

591

BAHRAIN AS A PERSIAN GULF STATE

With References to Its Relations
with Great Britain and the
Province of Al-Hasa

by

Richard E. Littlefield

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
of the degree of Master of Arts
in the Arab Studies Department of the
American University of Beirut
Beirut, Lebanon
1964

PREFACE

The Persian Gulf is one of the most interesting areas in the Middle East. It is an area of contrasts, the modern and the old, the rich and the poor, the educated and the illiterate. It is also an area of change. With the discovery of oil it has been converted from a backwater to an area of great economic and strategic importance.

Few states within the Gulf have been influenced by this change for as long a period as Bahrain. The island shaikhdom was one of the first to be affected by contacts with the West, first in the nineteenth century as a consequence of Britain's policy of suppressing the piracy in the Gulf and securing one of the routes to India, and later as the first area in the Southern Gulf to experience the impact of the oil industry and the wealth which it brought.

The first of these contacts has led to a close association between Bahrain and Britain, whereby the latter controls the foreign affairs of the former. At the same time the British have usually been able to influence the internal affairs of the island as well, thereby encouraging the institution of needed reforms. In addition to this second power influence, Bahrain employed an English adviser who began in the middle 1920's to modernize the system of government administration in all of its phases.

With this as a basis for change, oil provided the revenue needed

to build upon it. Consequently, at a time when other Gulf countries were experiencing their first major contacts with the modern world, Bahrain was well along the road toward social and economic change.

In this paper I have attempted to discuss some of the important aspects of Bahrain today in light of these changes. The discussion is mainly political and economic though I considered it desirable to mention the major social problems and to dwell in some length on education as it is having a profound influence in the country. Similarly I have mentioned the military, both British and United States, mainly because it is a subject not found in any other source.

It would prove somewhat awkward to begin relating modern Bahraini affairs without some knowledge of its past. For this reason I have begun by briefly outlining the history of the islands and the sequence of events which led to Britain's position with regard to them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE	ii
LIST OF TABLES	vi
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	vii
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Geography	
Historical Background	
II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE 1950's	13
Beginnings	
Demands for Government Reform	
The Higher Executive Committee	
Storm Clouds	
The Finale	
III. SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND CHANGE	45
IV. EDUCATION	51
Early History	
Education Today	
Religious and Technical Schools	
Higher Education	
Teachers	
V. GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS	71
Administration and Public Works	
Public Health	
Labor	
The Courts	

VI.	THE ECONOMY	85
	Transit Trade	
	Agriculture	
	The Pearl Trade	
	The Oil Industry	
VII.	THE ANGLO-IRANIAN DISPUTE	117
VIII.	THE MILITARY	125
	British Forces	
	United States Forces	
IX.	CONCLUSION	132
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	138

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. School Enrollment and Number of Schools, 1960 and 1964 . . .	57
2. Placement of Unemployed Bahrainis and Foreign Nationals, 1956-61	77
3. Bahraini Imports and Re-exports, 1957-62	87
4. Number of Divers and Boats Engaged in Pearling 1930-54 . . .	100
5. Refinery Processing, 1962	108

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure	Page
1. Map of the Bahrain Islands	144

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Geography

Bahrain is an independent Arab state under the protection of the British Government.¹ It is ruled by His Highness Shaikh 'Isa bin Sulmān Al Khalīfah.² The country is composed of an archipelago of eight islands situated in the Persian Gulf approximately 15 miles distant from both the Saudi Arabian mainland and the Qatar peninsula.³ Only three of these islands are significant. The largest, variously called Awal or just Bahrain, contains the oil field and is thirty miles long and about ten miles wide.⁴ A mile and a half to its north and connected to it by a two-lane causeway is the island of Arad or Muharraḡ upon which the air terminal is located. To the east of Bahrain is Sitra Island where the oil company's storage tanks and petroleum loading facilities are located.

¹Although British writers insist upon emphasizing the fact that it is not a British protectorate, British influence in its internal affairs can be considerable when desired.

²Shaikh 'Isa succeeded his father, Shaikh Sulmān bin Hamad, who died in 1961.

³The name "Bahrain" used to be applied to the area from Basra to Oman. Later Kuwait and Qatar became the boundaries, and finally it has come to be attached to the islands only.--al-Nabhani. History of Bahrain. (Mecca: Date and publisher unknown), p. 4. Translated to English by Chowdry M. A. Munir.

⁴See map p. 144.

According to the census of 1959 Bahrain's population was about 143,000 persons. Of this total 119,000 were Bahrainis and 24,000 were foreigners.¹ The Bahraini population is almost evenly divided between Sunnis and Shi'as,² and there are a few indigenous Jews. The foreigners consist of Persians, Indians, Pakistanis, Goanese, British, Americans and Arabs. The foreign Arabs come from throughout the Middle East but mainly from Oman and Musqat. There are only two population centers of any size. These are Manāmah, the capital, situated on the northeastern extremity of Bahrain Island with a population of over 60,000, and Muharraḡ, situated on the southwestern side of the island of the same name, with a population of about 32,000. Other smaller towns and villages are scattered throughout the islands upon which water is found. On Bahrain itself there is little habitation south of the village of Zallaḡ located on the west coast; beyond this point the date palms and cultivation cease and the country becomes a stony desert with small patches of camel grass and scrub.³

Like the other areas of the west coast of the Gulf, Bahrain's climate is hot and dry. The mean yearly temperature is about 80 degrees Fahrenheit and this is accompanied by a mean relative humidity of 73 per cent. This combination makes the summer months very trying, particularly during July, August and September when the buildings are said to "ooze with

¹Porter, R. S. The Third Population Census of Bahrain, May 1959. (Beirut: Middle East Development Division, 1961), p. 10. Almost all population statistics are derived from this source.

²In 1941, the last time the two sects were counted separately, the Shi'as outnumbered the Sunnis 46,000 to 42,000.--Hazard, H. Subcontractor's Monograph on Eastern Arabia. (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1956), p. 146.

³The Persian Gulf Pilot. (10th ed., London: Hydrographic Department, Admiralty, 1955, with Supplement No. 3-1962), p.21.

moisture."¹ According to one visitor a walk after 10 A.M. is like a "sweat-bathed purgatory";² yet during January and February it is often cold enough for a fire in the house.³ Rainfall is scant, averaging less than three inches per year with none falling from June through October. Consequently if it were not for the abundance of fresh water springs and artesian wells found on the islands they would undoubtedly be uninhabitable. As it is, however, these springs have provided water both for agriculture and for the pearl divers, as many of them are found under the sea in the vicinity of the pearl banks.⁴ It is these pearl banks and the wealth which they produced that have attracted the many conquerors who have checkered Bahrain's history. Before discussing Bahrain in the modern era, a brief look at its past is in order.

Historical Background

When civilization on Bahrain actually began is still a mystery, but recent archeological expeditions have uncovered ruins and identified objects which bear striking resemblance to those found at Ur, and others are believed

¹Belgrave, C. D. "Bahrain," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XV, No. 4 (October, 1928), p. 440.

²Villiers, A. Sons of Sinbad. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940), p. 324.

³During the past winter ice formed for the first time in people's memory.

⁴The true derivation of the name "Bahrain" (literally meaning "two seas") is still unknown, and while many theories have been offered, positive proof to substantiate any one claim is lacking. The most common claim is that it refers to the two types of water surrounding the island, i.e., the salt sea and the fresh water springs found within it.

to have come from areas within the ancient Indus Valley civilization.¹ These discoveries have led to the speculation that two flourishing mercantile civilizations existed on the islands in early times. The first, about 2400 B.C., died with the fall of the Indus Valley trade but revived about 1000 B.C. when the re-emergence of city states in India rejuvenated the trade routes and brought a period of prosperity.² Other objects point to the possibility of ties with Crete and Bronze-Age Europe, and items of Greek manufacture show that their merchandise had reached the island in the 4th century B.C.³ One archeologist has offered the following suggestion:

(Bahrain was a) pillar of the maritime trade between Mesopotamia and India and, moreover, ... Bahrain was inhabited by big-businessmen who led this trade. It is they and their families who lie buried in the 100,000 grave mounds of Bahrain,⁴ and it is presumably they who are described on the clay tablets of Ur as the aluk Dilmun--the travellers of Dilmun. In that case Bahrain was of old the legendary Dilmun.⁵

Whether these assumptions are true or not no one knows, but the fact that Bahrain's history is long is certain, and various records refer to its possible connection with the Assyrian and Babylonian Empires.⁶

¹Glob, P. V. "The Prosperity of Bahrein Five Thousand Years Ago," The Illustrated London News, Vol. CCXXXII, No. 6187 (4 January 1958), p. 14.

²Bibby, T. G. "Excavating a Bahrein Citadel of 5000 Years Ago," The Illustrated London News, Vol. CCXXXII, No. 6187 (11 January 1958), p. 54.

