THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE (1960 - 1964)

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PARLIAMENTARY ELITE

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ABSTRACT

This study is an attempt to delimit the social background of the Lebanese Parliamentary Elite. The composition of the legislative body of the Lebanese Government is analyzed from a sociological viewpoint. The 1960-1964 Chamber of ninety-nine members (in office during the research period) was selected for study.

The general problem revolves around the question: who are those who become deputies in Lebanon? We therefore had to find out what family backgrounds they come from, who their fathers were before them, whether they had had any previous political experience, and what strata of the society they come from generally.

Mainly objective information was secured about the deputies: age, political and religious affiliations, education, occupation, father's education and occupation, previous political experience, and the like. These criteria served to indicate the social status of the individuals, the type of people they are.

In chapter I the methodological procedure is explained, and the sources of information are listed.

As a general background and frame of reference, chapter II provides an outline of the main theories of the elite (Pareto, Mosca, Lasswell, Mills); as well as a summary of four empirical elite studies. These four studies are later compared to our own study.

Chapter III deals with the most important historical phases through which Lebanon has passed, with a particular emphasis upon the two main currents: sectarianism and feudalism.

A brief chronological outline of parliamentary evolution, along with a partial survey of the growth of Lebanese political parties in chapter IV, completes the general framework for our analysis.

The data about the 1960-1964 Chamber is then analyzed in Chapter V. The analysis is made within the context of feudalism and sectarianism. Some of the results yielded are: that family background is extremely crucial for the eligibility of a deputy in Lebanon; that feudal and sectarian considerations pervade the recruitment process; that the same deputies remain in the Parliament for various terms; that there are regional variations for most of the criteria analyzed, namely political affiliations, occupation, education, and the like; and that personal qualifications are less crucial than family status and prestige.

Finally, in Chapter VI, a few conclusions are drawn concerning the Lebanese Parliamentary Elite, then the results of the four elite studies summarized in chapter II are compared to the results of the present study.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

General Problem

It is the purpose of this study to find out what types of people become deputies in Lebanon. Do Lebanese become politicians primarily because their families have traditionally been active in the political sphere? What is the status of the families they come from? What educational level have they attained? What are their occupations? How much previous political experience do they have? In short, what is the social background of the Lebanese Parliamentary elite?

Several of these questions have been suggested by one or the other of the four elite studies that will be summarized in the following chapter. The concept "elite" here comprises the ninety-nine members of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies elected in June-July 1960, and at present in office.

Before outlining the methodology followed for the gathering of the data, it is necessary to state some of our anticipations regarding the composition of this Chamber.

First, it is expected that the majority of the deputies will be either landowners or lawyers. This is a result of the long trend in Lebanese history which shows that the rulers and lords of Lebanon have always been recruited from among the landowning class. We shall expand more fully upon this point in the chapter on Lebanese history. Likewise, the career of a politician and

that of a lawyer complement one another in many points not only in Lebanon but in other countries also.[1]

If a deputy is a lawyer or landowner, his father is more likely to have been a deputy before him than if he comes from a different occupational group. That is, most of those whose fathers were deputies before them will be either lawyers or landowners. Once again we have here the influence of big landowning families and their position in local politics.

Family status will therefore prove to be very crucial in the recruitment of Lebanese deputies. Many of the deputies are elected because their fathers had held the same position earlier.

In general, the deputies will come from the middle-age bracket.

Again, most of the deputies will tend to be old-timers - that is, they will have had previous terms as deputies or ministers.

The new deputies (that is those with no previous term) will tend to have a higher level of education than the older deputies. One of the causes for this is the growing importance of personal qualifications in the recruitment of these political decision-makers.

Another new trend that is expected to appear in the present Chamber is the increasing influence of political party membership in recruitment. Many of the deputies will therefore belong to political parties.[2]

There will be great differences between the various constituencies, depending upon whether they are more or less "feudal" regions. These shall be dealt with in a more detailed manner in the analysis of the data.

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[1]The complementary nature of these two professions will be emphasized in some of the forthcoming chapters of this study.

[2]There will be regional variations in the type of political membership.

We leave these formulations for the time being to turn to the methodological procedure employed for their validation.

Methodology

The methodology followed for this study has been chosen because it is the only one that would give the best results in a country like Lebanon. One of the most effective means of obtaining data has been the "WASTA", that is the use of informal and more personal channels to establish contacts with the deputy: relatives, friends, friends of relatives, and so on.

Gathering the data for the present research was based primarily on the following biographical works: C. K. Chehab's Les Elections Législatives de 1960 - which gave a comprehensive survey of the elections (including the distribution of seats, personal information about the candidates, as well as comments in the press) - Who's Who in U. A. R. and the Near East (1959), the Recueil des Archives Biographiques Permanentes du Monde Arabe (1959), The International Who's Who (1960), and Zaydan's A'alamuna al Arabi ("Our Arab World" - 1956).

Small biographical sketches found in two daily newspapers: L'Orient (in French) and Al Nahar (in Arabic); and in two weekly magazines (in French): La Revue du Liban and Magazine were used to check and supplement the information obtained from the above-mentioned references. These short sketches appeared in the election period issues: May to July 1960.

Formal interviews were conducted with thirteen deputies, while more than fifty deputies were interviewed informally at the Parliament itself between sessions. They were useful in so far as they supplied missing information about these individuals. They served to supplement the data obtained from the biographical sketches.

Several persons from the press, the government, as well as personal friends were of great assistance in obtaining important data on some of the

less-known deputies, from sources which we ourselves could not otherwise have reached.

Data about the following criteria was obtained for each deputy - and later divided into sub-categories:

(a) Religion - to which sect the deputy belongs.

(b) Constituency - that is, the area he represents.

(c) Age - at the time of election.

(d) Place of birth and place of residence.

(e) Occupation - that is, apart from being a deputy.

(f) Education - diploma held, and from where.

(g) Previous political experience - number of terms as deputy, and ministerial positions held.

(h) Political affiliations - member of what party or group.

(i) Father's education and occupation.

(j) Number of languages spoken.

Other criteria such as: associations of which he is a member, publications, hobbies, as well as any other relevant characteristics regarding his career, were also taken into consideration in the analysis of the data.

After a chapter summarizing some relevant theories of the elite, as well as four specific studies of the elite, we shall turn to chapter three which deals with the main historical phases through which Lebanon has passed. Chapter four will deal with the development of the parliamentary system in Lebanon, since 1920. Finally, the data will be analyzed in chapter five, which will be followed by a comparative analysis of the various studies, and some conclusions.

CHAPTER II

STUDIES OF THE ELITE

Definitions of "Elite"

According to the Webster Dictionary definition, "elite" is "the choice or select part; the flower; especially with collective sense, a group or body considered or treated as socially superior". However, the definition of any elite in society nowadays is not that simple. It is not always 'the flower' or the 'the select', and does not necessarily have to be called an elite, as such.

Smythe and Smythe say that in modern societies, "elite" implies "a broader and more flexible stratum of people who, for whatever reason, claim a position of superior prestige and a corresponding measure of influence over the fate of the community of which they are a part".[1]

For Lasswell, "the influential are those who get the most of what there is to get".[2] Therefore, "those who get the most are the elite; the rest are mass".[3]

C. W. Wills defines the 'power elite' as being 'composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the ordinary environments of ordinary

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[1]H. Smythe and M. Smythe, The New Nigerian Elite (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), p. 4.

[2]H. D. Lasswell, "Politics: Who Gets What, When, How," in The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), ch. 1, p. 295.

[3]Loc. Cit

men and women: they are in positions to make decisions having major consequences."[1] Likewise, Floyd Hunter says that "the right business, profession, style of life, manners, and morals are prerequisites to entry into the group of top level national policy makers."[2]

The elite is thus made up of those who are at the top of society, those who make the big decisions - regardless of whether they were born there, or whether they are even worthy of holding this particular status. Many unqualified people often acquire high positions because of the fact that they have the right contacts (usually relatives, friends, or friends of friends) hereby affirming Mills' statement "It's not what you know but who you know."[3] Being or not being in the elite depends upon such criteria as wealth, birth, position, education, etc., and upon how important each of these is considered in any specific society. Lasswell asserts that the concept of 'elite' is "classificatory and descriptive, designating the holders of high positions in a given society. There are as many elites as there are values."[4] This means that there is no one, specific elite in any society, but several elites whose hierarchical gradations will depend upon the values that the people hold. Supposing, therefore, that the society is based primarily on religious values, the religious elite will be the highest

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[1]Charles W. Mills, The Power Elite, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 3 - 4.

[2]Floyd Hunter, Top Leadership, U.S.A., (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959), p. 166.

[3]Mills, Op. Cit., p. 351.

[4]H. D. Lasswell, D. Lerner, and C. E. Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 6.

and most powerful elite in that society.[1] One can also find several other elites from the different fields, within that same society - e.g. the business elite, the social elite, and so on, which are themselves subdivided. In the political elite, for instance, there are presidents, ministers, members of parliament, and other subdivisions, depending upon the political system of the particular country. All these elites to a certain extent, set the rules in the respective fields to which they belong - this also varies according to the status of each individual, since there exists a hierarchy within each elite group.[2] Most of the people within the different fields try their hardest to attain elite membership so as to be placed in a position of leadership.

Why Study Elites?

Studies of elites serve to bring out the characteristics of those who hold the powerful positions in any society. Through them one can find out what the values, goals, interests, and purposes of these men are, and what types of personality they possess; in short, what sort of people they are. They may also serve to ascertain to what extent family background affects who gets which positions in the society. Recruitment naturally varies from country to country, and therefore depends upon the social organization of the particular society. It also depends upon the qualifications of the individual, the importance of the position, and the training that is necessary for its adequate fulfilment. One should bear in mind, however, that many people are born within the elite, and therefore do not have to be

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[1]The political elite in such a society would either be one and the same as the religious elite (i.e. the Church would have the political power), or it would be dominated by the will of the religious elite.

[2]To mention once again the political elite, a president is higher than a minister, a minister higher than a deputy, and so on. By higher is meant more prestige, more power, and also more remuneration.

recruited, or even trained, for the position or the status. The study of family background, then, serves to throw some light on the way of life of these elite members.

Research in the field of elite study - or rather political elite study - therefore illustrates and clarifies the influence that the social structure has upon political opportunities. It also shows how political success depends upon personality types and political skills and motivation. Matthews says: "perhaps most important of all, an individual must have the desire, skill and endurance necessary to succeed in a political career before he can expect to become a decision-maker"[1] - but this again depends on the structure of the society, and does not apply for all.

Mills asserts that the idea of the 'power elite' has nothing to do with the decision-making process itself, which means that he is not interested in what is done, but in who does it. He explains that "it is an attempt to delimit the social areas within which that process, whatever its character, goes on. It is a conception of who is involved in that process."[2] This is exactly the point of view this study is interested in: who are the political decision-makers in the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. We shall not deal at all with the policies which these men pursue, nor with their role in the political machinery of the State.

Several studies of the political elite have been undertaken in the fields of political science and sociology. They contribute to a greater understanding of why and how decision-makers are recruited or chosen, of how they remain in power, and of what makes them act and decide the way

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[1]Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers (N. Y.: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1954), p. 57.

[2]C. W. Mills, Op. Cit., p. 21

they do.[1] They therefore help the social scientist to understand the processes through which political changes occur.

To sociologists, however, the political scene is not important in and of itself, but namely as a context within which the study of the political elite is conducted. In that same context, the social (i.e. sociological) aspect is emphasized more than the political so as to yield a deeper and fuller understanding of who is involved in the political machinery. Thus, for example, political party membership might be related either to socio-economic status, or to religion, or to family tradition, as well as being due to definite political tendencies.

These studies also show whether the politicians in power actually represent the people who elected them. Are they a representative cross-section of the population? Are their interests the same as those of their electors? What kinds of people go into politics? Which types are generally successful politicians? In short, who are they?

Theories of the Elite

Various writers such as Mosca, Lasswell, Pareto and Mills, have put forth theories on the recruitment of political decision-makers. These theories differ in several respects. For instance, they differ in the criteria they use for differentiating elite from non-elite, in the framework in which they define their terms, and in the concepts which they use in their analyses. In spite of these, and possibly other, differences,

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[1] "The study of the social background of political decision-makers thus contributes to a deeper understanding of the actions and decisions of those in positions of political authority." D. R. Matthews, Op. Cit., p. 4.

three similar features do stand out.

(a) The decision-makers usually come from the upper strata of society.

(b) In general, they assert that the decision-makers will have a "political personality." Such a personality, according to Lasswell is characterized by "... the accentuation of power in relation to other values within the personality when compared with other persons."[1] That is, the politician places a very high value on obtaining power - the reasons for this varying according to the different individuals concerned.

(c) They suggest that the decision-makers must have certain skills and capacities to reach their position.[2]

Mosca, Pareto, Lasswell and Mills have been selected here because they are important writers whose ideas have had a great bearing on theoretical formulation in the fields of sociology and politics. Only such ideas as are relevant to our present study shall be dealt with in the following pages.

Mosca divides all societies into two classes:

> "... a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent, and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism."[3]

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[1]H. D. Lasswell, Power and Personality (New York: W. W. Norton, and Co., Inc., 1948), p. 22.

[2]Matthews, Op. Cit., ch. 2.

[3]Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company Inc., 1939), p. 50

This class has a great sense of solidarity and identity, and its members therefore obey "a single impulse."[1] Since political decision-makers tend to come from the upper strata of society, "members of a ruling minority regularly have some attribute, real or apparent, which is highly esteemed and very influential in the society in which they live."[2] Thus "... the people who rule are the rich rather than the brave."[3] This process may occur in any society or country, but Mosca, being Italian, would most probably base his formulation on his own country: Italy. He does, however, generalize with statements such as the following:

> "In all societies, be their level ever so mediocre, the ruling class will justify its power by appealing to some sentiment or credence generally accepted in that period and by that society, such as the presumed Popular or Divine Will, the notion of a distinct nationality or chosen People, traditional loyalty toward a dynast, or confidence in a man of exceptional qualities."[4]

The ruling class being necessary to the proper functioning of political organisms, "it is evident that the study of political phenomena must focus upon the examination of the various ways in which the ruling class is formed and organized."[5] Being in the ruling circles depends upon the social position of the individual within the society.

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[1] Ibid., p. 53.

[2] Loc. Cit.

[3] Ibid., p. 57

[4] Gaetano Mosca, "The Final Version of the Ruling Class," in James H. Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 384.

[5] Loc. Cit.

Mosca's criteria for recruiting the ruling class are:[1]

(a) The ability to rule - this, he says, is a predominant and indispensable criterion.

(b) The will to rule - that is, wanting to obtain power, and practice using it.

(c) Possession of the right qualities - depending on the conditions of the country.

For Pareto, 'elite' is the sum total of outstanding talents, and is the equivalent of Mosca's 'ruling' or 'political' class. There are two strata in the population:[2]

(a) A lower stratum, which he calls the non-élite.

(b) A higher stratum, which he calls the élite, and which is divided into

i) a governing élite

ii) a non-governing élite.

The governing élite "contains individuals who wear labels appropriate to political offices of a certain attitude."[3] Thus "the governmental elite includes not only those holding the higher posts in the administration but also, in modern societies, the powerful financiers, industrialists, and, in ancient as in modern societies, the high ranking officers of the military forces ..."[4]

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[1]Ibid., p. 388.

[2]Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, quoted in C. W. Mills, Images of Man (New York: George Bragiller Inc., 1960), ch. 10, p. 264.

[3]Ibid., p. 265.

[4]George C. Homans, & Charles P. Curtis Jr., An Introduction to Pareto: His Sociology (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1934), p. 249.

Pareto classifies people into two types: foxes - who have the "ability for innovation and manipulation"; and lions - "who are not very clever and are traditionalists and men of faith and force."[1] These are the political types. Their economic equivalents are 'speculators' for the foxes, and 'rentiers' for the lions.[2] The rentiers are the conservatives who try to save, preserve and maintain the status quo, while the speculators are all eager to promote changes to their advantage. Both types being antagonists, there is a constant struggle between them - since no political stability can exist when one personality rules the elite. As a result of this tendency for the two types to hold positions of political power, one finds a continual "circulation of the elites." This process goes on in most societies, and through it the whole character of the elite may change radically in a relatively short time. The term 'circulation of elites' means "the movement of individuals into" (and out of) "elite groups," as well as "the movement of elite groups into and out of positions of societal dominance."[3]

To Pareto, then, the qualities which give power to the elite might be either good or bad, as long as they are the qualities of rulers. He maintains, however, (Mosca strongly disagrees on this being general) that although there are many criteria of differentiation, wealth is one of the main ones.[4]

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[1]D. R. Matthews, Op. Cit., pp. 10 - 11.

[2]Ibid., p. 15

[3]Alfred McClung Lee, "elites, circulation of", Dictionary of Sociology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1944), pp. 104 - 105.

[4]James H. Meisel, Op. Cit., p. 179.

Therefore, who comprises the elite is very important in the determination of social, economic, and political change.

Harold Lasswell has written a great deal about the political elite in the American governmental system. This elite, he says,

> "comprises the power holders of a body politic. The power holders include the leadership and the social formations from which leaders typically come, and to which accountability is maintained, during a given generation. In other words, the political elite is the top power class."[1]

Elites can be compared in terms of skill (fighting skill, skill in handling people and things, and skill in political organization), class (which Lasswell defines as "a major social group of similar function, status, and outlook;"[2] personality, and attitude groups. This is the "contemplative" approach to political events. The "manipulative" approach tries to find out what are the means for the attainment of goals. Thus, "the fate of an elite is profoundly affected by the ways it manipulates the environment; that is to say, by the use of violence, goods, symbols, practices."[3]

The three conceptions of elite which Mills expounds in his study of The Power Elite are: first, that the 'institutional positions' that men hold "determine their chances to get and to hold selected values";[4] secondly, that their personality is greatly determined by the values they possess, and the institutional roles they enact; and thirdly, that their institutional positions, the values they hold, and their personality types are important in determining what cliques they belong to, and how strong are their feelings of class consciousness and class solidarity. This means that, with Mills,

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[1]H. D. Lasswell, D. Lerner, & C. E. Rothwell, Op. Cit., p. 13.

[2]Lasswell, "Politics: Who Gets What, When, How," Op. Cit., p. 299.

[3]Ibid., p. 310

[4]Mills, Op. Cit., ch. 1, footnote 6, p. 367.

the institution(s) make(s) the man what he is. (These are "the hierarchies of state and corporation and army."[1]) His position within any of the big institutions determines whether he shall wield any power, how much of it he will possess, what values he will then hold, of what personality type he will be, and hence what groups he will join and belong to. The Power Elite is thus defined in terms of institutional position.[2]

However, Mills asserts that the power elite "is not an aristocracy", that is, "it is not a political ruling group based upon a nobility of hereditary origin"[3] - always, of course, speaking of the power elite in America. The members of the elite come from both the old and the new upper classes, or, in other words, from "the upper third of the income and occupational pyramids."[4]

These theories have influenced our study to a great extent, and we have therefore adopted some parts of the more relevant ones. We shall mention which in the course of our analysis.

