, a meeting was held in President Chamoun's office and attended by Yafi, Salam and Bustani. Yafi declared that he was in an embarrassing position because he could not himself express his opinion in the Conference of the Arab Heads of States regarding the severance of relations. President Chamoun replied that the Lebanese position must be in harmony with that of the majority of the Arab States. Yafi allegedly said that the Syrians were exerting pressure upon his Government to sever diplomatic relations. Yafi denies this strongly and states that nobody had exerted pressure on him to sever relations. He points out that, as far as he was concerned, the question had already been decided upon with Chamoun before the invitation to the Arab heads of States to meet in Beirut was sent.

When the Arab heads of States finally met in conference at the UNESCO Building in Beirut, they discussed the question of the severance of relations. Some of the attending member states had already broken relations with both Britain and France (Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia) others (Jordan and Iraq) had broken relations with France only. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia had stopped supplying both aggressors with oil and had stopped the flow of oil to Bahrain in order to prevent it being sold to Britain. On November 13, 1956, a Sub-Committee of the Conference of the Arab Heads of States was formed. The Syrian delegate in this committee

17 "Bustani's Article," op.cit.
18 Interview with Dr. Abdallah Yafi.
argued that the severance of relations meant the severance of both diplomatic and economic relations while the Iraqi delegate insisted that it meant the severance of diplomatic relations only. The Jordanian delegate expressed the willingness of his country to sever relations with Britain if Arab aid could replace British economic aid to Jordan. The Iraqi delegate said that he and the rest of the Iraqi delegation were only advisers and could not adopt any decision without consulting the Iraqi Parliament. He added that the blowing up of oil pipelines in Syria had already cost Iraq a fortune and that 30% of the budget of Iraq came from oil revenues. He argued that if Iraq severed its economic relations with Britain, it would be in need of economic aid like Jordan. Furthermore, continued the Iraqi delegate, the situation had changed and the resolutions of the United Nations were being carried out. He added that the Arab States could exert greater pressure on Britain if they did not sever relations with it.

The Libyan delegate said that his Government could not sever relations with Britain and France because Libya had concluded a treaty of friendship with Britain according to which Britain was given military bases in return for a sum of money equal to half the budget of Libya. Besides, Libya had concluded an economic treaty with France. In return, the latter had agreed to the evacuation of its forces from Libya on November 30, 1956. 19

The Syrian delegate requested Iraq to take stronger

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measures than the temporary deprivation of Britain from participating in the meetings of the Four Islamic States who were members of the Baghdad Pact, which was the extent to which Iraq was willing to go in the political field. In reply, the Iraqi delegate said that his Government was ready to take more effective measures when necessary. The Syrian delegate then said that his country had concluded a treaty of mutual defence with Egypt and that if the aggressor forces refused to evacuate Egypt, Syria would be obliged to participate in the battle with Egypt against the aggressors. He demanded the application of Article 2 of the Arab League Joint Defence Treaty, and concluded by saying that, if the discussion at the meeting did not benefit Egypt immediately, it would be useless. The Syrian delegate then apologized and withdrew from the meeting with the rest of the Syrian delegation.

Mr. Kamal Jumblat, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, introduced a new point concerning Chamoun's attitude towards the subject of the severance of relations. In his book entitled "The Truth about the Lebanese Revolt," Jumblat said that Chamoun had refused his suggestion for putting an end to the Crisis by withdrawing the Lebanese Ambassadors from Paris and London. When asked to clarify this point to the writer, Dr. Yafi said that he was not aware that this was Mr. Jumblat's suggestion, but that the idea of the withdrawal of the two

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20 [Ibid.], Meeting of November 14, 1956.

Ambassadors had been considered after Chamoun had refused the severance of diplomatic relations. Chamoun had, however, allegedly rejected this idea also.

The Eisenhower Doctrine

When Premier Yafi submitted the resignation of his Government to President Chamoun on November 16, 1956, the latter designated Mr. Sami Solh as the next Premier.

With reference to the foreign policy of his Government Premier Solh declared, in his ministerial statement, that Lebanon would support Egypt fully in defending its sovereignty and would work for the execution of the statement of the Conference of the Arab Heads of States.

On January 5, 1957, President Eisenhower of the United States delivered a message before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives in which he expressed the determination of the United States to support the sovereignty and independence of all the Middle Eastern States. He made the following specific proposals. First, that the United States would assist any nation or group of nations in the Middle East to develop economic strength in order to maintain their independence. Secondly, the United States Government would extend military assistance to any Middle Eastern nation or nations desiring such aid. Thirdly, such assistance would include

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22 Interview with Dr. Abdallah Yafi.

employment of the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the territorial integrity and political independence of such nations, requesting such aid, against armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism. 24

What was the reaction of the Lebanese Government to the Eisenhower Doctrine as the above-mentioned proposals came to be known?

On January 7, 1957, Dr. Charles Malik, the Lebanese Minister of Foreign Affairs in Premier Solh's Government, declared that his country was desirous "to cooperate with the United States to the fullest possible extent," within the limits of its sovereignty. He declared that he found in the Eisenhower Doctrine "many guarantees of Lebanon's independence and sovereignty." However, he added, Lebanon would harmonize its policies with neighboring Arab States. Communist danger, said Malik, had infiltrated many parts of the Middle East. 25

Stressing his support of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Foreign Minister Malik said that he had assured the American President of his desire to cooperate fully with him to enforce his plan, namely, the Eisenhower Doctrine, which aimed at confronting International Communism in the Middle East by economic and military means. 26

24 The Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East: September 1956 - June 1957 (Department of State Publication 6505, Near and Middle Eastern Series 25, Released August 1957), pp. 15-20.

25 The Arab World, January 8, 1957.

The Lebanese President expressed his approval of the Eisenhower Doctrine in his annual speech at Deir El Kamar on August 4, 1957. President Chamoun welcomed American economic and military aid under the Eisenhower Doctrine because that doctrine "did not provide for any special privileges..." to the benefit of the United States. The President attacked in this speech the alleged intervention of some Arab States in the internal affairs of Lebanon. 27

In a statement of policy on February 22, 1957, Premier Solh declared, before the Lebanese Parliament, that his Government would cooperate with the United States Government because the Eisenhower Doctrine aimed at offering economic and military aid to any Middle Eastern country which demanded it without any infringement upon its sovereignty. He added that the Lebanese Government was negotiating with the American authorities regarding beneficial public projects such as starting a popular housing project, enlarging Beirut International Airport and other development projects. 28

In a message to President Chamoun, dated February 11, 1957, President Eisenhower welcomed the Lebanese Government's "forthright and favorable reaction..." to the Eisenhower Doctrine. 29

The Eisenhower Doctrine was viewed by the Opposition

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The Arab World, August 5, 1957.

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in a different light. They welcomed American economic aid if it were unconditional. That view was shared by many Opposition leaders such as Yafi, who after his resignation became a prominent leader of the Opposition, and Jumblat. On the other hand, Opposition leaders criticized American military aid which some of them saw as an attempt at "filling the vacuum" resulting from the contraction of Anglo-French influence in the Middle East, a policy which meant the substitution of American for Anglo-French influence. This was viewed by Yafi as a return to the policy of military pacts which led only to the involvement of small nations in the bipolar struggle and the cold war. The so-called vacuum, if it existed, the Opposition claimed, should be filled by the people of the Middle East supported by the United Nations. Mr. Jumblat supported Dr. Yafi's concept and felt that the Eisenhower Doctrine drew the Middle East into the American sphere of influence which was against the policy of neutralism which Lebanon had followed so far. Thus, the Opposition favored the idea of the neutrality of Lebanon between the two world blocs.

President Eisenhower sent Ambassador James P. Richards on a tour of the Middle Eastern countries in order to explain his proposals.

30 *As-Siassa*, January 3, 1957.


The aim of the Eisenhower Doctrine, according to Mr. Richards, was "to contribute to the security and stability of the independent nations of the Middle East who wished that contribution."\(^{34}\)

On March 16, 1957, a joint communiqué was issued following talks between Ambassador Richards on one hand and Chamoun, Solh and Malik on the other. The Communiqué declared that the United States and Lebanon would cooperate on the basis of mutual respect for each other's independence and sovereignty, which they were determined to defend. The Communiqué added that both Governments would not allow any interference of one of them in the affairs of the other. Finally, the Communiqué declared that Ambassador Richards agreed, in principle, that the United States Government would supply the Lebanese Government with "certain equipment needed to strengthen the Lebanese armed forces." That was to be an additional grant besides a grant of military equipment offered to the Lebanese Government \(^{35}\) shortly before.

The Richards-Chamoun talks and the determination of the Lebanese Government to support the Eisenhower Doctrine marked a turning point in the development of the Lebanese Crisis.

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\(^{34}\) The Department of State, United States Policy in the Middle East: September 1956 - June 1957 (Department of State Publication 6505, Near and Middle Eastern Series 25, Released August 1957), p. 47.

\(^{35}\) For the Text of the Lebanese-American Communiqué see Anne Slater, The Eisenhower Doctrine; an analysis of its aims in relation to United States Foreign Policy with special reference to Lebanon (M.A. thesis, Department of Political Studies and Public Administration, American University of Beirut, 1959), pp. 121-122.
of 1958 by widening the gap between the Government and the Opposition.

On April 6, 1957, the Solh Government won the Parliament's confidence regarding its foreign policy (support of the Eisenhower Doctrine) by 30 votes to 1, while 6 Opposition deputies resigned in protest. The deputies were Abdallah Yafi, Hamid Frangis, Ahmad Assad, Kamel Assad, Sabri Hamade and Rashid Karami. They all objected to, what they considered to be, the hasty manner in which the Lebanese Government had accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine.

The Opposition National Front issued a statement on April 11, 1957, in which it declared its support of the resignation of the Opposition deputies. It accused the Solh Government of violating the National Pact. Lebanon, the statement added, should have followed a neutral policy between the East and the West. The Lebanese Government should have consulted other Arab States as well as different Lebanese groups on the subject of accepting the Eisenhower Doctrine. It should have tried to increase American economic and technical aid according to the Point Four Agreement and to confront Communism by raising

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36 *Al-Hayat*, April 6, 1957.

37 "Lebanon: Comment and Chronology, April 1 - June 30, 1957", *op. cit.*, 299.

38 Members of the Opposition National Front were: Ahmad Assad, Kamel Assad, Fouad Ammoun, Ali Bazzi, Hamid Frangis, Sabri Hamade, Abdallah Haj, Elias Khoury, Fouad Khoury, Nassim Majdalany, Husein Cueni, Saeb Salam, and Abdallah Yafi.
the living standards of ordinary people and workers. In conclusion, the statement declared, a new policy, such as the Lebanese Government's adoption of the Eisenhower Doctrine, should have been discussed by a newly elected Parliament whose deputies would have discussed it thoroughly and not by a parliament whose mandate was about to expire. 39

Throughout the struggle between the Government and the Opposition, there had been efforts at mediating between the two groups. Such an effort was that of Mr. Henry Pharaon. In a statement issued on May 10, 1957, he declared that he was convinced of the possibility of uniting all the Lebanese groups on the following principles: (1) the safeguarding of Lebanese independence and sovereignty, (2) cooperation with sister Arab countries according to the Pact of the Arab League, (3) cooperation with foreign countries within the United Nations organization, (4) recognition of the fact that Communism was against Lebanese political, religious and social principles. Finally, the acceptance of American aid if not tied by political or military strings.

On May 12, 1957, the national elections campaign began. Opposition leaders: Hamid Frangieh (Maronite from Northern Lebanon), Ahmad Assad (Shi'a Moslem from Southern Lebanon), Saeb Salam and Abdallah Yafi (ex-Premier and Sunna Moslem leaders

39 Al-Hayat, April 11, 1957.

40 Ibid., May 10, 1957.
from Beirut) and Philippe Takla (Roman Catholic from Beirut) addressed a National Union Front (or Opposition National Front) rally. The Opposition platform presented by Yafi and Salam contained the following points: (1) no amendment of the Constitution to allow President Chamoun to be re-elected, (2) the neutrality of Lebanon, (3) the rejection of any aid which seemed to infringe upon Lebanese sovereignty, (4) "close, impartial and effective cooperation" with other Arab States, (5) replacement of the Solh Government by a "caretaker Government to supervise national elections."

A new electoral law, "providing for 66 members instead of 44 and a 4 year term for members" was approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies on April 16, 1957. According to this law, the Maronites were given 20 seats, the Sunna Moslems 14, the Shi'a Moslems 12, the Orthodox 7, the Catholics 4, the Druzes 4, the Armenian Catholics 1 and the Minorities 1. That was a triumph for the Government deputies and their supporters who wanted 66 deputies, while the Opposition demanded 88, in order to provide a wider choice for the Lebanese electorate and a stronger Opposition bloc in Parliament.

On May 7, 1957, the Government announced the end of martial law as well as press censorship.44

41 The Arab World, May 13, 1957.

42 "Lebanon: Comment and Chronology, April 1 - June 30, 1957," op.cit., 299


44 "Lebanon: Comment and Chronology, April 1 - June 30, 1957," op.cit., 299
The general parliamentary elections of 1957 marked another turning point in the course of the events leading to the Lebanese Crisis of 1958.

Prior to the elections campaign, Opposition candidates repeatedly accused the Government of planning to pervert the elections. For example, Mr. Kamal Jumblat, in a statement issued on May 16, 1957, specifically referred to the reduction of the number of deputies to "less than what was necessary for the true representation of different views of the Lebanese population," and expressed his disapproval of the secret booth system. 45

Similar views to those of Mr. Jumblat were expressed by Mr. Ahmad Assad, another prominent Opposition member, who declared in a statement issued on May 19, 1957, that certain names known as "the Government candidates" had appeared. Those candidates, added Assad, were dependent on the support of the authorities to reach parliamentary seats. He also accused the authorities of exploiting Government officials and security forces for electoral purposes in Southern Lebanon giving specific instances. He particularly referred to a visit by President Chamoun, on a hunting trip, to the constituency of a Government supporter, Mr. Kazem Khalil. 46

A summary of the Opposition charges against the intervention of the Lebanese Government in the elections could be found in a cable sent by the Opposition National Front to President Chamoun. In this cable, the National Front criticized


46 Ibid., May 19, 1957.
the haphazard distribution of constituencies; the use of obligatory lists and electoral bribery; and the use of the Gendarmerie, the internal security forces and the Government officials. The cable demanded the dismissal of the Solh Government during the next 48 hours or else "demonstrations and general strikes would be staged" if the people's demands were not fulfilled. 47

In reply to the Opposition demands, the Lebanese authorities agreed to the addition of two Lebanese personalities, whose neutrality was accepted by both sides, as Ministers of State, to supervise the elections. On this basis the United National Front agreed to participate in the elections. The Front's attitude was also affected by the Government's decision that General Fouad Chehab (the Commander in Chief of the Lebanese Army) would supervise the elections and would take under his command all the matters connected with the internal security forces. 48

In the results of the first phase of the elections, made known on June 9, the vote favored the "Government candidates." All the candidates supported by the Government won except Ghassan Tweini who was defeated by Socialist Majdalany (Opposition Member), Opposition leaders Assad, Machnoun, Salam and Yafi lost in the elections. 49 According to the official results of the first

47 The signatories of the cable were: Ahmad Assad, Fouad Ammoun, Hratchia Chamlian, Hamid Frangiéh, Adnan Hakim, Sabri Hamadé, Fouad Khoury, Nassim Majdalany, Abdallah Machnoun, Rafik Naja, Naaruf Saad, Saeb Salam, Philippe Takla, Abdallah Yafi, and Louis Ziadé. Ibid., May 28, 1957.

48 Ibid., June 4, 1957.

49 The Arab World, June 10, 1957.
stage of the elections made known on June 10, 1957, Government candidates won 15 out of 22 seats in Parliament.

The second phase of the elections ended on June 16, 1957, with the Government represented by 38 deputies and the Opposition National Front by 4. Socialist leader Kamal Jumblat lost. In a press conference held on June 18, he recalled the charges against the Government which he had made before the elections. He claimed that the security forces "had created an atmosphere of terror and pressure which the Chouf area [his constituency] had never witnessed before."\(^{51}\)

The two neutral Ministers of State, Dr. Yousef Hitti and Mr. Amin Beyhum, who were appointed to the Cabinet in order to supervise the elections submitted their resignation on June 17, 1957, in protest against the "general atmosphere" of the elections.\(^{52}\)

In reply to some questions by the pro-Opposition Al-Dyar, Dr. Hitti said that many complaints were received on election-day and were investigated. He allegedly added that the atmosphere of the elections in Mount Lebanon was not what they (he and Mr. Beyhum) had promised to create and what they had wanted to guarantee when they assumed their positions as Ministers of State. Then the news about the Massacre of Miziara

\(^{50}\) "Lebanon: Comment and Chronology, April 1 - June 30, 1957," op. cit., 300.

\(^{51}\) Al-Hayat, June 19, 1957.

\(^{52}\) Ibid., June 18, 1957.

\(^{53}\) This incident will be discussed later in this chapter.
and the incident of Aley made him and his colleague, Mr. Beyhum, convinced that such incidents had turned the election campaign from the course followed by general elections in the world.\footnote{54} The third phase of the elections ended on June 24, 1957, with the Government candidates winning 42 out of the 66 seats in Parliament.\footnote{55} In Baalbek, the Opposition-Constitutional Bloc won against the Government's list. That was the only district in which the candidates of the Beirut Opposition National Front won in the elections.\footnote{56}

According to the incomplete election results of July 1, 1957, the Government candidates won 46 out of the total of 66 seats. Dr. Charles Malik, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, won by a wide margin although he was running for election for the first time.\footnote{57} Among the 14 points of Dr. Malik's election programme, explaining his Lebanese policy, the fifth point reads: "Lebanon's past and the Lebanon's half which lives abroad imposes upon Lebanon the necessity of going with the West."\footnote{58}

Following the issue of statements by some Opposition candidates (whether they succeeded or failed) accusing the Government of perverting the general elections, the Opposition National Front issued a statement on July 4, criticizing the

\footnote{54} \textit{Al-Dyar}, June 18, 1957.

\footnote{55} "Lebanon: Comment and Chronology, April 1 - June 30, 1957," \textit{op.cit.}, 300.

\footnote{56} \textit{The Arab World}, June 24, 1957.

\footnote{57} "Lebanon: Comment and Chronology, July 1 - September 30, 1957," \textit{op.cit.}

\footnote{58} \textit{The Arab World}, June 18, 1957.
methods allegedly used by the Government during the elections. This was largely a recapitulation of charges already mentioned. The statement accused the Government of causing bloodshed during the May 30 demonstrations, which preceded the elections, and concluded with an open invitation for rebellion.59

The Issue of the Renewal of the President's Mandate

The question of the amendment of the Lebanese Constitution to allow the President of the Republic to renew his term of office, was claimed by the Opposition to be one of the basic issues of the Lebanese Crisis of 1958.

The Opposition Rally held on May 14, 1957, had decided "to resist any attempt aiming at electing a parliamentary majority receiving orders from the Government and wanting to amend the Constitution in order to renew the mandate of the President."60

On July 16, 1957, Mr. Pharaon (who assumed a neutral position between the Government and the Opposition) stated that the tension generated by the elections was caused by the fact that the new Chamber of Deputies was going to elect the new President of the Republic 13 months later. The President, added Mr. Pharaon, should refuse to renew his term of office because the Lebanese Constitution stipulated that the President's term

59 The details of the May 30, 1957, demonstrations will be mentioned while discussing the deterioration of internal security in Lebanon. Al-Hayat, July 4, 1957.

60 Ibid., May 14, 1957.
could not be renewed until six years following the expiration of the first term of office. 61

Opposition leader Mr. Kamal Jumblat stated, on December 18, 1957, that the renewal of the President’s mandate "will not take place except on the ruins of this country." He added that Lebanon was determined to resist the renewal of the President's term of office by force. 62

Denouncing the alleged intention of the President to renew his mandate, three hundred important Islamic personalities declared in a statement issued on April 11, 1957, that they held the Lebanese Government responsible for all the incidents and clashes which happened during the previous year. The statement accused the Government of encouraging communal differences between the Lebanese people in order to amend the Constitution and renew the President's term of office. It declared the determination of the signatories to resist, by all means, any attempt to amend the Constitution in order to renew the President's mandate. 63

In an interview given by the Maronite Patriarch Paul Meouchi on April 30, 1958, to Al-Jaryda (a neutral newspaper), the Patriarch stated that the best remedy to the situation would be the change of the causes and the persons "who discriminated between the Lebanese people." When asked about

61 Ibid., July 16, 1957.
62 Ibid., December 18, 1957.
63 Al-Jaryda, April 11, 1958.
the means that should be followed in order to stop such
differentiation, Patriarch Meouchi said that he would not
accept the amendment of the Constitution towards which a certain
group aimed, in order to achieve personal gain. The Maronite
Patriarch also declared that "the rulers" should be changed
because of the failure of their internal and foreign policies. 64

In a statement published by Al-Telegraph (Opposition
newspaper) the text of which was copied by Al-Jaryda (a neutral
newspaper) on May 20, 1958, former President Bishara Khoury
declared that "one word" uttered by the President of the
Republic a month ago would have put an end to the "tragic
situation" in which Lebanon was living. He added that the only
remedy would be the resignation of the President, a solution
which he himself had followed in 1952. 65

What was the attitude of President Chamoun towards
the idea of the renewal of his mandate?