³Ibid.

⁴See Wilson, A. T. The Persian Gulf. (London: Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1928), pp. 30-32.

⁵Glob, p. 14.

⁶Farouhy, A. The Bahrein Islands. (New York: Very, Fisher and Co., Inc., 1951), p. 52.

Arabs from the Arabian mainland first came to the islands about 190 A.D. and during the 4th century they carried out raids on the Persian coast. In retaliation the Persians later attacked Bahrain, defeated the Arab inhabitants and the islands became "an appendage of Fars".¹ From that time until the advent of the Portuguese, Bahrain was a center of conflict between various Arab and Persian empires and the only event of singular importance was the adoption of Islam by the people about the year 630 A.D.

The Portuguese came to the Gulf in the early 1500's and established themselves on Hormuz Island. At this time Bahrain was within the domain of the Prince of Hormuz, and when, in 1521, the Governor of Bahrain failed to pay his tribute the Prince appealed to the Portuguese who were only too anxious to offer their assistance in redressing the situation. A force under the command of Antonio Correa seized the town of Manamah and claimed the islands for Portugal.

Portuguese rule was interrupted on several occasions by rebellions against tyrannical governors. In 1559 the Ottomans tried to seize the island with a force of 1200 Turks and Janissaries, but they were repulsed.² By 1580 the power of the Portuguese began to wane due to events in Europe and to the rise of other naval powers in the Gulf. Therefore, when the people of Bahrain turned on their foreign ruler in 1602 the Portuguese were in no position to resist.³ The prize was in fact lost to Shah Abbas who

¹Wilson, p. 85. Fars is one of the districts of Persia. See the map in Ibid., p. 315.

²Belgrave, C. D. "The Portuguese in the Bahrain Islands," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XXII, No. 4 (October, 1935), p. 625.

³Ibid.

gladly answered the Bahraini requests for help by sending a force to annex the island. He made Saundik Sultan the first Governor and harsh Persian domination continued intermittently until 1783 when the Āl Khalīfah branch of the Utub tribe of Kuwait and Hasa moved from the town of Zubara on the Qatar coast and drove the Persians out.¹

In the ensuing years various Persian leaders made preparations to recapture Bahrain, but owing to deaths and domestic difficulties no action was taken. During this relatively peaceful interlude the trade of the islands flourished. There were no import duties and the merchants were carefully protected. As a result the annual trade with India reached one million rupees, all imports being paid for in pearls.²

The interlude was ended in 1800 when the Sultan of Musqat invaded the island, but he held it only a short time before being driven out by the Utub who had secured the help of the Wahnābis. The Wahnābis stayed on the island and appointed a governor, but were themselves ousted in 1810 as a result of Utub intrigue and the growing pressure of Muhammad 'Ali's forces on their capital in the interior of the peninsula. In 1816 the Sultan of Musqat once again attacked the islands but failed to capture them. Not to be denied he tried again in 1828 with the same result, but on this occasion his forces were so badly beaten that he lost much prestige in the Gulf and henceforth he turned his attention to his African domains.³ Further pressures were exerted on Bahrain by the Egyptians (1839), the Persians

¹al-Nabhāni, p. 61.

²Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia. (Calcutta, 1915), p. 839.

³Ibid., p. 842.

(1843) and the Turks (1847) but with British backing the Shaikh was able to thwart each attempt at domination.

Meanwhile in 1820 the Shaikh of Bahrain had entered the first of a series of treaties with the British Government when he signed the General Treaty of Peace for the suppression of piracy and the slave trade,¹ and this had been renewed with refinements in 1847 and 1856.² At the time of the signing of the General Treaty the British had no decided feelings as to Bahrain's status, but in 1839 when the Egyptian forces were making threatening gestures toward the island they indicated in plain terms that they desired it to maintain an independent status.³ Subsequent events were to compel them to take a firmer stand.

In 1859 the Shaikh of Bahrain attempted at two different times to solicit the protection of the Ottoman and Persian Governments, and in 1861 he set out to blockade the Hasa coast and thus annoy the Wahhābi amīr who had been molesting Bahraini shipping. The British were well aware of the possible consequences of these irresponsible actions as well as the possibility of the family feud which had been going on for the past two decades spreading into a conflict involving the whole Gulf. They thought to dispel these two problems by compelling the Shaikh of Bahrain to subscribe to a

¹Wilson, p. 247; for text see Hurewitz, J. C. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. (Vol. I, Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956), pp. 88-90.

²Aitchison, C. U. A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries. (Vol. XI, Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1933), pp. 234, 251.

³Kelly, J. B. "The Legal and Historical Basis of the British Position in the Persian Gulf," in St. Anthony's Papers Number 4, Middle Eastern Affairs Number One. (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1959), p. 125.

maritime truce and by recognizing the independence of Bahrain so as to "dissuade other powers from taking part in its quarrels or from asserting claims to the island."¹

Consequently in 1861 the British signed a treaty with the Shaikh in which, in exchange for British assurances of maintaining the security of the islands, the Shaikh agreed to abstain from "the prosecution of war, piracy and slavery by sea."² But in 1863 and again in 1867 the Shaikh violated this treaty, and after family intrigues had brought the island to a critical state, the British became tired of the continual games of cat and mouse. In 1869 they installed 'Īsa bin 'Alī Āl Khalīfah as the new Shaikh and imprisoned all likely contenders.

This bold interference in Bahrain's affairs marked the beginning of a new attitude toward the island, and in the next two decades the British moved to strengthen their hand. In 1880 'Īsa signed the First Exclusive Agreement with the British whereby he bound himself "to abstain from entering into negotiations, or making treaties with other governments, except with the sanction of the British Government, and to refuse permission to any, other than the British, to establish diplomatic or consular agencies or coaling depots in Bahrain territory."³ This was followed in 1892 by the Final Exclusive Agreement in which, by a further clause, the Shaikh agreed not to "cede, sell, mortgage or otherwise give for occupation any part of his territory save to the British Government."⁴

¹Ibid., p. 126.

²Wilson, p. 247; text in Aitchison, p. 234.

³Wilson, p. 247; text in Hurewitz, p. 194 and Farouhy, p. 123.

⁴Ibid.; text in Hurewitz, p. 209 and Farouhy, p. 123-24.

After the signing of this agreement, and in the face of growing Russian and German activity in the Gulf, the British began to tighten their grip on Bahrain. In 1900 a political agent was assigned to the island¹ and when a series of assaults on foreigners took place in September and October 1904 the British took immediate action to prevent any excuse for outside intervention. The British Resident visited the island in November and offered strong recommendations to Shaikh 'Īsa for improving the administration. In February 1905 further troubles indicated that nothing had been done and the Resident returned with three warships and issued an ultimatum to the Shaikh to produce the instigators of the trouble within 24 hours. The Shaikh failed to comply, whereupon fifty British marines landed, confiscated the property of the ringleader who was one of the Shaikh's nephews, and declared the young man an outlaw. This swift British action was reported to have left a profound impression on the people, and the whole affair no doubt contributed to the Shaikh's surrender of jurisdiction over foreigners to the British in 1909.²

In 1913 a convention between Britain and the Ottoman Empire was concluded whereby Turkey renounced all claims to Bahrain, and in the same year the Bahrain Order in Council was proclaimed applying the Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890 to Bahrain thus making it, in all but name, a British colony. This latter move aroused a bitter anti-British reaction, and its implementation was postponed until 1919.³ In 1914 the British procured a

¹The East India Company had maintained an agent in Bahrain in the early 1800's but he had little influence. Subsequently the Resident paid visits during crises. - See Farouhy pp. 82-94. Visits were also made by the Persian Gulf Squadron.

²London Times, 11 April 1905; Aitchison, p. 196.

³See Adamiyat, F. Bahrein Islands. (New York: F. A. Praeger, Inc., 1955), pp. 189-91.

written promise from the Shaikh to neither personally exploit any possible oil deposits on the island nor to allow anyone else to do so without both consulting the Political Agent and securing approval of the British Government.¹ This was followed in December 1915 by a treaty between Ibn Sa'ūd and the British in which the Wahhābi chief promised to refrain from "all aggression toward or interference with the territories of Koweit, Bahrein, Qatar, and the Oman coast, over which Britain claimed certain rights."² Hence, excepting Persia, Britain had by 1915 maneuvered herself into the position of sole claimant to the control of Bahrain.

The year 1917 marked the beginning of six years of misgovernment in Bahrain. The Shi'as were mistreated and by 1923 sectarian warfare and riots broke out. In an effort to correct the situation the British forced Shaikh 'Īsa to relinquish rule to his son Hamad as the old Shaikh "proved to be lacking in force of character and practical ability" and he "sometimes showed himself sensitive of control, even to the point of obstructing reforms..."³

Charles D. Belgrave accepted the post of advisor to the new Shaikh in 1926, and with the money that oil brought eight years later the shaikhdom entered a new phase of development which is generally outlined in succeeding chapters. In 1935 the British moved their Persian Gulf naval and air bases to Bahrain and the Residency was moved there from Bushire in 1946.