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[1] Ibid., p. 5 - 6. Mills leaves out the family and church in his study, since he believes they are shaped by the "big three" institutions.

[2] This resembles Floyd Hunter's statement of "A leader may be a self-made man, a leader by achievement, or a leader by inheritance of status; he may be a leader by ascribed status, he may be a professional or a business enterpriser, and he may not be particularly rich; but to be on the inner councils of policy making he must establish a claim of status as a leader in, or having vital connections with, an organization of men." Op. Cit., p. 166. In this book Hunter shows the importance of the corporation in the national power in the U. S. "They are primary forces in organizing the market, and since the market is so large, the corporate leaders are concerned with issues of great magnitude and of concern to all the nation and the world." Ibid., p. 256.

[3] Mills, Op. Cit., p. 278.

[4] Ibid., p. 279.

Four Studies of the Elite

Of the recent empirical studies of the 'elite' made in various countries, four have been chosen for purposes of comparative analysis with the present study.

The first of these is the study of the new Nigerian elite made by Smythe and Smythe,[1] who apply the elite concept ..

> "to a group of persons who, in one way or another, have attained the highest ranking in society, who stand at the peak of the social strata. They are the people looked upon by the masses as leaders, as decision-makers in political or economic spheres, as the persons at the top in major segments of the society."[2]

The Smythes were interested in finding out the characteristics of the African elite - from what family backgrounds they come, how they obtain and keep power, what are their values, the degree of conflict between traditional and Western ways, as well as the problems that are occasioned by social change. The main objective of this study then, is the description of "the new elite class in current Nigerian urban society - its emergence, function, and role as Nigeria changes from colonial dependency to political independence."[3] Nigeria has been taken as an example of the African elite since it is a newly independent country, and therefore has a new elite in place of the traditional one. The concept of 'elite' as applies to the Nigerian elite

> "is a broad and heterogenous one: a group, some members of which have great prestige because of acquired abilities and power, along with others whose prestige is traditional and unrelated to their personal qualifications, all of whom together constitute a reservoir of skills, talents, and influence of all kinds."[4]

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[1] Smythe and Smythe, Op. Cit.

[2] Ibid., p. 4.

[3] Ibid., p. 8.

[4] Ibid., p. 4.

All of these people nevertheless, are in the uppermost strata of society.

The field work for the research was done in 1957 - 1958. An analysis of the leading newspapers was made first to find all those who were "mentioned in connection with high-status roles in various contexts".[1] The names of these people were provided by specialists in the African field in the U. S.; people who had visited Nigeria and could suggest some useful contacts; persons at Cambridge, Oxford, and Edinburgh Universities; from some important British agencies and institutions; from the Who's Who in Nigeria, and from Nigerian calendar almanacs. In Nigeria itself more names were obtained by preliminary interviews with persons whom most of the above had agreed to as being in the "elite".[2]

A sample of 156 persons was selected for study - with shorter talks with around 500 persons. Instead of being asked to fill a questionnaire, the respondent was led to talk informally on the desired subjects, after the interviewer had taken down the more specific information such as education, age, etc. In some cases, several sessions were needed to cover all the main questions.[3]

The analysis of the data showed that the elite are more educated than the majority of the population. Out of the 155 educated ones, 153 had gone beyond primary school (i.e. the first six years of schooling), and seventy held university degrees granted by foreign universities.[4] Roughly 80 % of the sample were under fifty years of age.

One hundred and thirteen of the 156 interviewed were government officials or office-holders. "There is practically unanimous acknowledgement

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[1] Ibid., p. 9.

[2] Ibid., pp. 9 - 10.

[3] Ibid., p. 10.

[4] Ibid., p. 75. Forty-two of the 70 had 2 or more degrees.

by people from all walks of life that the government elite is the elite in contemporary Nigeria."[1] Two-thirds of the elite were of ordinary stock - i.e. not from the families of chiefs. Twenty-four out of the 31 who had had British Crown honours conferred upon them, however, were from a background of traditional elite status; the remaining seven were self-made men. This shows that honours were given mainly to more traditional, and therefore older, elite.

Practically all in the sample lived in westernized buildings, and more than one half lived in official quarters that were provided by the government. As for travel, 91 out of the 156 had gone abroad.

All the above data shows that elite members are those who have had the best opportunities in education, travel, housing, etc. It also shows that most of those who belong to the new elite come from a background of traditional elite status - i.e. their fathers had been members of the old Nigerian elite. This 'old' elite group is small (since the children of its members are joining the new elite), and it had once placed a high premium on British support of its influence. The young leaders of old elite background are more conservative, whereas the young self-made men are more liberal.[2]

The next study is that of the Nazi Elite, made by Daniel Lerner.[3] He drew a random sample of 159 persons whose biographies were found in the Fuehrerlexikon (the Leader Lexicon: the "Who's Who of Nazism") of 1934.

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[1] Ibid., p. 80.

[2] "... the new elite live and concentrate on the present while keeping an eye on the future," Ibid., p. 169.

[3] Daniel Lerner, The Nazi Elite (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951).

The purpose of this study was to find out, first, the common characteristics of all the four groups[1] he analyzed, and from this the characteristics of the whole Nazi elite; secondly, the variant characteristics (i.e. the socio-psychological differences) between the subclasses, so as to find out how they differ from each other; thirdly, how the Nazi elite can be compared with the German population as a whole; and finally, how the Nazi elite compares with the traditional German elite.[2] It also gives the reasons for Hitler's success by making a connection between social stratification and political values and attitudes. There did exist a difference between leaders and followers within the movement.

Lerner split the sample of 159 into:[3]

(1) Nazi Propagandists (128). These are what he calls the "alienated intellectuals" - "those who do not identify themselves with the prevailing structure of symbols and sanctions in the societies which nurture them."[4] They were found to be of the highest socio-economic status within the sample - probably due to the fact that they came from the upper middle class of Imperial and Weimar Germany. Their average age was 38.9 years, and they had the highest level of education, the best occupations, could afford to marry earlier (in spite of an economic crisis), and had a certain amount of foreign contacts. Military service was rather scarce among this group.

(2) Nazi Administrators (151). These men represent what Lerner terms "the rise of the plebeian,"[5] since they come from the lower social strata, and were brought to positions of high deference by the process of revolution.

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[1](1) Nazi Propagandists; (2) Nazi Administrators; (3) Nazi Coercers; and (4) a Random Subsample.

[2]Lerner, Op. Cit., p. 2.

[3]Ibid., p. 1

[4]Ibid., p. 9.

[5]Ibid., p. 34.

They were the men who used their skills primarily for the achievement of the goals of the movement. Their socio-economic status was found to be lower than that of the propagandists and the Random sample. They were born in rural regions, of parents who had little income, and they had a low level of education, as well as jobs with little income and prestige.

(3) Nazi Coercers (139). The soldiers and the Police - or the "specialists on violence". The former came from the upper strata of German society while the latter (Police) came from the lower middle strata. The Soldiers thus had more favourable opportunities in life, and were definitely of top status.

(4) Random Subsample. This group was composed of all those who did not fit in any of the above three categories. It represented quite adequately the Nazi elite as a whole, and was used throughout the study as a standard for evaluating the other three groups.

The third study is that by Madge McKinney on the personnel of the Seventy-Seventh Congress.[1] This study was undertaken because of the several problems that are being coped with by the legislative body. The relevant questions consequently became: "Who are the men responsible for solving them? What has been their past experience? What is their predisposition toward current issues? Are they representative Americans, qualified by education and training to deal with the problems before them? ..."[2] By analyzing the background of legislators, such questions can be answered.

To get the necessary information, questionnaires were sent to all the congressmen, and this was supplemented by material from current

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[1]Madge McKinney, "The Personnel of the Seventy-Seventh Congress," The American Political Science Review. Vol. 36 (1942), pp. 67 - 75.

[2]Ibid., p. 67.

biographical dictionaries. Data was thus obtained on age, place of birth, religion, education, political experience, occupation and economic interests, and military service.

It was found that the majority of congressmen were past middle age, and that most had spent their whole lives in the United States. All of the large religious sects were represented in Congress.

Eighty-eight percent attended colleges, professional schools, or both, and most of the congressmen had had previous governmental experience before entering into the national legislative body.[1]

Business, financial, and professional (especially legal) interests were very well represented, whereas labour was grossly under-represented.[2]

As for military service, fifty-one percent reported none, while thirty-seven percent were veterans of American wars.

All in all then, the data leads one to conclude that Congressmen tend to come from the more privileged classes. Many of them are born in the upper strata, while a smaller number have achieved this status by themselves.

The study on the composition of the British Parliament is the fourth to be expounded here. It was made by J. F. S. Ross, namely "to apply the spirit of research, the methods of science, to one small part of our political problem: that of parliamentary representation."[3] He found it very surprising that people do not pay any attention to the personnel of parliament. Some of the questions he put forth were: "What sort of people

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[1] Ibid., p. 70

[2] Only one man listed himself as a factory worker.

[3] J. F. S. Ross, Parliamentary Representation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 12.

do we choose to represent us? What qualifications for their duties do our members possess? ... Why are these kinds of people chosen and not others? ..."[1] Consequently, "I suggest, then, that the whole question of parliamentary representation requires reconsideration, and that it should be approached from a new angle - namely that of a study of the actual personnel of the House of Commons."[2]

The problem in this study, therefore, is that of adequate (or inadequate?) parliamentary representation. In the last part of the book, Ross gives a solution to this problem, but what we are here interested in is solely the analysis of the data.

The methodology used was the following: a sheet containing necessary data such as age, education, etc., was filled for each member who had sat in the House of Commons at any time from the general election of December 1918 to the end of 1936.[3] To obtain and check this data, Almanacs, Yearbooks, "Who's Who" and "Who Was Who" series, reports and censuses, as well as University calendars, professional lists, and the like, were used. The data was then systematically and statistically classified.

In all seven elections,[4] the average of new members was forty-five years, one month, whereas for all the members in all seven elections, the average age was fifty years, one-and-a-half months. This made parliament members roughly twenty years older than the average population. Most of the members had little or no previous political experience, and the average length of service for all in the seven elections together was five years, eleven months.

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[1] Ibid., p. 8. [2] Ibid., p. 9 [3] Ibid., p. 14.

[4] The 7 general elections were held in 1918, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1929, 1931, and 1935.

[5] Ibid., p. 35.

Generally, Conservatives came from public schools, Liberals from secondary schools, and Labour from elementary schools - showing a definite relationship between school attended and political party membership.

Two-thirds of the House was composed of members having professional or semi-professional occupations or not gainfully employed.[1] So, comparatively, the general body of workers was grossly under-represented in parliament.

Somewhere around 40 % of the members were of the aristocracy, i.e. had either inherited titles, or had been created peers or baronets. This clearly shows over-representation of the aristocracy.

It is obvious then, that the Parliament does not adequately represent the political opinion of the country, since strong parties are over-represented, and weak parties are under-represented. Such a situation creates an uneven balance of power by weakening the already weak parties, and by further strengthening the strong parties.

The Parliament in England is thus recruited primarily from the privileged classes.

In all the four above-mentioned empirical studies, the reasons for studying the elite were practically similar - with differences in the degree of emphasis placed on one or the other of the criteria involved. They tried to find out: of what kinds of people an elite is composed, and, in the case of the political elite, what sort of people enter, and are successful in politics; why they are elected, what their social backgrounds and their patterns of life are; why they act the way they do. What types of personality predominate in politics? What are the attitudes, values, interests,

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[1] Ibid., p. 63.

and objectives of an elite, or more specifically, of the political elite?[1] How do these motivate and influence their behaviour and the important decisions they make? and, in turn, how do these decisions affect the social structure and the social processes of the society? Are these people qualified to hold such prominent and influential positions? Are they representative of the community or society which they 'command'? Whose interests do they serve - their own or those of the society? Do political decision-makers come from a definite stratum of the society, or are their positions filled by any qualified individuals, no matter what their socio-economic status happens to be?

The 4 elite studies answered some of these questions partly or fully, depending on the particular focus of interest of each study.

Mills' The Power Elite gives an excellent picture of the elite in America as a whole.[2] He divides the elite into: 'local society' elite, the 'Metropolitan 400', the 'Celebrities', the 'Very Rich', the 'Chief Executives', the 'Corporate Rich', the 'Warlords', the 'Military Ascendancy', the 'Political Directorate', and, as a contrast, the 'Mass Society' - which is the rest of the society that is not elite. Mills says that "the rise of the power elite, ... , rests upon, and in some ways is part of, the transformation of the publics of America into a mass society."[3]

The Smythes were interested in the whole new Nigerian elite, not the political elite only. To pursue their research, they worked with a sample taken from the total population they were interested in.[4]

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[1]The American study by McKinney does not analyze such criteria as personality, values, or political behaviour, It only takes objective criteria into consideration.

[2]See C. W. Mills, Op. Cit. [3]Ibid., p. 297.

[4]See above, pp. 16 - 18.

Lerner's population was the Nazi elite - those who had the political power and prestige in Nazi Germany. He also drew a sample with which he worked.[1]

McKinney's object of interest was one section of the political elite: Congress, including both senators and representatives, and she obtained data on all of the members, not a sample, of the Seventy-Seventh Congress.[2]

Ross, likewise, took only one House of the British Parliament: the House of Commons. The only difference here is that he took all the members who had sat in all the Houses at the 7 general elections.[3]

The methodological procedures of the studies are somewhat similar. They differ in many ways, however, according to the object of the study, its orientation, and the facilities at the disposal of the scientist. As for the results of the analyses of the data, we shall compare these in a later chapter.

Let us now go on to the historical background of Lebanon, and the Lebanese Parliament. By outlining the historical background of Lebanon, we shall endeavour to show how the 2 main trends: sectarianism and feudalism are at the basis of every aspect of Lebanese life - including politics. Then, a summary of the major parliamentary phases will serve to give a clearer understanding of the framework and composition of the Lebanese Chamber.

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[1] See above, pp. 18 - 20.

[2] See above, pp. 20 - 21.

[3] See above, pp. 21 - 23.

CHAPTER III

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OUTLINE OF LEBANON

The Phoenicians, the Macedonians, the Seleucidae, the Romans, the Byzantines, the Saracens, the Crusaders, and then the Mamelukes, respectively succeeded each other as conquerors of Lebanon.[1] Then, in 1516, Sultan Selim I defeated the Mamelukes at Marj-Dabeq during the Aleppo campaign, whereupon Lebanon became part of the Ottoman Empire. Fakhr-al-Din I al Ma'ni, the feudal lord of Lebanon was confirmed in his position, as were the other feudal lords. They were left with the same autonomous privileges which they had enjoyed under the Mamelukes, but a slight tribute was imposed upon them in return. They also retained full authority on the life and death of their subjects, and their fiefs were hereditary.[2]

Due to the relative safety and stability in Lebanon, a large number of immigrants came in from the surrounding areas, thereby causing an increase of the population, and an intensification of the sectarian problem. We shall refer to this problem later. This situation had existed for a long time, but had never actually become an acute source of discussion like now

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[1]Before proceeding any further, it should be noted that the term "Lebanon", up the delimitation of the Lebanese frontiers in 1920, designated only the mountain of Lebanon - i.e. approximately what is at present the constituency of Mount Lebanon.

[2]Philip K. Hitti, "Lebanon", The Encyclopaedia Americana, Vol. 17 (1959), p. 176.

with the growing influx of foreign elements within the country. "Pays coupé, d'accès difficile, le Liban sert de refuge à tous les dissidents."[1]

Under Fakhr-al-Din II (reigned 1590 - 1635), lord of the Druzes,[2] the mountain regions greatly progressed. However, as he tried to revolt more than once, the Turks finally executed him in Constantinople in February 1635.[3]

The Shihabs succeeded the Ma'ns as feudal lords of the mountains. The most distinguished among them was the Emir Bashir II (reigned 1788 - 1840), who followed in the steps of Fakhr-al-Din as a sort of pioneer of "independence". Because of the fact that he too tried to take over the power and rule Lebanon alone, he was obliged to leave Lebanon and take refuge in Malta, in 1840.

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[1]"A cut-off country, with difficulty of access, Lebanon serves as a refuge for all dissidents." Pierre Rondot, Les Institutions Politiques du Liban (Paris: Institut d'Etudes de l'Orient Contemporain, 1946), p. 5.

[2]The Druzes, sometimes labelled as Moslem heretics, are "the adherents of an esoteric religion founded in the 11th century after Christ by the Fatimid Caliph of Egypt, Al-hakim bi'amrillahi, the son of a Russian mother, who proclaimed himself an incarnation of God" (1021). David G. Hogarth, and Gertrude Bell, "Druses", Encyclopaedia Brittanica, Vol. 7, 1962, p. 683. Their origin is obscure and mixed, some of them claiming Arab descent, while others maintain they are from Turkoman or Kurdish descent. They are mainly concentrated in Syria, while their strongholds in Lebanon are in the Shuf and Metn districts - since they have, like other persecuted minorities, preferred the security of the mountains to living in the plains. Loc. Cit. This group held "a special position in the administrative arrangements of the Ottoman Empire". B. Carra de Vaux, "Druzes", The Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. I (Holland, Leyden: E. J. Brill Ltd., 1913). It is difficult, however, to give an exact figure about their number, since their religion allows them to follow the faith of the people among whom they dwell. They get their name from al-Darazi, one of the leaders of their movement.

[3]Philip Hitti, Op. Cit., p. 176.

After Bashir's fall, there was a great hostility between Maronites and Druzes. The Sublime Porte did nothing to remedy the situation, but envenomed things more by following the policy of "divide and rule". This worried the foreign Powers, who felt it was their duty to "protect" the minorities in Lebanon. France therefore instituted herself as protector of the Maronites and other Catholics, while Russia decided to take the Orthodox under her protection. England, finding no Protestant minority, became the champion of the Druzes. The Powers thus succeeded in sustaining and increasing the bitter hatreds and rivalries of the various sects towards each other.

All this building tension culminated in a bloody massacre of the Maronites by the Druzes in 1860. The Powers (i.e. England, France, Austria, Russia, Prussia - as well as Turkey) intervened, and the Sultan issued the "Protocole of Mount Lebanon" which gave Lebanon a semi-autonomous status, making it a 'Mutassarifiyah'. The Mutassarif had to be a Christian from outside Lebanon, and he was to be assisted by an administrative council of twelve representatives from the different religious communities.

Early in World War I, however, the Turks put an end to Lebanon's privileged position, and after the War a French Mandate was instituted on Lebanon and Syria.