In a press conference held by President Chamoun on
May 21, 1958, he replied to a question about whether he was
thinking of the renewal of his mandate by saying that he did
not encourage nor demand renewal. He added that he had never
said that he was going to renew his term of office nor had he
denied it. He went on to say that he did not encourage some
of his friends when they suggested this idea. He also said
that incidents happening in Lebanon were a continuation of a

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64  Ibid., April 20, 1958.

65  Ibid., May 20, 1958.
series of incidents which occurred in other Arab countries. Similar incidents were happening in Jordan where there was no question of the amendment of the Constitution. Furthermore, said President Chamoun, there was an attempt to assassinate President Bourguiba of Tunisia and there was no question of the amendment of the Constitution there.

He concluded his press conference by saying that the issue of the amendment of the Constitution was a weak excuse for incidents happening in Lebanon. Even if that issue was the reason for the incidents, yet there were other lawful and constitutional methods to resist it. 66

The Prevention of the Syrian Deputies from Entering Lebanon

Another important incident which widened the gap between the Lebanese Government and the Opposition was the incident of the prevention of seventeen Syrian deputies from entering Lebanon to congratulate Patriarch Paul Meouchi on Lebanon's Independence Day.

Mr. Ali Bazzi, the Secretary of the Opposition National Front, attacked in a statement issued on November 24, 1957, the Lebanese Government's action. The Opposition leader, Mr. Saeb Salam, also attacked the Government's measure as a high-handed police action while Mr. Nassim Majdalany, an Opposition member,

66 Text of the Statement by President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon, May 21, 1958.
charged that it disturbed Lebanese-Syrian relations.

Premier Solh denied in a press conference that his Government had prevented the seventeen Syrian deputies from entering Lebanon. He added that they were requested to present their identity cards in accordance with the new security measures, but they had interpreted that as an attempt by the Lebanese authorities to prevent them from visiting Lebanon. He asked what would have been the feeling of the Syrians if a Lebanese delegation went to Damascus to felicitate opponents of their Government on Independence Day. That incident, it may be noted, marked the first direct clash between the Lebanese and Syrian authorities. It also indicated clearly that the Syrian Government favored the Opposition because the seventeen Syrian deputies were coming to Lebanon to congratulate Patriarch Meouchi, who was attacking Chamoun's regime, on Lebanon's Independence Day.

On November 27, 1957, and following a long debate on the basis of the internal and the foreign policies, defended by Premier Solh and Minister Malik representing the Government, the Lebanese Cabinet won a vote of confidence by 34 votes, while 13 deputies opposed, 3 abstained and 13 were absent. Out of the 13 deputies who voted against the Government, 5 deputies were anti-domestic but pro-foreign policy of the Government;

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67 Al-Hayat, November 24, 1957.

68 The Arab World, November 25, 1957.

69 Ibid., November 28, 1957.
three adopted a moderate opposition attitude to both; another three were moderately opposed to certain aspects of Lebanon's foreign as well as domestic policies. Those results showed that opposition to the Government's internal policy had increased but that the Government had the confidence of the majority of the Parliament on issues of foreign policy.

The United Arab Republic

A new development which had the deepest impact on the development of the Lebanese Crisis, occurred on February 2, 1958, when the Syrian-Egyptian Union was declared, that is, the United Arab Republic.

It was reported in the middle of January 1958, that there was a Socialist-Communist struggle in Syria over the question of unity with Egypt. The fear of Communism drove some leading non-Communist Syrians such as President Kuwatly, Premier Sabri Assali, Foreign Minister Salah Bitar, and Akram Hourani (the last two were leaders of Baath Arab Socialist Party at the time) who felt too weak to assume the responsibility of facing the Syrian Communists alone, to the idea of a merger with Egypt.

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70 Al-Nahar, November 28, 1957.

71 The term "the United Arab Republic" refers now to a federal union between the United Arab Republic (Egypt), Syria and Iraq which is still in the transitional period. It should be mentioned that Syria had seceded from the United Arab Republic on October 29, 1961. However, following a coup d'état which occurred on March 8, 1963, in Syria and which was preceded a month earlier by a coup d'état in Iraq both countries demanded the establishment of a federal union between them and the United Arab Republic (Egypt).
President Nasser had been allegedly cool to the idea and stressed the differences between the two countries but "despite his misgivings, President Nasser agreed to the merger." Washington welcomed the declaration of the United Arab Republic on February 2 "as a move to frustrate a Communist Coup in Syria." On February 25, 1958, the United States' Government formally recognized the United Arab Republic. In February 26, 1958, Mr. Dulles said that the Syrian-Egyptian Union "gave reason to hope the two countries were determined to avoid falling under the control of international communism." 72

Meanwhile, Iraq and Jordan were carrying on talks for the declaration of a federal union between the two countries. Thus, the Arab Federation or the Hashemite Union, was declared on February 14, 1958. 73

It is desirable to discuss now, in brief, the attitudes of the Lebanese Government and the Opposition towards those two Unions.

In a speech given at the Anniversary of St. Maron on February 10, 1958, President Chamoun stressed the determination of Lebanon to preserve its independence. He declared that the Lebanese would not interfere in the internal affairs of other Arab States, and would like to be treated likewise. 74 Thus, the


74 Ibid., February 11, 1958.
Lebanese President clarified indirectly the determination of his Government to keep aloof from the newly declared United Arab Republic.

Dr. Charles Malik expressed, in a statement issued on February 11, 1958, his hope that the new union between Syria and Egypt would "result in an increase in the standards of living of the people of the two countries involved."\(^{75}\) Lebanon, he said, was tied by "a covenant of life and death" with all the Arab States without exception. He concluded his statement, however, by stressing the determination of Lebanon to preserve its independence.\(^{76}\) Thus, the attitude of the Lebanese Foreign Minister was an elaboration of that of the President and was tantamount to a statement of neutrality between the United Arab Republic and the Hashemite Union.

However, the *Partie Populaire Sociale* (pro-Government) issued a statement in which it expressed its support of the Iraqi-Jordanian Union because it was a first step towards the unity of the "Syrian Nation."\(^{77}\) The statement added that the Syrian-Egyptian Union was an "artificial" one because it was based on "similar political attitudes" rather than on geographical, social, economic and strategic bases.\(^{78}\)

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75 *The Arab World*, February 12, 1958.


77 "The Syrian Nation" according to the P.F.S. includes: Natural Syria (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine and Syria) and Cyprus.

What was the attitude of the Opposition towards the declaration of the United Arab Republic?

Mr. Salam, an Opposition National Front leader, attacked President Chamoun’s statement at the Anniversary of St. Maron. He said that the Lebanese people were expecting him to welcome the declaration of the Syrian-Egyptian Union, but instead he had aroused the feelings of others which caused dismay particularly as Presidents Kuwatly and Nasser had already declared their respect for Lebanon’s independence.  

Patriarch Paul Meouchi’s point of view was summed up in his statement apropos the United Arab Republic that, although Maronites were a minority in the East, yet they lived peacefully with the overwhelming majority and there was "no alternative to this peaceful co-existence." The Patriarch advised the Lebanese to "rise above all rumours and intrigues."  

In a manifesto issued on February 17, 1958, the Opposition National Front accused the Lebanese Government of postponing its recognition of the United Arab Republic and of encouraging sectarian differences for personal ends. The Front attacked President Chamoun’s speech at the feast of St. Maron.  

The fact that the Hashemite Union was recognized by the Lebanese Government before its ratification while the United Arab Republic was not recognized before the referendum was

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79  
Al-Nahar, February 11, 1958.

80  
The Arab World, February 17, 1958.

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considered, by the Opposition, a sign of official lukewarmness towards the United Arab Republic.

Thus, the Opposition favored the United Arab Republic as a center of Arab Nationalism and wanted the Lebanese Government to establish friendly relations with the newly declared Republic. But the Opposition did not declare that they would like Lebanon to join the United Arab Republic.

The Deterioration of Internal Security in Lebanon

We shall attempt to discuss briefly the subject of the deterioration of internal security in Lebanon.

The disturbances which occurred on May 30, 1957, that is on the eve of the elections, marked the starting point of large-scale violence in Lebanon which led to the deterioration of internal security in the country and culminated in an armed revolt. On that day the Government Gendarmerie forces killed five persons and wounded many in elections' clashes. That happened when the police forces tried to break up meetings of the Opposition. Former Premier and Opposition leader Saeb Salam was beaten by the Gendarmerie and arrested.

Following the May 30 disturbances, the Lebanese Government took strict precautions against further rioting. Thus, all arms' permits were suspended and political meetings were banned for 48 hours.

The Government had issued a communiqué on May 29,

82 "Lebanon: Comment and Chronology, April 1 - June 30, 1957," op. cit., 300.
namely, the day before the demonstrations mentioned above, warning the people against demonstrating and forbidding shooting in celebrations conducted for electoral propaganda. Twenty four hours later, the Government issued a communiqué accusing the Opposition of instigating the disturbances and planning a coup d'etat to overthrow the President of the Republic and the Government. The authorities had learned about a "criminal demagogic plot" the day before and had decided to ban the demonstrations.

In an attempt to defend the measures taken by his Government during the May 30 disturbances; Premier Solh, accused the Opposition of gathering Palestinian Refugees and Syrian residents in Lebanon and other "foreign" elements to demonstrate and demand the resignation of his Government. He stressed his Government's determination to stay in power because it was ruling according to the will of the majority.

In a statement issued by the Opposition National Front on June 4, 1957, regarding the May 30 disturbances, the Front demanded, among other things, to stop prosecution which occurred as a result of the May 30 demonstrations and the rapid release of all those who were arrested. Secondly, the Front demanded the establishment of a committee to investigate the bloody incidents and the punishment of all those responsible for them


84 Ibid., May 31, 1957.

85 Ibid., June 2, 1957.
whether Government employees or not. 86

An important Opposition leader, ex-President Bishara Khoury issued a statement on May 31, 1957, in which he said that bloody incidents should not have occurred. He added that Lebanon should not side with either of the two world blocs. Negotiations should have been carried out between the Government and the Opposition in relation to foreign policy. Ex-President Khoury criticized the Government's internal policy. The ruler, (President Chamoun) added President Khoury should have listened to those who advised him, and enlarged parliamentary representation to the utmost. Constituencies should have been left in their former geographic and administrative form. Besides, the Government should not have interfered with the electoral campaign. He concluded his statement by warning the Government of bloodshed. 87

On June 16, 1957, the worst electoral clashes in the history of Lebanon occurred in the village of Miziara near Zgharta. 88

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86 Ibid., June 4, 1957.

87 Ibid., June 1, 1957.

88 In Zgharta, the Solh Government tried to support the anti-Frangieh faction of Zgharta, the Duweibi family, one of whom, Father Samaan Duweibi attempted to run for a parliamentary seat in the 1957 elections. The feud between the two clans caused "La Tuerie de Miziara" - or the Massacre of Miziara on June 16, 1957. Shooting was exchanged at a marriage ceremony in the village church in which 38 victims were said to have been injured. Arnold Hottinger, "Zuama and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958," The Middle East Journal, XV (Spring 1961), 133.
between the two leading families, the Frangiehs (Opposition) and the Duweihis (pro-Government) 18 were killed and 50 were wounded. 89

On June 26, 1957, the Lebanese Cabinet approved a bill authorizing the arrest before judicial inquiry of any journalist whose writing was considered abnoxious to the Government. 90

A three-day strike was started by Lebanese newspapers on July 12, 1957, in protest against this bill. On July 15, they called off their strike following the Government's approval of a substitute bill presented by their syndicate.

On July 22, 1957, the owners of two Opposition newspapers were arrested and accused of having published attacks on President Chamoun. On August 1, they were sentenced to 50 days of imprisonment.

Premier Solh formed a new Cabinet on August 18, 1957. Three days later, the new Government requested the Parliament to give it "emergency powers to arrest anyone considered a threat to the country's security."

As a result of the disturbances of May 30, 1957, the Lebanese Government drafted on September 25, 1957, an indictment of 400 persons including three former Premiers; Yafi, Salam and Queni. They were accused of stirring up the Lebanese people against one another on sectarian basis and of attempting to

89 The Arab World, June 17, 1957.

90 "Lebanon: Comment and Chronology, April 1 - June 30, 1957," op. cit., 300.
murder members of the national security forces. 91

The causes of the first incident of Deir El Achair, which occurred on September 13, 1957, according to an Opposition leader, Mr. Kamal Jumblat, were the following. Some Government forces were sent to that town in order to arrest Mr. Chebli Aryan although the authorities had already promised not to pursue him and his men. Thus, a battle started between the Government forces, whose commander was a Syrian Nationalist, named Ayash, and the followers of Chebli Aryan. He concluded that the incident of Deir El Achair was an internal party feud and that Syria did not interfere in the battle that was fought there. 92

Mr. Joseph Salem issued a statement in the name of the "Third Force" 93 on September 26, 1957, in which he criticized the deterioration of security in Lebanon. He described the country as an arena of strife. The authorities and their "agents"

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92 League of Arab States, Secretariat, The Political Department, The Council of the Arab League, Extraordinary Session in Benghazi (Minutes of the Third Meeting, June 3, 1958), pp. 32-34.
93 The third Force or "La Troisieme Force" was an association of notable politicians and civic leaders (mostly businessmen) such as Henry Phareon, Emile Bustani, George Naccache and Ghassan Tweini; on the Opposition side Takfiddin Solh and Philippe Takla. They assumed a mediatory position between the two disputing camps, the Government and the Opposition, "desiring the election of a new President at the end of Chamoun's mandate but disapproving of open violence and dynamiting..." They acted as intermediaries and peacemakers. Arnold Hottinger, "Zuama and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958," The Middle East Journal, XV (Spring 1961), 139-140.
had refused any criticism. He concluded by saying that there was "no democracy, freedom, civilization or respect for the law," he then warned the Government of the bad results of such a policy.

In a statement of policy issued by the Lebanese Government on November 27, 1957, Premier Solh commented on the internal situation in Lebanon by saying that there were three kinds of acts of lawlessness in Lebanon. First, the ordinary offences that happen everywhere. Secondly, the feuds between clans which were typical of Lebanon; and thirdly, certain "subversive activities of foreign inspiration" which included the throwing of bombs and the staging of certain strikes and demonstrations. Those acts were generally carried out by non-Lebanese elements and by refugees. He added that the wave of sabotage had begun in the fall of 1956, following the Tripartite Attack on Egypt, when the Yafi Government declared a state of emergency and press censorship. Many acts of lawlessness occurred then, such as the throwing of bombs on banks, foreign embassies and other public places. Premier Solh concluded that his Government had, however, abolished the state of emergency as well as press censorship instituted by Yafi's Government.

On March 3, 1958, the Government decided to implement

94 Al-Hayat, October 27, 1957.

95 The Arab World, November 27, 1957.

96 Al-Hayat, November 27, 1957.
the draft law prepared by the Government and the Press Syndicate in September 1957. The law provided that newsmen charged with press offences should not be arrested except if they publish something disparaging about the head of state or "affecting the security, integrity, sovereignty or frontiers of the state." 97 That law amended the earlier press law passed on February 24, which allowed provisional arrest.

On April 2, 1958, Army units were sent to Tyre to control the rioting there. Sidon went on strike in sympathy with Tyre.

The Committee which was sent to Tyre to investigate the cause of the disturbances told Premier Solh, "the rioting was instigated by agitators placed among the local population."

It was on May 8 that Nassib Matni, editor of Al-Telegraph (an Opposition newspaper) was shot. 98 This was the climax of the first phase of intermittent violence since the clashes of May 30, 1957, and the starting point of a new and a more serious phase of the Crisis.

The Congress of National Parties and Personalities 99


98 "Lebanon: Comment and Chronology, April 1 - June 30, 1958," The Middle East Journal, XII (Summer 1958), 306.

99 The Congress of National Parties and Personalities consisted of the following: the National Organization, the Progressive Socialist Party, the Constitutional Bloc, the Najada Party, the National Bloc, the National Congress and the Free Press.
denounced that crime in a statement issued on the same day. They held the Government responsible for it. The Congress concluded its statement by calling for a general strike in protest against the assassination of Matni.

Former Premier Saeb Salam (an Opposition leader) explained, in an interview with Al-Hayat newspaper on May 19, 1958, the general policy of the Opposition at that time.

When asked about the aim of the Opposition in declaring the strike, Mr. Salam answered that it was to protest against President Chamoun's policy and to make him resign. Mr. Salam replied to another question by saying that the strike would continue as long as the President of the Republic stayed in office. He added that the Opposition would not accept any other solution.

When asked if the members of the Opposition were buying arms from the United Arab Republic, Mr. Salam answered in the negative but added that some individuals, not parties nor the Opposition as a whole, might have bought weapons from the United Arab Republic. He also said that the Opposition had bought a large quantity of weapons from the Lebanese security forces. When asked if the Opposition was in contact with the United Arab Republic, Mr. Salam answered that they kept in contact with all neighboring Arab countries. When asked if Egypt supported the Opposition morally, he answered, yes. He added that the Opposition members expected all peace-loving states especially the United States to support them but the latter

As-Siassa, May 9, 1958.
preferred to cooperate with Charles Malik. When asked, until when "would resistance activities continue," Mr. Salam answered "until the end of that [Chamoun's] regime." 101

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*Al-Hayat*, May 19, 1957.
CHAPTER III

THE ROLE OF THE ARAB LEAGUE DURING

THE LEBANESE CRISIS OF 1958

We shall attempt in the next few pages to give a short review of the events which preceded the reference of the Lebanese complaint against the United Arab Republic to the Arab League and the United Nations Security Council.

In a press conference held on May 13, 1958, Foreign Minister Charles Malik accused the United Arab Republic of interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon. He said that events occurring in Lebanon could not be understood except "in the light of the wide scale foreign interference" in the internal affairs of Lebanon which had been taking place for a long time. He added that three incidents had taken place on the previous day. The first incident was that of the Belgian Consul Monsieur Louis de San. On the night of May 12, continued Dr. Malik, the Belgian Consul was driving his car across the Syrian - Lebanese border. Lebanese Customs Officers were suspicious and when they searched the car they found weapons and ammunition as well as instructions to unknown persons in Lebanon to carry out sabotage activities. The second incident, was that armed men, estimated at five hundred, raided the Customs Post of Masnaya on the Beirut - Damascus road. He claimed that that action was "a reprisal" against that Post because its officers had arrested the Belgian Consul. Those
armed men, added Malik, killed six officials in that Post and retreated into Syria when the Lebanese armed forces reached the spot.

The third incident was that of a boat which was seized near Damour, a few miles south of Beirut allegedly carrying armed Palestinians from Gaza. These Palestinians had thousands of Egyption Pounds with them. Another boat added Malik, carrying eleven Palestinian from Gaza was captured near Barja, a few miles south of Beirut, near President Chamoun's house in Saadiyat. Dr. Malik also said that twenty four persons had been arrested in Beirut allegedly carrying identity cards indicating that they were in the service of, or had served in, the Syrian Army. The Foreign Minister also stated that the United Arab Republic's newspapers and radio broadcasts were unfriendly to the Lebanese Government and concluded that there was massive interference from abroad in the internal affairs of Lebanon.¹

President Chamoun declared in a statement issued on May 21, 1958, "the issue at stake was not the Government..." but "the existance of Lebanon as a free country" in the Middle East in which Moslems and Christians could live peacefully together. The United Arab Republic, added the President, was "massively interfering" in the internal affairs of Lebanon" with a view to causing radical alterations " in the basic national policy of this country and wanted Lebanon's policy" to coincide

¹ The Arab World, May 14, 1958.
with its policy." He added that Lebanon's "fundamental orientation and friendships" were deep and could not be changed easily. Lebanon was determined, added the President, "never to be subservient" to the United Arab Republic's policy or to its orientation. Lebanon was determined "to remain independent." "The facts of that massive interference", said President Chamoun, were "being placed before the judgement of world public opinion."