Rumors of possible unification of some of the Arab countries caused considerable anxiety in Bahrain in 1937, and a new Bahrain Nationality Law

¹See Farougy, Appendix III, p. 124.

²Adamiyat, p. 192.

³Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division. A Handbook of Arabia. (Vol. I, London: 1916), p. 318.

promulgated the same year disturbed many people. In 1938 affairs came to a head and the Political Agent jailed some Bahraini notables. In November the merchants closed their shops for two days in protest of this action, and demonstrators "advocated the formation of a native committee to direct education; the administration of justice by native Bahrainis; the creation of trade unions; formation of a Legislative council, replacement of the British Political Agent and expulsion of unskilled foreign workers in the service of the oil company and their replacement by subjects of Bahrein."¹ The British declared martial law, arrested many people and exiled others. In the face of these actions a movement in Iraq in 1939 began to agitate against British oppression in the Gulf, but the war intervened and the common crisis overshadowed these matters of lesser importance.

The war years were generally uneventful for Bahrain,² although the Bahrain Petroleum Company's storage facilities and refining plant were bombed on 19 October 1940 by a flight of Italian bombers. Contrary to Italian claims of great success there was little damage and no one was injured.³ The islands contributed some money for the war cause,⁴ provided hospital facilities and recruited two companies of Levies for the Royal Air Force,⁵ and while wartime precautionary measures were put into effect,

¹Farouqy, p. 110.

²In 1942 Shaikh Hamad bin 'Īsa died and his eldest son, Shaikh Sulman, became ruler.

³London Times, 21, 22 October 1940. The planes flew from the Dodecanese Islands, and for the era this was the longest bombing raid on record being over 2790 miles. Damage included a broken water main and oil pipeline.

⁴Ibid., 30 September 1939.

⁵Government of Bahrain. Annual Report For the Year 1942. (Date and

the people lacked any sense of urgency.

At war's end the Bahrainis settled into the normal routine of everyday life, but by the early 1950's new rumblings of nationalism and self determination began to appear, and it is to this important phase of Bahrain's history that we must now turn our attention.

place of publication unknown.), pp. 6, 19. Hereafter cited as Annual with appropriate date. Recent publications are from the Oriental Press, Manamah.

CHAPTER II

THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF THE 1950's

Beginnings

A resurgence of the political agitation of 1938 became manifest in Bahrain in the early 1950's. Many factors were responsible for its re-appearance at that time. Bahrain was well ahead of the other Gulf states in the promotion of a modern pattern of rule, yet, ironically, it was this very circumstance which contributed to its troubles, for this taste of democracy led to an insatiable hunger for more. Added to this was the fact that each academic year witnessed the return of a new group of young men whose education abroad had left them dissatisfied with a shaikhdom that, in their eyes, was obviously old-fashioned. Much of their criticism was undoubtedly justified for there was a degree of failure on the part of the Bahrain Government to keep pace with the times. Although for its part of the world the island had been endowed with a twentieth century framework at a very early date, the Bahraini authorities had tended to rest on these accomplishments content to let them take care of the future as well. However, the combination of long-term prosperity from oil, unprecedented educational advances and Bahrain's location on a major air route all opened up opportunities for glimpsing life elsewhere.¹ These glimpses convinced

¹"Growing Pains in Bahrain," The Economist, Vol. CLXXVIII, No. 5874 (24 March 1956), p. 641.

some elements that the island was not progressing at its former rate, and certainly not at a rate compatible with the post war age. In addition, with the modern methods of communication it was only a matter of time before the ideas formulated in and disseminated from Cairo would eventually find their way to the Gulf. It was also understandable that these ideas would take root in and appeal to the members of this relatively well educated and enlightened community.

In tracing the beginnings of the nationalist movement in Bahrain it is necessary to start with a series of sectarian disputes that took place between the Shi'as and the Sunnis in September 1953. The trouble erupted during the Tenth of 'Ashura at the culmination of the Shi'a celebrations of Muharram on September 20th. A procession was winding through the streets of Manāmah when a Sunni, Shaikh 'Abdullah bin Jabir, inadvertently drove his automobile between two groups of the celebrants. The Shaikh certainly had no inkling of the consequences of his act, but it aggravated the drawn and sensitive Shi'a participants and sparked an argument which resulted in a brawl between the Shi'as and the Sunni onlookers. The police were immediately called in, but echoes of the violence spread rapidly to all parts of the island.¹ Shi'as rushed to their eating places and engaged in fiery speeches and wild rumors spread far and wide attesting to acts of violence perpetrated by one group upon the other.² The causeway between Muharraḡ and Manāmah was closed as were the airport and the sūq, and even the motor launch traffic to the smaller islands was suspended. By the 25th of

¹Report from an anonymous source. Hereafter cited as Anon.

²Belgrave, C. Personal Column. (London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1960), p. 197.

September, however, things had returned to normal.

While this violence was primarily religious in nature some political factors evolved. The Baharnah demanded equal representation and some wanted the deposition of the Āl Kalīfah and the joining of the British Commonwealth. Shouts of "Down with Āl Kalīfah" and "Long live the British Political Agent" were reported. One group of Sunni youths charged the Shi'as with holding all of the key Government posts and they wanted their removal in favor of the Sunnis. These youthful agitators were attributed with spreading anti-British slogans. Yet a third group rumored that the whole affair had been engineered by the British Secret Service to provide an excuse for stationing additional troops on the island. Through it all the Persians remained neutral. This of course pleased the Sunnis, but it made the Shi'as quite unhappy as they tended to look toward Persia as their religious home.¹

During the remainder of 1953 "there was an uneasy truce between Shi'as and Sunnis,"² and the situation was not helped by events in nearby Hasa when the Arab workers of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) went on strike. Many of the Bahrain Arabs who were employed by Aramco came back to the islands "full of talk of strikes and labour demands."³ Saudi authorities nipped these events in the bud and the strike collapsed.⁴ Nonetheless, these strained relations between the sects became more intense throughout the Spring of 1954, and every court case involving the two was closely watched by both groups with the losing side complaining of favoritism

¹Anon.

²Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 198.

³Ibid.

⁴While this attempted strike had little immediate effect on Bahrain, it may well have contributed to the later Bahrain labor movement and the events discussed below in July and December 1954.

toward the other. Sometime in May the leaders of the two sects proposed a joint meeting to discuss and attempt to settle their mutual problems, but both Belgrave and the Ruler opposed it.¹

Early in June further problems began to crop up. During the 'Īd al-Fitr a scuffle between a Sunni and a Shi'a resulted in the death of the latter, and about the same time a member of the ruling family is reported to have struck down and killed a Shi'a with his car. Set against these two incidents tension mounted. A few days later a domestic tiff between some Shi'a and Sunni women so excited the Shi'a men that they attacked a group of Sunnis on Sitra Island killing what was severally reported as one, two, three and four of them.²

The police rounded up the Shi'a ring-leaders and sentenced them to varying terms of imprisonment some of which amounted to three years in jail and a five thousand rupee fine. The Shi'as violently protested against the severity of these sentences on the basis that previous convictions of Sunnis for similar offences had resulted in fines only. Feeling ran high and on July 1st, the day after the trial, demonstrations took place and a mass meeting was held in one of the Shi'a mosques. The next day a group of Shi'as marched on the police fort with the view of setting their companions free, and in the fracas which ensued the police fired upon the crowd killing four persons.³

¹Anon.

²Anon. - Belgrave says that this incident resulted from an argument over a bicycle near the gate of the Sitra refinery, and that only one Sunni was killed.--Personal Column, p. 201.

³London Times, 13 July 1954. Belgrave makes the strange statement that the police located in the tower of the fort fired into the air hitting

On the 3rd of July a general protest strike of Shi'a workers was called and over two thousand workers were absent from the oil fields and the refinery. The strike lasted for about a week after which the laborers began to drift back to work. Meanwhile Shaikh Sulmān had ordered the formation of a committee of inquiry, to include one Shi'a, in order to investigate the incident. The committee condemned the use of firearms by the police and criticized the police officers for failing to take timely action.

The events during July 1954 seemed to provide the catalyst for uniting the Shi'as and the lesser merchant class of Sunnis into one body which made certain demands upon the Ruler reflecting their dissatisfaction with the existing system of criminal law, and the composition of the courts and the police force. They also demanded that the Government compensate the families of those injured and killed as a result of the irresponsible action of the police.