On September 1, 1920, General Gouraud inaugurated the "State of Greater Lebanon" (Grand Liban) by adding to Lebanon the cities of Beirut and Tripoli, and the 'qadas' of Sidon, Tyre, Rashayya, Marja'youn, Hasbaya, Beqa'a and Baalbeck[1] - all of which were taken from Syria. According

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[1]N. Zananiri, Local Government and Administration in Lebanon (M. A. Thesis, American University of Beirut, 1954), p. 25.

to Philip Hitti, these areas had, in the past, "belonged to Lebanon geographically and historically", since they had been ruled by Ma'ni and Shihabi Emirs at one time or another.[1] This was so in the 17th, the 18th and/or the 19th centuries - depending upon which of these areas was held by the Emir who was ruling at that particular time.[2]

Tabbarah, on the other hand, says it is difficult to affirm that these areas are historically part of Lebanon.[3] He quotes N. Moutran's assertion that the claim made by Lebanon on the Beqa'a was started by Daoud Pasha in 1862, and who furthermore states that Tripoli, Beirut, Saida, and Tyr never belonged to Lebanon in any period in any way.[4]

Apart from the original Sanjaq of Lebanon, the new State thus included the city of Beirut which had a half-Christian, half-Moslem population; the Sanjaq of Tripoli with an overwhelming Moslem majority; the fertile Beqa'a valley where the Sunni, Shiite and Druze inhabitants were nearly twice as many as the Christian; and the coastal districts from Tyre to Sidon, in which two-fifths of the predominantly Shiite population were Christians.[5]

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[1]Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1957), p. 489.

[2]See Ibid., pp. 387, 390 - 393, 414, 442, etc.

[3]Bahige B. Tabbarah, Les Forces Politiques Actuelles au Liban (Thèse pour le Doctorat en Droit, Faculté de Droit, Université de Grenoble, 1954), p. 23.

[4]N. Moutran, La Syrie de Demain (Paris, 1916) cited in Tabbarah, Op. Cit., p. 23.

[5]Stephen H. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 123.

Lebanon henceforth became a heterogenous nation, and the Christian community lost its former majority within the country, since the Moslem population became more than five times larger than it formerly was. The addition of these districts also doubled the area, while the population increased by nearly half. "What the country gained in area it lost in cohesion. It lost its internal equilibrium, though geographically and economically it became more viable."[1]

This enlargement of Lebanon which was made to the detriment of Syria, was disadvantageous because first, Syria lost its most important normal outlets to the sea, (this created a 'movement of irredentism'), secondly, it was a threat to the safeguard of the Christian majority who, with time, would become "a minority in a state designed to ensure its predominance";[2] and thirdly, it fostered much bitterness through the revival of sectarian hatred, since it created a new subject for argument and discussion.[3] In the old Lebanon, on a total of 414,800 inhabitants, 329,482 were Christians and 85,032 were Moslems;[4] in the State of Greater Lebanon, according to the 1932 census figures, the number of Christians was 612,790 against 423,364 Moslems[5] - showing a definite change in the proportion of Christians to Moslems.

Consequently, none of the areas had a homogenous population, "and by no manipulation of frontiers could the tangle of interlaced minorities

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[1]P. K. Hitti, Op. Cit., p. 490.

[2]George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London: Hanish Hamilton, 1938), p. 370.

[3]Loc. Cit.

[4]According to the 1913 census figures. See Tabbarah, Op. Cit., p. 24.

[5]Rondot, Op. Cit., p. 29.

be unravelled.[1] For the time being, nevertheless, the Maronites were still the largest single community (even though they were less than fifty percent of the total population), and they were followed in numerical order by the Sunni, Greek Orthodox, Shiite, and Druze communities.

The new State was to be governed by a French official who was to be assisted by a "representative Advisory Council" appointed by the High Commissioner. The country was divided into four 'sanjaqs': North Lebanon, the Beqa'a, Mount Lebanon, and South Lebanon. Each of these was in turn divided into twelve 'qadas'; the major municipalities of Beirut and Tripoli having independent status.[2]

The Moslems were very reserved concerning this new Lebanese State. They did not want to be included in Lebanon but preferred remaining a part of Syria. They demanded political guarantees, and only the assurance of sectarian representation made them associate in the life of the Lebanese State.[3] The Christians, on the other hand, were worried about Lebanese unity. They believed that as long as 45 % of the Lebanese refused to be Lebanese, Lebanon would cease to be viable.[4] In spite of this belief, however, they did not actually ask for a separation of the amalgamated territories. The French wanted to uphold Greater Lebanon so as to retain Maronite and Catholic support in the area.

The Lebanese "Republic" was then proclaimed on May 23, 1926, but it was still under French Régime. This was not a very smooth-working

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[1] Longrigg, Op. Cit., p. 123.

[2] Ibid., p. 123.

[3] Rondot, Op. Cit., p. 47.

[4] Ibid., p. 49.

arrangement[1], however, and the Vichy régime was obliged to surrender to the allied forces in July 1941. On November 26 of the same year, the Free French officially declared Lebanon independent.[2]

On August 29, 1943, a Chamber of Deputies of 55 members was elected, and these chose Bechara el-Khoury as President of the Republic, on September 21. The President and several of the nationalist leaders asked for an amendment of the Constitution, the main provisions being: a strong emphasis on Lebanon's sovereign status, the abolition of French as an official language, the ending of all functions, obligations and rights of the ex-Mandatory, as well as effacing all references to the Mandate.[3] The French refused these terms, and immediately arrested the President and several ministers and deputies, and imprisoned them at Rashayya from November 8 to November 22,[4] 1943.

Bechara el-Khoury renewed his term for six more years in the May 1948 elections, but "his régime was charged with nepotism, corruption, and laxity in administration and in the execution of justice",[5] and he was therefore forced to resign in September 1952. President Camille Chamoun succeeded him and was in turn succeeded by General Fouad Chehab after the 1958 crisis.

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[1]See next chapter on the vicissitudes of the parliamentary régime.

[2]It did not really exercise its sovereignty, however, until after 1943 - 1944.

[3]Longrigg, Op. Cit., p. 331.

[4]This date was adopted by the Lebanese as the day of celebration of the National Independence.

[5]P. K. Hitti, "Lebanon", The Encyclopaedia Americana, p. 176.

Throughout the history of Lebanon, one finds two main underlying currents which have helped in the shaping of its governmental structure: sectarianism and feudalism.

Sectarianism

Under Ottoman rule, as was mentioned above, Mount Lebanon was administered mainly on a sectarian basis. "In all matters that concerned one of the sects, the head of the sect was the person to whom the government turned. Civil as well as judicial functions devolved upon the spiritual leaders; they administered the sects' property and institutions, and they handled matters of personal status."[1] This was the cause of all the hostility and fighting that existed between sects, especially between Christians and non-Christians. Sectarianism is "a religious factionalism, a feeling of loyalty to a group formed alohg religious lines, and a feeling of remoteness from the other groups".[2] It has been a determining factor in all aspects of Lebanese life, and has therefore had a tremendous impact on politics as well.

In 1943, there was an agreement among the various sects to work for "a state that is acceptable to the Christians as well as to the Moslems".[3] (We have seen above how the amalgamation of mainly Moslem-populated territories - previously part of Syria - with Lebanon greatly increased the sectarian problem. The anxieties of both Moslems and Christians regarding their future in such a State, grew after 1920. The different communities therefore had to reach some sort of understanding, especially in view of

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[1]Halim Fayyad, The Effects of Sectarianism on the Lebanese Administration (M. A. Thesis, American University of Beirut, 1956), pp. 4 - 5.

[2]Ibid., p. 15.

[3]Ibid., p. 44.

the fact that the new State had been established by the French who had not bothered to consult the populations concerned.) This agreement, or understanding, was the National Pact, which is considered as the 'unwritten Constitution' of Lebanon, and is "a binding convention in Lebanese life".[1] It thus provides for a distribution of government positions between the different sects according to their numerical strength, as determined by the 1932 census. Consequently, the President of the Republic is a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunni, the Speaker of the Chamber a Shiite, the Deputy Prime Minister[2] a Greek Orthodox, and the Commander-in-Chief of the army and the Director of the Office of Internal Security (Sûreté Générale), Maronites.[3]

Feudalism

Feudalism, too, has been an important force in the history of Lebanon. During the Ottoman period, officials were recruited mostly from the aristocracy, which was a landholding aristocracy. The fiefs did not confer upon the holder ownership or use of the land, but they entitled him to the revenue of the land. This was due to the fact that in the Near East, feudalism arose from the administration and general condition of the lands that were conquered by the Arabs.[4] When the conquered lands belonged to pagans they were confiscated, one-fifth becoming the inalienable property of the Moslem community, and four-fifths being distributed as booty among the warriors who had been active in the battle. If, on the other hand,

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[1]H. Fayyad, Op. Cit., p. 45.

[2]The Vice-President of the Council of Ministers.

[3]See Appendix III: the confessional representation in the Chamber by geographical constituency.

[4]Issam Y. Ashour, The Remnants of the Feudal System in Palestine, Syria, and the Lebanon (M. A. Thesis, American University of Beirut, 1946), p. 1.

the conquered lands belonged to Christians or Jews, they were left to their owners (providing they did not oppose the Conquest) who, in return, had to pay taxes.[1] Later, after the conquest of Syria, the confiscated lands were no longer given to the warriors,[2] but became a part of the public property of the State: Beit ul Mal. To exploit these domains, then, there were two alternatives:

(a) Direct administration by workers that were hired by the Caliph.

(b) The Iqtah system, which consisted in leasing these lands to certain people who paid an annual rent, as well as their services, for them.[3]

With time, and because of various other factors, this system (the Iqtah) gradually evolved into full ownership of the land; and, after the decline of the Ottoman Empire, many of these lands were bought by their holders. The 'aristocracy' thus became the landowners by the end of the nineteenth, and the beginning of the twentieth centuries.

In Mount Lebanon, the condition of the peasant was slightly better than in other areas. Being more individualistic, the relationship between the Emir and himself was somewhat different from the vassal-lord relationship in the West.[4] Nevertheless, the Lebanese lords still held a great deal of influence - legal, political, economic, as well as moral - over their peasants.[5]

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[1] Ibid., p. 1. These takes were the Djeziya: a personal tax in proportion to wealth, and the Khradj: a tax on the revenue of the land.

[2] Caliph Omar thought that this would turn the attention of his men from war. Tabbarah, Op. Cit., p. 140.

[3] Ashour, Op. Cit., p. 2.

[4] Ibid., pp. 23 - 25, and 39.

[5] Loc. Cit.

The strength of sectarianism is clearly illustrated in the inheritance laws, since they differ according to the various sects. Among the Sunni Moslems, the property was divided between the children, the girl's part being half that of the boy. If the sole heir was a girl, she did not get all the property, and one-third of it could therefore be given away to strangers. The Shiite Moslems had the same laws with the sole difference that if the heir was a girl, she inherited all of the property. A Druze lord could bequeath his estates to whomsoever he willed, whether children, distant relatives, or total strangers. Finally, the Christian laws of inheritance provided for the division of the property equally among the children - both male and female.[1] This digression shows how the lands that became the property of the landholders were passed on to their children, and their children's children.

All those who ruled Lebanon at one time or another always "left the internal affairs of the mountain to the care of the local dynasts, more often than not members of local landowning families."[2] (This statement applies to Mount Lebanon before the establishment of the State of Greater Lebanon, in 1920.)

When, in 1866, feudalism was officially abolished in Lebanon, the serf-lord relationship still continued to exist in the minds of the people - that is, the lords retained their moral influence over the peasants.

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[1]Subhi Mahmassani, Al Mabadeh al Shari'yah wa'l Qanuniyah: Fi al Heir, wa'l Nafqat, wa'l Mawarith, wa'l Wassiyah (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm-Lillmalayin, 1962). Third Edition.

[2]A. H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 130.

In the South of Lebanon, the Beqa'a and Akkar (areas which were added to the State of Lebanon in 1920) feudalism was the main force, and remains in existence till now, since they are the regions where really large land-holdings exist.[1]

In spite of a certain amount of so-called 'freedom' of election - under the French - the Lebanese nevertheless obeyed their religious leaders and their feudal lords.

In its political context, feudalism has manifested its influence in several ways. First, through the extended family. The family in Lebanon "has actually become a political and electoral force."[2] It supports the candidates during their campaign, and helps them to obtain a larger number of votes. Very frequently, members of the same family run as rival candidates in the same election. Relatives also often hold office at the same time in the Parliament.[3]

Secondly, through the persistence of the 'feudal mentality', a result of a long history of feudalism. The political leader tries to live up to the reputation of power and prestige that surrounds his name.[4] He therefore uses several of the external signs of power and wealth which distinguish him from his followers - for example, a big, luxurious house, the latest car model, jewels for his wife, and so on.

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[1]Ashour, Op. Cit., p. 39.

[2]Tabbarah, Op. Cit., p. 161.

[3]In the 1953 Chamber, there were 2 brothers, Raymond and Pierre Eddé; a father and son: Ahmad and Kamel el-Assaad; and others more distantly related. Ibid., p. 162

[4]Ibid., p. 164.

Thirdly, through actual practices, as a result of the feudal mentality. The leaders try as much as possible to behave like real feudal chiefs. They are often so powerful that in some cases their word counts over that of the State. When anyone of their "men" needs protection, he gets it (even if he is a criminal) simply because the 'big man', the "ZA'IM", has personally intervened. These leaders have their "ABADAYES", who are personal bodyguards as well as the men who eliminate any undesirable opponents, settle accounts, etc.[1]

Of course this absolute authority has greatly decreased nowadays. It exists to a certain extent, but is not quite as strong and as binding as it used to be. Deputies who were elected through the influence of the 'big man' of the region became his puppets. They did everything he wanted them to do, and could not make any personal decisions that were contrary to his wishes.[2]

The influence of sectarianism and feudalism in the actual Parliament will be obvious in our discussion of the composition of the Chamber, in chapter 5.

Let us now turn to a survey of parliamentary evolution in Lebanon.

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[1] Ibid., p. 166.

[2] Loc. Cit.

CHAPTER IV

EVOLUTION OF THE PARLIAMENT IN LEBANON

From 1920 up to 1960, Lebanon has had 13 National Assemblies[1] which have held the legislative power within the nation. It was in 1926 that the parliament was first called the "Chamber of Deputies".

The Administrative Commission that ruled the country from 1920 to 1922, was composed of 17 nominated members. This state of affairs could not last in view of the fact that there were no really representative institutions elected by the people themselves. A census was therefore taken, in March 1922, for all of Greater Lebanon.[2] In the first Representative Council (1922 - 1925), representation was along confessional lines: 10 Maronites, 6 Sunnis, 5 Shiites, 4 Greek Orthodox, 2 Greek Catholics, 2 Druzes, and 1 Latin (representing the minorities) - the total number being 30.

Under the 1926 Constitution, the Chamber became bicameral, with a 'Senate' of sixteen appointed members (whose term of office was to be six years), and a 'Chamber of Deputies' composed of 30 elected members (whose term was for four years). Due to an intense antagonism between the Senate

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[1] See Appendix I.

[2] The total figures yielded were: 330,000 Christians, 275,000 Muslims, 43,000 Druzes, 3,500 Jews, and 20,000 Syrians and foreigners. This census "was highly imperfect, for the reasons ... which in such countries always prevent accurate personal registration", but the elections were still held in April 1922. Longrigg, Op. Cit., p. 127.

and the Chamber of Deputies, however, the Senate was abolished by the Constitutional law of October 17, 1927.[1] The two assemblies were thus merged into one Chamber.

Up to the time of independence, two-thirds of the members of parliament were elected, the remaining third being appointed by the French authorities. After Lebanon started to exercise its rights as a Sovereign state, all the members of parliament were elected.

Before going on to the various Chambers that succeeded each other after the Independence, a word should be said about the political parties that cropped up after 1930, and which are actually represented in the parliament.

By 1934, two distinct blocs had appeared: the Constitutional Bloc (also known as the "Destour"), founded by President Bechara el Khoury, and the National Bloc, founded by Emile Edde. It was around, by, and for these two men that the two blocs came into existence and went on surviving - since the rivalry that existed between them was primarily personal. The purpose of the Constitutional Bloc "was the defence of the Constitution",[2] whereas the aim of the National Bloc was "the defence of Lebanon in her present form and the maintenance of her independence against any forces that might attempt disintegration or separation".[3]

Around 3 years later, 2 more groups were born. One was the Najjadeh, the other the Kataeb (Phalanges). The first of these preached Pan-Arabism,

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[1]M. Majzoub, Le Liban et l'Orient Arabe: 1943 - 1956 (Aix en Provence: La Pensée Universitaire, 1956), p. 19.

[2]Ziadeh, Syria and Lebanon, p. 194. [3]Ibid., p. 195.

"disowned localism and tribalism, and accepted as its programme to work for some form of union of Arab countries, provided that autonomy in internal affairs was preserved."[1] The Kataeb, on their side, fought for the preservation of Lebanese independence, and denied all theories of a geographical Syria or an Arab Nation that would engulf the Lebanese people. They were thus absolutely opposed to any kind of union or unity whatsoever.[2] As a consequence of their respective political standpoints, the Najjadeh are considered mostly a Sunni-youth movement or party, while the Kataebs have mainly Maronite adherents.[3]

The Progressive Socialist Party was founded more than ten years later by Kamal Joumblatt, in May 1949. The aim of this party is the application of socialism and the total annihilation of feudalism.[4] The Progressive Socialist "believes in moderate Socialism which will see to planning for the utilization of the country's natural resources, medical and social insurance, etc."[5] The success of this party and its wide appeal has been due primarily to the "personality and dynamism of its founder".[6]

The National Liberal Party was founded in 1958 by President Camille Chamoun as an outcome of the crisis that had occurred in that year. The National Liberals believe in the Lebanese identity and in the crystallization of the status quo[7] - i.e. Lebanese nationalism and independence.

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[1] Loc. Cit.

[2] Majzoub, Op. Cit., p. 100. "Nous n'avons en vue que le Liban et le Liban seul."

[3] Adnan el-Hakim founded the Najjadeh; Pierre Gemayel founded the Kataeb.

[4] Majzoub, Op. Cit., p. 113.

[5] Ziadeh, Op. Cit., p. 204.

[6] Majzoub, Op. Cit., p. 111.

[7] Personal interview.

Whatever appeal the party has been able to provide it was not due to any specific ideology or programme of action, but mainly as an expression of support and loyalty to President Chamoun.

The Tachnak party is the last one we will mention here. It is the right-wing conservative Armenian party, whose principal aims are the fight against communism and the return to the homeland.[1] It was founded some time in the 19th century, and cannot therefore be considered a Lebanese party as such.

In general, most, if not all, of the above-mentioned parties continue to function chiefly because of the men who founded them; their personality, their character, and their supporters. Although they do not actually have any definite ideologies or programmes of action that might attract members, they still survive as political parties.

Let us now return to parliamentary history in Lebanon.

In 1943, the elections were the first to be pervaded with the 'spirit of independence.'[2] There were no actual political party affiliations as such, but the members of that parliament were split in their sympathies with either the Constitutional or the National Blocs.

The 1947 parliament was called the "Puppet Chamber", because there was a great deal of "traffic in influence, bribery, and corruption."[3]

The importance of political parties started to show in 1951. (By "importance" is meant their significant representation in the parliament.)

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[1]Personal interview.

[2]Nicolas A. Ziadeh, Op. Cit., p. 207.

[3]Loc. Cit.

There were two Progressive Socialists, one Kataeb, and one Syrian Nationalist[1] in the Chamber elected that year.