After this statement President Chamoun answered some questions. He said that he thought the Lebanese complaint against the United Arab Republic would probably be presented to the Security Council. Then President Chamoun added that the Lebanon authorities had arrested, since 1956, "Syrian and Egyption agents" who were allegedly convicted by the Lebanese Courts of carrying on sabotage activities. He accused the United Arab Republic of being, to a large extent, responsible for those activities. He added that the number of those arrested exceeded one hundred and that they were in the service of the Syrian Army. The President declared that many Syrian nationals who had no business in Lebanon and who carried no permits to enter the country were deported. He denied strongly that the Lebanese Government had given weapons to the Syrian Nationalists and the Phalanges Libanaises Party. He also reaffirmed his belief in "the assistance of the free world" and expressed his determination to remain in office in spite of the Opposition's demand for his resignation.² This was the

² Text of statement by President Camille Chamoun, May 21, 1958.
nearest that Chamoun came to clarifying his position on this point.

In a general statement on May 28, 1958, Premier Solh reviewed developments since the Tripartite Attack on Egypt. The most important part of Solh's statement was his reference to the question of the renewal of President Chamoun's term of office. He stated that President Chamoun had never brought up the question of the renewal of his term of office nor was he desirous of renewing it. He added that the Opposition had taken the idea that the President was going to renew his mandate in an attempt "to satisfy the means which it used in order to achieve its ends." ³

On behalf of the Opposition, Mr. Saeb Salam denied President Chamoun's charges and asserted that the President was the only cause of the Lebanese Crisis. Mr. Salam emphasized that the Crisis was an internal one. He accused President Chamoun of distributing arms among bands and para-military organizations and gave specific examples such as the case of the transfer of weapons from the Gendarmerie Headquarters in the official car of Minister Clovis Khazen. Mr. Salam commented on the incident of the boat near Saadiyat, mentioned in Malik's statements, by saying that the owner of that boat was a notorious smuggler in narcotics, Abdallah Ghafari, who carried on his trade with the connivance of the authorities. ⁴

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Furthermore, the Congress of Lebanese Parties and Personalities attacked, in a statement issued on May 23, 1958, the reference of the Lebanese complaint to the Arab League. The statement declared: (1) foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon would destroy its integrity and independence and (2) the reference of the Lebanese complaint to the Arab League, which was "paralyzed by the Baghdad Pact" would increase internal tension.

The Opposition National Front sent a cable to the Secretary-General of the Arab League denouncing the Lebanese complaint against the United Arab Republic. The Front said that the real difference was between the Lebanese Government and the people who were defending their freedom and integrity. The real cause of the difference was the corruption of the rulers and their cooperation with the "Western imperialists" and the latter's supporters in the Middle East. The Opposition Front requested the Secretary-General to refuse the Lebanese complaint and if that were not possible, to allow the Opposition to explain its point of view.

The Opposition National Front also denounced in a memorandum, addressed to the Ambassadors of Britain, France and

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5 It should be noted here that on May 21 and 22, 1958, the Lebanese Government had lodged two complaints, against the alleged intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, one with the Arab League and the other with the United Nations Security Council.


7 As-Siassa, May 27, 1958.
the United States, the assistance granted by those Governments to the Lebanese Government. The memorandum accused those States of supplying the supporters of the Lebanese Government as well as some unlawful groups with arms, and declared that such an intervention could not be tolerated and would lead to the intervention of other foreign countries. 8

The Government's charges against the United Arab Republic drew a reaction from President Nasser, who, in a speech on May 16, 1958, stated that the Lebanese Government was trying to change an internal feud, between itself and the Opposition, into an international problem by accusing the United Arab Republic of being the cause of that feud, in order to receive the assistance of foreign countries. He added that the charges of the Lebanese Government were series of allegations. President Nasser concluded by saying that the United Arab Republic respected Lebanese independence. 9

We shall now review, in brief, the minutes of the extraordinary session of the Arab League held in the city of Benghazi, Libya, between May 31 and June 6, 1958, to discuss the Lebanese complaint against the United Arab Republic.

On May 31, 1958, the Council of the Arab League held the first meeting of its extraordinary session in Benghazi. 10

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At the outset of the meeting, President Kaabar of Libya expressed his Government's hope that the Council of the Arab League would use its "good offices" to solve the misunderstanding that had occurred between the two disputing parties. Mr. Muhammad Ahmad Mahjoub, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Sudan and the head of its delegation, expressed the same hopes whereupon the meeting was adjourned until the next day, that is June 1, 1958.10

During the second meeting of the Arab League held on June 1, 195811 Dr. Sayed Nofal, the Secretary of the extraordinary session and the head of the Political Department and the Secretariat affairs of the Arab League, said that the Secretariat of the Arab League had received a memorandum from the Lebanese Embassy in Cairo on its decision to lodge a complaint against the United Arab Republic with the Council of the Arab League according to Article VI12 of the Covenant of the Arab League of Arab States, Secretariat, the Political Department, the Council of the Arab League, Extraordinary Session in Benghazi (Minutes of the First Meeting, May 31, 1958).

11 Ibid., (Minutes of the Second Meeting, June 1, 1958).

12 Art. VI of the Covenant of the Arab League stipulates: "should aggression by a State against a member State of the League take place or be apprehended, it is for the State which has suffered, or is threatened with aggression, to demand that the Council be summoned to meet immediately..." Gerard J. Mangone, A Short History of International Organization (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), p.285.
League. That complaint was based on the ground of "the unfriendly actions and interferences of responsible and military men of the Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon which caused a threat to Lebanon's independence and integrity, and to its legitimate Government." The memorandum added that since the Lebanese Government wished to settle the disputes between Lebanon and its sister Arab States, peacefully, therefore, its decision coincided with Article V, paragraph 13 of the Covenant of the Arab League. The memorandum concluded by requesting the Secretariat of the Arab League to invite the Council of the Arab League to an extraordinary session to be held on a high level, in either Sudan or Libya as soon as possible.

Dr. Nofal continued by reading a memorandum dated May 26, 1958, issued by the Foreign Ministry of the United Arab Republic to all ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions explaining the United Arab Republic's point of view regarding the Lebanese complaint to the Arab League. The main points were the following: (I) that the Lebanese revolt was an internal one conducted by the Lebanese people against the Lebanese President who was trying to renew his term of office and to amend the constitution, and who also tried to deceive the Lebanese people by saying that a communal danger was threatening Lebanon, an accusation which was

13 Art. V, para. I, of the Covenant of the Arab League stipulates: "Recourse to force to resolve disputes between two or more League States is inadmissible. If a difference should arise between them, not pertaining to the independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of any of the States concerned, and the contending parties have recourse to the Council to settle it, then its decision is executory and obligatory." Ibid., p. 284.
refuted by statements made by Patriarch Moeuchi and other Christian Opposition leaders; (2) that the leaders who were opposing the President of the Republic were distinguished personalities such as former President Bishara Khoury and former Premiers, Salam, Yafi, Karami and Ouei(3) there were imperialistic forces supplying the Lebanese Government with arms and equipment; (4) it refuted the Lebanese accusation that the United Arab Republic was interfering in the affairs of Lebanon and that the Lebanese Government with the help of imperialistic forces "wanted to transform an internal problem into an international problem;" (5) the United Arab Republic accused the Lebanese Government of permitting Lebanon to become the center of conspiracies against the United Arab Republic, and of deporting nearly nine thousand United Arab Republic nationals from Lebanon without any reason.14

During the same meeting of the Arab League, Mr. Bashir Awar, speaking for Lebanon, brought up the following charges against the United Arab Republic: (1) "instigation" through newspapers, pamphlets and radio broadcasts (2) "constant activity by the agents" of the United Arab Republic which led to the bloody events in Lebanon. Regarding the first charge, Mr. Awar said that, for two years, a strong propaganda campaign had been launched against the Lebanese Government by" the official radio broadcasts and the guided Syrian and Egyptian newspapers." Instigation included the following types. First, instigating the Lebanese Army against the Syrian authorities. Secondly, provoking other Arab

14 League of Arab States, op. cit., (Minutes of the Second Meeting, June 1, 1958), pp.3-8.
countries against Lebanon and thirdly, provoking the Lebanese people against their Government. Mr. Awar added that the official broadcasts of Cairo, the Voice of the Arabs and Damascus radios, commented on articles and news written in Syrian and Egyptian newspapers.

Regarding the Lebanese Government's charges of "actual interferences" by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, Mr. Awar said that sabotage activities had begun two years earlier by throwing bombs and explosives on many public and private places in Lebanon such as the throwing of a bomb on the Bank of Syria and Lebanon. When arrested, the doers, admitted that the Military Attaché of the Egyptian Embassy in Beirut had given them the bombs. Those "actual interferences", added Mr. Awar, also included military activities on the Syrian - Lebanese border. In commenting on the first Deir-El Achair incident, September 13, 1957, he said that the road to Deir El Achair passed through Syrian land. He added that the Syrian forces used all means to help the armed men, prevented Lebanese reinforcements from reaching the battleground and helped the mutineers in their retreat. Those activities led to heavy losses on the part of the Lebanese Gendarmerie forces. Besides, they used to arrest those Gendarmeries who had to return to Lebanon through Syrian territory. He added that those armed men were trained in Syria and supplied with arms and orders from there.

Furthermore, Mr. Awar mentioned some incidents of throwing bombs in the plains and the mountains as well as in the cities such as the incidents of the villages of Chebaa and Kfar Shouba. Then he mentioned the Masnaa incident in which many
armed men, the majority of whom were Syrians, entered from a station on the Syrian border and attacked five officials in the Masnaa Station. The reason for the attack, claimed Mr. Awar, was that the Masnaa officials had previously stopped a foreign diplomat who was transferring arms, ammunition and explosives to Lebanon from entering the country.

Mr. Awar added that the Lebanese Army had confiscated, on May 27, 1958, arms and ammunition used only by regular armies and which belonged to a neighboring Arab army. Then he complained of the use of some Palestinian Refugees in sabotage activities. He concluded by saying that Lebanon hoped "not to find itself obliged to look for its safety and the safety of its status outside the Arab League" and that it hoped that the League" would not fail in that difficult test."¹⁵ Thus, it seems that, even at this stage of the discussion of the Lebanese complaint, the Lebanese Government was doubtful of the ability of the Arab League to solve the dispute arising between it and the United Arab Republic Government.

The delegate of the United Arab Republic's replies to the Lebanese charges were focussed upon the claim that the Government of the United Arab Republic respected Lebanon's integrity and independence. Ambassador Sayed Fahmi (the head of the delegation of the United Arab Republic) described the memorandum of the Lebanese Government and the statement of its delegate, Mr. Awar, as a series of allegations. Then he read excerpts from President Nasser's speech of May 16, 1958, in which the Egyptian President declared that the United Arab Republic respected and defended

¹⁵ Ibid., pp.8-14.
Lebanon's independence.

The United Arab Republic's delegate was doubtful of the purpose of the reference of the Lebanese complaint to the Arab League and the Security Council at the same time. He asked whether the Lebanese Government's presentation of its complaint to the Arab League was meant to be "a formal measure" only. Ambassador Fahmi added that his Government had not received any advance notice of the "facts, statements and information" regarding the Lebanese complaint which the Arab League had asked the Lebanese Government to provide, and requested enough time to study them and prepare a reply. 16

When President Kaabar asked for the opinion of each of the Arab delegations regarding the request of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Awar of Lebanon requested the rest of the Arab delegations not to allow an "opportunity for delay." Ambassador Fahmi of the United Arab Republic protested against the word "delay" and said that he only asked for an opportunity to reply to the Lebanese charges.

Mr. Mahjoub of the Sudan asked Mr. Awar to present proofs of what he had said, such as, clippings from newspapers, recordings of radio broadcasts and parts of weapons bearing the marks of the Egyptian and the Syrian Armies. Mr. Ibrahim Khudairi of Iraq requested the postponement of the meeting to June 2.

After a lengthy discussion, the Council of the Arab League decided that Mr. Awar should ask his Government to postpone the consideration of its complaint at the Security

16 Ibid., pp.15-19.
Council in order to give the Council of the Arab League an opportunity to discuss that subject. Then the Council agreed unanimously to adjourn its meeting until June 3, 1958.\footnote{17}

At the outset of the third meeting of the Council of the Arab League\footnote{18} President Kaabar announced that the Lebanese Government agreed to postpone the meeting of the Security Council, which was scheduled for June 3, in order to discuss the Lebanese complaint against the United Arab Republic until June 5, 1958.

Ambassador Fahmi of the United Arab Republic tried, in a detailed speech, to explain his Government's point of view regarding the Lebanese complaint. Mr. Fahmi began by criticizing the concluding sentence of Mr. Awar's statement that the latter's Government hoped "not to find itself obliged to look for its safety and the safety of its status outside the Arab League." He said that that sentence showed that the Lebanese Government was not serious in referring its complaint to the Arab League.

In an attempt to defend his Government's point of view that the Lebanese Crisis was an internal one but not sectarian, he then presented many examples as evidence of that point. He said that the Lebanese Crisis was a dispute between two groups. The group which opposed the Lebanese Government included a number of distinguished political personalities such as former President

\footnote{17} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 20-24.

\footnote{18} League of Arab States, \textit{op.cit.} (Minutes of the Third Meeting, June 3, 1958).
Bishara Khoury and former Premiers and Ministers. Then he gave examples from statements and declarations by the Maronite Patriarch Paul Meouchi, Sheikh Muhammad Abu Chakra, religious dignitary (Sheikh Al Aql), and former President Khoury in which the three of them regarded the President’s insistence on renewing his term of office as being the cause of the bloody events in Lebanon and called for the resignation of President Chamoun as the only remedy to put an end to the Lebanese Crisis. Ambassador Fahmi added that Lebanon had witnessed a similar crisis in 1952 which was solved by a wise action, namely, the resignation of President Khoury. Then he presented a statement by former Premier Saeb Salam, in the name of the Opposition National Front, in which he said that the Lebanese Crisis was an internal one, and a struggle by the people against Chamoun. Salam was also quoted as denying the authorities’ claim that there was an interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Ambassador Fahmi then read a similar statement by the "Third Force."\textsuperscript{19} He added that three ministers had resigned from the Solh Government. They were Mr. Rashid Beydoun (Minister of Defence), Mr. Bashir Uthman (Minister of Post and Wire) and Mr. Farid Kozma (Minister of Information). Mr. Rashid Beydoun said, in the text of his letter of resignation, that he had resigned in protest against the deterioration of security in the country. The delegate of the United Arab Republic expressed his Government’s realization of the extent of the danger facing

\textsuperscript{19} See chap. II, footnote 91.
Lebanon because of the interference of foreign elements in its internal affairs. He added that any such interference from "either side" (the two world blocs) would threaten the Middle East. He also declared that the United Arab Republic did not want Lebanon to become "another Korea."

In commenting on Mr. Awar's accusation, that the newspapers and the radio broadcasts of the United Arab Republic were attacking the Lebanese Government, Mr. Fahmi said that Egypt and Syria and later on the United Arab Republic had been subjected to different kinds of attacks by many newspapers "speaking in the name" of the Lebanese rulers. He added that the enemies of the United Arab Republic had paid millions to fulfil their aims and had established secret broadcasting stations throughout Lebanon and had started attacking the United Arab Republic. The Lebanese Government, said Fahmi, did not take any measures "to curb" those newspapers or stop those stations. He added that the newspapers and the broadcasting stations of the United Arab Republic were, until May 16, 1958, communicating what the international information agencies published.

Then he presented a tourist pamphlet published in Lebanon. It was full of insults against President Nasser and gave false information about the United Arab Republic. Mr. Fahmi then presented some examples from Lebanese newspapers which he considered as being pro-Government. For example, Al-Amal newspaper, of the Phalanges Liberales Party, published an article on May 2, 1957, entitled "the Tragedy of Freedom in Egypt" in
which it pretended that a law had been promulgated in Egypt to the effect that anyone who attacked the President of the Republic would be put to death. That piece of news was absolutely denied by the delegate of the United Arab Republic. Furthermore, Mr. Fahmi presented a false picture of President Nasser and General Dayan, the Commander of the Israeli Army, with insolent words written under it, and said that that picture was printed and distributed in Beirut. He added that he had with him envelopes containing copies of that picture, with the Beirut Post Office Stampt on them. Those pictures, Mr. Fahmi added, were sent to distinguished Arab personalities.

Ambassador Fahmi then accused the Lebanese Government of allowing the Arab Information Office, speaking in the name of the Baghdad Pact, to spread its "lies" against the United Arab Republic. Besides, the Government of the United Arab Republic had been attacked by the Lebanese President, his Prime Minister and his Minister of Foreign Affairs before the Council of the Arab League met. That was done through press conferences and statements in which the Lebanese authorities uttered some "allegations." Thus, the newspapers and broadcasting services of the United Arab Republic had to answer them.

Mr. Fahmi went on to say that the Lebanese rulers could not present documentary evidence to substantiate their charges. He added that when members of the Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Lebanese Parliament told Dr. Malik that the conditions for accepting the Lebanese complaint by the Security Council were not fulfilled, Dr. Malik answered that the Lebanese Government wanted to present Lebanon's problem to world opinion and did not
aim at condemning the United Arab Republic. Thus, Ambassador Fahmi said that it was "a question of propaganda" and not of conviction.

Mr. Fahmi then began commenting on each of the Lebanese Government's accusations entitled "actual interferences" refuting them in detail for example with regard to the accusation of throwing bombs by "agents" of the United Arab Republic. Mr. Fahmi said that judicial inquiry by the Lebanese security police about bombs thrown in Lebanon proved that some members of those forces were themselves throwing the bombs. He also accused the Lebanese Government of allowing conspirators against the United Arab Republic such as Ghassan Jadid, who was convicted by the Syrian Courts of plotting against the United Arab Republic, to settle in Lebanon. He charged the Lebanese authorities of establishing centers to train those conspirators and mentioned the names of five such places. He also accused the Lebanese authorities of recruiting them in the body of the internal security forces and using them in "sabotage" activities. Furthermore, said Mr. Fahmi, the Partie Populaire Sociale had prepared plots in Lebanon against Syria and later the United Arab Republic. He gave the incident of the assassination of Colonel Adnan Malki in April 1955, by the Syrian Nationalists as an example of that. He added that that plot and many others were "prepared in Lebanon" against Syria and Egypt and later against the United Arab Republic. On December 23, 1957, continued Ambassador Fahmi, the Egyptian Government announced that a plot, prepared in Beirut against the Egyptian Government,
was discovered. He added that the Lebanese authorities did not take any measure against the two conspirators, Maraghi and Husein Fakhry, nor against the papers which published many declarations by the conspirators in which they attacked the Egyptian Government. Ambassador Fahmi concluded his statement by accusing the Lebanese authorities of "making up incidents to show the United Arab Republic as an aggressor," thus, attempting to justify foreign intervention in the affairs of Lebanon and bringing foreign forces and arms in order "to subject the people to their wishes."

Deputy Edward Honein, a member of the Lebanese delegation, in reply to Mr. Fahmi's speech, expressed the hope of his country that the Arab League would not fail in finding a solution for the conflict arising between the Lebanese and the United Arab Republic's Government by saying that that mainly depended on the goodwill of the United Arab Republic.

After reading the accusations found in Mr. Awar's (head of the Lebanese delegation) speech, Mr. Honein questioned whether the memorandum of the United Arab Republic and Mr. Fahmi's statement were a reply to the Lebanese charges against the United Arab Republic or were "an attempt to justify the United Arab Republic's interference." He added that the reply of the delegate of the United Arab Republic was a counter complaint rather than a reply. That was the reason why the Lebanese delegation saw fit to neglect replying to those accusations. He replied to

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League of Arab States, op. cit. (Minutes of the Third Meeting, June 3, 1958), pp.6-58.
Mr. Fahmi's question as to whether the Lebanese Government aimed at considering its complaint before the Arab League, as a formal measure only, by saying that it was up to the United Arab Republic not to make the Lebanese complaint before the Arab League a formal measure. He attacked the United Arab Republic's memorandum which mentioned that the Lebanese President "had requested foreign intervention made up of foreign volunteers, arms and ammunition" and asked whether the United Arab Republic wanted Lebanon to be defenceless against Israel.