On July 22nd Shaikh Sulmān stated by formal announcement that most of the reforms demanded by the public would be adopted. A legal consultant was to be contacted for reorganizing the judiciary and writing a new criminal law, and a committee was to be formed to consider the requested compensation.¹

The initial contacts which took place between certain members of the two sects gradually spread to include larger groups, and meetings, which were held in various mosques, took on a national character. Poetry was

the crowd?--Personal Column, p. 202. He also implies that this event was purely sectarian, but other reports stated that it was a matter of anti-Government sentiment. Subsequent happenings tend to support the latter theory.--Ibid. and Anon.

¹Radio Near East (Cyprus), 21 July 1954.

read and speeches for unity were given. General attacks against the status quo evolved though no specific demands were made. The speakers who were best able to influence their listeners soon became the recognized leaders. By the Muslim month of Safar, 1954 (September) secret meetings were held at the Masjid al-Mu'mun attended by laborers, drivers, the middle class and some merchants.¹ Subscriptions were collected from the attendants and an organization known as "the committee" was formed to provide leadership. The two foremost personalities, 'Abdul Rahman Bakr and 'Abdul 'Aziz Shemlān, began to make specific attacks on the Government, and they were supported by the weekly newspaper al-Mizān and the bi-weekly al-Watan.

Demands For Government Reform

On October 16th Bakr presented a petition to the Shaikh asking for a new law for the courts, the appointment of capable judges, the establishment of a new organization for the Ministry of Education and the procurement of capable doctors.² Nothing came of these requests and a popular meeting was called at the 'Id Mosque on the 28th of October where an estimated eight thousand people gathered. Bakr reportedly made "an admirable, patriotic, enthusiastic speech" in which he said:

Now let us leave all the demands we presented aside, and insist on only one demand--the establishment of a legislative assembly all of whose members are elected by the people. When we get this important demand, we can be sure of getting all the others, for the legislative assembly, which represents the people, will study all our demands carefully.³

¹Personal interview with Bahrain citizens.

²al-Nahdhah, 16 December 1954.

³Ibid.

Consequently the following morning the newspaper al-Qāfilah carried the following petition:

His Highness Shaikh Salman ibn Hamad Āl Khalifah Ruler of Bahrain

His Highness:

It has been more than a quarter of a century since the bases of the Government administrative system were first laid down. Although this system was adequate for the requirements of the country in its primitive stages, it is no longer in keeping with the requirements of present day life. The country has undergone a tremendous evolution and has marched in long strides, especially in the ideological and social fields. The Government administration has rigidly maintained the same forms, making no attempt to keep pace with this natural evolution. As a result of this inflexibility, there has developed a wide gap between the people and the Government which is illustrated by the restiveness and resentment prevailing in the nation today.

The country's disturbed state is by no means in the interest of the ruler or the ruled. In order for matters to take their natural course it will be necessary to carry out radical improvements in the governmental system by inviting the people to participate in the conducting of their affairs. The people have shown through their press, national meetings, and representatives, their desire to effect reforms upon which depend their security and advancement.

In order to remove the causes for restiveness previously referred to, the people have delegated us to present Your Highness on their behalf the following demands which we trust you will take steps to transform into reality, thereby insuring a brilliant record in the history of this country:

1. Establishing a legislative council in which the people of the country are genuinely represented through free elections.
2. Having drawn up a code of laws--civil and criminal-- by a committee of lawyers, in keeping with the requirements of the country and its traditions. The laws, however, should be presented to the legislative council for its approval. Also reforming and reorganizing the courts, and assigning to them qualified judges who possess university degrees in law and have acquired judicial experience under recognized laws.
3. Permitting the formation of a labor union and a trade union whose bylaws and regulations are to be referred to the legislative council for its approval.
4. Establishing a high court of cassation whose duty is to resolve disagreements arising between the legislative and the executive authorities, or any disagreement between the Government and the citizen.

We wish to assure Your Highness that the demand for these reforms does not aim at interfering with the position of the Ruler nor does it conflict with the interests of the British Government or the existing friendly relations with it. It is only a necessary step towards creating the bases for justice and equity in accordance with the democratic principles enjoyed by the nations of the free world on whose side we belong.

Our confidence in Your Highness's desire for reforms, progress and welfare of the country makes us strongly hopeful that you will respond and effectuate the above demands which the nation has presented to you through its representatives.

Awaiting your kind answer, we extend to Your Highness our respectful regards.

Sincerely Yours

(No signatures given.)¹

The Shaikh was requested to study the petition and reply within three weeks time. By November 8 he announced his refusal to form a legislative council. He declared that the Government was doing its best to introduce reforms and improvements in all walks of life and he solicited the cooperation of the people in the Government's drive toward progress.²

Faced with this rebuff "the committee" called upon the people to observe a general strike beginning the 28th of November, but on the 26th they distributed printed handbills asking the people to postpone the strike for one week as the members of "the committee" were in contact with Government authorities and they wanted to be certain of the Government's attitude and policy vis-a-vis their demands.³

Finally on the 1st of December the Government issued a communique appointing an education council and a health council without mentioning the legislative council. Consequently the next day the following leaflet was issued:

¹al-Qafilah, 29 October 1954. A former Bahrain paper.

²Radio Near East, 8 November 1954.

³Ibid., 4 December 1954.

The fact that the Governor ignored your demands and closed the door of negotiations in the face of your representatives has led to an increase in the general feeling of indignation among the individuals and groups of the people, and to an increase in the popular pressure demanding that a popular step be taken.

The Higher Executive Committee cannot but fulfill your desire and keep the promise it made to you, and proclaim a total general strike. This is a means of expressing the general feeling of indignation, showing the people's unanimous support for their representatives, and protesting strongly against the Governor's unjust attitude towards the people's unanimous desire to fulfill their just demand for the establishment of a legislative council.

In view of all this, under the weight of your pressure, and in answer to your wishes, we find ourselves forced to proclaim a total general strike on Saturday, 4 December 1954 at six o'clock in the morning. So let us go on a general strike oh honorable people on the appointed day, next Saturday, and may God grant us success.

Written on 2/12/54

The Higher Executive Committee¹

As a result of Government refusal to concede to their demands, a general strike took place as predicted. Only essential services were maintained and the oil company carried on with a skeleton staff. Most of the shops were closed from the 4th to the 10th of December although bakeries and kerosene shops remained open. The police set up road blocks and all non-Westerners were stopped for inspection; but no incidents occurred, which spoke well for the ability of "the committee" to control events. Reportedly some Saudis contributed money to the strike committee and all businessmen and taxi owners and taxi drivers were asked to contribute one hundred rupees and fifteen rupees respectively to finance the venture.²

"The committee" appointed one Husain Yatim as their intermediary between the strikers and the Government, and although the Ruler refused to

¹Anon. Text of leaflet issued by the Higher Executive Committee (see below) on 2 December 1954.

²Anon.

negotiate until after the termination of the strike, joint sessions were held to try and cope with the situation.

Meanwhile the Government, faced with the growing popularity of an organization that proved strong enough to set up and control an island-wide strike, tried to play down the committee's influence and extoll the Government's tolerance for allowing such action. The people were reminded of the losses in money incurred by those ignorant of the strike's causes and aims, and it was suggested that since the leaders were bankrupt they had nothing to lose. Suspicions were also put forward concerning the money collected for the strike committee's support of the poorer workers and what had been done with it, intimating that the leaders had a golden opportunity for embezzlement. Also it was mentioned that reforms had been started before the strike and that they would only be delayed as a consequence of it.¹ What immediate effect this effort to play down the strike might have had is unknown, but it is reasonable to suppose that the majority of the people, caught up as they were by the enthusiasm of the moment, were not in the least concerned.

The Higher Executive Committee

The handbill calling for the strike is an interesting document as it appears to signify the first time that the name Higher Executive Committee was used as opposed to the somewhat insignificant title of "the committee". This Higher Executive Committee (HEC) was the steering group for a larger advisory body which is variously reported as consisting of either fifty or

¹Government of Bahrain, Official Gazette, No. 87, 23 December 1954. (In Arabic.) This article smacks of Belgrave's writing. See Personal Column, pp. 205, 210.

a hundred members. Such figures have never been corroborated, but it is safe to say that the HEC enjoyed a fairly substantial nationalist backing.¹ The Committee itself was composed of eight members, four Shi'as and four Sunnis, a device no doubt used to advertise the new solidarity of the two sects. None of its members was drawn from what could be considered the young intelligensia. On the contrary almost all of them were middle aged men of inauspicious background without a great deal of education.²

The HEC represented a coalition between the Persians, Shi'as and the majority of the Sunnis on the island, all three groups being opposed to the ruling family which they considered an instrument of British policy. Their platform called for the eventual ousting of the Ruler in favor of a strong representative government, it being felt that once this was realized the British would be compelled to grant wide powers that might in time lead to home rule.³

To this end the invective of al-Watan, the Bahrain fortnightly, and al-Mizān, the Bahrain weekly, was directed primarily at the Ruler rather than against the British. The Ruler was rarely attacked openly, however. More subtle means were employed such as constant praise of the rulers of Qatar and Kuwait for their generosity and foresight while no mention of the Bahrain ruler was made except in official notices. The obvious implication of this was that Shaikh Sulmān was not generous or enlightened.⁴ Nonetheless,

¹According to Owen, R. The Golden Bubble (London: Collins, 1957), p. 124, Shemlān "was not simply followed by the man in the street, he was loved."