The number of deputies in the different Lebanese Parliaments has greatly varied, but has always been a multiple of 11. This has maintained the ratio of 6 Christians for every 5 non-Christians (Moslems and Druzes).[2] The bases for this arrangement are: the census of 1932, and the general population count of 1943. The figures yielded in the 1932 census were 612,790 Christians, and 423,364 Moslems and Druzes. In 1943 the figures became 584,443 Christians, and 507,547 Moslems and Druzes.[3] The total population figures were 1,047,813 in 1932, and 1,104,669 in 1943.

The 1932 census is more reliable than the general population count of 1943 because, in spite of the fact that there was a lot of justified criticism about the census, it was the result of a methodical and 'scientific' research. The 1943 figures, however, were taken from the total number of Lebanese registered on December 31, 1943 - whether present or absent, or whether emigrants or not.[4]

Since 1932, the bureau of statistics, using the census as a basis, has brought these figures up to date by annually adding to them the number of births minus the number of deaths. The results thus obtained cannot be accurate, for this method neglects the various factors that play a determining role in demographic fluctuations[5] - factors such as immigration, emigration, urbanization, and so on. This is another reason why

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[1] A member of the PPS Party, now dissolved in Lebanon after its attempted coup d'état in January 1962.

[2] Malcolm H. Kerr, "The Lebanese Parliamentary Elections", Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 11 (October 1960), p. 268.

[3] Rondot, Op. Cit., Table I, p. 29.

[4] Ibid., pp. 28 - 29, footnote

[5] Tabbarah, Op. Cit., p. 81.

the 1943 figures are not very reliable. In any case, the whole Lebanese political system has been based on these population figures.

The Parliament has two important regular rounds of sessions:

1) The first session of the first round starts on the first Tuesday that falls after 15 March, and the round lasts till the end of May.

2) The second round of sessions starts on the first Tuesday that falls after 15 October, and lasts till the end of December.[1]

The latest electoral law was the one passed by the 1957-1960 parliament, on April 26, 1960. The following are some of the amendments that were made: the number of deputies became 99 (the largest chamber ever constituted during Lebanon's 40 years of parliamentary life), the Secret Chamber was instituted[2] (i.e. voting in a secret booth, where no one can influence the individual who is voting, or see for whom he is voting), and the country was redivided into 26 new constituencies.[3]

To be eligible (according to the electoral law) a candidate must be Lebanese, resident in Lebanon, over 25 years of age, a civilian and literate. He should have no criminal record, should be in full possession

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[1]Chafik Jeha, and George Shahla, Mabadec al Tarbiah al Wataniyah (Jounieh: The Lebanese Missionary Fathers' Press, 1946), pp. 57 - 58.

[2]For the first time since the beginning of parliamentary history. Previously the voting was done in one big room, the votes being slipped into sealed boxes. Everyone could see who was voting for whom, that way.

[3]Nicola A. Ziadeh, "The Lebanese Elections 1960," The Middle East Journal. Vol. 14 (Autumn 1960), p. 368. See also Appendix II.

of the right to vote, and he must not be a government employee or official (i. e. on the payroll of the National Treasury). When signing his name for admission to candidacy, he should deposit 3,000 Lebanese Pounds at the Treasury. If the candidate obtains 25 % of the votes during the elections, this amount is returned to him; otherwise, it is forfeited. These are the legal characteristics of the Lebanese deputies.

To run for elections, groups of candidates get together and run on a joint list - which is usually headed by a well-known politician or influential 'feudal' leader, a "za'im". Among the factors taken into consideration in the setting up of these "electoral lists" are: the electoral strength of the individual, his religious and political affiliations, his "personal magnetism", his financial status, and his position vis-à-vis the "authorities".[1]

This brings us to the analysis of the social characteristics of the 99 deputies.

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[1]Mounir R. Sa'adeh, The Fifth Lebanese Legislative Assembly, 1943-1944 (M. A. Thesis, American University of Beirut, 1945), pp. 43 - 44.

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS OF THE DATA:
THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENTARY ELITE

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the data that was gathered about the Lebanese Parliamentary Elite. A distinction should first be made here between the real meaning of the term 'elite', and its application to the Lebanese Chamber. Being the legislative body of the Lebanese Government, the deputies are considered as the "Parliamentary Elite." Nevertheless, they are elite only insofar as they are a section of the political ruling class, not elite in the real sense of the term. That is, they are neither the 'flower' nor the 'best' of everything. In the words of Heberle: "The term élite should be taken in a neutral, technical sense; the quality of such a group can rarely be judged objectively, except by its ability to lead, to rule, and to stay in power. In this sense even the most depraved and corrupt ruling clique is an elite."[1]

The Lebanese Parliamentary Elite comprises the 99 members of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies actually in office, who were elected in the June-July elections of 1960.

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[1]Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951), pp. 431 - 432.

An attempt will be made to answer the following questions: From what social background is the Lebanese parliamentary elite drawn? What are the major criteria taken into consideration in the recruitment of the deputies? Who were their fathers before them? Is there an occupational continuity between them and their fathers? Are these elite members political 'careerists'? What are their characteristics? What are the regional variations in the composition of the Chamber?

It has already been pointed out earlier that Lebanese history has been shaped and determined by two main trends: feudalism and sectarianism. In view of the fact that they continue to pervade all major aspects of our society, it is logical to infer that the political system will likewise be based on them.

Our analysis will therefore be made within the context of feudalism and sectarianism, insofar as their influence is manifested in the composition, i.e. the recruitment, of the Chamber.

The allotment of seats within the Lebanese parliament is based on purely sectarian considerations. This is not stipulated as such in the Lebanese Constitution, but is a result of the National Pact - the 'Unwritten Constitution' of Lebanon. The religious distribution of the Chamber is 54 Christians and 45 Moslems and Druzes.[1]

The 99 seats are geographically distributed between the 26 constituencies or districts of the 5 'mohafazats' of Beirut, Mount Lebanon, the Beqa'a, South Lebanon and North Lebanon.[2] Each of these 5 'mohafazats'

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[1]Of the 99 deputies, 30 are Maronites, 20 are Sunni Moslems, 19 are Shiite Moslems, 11 are Greek Orthodox, 6 are Greek Catholics, 6 are Druzes, 4 are Armenian Orthodox, 1 is Armenian Catholic, 1 is Protestant, and 1 is Latin (representing the minorities). See Appendix III for the confessional representation by constituency.

[2]See Appendix II for a list of the 26 constituencies.

differs from the others with regard to the criteria that are taken into consideration in the recruitment process. How they differ will be illustrated later on in our analysis. The number of seats by 'mohafazat are: 30 for Mount Lebanon, 20 for North Lebanon, 18 for South Lebanon, 16 for Beirut, and 15 for the Beqa'a.[1]

One of the most significant heritages left over from feudal times is the za'im, that is, the leader of a community. The za'im possesses an absolute and unchallenged authority among his followers - whether these are religious adherents, political cliques, or peasants on his lands.

The Za'im

In the Middle East, and especially in Lebanon, "to the People ... Power is first of all Someone. It is a Name and a physical person."[2] The man in power is not considered in his capacity of official 'somebody', but rather as a member of a certain family, a certain religion, or a certain region.[3] This point of view is a direct outgrowth of feudal and sectarian traditions in Lebanese society at large.

Before going on to the za'im himself and his role in the community it is appropriate to discuss first the concept of authority.

Weber recognizes three 'ideal' types of legitimate authority:[4]

(a) Rational legal authority which is based on impersonal and

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[1]See Appendix III for the breakdown of seats by constituency.

[2]Georges Naccache, Conférences du Cénacle (Beyrouth). November 25, 1952, p. 10. Quoted in Tabbarah, Op. Cit., p. 35.

[3]B. Tabbarah, Op. Cit., p. 35. "A travers le personage officiel, c'est surtout l'homme qu'on guette et qu'on observe.

[4]Nicolas S. Timasheff, Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth (New York: Random House, 1955), chapter 14, "Max Weber", p. 179.

standardized rules or norms - as in modern societies.

(b) Traditional authority which is based on belief of the established legitimacy of tradition - as for example a feudal society or a dynasty of kings.

(c) Charismatic authority which rests on the outstanding qualities and model character attributed to a particular individual - as, for example, Hitler, Nasser.

Leadership in Lebanon is a blend of both the traditional and the charismatic types. Power remains within the same family over a long period of time, and is passed on from father to son. Likewise, some individuals have a strong following not only because of the name and prestige they possess but because of the exceptional qualities with which they are endowed. An example of a predominantly charismatic leader (who also possesses traditional and rational authority) is Kamal Joumblatt who is regarded as the 'spiritual' leader of several hundreds of Druzes.

The rational legal type of authority does not apply to the Lebanese political class in the strict and absolute sense of the term. It applies only insofar as a deputy does possess authority as a result of the office he holds. Whether he has any authority over and above that inherent in his position, will depend upon his family and social background, and himself, traditionalistic and charismatic features.

The leaders of the various political groupings in Lebanon are known as zu'ama, the plural for za'im or chief. The za'im "in peacetime ... is the recognized leader of a community who has the power to speak for his clients as a group or as individuals, who is expected to take action in

their and in his interest whenever necessary."[1] He helps and protects them when they need him, no matter what means he must use. This situation still prevails in Lebanon in spite of some modifications during the course of its evolution from a completely feudal society to a more modern one. "In times of war, the za'im takes the field himself, or, if he is too old, deputizes a son. The group bound to him by the manifold ties of interest and loyalty serves as his armed following."[2] The position of za'im is generally inherited, since it is difficult for a tradition-oriented community to accept new men as its leaders. The position of za'im is not acquired overnight: "Money, influence, power, the right touch with clients are prerequisites."[3] Every za'im deals differently with his people depending upon his religious affiliations, regional community, and how 'big' or 'little' he is.

Being elected deputy is extremely crucial for the position of a za'im.

> "To be a deputy gives the za'im the consecration of modernity. It adds to his real basis of power, the one back home as the head of his group, a modern façade exhibited in many cases with much complacency. It also gives many and manifold advantages. It puts the za'im on the level of a privileged person in all negotiations with the state. By becoming a deputy his role as one of the leaders is recognized by the state and the administrative machine. This makes the position of a deputy for an important za'im a political must. He cannot afford to lose it for an indefinite period."[4]

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[1]Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'ama and Parties in the Lebanese Crisis of 1958", Middle East Journal, Vol. 15 (Spring 1961), p. 128.

[2]Ibid., p. 129.

[3]Loc. Cit.

[4]Ibid., p. 131.

As our analysis progresses it will become increasingly evident that a great number of the deputies are such zu'ama themselves. Considering the fact that the za'im is the leader of his community, it follows that he will be the most eligible candidate of the area during the legislative elections.

A shift seems to have occurred, recently, from the absolute za'im to the more 'modern' type of political leader. Lebanon is gradually freeing itself from traditionalism and feudalism. What has evolved is a kind of in-between society: neither completely tradition-oriented nor completely rational and modernized. Being based on feudalism and traditionalism, it is borrowing from the Western world in all fields: commerce, industry, mode of life, education, arts, etc., as well as politics.

The political leader must have some attributes that will place (and keep) him in his position, other than the mere fact of coming from a family of zu'ama. He must possess the type of personality that can rally supporters (this factor we cannot expand more fully since it falls more within the realm of the psychologist); he must possess material advantages superior to other people, as for example money, a beautiful home, a car, etc.; he must be considered able to give advice on all matters, and hence should possess a certain degree of education. To increase his chances of getting elected, the 'modern' Lebanese za'im forms either a political party or a personalized leadership group. This does not mean that the za'im has changed into the rational political leader, but simply that the Lebanese political leader is a blend of both types.

Political Affiliations

The political affiliations represented in the Lebanese Chamber are varied. These can be classified into four types:

(1) Personalized leadership groups.

(2) Political parties.

(3) Blocs.

(4) Independents.

(1) Personalized leadership groups. These are groups formed around one man, a 'feudal' za'im. They are based solely on loyalty to the leader himself as a person, and not around any ideology he might expound. They exist for, by, and around the leader, and rarely survive him, unless they are re-formed around his son after his death.[1] Personalized leadership groups do not have any formal organization whatsoever, and are only political cliques. The followers of the personalized leadership group usually remain in it since they have a greater chance of getting elected if they are in with the za'im.

(2) Political parties. As defined by Heberle, a political party "is an association of citizens recruited by free solicitation with the purpose of securing power for the leaders. A party awards to its active participants chances of attaining objective ends or of gaining personal, ideal, or material benefits."[2] A political party, furthermore, has a formal organization, with a president, membership formalities, a constitution which defines its ideology, and a definite programme of action.

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[1] An example of this is the Assa'ad el-Assa'ad group which became the Kamel el-Assa'ad group on the death of the father. To a considerable extent also, Rashid Karameh inherited his position from his father.

[2] R. Heberle, Op. Cit., p. 275.

Political parties in Lebanon differ from political parties elsewhere in that they are formed at the beginning around one man, whose authority is largely of the charismatic type. It is in this sense that the Lebanese political party resembles the personalized leadership group.

(3) Blocs. A bloc is a coalition in the legislature that often cuts across parties. It is less formally organized than a party, and does not have any definite framework of action. There are three blocs represented in the Chamber - the Constitutional Bloc, the National Bloc, and "Al Hayat al Wataniya".

(4) Independents. They are supposed to be neutral, but they tend to have inclinations for or against certain individuals or groups within the Parliament. Many of the Independents are zu'ama, while others are the followers of such zu'ama. However, these sympathies or antipathies (that sometimes take the form of cliques) are merely partisanships that shift according to the numerous political intrigues that continuously unfold behind the scenes. Being based purely on personal interest and/or friendship, they are not considered ideological political affiliations as such. Among the deputies who are labelled Independents, there are a few who have, at some time in the past, been affiliated to some political party or other, and who have now dropped out. The status of 'Independent' therefore gives the deputy a greater freedom to change sides when, and as often as he pleases.

In the structure and organization of political parties in Lebanon, one finds both feudal as well as sectarian social foundations for their existence. These parties are important insofar as they are more or less

'organized' groupings with a supposedly 'formal' framework, as opposed to the groups that rally around a 'feudal' chief in the more feudal areas. It is logical to infer, then, that political affiliations vary according to the region and the sect to which the deputy belongs. For example, Kataebs tend to be Maronites, while the Najjadeh Party has Moslem adherents; and personalized leadership groups exist in the 'feudalistic' areas whereas political parties prevail in the modern areas like Beirut.

The political affiliations that are represented in the 1960-1964 Assembly are:[1]

Political Parties	Number of Members
Kataeb Party (Phalanges	6
National Liberal Party	5
Tachnak Party	4
Progressive Social Party	3
Najjadeh Party	1
Personalized Leadership Groups	
Rashid Karamé Group	11
El-Assa'ad Group	7
Joseph Skaff Group	5
Soleiman Frangieh Group	4
Blocs	
Constitutional Bloc (Destour)	7
National Bloc	6
"Al Hayat al Wataniyeh"	1

[1]See Appendix IV for the names of the deputies within each group.

Independents 39 members

Thirty-three deputies are members of the 8 parties and blocs represented in the Chamber; of these 33, 6 are the leaders and/or founders of 4 parties and 2 blocs,[1] and 13 are officers in 5 of the 8 parties and blocs.[2] This means that political party membership is rather important in the recruitment of the members of the Chamber of Deputies. With the strong backing of a party, a candidate is more liable to be successful, especially in regions where feudalism is no longer a very strong force, namely in Mount Lebanon and in Beirut. These figures are also significant because they show that those party members who get elected are usually those with the responsible positions (19 out of 33). Once again we see the importance of the 'leader,' the '<u>za'im</u>' in the traditional sense.

Nevertheless, this clearly marks the advance of 'organized' parties, which up to now had been hardly represented in the Chamber.[3] Although they participated in the campaign in their capacity as organized parties having an ideology and a programme of action, the fact still remains that they are motivated primarily by and for the promotion of personal interests. They "are basically personal in the sense that such associations, with rare

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[1]Camille Chamoun (N. L. P.), Pierre Gemayel (Kataeb), Kamal Joumblatt (P. S. P.), Adnan Hakim (Najjadeh), Raymond Eddé (National Bloc), and Rafic Naja ("Al Hayat al Wataniyeh). The last two are leaders only, while the first 4 are <u>both</u> founders <u>and</u> leaders.

[2]Of the officers, 5 are from the Constitutional, 4 from the Kataeb, 2 from the National Bloc, 1 from the Tachnak, and 1 from the Progressive Socialis

[3]A few of the interviewed deputies, who are political party members, expressed the belief that their election was greatly influenced by the support of their respective parties. One of them asserted: "The day will come when one can be a candidate only if one is a party member, because people will then rally round an ideal."

exceptions depend on personal loyalty to the leader."[1] This is another manifestation of the persistence of the feudal 'spirit' in Lebanese society, for the attachment between the leader and members of a party is somewhat similar to the attachment that exists between a feudal chief and his peasants. Hence, these parties are "made and unmade by coalitions and quarrels of the zu'ama or by the wish of one such za'im to be "modern" and "up-to-date". Their grass roots are the personal ties of socio-economico-political interest between the za'im and his client."[2]

It does not mean, however, that Lebanese political parties are identical to personalized leadership groups. Parties have a constitution, by-laws, and all other usual formalities. The main resemblance between the two formations is that they start out because of, and around, one man. That is, at the onset a party is not formed around an ideal for itself but around an individual who is customarily a za'im with a considerable following.

The 1960 elections are significant because they were the first after the 'civil war' of 1958, and "thus represent a return to normalcy."[2] Furthermore, "some of the traditional 'feudal' notabilities also recovered their places in the Chamber."[3]

The 1958 crisis, then, is one of the indirect causes of the heterogeneity of the actual Chamber. The members of the parliament represent largely the various tendencies and interests which are found in the country.

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[1] N. Ziadeh, "The Lebanese Elections, 1960," Op. Cit., p. 369.

[2] M. Kerr, Op. Cit., p. 270.

[3] Europa Publications Ltd., The Middle East: 1961. Eighth Edition (London: Europa Publications Ltd., 1961), p. 220.

As Kerr puts it, " the elections tended not to produce a confrontation of bitter sectarian partisans but to scatter the forces of each group into localized rivalries."[1]

Twenty-seven deputies belong to the 4 personalized leadership groups (i.e. each behind a 'feudal' chief) represented in the Parliament,[2] while 39 deputies are Independents - i.e. they have no particular political affiliations. Table 1 below shows the prevalence of party members in the less 'feudal' areas (Beirut and Mount Lebanon) and the number of personalized leadership group members in the more 'feudal-oriented' regions of North and South Lebanon, as well as the Beqa'a.

TABLE 1 - General Distribution of Political Affiliations by 'Mohafazat'

	Political Parties	Personalized Leadership Groups	Blocs	Independents	Number of Deputies
Mount Lebanon	10	-	9	11	30
North Lebanon	1	15	3	1	20
South Lebanon	1	7	-	10	18
Beqa'a	-	5	1	9	15
Beirut	7	-	1	8	16
Total	19	27	14	39[a]	99

[a]Out of these 39, Kazem el Solh had been the founder and leader, and Ali Bazzi a member, of the now dissolved party "Al Nida' al Kaoumi" - the National Appeal. Also, Nassim Majdalani had been an officer of the Progressive Social Party.

[1]M. Kerr, Op. Cit., p. 273.