Regarding the United Arab Republic's Government charge against Lebanon as being the center of plotting against the United Arab Republic, Mr. Honein said that those who murdered Colonel Adnan Malki were from the Syrian Army. Those who planned the plot were Syrian Nationalists whom Syria was "protecting" and some of whom were convicted by the Lebanese Courts. They were not surrendered by the Syrian authorities under the pretence that they were convicted of political crimes.

In commenting on the pamphlets such as the tourists' pamphlet, which was presented by the head of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Honein said that there was no proof that they were printed in Beirut nor that the Lebanese authorities encouraged printing and publishing them. In every country, added Mr. Honein, there were printing presses for such purposes the statements of which the Government could not be held responsible.

In reply to Mr. Fahmi's statement that newspapers in the United Arab Republic were not guided by the Government, Mr. Honein asked, how all the daily newspapers of Cairo and
Damascus published the same information and had the same character or trend if they were not guided? Then he presented some samples of such newspapers. Mr. Honein added that he had another proof. Egyptian and Syrian newspapers used to publish, simultaneously, information about certain incidents as if they had occurred in Lebanon, but in fact those incidents used to occur on the following day sometimes or not occur at all. He added that such incident made the Lebanese Government think that news in the United Arab Republic's newspapers were guided and that those newspapers were publishing those incidents as orders for the rebels to execute."21 Besides, the three radio stations of Damascus, Cairo, and the Voice of the Arabs, exchanged news with those newspapers. That showed, Mr. Honein added, that those news were issued by the same source. Furthermore, he presented some leaflets22 "instigating the Lebanese people against their Government."

Mr. Honein then added that insults against the Lebanese President in Lebanese papers exceeded those against the President of the United Arab Republic. Immediately, Mr. Fahmi of the United Arab Republic questioned what was the cause of that, and Mr. Honein answered that it was due to the freedom of the press which was

21 Interview with Deputy Edward Honein on November 27, 1982.

22 I have reviewed some photostatic copies of those leaflets. They were issued by different Opposition associations and parties such as the Arab Nationalists' Movement, the Opposition National Front, the Baath Party and the Communist Party. Those leaflets attacked Chamoun's Government internal and foreign policies, such as the Eisenhower Doctrine (foreign policy) and press censorship (internal policy).
guaranteed in Lebanon even during those critical days. Mr. Honein concluded his speech by suggesting the stopping of all newspaper and radio attacks from both countries, the United Arab Republic and Lebanon. Later on he presented a recording of attacks by the United Arab Republic's broadcasting station against the Lebanese Government. Mr. Fahmi commented on that by saying that that recording did not come from any of the three stations of the United Arab Republic and that the voice was rather confused.

After a short recess, Mr. Honein said that the United Arab Republic's intervention in the affairs of Lebanon was revealed by the United Arab Republic's deep interest in those affairs as well as its "overt intervention" before the Council of the Arab League. He added that since the affairs of Lebanon concerned the Lebanese alone, therefore, the Lebanese delegation would not reply to what the United Arab Republic's delegate had said and would only discuss the Lebanese complaint.

Furthermore, Mr. Honein read the sentence issued by the Lebanese Military Court on April 17, 1957, accusing the Egyptian Military Attaché and other persons of sabotage activities and throwing explosives on foreign buildings and institutions. He then said that judicial inquiry proved that some Syrians had, by order from the Syrian Deuxième Bureau, carried on sabotage activities and thrown explosives. Mr. Honein presented the photos of heavy arms such as anti-tank bombs which could not be found in free markets. When Mr. Honein showed the rest of the Arab delegations two samples of clips carrying the Egyptian and the Syrian Armies' stamps, the head of the United Arab Republic's
delegation said that those weapons were not manufactured in Egypt and that Egypt did not have arms' factories in 1949, the date which was stamped on the weapons. Mr. Honein then announced that many Lebanese nationals and other persons were trained as commandos under the direction of the Syrian Deuxième Bureau.

Mr. Honein also added that the incidents of Masnaa, Deir El Achair, Chebaa and Kfar Shouba, which the United Arab Republic's delegate tried to refute, were proved by the Lebanese authorities through reports, photographs and testimonies. These "proved" that a meeting was held between Mr. Kamal Jumblat, an Opposition leader, and his men on the one hand, and some representatives of the Syrian Deuxième Bureau on the other. In that meeting, added Mr. Honein, the Syrian Deuxième Bureau agreed to support Kamal Jumblat in starting an armed revolt and carrying on sabotage activities in order to oblige the Lebanese President to resign. When Mr. Fahmi of the United Arab Republic asked him who wrote those reports, Mr. Honein answered that they were written by the official Lebanese authorities whose sincerity could not be doubted. Then the meeting of the Council of the Arab League was adjourned until the next day, June 4, 1958.23

During the fourth meeting of the Council of the Arab League,24 Ambassador Fahmi of the United Arab Republic, requested

23 League of Arab States, op.cit., pp. 59-80.

24 Ibid. (Minutes of the Fourth Meeting, June 4, 1958).
an opportunity to prepare an answer to Mr. Honein's speech. Thus, the meeting was postponed until the afternoon of June 4, 1958.²⁵

On the morning of June 4, 1958, a meeting was held outside the Legislative Council's Building which was not attended by either of the disputing parties, the Lebanese or the United Arab Republic delegations. The cause of that meeting was the fact that the Sudanese delegation presented, to the Council of the Arab League, a draft resolution which the rest of the Arab delegations would accept.²⁶ Then that original Sudanese draft resolution²⁷ was amended several times especially by the Lebanese Government, which was consulted and its amendments were included in the final draft resolution.²⁸

The fifth meeting of the Council of the Arab League²⁹ was held on the afternoon of June 4, 1958. Mr. Mahjoub of Sudan said that the Arab League should try to restore peace to Lebanon.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 4-6.


²⁷ For the text of that resolution see Appendix III.

²⁸ Deputy Edward Honein said, in an interview with the writer, on November 27, 1962, that the original Sudanese draft resolution was reviewed by the Lebanese delegation and the Lebanese Government and various changes were included in that resolution.

²⁹ League of Arab States, op.cit. (Fifth Meeting on the afternoon of June 4, 1958).
Then he presented the final Sudanese draft resolution, 30 which had been approved by all the Arab delegations except those of Lebanon and the United Arab Republic. He insisted on discussing the dispute arising between the United Arab Republic and Lebanon in the Arab League without resorting to international agencies, that is the Security Council and the General Assembly. He was, thus, trying to localize the problems arising between the Arab States and preventing other states from interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon.

Ambassador Fahmi of the United Arab Republic asked for the re-inclusion of the following sentence, which was included in the original Sudanese draft resolution, "after observing in both parties the spirit of mutual respect and the true intention of not interfering in the internal affairs of each other..."

Mr. Awar of Lebanon commented on Mr. Fahmi suggestion by saying that if the United Arab Republic's amendment mentioned above, was accepted, then the Lebanese delegation had many objections. Mr. Mahjoub, of Sudan, Sheikh Ibrahimm Al Suleiman Bin Aqil, of Saudi Arabia, Mr. Ahmad Tarawneh, of Jordan, Mr. Ibrahim Khudairi, of Iraq, and President Kaabar of Libya, insisted on the wording of the draft resolution as it was without the addition of that sentence suggested by the United Arab Republic's delegate and found in the original Sudanese draft resolution. Only Mr. Ahmad Shami, of Yemen, said that he did not find any objection to the acceptance of that additional sentence because it did not influence the bulk of the draft resolution but added good spirit to it.

At that point Mr. Fahmi questioned why all the

30 See Appendix III.
delegations refused the re-inclusion of that sentence, although the draft resolution containing it was discussed several times on the morning of June 4, 1958, and that sentence was only removed during the fourth meeting. He wondered "what secret was behind that unanimity?" Mr. Mahjoub commented on Mr. Fahmi's remark by saying that the question was one of principle and that the door for further amendments should not be opened. Mr. Mahjoub then read the full text of the original Sudanese draft resolution,\(^{31}\) which included the sentence mentioned above by Mr. Fahmi and on whose inclusion, in the final Sudanese draft resolution, the delegate of the United Arab Republic had insisted. Mr. Awar of Lebanon, suggested the inclusion of the following sentence, as well as the sentence suggested by the United Arab Republic's delegate, "the Council of the Arab League would call upon each member not to interfere in the internal affairs of any other member."\(^{32}\) Mr. Fahmi said that the Lebanese proposal, suggested by Mr. Awar, was already included in the Covenant of the Arab League. As an attempt to solve the problem he suggested to President Kaabar the including, in the minutes of the fifth meeting, of absolute confirmation of all the Arab delegations of the following sentence "the United Arab Republic respected the independence and integrity of Lebanon and did not interfere in its internal affairs."\(^{33}\) If all the delegates approved of it,

\(^{31}\) For the full text of the original Sudanese draft resolution see Appendix II.

\(^{32}\) League of Arab States, op.cit., p.13.

\(^{33}\) Ibid.
then it should be included in the draft resolution. At that point the head of the Lebanese delegation asked the permission to refer to his Government. The meeting was adjourned until June 6, 1958.\textsuperscript{34}

At the outset of the sixth meeting of the Arab League,\textsuperscript{35} President Kaabar asked the Lebanese and the United Arab Republic's delegates to present the reply of their respective Governments to the Sudanese draft resolution which the rest of the Arab delegates had accepted in the previous meeting.

Mr. Awar of Lebanon, said that the Lebanese Government did not accept the draft resolution because it was "general" and "did not tackle the Lebanese Crisis itself." Besides, it was "a recommendation" or "a mediation" effort. Such a resolution, he added, would not lead to the withdrawal of the Lebanese complaint from the United Nations Security Council but to its "suspension while waiting for the result of that recommendation or mediation."\textsuperscript{36}

With the Lebanese delegate's suggestion of the suspension of the Lebanese complaint at the Security Council, a good opportunity was offered, which the rest of the Arab delegations could have used to mediate between the two disputing states. On the contrary, they (the delegates of Iraq, Jordan,

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.4-16

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Ibid.}(Sixth Meeting June 6, 1958).

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ibid.}, p.3.
Libya, Saudi Arabia and Sudan) declared that since approval of the draft resolution should be unanimous by all the members of the Arab League and since the Lebanese Government had "refused it," they considered the draft resolution "as if it had never existed." 37

It seems surprising that those delegates had used the word "refused" while the Lebanese delegate had declared that his Government considered the final Sudanese draft resolution as a recommendation which could lead to the suspension rather than the withdrawal of the Lebanese complaint from the Security Council while waiting for the result of that recommendation. Another point that should be noted here is the fact that the Lebanese delegate had accepted the United Arab Republic's amendment to the final Sudanese draft resolution on condition that that draft resolution would include the following Lebanese amendment, the Council of the Arab League requests "each member not to interfere in the internal affairs of any other member."

Thus, it seems that all the Arab delegations, except those of the United Arab Republic and Yemen, were not anxious to settle the dispute between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic in the Arab League. Furthermore, they were encouraging the Lebanese delegation to continue the reference of its complaint to the Security Council. Mr. Honein commented on the attitude of those delegations by saying that they were encouraging the Lebanese delegation to insist on its complaint.

37 Ibid., pp. 1-3.
Great encouragement, added Mr. Honein, came from the three delegations of Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Jordan and Iraq expressed explicity their full support of Lebanon. The Lebanese delegation, he added, understood that they had received orders from their Government to support the Lebanese delegation under all circumstances. The atmosphere of the meetings of the Council of the Arab League, continued Mr. Honein, was favorable to the Lebanese delegation. None of the Arab delegations, however, supported the Lebanese suggestion aiming at proving that intervention in the affairs of Lebanon had taken place and that it should be stopped immediately. The reason for that, according to Honein, might have been their desire not to arouse the United Arab Republic. 38

The head of the delegation of Yemen expressed his regret at the lost effort. The heads of the Sudanese, the Libyan and the Saudi Arabian delegations expressed their deep regret at the sad result of that extraordinary session of the Arab League. Ambassador Fahmi, after thanking the Libyan King, Government and people, as all the other delegates had done, said that he had warned from the beginning that the Lebanese Government was not serious in referring its complaint to the Council of the Arab League and was not aiming to reach a solution through it. By presenting two complaints simultaneously to the Council of the Arab League and the United Nations Security Council, the Lebanese Government "had imposed on the Arab League an atmosphere which it was not used to" since its establishment. 39

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38 Interview with Deputy Edward Honein

39 League of Arab States, op.cit., pp.3-8.
Did the Arab League have a chance of success in its efforts to solve the Lebanese Crisis?

The Arab League was faced by two obstacles at the time, a theoretical one and a political one. The theoretical hindrance was the fact that all its resolutions had to be agreed upon unanimously by all its members. The political obstacle, which hindered the Arab League from achieving a solution of the Lebanese problem was the fact that the Arab States were divided, at the time, into two blocs. All the Arab States but Yemen supported the Lebanese point of view. A chance of compromise had occurred when the Lebanese delegate suggested the suspension of the Lebanese complaint lodged with the Security Council until the result of the mediation efforts, according to the Arab League resolution of June 6, 1958, was known, but the rest of the Arab States instead of seizing that opportunity at compromise declared that they considered the Lebanese complaint as if it had never existed.
CHAPTER IV

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
DURING THE LEBANESE CRISIS

Dr. Karim Azkoul, the representative of Lebanon, requested in a letter dated May 22, 1958, the President of the Security Council to consider the "complaint by Lebanon in respect of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."\(^1\)

Five days later, the Security Council placed the Lebanese complaint on its agenda. Upon the request of the Iraqi delegation and with the approval of the rest of the members of the Security Council, the Council had postponed the consideration of the Lebanese complaint from May 26 to June 3, 1958, in order to give the Arab League more chance to study the Lebanese complaint placed before it.\(^2\)

For the same reason mentioned above and upon the request of the Lebanese delegation the Council had agreed to postpone further discussion of the Lebanese complaint before it twice more. Once for 48 hours on June 2, 1958, and the second

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\(^1\) S/4007, see Appendix IV.

time for 24 hours on June 5, 1958. Thus, on June 6, the Security Council held its first meeting to consider the Lebanese complaint.\(^3\)

The Lebanese Foreign Minister, Dr. Charles Malik, declared in his speech that his Government had placed its complaint before the Arab League in an effort to let that regional organization deal with the Lebanese case. The Arab League, added Dr. Malik, after meeting for six days in order to discuss the Lebanese complaint had failed to take any decision regarding that subject. Thus, the Lebanese Government had to present the Lebanese complaint to the Security Council. Dr. Malik expressed his deep sorrow at having to present a complaint against a sister Arab country.

The Lebanese complaint, stated Dr. Malik, consisted of three claims. The first was the presence of "massive, illegal and unprovoked intervention in the affairs of Lebanon by the United Arab Republic." The second claim was that the:"Intervention aimed at undermining, and did in fact threaten the independence of Lebanon." The Third was that the:"Situation created by that intervention which threatened the independence of Lebanon was likely, if continued, to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."\(^4\)

Dr. Malik said that the actuality of the intervention

\(^3\) S/PV.823, June 6, 1958, p. 2.

\(^4\) Ibid., pp. 3-4.
of the United Arab Republic could be proved through the following six sets of facts:

1. The supply of arms on a large scale from the United Arab Republic to subversive elements in Lebanon;
2. The training in subversion on the territory of the United Arab Republic of elements from Lebanon and the sending back of these elements to Lebanon to subvert their Government;
3. The participation of United Arab Republic civilian nationals residing in or passing into Lebanon in subversive and terrorist activities in Lebanon;
4. The participation of United Arab Republic government elements in subversive and terrorist activities and in the direction of rebellion in Lebanon;
5. The violent and utterly unprecedented press campaign conducted by the United Arab Republic against the Government of Lebanon;
6. The violent and utterly unprecedented radio campaign conducted by the United Arab Republic inciting the people of Lebanon to overthrow their Government.5

Dr. Malik mentioned fifteen incidents in order to prove the supply of arms by the United Arab Republic "to subversive elements in Lebanon."

One such incident mentioned by Dr. Malik was the following. He said that the Lebanese Deuxième Bureau had listed, in a report dated May 28, 1958, different kinds of weapons and ammunition smuggled from Syria. A certain Hisham Najj of Tripoli, who was arrested on that day, confessed that those weapons, on which Syrian and Egyptian Army marks were stamped, were sent to a notable Opposition leader in Tripoli. Dr. Malik added that he had the pictures of the weapons carrying those marks.

Furthermore, Dr. Malik presented more details concerning the incident of the arrest of Mr. Louis de San, the

5 Ibid., p. 4.
Belgian Consul General at the Lebanese-Syrian border. Besides different weapons found in the Consul's car the Belgian Consul was carrying a letter addressed to an unknown person in Beirut ordering, among other things, the throwing of bombs in three main streets in the Capital as well as on the Presidential Palace. When arrested, the Belgian Consul would not allow his car to be searched and asked if he could return to Syria without being searched. The Consul claimed that his driver had trusted him "with the suitcase containing the weapons" the contents of which he was ignorant of. Dr. Malik linked the incident of the arrest of the Belgian Consul to the subsequent raid on the Custom's post by "several hundred Syrians and Lebanese coming from Syria" on the following night.

In order to prove "the training in subversion" of Lebanese in Syria Dr. Malik announced that the Lebanese Government knew for certain that Lebanese and non-Lebanese commandos were trained in Syria under the direction of Syrian officers from the Syrian Deuxième Bureau. The majority of those arrested by the Lebanese authorities for sabotage activities in Lebanon belonged to the Syrian Commando Unit. Dr. Malik added that many members of that unit were in the Lebanese prisons and he could present them to the Security Council.

Dr. Malik then announced that he brought with him a list of 150 Trilobitanians, who had been seen while receiving military training with the Syrian Army in the Syrian town of Hadbussy near Tell Kalakh. He added that when they were arrested those Trilobitanians had confessed that they had been trained in the use of weapons in Syria.
The Lebanese Foreign Minister then turned to the participation of United Arab Republic civilian nationals "in subversive and terrorist activities in Lebanon." In order to prove this point he referred to the arrest in Sidon on May 25, 1958, of twenty two Syrians, thirteen of whom had carried Syrian Army identity cards. Moreover, internal security reports revealed that during the year 1958 many Palestinians from Gaza as well as Syrians had been arrested for terrorist activities.

Dr. Malik then turned to "the participation of United Arab Republic government elements in subversive and terrorist activities and in the direction of the rebellion in Lebanon." In order to prove this point Dr. Malik mentioned the incident of Deir El Achair.

Dr. Malik declared that all the incidents mentioned by him "proved" the existence of "intervention".

Dr. Malik turned to his second claim that: "That intervention aimed at undermining and did in fact threaten" Lebanon's independence. Malik based this claim on "the violent and utterly unprecedented press campaign conducted by the United Arab Republic against the Government of Lebanon," and on the fact that this press campaign openly incited the Lebanese to overthrow their Government. Dr. Malik said that many people, including himself, believed that the Press of the United Arab Republic was controlled by the Government. Even if that could

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6 Ibid., p. 44.

7 For the details of this incident see Chap. III, p. 72.
not be proved, yet there was a link between the Government and
the Press of the United Arab Republic in regard to what the Press
said about Lebanon. A study of that press would immediately
substantiate his claim. For nearly two years no Egyptian or
Syrian newspaper had spoken a kind word about the Lebanese
Government.

Radio broadcasts have a particularly disturbing effect.
This was so because illiterate people could listen to the radio.
Dr. Malik added that he had brought 500 such broadcasts with him
and that he would present samples of them. The United Arab
Republic's radio was certainly controlled by the Government,
Dr. Malik asserted. The broadcasts seemed to reflect the United
Arab Republic policy.

Dr. Malik also said that a clandestine voice called
"Radio Free Lebanon" had been broadcasting from the territory
of the United Arab Republic. It had incited the Lebanese people
to rebel and had supported subversion. Dr. Malik concluded by
saying that since the outbreak of the disturbances the United
Arab Republic's propaganda machinery had been directed towards
the "upholding, promoting, inflaming and even directing and
guiding the subversion activities" occurring in Lebanon, and
that that propaganda aimed at the overthrow of the Lebanese
Government and its replacement by another one "subservient to
the will of the United Arab Republic." 8

The intervention of the United Arab Republic had

8 S/PV.823, op.cit., p. 20.
therefore threatened Lebanese independence. And since Lebanon was a member of the United Nations Organization, that intervention would in turn threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. The United Nations, continued Malik, should stop any external intervention if it threatened the independence of a member of the Organization.