²New York Times, 18 May 1956.

³Anon.

⁴Ibid.

despite these attacks "the movement initially appeared to be neither ultra-nationalistic nor anti-British. It was a reform movement",¹ and it seemed to lack "the congenital Anglophobia which marks Arab nationalism elsewhere."²

Because of these features the British Political Agent at Bahrain and the Resident for the Persian Gulf had watched these early events with considerable interest. Desirous of seeing new reforms themselves, they played a noncommittal part until they had sounded out the movement and determined that it was moderate in its methods. Sometime in the early part of 1955 they decided to lend support to the HEC and used their influence to press the Ruler to implement some of the committee's demands.³ To further this goal the British Government offered the Shaikh the services of an expert advisor to aid in drafting a labor law, and in February 1955 the Bahrain Government formally announced its intention to establish a Labor Law Advisory Committee to draft the desired legislation.⁴

In the early months of 1955 the Saut al-Arab broadcasting station in Cairo began a series of violent attacks on Sir Charles Belgrave and British imperialism in the Gulf. Syrian and Egyptian newspapers chimed in and also gave written endorsement to the HEC. Rumors, always rife on the island, whispered of British Government support of the committee. These broadcasts, editorials and rumors all gave further encouragement and

¹Beling, W. A. "Recent Developments in Labor Relations in Bahrain," The Middle East Journal, Vol. XIII. No. 2 (Spring, 1959), 156-69.

²Johnson, P. "Struggle For the Middle East," New Statesman, Vol. LIV, No. 1374 (13 July 1957), 53-56.

³Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 213.

⁴Official Gazette, No. 96, 24 February 1955; Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 212.

popularity to the movement. This in turn only made the leaders more self-assured and demanding. The local newspapers reflected this attitude and were becoming increasingly critical so that in April press censorship was imposed.¹

This move was somewhat lightened by the Government announcement that elections were to be held to elect representatives to the nine-man Labor Advisory Committee. It was to consist of three Government nominees, three representatives chosen by employers, and three men elected by the workers.² No sooner was this announcement made than the HEC began feverish maneuvering to secure the three seats allotted to labor and to establish a general union before a restrictive labor law could be put into effect.³ The three elected labor representatives were all endorsed by the HEC and by the end of April the labor committee began its sittings.

In the course of the late spring and the summer of 1955 two proposals for reform were announced by the Government. The first dealt with the criminal code which had been one of the basic items attacked by the HEC. Legal experts in the British Foreign Office had formulated a code for their use in the Gulf, and after some modification it was accepted by the Bahrain Government. It met with immediate opposition at the hands of the Committee whose members objected to certain parts of it. No understanding was reached so the law was shelved.⁴

¹New York Times, 18 May 1956.

²Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 212.

³Beling, p. 160.

⁴Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 203.

The second proposal was the establishment of two permanent councils to deal with education and public health. This had resulted from the work of a temporary committee set up after the strike of December 1954. It consisted of leading Sunnis and representatives from the Shi'as. Apparently the Ruler's appointed members tried to run affairs their own way for the Shi'as resigned after the first meeting and the HEC tried to boycott the committee's further activities.¹ Nonetheless, in the summer of 1955 Shaikh Sulmān announced the appointment of the members to the Health and Education Councils which were to advise the Ruler on the running of the Departments of Public Health and Education. Naturally the appointees were sympathetic with the Ruler's wishes and they consequently had no appeal to the HEC which failed to recognize the councils and used every means at its disposal to criticise them.

In an effort to break the HEC's propaganda the Shaikh established a Public Relations Office in July 1955 and its first director was Charles Belgrave's son who had moved from the Bahrain Petroleum Company's (Bapco) Public Relations Department. By August the Government was operating a radio station (BBS--Bahrain Broadcasting Station) and its activities contributed to the Government cause throughout the following year.²

Despite these antagonistic activities, negotiations on these two proposals continued and on 6 October Radio Bahrain announced the Ruler's decision to implement new councils, half the members of which were to be appointed and the other half elected by free elections. This represented

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 217; Beling, "Recent Developments in Labor Relations in Bahrayn," p. 157.

a compromise on the part of both the Government and the HEC. While the former retained control of half of these councils, the latter looked upon this setup as a stepping stone toward their ultimate goal of a popularly elected legislative council.

This announcement was further amplified by a second one on October 13th which also alluded to the invitation of an Egyptian legal specialist, Dr. Sanhuri, to study the existing laws and advise the Government on their codification. On November 3rd a committee to supervise the elections for the two councils was formed,¹ and in December this committee notified the public that every male Bahraini national who had resided on the islands for at least twelve months and who was over eighteen years of age would be eligible to vote.² The work of drawing up the electoral register, the rules for nomination of candidates and the arrangements for polling day were carried out with relative efficiency and fairness. Only a few hotheads contested the restriction of voting to men.³

Meanwhile the HEC was following developments in the labor field with great interest. In October a general trade union known as the Bahrain Labor Federation was founded on a tentative basis, and within a short time it claimed six thousand members.⁴ The Labor Law Advisory Committee had made good headway and agreements had been reached on the formation of unions to negotiate with individual industries. This idea was not quite compatible

¹Radio Bahrain, 3 November 1955. This committee was composed of Kadim al-'Usfur, 'Isa al-Hadi, Mirza al-'Urayyidh and Abdullah al-Sa'i.--Anon.

²Radio Bahrain, 19 December 1955.

³Anon.

⁴Beling, "Recent Developments in Labor Relations in Bahrain," p. 161; Pan-Arabism and Labor. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 67.

with the HEC's desire for the establishment of one labor organization as a statewide federation, and in December one of the labor leaders returned from a visit to Cairo where he was evidently informed that labor should demand more, for upon his return the labor representatives on the committee demanded re-examination of many previously settled points.¹

With the turn of the new year the Higher Executive Committee began an active drive to secure election of its candidates for the Education Council.² They traveled the length and breadth of the island carrying out a typical political campaign. Their opposition consisted of three candidates of the "Pro-Khalīfah Front", an organization numbering about one thousand persons most of whom came from the old Arab families loyal to the Ruler. Many of them had blood ties with Āl Khalīfah. Their organ was al-Bahrain which published mainly official news.

The results of the election which took place on February 9th proved that the Pro-Khalīfah Front's political role was insignificant in the face of new-born nationalism. All six elective posts were handily won by the HEC's candidates. Each was elected by over seventeen thousand votes and no more than two hundred votes separated any of them attesting to the excellent organization of the campaign.

Storm Clouds

In February further supposedly "secret" meetings took place between members of the HEC and the British Residency, but most everyone knew of

¹Hazard, p. 190.

²The candidates were: Khalīl al-Mu'ayyad, Qasim Fakhrū, Muhammad Qasim al-Shirawi, Taqi al-Bahharnah, 'Ali al-Tajir, and 'Ali Abdul Āl al-Bilādi. The first three were Sunnis and the others Shi'as.--Anon.

their occurrence and rumors spread claiming unqualified British support of all the Committee's aims. At least one of these rumors was true--desire for the removal of Sir Charles Belgrave, who had been adviser to the Khalifah rulers for the previous thirty years. The British felt that his influence and long attachment with the Shaikh placed them in the embarrassing position of being linked with colonialism.¹ While he had contributed immensely to the development of the country, Sir Charles, in the later years, suffered from a sense of indispensability, inflexibility and lack of progressiveness which often characterizes those who have been too long in one position of public service. Though a tower of integrity who was devoted to the betterment of the islands, he had, by the middle 1950's, become an anachronism of a by-gone era and he was "rarely in the position of urging the ruler to go faster and further in modernizing the political conditions in Bahrain than the ruler himself would have been inclined to do."² Hence the Committee began to actively request Belgrave's removal.

In addition, the HEC had been trying for many months to win the Government's recognition as an authorized political party, but it had met with nothing but rebuffs. Emboldened by their success in the election and by British support the members began to become more demanding. On February 22nd, 1956, activity started anew in the labor field when the Constituent Committee of the Bahrain Labor Federation held a meeting to arrange for elections and to establish a formal Federation. The meeting produced a number of resolutions which were presented to the Government and the Labor

¹Personal interview with a government official.

²Levin, B. "The Prisoners of St. Helena," The Spectator, Vol. CCV (July-December, 1960), 6-10.