[2]Soleiman Frangieh, Rashid Karamé, Joseph Skaff, and Kamel el-Assaad Groups.

It should be noted that the number of Independents in the 'feudal-oriented' areas of South Lebanon and the Beqa'a are a result of this same 'feudalism'. (There are 10 in South Lebanon, and in the Beqa'a, meaning that they are the majority in each region respectively.) The number is that large because these people are not Independents in the real sense of the term, but have their sympathies and antipathies for one or the other of the big zu'ama of their constituency.

Thus out of 33 political party and bloc members, 19 are from Mount Lebanon and 8 are from Beirut, whereas North Lebanon has 4, and the South and the Beqa'a each have 1. Of the 27 who belong to groups around a notable 'feudal' chief, 15 are found in North Lebanon, 7 in the South, and 5 in the Beqa'a, while Mount Lebanon and Beirut have none at all. This means that political affiliations tend to differ by region, depending upon feudal and sectarian considerations. As a former Maronite deputy, Cheikh Farid el Khazen, once declared: "The sects of our country do not only represent religious entities, but political parties."[1] For a picture of specific political affiliations by region, see Table 2.

As shown by the figures on Table 2, the members of formal organizations (like parties and blocs) predominate in Beirut and Mount Lebanon. On the other hand, members of personalized leadership groups (which may be termed the non-formal organizations) are found only in South Lebanon, North Lebanon and the Beqa'a. This means that in the less feudal-oriented regions like Mount Lebanon and Beirut, formal organizations are regarded as the most effective kind of organizations for a more 'modern' community. On the other hand, the North, the South and the Beqa'a have not yet reached

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[1]Quoted in Rondot, Op. Cit., p. 23, from the Orient, April 29, 1937.

this point of view, and remain more 'feudal' in outlook by upholding the personalized leadership group that rallies round a za'im. It is not astonishing, therefore, to find a greater proportion of so-called Independents in the feudal areas than in the non-feudal areas.

TABLE 2 - Specific Distribution of Political Affiliations by 'Mohafazat'

	Mount Lebanon	North Lebanon	Beqa'a	South Lebanon	Beirut	Total
POLITICAL PARTIES						
Kataeb	3	-	-	1	2	6
National Liberal	4	1	-	-	-	5
Tachnak	1	-	-	-	3	4
Progressive Socialist	2	-	-	-	1	3
Najjadeh	-	-	-	-	1	1
BLOCS						
Constitutional	4	2	1	-	-	7
National Bloc	5	1	-	-	-	6
Hayat Wataniyah	-	-	-	-	1	1
PERSONALIZED LEADERSHIP GROUPS						
Rashid Karamé Gr.	-	11	-	-	-	11
el-Assa'ad Gr.	-	-	-	7	-	7
Soleiman Frangieh Gr.	-	4	-	-	-	4
Joseph Skaff Gr.	-	-	5	-	-	5
INDEPENDENTS	11	1	9	10	8	39
	30	20	15	18	16	99

Nearly two-thirds (19) of the deputies of Mount Lebanon belong to political parties and blocs, and one-third (11) have no political affiliations. As was already pointed out, there is no membership in personalized leadership groups here.

In North Lebanon, political parties and blocs are less represented than personalized leadership groups. Out of a total of 20 deputies, three-quarters (15) belong to groups,[1] 1 to a political party, 3 to blocs, and only 1 has no affiliations whatsoever. The strength of feudal and family ties is manifested here together with the power held by a za'im over his community.

The majority of the representatives of the Beqa'a, i.e. three-fifths (9) are Independents, while one-third (5) belong to the Joseph Skaff[2] group, and 1 is a member of the Constitutional Bloc. Again, one sees the relative unimportance of formal organizations in a 'feudal' area.

In Beirut, half of the deputies (8) belong to political parties and blocs, while the remaining 8 have no political affiliations. Here too, there are no personalized leadership group members. One would expect more political party members in the capital instead of only 50 %. This situation, however, is in all likelihood a result of the fact that in Beirut there is a greater tendency to look toward outside countries for support and influence, and political party membership would therefore be a hindrance. Thus, there seems to be a duality in Beirut: on the one hand we have the relative importance of party membership for eligibility, and on the other hand we find that 50 % are labelled 'Independents', although they have their own political tendencies.

Finally, in South Lebanon (also a 'feudal' region), more than half of the deputies (10) are Independents, 7 are members of the el-Assa'ad group, and 1 is a party member.

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[1] 11 are members of the Rashid Karamé group, and 4 of the Soleiman Frangieh group.

[2] Considered the undisputed chief of Zahlé and the "lord" of the Beqa'a.

Throughout this section we have attempted to show that political affiliations within the Lebanese Parliament rest largely upon feudal and sectarian considerations and beliefs. This became more obvious when we mentioned the differences in affiliations between 'feudal' and 'non-feudal' (i.e. more individualistic) areas. The representatives of the feudal areas, who are usually all zu'ama, tend to have their own partisans around them in groups (personalized leadership groups) that survive because of feudal, personal and regional interests. The deputies of the more individualistic and 'modern' regions, on the other hand, are usually affiliated to organized formations (political parties and blocs), which are wider in scope but still retain feudal, sectarian, and charismatic features.

Consequently, the electorates of the North, the South, and the Beqa'a will tend to elect feudal leaders or candidates who are sponsored by these feudal chiefs. In Mount Lebanon and Beirut the electorates will prefer to choose their representatives from among political party members or zu'ama who are Independents.

We shall now go on to find out what the occupations of the Lebanese Parliamentary elite are, that is, what they do apart from being deputies.

Occupational Distribution

The occupational breakdown of the Chamber is quite varied.[1] The legal profession and the landowning aristocracy make up nearly two-thirds of the Chamber: with 32 lawyers and/or magistrates, and 30 agricultural landowners.

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[1] As regards the coding of the occupational distribution, I was triple-coded, and 14 were double-coded. For example, one was both a lawyer and a merchant, another was a merchant and landowner, etc. Data was obtained from personal interviews, biographical sketches, and parliamentary records.

The legal profession and the landowning aristocracy tend to have a priority in the elections. Which of these obtains more seats depends upon the predominant character of the particular region involved, that is, whether it is more 'feudal' or more 'modern'. The other occupational categories are scattered among the remaining seats.

The tabular presentation of the occupational breakdown for the Chamber as a whole, is as follows:

TABLE 3 - Occupational Distribution of the Chamber

Lawyers and/or Magistrates	32
Agricultural Landowners	30
Merchants and Owners	13
Businessmen	8
Engineers, Contractors and Entrepreneurs	7
Doctors and Dentists	7
Bankers	5
Journalists	3
Professors	2
Directors of a School and a University	2
Executives	2
Sub-Manager of a Bank	1
Sub-Manager of an Oil Company	1
Diplomat	1
Pharmacist	1
Optician	1
Expert Accountant	1
No occupation[a]	2

[a]One a retired official, and 1 a retired general of the army.

The legal profession thus holds the greatest number of seats within the 1960 Chamber, thereby indicating a similarity with the trend in the United States. "One small occupational group, the legal profession, has supplied a large majority of America's top-level public officials throughout our entire history."[1] This is due to the fact that "lawyers meet what

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[1]Matthews, Op. Cit., p. 30.

seems to be the first prerequisite of top-level political leadership: they are in a high-prestige occupation."[1] Mosca meant just that in his theory of the 'ruling class'. [2]

In Lebanon too, the legal profession holds a substantial degree of prestige, and possesses a high status within our society, especially because of the amount of study it needs as preparation. Another reason why lawyers tend to enter the field of politics is that they possess skill in oration as well as in interpersonal relationships - both being as crucial in politics as in the legal profession. It is therefore a two-way process: legal training serves as an added qualification for the office of deputy, and the office in turn contributes to legal career advance. In the case of an electoral failure, the individual can return to his own career unharmed, and with no loss whatsoever.

The considerable number of lawyers in Lebanon is also a result of the bias toward the French system of education. Once a young man starts his education in French, there seems to be no wide choice as to what his specialization will be. He therefore chooses law, since apart from the fact that it is available, it opens a lot of doors before him.

Since the legal profession enjoys such an important status within Lebanese society, it is not surprising to find that a large number of deputies belong to it.

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[1] Loc. Cit.

[2] When he said "members of a ruling minority regularly have some attribute, real or apparent, which is highly esteemed and very influential in the society in which they live." Mosca, Op. Cit., p. 53.

Morroe Berger gives a general hierarchical scale of social classes that are at present found in the Arab world (going from highest to lowest in status, wealth, power, and occupational prestige):[1]

I. Big landowners, bankers, industrialists, and highest governmental and military leaders.

II. Higher civil servants and army officers, independent professionals (doctors, lawyers, engineers, etc.,) higher intellectuals, religious leaders.

III. Lower professions (teachers, journalists, pharmacists, etc.) white-collar workers in government and private enterprises.

IV. Shopkeepers, skilled workers, artisans.

V. Peasants, labourers, service workers.

Basing our findings upon Berger's hierarchy, we can find out from what social classes the deputies come: 43 belong to social class I, 61 belong to social class II, 11 belong to social class III, while 2 have no occupations. These 2, a retired general and a retired official, when classified according to their former occupations, enter into classes I and II, respectively. This means that approximately 90 % of the Lebanese deputies come from the upper 2 social classes of society (more than half belonging to the second highest class), and around 10 % come from class III - which is more or less middle class.

In the 1953 Chamber, the occupational breakdown for the 44 deputies was as follows:[2]

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[1]Morroe Berger, The Arab World Today (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1962), p. 268

[2]Some were double-coded, e.g. lawyer and landowner.

Agricultural landowners and rentiers	20
Lawyers and Magistrates[1]	17
Doctors	2
Journalists	2
Engineers	2
Administrators	2
Businessmen	2

If we compare both Chambers (the 1953 and the 1960) we get the following table:[2]

TABLE 4 - Occupational Distribution of the 1953 and the 1960 Chambers

	1953 (44 members)		1960 (99 members)	
	No.	%	No.	%
Landowners and rentiers	20	45.45	30	30.3
Lawyers and magistrates	17	38.63	32	32.32
Merchants and owners	-		13	13.13
Businessmen	2	2.27	8	8.08
Engineers, contractors and entrepreneurs	2	2.27	7	7.07
Doctors and dentists	2	2.27	7	7.07
Bankers	-		5	5.05
Journalists	2	2.27	3	3.03
Professors	-		2	2.02
Directors of Academic Institutions	-		2	2.02
Executives	-		2	2.02
Sub-managers	-		2	2.02
Diplomats	-		1	1.01
Pharmacists	-		1	1.01
Opticians	-		1	1.01
Expert accountants	-		1	1.01
Retired officials	-		2	2.02
Administrators	2	2.27	-	

[1]One of them had been President of the Republic.

[2]The data for the 1953 Chamber is taken from Tabbarah, Op. Cit., Annèxe No 7, in which he gives the composition of the Chamber.

The percentages of the occupations that are most largely represented are therefore the agricultural landowners and rentiers (45 % in 1953 and 30.3 % in 1960) and the lawyers and/or magistrates (39 % in 1953, and 32.32 % in 1960).

Ziadeh, writing about Lebanese Chambers in general gave the following percentages for the 2 groups:

> "Landowners - always the largest single group - have ranged between 42 % and 47 %. The second largest group was that of lawyers (between 28 % and 38 %). The remainder were composed of professional and businessmen - doctors, engineers, journalists, bankers and merchants. On two occasions there were retired government officials, and only in one case was a man of letters elected."[1]

Having more lawyers than landowners (in the 1960 Chamber) seems to indicate a slight change in the usual pattern of the occupational distribution of the Chamber. Even though the percentage of lawyers falls within the same average category,[2] the percentage of landowners has decreased to less than that of lawyers. We therefore find a greater percentage[3] of the Chamber who belong to other occupational groups - e.g. merchants, businessmen, engineers, doctors, bankers, and so on. The 1953 figures approximate Ziadeh's percentages more closely than the 1960 figures.

As will be pointed out later, this change in occupational breakdown is a consequence of the growing importance of education both in Lebanese society, and as a criterion for eligibility. Even in small

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[1] Ziadeh, Op. Cit., p. 209.

[2] In the 1960 Chamber, 32 % are lawyers - compared to 39 % in 1953, and 28 % to 38 %, according to Ziadeh, for all previous Chambers.

[3] 38 % in 1960 as opposed to 16 % in 1953.

villages, the people go to the educated for advice, information and leadership.[1] One should bear in mind at this point that 'educated' is a relative term, depending upon the region involved. In a small village it is used to denote the individual who commutes to the city and can bring fresh news, as well as read the newspapers to the villagers. In an advanced village or city, the term is used for the person who holds a degree from an academic institution.

The number of new deputies is another reason for the large number of lawyers, since 12 of the 32 lawyers are new members of Parliament. Several lawyers run on lists headed by big zu'ama, thus uniting power and education,[2] and thereby strengthening the chances of the lawyer to succeed.

The trend data we have is significant because it denotes a change in the habitual situation in which the landowning feudals monopolized the greatest number of seats. Although the za'im is still the first choice because of the power and prestige he possesses, the legal profession is now one step in advance of the landowners and agriculturists. Candidates who are landowners or lawyers will therefore tend to have a better chance of being elected than those who belong to the other occupational groups.

The greatest variety of occupations can be found in Mount Lebanon and in Beirut,[3] these being the more 'individualistic' and heterogenous

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[1]See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), chapter 6, "Lebanon: Two Worlds in Small Compass".

[2]Mosca's statement of "... the people who rule are the rich rather than the brave", Mosca, Op. Cit., p. 57, could be modified to be (for Lebanon): the people who rule are the rich as combined with a very small proportion of the brave.

[3]See Table 5 for the occupational breakdown by 'Mohafazat'.

constituencies. In Mount Lebanon there are 14 lawyers and magistrates, whereas there are only three landowners,[1] the remainder being professionals, businessmen, executives, and the 2 retired officials. In Beirut the number of lawyers exceeds the number of landowners: 6 to 1, respectively. There are 4 merchants and owners, and 2 businessmen in Beirut, however, as well as 1 banker, 1 journalist, 1 school director, 1 pharmacist, 1 optician, and 1 expert accountant.

TABLE 5 - Occupational Distribution by 'Mohafazat'

OCCUPATION	MOHAFAZAT					TOTAL
	Mount Lebanon	North Lebanon	Beqa'a	South Lebanon	Beirut	
Lawyers and magistrates	14	4	2	6	6	32
Agricultural landowners	3	8	11	7	1	30
Merchants and owners	2	6	-	1	4	13
Businessmen	1	1	2	2	2	8
Engineers, contractors, entrepreneurs	2	-	2	3	-	7
Doctors, dentists	3	2	1	1	-	7
Bankers	1	1	2	-	1	5
Journalists	1	1	-	-	1	3
Professors	1	-	-	1	-	2
Directors of school and university	-	-	-	1	1	2
Executives	2	-	-	-	-	2
Diplomat	-	-	1	-	-	1
Pharmacist	-	-	-	-	1	1
Optician	-	-	-	-	1	1
Expert accountant	-	-	-	-	1	1
None (retired)	2	-	-	-	-	2

Landowners are more numerous than lawyers in the 'feudal' areas: North Lebanon, South Lebanon, and the Beqa'a. In such areas one would

[1] One should remember that a few have been double-coded, so the same individual may be ranked in 2 categories simultaneously.

expect the aristocracy to come from the big landowning families. These hold most of the power, prestige, and status within their respective regions. In North Lebanon there are 8 landowners and 4 lawyers (here the lawyers are fewer than the merchants who are 6 in number). The Beqa'a has 11 landowners as opposed to 2 lawyers, 2 businessmen, 2 engineers and entrepreneurs, and 2 bankers. In the South, the difference between both groups is slight: 7 landowners and 6 lawyers. The reason for this is that 2 of the lawyers[1] entered the Chamber after their fathers died (both of these men had been politicians and had given a law education to their sons).

In these three 'feudal' regions we have a type of landholding feudalism by which the peasant obtains what he needs: an assurance of social, collective, and individual guarantees. That is why the leaders are the landowners, the zu'ama, regardless of their capacity.

In Mount Lebanon, where the peasant is more independent, the za'im must offer more qualifications than owning a lot of land, particularly since the peasant is himself a small-scale owner. It is because of this aspect that Mount Lebanon shows the characteristics of an 'individualistic' and 'heterogenous' region.

Beirut, being the capital of Lebanon, and a modern and cosmopolitan city, also exhibits the same tendency for electing deputies from among the lawyers and magistrates, who are the educated group best fitted for political function.

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[1] Kamel el-Assa'ad and Abdel Latif el-Zein.

Before turning to the educational level of the Lebanese Parliamentary Elite, it is appropriate to give a few more details about the occupations of the 99 deputies. Several of those who are lawyers have, at one time or another in their career, been judges or magistrates within the various courts in Lebanon. All the lawyers have their law practices - either alone or with partners. Approximately 13 % of the deputies are presidents, members and shareholders of the boards of administration of various national and international companies.[1] Finally, most of the deputies are owners. They own buildings, lands, farms, hospitals, shops, gas-stations, bus-lines, hotels, as well as various other business concerns.

Education and Place of Education

In the preceding section we have seen how important the legal profession is in the occupational composition of the Chamber. One of the main reasons for this is the growing awareness of the importance of education as a further qualification in the electoral battle. Several of the families of zu'ama have likewise realized this, and have sent their sons to colleges and universities. Previously, this factor was not even considered when viewed against prestige and family name. It appears that there has been an improvement in the situation.

More than half of the actual deputies have attained a reasonable level of education, but one cannot say that all the members of the Lebanese Parliamentary elite are highly educated individuals.

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[1]These include banks, airline companies, the port, Radio-Orient, and other important commercial, financial, and industrial enterprises.

The levels of education attained by the 99 deputies range from: no education to 2 Ph. D.'s and 37 Law Degrees ('Licence'). Sixty-five deputies hold what could be termed 'high' or advanced degrees and diplomas, while 31 are in the low-education brackets. The remaining 3 have no education whatsoever.

TABLE 6 - Educational Level Attained by the Members of the Chamber

Higher Education	
Licence	37
Ph. D.	2
M. D. and M. A.	10
B. A., B. S., B. B. A.	5
Pharmacy	1
Engineering	3
Officer's Diploma	2
Higher Commercial Studies	3
Oriental Literature	1
Diploma in Education[a]	1
Lower Education	
Sophomore	1
Baccalaureat (first and second part)	11
High School	4
Elementary, primary, and secondary	15
No Education	3

[a]Equivalent to the Normal Diploma.

Of the 96 who have attended school, 70 have pursued their education in Lebanon, while 26 have gone outside Lebanon for their education. These 26 are divided in the following way: 8 in France, 8 in Syria, 4 in England, 2 in the U. S. A., 2 in Turkey, 1 in Brazil, and 1 in Cairo (U. A. R.).

Fifty-three have studied in French institutions, 21 in Arabic institutions, 19 in English institutions, 1 in a Brazilian institution, 1 in an Italian school, and 1 in a Turkish institution. These figures denote a marked preference for French education, this being an outcome of French influence throughout the history of Lebanon, and most especially because of the French Mandate.