Dr. Malik concluded his statement by urging the Security Council to come to grips with the Lebanese problem, to stop that "unprovoked massive intervention" and to preserve the independence of Lebanon, thus, removing a threat to international peace and security.9

Mr. Omar Loutfi, speaking for the United Arab Republic, began by stressing the fact that the United Arab Republic's peoples had always supported the independence of Lebanon.

In commenting on the circumstances surrounding the reference of the Lebanese complaint to the Security Council, Mr. Loutfi said that the Lebanese Government tried to give an international aspect to an internal problem and was thus using the Security Council for the settlement of an internal issue.

Mr. Loutfi added that, prior to the submission of the Lebanese complaint to the Arab League, the Lebanese Foreign Minister had declared, upon his arrival in New York, that the Security Council should discuss that complaint. Therefore, said Loutfi, it was apparent that the Lebanese Government was not

9 See text of Malik's statement, Ibid., pp. 3-22.
very serious in the reference of the Lebanese complaint to the Arab League but used it as an attempt to show that it had exhausted its local efforts to solve the Lebanese problem before the reference of its complaint to the Security Council.

Mr. Loutfi added that preceding the June 6 meeting he had been notified that a resolution submitted by six States of the Arab League, namely, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, Libya and Yemen, had not been accepted by the Lebanese Government. That resolution (the text of which he read to the Council) could have settled the dispute were it not for the refusal of the Lebanese Government.

Mr. Loutfi then drew the attention of the Security Council to the provisions of Article 36, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter. Mr. Loutfi described the statement of the Lebanese representative as a speech "full of allegations and accusations unsupported by any tangible evidence." He would attempt to prove that the Lebanese Crisis was an internal problem.

The international press had already mentioned a lot about the leaders of the Opposition to the Lebanese Government. Those leaders, such as Mr. Bishara Khoury, Former President of Lebanon, and Messrs. Salam, Yafi, Queini and Karamy, former

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10 See Appendix III.

11 Which stipulates: "the Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties."

Prime Ministers were all responsible people.

Opposition papers in Lebanon mentioned that among the causes of the troubles in Lebanon was the desire of the Lebanese President to renew his term of office. The Opposition also accused the Government of "having manipulated the elections" in an attempt to guarantee the return of the "Governmental candidates."


The Maronite Patriarch of Lebanon and the Opposition leaders, said Mr. Loutfi, considered the issue as an internal problem of Lebanon and absolved the United Arab Republic of any responsibility for it. That was the reason why the question of the reference of the Lebanese case to the Security Council was disputed even in the meeting of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. Mr. Philippe Takla, the Chairman of that Committee, had said that the Foreign Minister could not prove that the Lebanese complaint referred to the Security Council "was based on true facts" and that its reference would only "aggravate" the Lebanese problem.

Mr. Loutfi said that he would comment on Dr. Malik's individual accusations after studying the latter's speech carefully. Meanwhile, he quoted an extract from an article which appeared in the May 27, 1958, issue of the Times of London, regarding Syrian infiltration, which stated that in spite of "the Governmental claim during the 1957 general elections, no Syrian agitator
arrested was brought to trial." Furthermore, said Mr. Loutfi, Mr. Fouad Ammoun, the former Secretary-General of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had stated that it was the Lebanese Government itself which had demanded foreign weapons and distributed them among its own followers.

Mr. Loutfi commented on the incident regarding the Belgian Consul General in Damascus by saying that since the Lebanese courts were dealing with that case, he would not like to discuss it in detail.

Regarding the alleged radio and press campaign mentioned by the Lebanese representative, Mr. Loutfi said that even if those allegations were true the radio and the press of the United Arab Republic, in general, broadcasted and published the news published by the Lebanese Press. He added that some Lebanese papers were attacking the United Arab Republic's Government in Egypt. Regarding the radio broadcasts Mr. Loutfi said: the United Arab Republic "had to reply to transmissions attacking it." He had documents on that subject and was ready to put them at the disposal of the Council members.

Mr. Loutfi then attacked the provocative actions by Lebanese authorities against the United Arab Republic. For several months Lebanese authorities had expelled thousand of United Arab Republic's citizens without any explanation or reference to any administrative or judicial bodies. He then read an extract from the May 21, 1958, issue of the New York Times which mentioned that a thousand Syrian nationals had been

13 Ibid., p. 29.
deported from Lebanon.

Mr. Loutfi concluded his speech by quoting some extracts of a speech by President Nasser on May 16, 1958, in which the United Arab Republic's President had declared that his country had nothing to do with events occurring in Lebanon. 

Most of the representatives who spoke after Mr. Loutfi including those of Japan and Colombia demanded further information about what had happened in the Arab League meetings in Benghazi. Dr. Malik denied that a "unanimous resolution was submitted for the decision of the Government of Lebanon." He added that the Iraqi and the Jordanian Governments did not agree to any draft resolution accepted by some members of the Arab League.

Dr. Malik commented on Mr. Loutfi's statement by saying that the latter had used quotations from newspapers while he himself had used "official documents" and excerpts from United Arab Republic papers in support of his view. The mere discussion of the Lebanese Crisis by the United Arab Republic's representative, added Malik, proved that the United Arab Republic Government had intervened in the internal affairs of Lebanon. He went on to say that Mr. Loutfi should have tried to refute the facts enumerated by him instead of discussing the domestic affairs of Lebanon.

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See Chap. III, p. 68.


Ibid., pp. 13-14.
Further statements were made, in the June 10, 1958, meeting, by Mr. Omar Loutfi (United Arab Republic representative) and Dr. Charles Malik (Lebanese representative).

Mr. Loutfi replied, in a lengthy statement, to Dr. Malik's charges against the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon. The majority of the examples cited by Dr. Malik, said Loutfi, "were based on reports prepared by the Lebanese police or by the Deuxième Bureau." Those reports, he added, could not be taken into consideration unless they were supported by "conclusive evidence." The responsibility of the United Arab Republic was thus not proved.

Mr. Loutfi then defended the Consul-General of Belgium in Damascus, who was accused of carrying arms from Syria into Lebanon, on the basis that the latter was unaware of the presence of weapons in his car. Mr. Loutfi added that the United Arab Republic Government had no knowledge of the letter the Consul was accused of carrying.

Mr. Loutfi criticized Dr. Malik's conclusion that the United Arab Republic supplied elements, "engaged in subversive actions in Lebanon," with arms. That conclusion had not taken into consideration the fact that in Lebanon all the hill-folks and the tribesmen were armed and that there had always been "clandestine crossing of the frontier between Syria and Lebanon from one side or the other." He went on to say that Dr. Malik was aware of the fact that his Government had "distributed large quantities of arms to its partisans and to certain organizations."

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17 S/PV.824, June 10, 1958.
and that those arms had passed from one person to another. Many Opposition leaders, such as Mr. Ammoun, had stressed that point.

In commenting on Dr. Malik's allegation that Lebanese rebels were trained in Syria, Mr. Loutfi said that Malik had mentioned no names nor did he explain whether those persons had been tried and found guilty.

Mr. Loutfi added that Dr. Malik had referred to Syrians carrying Syrian Army Service cards. Since all Syrians who had completed their military service had to carry military cards that did not mean that all those people, mentioned by Malik, were enlisted in the Syrian Army.

The Lebanese problem, Loutfi concluded, being a purely domestic problem, should be solved by the Lebanese themselves.18

Before commenting on Mr. Loutfi's statement Dr. Malik announced that he had received news from Beirut that the situation there had deteriorated and that the infiltration of arms and men had increased. He added that he was requested by the Lebanese Government to ask the Security Council to remain in session until a decision on the Lebanese problem could be reached.

Dr. Malik said that the United Arab Republic representative did not comment on more than 16 or 20% of the facts mentioned by him.

Dr. Malik admitted that some of the quotations, that he

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Ibid., pp. 2-13.
had read, from Egyptian and Syrian newspapers had been printed from material which had originated in Lebanon but asked why the United Arab Republic newspapers should use only that sort of material.

Dr. Malik commented on Mr. Loufi's charges that the Lebanese Press had published certain material attacking the United Arab Republic, by saying that there was a free press in Lebanon that criticized even the Lebanese Government itself.

Regarding Mr. Loufi's comment that the United Arab Republic's broadcasting services were answering the Lebanese radio, Dr. Malik said that the Lebanese radio, being very weak, was hardly heard in Beirut let alone Egypt. Besides, the Lebanese radio had tried to be objective and fair in its broadcasts.

Dr. Malik commented on what had "really" happened in the Arab League by saying that the Lebanese delegation was not the only Arab delegation which had refused the Arab League's draft resolution (or the final Sudanese draft resolution), but that the majority of those delegations said that they would not take any decision until they knew Lebanon's opinion regarding that resolution. When the Lebanese Government "rejected" that draft resolution, the representatives of Iraq, Jordan and Libya said that they had nothing to do with that resolution either. 19

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19 One point should be clarified here regarding the two versions of the meetings of the Arab League presented by the United Arab Republic's and the Lebanese delegates. When the final Sudanese draft resolution was discussed during the fifth meeting of the Arab League, President Kaabar, of the Libyan delegation, asked if that resolution was accepted by all the Arab delegates subject to the acceptance of the Lebanese and the United Arab Republic's Governments; nobody answered. Furthermore, when he
In commenting on Mr. Loutfi's charges accusing the
Lebanese Government of expelling United Arab Republic nationals
from Lebanon, Dr. Malik said that the Lebanese Government had to
expel some of the United Arab Republic nationals because they had
performed subversive activities. Many of them, Dr. Malik added,
did not possess identity cards in Lebanon. Besides, there were
still fifty thousand Syrians living in Lebanon and working in
commerce, agriculture and other activities. Those expelled during
the events, continued Malik, were a minority that did not exceed
one thousand.

Dr. Malik said that the Lebanese Government had treated
the diplomatic officials of the United Arab Republic with patience
except in one or two cases where the situation was so disagreeable
that it was impossible for it to remain patient. He added that
United Arab Republic diplomats were engaged in openly anti-
Government and pro-Opposition activities. It was beyond credulity,
said Dr. Malik, to believe that Lebanon was engaged in subversive
activities in Egypt or Syria.20

After this detailed presentation of the Lebanese charges
against the United Arab Republic and the latter's reply to those
charges it is convenient to give a few general comments on the

announced that that reaction would mean that all the Arab
delocations had accepted the resolution subject to the approval
of the Governments of the two disputing states, he again got no
answer and the meeting was adjourned until June 6, 1958.

attitudes of both Governments. We can say that the Lebanese representative had emphasized the external intervention and had "played down the serious domestic schism." The representative of the United Arab Republic, on the other hand, had denied that any interference approved of, or assisted by the United Arab Republic had occurred from Egypt or Syria; but he "did not deny that private individuals might have infiltrated" or that some individuals might have smuggled weapons across the Syrian-Lebanese border. 21

Different views were expressed during the June 10, 1958, meeting of the Security Council regarding the serious situation in Lebanon.

Mr. Jarring, the Swedish delegate to the Security Council declared that the dispute between the Lebanese Government and the United Arab Republic had reached a deadlock with the former claiming that the latter had intervened in its internal affairs, and the United Arab Republic rejecting that allegation of the Lebanese Government. In such cases, added Mr. Jarring, some form of investigation or observation by the Security Council might help in clarifying the situation, "and might ease the tense situation existing in Lebanon." 22 Mr. Jarring then read the

21 Miller, op. cit., p. 162.

22 S/PV.824, June 10, 1958, pp. 21-23.
Swedish draft resolution requesting the establishment of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). Sweden, assuming a mediatory position between the Lebanese and the United Arab Republic's points of view, presented an objective draft resolution on June 10, 1958, which won the acclaim of the majority of the members of the Security Council. That resolution had three sections. It:

1. Decided to dispatch urgently an observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as to insure that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other matériel across the Lebanese borders.
2. Authorized the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to that end.
3. Requested the observation group to keep the Security Council currently informed through the Secretary-General.\[23\]

The Western bloc, namely, the United States, Britain and France expressed their support of the Lebanese point of view as well as the Swedish draft resolution mentioned above. The French representative expressed his Government's belief that the armed revolt in Lebanon was probably receiving aid from abroad and referred indirectly to such interference by the United Arab Republic. Mr. Lodge of the United States stated that there had been "outside interference in the internal affairs" of Lebanon and that that interference had aimed at promoting "civil strife." He added that that interference had been carried out from the territory and through the facilities of the United Arab Republic. Furthermore, the British representative declared that his delegation expected that

\[23\] Ibid., p. 23. See the text of the Swedish Draft Resolution, S/4023, in Appendix IV.
Lebanon's point of view could be supported by world public opinion "because of the justice of its complaint."\(^{24}\)

Mr. Sobolev of the Soviet Union, on the other hand, supported the position of the United Arab Republic and declared that the internal disturbances in Lebanon: "Were the result of the indignation of the popular masses and represented an organized struggle by the Lebanese people for their constitutional rights.\(^{25}\) He charged: "That Lebanon was faced with the threat of open foreign intervention, not from the Arab States, but from the West."\(^{26}\)

A bitter conversation took place between Jamali, the Iraqi representative and the representative of the United Arab Republic. Iraq charged that "Nasserism" was "applying the same pattern as that followed by international communism in its subversive methods." The Iraqi representative added that Iraq was "deeply grieved" that Lebanon "should be suffering so painfully at the hands of other sister states."\(^{27}\) Mr. Loutfi of the United Arab Republic "wondered" if he "should take Mr. Jamali's statement seriously," then went on to say that he would not answer Mr. Jamali's insults for it was "easy to be insulting."\(^{28}\)

\(^{24}\) Ibid., pp. 44-50.

\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 29.

\(^{26}\) Ibid.

\(^{27}\) Ibid., pp. 37, 41.

\(^{28}\) S/FV.825, June 11, 1958, p. 7.
The Swedish draft resolution was adopted on June 11 by a vote of 10 to 0 with one abstention, the Soviet Union who abstained because the Council: "Had not expressed its opinion on the substance of Lebanon's complaint and its accusations that the United Arab Republic was interfering in Lebanon's domestic affairs." 29

At this stage the Lebanese representative raised a question that would receive much comment in the coming sessions. He asked whether the United Nations was able to handle "indirect aggression or subversion." 30

Thus, the Security Council succeeded, in view of the circumstances surrounding it, in passing "a very general and non-committal resolution that gave the observers the right to report on infiltration but not to stop it." 31

The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) was established and the Secretary-General of the United Nations labored in order to carry out the mission entrusted to him according to the Security Council resolution of June 11, 1958. 32

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32
Thereafter referred to as UNOGIL. The details of the activities of UNOGIL shall be discussed in Chapter VI.

33
The details of Mr. Hammarskjold's role would be discussed in Chapter VI.
The June 11 resolution had, therefore, requested the Secretary-General to "take the necessary steps" to form UNOGIL but the Security Council had left the details of the implementation of that resolution to Mr. Hammarskjöld himself. Again, the Council found a way out of an impasse by not coming to decisive conclusions but by giving considerable freedom of action to the Secretary-General. 34

UNOGIL began its activities in Lebanon on June 14, 1958. Those activities continued and were broadened under the direction of the Secretary-General until July 15, 1958, when, following the Iraqi Coup d'état of July 14, 1958, the United States landed its troops in Lebanon.

The Effect of the Landing of American Troops on the Role of the Security Council

The American President, in a special message to Congress on July 15, 1958, said:

The United States forces were being sent to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence to assist the Government of Lebanon in the preservation of Lebanon's territorial integrity and independence which had been deemed vital to United States national interests and world peace.

Those forces, President Eisenhower added, were sent upon the request of the Lebanese President with the unanimous approval of the Lebanese Cabinet. 35

34 Miller, op. cit., p. 175.

The landing of American troops on July 15, 1958, had its deep effects upon the Lebanese Crisis. On the one hand it widened the schism between the Lebanese Government and the Opposition and on the other hand it introduced a new factor to the already complex situation in Lebanon. For the Security Council had already sent UNOGIL to Lebanon in order to observe and report so as to ensure against illegal infiltration of arms and personnel across the Lebanese borders.

After the landing of American troops in Lebanon on July 15, 1958, the Security Council met on the same day at the request of the United States.

Mr. Lodge, speaking in the name of the United States, tried to defend the action taken by his Government. He repeated what President Eisenhower had mentioned earlier that morning. He declared that the American troops were dispatched in order to help the Lebanese Government "at its request in its efforts to stabilize the situation brought on by the threats from outside, until such time as the United Nations can take the steps necessary to protect the independence and political integrity of Lebanon." Mr. Lodge added that the United States forces were instructed to cooperate with UNOGIL and "establish liaison immediately upon arrival." Thus, the


37 Ibid., p.8.
United States had tried to reduce the pressure of world opinion against the landing of its troops in Lebanon by stating that those troops were going to cooperate with UNOGIL, the representative of the United Nations in Lebanon. Mr. Hammarskjold spoke, after Mr. Lodge, on his efforts in implementing the June 11, resolution of the Security Council. He did not refer directly to the landing of American troops but his statement implied indirectly that the interference of the United States "was unnecessary because the United Nations was constantly improving and refining its observational operation in Lebanon." 38

Mr. Azkoul, the Lebanese representative, gave an account of the official comments of the Lebanese Government on the first report of UNOGIL (which had in the meantime been published) 39 after criticizing the work of UNOGIL, he said that the intention of the Lebanese Government was not to minimize the importance of the presence of the Group in Lebanon or the usefulness of its activities. Besides, the Lebanese Government appreciated the efforts of Mr. Hammarskjold in the establishment of the observation machinery in Lebanon and of the efforts of the Group in fulfilling its mandate. He added that since then the situation had considerably deteriorated in Lebanon; and because of the immediate threat to Lebanese independence and while waiting for the action of

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38 Miller, op.cit., p.182.

39 Those official comments shall be discussed in Chap.V, pp. 130-131.
the Security Council, the Lebanese Government had decided to invoke Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which "recognized the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence." Thus, the Lebanese Government had requested help from a friendly state, in this case the United States. Mr. Azkoul, however, asserted that that help was "strictly temporary." Mr. Azkoul's statement mentioned above was an attempt to defend the measure taken by his Government of requesting the landing of American troops.

The Soviet representative, Mr. Sobolev, attacked the landing of American troops in Lebanon and charged that that action, which was motivated by a desire to control Middle East "oil", constituted "an act of aggression" and was "a case of gross intervention" in the internal affairs of the Middle Eastern States. Mr. Sobolev then presented a draft resolution (S/4046) which called upon the United States "to cease its armed intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab States" and to withdraw its forces from Lebanon immediately. 41

During the Council's second meeting on July 15, 1958, Mr. Loutfi, United Arab Republic's representative, denounced the armed intervention of the United States Government, at the request of the Lebanese President, and said that that would increase the tension in the Middle East. He added that there was no reason for the unilateral intervention of the United States Government because the


41 Ibid., pp.21-22.
situation in Lebanon had improved considerably. Besides, Article 51 of the United Nations Charter could not serve as an excuse for the United States intervention because of two reasons. First, there was no armed attack on Lebanon (which was mentioned as a precondition for intervention in Article 51) and secondly, there was a Security Council decision which was being carried out by UNOGIL. He charged that the United States had intervened for the sake of prestige or private interests.\textsuperscript{42}

During the July 16, 1958 meeting of the Security Council, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold declared that the United Nations observers had succeeded in arranging "for inspection all along the Lebanese border." He concluded his statement by saying that he felt that with such results UNOGIL was "fully equipped to play the part envisaged for it." He also expressed his hope: "That no later developments would cause a set-back."\textsuperscript{43} The last sentence of Mr. Hammarskjold was interpreted as a statement of disapproval of American intervention in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{44}

During the same meeting of the Security Council on July 16 Mr. Lodge, representative of the United States, introduced an American draft resolution (S/4050) which he said had three purposes. First, it supported the efforts of UNOGIL

\textsuperscript{42} S/PV.828, July 15, 1958, pp. 4-7.