Law Advisory Committee. The most important and controversial of these resolutions was the demand of the right to establish a single labor organization as a statewide federation, the argument being that labor conditions in Bahrain did not lend themselves to the establishment of numerous unions.¹ No doubt the real reasoning behind the demand was the realization that a single union in the hands of those who controlled it would have provided a powerful weapon,² and the HEC was in the position to assume that control. For this reason both the Government and the employers were opposed to the single union organization, but despite this opposition labor began to establish an island-wide labor federation without waiting for Government approval.

Then, four days later, the HEC issued a bulletin criticizing the failure of the Government to deal fairly with the Committee's demands and accusing it of issuing "ambiguous announcements designed to opiate public opinion and gain time."³ The Committee warned that such actions were certain to increase the conflict and rile tempers. It accused the Government of deliberate delay in calling Dr. Sanhuri, who, according to the HEC, had expressed his willingness to come to Bahrain on January 21st in order to start work on drafting new laws. In addition it stated that subsequent to the Government's announcement that it would hire Bahrainis as police in the future, it had reneged and hired more foreigners. The Government was called upon to start showing some responsible action in the face of a grave

¹Beling, "Recent Developments in Labor Relations in Bahrain," p. 161.

²Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 213

³Higher Executive Committee, Bulletin No. 41, 26 February 1956.

and deteriorating situation.

By the 28th of February yet another conflict appeared. The six candidates elected to the Education Council had been unable to convene as the Ruler had delayed in appointing the six Government members.¹ The HEC therefore delivered an ultimatum to the Ruler stating that if the Education Council did not convene by February 29th they would not be responsible for what might happen. They also included in the ultimatum demands for the following:

1. Formation of a legislative council
2. Procurement of Doctor Sanhuri to cope with the legal system
3. Repatriation of the Pakistani and Iraqi policemen brought in to augment the police force.

They added further that the Government's statement to the effect that the Bahraini candidates for the police force vacancies had failed their medical examinations was not true.

That evening the Government rebutted the Committee's statements about the police and the law code, outlining its attempts to procure Dr. Sanhuri since the 22nd of November 1955 and adding that his work load would not allow his arrival earlier than May. It also added that because of the necessity for an increase in the police force and the unsuccessful efforts at local recruitment they were compelled to turn elsewhere.² These statements brought rumors that the HEC was making plans for a general strike and a demonstration, but events far removed from Bahrain were to alter other plans.

¹Belgrave states that this was vice-versa with the elected members refusing to sit because of their dislike of some of the appointed members. Personal Column, p. 221. Owen corroborates this, but Belgrave failed to give the reason. It seems that the Shaikh had appointed two candidates who had been defeated in the elections. - Owen, p. 225.

²Radio Bahrain, 28 February 1956.

The Crises of March 1956

In the late hours of February 29th, 1956 King Hussein of Jordan summarily dismissed John Bagot Glubb, an Englishman who had been the head of the Arab Legion for twenty-six years, and without ceremony or thanks he left Amman airport early on March 1st.¹ By the 2nd news of this event reached Bahrain and, as it was Friday and the bazaars were full of people, the story was widely discussed and caused considerable excitement. The HEC and their followers were particularly elated over this blow at British imperialism, and a degree of anti-British sentiment was aroused. It was also quite natural that the Bahrainis should associate Glubb and his position in Jordan with Belgrave and his position in Bahrain, and the logical conclusion of such an association was that the dismissal of one called for the dismissal of the other. Consequently there arose a stronger feeling for the ousting of the Shaikh's adviser.

By far the greatest consequence of the news from Jordan, however, was its relation to the visit of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. The British Foreign Secretary, who was enroute to Pakistan, was to stop at Bahrain to attend a dinner party to be given by the Shaikh at the Mansmah palace. The afternoon of 2 March the Shaikh and other dignitaries met Mr. Lloyd at the airport and they proceeded in convoy to the causeway which connects Muharraq and Bahrain islands. At the head of the causeway a group of students and observers of a soccer game crowded the streets stopping traffic and proceeded to throw sand and stones on the passengers all the while shouting remarks against Belgrave whose influence and "aversion to change"

¹Dearden, A. Jordan. (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1958), p. 118. The facts given by Mrs. Dearden are correct but the date of 29 March is an obvious misprint.

were believed to be the reasons for what was considered a lethargic Government response to the peoples' demands.¹ Though no one in the official procession was injured, the demonstrators began to get out of hand and headlights were broken and a bus was almost set afire.²

That evening in a news conference held at the Residency Mr. Lloyd gave a hint of future British policy when in answer to the question of the British Government's attitude to the demands of the people of Bahrain he remarked, "We have a high respect for your Ruling House, and we think you have been wisely guided in the past. There is this evolution, and we hope you will allow your institutions to develop in stability."³

One must assume that there were some huddled sessions behind closed doors, for the activities of March 2nd produced several results. First, the HEC publicly denounced the demonstration which had taken place.⁴ Second, the expected arrests of the ringleaders who instigated the demonstration never materialized implying that the HEC continued to enjoy the support of the British. Third, the Government finally announced the appointment of its six members of the Education Council, two of which were from the ruling family, and the Council was to be headed by Shaikh 'Abdullah bin 'Īsa Āl Khalīfah, the Minister of Education.⁵ Fourth, the election

¹"Faster, faster...in Bahrain," The Economist, Vol. CLXXX, No. 5890 (July 14, 1956), p. 141; Owen, pp. 228-30.

²Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 219.

³The Bahrain Islander, 7 March 1956. A Bapco publication usually issued weekly. During the various crises special information sheets were put out daily or twice daily.

⁴Higher Executive Committee, Bulletin No. 43, 3 March 1956.

⁵Radio Bahrain, 3 March 1956.

committee announced that nominations for the election of the six members of the Health Council were to be submitted between the 5th and 14th of March.¹

These announcements did not satisfy the Committee. Their organization had not been recognized, Belgrave was still very much in evidence, no steps were taken for the election of a legislative council, and they objected to the appointment of a head for the Education Council. In an effort to gain recognition of the HEC, 'Abdul Rahman Bakr carried out negotiations with the Residency and, as the British apparently viewed him as an obstacle to this end, he offered to leave the island for five months if the Shaikh would recognize the Committee.²

Negotiations on all these points were being carried out when more trouble occurred on March 11th between the police and the people. In the course of trying to move a vegetable vendor in the market, a policeman and a Government inspector became involved in an argument. A crowd formed and soon a brawl ensued, whereupon the policeman and the inspector beat a hasty retreat to the Town Hall of Manamah. More police arrived; the crowd became angrier and began shouting abuse and throwing stones, and finally the police fired hitting some of the crowd.³ The people, who were at a high pitch emotionally anyway, were further excited when it was learned that the police involved were recent recruits from the Gulf coast. The HEC made the most of an opportune situation and they became more vociferous in their demands for Belgrave's recall, and they once again called upon the

¹Ibid., 4 March 1956.

²Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 220.

³Ibid., p. 222.

people to strike.¹

The results of these March demonstrations and riots heartened the HEC a great deal and the Committee looked upon them as a mandate of popular support. Unfortunately, however, this caused them to abandon their former conservatism and coupled with the increasing amount of Egyptian propaganda there began to awaken within them "a resentment of the privileged ruling family and what one Bahraini subject, speaking from Cairo, called 'the fetters of despotism'."² The British on the other hand found themselves in the precarious position of becoming identified with a group that was becoming a bit too radical for their liking. A game of "running with the hare and hunting with the hounds" scarcely appealed to them and in the final analysis they felt obligated to support the Ruler.

In an attempt to remedy the situation the Political Agent met with the Committee's members on 13 March and assured them of the desire of the British to support any legitimate demands made upon the Ruler for a more democratic form of government. At the same time, however, he cautioned them against moving too swiftly and against associating themselves with elements upon which Her Majesty's Government did not look with favor.³ In what one attendant of this meeting has termed an unfortunate incidence of the misinterpretation of language, the HEC, despite warnings by advisers, took these statements as unreserved British support instead of the intended warning that if pressed to the point of having to choose between the Ruler

¹"Growing Pains in Bahrain," p. 641. In reality the committee was merely bending with popular pressure, for the people would have gone on strike with or without them. - Owen, p. 238.

²"Growing Pains in Bahrain," p. 641.

³Personal interview with a Government official.

and the HEC the British sympathies would lie with the former.