Thirty-seven of the 65 deputies (i.e. approximately 57 %) possessing advanced degrees are newcomers to the Chamber. This shows the actual significance of educational achievement.

Regarding educational level, then, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies is not 'elite' in the proper sense of the term since not all of them are highly educated. (Some 'feudal' regions still do not consider education as an additional qualification for candidacy.) Nevertheless, the proportion of educated individuals is quite large (two-thirds of the Chamber) as compared with the rest of the population.

Education is therefore one of the significant factors in the recruitment of the Lebanese Parliamentary elite.

Age at Time of Election (1960)

In tradition-oriented Middle Eastern society, age is very important. The oldest member of the family, the patriarch, holds the highest position within the family group. He makes all the weighty decisions and his word counts above all in family matters. It is to him that all the relatives and younger family members turn for advice and counsel. It would therefore be expected that the patriarch, the za'im, represents his region at the Parliament.

This is not always the case, however. Frequently, the patriarch delegates the authority to his oldest son because he is unable (for some

reason or other) to assume the responsibilities inherent in that position. Preference is also frequently given to the younger members of big families who become leaders of their 'clans'. Moreover, when the patriarch dies he is usually replaced by his son or by another member of his family. We shall elaborate more fully on this point in a later section.

The average age of the deputies for the whole Chamber at the time of election[1] (1960) was approximately 48 years (to be exact, 47.98 years), with the ages ranging between 27 to 70 years. The overall age distribution at the time of election was the following:

TABLE 7 - Age Distribution for the 1960 Chamber, by 'Mohafazat'

'Mohafazat'	Average Age (1960)	Age Range
Beirut	50.31	36 - 65
Beqa'a	48.2	36 - 65
Mount Lebanon	47.6	27 - 64
North Lebanon	47.45	34 - 60
South Lebanon	47	32 - 70

The frequency distribution within each age bracket was: one in the 20's, 22 in the 30's, 31 in the 40's, 33 in the 50's, 11 in the 60's, and 1 in the 70's. This is significant because it means that nearly two-thirds of the deputies were more than 40 and less than 60 years of age (one-third being between 50 and 60 years of age) at the time they were elected. The lowest average age (47) is found in South Lebanon, while the highest (50.31) is found in Beirut. It would appear more logical if these two

[1]The ages have been calculated from date of birth up to the year of election, i.e. 1960.

figures were reversed, since South Lebanon is a 'feudal' area and one would expect the patriarch to be the leader. For various reasons, the patriarch delegates the authority to his son, and therefore retires from the active political arena. The young 'feudal' lords become the holders of a notable office by virtue of their status as 'heirs' of the patriarchs.

In Beirut, there is no 'inheritance' of a seat in Parliament since the candidates participate in the electoral campaign as Independents or as political party members and not as members of a family 'clan'.

To check whether our findings are correct, we shall compare the 1960 Chamber with the July 1953 Chamber, with respect to age distribution. The average age for all in 1953, was 48 years. By region, the Beqa'a had the youngest deputies, followed by Mount and North Lebanon with an average age of 47 years, and then South Lebanon with an average of slightly less than 48 years. Beirut had the oldest deputies, the average being 54 years of age.[1]

If one compares the age distributions of both Chambers, one finds that they are similar in all respects with only one difference: in 1953 the Beqa'a had the youngest deputies, whereas actually the youngest deputies are found in South Lebanon. This difference is probably due first, to the fact that feudalism is weakening in the Beqa'a, and secondly, to the fact that Joseph Skaff and his group are constantly being re-elected, thus advancing the ages as they grow older. Again, in the South (a 'feudal' region) many young candidates of traditional families are getting elected to replace the older leaders (usually their fathers) who have died.

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[1]Tabbarah, Op. Cit., Annexe No 7 (4), "Observations", section 3. He explains that Beirut has the oldest deputies because, being a cosmopolitan city, "feudalism" and big families that are favourable to young candidates play a relatively unimportant part in it compared to other regions. It seems to be the most logical reason to account for this phenomenon.

Two conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. First, Lebanese deputies generally tend to come from the middle-age brackets. One of the reasons for this is that several of them are what one terms 'veterans' of the Chamber who are continually elected to the legislature. The average age will therefore invariably increase as these men grow older.[1] Second, one can infer that the more 'feudal' areas will elect younger candidates (who are the successors of their older leaders), while the less feudal areas will show a preference for older candidates (who run independent of family name). Traditionalistic areas can afford to elect young candidates because these have the halo of their family name and prestige to back them. In Beirut, however, a really young man does not have a great chance of success if he is not known, unless he is from an eminent family and has a strong following.

Father's Education and Occupation

The fathers of the deputies are frequently themselves feudal chiefs and zu'ama in their respective regions. This aspect is more intense in the 'feudal' regions than in the 'modern regions.

Around 50 % of the deputies come from "big" families - that is, families that are notable in the particular regions from which they originate. A few of these families are eminent not only in their areas, but also

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[1]Since 1943 to 1953, the average age of the deputies was 43 years, according to Tabbarah, Op. Cit., Annèxe No 8. Assuming that this figure is correct, one gathers the existence of a definite increase of the average age when one compares it to the actual average age, 47.98 years. This is significant insofar as one would expect the opposite to happen. However, it can be accounted for by the fact that many members are growing older in the Chamber (those who keep getting re-elected), and by the reduction of 'feudal' tendencies which keep the power within one family.

throughout Lebanon. As a matter of fact these families are no longer considered families as such, but rather as 'clans' and 'political nuclei'.

Only 25 deputies had educated fathers with degree, e.g. a Licence in Law, studies in Theology (Moslem or Christian), or a diploma of Education. All the rest were self- or village-educated individuals. By self-educated is meant what most of the deputies interviewed explained by: "He studied in the school of life, which is better than going to school." Again, when asked what education their fathers had pursued, 20 deputies answered : "He was a za'im." For them, this was sufficient because at the time when their fathers were young, education was not a predominant consideration in the eligibility of a candidate. Whenever a problem cropped up in the community, the members turned to the za'im for help and advice, since their lack of education did not prevent them from holding the leadership in their region.

The occupations of the fathers ranged from merchant and trader to lawyer, agricultural landowner and politician, as well as 'man of religion'; apart from their status as zu'ama. (Here we see both forces at work: feudalism, with the za'im and his power, and sectarianism, with the 'man of religion', who was blindly obeyed by all the members of his sect.[1]

Practically all those who were merchants and landowners were also politicians on the side. It would be somewhat inaccurate if we classified the occupations of the fathers like those of the sons, since several were

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[1]The difference lies in the type of authority exercised. The za'im usually holds the power over material, political, and other temporal matters. The 'man of religion', on the other hand, has an absolute authority over all 'spiritual' matters involving the people of their sect. It will be remembered that throughout the history of feudalism (both in Europe and in the Middle East) there has always existed some conflict between the lords and the clergy.

exaggerated. An example of that is the deputy who declared his father's occupation to have been 'industrial owner' when all heowned was a small-scale local village industry.

Thirty-three listed their fathers' occupations as 'rentier', 'bey', 'landowner', 'sheikh', 'za'im', and the like. All these terms were used to denote the same character: a landowner who did not actually work but lived off the produce of his lands, who enjoyed a great deal of power and prestige, and who played an active part in the political intrigues of his region. Twenty have fathers who had been deputies, ministers and government officials[1] before them, and 2 have fathers who were Presidents of the Republic.[2]

Hence social background is crucial for the Lebanese Parliamentary elite. There is also an occupational continuity, as regards political office, between the deputies and their fathers, which means that those who enter politics have been born in a 'political environment'. If it is not a father-son continuity, it is a relative-relative one, e.g. a leading member of a family dies with no son to replace him, so his nephew, brother, cousin, and so on, is chosen instead.

Thus Lebanese deputies usually come from political backgrounds. Very few, if any, come from 100 % non-political background.

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[1]As, for example, 'moukhtar' of a village, or president of a municipality.

[2]These are Raymond Eddé, whose father was President Emile Eddé, and Sheikh Khalil el-Khoury, whose father was President Bechara el-Khoury.

Family Status and Relationships

Family status is a very influential criterion for the election of a Lebanese deputy. Like a contagious disease, the prestige and power that are attached to a leader are transmitted to the rest of his family as well. In evaluating a future candidate to the Chamber, then, the electors will first consider the family he comes from, the name he bears. If it is a 'respectable' family which enjoys a certain degree of prestige, it will be to his advantage, regardless of whether his personal qualifications are equal to his family status.

Within the present Chamber we have several cases which show the strength and importance of family ties and family name. A few concrete examples are essential at this point, to give more weight to the main body of material in this work.

Between July 1960 (when the Chamber was elected) and the time of writing, May 1963, four deputies had died.[1] Three of these have been replaced by their children at the partial elections conducted in their respective regions, once more illustrating the phenomenon of occupational continuity within the Lebanese Chamber. Ahmed el-Assa'ad died on March 16, 1961, and his son Kamel el-Assa'ad[2] was elected in his place. Youseff el-Zein died on May 18, 1962, and was also replaced by one of his sons: Abdel Latif el-Zein, who had always assisted his father during his electoral

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[1]The first 2 died and were replaced when we were still at the beginning of our research, so we counted the sons among the 99 deputies who are our population. The last 2 died much later so they were left in the population of our study.

[2]He had already been a deputy twice when his father was alive.

campaigns. Then Kabalan Kabalan died in the Spring of 1963, and his successor was elected from a different family. Finally, Emile Boustany, who died on March 15, 1963, was replaced by his only child, a daughter, Mrs. Myrna Boustany el-Khazen,[1] the first Lebanese woman to become a deputy.

There are other deputies who have greatly profited from their father's prestige and experience. A few specific examples will be cited to show the importance of family status and prestige in the Chamber.[2]

(1) Rashid Karamé, whose father Abdul Hamid Karamé was a well-known political figure, several times deputy and Prime Minister in the North - namely in Tripoli;

(2) Raymond Eddé, son of Emile Eddé who was an eminent politician, President of the Republic in 1929, and the founder of the National Bloc;

(3) Khalil el-Khoury, son of Bishara el-Khoury, former deputy, Prime Minister, twice President of the Republic, and the founder of the Constitutional Bloc;

(4) Kamal Joumblatt, in whom "many modern ideologies and modern political ambitions are blended strangely with the inherited position of a

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[1]The "responsible" members of the Boustany family chose Myrna Boustany el-Khazen to succeed her father and represent the 'clan' in the Chamber. She was elected ex-officio, after the withdrawal of the other 2 candidates from the battle. Concerning this point, a reader wrote a letter to Magazine (April 26, 1963), p. 6, in which he said: " ... one must take into account the fact that our first woman deputy has been elected on the prestige of a name - or two names - and an exceptional social position. I would by far have preferred to record the rise of an unknown or little-known woman who would have owed her success solely to her own merits." This is a personal opinion, it is true, but it was voiced by many people. Mrs. B. el-Khazen is a 27-year-old mother of two, very intelligent and educated, and moreover she seems to enjoy a certain amount of popularity.

[2]The information for this has been compiled from the various sources that were used in this study.

Druze tribal leader and the son of a great Druze amirah who had been endowed, so many believed, with prophetic gifts."[1] Joumblatt's "feudal' position is the source of his political strength ... ,"[2]

(5) Fouad Ghosn, who 'inherited' the position of deputy which his father, Nicolas Ghosn, had occupied before him. The Ghosns are one of the leading families[3] in Koura (North Lebanon) since more than 50 years;

(6) Emir Majid Arslane, whose father was Caimacam,[4] Mutassarif,[5] and deputy, is actually the head of the Druze faction that is the rival of the Joumblatts;

(7) Saeb Salam, whose father had been a deputy in the Ottoman Parliament at Constantinople, deputy of Beirut (vilayet), and Mayor of Beirut, and

(8) Ibrahim Abdallah who had to become a deputy to replace his father, who was a known politician and deputy of the South.

These are only 8 instances of a phenomenon existing not only in the Parliament but also in Lebanese society at large.

Most of the deputies stressed the importance of family status as a prerequisite for the eventual success of a candidate. The Safieddins, the Solhs (who have given Lebanon many of its distinguished politicians), the Skaffs, the Frangiehs, the Moawads, the Osseiranes, the el-Alis, the Joumblatts, the Arslanes, the el-Khourys, and others, are powerful families that have traditionally been active in politics.

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[1]Hottinger, Op. Cit., p. 131

[2]Ibid., p. 132.

[3]By 'leading' here is meant political leadership (legislative).

[4]Representative of the Government.

[5]Governor.

Consequently, the successor of a deputy will frequently be a member of his family, when such a person is ready and eligible. Soleiman Frangieh the actual deputy of Zghorta (North Lebanon) for instance, was elected in place of his brother Hamid when the latter fell too ill to run for elections.[1] Other specific examples were given in the preceding paragraphs.

In the 1960 Chamber, there are members of the same family who are holding office simultaneously. Joseph and Michel Skaff are brothers, the latter having changed his religious sect to be eligible for the Greek-Orthodox seat in Zahlé; Nicolas and Youssef Salem are twins; Pierre and Maurice Gemayel are first cousins; Samih and Adel Osseirane are distant cousins; and Soleiman el-Ali and Ali Abdel Karim el-Ali are distant relatives. Then there are other types of relationships as well: Sabri Hamadé is the brother-in-law of Kamel el-Assa'ad, the Emir Majid Arslane is married to a Joumblatt, and so on for several others.[2]

We have seen the importance of family status for the recruitment of Lebanese deputies. Deputies from obscure backgrounds are rarely elected, and when they do succeed it is because they are sponsored by an influential za'im.

Individuals will therefore run for election in the regions where they are best known, and where they have enthusiastic supporters. The regions where they are most certain of success are the regions in which they were born.

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[1]Soleiman Frangieh is in office for the first time, but he had always been in charge of the electoral campaigns of his brother.

[2]Sometimes a woman will help her husband in his electoral campaign even if his rival is her brother, or another member of her own family.

In the 1960 Chamber, two-thirds of the members represent the constituencies in which they were born. For 67, the place of birth and the constituency are one and the same, while 32 are not deputies of the regions in which they were born. This is one more manifestation of the traditionalism still inherent in the Lebanese political sphere.

Before going on to the previous political experience of the deputies, we shall first mention 2 factors that are relevant in the recruitment process.

Services to the People

The people of each region customarily expect certain services from their representatives. They demand better roads, electricity, water, and other necessary technical commodities. A deputy who will assure his electorate that he will fulfil all their needs will be much more eligible than a deputy who does not promise social, hygienic, and economic progress for his region.

Serving the electorate is an obligation for the deputy. To be popular he has to be constantly at the service of his constituency and its individual inhabitants. These services also take the form of welfare and charity participation as well as all sorts of personal demands and favours. All day long there is an incessant stream of applicants (who solicit jobs, pressures, services, WASTAS, and so on) pouring in the office or at the home of the deputy. One of the most important functions of the deputy, therefore, is the services he can offer to his electorate.

Money

The second factor which is determining in the recruitment process is money. Belonging to a 'big' family usually entails the possession of a certain amount of money. A candidate must dispose of an appreciable sum

of money in order to participate in the electoral campaign. The first step on signing for candidacy is the payment of a deposit of 3,000 Lebanese Pounds to the Treasury.[1]

Recently, with the institution of the secret Chamber by the new electoral law, there has been a relative decrease in the importance of money. Thus the effectiveness of money for the buying of votes is practically nil; if a voter is paid by a candidate he can still vote for someone else since no one is with him when he fills the ballot. This is one of the reasons for the failure of a few rich men in the 1960 elections. One of them in particular spent over a million pounds and lost the seat to his rival who did not have his money or his name. Money therefore is no longer a security for obtaining votes.

The candidates in the 1960 elections did spend money, but mostly for the campaign itself: renting cars for the electors, printing and distributing pictures and tracts, and the like. Mr. Clovis Rizk, a journalist, wrote that 9 out of 10 pay hundreds of pounds to become deputies and enter the Parliament because it is a means for power and big enterprise.[2] He claims, however, that for the first time there was no buying of votes or pressures,[3] which is rather hard to believe for all the Chamber.

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[1]This amount is refunded only if the candidate obtains 25 % of the votes; otherwise it is forfeited.

[2]Clovis Rizk, "Les Jeux Sont Faits," Magazine (June 9, 1960), p. 15.

[3]Clovis Rizk, "D'un Scrutin à l'Autre," Magazine (June 16, 1960), p. 23.

Previous Political Experience

Several of the well-known deputies keep getting elected over and over again so we have a number of 'permanent' members in the Chamber. These can be labelled 'political careerists.'

For each deputy, political experience here means: the previous number of terms he served as a deputy, the number of times he was a minister, and any other official positions he occupied some time in the course of his career. Of the 99 deputies, 49 are new members, whereas 50 are old ones. Or, more specifically, 49 were elected in 1960 for the first time, 31 had been in the 1957 Chamber, and 19 had been in one of the Chambers preceding that of 1957. Hence nearly half of the deputies are new members of parliament, and slightly over 50 % have had some previous political experience.

TABLE 8 - Previous Service (As Deputies) for All, by 'Mohafazat'

	Beirut	Mount Lebanon	South Lebanon	North Lebanon	Beqa'a	Total
Deputies in 1957	4 (25%)	10 (33.3%)	7 (38.9%)	5 (25%)	5 (33.3%)	31
Deputies formerly	1 (6.25%)	4 (13.3%)	5 (27.8%)	7 (35%)	2 (13.3%)	19
Deputies for the first time	11(68.75%)	16 (53.3%)	6 (33.3%)	8 (40%)	8 (53.3%)	49
Number of deputies	16	30	18	20	15	99

Among the 50 who have served previously, 22 were deputies once (i.e. apart from their present term), 11 were deputies twice, 9 three times, 3 four times, 2 five times, 1 eight times, and 2 ten times. Table 9 below shows the number of terms for the representatives of each 'mohafazat.'

TABLE 9 - Number of Terms (Excluding Actual) by 'Mohafazat'

'Mohafazat'	None	One	Two	Three	Four	Five	Eight	Ten	Total
Mount Lebanon	16	6	3	2	1	1	1	-	30
North Lebanon	8	5	4	3	-	-	-	-	20
South Lebanon	6	6	3	1	1	-	-	1	18
Beirut	11	2	1	1	-	1	-	-	16
Beqa'a	8	3	-	2	1	-	-	1	15
TOTAL	49	22	11	9	3	2	1	2	99

New candidates (i.e. deputies for the first time) are the majority in Beirut (68.75 %), in Mount Lebanon (53.3 %) and in the Beqa'a (53.3 %), whereas in the North and in the South they are the minority amounting to 40 % and 33.3 % respectively.[1] This shows that in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, the more 'individualistic' areas, feudalism and tradition play a smaller part than in the North, the South and the Beqa'a. It is due to the fact that landholding feudalism has been replaced by 'political' feudalism,[2] where the firmly established big and leading families of some regions retain their traditional authority together with their ardent supporters. The prestige of most of these families probably dates from the time when they played an active and crucial role in the representative organisms of the Ottoman Empire.[3] These families had also greatly profited from the land grants of the Iqtah (which was mentioned briefly in Chapter 3 above).