\textsuperscript{43} S/PV.829, July 16, 1958, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{44} Miller, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 186.
in Lebanon. Secondly, it requested Mr. Hammarskjöld to consult the Lebanese Government and other Member States to provide "such additional arrangements, including the contribution and use of contingents" in order to protect Lebanese independence when necessary and to ensure against the infiltration of men and matériel across the Lebanese frontiers. Thirdly, if implemented, this draft resolution would facilitate the immediate withdrawal of American forces.\footnote{45}

Mr. Jarring of Sweden attacked the American landing and declared that such action could not be justified under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter because that Article could be applied only if: "An armed attack had occurred against a Member State." He added that his Government did not consider that that action had been fulfilled in the case of Lebanon nor that there existed "an international conflict in the terms of Article 51."\footnote{46}

During the July 17, 1958 meeting of the Security Council the United States representative made the following very serious statement "if the United Nations cannot deal with indirect aggression, the United Nations will break up. This could surely be the rock on which the Organization could flounder."\footnote{47}

\footnote{45} S/PV.829, op.cit., pp. 2 - 3.
\footnote{46} S/PV.830, July 16, 1958, pp. 8 - 9.
\footnote{47} S/PV.831, July 17, 1958, p.11.
During the same meeting of the Security Council on July 17, 1958 Mr. Sobolev of the Soviet Union, said that due to the latest events, the Soviet delegation had changed its draft resolution (S/4047). The revised draft had attacked British armed intervention in Jordan as well as the United States armed intervention in Lebanon. He added that charges against the United Arab Republic used as a pretext for intervention were very vague.

Since Article 51 of the United Nations charter, said Mr. Sobolev, could not be applied in the case of United States intervention in Lebanon, then "the United States had no justification either in law or in fact for intervening." The same thing would apply to the British intervention in Jordan. 48

During the second Council meeting which occurred on July 17, 1958, the Swedish representative, reaffirmed his Government's position in relation to the presence of United States troops in Lebanon by saying that that action had "substantially altered the conditions of the activities of the United Nations observers in Lebanon." He then presented the Swedish draft resolution (S/4054) requesting the withdrawal of UNOGIL because it was "unsuitable" that members

48 Ibid., p. 21.
of the Observation Group "perform their functions in the presence of foreign troops." Sweden had changed its role from that of mediator by declaring itself strongly against the United States landing.

Meanwhile, the Japanese delegation had assumed the role of a mediator. Its representative drew the attention of the Council members to the "inappropriate and regrettable" intervention by the United States in Lebanon and expressed his hope that the United States forces would be withdrawn as soon as possible.50

At the July 18, 1958 meeting of the Security Council, the Council members voted on the three resolutions mentioned above. The Soviet resolution (S/4047/Rev.1) was defeated by a vote of 1 to 8 with 2 abstentions, Japan and Sweden; the United States draft resolution (S/4050/Rev.1) was vetoed by the Soviet Union but had received 8 votes in favor, while Sweden had abstained from voting; finally, the Swedish draft resolution (S/4054) was defeated by a vote of 2 to 9.

At this point the United States representative presented another draft resolution (S/4056) requesting the holding of an emergency session of the General Assembly according to the "Uniting for Peace" resolution of 1950, but Mr. Lodge requested that his resolution be withheld.

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50 Ibid., p.12.
pending a final effort by the Japanese delegation to present a satisfactory resolution. 51

Furthermore, the Soviet Union presented a similar draft resolution (S/4057) requesting the immediate convening of the General Assembly to consider "... the intervention of the United States and Britain in Lebanon and Jordan." 52

On July 21, 1958, the Japanese representative submitted a draft resolution that requested Mr. Hammarskjold "to make arrangements forthwith for such measures, in addition to those envisaged by the resolution of June 11, 1958, as he may consider necessary in the light of the present circumstances ... so as to make possible the withdrawal of United States forces from Lebanon." 53

In the July 22, 1958, meeting of the Security Council, the Japanese draft resolution (S/4055) was voted upon and it received 10 votes in favor and 1 against; but it was not adopted because the negative vote was that of a permanent member of the Security Council, namely, the Soviet Union. 54

During the August 7, 1958, meeting of the Security Council the United States draft resolution (S/4056/Rev.1) declaring that the Security Council: "Decided to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly," was adopted

51 S/FV.834, July 18, 1958, p.12.
52 Ibid., p.17.
54 S/FV.837, July 22, 1958, p.3.
What did the Security Council actually do to solve the Lebanese Crisis?

Before attempting to answer this question we have to take into account the limitations of the Security Council mentioned in Chapter I of this thesis. We have seen that several resolutions had failed to pass in the Security Council because of the use of the veto. For example the Soviet Union had vetoed the American resolution (S/4050/Rev.1) although that draft resolution had received 8 votes in favor. The Security Council had succeeded only in passing the June 11, 1958, resolution which had requested an observation group (UNOGIL) to observe and report but not to stop the alleged "illegal infiltration" of men and arms across the Lebanese borders and had left the rest to the efforts of Mr. Hammarskjold.

The activity of the Security Council was thus paralyzed by the use of the veto, and the Lebanese complaint was referred to the General Assembly in which the Lebanese Crisis proved later to have greater chances of solution.

The landing of the Marines had also complicated the situation by introducing a new factor which threatened to undermine the position of UNOGIL.

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55 S/PV.838, August 7, 1958, p. 3.
Following the landing of American troops in Lebanon, efforts were made, outside the Security Council, to solve the Lebanese Crisis.

Premier Khrushchev had invited Britain, France, India and the United States on July 19, 1958, to an urgent conference to be held, three days later "in this awesome moment of history" to prepare concrete measures to stop the "military conflict" in the Middle East. He also proposed that the recommendations of the Conference should be referred to the Security Council for its consideration.

On July 22, 1958, President Eisenhower sent a note to Premier Khrushchev in reply to the latter's message of July 19, in which he denied strongly that the United States had stirred up the Middle Eastern area with the landing of its troops. He said: "the real danger of war would come if one small nation after another were to be engulfed by expansionist and aggressive forces supported by the Soviet Union." President Eisenhower then declared: "that it lay to any of us [the United States or the Soviet Union] to enlarge the scope of the Security Council consideration of the Middle East issues."

A second exchange of letters between Premier Khrushchev and President Eisenhower occurred on July 23 and 25, 1958.

Premier Khrushchev in his letter dated July 23, 1958, accepted Western suggestions for a summit meeting on the Middle East "within the framework" of the Security Council.
In reply to this message President Eisenhower sent a note, two days later, in which he welcomed the recognition of Premier Khrushchev of "the responsibility of the United Nations." 56

Premier Khrushchev, however, suddenly called off the summit conference and the State Department "breathed a sigh of relief." 57

In Lebanon itself the Crisis took a wide step towards solution on July 31, 1958, with the election of General Fouad Chehab as President of Lebanon. "The 'General' was the most popular figure in Lebanon" during the revolt. His "kid glove" treatment of the Opposition helped him keep the friendship of both Government and rebels and thus "prevented the war from becoming more bitter." His election marked the basic turning point in the Crisis. The Lebanese Crisis could be considered to have come to a conclusion although some time would be necessary to stabilize the country. 58


58 Miller, op.cit., p. 197.
CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF UNOGIL DURING THE
LEBANESE CRISIS OF 1958

Formation of UNOGIL

The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon was sent by the United Nations according to the June 11, 1958, resolution of the Security Council in order "to ensure" against the "illegal infiltration" of men and arms across the Lebanese frontiers.¹

The Opposition National Front had commented on the dispatch of UNOGIL to Lebanon, by saying that since the Front had considered the Lebanese Crisis as an internal one, thus, the presence of UNOGIL would not affect its aim of "saving the country from Chamoun's rule." The statement further demanded that UNOGIL should ensure against the flow of men and matériel "from Turkey, Iraq and Jordan" and arms "from the United States, Britain and France." Those arms and ammunition, the Front claimed, were "distributed among some para-military organizations" in order "to destroy national resistance."²

In a statement issued on June 14, 1958, Mr. Ali Bazzi, (Secretary of the Opposition National Front), commented on the arrival of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon by

¹ S/4023, June 11, 1958. See Appendix V.
saying that the observers should not interfere in the internal affairs of Lebanon. Their presence, he added, would complicate the situation because of the attempt of the Lebanese Government to change an internal crisis into an international one in order to request the assistance of foreign countries.

Mr. Bazzi rejected all the charges of the Government concerning the interference of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon.³

The establishment of UNGIL was described by Mr. Salam, a leading Opposition leader, on June 22, 1958, as an "unwise decision" but declared that if their mission would be restricted to observation they would be welcome.⁴

The Composition of UNGIL

The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon was appointed by the Secretary-General and was composed of three leading members supported by field observers.

Major General Odd Bull of Norway was designated as Executive Member of the Observation Group while Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal of India and Mr. Galo Plaza of Ecuador were appointed as deputies. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East (UNRWA) had provided, on a temporary basis, a number of field observers and the use of

³ As-Siassa, June 14, 1958.
UNRWA facilities. The Secretary-General requested Major General Von Horn, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, to detach 10 United Nations military observers from Truce Supervision Organization duty to assist UNOGIL. The first military observers, five in number, arrived in Lebanon on June 12, 1958. They began active reconnaissance on June 13.

Powers, Privileges and Immunities of UNOGIL

In the first interim report presented by the Secretary-General on June 16, 1958, to the Security Council informing it of the steps he had taken to implement the resolution of June 11, 1958, he said "the Observation Group will constitute itself and determine its own procedures."5

Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, a deputy of the Chairman of UNOGIL, declared before the Observation Group left Lebanon that the Group "had no police or preventive functions."6

The Lebanese Prime Minister informed Major General Odd Bull, in a letter dated June 15, 1958, that the Lebanese Government had nominated Dr. Albert Moukheiber, Minister of


6 "Forum interviews His Excellency Rajeshwar Dayal, Member of the UN Observation Team in Lebanon," The Middle East Forum, XXXIV (January 1959), 11.
Health, as "Minister in charge of relations" between the Lebanese Government and UNOGIL. Dr. Moukheiber was to be assisted by a commission composed of representatives of the Sureté General, the Ministry of Foreign Affair, the Lebanese Army Headquarters, and the Ministry of Finance. The Commission's task was to assist UNOGIL, to supply it with information known to the Lebanese authorities about the infiltration of personnel and matériel across the Lebanese border, and to ensure the contact between the different sections of the Lebanese Administration and UNOGIL. The Lebanese Prime Minister requested UNOGIL in that letter to contact the various departments of the Lebanese Government through Dr. Moukheiber's Commission whose job was to fulfil their requests.7

Mr. Hammarskjold requested the Lebanese Foreign Minister, in a letter dated June 13, 1958, "to extend" to UNOGIL, in addition to the status enjoyed by the United Nations' officials under "the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations," the privileges and immunities given to diplomatic envoys under international law. Mr. Hammarskjold also requested the following facilities for UNOGIL which included "freedom of entry... of property, equipment and spare parts, freedom of movement of personnel, equipment and transport ... and the right of unrestricted communication by radio." Besides, the Lebanese Government would provide, at its own expenses, for living facilities including headquarters and areas for observation stations and would provide

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the necessary means of transportation and communication. 8

Mr. Hammarskjold's Second Report
to the Security Council

In this report on the implementation of the June 11, 1958, resolution of the Security Council, presented by the Secretary-General on June 28, 1958, Mr. Hammarskjold declared that during the two preliminary meetings of UNOGIL held on June 18 and 19, 1958, the observers' different methods of fulfilling their task of stopping "the illegal infiltration" of men and arms across the Lebanese frontier, were discussed.

The Secretary-General also declared that by June 25, 1958, ninety-four officers from eleven different countries were serving as field observers in Lebanon. In addition to patrolling accessible areas, they had since June 16, advanced into areas under Opposition control. Furthermore, observer outstations had been established in areas regularly patrolled by observer team such as Tripoli and the North Bekaa area.

As to transport equipment there were, on June 26, 1958, 74 vehicles for the 94 observers, and a completely operating "radio communication system" to provide contact between the Observation Group headquarters, observer outstations and the jeeps touring the territory assigned for observation. Air patrolling had started At the request of UNOGIL the United Nations Headquarters had sent

8 S/4029 Annex II, op.cit.
two helicopters which arrived in Beirut on June 23, with Norweigian pilots. UNOGIL planes would be used to fulfil the task entrusted to the Group under the June 11, 1958 resolution.  

The First Report of UNOGIL

UNOGIL's first report issued on July 4, 1958, mentioned the following problems of observation which limited the Group in trying to fulfil the purpose it was established for. First, only 18 Kms out of 324 Kms of the frontier between Lebanon and Syria, lying on either side of the Beirut-Damascus road, were still under the control of the Government forces. Access to area under Government control was assured for the Group, but no such assurances were granted to the Group to enter Opposition territories. Secondly, physical accessibility to the frontier by road was limited to the area between the frontier and the main road, running the length of the Bekaa Valley 10-15 Kms in width. Thirdly, the northern border could only be reached through the area north of Tripoli, which was under the control of the Opposition forces and which was not yet opened for observation. Fourthly, the Observation Group had to take into consideration "the nature and location" of the population living along the frontier and the traditional freedom of association which had existed for centuries among certain people living in areas now lying on both sides of the frontier. Besides,

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9 S/4038, June 28, 1958.
the possession of arms had been a general practice. Fifthly, UNOGIL stressed the fact that the methods used in fulfilling its purpose must be directed "towards the explicit purpose of observation and reporting" for which the Group was formed. Thus, UNOGIL had restricted its activities to "observing" and "reporting" instead of stopping the alleged intervention from outside.

Were the methods adopted by UNOGIL and its resources adequate?

UNOGIL had used the following methods: (1) Regular and frequent patrols of all accessible roads were carried out at daytime especially in the frontier areas. Therefore, no night patrolling was carried by the Observation Group which hampered its observation activities. (2) A system of permanent observation posts had been established at which military observers had been stationed. This achievement had helped the Group in trying to fulfil its mission. (3) "Aerial reconnaissance" had developed, two helicopters were in action and four light planes had arrived and another four were expected soon.

The patrols of UNOGIL had reported considerable movements of weapons in Lebanon and concentration at several places. The Observation Group declared that the weapons that were observed consisted of various kinds of rifles of French, British and Italian makes, but the Group could not determine from where those arms were acquired, or "if any of the armed men had infiltrated from outside," but "there was little doubt that the vast majority were in any case Lebanese." The above
mentioned conclusions of UNOGIL had caused a lot of controversy as we shall see while discussing the reaction of the Lebanese Government to the first report of UNOGIL. Observer teams had sometimes found difficulty in penetrating Opposition-held areas. Two Opposition leaders, namely, Mr. Jumblat of the Chouf area, and Mr. Haidar of Central Bekaa, said that they would not allow observers working in their official capacity to enter their territories. Both men noted that that was a matter of principle since they were involved in a domestic conflict with which the United Nations had no concern. The attitudes of those two Opposition leaders expressed clearly the Opposition's point of view regarding the activities of UNOGIL. The Opposition had already rejected the reference of the Lebanese complaint to the Arab League and the United Nations Security Council on the basis that they considered the Lebanese Crisis as an internal one and that the United Nations should not interfere in it.

UNOGIL's first report mentioned that obstruction tactics to observation patrols had taken the form of firing in the vicinity of patrols, mining of roads, and the blowing up of bridges.

What was the reaction of the Lebanese Government to the first report of UNOGIL?

Mr. Azkoul, the Lebanese permanent representative in the United Nations, summarized his Government's comments on the first report of UNOGIL. 10 by saying "for a number of reasons the

10 For the details of the official comments of the Lebanese Government on the first report of UNOGIL see S/4043 and Add.1, July 8, 1958.
Observation Group had failed to make a final judgement" on the infiltration of personnel and arms into Lebanon. He added that the Group was unable to reach the Opposition-held border, for it lacked air patrolling facilities and the equipment for night patrolling.

Mr. Azkoul said that the charges of the Lebanese Government regarding the infiltration of men and weapons into Lebanon had been confirmed by UNOGIL's first report in the following respects. First, the Observation Group acknowledged, indirectly, that it had observed a few men who were not Lebanese. The observers admitted, indirectly, that infiltration was possible in regions where there were ethnically similar groups on both sides of the Syrian-Lebanese border. Furthermore, the rebels could hold the frontier areas because of the nearness of Syria from where they could receive support in men, money and weapons. In order to conceal infiltration movements, added Mr. Azkoul, the rebels had prevented the observers from reaching the frontier areas. Mr. Azkoul finally urged the Security Council to take more effective measures in order to fulfil the Group's mission of preventing any matériel or armed men from entering Lebanon. 11

Mr. Salam, a prominent Opposition leader, commented on the first report of the United Nations observers by saying that he was glad because Mr. Hammarskjold and his assistants had reached that conclusion which revealed the truth to world opinion. 12


12 As-Siassa, July 8, 1958.
Some of the observers themselves had made statements concerning the conclusions they reached in the first report of UNOGIL. Mr. Plaza for example was asked "whether the Lebanese Government had provided information which the Group had not yet been able to investigate but which, if substantiated, would justify its charges," Mr. Plaza answered that the Group "had not had anything from the Lebanese Government which would lead it to say that there was massive infiltration." Mr. Azkoul said that this statement was acceptable to his Government because it had "never claimed that there was massive infiltration in Lebanon." Massive infiltration, added Mr. Azkoul, would mean an invasion and Lebanon had never claimed that it was invaded.\(^{13}\)

UNOGIL seemed to react rather negatively to the landing of the American forces. Mr. Galo Plaza, Chairman of UNOGIL, allegedly stated on July 20, 1958 that the landing of American troops in Lebanon had destroyed his efforts "to bring peace to that strife-torn land." Mr. Plaza also expressed his hope that the coming Presidential election in Lebanon might bring a new president who could unite all the groups under his leadership. Such a leader might be General Fouad Chehab. Mr. Plaza added that Chehab, as the Chief of the Lebanese Army, could pacify the land. The above statement of Mr. Plaza was neither confirmed nor denied by the United Nations Secretariat because it had no knowledge of it. Since the United Nations had issued no statement denying Mr. Plaza's statement, I presume that there existed such a statement.\(^{14}\)

\(^{13}\) S/PV.628, July 15, 1958, p. 10

Furthermore, the Secretary-General had expressed his fear that the landing of the United States troops might cause a set-back to the activities of UNOGIL.

The First and the Second Interim Reports of UNOGIL

Since the second report of UNOGIL was not published until July 25, 1958, the United Nations Observation Group had submitted two interim reports, through the Secretary-General, in pursuance of the Security Council's resolution of June 11, 1958.

In the first interim report of UNOGIL, submitted to the Security Council on July 15, 1958, the Observation Group declared that on July 15, it had "completed the task of obtaining full freedom of access" to all sections of the Lebanese frontier. 16

In its second interim report, the Observation Group declared that as of July 15, 1958, it had established the following network of outstations and substations: 14 observers were stationed at the Headquarters of UNOGIL in Beirut. 14 stations were established in the different Opposition-held areas. 5 stations were established in the Tripoli area manned by 22 observers; 3 stations in Bekaa, manned by 29 observers; 3 stations in Zahlé, Rachaya and Saghbine manned by 18 observers; a station in south east Lebanon in Marjeyoun, manned by 10

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15 See Chapter VI, p. 160.

observers. Thus, the largest number of stations and observers were found in Tripoli which was a strong Opposition-held area while a similar number of observers and stations were found in the other Opposition-held areas except in South-East Lebanon where only one station was established at Marjeoune because that town was under the control of the Government.

Air reconnaissance, added the report, proved to be very useful in addition to the Group's ground observation. "The aircraft and personnel" of the Group had been used to the maximum of their abilities. Until July 15, 1958, "82 missions had been flown totalling 150 flying hours." The report, however, stated that the Group should be equipped with a sufficient number of planes and experienced personnel "capable of providing continuous air patrols" on all the frontier areas.  

The Lebanese Government's reaction to the second interim report could be summarized as follows. The report did not clarify if permanent observation posts had been established on the border. Even if the observers could reach the border yet that did not mean that observation had become effective. The observers, however, had not conducted night patrolling, while information had shown that infiltration of arms and men had occurred at night. The observers would enter Opposition-held areas accompanying the rebels at times when nothing could be hidden from them. Furthermore, the Lebanese Government knew that the observers were not allowed to enter the Baalbek area. Then on July 18 the Lebanese Government had published a

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communiqué dealing with recent acts of infiltrations into Lebanon.

The Second Report of UNOGIL

This report issued on July 25, 1958, covered the activities and the observations of the Group from July 2 to 15, 1958. Reference should be made, while reading this report, to the first and second interim reports of the Group dated July 15 and 17, 1958.

Two important events occurred on July 15. The first event was that UNOGIL had finally succeeded in making agreements with the Opposition leaders for the freedom of access of its observers to the border in all Opposition-held areas. Secondly, the United States troops landed in Beirut. This event had its impact on the inhabitants of Opposition-held areas, where observers were operating, and caused set-backs to the task of observation.