On March 17th Mr. C. A. Gault, the British Political Agent, was appointed as the official mediator between the Government and the HEC. After day-long negotiations both sides concluded a number of agreements and other points were agreed on which were to be implemented after the cessation of the strike. The Government recognized the right of the people to have a committee for investigating the disturbances of March 11th, and in a very important move the HEC was recognized as an authorized political party.¹ Since the Committee's name had been linked with two rather unpleasant incidents it was deemed advisable for all concerned that advantage be taken of a Government decree authorizing the formation of committees "to work for the benefit of the people of Bahrain," in order to change the name of the steering group and give it a fresh start.² Consequently the Higher Executive Committee became the Committee of National Union (CNU), the leaders called off the strike, and Bakr left for his five months exile. The same day a Foreign Office statement released in London reiterated what had been said in the meeting of March 13th:

We are glad to learn that the situation in Bahrain is now quiet. We have every confidence in the Ruler of Bahrain and his advisers (sic), and we will continue to give him all necessary support in carrying out his programme of gradual development, both in the material well being of the country and in its orderly constitutional advancement.³

By March 18th the town of Manāmah was back to normal and Shaikh Sulmān announced the formation of the committee to investigate the incidents

¹Radio London, 17 March 1956.

²Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 221.

³Bahrain Islander, 18 March 1956.

of 2-16 March.¹ Also the leadership of the Educational Committee was thrown open to election whereby the council members were allowed to elect their own chairman from either element of their group.

Now, however, the CNU eyed all other concessions as secondary to the ousting of Sir Charles Belgrave. Following the Ruler's announcement of the appointment of an Administrative Council to aid him in the running of state affairs,² 'Abdul 'Aziz Shemlān made a fiery speech in which he referred to Belgrave as "the tyrant". He stated that the CNU had reached agreement with representatives of the Government to the effect that Sir Charles would be removed within three months. Asked what would happen if the Government failed to take action Shemlān stated, "It is the people's will and not the Government's word which ousts Belgrave." He added that only peaceful means had been resorted to thus far, and that if necessary the CNU would use violence.³ As an additional slap at the Shaikh the Bahrain Labor Federation announced the very next day its intention of electing members to its Administrative Council.⁴

The Finale

During the next two months meetings took place between some members of the CNU and the Ruler. The Committee became less responsive to discussion,

¹The two-man committee consisted of Mr. Peace, the Government's legal adviser, and Mr. Maudsley, an assistant judge of the Residency court.-- Radio Bahrain, 18 March 1956.

²Ibid., 20 March 1956.

³Anon. This seems inconsistent with Shemlān's supposed moderation; but it is somewhat clarified by Shemlān's own remarks concerning crowd-oratory. - See Owen, p. 233.

⁴Beling, "Recent Developments in Labor Relations in Bahrayn," p. 161.

and problems solved at one meeting were often repudiated at the next.¹ Early in May the Shaikh received a letter from Dr. Sanhuri saying that he was hopeful of being able to visit Bahrain shortly; and on May 19th formation of the new Health Council was announced.² Meanwhile Belgrave had announced that press censorship was to end, but it was followed by a stronger press law which restricted the contents of the CNU's pamphlets and notices and caused considerable rancor.³

In June the new post of Secretary to the Government of Bahrain was created. Mr. G. W. R. Smith, formerly of the Customs Department, accepted the appointment.⁴ Apparently the post was created as a sop to still the demands of the CNU for Belgrave's removal, but under continuing pressure from both the British and the people Shaikh Sulmān announced in August that he had reluctantly accepted Belgrave's resignation which would become effective in the Summer of 1957.⁵

With this announcement the CNU lost much of the wind from its sails. As is often the case with coalitions, once the common goal was realized the members of the opposition began to look at one another and find faults. One of the biggest problems was the violently anti-British radio speeches supposedly made by Bakr, who had chosen Cairo as his domicile for the duration of his absence. These did not please the Shi'as who felt that

¹The Government was undoubtedly partially at fault. - See Owen, pp. 125, 225.

²Radio Bahrain, 19 May 1956.

³New York Times, 18 May 1956; Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 226.

⁴London Times, 18 June 1956.

⁵London Times, 14 August 1956.

the British had done a great deal to help the Committee's cause.¹ At the end of September Bakr returned and his physical presence did not enhance the situation. Questions of unaccounted finances were raised and cracks began to appear in the Committee's solidarity. In addition, while recent CNU speeches had proven more radical than before, Bakr used even less restraint in his accusations of the Government and of the British in particular. As a result a breach opened between the Residency and the CNU.

Again fate was to prove provident in welding the Committee together. This time it came in the form of the Israeli invasion of Egypt on the 30th of October 1956. Despite past help by the Residency the CNU "had no scruples over organizing a large-scale anti-British demonstration and encouraged by Cairo's frenzied abuse of the British, which was vomited from every radio in Bahrain...the Committee announced a strike and a demonstration on November 1st."²

The Government thought it best to play along with the CNU's decision rather than to cause further antagonism, but Belgrave took the precaution of obtaining Bakr's promise that the procession would follow a prescribed route avoiding trouble spots. The procession started from a mosque in Manāmah on 2 November. A few disorders developed and some arrests were made but the whole affair was fairly well controlled by the police. On the following day, however, riots began and some of the demonstrators using

¹Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 226. Apparently one of the Shi'a members dropped out of the CNU at this time over this very issue. Ibid., p. 225.

²Ibid., p. 228. Belgrave fails to add that this was the common reaction throughout most of the Arab world.

home-made "Molotov cocktails" burned down several buildings including the offices of the newly established newspaper al-Khalīj and the Public Works Office.¹ The homes of some of the British Overseas Airways Corporation's employees and British military personnel located on the airport road in Muharraḡ were sacked and burned. The Government imposed a curfew on the 3rd after four people were injured when police opened fire with riot guns on crowds that refused to disperse.² On the 4th the curfew was suspended for two hours to allow people to shop for food, but when the suspension lifted a crowd of five hundred gathered and refused to return to their homes. Police were once again forced to use riot guns slightly injuring two persons. Twenty-three were put under arrest.³

By noon on the 5th everything was reported quiet although a few people were still on the streets ostensibly because they did not understand what a curfew was. A special session of the Bahrain Court was sitting at the police fort to deal with the curfew breakers.⁴ Nonetheless, that day Shaikh Hamad Road was reported "...almost impassable. It is littered with glass, bottles, stones and drums."⁵

That evening the Shaikh decided that the four leaders of the CNU should be arrested and the Committee of National Union dissolved. The British, faltering in the moment of crisis, agreed. The arrests were made that same evening. Those taken into custody were 'Abdul Rahman Bakr, 'Abdul 'Aziz Shemlān, 'Abd 'Alī 'Aliwat and Ibrahīm bin Hasan bin Mūsa.⁶ The

¹London Times, 3 November 1956. ²Bahrain Islander, 4 November 1956.

³Ibid., special bulletin issued 4 PM. ⁴Ibid., 5 November 1956.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibrahīm Fakhrū, a fifth member, was already in custody as a result of the Muharraḡ fracas.

following day the Government formally announced its action dissolving the CNU and forbidding anyone to issue notices or circulars in its name.¹ It said that this action had been made necessary by the failure of the Committee members to comply with their assurances that the demonstrations of the previous Friday would be orderly. It added that the CNU, "by its inflammatory notices and by speeches made by its members both in Bahrain and outside, is responsible for the state of tension that now exists. This situation must now be ended."² Later the Government reiterated its former message and with slight elaboration expressed its regrets at the action that had to be taken:

We are only too anxious that there should be a responsible body to represent the interests of our people, but we must be sure that such a body has the real welfare of the country, and the people, at heart.³ Therefore we will gladly recognize any committee of the people of this country who are willing and capable of complying with the regulations of the Government. It is our firm desire that the position should be restored so that all can go back to work, and we ask the co-operation of all our people with this object.⁴

The expected repercussions of the arrests and the dissolving of the CNU were not forthcoming and by the 9th of November things were quiet enough to lift the curfew and order Government employees back to work. On the 10th the last of the situation was heard when a proclamation signed by "The Shadow Committee" called for continual popular support of the Committee of National Union.⁵ However, this support never materialized into any overt action.

¹Bahrain Islander, 6 November 1956

²London Times, 7 November 1956.

³"the people" almost seem to have been added as an after thought.

⁴Bahrain Islander, 7 November 1956.

⁵Ibid., 10 November 1956.

Evidently the Ruler decided to make an example of the Committee's leaders for the benefit of others who may have been considering anti-Government activities. Therefore the detainees were indicted by the Government for attempting to depose the Ruler, communicating with a foreign power (Egypt) to accomplish this end, and composing a document addressed to the people of Bahrain stating their intention to assassinate the Shaikh and his British adviser, and to burn down the palace and the airport.¹

Possibly the Committee had, by its failure to control the demonstrations, subjected itself to a charge of inciting a riot, but the other charges were essentially without foundation and would never have led to conviction in a proper court of law.² As will be seen, however, a proper court of law seems to have been furthest from the minds of the Government officials. On December 23rd, 1956 a special tribunal found the five members of the disbanded Committee guilty of the charges preferred. Three of them were sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment and the other two to ten years. The former were sent to Her Majesty's penal colony at St. Helena and the latter to the local facility on Jidda Island just off the coast of Bahrain.³

Sometime after the trial certain facts came to light which proved that a travesty of justice had been perpetrated. The case had been tried by a special ad hoc court composed of three judges all from the ruling family, thereby denying the possibility of an impartial hearing. Instead of holding the trial in Manāmah it was removed to the town of Budeya, and

¹London Times, 24 December 1956.