The regions in which large land holdings are still frequent and in which one can find traces of a feudal régime (with various modes of application

[1] See Table 8, p. 84.

[2] Tabbarah, Op. Cit., p. 168

[3] Ibid., p. 169.

and intensity) are Akkar in the North, South Lebanon, and the Beqa'a in the East.[1] In spite of this, 53.3 % of the deputies of the Beqa'a are newcomers. This may be accounted for by the fact that the electorate chose to set aside tradition; it showed a definite preference for feudal leaders who had till then been considered beaten in advance, over feudal leaders hitherto reputed to be invincible.[2] This was a conflict between the big feudal chiefs, with victory going to the ones who made the most promises, and who were less 'feudal'.

The other two regions, North and South Lebanon, behaved according to expectations, i.e. they had a greater number of old members than of new ones. As these two regions still retain characteristics of the 'feudal spirit', the people there have a tendency to vote for members of leading families,[3] and new candidates thus have a smaller chance of winning a seat in these regions.

Beirut had the greatest percentage of new members (68.75 %) due to the complex situation that resulted after the 1958 crisis. Consequently, the moderates were then replaced by extremists to maintain a 'balance of power' between the revolutionary and the pro-government factions.[4] Here again we see the decline of feudal traditions.

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[1]These regions, it will be remembered, became part of Lebanon in 1920 upon the institution of the State of Greater Lebanon.

[2]C. K. Chehab, Op. Cit., p. 82. Extracts from the press.

[3]This also explains the relatively younger age of the representatives of such regions.

[4]At the end of the 1958 troubles, a Cabinet of 4 ruled the country for some time as a sort of Balance of Power: Pierre Gemayel, leader of the Kataeb Party and an extreme Lebanese loyalist, against Rashid Karamé, an 'extreme insurgent', and Hussein el Oueini, a 'moderate', against Raymond Edde, leader of the National Bloc, and a 'moderate loyalist'. M.H. Kerr, Op. Cit., p. 270. Several of the 'rebel' personalities who had been very active in 1958, obtained their first mandate in these elections.

In Mount Lebanon, because big domains are quite scarce and the peasant himself is usually an owner, he is more detached from the master's authority. This makes the electorate of Mount Lebanon more independent and individualistic, as well as readier to elect new representatives.

Sixty-two of the 99 deputies have never been ministers. This means that 37 deputies have held ministerial positions at some time during their career, the number of times they have been ministers ranging from one to 18 times.[1] (By 'number of times minister' is meant: in how many cabinets the individual has been appointed, not how many ministries he has held, for very often he holds more than one ministry at the same time.) Most of the deputies tend to occupy the same ministerial positions, as e. g. the Emir Majid Arslane. He has been in 18 Cabinets: 16 times Minister of National Defense, 5 times Minister of Agriculture, twice Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and once Minister of Public Health. Here once more, we see the impact of tradition and feudalism upon Lebanese politics; who is known (whether he is capable or not) is chosen before who is unknown (no matter how capable).

The deputies have filled various other important positions in the Government, but we shall not go into unnecessary detail at this point.

A very limited number of deputies have had no previous political experience whatsoever. The majority have, to a certain extent, had some degree of political experience or held positions of national importance in the Lebanese political and government set-up. We therefore have 'political

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[1]Counting all the Cabinets from 1926 up to and including the present one, the distribution of 'times minister' becomes: Once: 15 deputies; twice: 8 deputies; three times: 4 deputies; four times: 2 deputies; five times: 2 deputies; six times: 3 deputies; eight times: 1 deputy; ten times: 1 deputy; eighteen times: 1 deputy. Data for this was obtained from personal interviews, and from records found in the library of the Parliament.

careerists' in the Lebanese legislature who are preferred over candidates who come from non-political backgrounds.

In the following chapter we shall draw our conclusions about the Lebanese Parliamentary elite. We shall then compare the findings of the present study with those of the four empirical studies that were summarized in chapter two.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Conclusions About the Lebanese Parliamentary Elite

In this section, an attempt will be made to draw some conclusions and generalizations concerning the Lebanese Parliamentary Elite.

To begin with, it is not elite as such; rather is it an elite simply by virtue of the position it occupies in the political hierarchy. Nevertheless, the deputies come from the 'upper' strata of their respective regions. 'Upper' here is determined by family status, money, and the power and prestige resulting from them.

They are an 'aristocracy' in the sense that they belong to the old families of Lebanon, the families that have traditionally been the leaders of their respective regions. They feel it is their right and their duty to continue the work of their predecessors. We therefore find that in many cases, a seat in the Chamber will remain 'in the family'. It will always be a member of that same family who will be elected to that particular seat - this, of course, in the 'feudal' regions. We must therefore disagree with Mills' statement about the power elite: "it is not a political ruling group based upon a nobility of hereditary origin",[1] since we have seen that in

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[1]Mills, Op. Cit., p. 278.

Lebanon the position of deputy is practically hereditary. Mills has also claimed that man is made by the institution he belongs to, whereas in Lebanon he is made by the family he comes from.[1]

Generally, power, family name and prestige bear more weight as criteria for recruitment than education and personality characteristics. Some deputies enter the Chamber, never participate in the debates, and rarely attend the sessions. Nevertheless they work hard to get elected either because of tradition, or as a channel through which their prestige and occupational success will be enhanced.

It is apparent then, that the deputies come from political 'milieux', meaning that their families have been either directly or indirectly involved in politics over a long period of time. The fathers of several of the deputies have been deputies, ministers, and politicians before them.[2]

In areas where feudal and tribal loyalties and traditions still play a decisive role in the political sphere,[3] the pattern is more clear-cut.

> "The leader or za'im of the region is blindly obeyed by those of his clan who form the majority of the electors of the Constituency. Consequently, it is he who decides who will be on the same list as himself ... his omnipotence appears mostly in his last dealings either with the authorities or with the candidates, with regard to the definite formation of the list. He determines the conditions

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[1] According to Mills, the main institutions are: the army, the state and the corporation, and his statement therefore does not apply to the situation in Lebanon. However, insofar as the family is considered an institution by sociologists, our results can be said to support his observations.

[2] See Appendix VII.

[3] These areas are mainly the North, the South, the Beqa'a.

> by which these candidates can be in it, fixes the sum that they will have to pay him ... It is a market in which the public good is deliberately sacrificed."[1]

Tabbarah, wishing to emphasize a similar point of view, gives the translation of a pledge signed by those on the list headed by Soleiman el-Ali in the 1953 elections.[2] It reads as follows:

> "We swear by God Almighty, by our honour, and by all that is dear to us, that - having agreed to participate in the battle of legislative elections on the same list - we pledge ourselves, in the case of victory by the grace of God, to follow in the Lebanese Parliament the directives and the policy that will be traced for us by His Excellency our companion in the struggle, Soleiman Bey el-Ali el Mara'aby, and to act in a manner to carry out all that he wills. We pledge ourselves to back him in all that he desires, in the ministry or outside of it, and not to swerve one bit from the attitude he intends to adopt with regard to the authorities as a partisan or as an opponent.
>
> "If we do not keep our promise and fail to fulfil this oath we recognize ourselves to be unworthy of the human species, and deprived of honour and gratitude."

It is hard to believe that this document is only 10 years old, that is, 2 Chambers ago.

Two of the most important reasons, then, why a candidate is successful are:

(1) whether he comes from a powerful family of zu'ama or 'beys', and

(2) if he participates in the elections on the list of a strong and influential za'im.

Other factors such as money, personal qualifications, and popular support carry a significant amount of weight too. The degree of intensity and importance of such factors appears to vary, as several deputies have alleged,

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[1] A. Naccache, "La Réforme Eléctorale," Cénacle, 11ème année, No 3 - 4 du 10 mai 1948, p. 49, quoted in Majzoub, Op. Cit., p. 71.

[2] This text quoted in Tabbarah, Op. Cit., p. 167, was reproduced from Al Jaryda, September 7, 1953.

according to the different regions concerned. In Mount Lebanon, for instance, popular support and personal qualifications are in general as decisive as family status. Money is more determining than family status in the constituency of Beirut. In the Beqa'a, the North, and the South, on the other hand, family status and popular support are the crucial criteria that are taken into consideration, regardless of personal qualifications. In the Lebanese political system as a whole, it is therefore obvious that "a great deal of the leadership itself depends on ties of families, localities, interests, and influence."[1] This is far from being an ideal situation since personal interest benefits to the detriment of the national and public interest. As Mosca put it, "... the people who rule are the rich rather than the brave." Possession of the right qualities[2] in Lebanon is relative, the 'right' qualities ranging from family status, to money, pressures, personal qualifications, and so on.

In Lebanon "there aren't 1 or 2 machines competing for power, but 10 or 15; none of which extends beyond a handful of parliamentary constituencies."[3] There are 8 political parties and blocs, and four personalized leadership groups, represented in the actual Parliament. The political party and bloc members comprise 33 % of the Chamber, whereas the groups make up 27 %. The remaining 39 % are Independents who shift in their affiliations according to personal and regional interests. In reality these 'formal' and 'informal' political groupings are to a large extent based upon sectarian, 'feudal',

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[1] N. Ziadeh, "The Lebanese Elections, 1960", Op. Cit., p. 369.

[2] Which Mosca lists as one of the criteria in the recruitment of the ruling class.

[3] M.H. Kerr, Op. Cit., p. 166.

and personal (charismatic) loyalties. The Lebanese leaders are mainly leaders 'by inheritance of status' and 'by ascribed status'.[1] Despite this fact, affiliation to a political group with a formal organization is actually becoming a criterion in the recruitment process.

During the 1960 elections, a Lebanese journalist declared: "A very net social evolution is manifested. It tends towards a democratization and a politization of the system. The tendency from which all the constituted parties benefit will be more accentuated with time. In spite of certain localized and temporary alliances, the electorate is oriented towards homogenous formations."[2]

The Lebanese Parliamentary elite falls into Pareto's classification, with the lions - "who are not very clever and are traditionalists and men of faith and force."[3] They run for elections, and win, on the strength of feudal and sectarian traditions which they try to maintain for their own benefit.

Fifty of the 99 deputies have had previous experience as deputies, with a number of terms ranging from once up to ten times. They therefore stand a good chance of success since the electorate gets to know them better each time. Forty-nine are deputies for the first time, and many of them come from families that have been involved in politics for a long time. Among these 49, there are several who have been candidates in previous electoral campaigns but who have failed for some reason or other.

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[1]See Floyd Hunter, Op. Cit., p. 166.

[2]C. Rizk, "D'Un Scrutin à l'Autre," Op. Cit., p. 15.

[3]See D. R. Matthews, Op. Cit., pp. 10 - 11.

Thirty-seven deputies have held (and are currently holding) ministerial positions. The total number of Cabinets to which they were appointed ranges from one to 18 times. Other important positions held by one or the other of the 99 deputies before their actual term of office, were Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister,[1] Speaker of the Chamber, President of the Republic, Governor, Magistrate, and so on.

Previous political experience can therefore be considered as one more factor for success in the credentials of a candidate. The more previous political experience he possesses, the greater will be his chance of being elected. This may be easily seen by the considerable number of deputies actually in office who have had such experience. "Professional politicians are very numerous in the Lebanese Parliament. They cannot or will not, agree on a government for a long period of time because the competition for the exercise of power and authority is their profession."[2]

Sixty-five deputies have reached the high education brackets, 31 have had a certain amount of education, and 3 have had no schooling or education whatsoever. Seventy of the educated 96 have had their education in Lebanon, while 26 have pursued their education outside - either abroad or in the Middle East. There has been a definite bias for French education since 53 studied in French institutions compared to 21 in Arabic institutions and 19 in English institutions. Relatively speaking, the Lebanese Chamber of deputies has attained a significant level of education, with two-thirds holding 'advanced' diplomas, and one-third having stopped at high-school

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[1]The positions of Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister are actually occupied by two deputies.

[2]Majzoub, Op. Cit., p. 74.

or one or two years before or after. Education can therefore be placed among the factors that influence recruitment.

The bias for the French system of education is manifested also in the occupational breakdown of the Chamber. The legal profession dominates both the educational and the occupational distribution: 37 deputies have their 'Licence' (law degree), while 32 state their occupation as being 'lawyer'. Landowners are the second largest occupational group (30), and they prevail mainly in the more 'feudal' and traditionalistic areas.

The majority of the deputies (91) were born in Lebanon, while only 8 were born outside. These 8 moved to Lebanon at an early age. Sixty-five deputies reside in Beirut and 34 outside Beirut.[1]

Lebanese deputies usually represent the regions in which they were born (or from which they originate) but they do not necessarily live in those areas. In the 1960 Chamber only 32 were not the representatives of their place of birth, while 67 were deputies of the region in which they were born.

The deputies come from the middle-age brackets, with an average of 48 years, and two-thirds of the Chamber being between 40 and 60 years of age.

Ninety percent of the deputies have never published anything; less than 50 % of the Chamber belong to religious and welfare associations, while the rest do not belong to any associations.

The Parliamentary Elite members have social obligations and interests apart from their work, such as informal social evenings, dinners, cocktails, and sponsoring various activities (cultural, educational, etc.). They indulge in sports, especially hunting, and gardening, card-playing, travel, and so on.

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[1] See Appendix VI, 'place of birth' and 'place of residence'.

Notwithstanding, the deputies cannot afford to spend a considerable length of time on their hobbies.

Services to the electorate consume a large portion of the deputy's time. Starting very early in the morning (as early as 6.30 a.m. in many cases) those who are seeking favours begin crowding in his house or his office. Till noon, and frequently in the afternoons, it is a constant stream of applicants for jobs, for a WASTA, for "a good word in the right place", and a string of endless demands. Depending upon how capable he is to satisfy his people, a deputy will gain a lot of prestige and popular support. Services to the public is thus a means for securing more votes for the next electoral campaign.

One can refer to Lasswell's theory of the political elite and his notion of skills,[1] at this point. We can see that the Lebanese Parliamentary elite possesses skill in handling people and things as well as the techniques of propaganda and of bargaining.[2] The elite members also come from the same class - "a major social group of similar function, status and outlook"[3] - since they usually come from the leading families.

Comparative Analysis

Let us now compare our findings with those of the four studies we have summarized in chapter two: The New Nigerian Elite, by Smythe and Smythe; The Nazi Elite by D. Lerner; "The Personnel of the Seventy-Seventh Congress" by M. McKinney; and the personnel of the British Parliament by Ross, in his book Parliamentary Representation.

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[1] See Lasswell, "Politics: Who Gets What, When, How," Op. Cit.

[2] Ibid., p. 375.

[3] Ibid., p. 299.

Generally speaking, the four studies, as well as our own, have found out that the political elite tends to be recruited from among the upper strata of society. What is "upper" varies from society to society, according to cultural values and the social framework upon which the political system rests.

In Nigeria as in Lebanon, for example, family status, and feudal (in Lebanon) and tribal (in Nigeria) considerations play a crucial role within the society. In the new Nigerian elite, only 34.6% came from old elite families while 65.4 % were of ordinary stock - showing the evaluation of 'traditional' society. We cannot give parallel figures for Lebanon since there has been no change of elites as such. The Lebanese Parliamentary elite is more than 50 % of 'old stock' and from families which dominate their own regions. McKinney does not mention family status at all. Lerner's elite is composed of individuals who were elevated to high positions as an outcome of revolution, but who actually came from the lower social strata.[1] Ross declares that the 'aristocratic element' in the House of Commons is around 40 %,[2] quite a large percentage since its share in the membership of the house is 400 times as great as its proportion in the community at large.

In the five studies, the political elite has been found to be in the middle-age brackets, more specifically between 40 to 50 years of age.

The studies all prove that the top-level elite is more highly educated than the rest of the population. According to McKinney, for instance, 88 % of the Members of the Seventy-Seventh Congress attended colleges, professional schools or both.[3] In Lebanon, the figure is 65 %, and indicates

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[1]These were the Nazi Administrators. The Propagandists probably came from the upper middle classes of Imperial Germany.

[2]Ross, Op. Cit., p. 80. These were mostly 'created' peers or baronets, not inherited titles.

[3]McKinney, Op. Cit., p. 70.

that personal qualifications fail to take over precedence in recruitment. In Lebanon, therefore, a person is elected because of who he is, not because of what he can do. Personal qualifications are more important in the United States, in Nigeria, in England, and in Nazi Germany (or so they were).

In all five studies, the professions, especially the legal profession, are the largest occupational groups from which the elites are drawn. The particular training and skills that a lawyer possesses are as useful and as effective in his political career as they are in his legal career. We have already mentioned this in the preceding chapter.

Lebanon is the only case among the five studies to have such a big percentage of its elite members being landowners and agriculturists: 30 %. This feature is characteristic of the Lebanese Parliamentary elite recruitment.

We have already mentioned the significant amount of previous political experience that the Lebanese Parliamentary elite possesses. On this point our studies differ. McKinney found out that most of the members of Congress have had years of governmental experience before becoming representatives or Senators. Ross says that very few members of Parliament have had a long period of political service or experience behind them. In Nigeria this is irrelevant because the leaders of the Independence Movement were all young men who replaced the former old elite who had been the traditional rulers under British control. In any case, the Smythes do not mention previous service at all. The situation is identical with Lerner's Nazi elite.

Again in all the five studies, the elite members have been born and reside in their respective countries. Some have travelled abroad, and a few

have lived outside their countries for varying periods of time. Much of this travelling and living abroad is in great part due to official business and missions.

Finally, all five studies have drawn more or less similar general conclusions, in spite of the fact that they have been undertaken for different reasons:

The Smythes studied the new Nigerian elite to demonstrate the evolution from 'traditional' to 'modern' elite status, in a country that had just obtained its Independence. McKinney made her research to find out who are the people who make the decisions that have national and international import, and how their characteristics affect the decisions they make. Ross obtained data on the composition of the British Parliament simply as a further step in the analysis of parliamentary representation. He thus found out that the parliament in England is not a representative cross-section of the population - whether it should, or should not be, of course depends upon personal points of view. Lerner's study attempted to discover what the major 'sickness' of the Nazi elite was, who these people really were, since they had become 'elite' after a revolution. Our study was also made to find out what kinds of people enter politics in Lebanon, and we tried to fit our findings in a family-feudal- regional-interest context.

We can conclude, on the basis of our data, that Lebanon sorely lacks the consideration of objective criteria in the recruitment of its political decision-makers. Family, feudal, and regional considerations come first, before qualifications, capacity and ability.

A D D E N D U M

During my oral thesis defence, members of the examining committee made several pertinent suggestions regarding the development of certain ideas. These are what may be termed the 'shortcomings' of this study.

First, some concepts like za'im, élite and parliamentarian, could have been more refined. That is, after the operational definition of each, a more clear-cut distinction could have been made between them. As it is, the term parliamentarian has not been used in the preceding pages.

Secondly, a trend history could have been constructed for most of the variables that were studied: education, occupation, political affiliations, family background, and so on. Thus the composition of five or six Chambers could have been comparatively analyzed before drawing any conclusions.