The second report of UNOGIL mentioned the development of observation in the different Opposition-held areas. The United Nations Observation patrols could now reach every part of the North Bekaa Valley during the day (the main part of the Bekaa Valley was under the control of the Opposition). Starting on July 11, 1958, day patrols from Ch'taura outstation began to

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18 For the details of that Communiqué see S/PV.335, July 21, 1958, pp.20-23.

19 S/PV.333, July 18, 1958, p. 2.
reach the frontier with Syria in that area. Besides, adequate ground observation of the Central Bekaa Valley area was carried from Ch'taura outstation and 3 other substations. A day observation post was established near the border with Syria at Masnaa. In Masnaa, the Group had observed "a considerable movement of traffic" but nothing indicated that there was "any infiltration" of arms or ammunition. This conclusion could not be final because the border was only observed in the daytime.

In the South Bekaa Valley area Opposition forces controlled most of the area between the Masnaa-Rachaya road and the border with Syria. Ground observation in that area was carried out from a substation at Rachaya.

The main conclusions of the second report of UNOGIL were the following. First, a limited scale infiltration of arms and personnel. Secondly, as to the question of the illegal infiltration of personnel, the following factors should be taken into consideration, namely, "the nature of the frontier, the existence of traditional tribal and other bonds on both sides of it" and "the free movement of produce in both directions." The United Nations observers, who had been carefully observing Opposition-controlled areas and who had often observed armed bands there had not been able to detect the presence of persons who had crossed the border for the purpose of fighting.

Thirdly, the above observations were based upon the results of vigilant air and ground patrolling. Intensive air patrolling was carried on day and night. No comments by the Government
or the Opposition were made on the second report of UNOGIL. Both of them were busy with the new Presidential elections which took place on July 31, 1958. The Lebanese Parliament unanimously elected General Fouad Chehab as the new President.

The Third Report of UNOGIL

The second report of UNOGIL was adopted on July 25, 1958, but for some reasons had covered the activities of the Group only up to July 15. The third report of UNOGIL covered its activities from July 15, to August 11, 1958. Being a progress report, it should be read in conjunction with the previous reports.

That period had been marked by two important events. First, the landing of American troops in Beirut on July 15, and secondly, the election on July 31, of General Chehab as the President of Lebanon.

The landing of United States troops had affected the inhabitants of Opposition-held areas and had caused difficulties and "setbacks to the task of observation" not only was the Group prevented from putting into effect its plans for the immediate establishment of permanent posts in Opposition-held areas which it had made arrangements for on July 15, but also its observers had to continue the tiresome job of winning the confidence of the population of those areas by the impartiality and independence of the observers.

UNOGIL emphasized in a statement made on July 16, its
independent nature and that it had no connection with the American troops that landed on July 15, 1958. By their perseverance the observers won back the ground lost after July 18. Since June 29, motor traffic on the roads leading from the Syrian frontier into Lebanon had decreased.

The number of ground observers working with UNOGIL had already increased from 113 on July 15, to 166 on August 10. Meanwhile, 8 planes had arrived and the air operations personnel had increased from 20 to 24. The necessary vehicles, camp equipment and radio communications equipment were received gradually.

Most of the permanent stations in the Opposition-held areas envisaged in the second interim report of the Group were established since that time and other stations were expected to be established soon. Seven of the 12 proposed substations were established in the different Opposition-held areas to aid the already established stations. The first substation in the Akkar Plain was established on July 15, 1958, at Halba.

In the Tripoli area, and following the landing of the United States troops, observer teams had witnessed a rotation of armed men. Besides, "interference with the activities" of observer teams had precluded a complete observation on road traffic. Three substations were established in the North Bekaa Valley area between July 26 and 27, 1958. Another substation was established in the Opposition-held area of Baalbek. On August 8,
1958, Baalbek replaced Cht aura as the main station for that area. Thus, the Group had been able to exercise direct observation over the possible infiltration routes in that area. Only normal day traffic and little night traffic had been reported by the new substations.

In the Central Bekaa Valley area Government forces controlled the main centers and roads. The South Bekaa Valley was an Opposition-held area. Substations were established at Rachaya and Saghbine, and a permanent observation post at Kaf raya (the posts of Saghbine and Kaf raya were closed on August 10, 1958, and their personnel transferred to Ain Zebde substation). Three additional night observation posts were established in that area. Patrols were carried out along the main roads and to the various villages even at night.

In its second report UNOGIL had said that a limited scale infiltration of arms and ammunition had occurred on the route from the frontier near Deir El Achair across the South Bekaa Valley and then by mule caravan across the mountains into the Chouf. Besides, the size of the caravan was limited and "insufficient to transform the Druze tribesmen in the Chouf into a force" which could resist well armed troops.

In South-East Lebanon an observation patrol received a hostile reception in Chebaa on July 21, 1958. Another attempt to enter Chebaa, five days later, also failed. Thus, an alternative post was selected at Chouaiya.

In South-West Lebanon an agreement was reached on July 28, with the Opposition leader in the Chouf allowing the
observers to patrol that area by day and night. The following conclusions were mentioned in UNOGIL's third report.

First, the ground lost after the landing of the United States troops on July 15, 1958, and which resulted in a violent reaction in the Opposition-held areas was regained through "the tact, patience and perseverance of the military observers." Thus, UNOGIL's activities were extended and new posts were established at most of the sensitive regions along the frontier.

Secondly, the presence of the United Nations observers in villages was welcomed both by Government supporters and Opposition elements. "The independence and impartiality" of the observer teams was appreciated. They succeeded sometimes in solving local disputes referred to them by different parties.

Thirdly, limited infiltration of arms which might have occurred prior to the Presidential elections on July 31, 1958 had since greatly diminished. "A virtual truce" had prevailed then in most of the Opposition-held areas which had been the center of disturbances. Many acts of lawlessness unrelated to the political situation were reported. Those acts were motivated by economic reasons which resulted from the "prolonged state of civil strife."

Fourthly, UNOGIL finally announced that the "scope" of its activities would be determined "by the progress made in dealing with the internal political aspects" of the Lebanese Crisis and with the restoration of normal life to the cities and the countryside.21

The above mentioned progress in the internal situation

in Lebanon was due to the election of General Fouad Chehab as the new President of Lebanon on July 31, 1958. General Chehab was respected by both the Government and the Opposition due to the neutral stand that he and his army had taken during the Lebanese Crisis and his refusal to resist the Opposition according to the Government's orders. The new Lebanese President had since that time won the confidence of the Lebanese public as a whole.

The Fourth Report of UNGIL

This report covered the Group's activities between August 11, and September 20, 1958. "That period had witnessed a consolidation" of the activities of UNGIL, an increase in its personnel and equipment, "an improvement in the techniques of observing and further development of its procedures for evaluating the results of observation."

Observers were able to move freely throughout the country-side where they were welcomed. Occasional interference with patrols and shooting at United Nations jeeps and planes by irresponsible persons had occurred.

The election of General Fouad Chehab had reduced the tension but lawlessness had continued in some parts of Lebanon. Although there was still a considerable number of armed men, yet there had been no significant clashes between organized Opposition bands and Lebanese armed forces. With increasing the number of posts, the Group was confident that if infiltration was still occurring, it occurred on a very small scale. There were no
convincing reports of such infiltration but the Group had
some detailed reports that persons who had entered Lebanese
territory for illegal purposes had left the country.

The period under review had witnessed a considerable
development of air activities of the Group. The number of
air personnel had increased from 24 to 73. There were also
24 additional planes. The level of air activities, however,
had improved after the arrival of the additional aircraft and
personnel. The total flying hours and take-offs had increased
from 15 trips totalling 23 flying hours in June to 221 trips
totalling 515 flying hours in September, 1958.

During the period covered by this report the number
of field observers had increased from 166 to 214 while the
number of observer stations, substations and permanent observation
posts had increased from 22 to 34 of which many, however, were
not completely manned. At least 150 fully manned posts were
required. 5 new observation posts were established in Tripoli and
the Akkar Plain areas, while no new stations were established
in the North Bekaa Valley area. The Group covered all practicable
roads leading into the country. There were also numerous mule
tracks and other paths by means of which the frontier could
be crossed. The only considerable traffic across the frontier
was reported by the post at El Kah where 20-25 vehicles
had been reported moving daily in each direction. Local
leaders were eager to restore order in that area by establishing
a local "police." Some villages had requested the Lebanese
armed forces to move into that part of the country.
In South-East Lebanon two new substations were established. In South-West Lebanon United Nations military observers aimed at keeping watch on any possible illegal infiltration of personnel or matériel from the sea. A main station at Sidon and substations at Jezzine and Barouk were established on August 25.

The fourth report of UNOGIL mentioned the following conclusions. First, no cases of infiltration had been observed. Even if any infiltration had occurred yet its extent was insignificant. Secondly, the number of posts had increased during that period from 22 to 34 manned by 214 observers compared with 166 at the disposal of the Group on August 10. Thirdly, air patrolling had increased. 22

We should conclude this report by saying that the remarkable improvement in the activities of UNOGIL was due to the fact that after the election of President Chehab the Lebanese forces started taking over the responsibility for keeping law and order in the Opposition-held areas. Furthermore, the United States began to withdraw its troops at the beginning of September.

The Fifth Report of UNOGIL

This report covered the Group's activities from September 21 to November 14, 1958. In that period a great expansion in personnel and equipment occurred. Two important events

occurred. First "the assumption of office on September 23, by General Fouad Chehab as the new President of Lebanon."

On October 15, 1958, disturbances ended with the formation of a new Government supported both by the Parliament as well as by Lebanese public opinion. After the new President assumed power the Lebanese armed forces started to enter the previously "Opposition-held areas of the Akkar Plain, the North Bekaa Valley, and the villages on the slopes of Mount Hermon."

The second important event was the withdrawal of United States troops which was completed on October 25, 1958, by that time the Chouf and Deir El Achair areas were the only parts outside the control of the Government forces. By the end of October the leaders of those areas had disbanded their forces. Thus, no organized Opposition forces were left and "the Government was in the process of extending its authority over the whole country."

The development of military operations since the fourth report was as follows. First, the number of military personnel serving with UNOGIL had risen from 287 to 591. Of those 469 were "ground observers", 32 were "non-commissioned officers in support of ground operations and 90 were in the air section." The number of vehicles had increased from 173 to 290. Secondly, ground observation had increased considerably. Since September 21, 1958, 11 new substations, 4 permanently manned observation posts and one traffic check-post had been established. Therefore, the number of manned posts had increased from 33 to 49.
During that period ground observers could observe the roads along the border or leading to it as well as the interior roads. The daily average of patrol hours had risen from 140 hours in mid-August to 932 hours at the end of October.

Air operations had increased. The combined totals of missions and flying time per month for fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters had risen from 210 trips totalling 494 flying hours in August to 305 trips totalling 767 flying hours in October.

The following general observations were mentioned in this report. In the first place, no case of infiltration of personnel or matériel had been noted by the United Nations observers during the period covered by this report. Sporadic instances of interference with the freedom of those observers had continued to occur. The period under review had been marked by a continuous decrease of armed men seen throughout Lebanon especially after the formation of the new Government in mid-October.

The following were the conclusions of the fifth report of UNOGIL. First, due to the improvement of internal security in Lebanon and in the relations between Lebanon and its "Eastern neighbor" the Observation Group regarded its mission as completed. Secondly, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold had declared, in his report to the General Assembly on August 21, 1958, that UNOGIL had succeeded in fulfilling the two tasks for which it had been established. The Observation Group had contributed to the task of fostering peaceful relations between Lebanon and the Arab States by carrying out as efficiently as possible its mandate under the
Security Council's resolution of June 11, 1958. The Group had also facilitated the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country which was completed before the end of October. Because its task had been completed the Group believed that UNOGIL should be withdrawn. UNOGIL, added the report, had been "a symbol of the concern of the international community" for Lebanon's welfare and integrity. The report finally stated that observers from 21 different countries had cooperated effectively to fulfil the mission of the United Nations.  

In a letter dated November 16, 1958, the Government of Lebanon, had requested the deletion of the Lebanese complaint presented to the Security Council on May 22, 1958, from the Council's agenda.

Mr. Hammarskjold declared that in view of the recommendations of UNOGIL and the Lebanese Government he had prepared a detailed plan for the withdrawal of the Observation Group.  

According to Mr. Hammarskjold's plan, field operations would be ordered to stop immediately. Furthermore, the closing down of substations would begin on November 26, 1958, according to a fixed schedule. All UNOGIL stations in all the Opposition held areas would be closed down by November 30, 1958.

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24 S/4115, November 17, 1958.
The military personnel of UNOGIL would be withdrawn in three phases. During the first phase 120 observers would be withdrawn, 153 during the second phase and 102 during the third phase. 25

To what extent did UNOGIL succeed in fulfilling its mission according to the Security Council's resolution of June 11, 1958?

We have already discussed in this chapter of the thesis how UNOGIL was dispatched to Lebanon, according to the above-mentioned resolution, in order "to ensure" that there was "no illegal infiltration" of arms and men across the Lebanese frontier and to report back its findings to the Security Council through the Secretary-General.

It should be noted here that UNOGIL had provided the Security Council with "accurate and unbiased information" taking into consideration the material and political limitations mentioned in its first report to the Security Council. Those limitations were overcome, to a certain extent, gradually as we have already seen in this chapter.

Lieutenant-General Burns, then Commander of UNEF, described the observers and the observation groups as: "An essential part of any peace-keeping machinery which the United Nations was likely to set up." He added that the effectiveness of any

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25 S/4116, November 18, 1958.
observation group would depend upon the cooperation of the host country. 26

The June 11, 1958, resolution of the Security Council mentioned above was interpreted differently by Mr. Hammarskjold and the members of the Observation Group on one hand, and the Lebanese Government on the other. While the first emphasized the "reporting" and "observing" role of UNOGIL, the latter insisted that the Group should stop the alleged infiltration and attacked most of the conclusions of the first report of UNOGIL.

In addition to the Government's negative attitude towards UNOGIL, a serious set-back to the latter's activities occurred on July 15, 1958, with the landing of American troops in Lebanon. Members of the Group succeeded with perseverance and patience to restore the confidence of the Lebanese public especially in the Opposition-held areas. It should be mentioned, however, that the Opposition leaders had taken, at the beginning, a cautious attitude towards UNOGIL but had gradually allowed the observers to enter the Opposition-held areas.

Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal, the Indian deputy of the Chairman of UNOGIL, had declared before the Observation Group left Lebanon that the presence of UNOGIL "had a calming effect on the situation..." in Lebanon. "By its presence" UNOGIL had "acted as a catalyst," and had "thus indirectly helped the Lebanese people themselves find a solution for their problems."

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The Lebanese public had treated UNOGIL with scepticism at the beginning but the Group had gradually won their confidence.

Mr. Dayal added that UNOGIL was leaving Lebanon at a time when peace was restored to the country and its relations with Syria had improved. Furthermore, foreign troops had left the country. Mr. Dayal concluded by saying "while UNOGIL" could not "claim credit for all those developments," it might have "helped to influence them."27

27 "Forum Interviews His Excellency Rajeshwar Dayal, Member of the UN Observation Team in Lebanon," op.cit., 11-13.
CHAPTER VI

THE ROLES OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL DURING THE
LEBANESE CRISIS OF 1958

The Role of the General Assembly

The third emergency special session of the General Assembly which convened on August 8, 1958, upon the request of the Security Council, unanimously agreed on August 21, on a formula for a solution of the Lebanese Crisis. Up until the final meeting of that session on August 21, fifty-five of the eighty-one Member States had expressed their points of view in a general discussion.

A clear indication of the importance with which the Member States had viewed the emergency session was shown by the fact that twenty-three countries had sent their Foreign Ministers to participate in it, including France, the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States.¹ Even President Eisenhower attended the August 13, 1958, meeting of the session.

The speeches of the representatives of the different members of the General Assembly indicated the different approaches towards the Middle East problem. Some representatives favored the landing of American troops in Lebanon, while others attacked that measure. A third group, however, took a moderate attitude towards the subject.

President Eisenhower addressed the members of the General Assembly on August 13, 1958, on the policy of the United States towards the Middle East and the United Nations. He defended the measure taken by his Government, namely, the landing of American troops in Lebanon by saying that his Government had responded to the urgent plea by the "freely elected" Lebanese Government which was threatened by civil strife instigated from outside. Since 1945, added the American President, the United States' Government had undertaken the following policy towards incidents such as those of Iran, Greece, the Berlin Blockade, Korea, etc... that aggression, whether direct or indirect, should be checked before it destroyed "both aggressor and defender alike." That principle, continued President Eisenhower, was applied when the United States answered the appeal of the Lebanese Government. He concluded his statement by requesting the General Assembly, which was free of the veto, to discuss methods to ensure the integrity and independence of Lebanon, and expressed the willingness of his Government to support any resolution with that aim. 2

Dr. Abdul Monem Rifai of Jordan, expressed his Government's approval of the landing of American troops in Lebanon by saying that his country: "Was undertaking a bold struggle against indirect aggression and external plots threatening its

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2 "President Eisenhower's Program for the Middle East," The Department of State Bulletin, XXXIX (September 1, 1958), 337-342.
independence and integrity." It should be mentioned, however, that Jordan's attitude to the American landing in Lebanon was influenced by the presence of British troops in Jordan.

Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi, the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic, took a moderate attitude. He welcomed the declaration of the Government of the United States' aim to withdraw its troops from Lebanon, and of the actual beginning of that withdrawal. He then expressed his Government's disturbance because the American Government had not yet fixed a date for the final withdrawal of its troops. The moderate attitude of the United Arab Republic could be explained by the fact that certain internal developments had occurred in Lebanon, the most important of which was the election of General Fouad Chehab, who had the confidence of the Lebanese public, as the new President.

A strong attack on the landing of American troops in Lebanon was made by Mr. Gromyko, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, on August 13, 1958, before the General Assembly. He accused the United States of armed aggression and violation of the Charter of the United Nations. He then presented a draft resolution (A/3870) recommending the immediate withdrawal of the American and British troops from Lebanon and Jordan. Almost every Afro-Asian representative stressed "the

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3 "Third Emergency Special Session," op.cit., 46.
4 A/3870, August 13, 1958.
positive aspects of nationalism" and pointed out its importance to the development of his country. That attitude was a challenge to the Western bloc to tolerate nationalism "as desirable and necessary." For example, the Indian representative declared that it was: "One of the extraordinary ironies of the present situation that a great deal of criticism of nationalism in the Arab world came from just those parts of the world where the life of the people was squarely based on a vigorous, flourishing established nationalism."  

The Latin American group in the General Assembly expressed their belief that no resolution should support the Western stand and justify the dispatch of American and British troops in answer to the requests of the Lebanese and Jordanian Governments. The aim of the Latin American group was to prevent the passage of any such resolution which might be used in the future to justify foreign intervention to support a Latin American Government.  

On August 19, 1958, the President of the General Assembly, Sir Leslie Munro of New Zealand, read a seven-power draft resolution (A/3878) presented by Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Liberia, Norway, Panama, and Paraguay. This draft resolution

6 A/FP.V.738, August 18, 1958, p. 66.  
took into consideration documents \((A/3876^8)\) and \((A/3877^9)\) and declared that Member States of the United Nations should not interfere, directly or indirectly, in the internal affairs of one another or instigate civil strife in any state. This draft resolution added that all Member States should apply the above-mentioned policy with regard to the Middle East area.\(^{10}\)

At the outset of the August 21, 1958, meeting of the General Assembly Mr. Mahjoub, Foreign Minister of Sudan, presented an Arab draft resolution \(^{11}\) sponsored by ten Arab states, namely, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic, and Yemen. Among the sponsors of the Arab draft resolution were Jordan and Lebanon who had lodged two complaints with the United Nations Security Council against the alleged intervention of the United Arab Republic in their internal affairs.

The Arab draft resolution mentioned that states should "practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors," according to the United Nations Charter. The General Assembly, added the Arab resolution, noted also the

\(^8\) A/3876 was a letter dated August 18, 1958, from the Secretary of State of the United States to the President of the General Assembly informing him of the readiness of the United States to abide by any resolution by the United Nations General Assembly requesting the withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon.

\(^9\) A/3877 was a letter dated August 10, 1958, similar to the above-mentioned letter \((A/3876)\) regarding the withdrawal of British troops from Jordan.

\(^10\) A/3878, August 19, 1958.