Thirdly, a study of the voting behaviour of the deputies within the Chamber could have been undertaken. What issues were proposed, by whom, how many voted for or against, and who attended (or was absent from) the sessions. Also the differential analysis of the behaviour of a za'im and that of a parliamentarian could have been elaborated.

These 'shortcomings' could also be considered as implications for further research in the subject, and if pursued, could yield very interesting results.

APPENDIX I

NUMBER OF MEMBERS IN LEBANESE NATIONAL ASSEMBLIES

1920 - 1960[1]

	Elected Members	Appointed Members	Total
UNDER FRENCH REGIME			
Administrative Commission (1920 - 1922)	-	17	17
First Representative Council (1922 - 1925)	30	-	30
Second Representative Council (1925 - 1926)	31[2]	-	31
UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL REGIME		(senators)	
First Chamber of Deputies (1926 - 1927) - bicameral	30	16	46
Second Chamber of Deputies (1927 - 1929) - unicameral	30	16[3]	46
Third Chamber of Deputies (1929 - 1932)	30	15	45
Fourth Chamber of Deputies (1934 - 1937)	18	7	25
Fifth Chamber of Deputies (1937 - 1939)[4]	42	21	63
UNDER THE SOVEREIGN LEBANESE REPUBLIC			
Sixth Chamber of Deputies (1943 - 1947)	55	-	55
Seventh Chamber of Deputies (1947 - 1951)	55	-	55
Eighth Chamber of Deputies (1951 - 1953)	77	-	77
Ninth Chamber of Deputies (1953 - 1957	44	-	44
Tenth Chamber of Deputies (1957 - 1960)[5]	66	-	66
Eleventh Chamber of Deputies (1960 - 1964)	99	-	99

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[1]From C. K. Chehab, Les Elections Législatives de 1960. (Beyrouth, Imp. Alayli, 1960), pp. 5 - 9.

[2]The additional seat: 1 Minoritary.

[3]The ex-senators. Senate was abolished (see text, ch. IV).

[4]This Chamber was dissolved by decree at the outbreak of World War II.

[5]The Chamber of 66 did not complete its term; its dissolution had been imminent since the 1958 crisis.

APPENDIX II

THE FIVE MOHAFAZATS WITH THEIR 26 CONSTITUENCIES

BEIRUT	BEQA'A	SOUTH LEBANON	NORTH LEBANON	MOUNT LEBANON
Beirut I	Zahlé	Sidon (town)	Tripoli (town)	Ba'abda
Beirut II	Rashaya	Zahrani	Tripoli (distr.)	Metn
Beirut III	Ba'albeck-Hermel	Jezzine	'Akkar	Chouf
		Nabatiyeh	Zghorta	Aley
		Bint Jbeil	Koura	Kesrouan
		Tyr	Bcharré	Jbeil
		Marja'yun-Hasbaya	Batroun	

APPENDIX III

CONFESSIONAL REPRESENTATION BY CONSTITUENCY

	Maron.	Sunni	Shiite	Gr. Orth.	Gr. Cath	Druze	Arm. Orth.	Arm. Orth.	Prot.	Minor.	Total Number of seats
BEIRUT											
Beirut I	1	-	-	1	1	-	3	1	1	-	8
Beirut II	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3
Beirut III	-	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
MOUNT LEBANON											
Ba'abda	3	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	5
Metn	3	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	5
Chouf	3	2	-	-	1	2	-	-	-	-	8
Aley	2	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	5
Kesrouan	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Jbeil	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
BEQA'A											
Zahlé	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	5
Rashaya	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	3
Ba'albeck-Hermel	1	1	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	7
SOUTH LEBANON											
Sidon (town)	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Zahrani	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2
Jezzine	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3
Nabatiyeh	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Bint Jbeil	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Tyre	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Marja'yun-Hasbaya	-	1	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
NORTH LEBANON											
Tripoli (town)	-	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
" (distr.)	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
'Akkar	1	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
Zghorta	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Koura	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Bcharré	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
Batroun	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
TOTALS	30	20	19	11	6	6	4	1	1	1	99

APPENDIX IV

RESULTS OF 1960 ELECTIONS

A - MOUNT LEBANON[1]

Deputies Elected	Sect	Political Affiliations
Metn		
Maurice Gemayel	Maronite	Kataeb
Gen. Jamil Lahoud	Maronite	-
Camille Chamoun	Maronite	N. L. P.
Albert Moukheiber	Greek-Orthodox	N. L. P.
Vartkes Chamlian	Armenian-Orthodox	Tachnak
Jbeil		
Raymond Edde	Maronite	N. B.
Gabriel Germanos	Maronite	N. B.
Ahmed Esber	Shiite	N. B.
Kesrouan		
Louis Abou Charaf	Maronite	Kataeb
Fouad el Bonn	Maronite	Constitutional
Nouhad Bouez	Maronite	N. B.
Fouad Naffah	Maronite	Constitutional
Chouf		
Kamal Joumblatt	Druze	P. S. P.
Bahige Takieddine	Druze	-
Abdel Aziz Chehab	Maronite	-
Dr. Aziz Aoun	Maronite	P. S. P.
Salem Abdel Nour	Greek Catholic	-
Issam Hajjar	Sunni	-
Kabalan Kabalan[2]	Sunni	-
Emile Boustani[3]	Maronite	-

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[1]Adapted from C. K. Chehab, Les Elections Législatives de 1960 (Beirut, 1960), p. 12.

[2]Died in the Spring of 1963.

[3]Died on March 15, 1963.

Deputies Elected	Sect	Political Affiliations
Aley		
Emir Majid Arslane	Druze	-
Fadlallah Talhouk	Druze	-
Khalil el Khoury	Maronite	Constitutional
Emile Moukarzel	Maronite	N. L. P
Mounir About Fadel	Greek Orthodox	-
Ba'abda		
Edouard Honein	Maronite	N. B.
Abdo Saab	Maronite	Kataeb
Bechir Awar	Druze	-
Mahmoud Ammar	Shiite	N. L. P.
Elias el-Khoury	Maronite	Constitutional
B - BEIRUT[1]		
Beirut I		
Pierre Gemayel	Maronite	Kataeb
Antoine Sehnaoui	Greek Catholic	-
Fouad Boutros	Greek Orthodox	-
Charles Saad	Protestant	-
Movses Der Kaloustian	Armenian Orthodox	Tachnak
Khatchik Babikian	Armenian Orthodox	Tachnak
Joseph Chader	Armenian Catholic	Kataeb
Souren Khanamirian	Armenian Catholic	Tachnak
Beirut II		
Mohsen Slim	Shiite	-
Farid Gebrane	Latin (Minoritary)	P. S. P.
Adnan Hakim	Sunni	Najjade
Beirut III		
Saeb Salam	Sunni	-
Nassim Majdalani	Greek-Orthodox	-
Abdallah Machnouk	Sunni	-
Osman Dana	Sunni	-
Rafic Naja	Sunni	"Hayat Wataniya"

[1]Adapted from Chehab, Op. Cit., p. 35.

C - SOUTH LEBANON[1]

Deputies Elected	Sect	Political Affiliations
Saida		
Maarouf Saad	Sunni	-
Zahrani		
Youssef Salem	Greek Catholic	-
Adel Osseirane	Shiite	-
Jezzine-Maghdouch		
Jean Aziz	Maronite	-
Bassile Abboud	Maronite	Kataeb
Nicolas Salem	Greek Catholic	-
Bint-Jbeil		
Kamel el-Assa'ad	Shiite	el-Assa'ad Group
Said Fawaz	Shiite	el-Assa'ad Group
Nabatiyeh		
Abdel Latif el Zein	Shiite	-
Samih Osseirane	Shiite	-
Rafic Chahine	Shiite	el-Assa'ad Group
Marja'yun-Hasbaya		
Assa'ad Bayoud	Greek Orthodox	el-Assa'ad Group
Ali Bazzi	Shiite	-
Ibrahim Abdallah	Shiite	-
Khaled Chehab	Sunni	-
Tyr		
Mohammed Safieddine	Shiite	el-Assa'ad Group
Soleiman Arab	Shiite	el-Assa'ad Group
Jaafar Charafeddine	Shiite	el-Assa'ad Group

[1]Adapted from Chehab, Op. Cit., p. 36.

D - NORTH LEBANON[1]

Deputies Elected	Sect	Political Affiliations
Tripoli		
Rashid Karamé	Sunni	Karamé Group
Mohammed Hamzé	Sunni	Karamé Group
Hachem Husseini	Sunni	Karamé Group
Amine el-Hafez	Sunni	Karamé Group
Fouad el-Bort	Greek-Orthodox	Karamé Group
Tripoli-Caza		
Mohammed Fatfat	Sunni	Karamé Group
Mohammed Alameddine	Sunni	Karamé Group
Zghorta		
Soleiman Frangieh	Maronite	Frangieh Group
René Moawad	Maronite	Frangieh Group
Youssef Karam	Maronite	Frangieh Group
Bcharré		
Habib Keyrouz	Maronite	Frangieh Group
Said Tok	Maronite	Constitutional
Akkar		
Soleiman el Ali	Sunni	Karamé Group
Ali Abdel Karim el-Ali	Sunni	Karamé Group
Ruchdi Fakhr	Maronite	Karamé Group
Yacoub Sarraf	Greek-Orthodox	Karamé Group
Koura		
Fouad Ghosn	Greek-Orthodox	Constitutional
Philippe Boulos	Greek-Orthodox	-
Batroun		
Camille Akl	Maronite	N. B.
Jean Harb	Maronite	N. L. P.

[1]Adapted from Chehab, Op. Cit., p. 59.

E - BEQA'A[1]

Deputies Elected	Sect	Political Affiliations
Zahle		
Joseph Skaff	Greek Catholic	Skaff Group
Georges Hraoui	Maronite	Skaff Group
Hussein Mansour	Shiite	Skaff Group
Kazem el Solh	Sunni	Skaff Group
Mikhail Debs	Greek-Orthodox	Skaff Group
Baalbeck-Hermel		
Fadlallah Dandache	Shiite	-
Sabri Hamadé	Shiite	Constitutional
Chafic Mortada	Shiite	-
Habib Moutran	Greek-Catholic	-
Mourched Habchi	Maronite	-
Moustapha Rifai	Sunni	-
Naief Masri	Chiite	-
Rachaya		
Nazem Kadri	Sunni	-
Michel Skaff	Greek-Orthodox	-
Chebli Aryane	Druze	-

[1]Adapted from Chehab, Op. Cit., p. 70

APPENDIX V

PARTIES AND GROUPS REPRESENTED IN THE 1960 ASSEMBLY

RASHID KARAME GROUP (11): Pro-Arab and Anti-Western.

Rashid Karamé (Leader), Mohammed Hamze, Hachem Husseini, Amine el-Hafez, Mohammed Fatfat, Mohammed Alameddine, Ruchdi Fakhr, Soleiman el-Ali, Ali Abdel Karim, Yacoub Sarraf, Fouad el Bort.

CONSTITUTIONAL BLOC (7): Christian, Pan-Arabic.

Khalil el-Khoury (son of Founder, and Member of the Supreme Council), Dr. Elias el-Khoury (Treasurer, and Member of the Supreme Council), Fouad el Bonn and Fouad Naffah (Members of the Supreme Council), Sabri Hamade (Active Head), Fouad Ghosn, and Said Tok.

AHMED EL-ASSA'AD GROUP (7): South Moslems behind a feudal lord.

Kamel el-Assa'ad (son of the late leader, and actual leader himself), Said Fawaz, Mohammed Safieddine, Jaafar Charafeddine, Soleiman Arab, Rafik Chahine, Assa'ad Bayoud.

KATAEB PARTY (6): Christian Lebanese Nationalists.

Pierre Gemayel (Founder and leader), Joseph Chader (Vice-President), Maurice Gemayel (Member of the Political Bureau), Abdo Saab (Member of the Political Bureau), Louis Abou-Charaf (Spokesman), and Dr. Bassile Abboud.

NATIONAL BLOC (6): Francophile Nationalists.

Raymond Eddé (son of Founder, and actual leader), Gabriel Germanos (Secretary-General), Edouard Honein (Spokesman), Nouhad Bouez, Camille Akl, Ahmed Esber.

SOLEIMAN FRANGIEH GROUP (4): Moderate Christians behind strong family.

Soleiman Frangieh (leader), René Moawad, Youssef Karam, Habib Keyrouz.

PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY (3): Socialist tendency.

Kamal Joumblatt (Founder and leader), Farid Gebrane (Vice-President), Dr. Aziz Aoun,

NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY (5): Pro-Western and progressive domestic policy.

Camille Chamoun (Founder and leader), Jean Harb, Emile Moukharzel, Dr. Albert Moukheiber, Mahmoud Ammar.

JOSEPH SKAFF GROUP (5): Beqa'a, behind powerful feudal landowner.

Joseph Skaff (leader), Georges Hraoui, Kazem el-Solh, Hussein Mansour, Mikhail Debs.

TACHNAK PARTY (4): Right-Wing Armenians.

Movses Der Kaloustian (one of the directing members), Khatchik Babikian, Vartkes Chamlian, Souren Khanamirian.

AL HAYAT AL WATANIYA (1): Moslem.

Rafic Naja (leader).

NAJJADAH PARTY (1): Moslem youth, lower classes.

Adnane Hakim (Founder and leader).

APPENDIX VI

OTHER CHARACTERISTICS

A - AGE

The average age for the old deputies (i.e. those with previous service) in the year of their first election was 40.88 years, with the ages ranging from 24 to 55 years. Also, the average age of the new candidates at their first election, i.e. in 1960, were compiled. As a group they average 44.79 years of age, with an age-range of 27 to 65 years.

Below, we see the picture of the average ages for the three groups: the present Chamber as a whole, the new deputies within the present Chamber, and the old deputies (i.e. with previous service) in the year of their first election.

Average Ages for 3 Groups by Region

	Present	New	Old
Beirut	50.31	48.9	45
Beqa'a	48.2	46.75	38.71
Mount Lebanon	47.6	44.88	41.29
North Lebanon	47.45	42.5	41
South Lebanon	47	39.14	40.73
Average for each group	47.98	44.79	40.88

B - MARITAL STATUS

Eighty-seven deputies are married; 12 are bachelors. A little less than 10 are married for the second time.

C - PLACE OF BIRTH

Ninety-one were born in Lebanon; 8 were born outside. Of these 8: 3 were born in Syria, 2 in Egypt, 2 in Cyprus, and 1 in Turkey.

D - PLACE OF RESIDENCE

Sixty-five deputies live in Beirut: 30 in residential areas, and 35 in non-residential quarters.

Thirty-four deputies live outside Beirut: 14 live in villages, 12 in towns or cities, 5 in non-residential quarters, and 3 in residential areas.

In summer they all go to the mountains where they generally own their homes.

E - LANGUAGES SPOKEN

On the average, the deputies speak either Arabic and French, or Arabic and English. Around 70 speak French, nearly 50 speak English, well. Thirty-five to 45 % speak the 3 languages together (Arabic, English, French).

Ten speak Turkish, 3 German, 5 Armenian, 2 Spanish, 1 Latin, 2 Portugese, 1 Italian, 1 speaks one of the African dialects.

F - ASSOCIATIONS OF WHICH MEMBERS

More than half of the 99 do not belong to any associations. The associations that the rest belong to are mostly religious welfare societies. Then they belong to professional and alumni associations, the Lion's Club, the Red Cross, the St. George Club, the Rotary Club, and the like.

G - HOBBIES

They like sports in general, as well as in particular. Most prefer hunting. Other hobbies are: agriculture, politics, gardening, law, card-playing, travelling, backgammon, and the arts (e.g. painting, classical music, reading and writing poetry), and so on.

H - PUBLICATIONS

Only 10 % have ever published (a) book(s). These have generally been written in the particular line of interest of the deputies concerned.

The remainder have written articles (usually in the press), pamphlets, have given lectures or conferences, or else have written nothing at all.

APPENDIX VII

THE "HEIRS" IN THE 1960-1964 CHAMBER

After the 1960 Chamber ended its mandate in 1964, a series of articles appeared in various newspapers giving a general picture of that Chamber. The As-Safa, an Arabic daily, gave two articles on March 10 and 11, 1964, respectively, in which the aspect of 'inheritance' is emphasized. According to As-Safa, 23 members of the 1960-1964 Chamber are the sons, grandsons, and relatives of men who were appointed in the Legislative Assemblies under the French Mandate.

Below is a list of these 23 'heirs', with the date in which a member of their family first entered the legislature:

Emir Majid Arslane (1922)
Fadlallah Talhouk (1929)
Anouar el Khatib (1937)
Emir Khaled Chehab (1922)
Adel Osseirane (1922)
Kamel el-Assa'ad (1925)
Rashid Karamé (1937)

Mohammed Alameddine (1922)
Yacoub Sarraf (1920)
Joseph and Michel Skaff, brothers (1925)
Georges Hraoui (1943)

Khalil el-Khoury (1937)
Kamal Joumblatt (1920)
Myrna Boustany el-Khazen (1929)
Raymond Eddé (1922)
Abdel Latif Zein (1920)
Ibrahim Abdallah (1937)
Soleiman Frangieh (1929).[1]

Jamil Lahoud (1943)
Fouad Ghosn (1920)

Kazem el Solh (1943)
Sabri Hamadé (1925).[2]

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[1] As-Safa (Beirut), March 10, 1964, p. 2.

[2] Op. Cit., March 11, 1964, p. 2.

APPENDIX VIII

THE 'PHYSIQUE' OF THE 1964-1968 CHAMBER OF 99

(Elected in April-May 1964)

As the typing of these last pages was being completed, the results of the elections for the new Chamber (1964-1968) had already come out. A few figures, at this point,[1] showing the composition of the new Chamber, will therefore serve as a basis for comparison with the 1960-1964 Chamber.

The sectarian distribution, and the number of seats by constituency are the same as in the 1960-1964 Chamber.

Political Affiliations

Rashid Karamé Group	14	
El-Assa'ad Group	10	
Joumblatt Group	10	(nothing is mentioned here about the P.S.P.)
Constitutional Bloc	8	
Salam-Frangieh Group	6	
National Liberal Party	6	
Skaff Group	5	
Kataeb Party	4	
Tachnak Party	4	
Dandache Group	3	
National Bloc	2	
Total	72	
Independents	27	

Previous Service

57 deputies have been reelected, i.e. were deputies in the 1960-1964 Chamber
29 deputies are elected for the first time
13 deputies had belonged to Chambers previous to that of 1960

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[1] Taken from l'Orient (Beirut), May 5, 1964, pp. 1 - 2.

Occupational Distribution

28 lawyers
18 businessmen and merchants
15 big landowners
9 former magistrates and/or government officials
8 doctors
5 agriculturers
2 engineers
2 entrepreneurs
2 school directors
2 rentiers
1 priest
1 pharmacist
1 economist
1 banker
1 retired general
1 expert-accountant
1 mechanics expert
1 former bank employee

Family Representation[1]

11 families fill 26 seats:

Gemayel	2
Solh	3
Keyrouz	2
El Zein	2
Mera'abi	2
El-Khoury	5
Chehab	2
Beydoun	2
Sa'ad	2
Sehnaoui	2
Lahoud	2

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[1] As-Safa, May 5, 1965, p. 2.

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