\(^11\) For the text of the Arab draft resolution \((A/3893/Rev.1)\) adopted unanimously by the Assembly on August 21, see Appendix VI.
desire of the Arab States to live peacefully together and refrain from interfering in the affairs of one another according to the Pact of the Arab League. The Arab resolution expressed the Assembly's pleasure at the renewed assurances proposed by the Arab States to implement the following provisions of the Pact of the Arab League "each member state shall respect the systems of Government established in the other member states and regard them as exclusive concerns of these states," besides, "each state shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of Government."\(^\text{12}\)

The adopted Arab resolution was similar to the seven-power draft resolution mentioned above in many ways except that the former "did not include any reference to separate but similar declarations" which had been presented by Britain and the United States to the President of the General Assembly on August 18, 1958, concerning the withdrawal of their forces from Jordan and Lebanon (A/3876 and A/3877 mentioned above).\(^\text{13}\)

The Arab draft resolution was welcomed by the majority of the speakers in the General Assembly and was thus adopted unanimously on August 21, 1958. Thus, due to the absence of the veto, the General Assembly was able to adopt the Arab draft resolution and succeed where the Security Council failed.

The representative of Ceylon described the event as "historic and momentous."

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\(^\text{12}\) "Third Emergency Special Session," \textit{op.cit.}, 6-8.

\(^\text{13}\) \textit{Ibid.}, 8-9.
The American Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, called it "an event of happy augury." Foreign Minister Gromyko of the Soviet Union considered it "a good example." Selwyn Lloyd, the British Foreign Secretary, welcomed it as "a constructive first step" towards an agreement between the Arab countries concerned.  

The Secretary-General's Interpretation of the United Nations Role During the Lebanese Crisis of 1958

We have already discussed in Chapter I of this thesis how Mr. Dag Hammarskjold had taken the initiative during the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. A similar role was played by him during the Lebanese Crisis of 1958. We have discussed also in Chapter IV how the Security-Council had left the Secretary-General in charge of the implementation of the June 11, 1958, resolution according to which UNOGIL was dispatched to Lebanon. The following were Mr. Hammarskjold's ideas and interpretations of the June 11, resolution of the Security Council. The Secretary-General declared that UNOGIL had no relation to events considered as the domestic affairs of Lebanon. He added that the Secretary-General in that case: "Was neither an arbiter nor a mediator." Yet, in spite of those restrictions there was a wide variety of ways to fulfil the purposes of that resolution according to the principles of the United Nations.

14 
Ibid., 68.
Mr. Hammarskjold declared that the Security Council in sending an observation group to Lebanon had defined the scope and the character of its operations. That was done by instructing the Group to observe the illegal infiltration of arms and informing the Council of its findings. Thus, the Council had "defined the limits for authority delegated to the Secretary-General in this case." Mr. Hammarskjold said that he had a "free hand as to the structure and organization of the operation" but he could not interpret the authority granted which would have implied that he had changed the policy prescribed by the Security Council, by his "decision on the scope of the operation and the authority of the observers." He added that UNOGIL's job was not that of police action but observation.

At the beginning, said Mr. Hammarskjold, he had consulted with members of the Security Council and the Lebanese representative on the structure, organization and activities of UNOGIL. They approved of his interpretation of the June 11, 1958, resolution of the Security Council. Later, he added, that he had depended upon the advice of highly specialized military, political and diplomatic experts of the United Nations who were in the field. He added that he had applied diplomatic efforts in getting the required help for the observation operation to try to stop any infiltration of arms. He said that he had "striven to give to the observation operation the highest possible efficiency."15

15 S/PV. 827, July 15, 1958, pp. 9-12.
Mr. Hammarskjold went on a tour of the Middle East countries between June 19, and 26, 1958. On June 19, 1958, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, in an effort to harmonize the different points of view regarding the Lebanese Crisis, arrived in Beirut and started talks with the United Nations observers and the Lebanese Government officials on the necessary ways to restore tranquility to Lebanon. On the same day, Mr. Hammarskjold conferred with President Chamoun for forty-five minutes and later conferred with the senior members of UNOGIL. The Secretary-General, refused to meet with the rebels because he had declared before leaving New York that the United Nations, being "an organization of Governments," would deal only with them.17

Upon his return to New York on June 28, 1958, Mr. Hammarskjold said that UNOGIL had "got off to a very satisfactory start indeed." He stressed to news reporters his idea that the Security Council had not authorized anything beyond "observation."

Mr. Hammarskjold's comments were interpreted by delegates as an indication that he believed that the Security Council should pass another resolution to authorize UNOGIL to stop infiltration across the border instead of reporting on such cases. But, it was expected also that the Soviet Union would veto such a resolution so that the only way to pass it would be to call an


17 Ibid., June 23, 1958.
emergency session of the General Assembly.

Mr. Hammarskjold declared upon his arrival in New York that he hoped that by the establishment of the Observation Group he would: "Improve on the situation about which there were complaints in the Security Council; so that for the future any infiltration or traffic in arms which the Security Council sought to ensure against would be avoided through their activity." 18

After an hour talk with Mr. Hammarskjold, Dr. Malik of Lebanon only commented by saying that he was "optimistic." 19

Mr. Hammarskjold declared on July 3, 1958, following the issue of the first report of UNOGIL, that there was no evidence now of "mass infiltration" of arms and personnel into Lebanon. When questioned regarding reports from Beirut that men and arms had infiltrated, between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hammarskjold replied that to his knowledge they had "no foundation for such a judgement now." The Secretary-General added that UNOGIL teams were gradually gaining access to territories previously reported under the control of the rebels. He suggested, while speaking at a news conference, that the Security Council should not meet until a report of the United Nations observers was ready. He added that he would strengthen the Group by as many men as suggested by its administrators Major General Odd Bull of Norway and his civilian advisers.

It was reported that while Mr. Hammarskjold was

18 Ibid., June 27, 1958.
19 Ibid.
visiting President Chamoun in Lebanon he received a cake as a present. On the cake the following words were inscribed "United Nations save Lebanon" but Mr. Hammarskjöld replied "only Lebanon can save Lebanon." When asked if that story was correct, the Secretary-General answered "that is correct."

Mr. Hammarskjöld then explained his true role in dealing with the Lebanese Crisis which a New York Times editorial had referred to as "secret diplomacy" by saying that that phrase was a "complete misunderstanding" of his role during the Lebanese Crisis. The Security Council did not reach any decision on the actual situation in the field, added Mr. Hammarskjöld, but requested the dispatch of an observation group and asked that group to report to it. The Council had never asked the Secretary-General to report on this matter. Mr. Hammarskjöld concluded by saying that he was "neither an arbiter nor a fact-finder." 20

On July 16, 1958, and following the landing of American troops in Lebanon, Mr. Hammarskjöld declared in a meeting of the Security Council that he hoped: "No other developments would cause a set-back," so that UNOGIL would "retain its key position." 21 This sentence was interpreted as a sign of disapproval of the American landing.

Mr. Hammarskjöld had interpreted the role played by the Secretary-General by declaring, before the General Assembly's meeting of September 26, 1957, that the Secretary-General should


21 *S/PV. 829*, July 16, 1958, p. 32.
"use his office, and, indeed the machinery of the Organization to its utmost capacity and to the full extent permitted at each stage by practical circumstances." Mr. Hammarskjold added that he had thought:

it is in keeping with the philosophy of the Charter that the Secretary-General also should be expected to act without [such] guidance [from the General Assembly or the Security Council] should this appear to him necessary in order to help in filling any vacuum that may appear in the systems which the Charter and traditional diplomacy provide for the safeguarding of peace and security.

The Secretary-General insisted that the above-mentioned proposal could be applied to the situation in the Middle East in order to prevent it from deteriorating. That would mean, he added, the further development of UNOGIL according to the June 11, 1958, resolution of the Security Council and the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

Mr. Hammarskjold commented on a suggestion to "seal" the Lebanese-Syrian border by military means, that is, the establishment of a United Nations force, by suggesting the strengthening of UNOGIL instead. He added that he would consider:

Arrangements under the [Japanese] draft resolution [S/4055] which would make it possible for the United Nations also to accord assistance in the form and to the extent proper to the United Nations, towards ensuring against any externally directed activities within the country.

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22 A/PV. 690, September 26, 1957, p. 175.
23 Ibid.
25 Ibid., p. 8.
Such activities would include the infiltration of men and the smuggling of arms and would fall within the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Mr. Hammarskjold added that UNOGIL could, with the agreement of the Lebanese Government, widen its activities in that direction. For that end UNOGIL’s personnel as well as its observers of all ranks should be increased.26

On August 8, 1958, the Secretary-General introduced a detailed plan for calming the situation in the Middle East. Mr. Hammarskjold declared, in his plan, that the Arab States should renew their adherence to the following principles of the Arab League such as "mutual respect for each other's territories, integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and of equal and mutual benefit."27

Mr. Hammarskjold’s above-mentioned suggestion was included in the Arab draft resolution to the General Assembly (A/3893/Rev.128) which was adopted unanimously by the Assembly on August 21, 1958.

"Mr. Hammarskjold's presentation [plan] marked the first time he had publicly advocated a particular program on a sensitive political problem."29

26 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
27 A/PV.732, August 8, 1958, pp. 4-5.
28 For the text of this resolution see Appendix VI.
29 Miller, op.cit., pp. 198-199.
CONCLUSION

Any effort to analyse the role of the United Nations during the Lebanese Crisis of 1958 necessitates an understanding of the interacting factors which came into play during that period. One factor was the complex internal situation in Lebanon. A deep feud had developed in Lebanon between the Lebanese Government under President Chamoun's leadership on the one hand and the Opposition, chiefly as organized in the National Front which included several outstanding Lebanese personalities on the other. The causes of that schism, as discussed in Chapter II of this thesis, were many, the most important being perhaps the differences regarding Lebanon's foreign policy. President Chamoun's Government had insisted on adopting openly a pro-Western foreign policy through the acceptance of the Eisenhower Doctrine, while the Opposition had called for the continuation of what they considered to be the traditionally neutral foreign policy which Lebanon had adopted until then. Furthermore, the Opposition believed that President Chamoun was using every means to renew his mandate, including the "perversion" of the general elections of 1957. President Chamoun, we may say, did not, even when the Crisis had developed to a dangerous point in May 1958, confirm nor deny his wish to renew his term of office. President Chamoun's reluctance to adopt a clear position regarding this matter showed at least that he was not ready to commit himself to a fixed stand which
the Opposition chose to take as confirmation of his intention to renew his term of office. Did President Chamoun's Government "pervert" the general elections of 1957? The resignation of the two neutral Ministers of State, Hitti and Beyhum, from Premier Solh's Government at the end of the first stage of the elections in protest against "the atmosphere" of those elections was considered by the Opposition as another confirmation of their allegations against the Government.

In addition to the delicate internal schism, another important factor developed. The Lebanese President and the Lebanese Government with Solh as its Premier and Dr. Malik as its Foreign Minister had accused the Government of the United Arab Republic of interfering in the internal affairs of Lebanon by assisting the Opposition with arms and men. Thus, and on the basis of this alleged intervention, the Lebanese Government had lodged two complaints on May 21 and 22, 1958, one with the Arab League and the other with the Security Council. One question, as we have seen, constantly raised by the Opposition in this connection was: Why the Lebanese Government had presented the two complaints simultaneously to the Arab League and to the Security Council?

Article 33 of the United Nations Charter stipulated that Member States should use the regional organization to settle their disputes before referring them to the United Nations. Since the Arab League was a regional organization of Arab States, therefore, it was argued by the Opposition, any dispute arising
between two or more of its members should be referred to it before its reference to the United Nations. Thus, according to this view, even as a formality, the Lebanese Government should have referred its complaint to the Arab League before lodging it with the Security Council. Another interesting incident occurred during the extraordinary session of the Arab League. The Lebanese delegate had, as was clarified in Chapter III, introduced privately the amendments he wished to the original Sudanese draft resolution. Following the Lebanese amendments that draft resolution was accepted by all the Arab delegations subject to the approval of the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Lebanon. One might well wonder why the Lebanese Government "refused" that draft resolution after all? Did the Arab League really fail to solve the Lebanese question? Or to put the question differently, was it really given a chance to succeed? It must, however, be mentioned that the Arab League has a serious constitutional weakness, namely, the provision that all its resolutions should be adopted unanimously by its members. Another factor was that there existed in the Arab League, at the time, two blocs: the first composed of the United Arab Republic and Yemen who had adopted a neutralist foreign policy; while the second was composed of Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Sudan and Saudi Arabia who had either supported Lebanon openly, as in the case of Iraq and Jordan or indirectly as in the case of Libya, Sudan and Saudi Arabia.
Therefore, a further question may be asked as to whether the Arab League had a chance to succeed in solving a complaint such as the Lebanese one given its constitutional provisions and the political divisions that split its ranks.

The lodging of the Lebanese complaint with the Security Council on May 22, 1958, had the following purpose, according to Foreign Minister Malik; "to refer the Lebanese case to world public opinion." We have already seen in Chapter IV how the Security Council had succeeded, after a lengthy discussion of the Lebanese complaint, in passing a weak resolution on June 11, 1958 (S/4023) establishing UNOGIL and restricting its activities to "observing" and "reporting" in order to ensure against the illegal infiltration of arms and personnel across the Lebanese frontier. We have seen how the Security Council, due to the veto and its political composition by the use of which any of the two world blocs might block the passage of a substantive resolution, actually duplicated the inadequacies of the Arab League for the solution of the Lebanese complaint. It was in these circumstances that the Security Council left the job of watching the implementation of the June 11, 1958, resolution to the efforts of Mr. Hammarskjold.

UNOGIL was successful, to a certain extent, if one takes into consideration the limited scope of its activities.
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UNOGIL was successful, to a certain extent, if one takes into consideration the limited scope of its activities.
UNOGIL had served at the beginning as a symbol of United Nations care. It had prevented, to a certain extent, the further deterioration of the feud between the Government and the Opposition. It was established with remarkable speed and its operations were developing rapidly until the landing of American troops on July 15, 1958, which caused a set-back to its activities as we have already seen in Chapters IV and V of this thesis.

The landing of American troops on July 15, 1958, introduced another disturbing factor to the already complex situation. It widened the gap between the Government and the Opposition and interfered in the plan of the United Nations to harmonize the conflicts between, the Government and the Opposition on one hand, and Lebanon and the United Arab Republic on the other, through the presence of UNOGIL as well as the efforts of Mr. Hammarskjold. The Secretary-General had already visited Lebanon and the United Arab Republic between June 19 and 26 in an attempt to mediate between the disputing parties.

However, the landing of the American troops had brought pressure on all the disputing parties concerned, namely, the Government, the Opposition and the Chehab faction, to bring about a solution of the Lebanese Crisis in order to hasten the withdrawal of the American forces.

When the Security Council failed to pass any resolution
other than the one of June 11, 1958, because of the use of the veto, both the United States and the Soviet Union's delegations presented two draft resolutions requesting the reference of the Lebanese complaint to the General Assembly.

Mr. Hammarskjold played a major role in mediating between the two disputing states as we have already seen in Chapter VI. Besides, he succeeded in finding a final official solution for the Crisis by introducing his plan for peace in the Middle East before the General Assembly on August 8, 1958. Mr. Hammarskjold's proposals found in that plan were included in the Arab draft resolution which was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on August 21, 1958.

It should be mentioned here that the Arab resolution was not the only reason for the termination of the Lebanese Crisis. Perhaps the decisive factor here was rather the result of internal developments in Lebanon, the most important of which was the election of General Fouad Chehab as the new President instead of Chamoun on July 31, 1958.

The writer would like to end her thesis with the following quotation from Mr. Joseph J. Sisco: the United Nations "is a mirror of the world as it is, and, if it sometimes reflects an ugly image, it is not because of the mirror but because of the world itself."
APPENDIX I

Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter

Pacific Settlement of Disputes

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.

2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.

3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.
APPENDIX II

The Original Sudanese Draft Resolution
to the League of Arab States

"The Council of the League of Arab States having considered, in its extraordinary session in the city of Benghazi, the complaint presented by the Government of the Lebanese Republic against the United Arab Republic, according to Article VI of the Covenant of the League of Arab States;

"Having heard the statements of the delegations of the Lebanese Republic and the United Arab Republic;

"Having observed in both parties the spirit of mutual respect and the sincere intention of not interfering in the internal affairs of each other and having noted the wish of both parties to settle their differences in a peaceful manner within the Covenant of the League of Arab States;

"In accordance with the letter and spirit of Article II and III of the Covenant of the League of Arab States and desirous of removing anything which disturbs the atmosphere of calmness among the Arab States, the Council decides:

1. To labor in order to stop the broadcasting services and the press from broadcasting or writing anything which may instigate the people against their rulers or scandalize the authorities in the Arab countries and endanger its safety;

2. No Arab State should allow the infiltration of arms to the land of any other Arab State;

3. To request the Government of the Lebanese Republic to withdraw the complaint it had lodged with the Security Council;

4. To appeal to various sects and parties in Lebanon to end the disturbances and to take the necessary measures to settle the domestic disputes by peaceful and constitutional means;

5. To send a committee selected from amongst the members of the Council of the Arab League to ease the situation and to give effect to the fourth item of the Council's decision mentioned above."

1 League of Arab States, Secretariat, the Political Department, the Council of the Arab League, Extraordinary Session in Benghazi (Minutes of the Fifth Meeting, afternoon of June 4, 1958).
APPENDIX III

Draft Resolution of the League of Arab States

"Having heard the statements of the delegations of the Lebanese Republic and the United Arab Republic; having noted the wish of both parties to settle their differences in a peaceful manner within the League of Arab States; in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the Fact of the League of Arab States, and desirous of removing anything which disturbs the atmosphere of calm among the brotherly Arab States;

The Council decides:

1. To do all in its power to put an end to anything which may disturb the atmosphere of calm among member states;

2. To request the Government of Lebanon to withdraw the complaint it had placed before the Security Council;

3. To appeal to the various Lebanese groups to end the disturbances and to take the necessary measures to settle domestic dispute by peaceful and constitutional means;

4. To send a committee selected from among the members of the Council to ease the situation and to give effect to the decision of the Council." 1

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1 S/PV. 823, June 6, 1958, p.24.
APPENDIX IV

Letter dated 22 May 1958 from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Security Council.¹

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request you, in your capacity as President of the Security Council, to call an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the following question:

"Complaint by Lebanon in respect of a situation arising from the intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security."

The said intervention consists enter alia of the following acts: the infiltration of armed bands from Syria into Lebanon, the destruction of Lebanese life and property by such bands, the participation of United Arab Republic nationals in acts of terrorism and rebellion against the established authorities in Lebanon, the supply of arms from Syria to individuals and bands in Lebanon rebelling against the established authorities and the waging of a violent radio and press campaign in the United Arab Republic calling for strikes, demonstrations and the overthrow of the established authorities in Lebanon, and through other provocative acts.

(Signed) Karim Azkoul
Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations.

APPENDIX V

The Security Council's Resolution
of June 11, 1958

"The Security Council;

"Having heard the charges of the representative of Lebanon concerning interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon and the reply of the representative of the United Arab Republic;

"1. Decides to dispatch urgently an observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply material across the Lebanese borders;

"2. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to that end;

"3. Requests the Observation Group to keep the Security Council currently informed through the Secretary-General."1

1S/4023, June 11, 1958.
APPENDIX VI

Action Taken by the General Assembly

At its 746th plenary meeting, on 21 August, 1958, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution submitted by Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabian, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and Yemen (A/3873/Rev.1). See resolution 1837 (ES-111) below.

Resolution 1837 (ES-111) questions considered by the Security Council at its 638th Meeting on 7 August, 1958,

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled "Questions considered by the Security Council at its 638th meeting on 7 August, 1958,"

Noting that the Arab States have agreed, in the Pact of the League of Arab States, to strengthen the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab States, and to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these States, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future and the realization of their aspirations and hopes,

Desiring to relieve international tension,

I

1. Welcomes the renewed assurances given by the Arab States to observe the provisions of Article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States that each member State shall respect the systems of Government established in the other member States and regard them as exclusive concerns of these States, and that each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of Government;

2. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to act strictly in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and of equal and mutual benefit, and to ensure that their conduct by word and deed conforms to these principles;

II

Requests the Secretary-General to make forthwith, in
consultation with the Governments concerned and in accordance with the Charter, and having in mind section I of this resolution, such practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances, and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries;

III

Invites the Secretary-General to continue his studies now under way and in this context to consult as appropriate with the Arab countries of the Near East with a view to possible assistance regarding an Arab development institution designed to further economic growth in these countries;

IV

1. Requests Member-States to co-operate fully in carrying out this resolution;

2. Invites the Secretary-General to report hereunder, as appropriate, the first such report to the made not later than 30 September 1958.¹

¹A/3893/Rev.1, August 21, 1958.
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