²An opinion expressed by a Government official.

³London Times, 24 December 1956; 14 January 1957.

during the hearing many legitimate requests of the defendants were denied.¹ In addition, it would appear that the conviction and sentencing of these men was a foregone conclusion by all concerned, for the following article was published in the St. Helena Government Gazette on the 22nd of December 1956, a day before the conclusion of the court proceedings:

An urgent request made on behalf of Her Majesty's Government was recently received by His Excellency the Governor, as to the possibility of arranging for the detention in St. Helena of five subjects of the Ruler of Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, convicted of political offenses.²

Nor was this all, for it seems that Belgrave made formal request of Her Majesty's Government on December 18th for providing internment facilities to accommodate "persons who will be sent to that island in accordance with the sentence decided."³ This request was made not only five days prior to the court's verdict, but four days before the court was even convened!

When news of this became known in Parliament it created a furor, and proceedings to effect the prisoners' release were started at once. These proceedings ran into a considerable amount of red tape and delay upon delay ensued prompting caustic editorial comment describing the affair as "...this squalid episode in British Government cowardice and dishonesty"⁴ ...Fake court, fake trial, fake verdict...this scandal cannot continue

¹Levin, p. 8.

²London Times, 17 June 1960. (Italics mine.)

³Levin, p. 8.

⁴Ibid., "The Prisoners of St. Helena Part 3," The Spectator, Vol. CCVI (January-June, 1961), p. 6.

much longer."¹

Finally in June 1961, after four and a half years of detention, the three prisoners were released and awarded £15,000 each as compensation for illegal imprisonment plus £5000 for expenses.² Unfortunately their friends on Jidda Island, having no one to fight for their cause, did not fare so well. They are still in confinement.

¹"Island Paradise," The Spectator, Vol. CCVI (January-June, 1961), p. 6.

²London Times, 14 June 1961; 5 June 1962. These three are presently residing in Arab countries but have made no attempt to return to Bahrain.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND CHANGE¹

Social problems in Bahrain derive from differences in religion and nationality. The Persians constitute the largest foreign element on Bahrain.² This is true despite considerable emigration after the land registration law of December 1927. They are mainly engaged in trade, the oil industry or employed in some business firm. It can be said generally that they are disliked by both the Bahrainis and the English. To the Bahrainis they are simply foreigners, and, notwithstanding the Bahraini citizenship of some, they are still suspected of sympathizing with Iran. As Shi'as they have a history of being at odds with the Sunnis, and the logical ties that religion might provide with the Shi'a Bahrainis are offset by their general prosperity which places them on a different social plane. Also, because of their tenuous position they have normally refused to openly support the indigenous Shi'as in their conflicts with the Sunnis and have thereby aroused further antagonism.

In the eyes of the British the Persians are seen as playing the "double role of an opposition party and a fifth column."³ In the past they

¹Much of this discussion is based on two sources--Qubain, F. I. "Social Classes and Tensions in Bahrain," Vol. IX, No. 3 (Summer, 1955), 269-80, which is still basically sound today, and Hazard, H. Subcontractor's Monograph on Eastern Arabia.

²The Persian population in the 1959 census was 4203. - Porter, p. 30.

³Qubain, p. 275.

openly opposed the British policy of bringing in Indians, and during the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute Mosaddag was hailed as a hero and his picture was displayed in many of the Persian shops.¹ Such action in conjunction with Iranian claims of sovereignty over the island has led to ill feeling, and the British view the Persians as a threat to their position in the Shaikhdom.

For centuries Bahrain has had ties with India, particularly through the pearl trade. In 1913 Bahrain became subject to the jurisdiction of the Viceroy of India after passage of the Bahrain Order-in-Council.² As a result of these commercial and administrative ties Indians have emigrated to the island and comprise the second largest foreign group.³ Many of the most prosperous merchants in Bahrain are Indians, though the majority are employed by the Government, Bapco, foreign businesses and the British military and civil establishments. With the former organizations they are usually employed as clerks or supervisors (though Bahrainis have displaced many as clerks), and with the latter they act as domestic help.

The Indians occupy an unusual social position in Bahrain. As they are foreigners and occupy positions in business which the young generation of Bahrainis covet, they are resented by the local population.⁴

¹Ibid.

²Though promulgated in 1913 it was not implemented until after World War I.--See Farougy, p. 98.

³The Indian population in 1959 was 4043. - Porter, p. 30.

⁴Hazard, p. 187. At the same time, however, there has grown up among them in recent years a feeling of insecurity, for they know that their tenure will only last until Bahrainis have been trained to replace them.

Tied to this is the fact that economic prosperity gives them a position of influence that is often far in excess of what their numbers warrant. This is resented also. Yet probably the biggest grievance against the Indians is that they enjoy privileges which are not open to the other elements of the non-Western society. Being non-Muslim (except for some Pakistanis) they are given a monthly liquor ration, they have bars in their clubs and they enjoy dancing and other activities commonly associated with the Westerners. Their ability to speak fluent English and to rub shoulders with this other stratum of society often gives them a feeling of superiority, and they form a close-knit community which makes very little effort to mix with others. Even their attitude toward athletics reflects this desire to become identified with the European set, for to the exclusion of the other groups they have formed their own clubs to engage in the gentleman's sport of cricket.

Other Arabs also comprise a good portion of the foreign element. They can be divided into two groups--Gulf Arabs and the Egyptians and Levantines. The former are mostly engaged as laborers, and being generally less educated than the Bahrainis they perform tasks in construction and other areas which the local population is usually disinclined to do. Because of this they provide little or no competition and as brother Arabs from the same area they engender no hostility. As for the latter group, feelings have changed within the last decade. Formerly they were looked up to and respected because of their greater education and knowledge. Now there is the feeling that they are undermining the chances of advancement for the newly educated group of Bahrainis, and except in the fields of medicine and higher educational administration, the drive is on to move

them out.¹

Bahrain has a small Jewish minority which totaled only 149 persons in the 1959 census.² They are almost exclusively engaged in trade and money changing. For centuries the Jews lived in comparative peace in Bahrain until the outbreak of the Palestine problem when they experienced a period of social ostracization and economic boycott.³ A bit of violence did occur causing the emigration of some Jewish families, but a few of them have subsequently returned, finding life in Bahrain preferable to life elsewhere. In recent years the vitriolic press articles of the 1950's have been largely forgotten and the ordinary Bahraini no longer seems to exhibit an open antagonism toward them. The Jewish families that remain are generally wealthy, and if not respected by the Government they are at least accepted. As elsewhere in the Middle East, however, there is the latent stigma of guilt by association with Zionism and their present position is precariously subject to current attitudes toward Israel.

Before dealing with the Bahrainis themselves it should be added that this animosity felt toward the foreign elements from the Middle East and East Asia who are resident in Bahrain is not felt toward their respective countries.⁴ These other governments receive the sympathy warranted as brother combatants against the peril of Western influence.⁵

¹This stage has not as yet been reached in Saudi Arabia except in certain areas of oil company work; but with increasing education it is bound to occur.

²Porter, p. 26.

³Qubain, p. 274.

⁴Israel must be excepted of course if it is construed to mean the country for all Jews.

⁵Qubain, p. 279.

Sunni-Shi'a antagonism in Bahrain has been closely drawn along the line of the poor downtrodden tenants and the rich, powerful rulers or merchants. As late as the first decade of the present century the Shi'as suffered from the ravages of raiding parties sent by the Ruler, and the sectarian strife of 1923 was controlled only after the British Navy was called in and Shaikh 'Īsa had been forced to abdicate in favor of his son Hamad.¹ The Shi'as continued to live as second class citizens until the discovery of oil brought a change to their traditional agricultural life, and many of them joined the oil company where they were promoted on merit and became relatively prosperous. With this new-found prosperity came a resentment of their inferior status which was a contributing factor to the sectarian troubles of the early 1950's.² At the same time, however, these oil company jobs also led to a workers' relationship with the Sunnis and the two apparently saw that the interests of both could best be served by co-operation. This resulted in the nationalist movement. This in turn led to a stronger bond despite some divergencies in the summer of 1956. Today a third force is helping to promote better understanding between the two groups--education. Its influence is already discernible among the younger generation of Bahrainis. To say that these factors--the oil industry, nationalism, education--have solved all the problems of antagonism would be naive, but their influence has been profound within a short period of time, and sectarian conflicts are now minimal.

Bahrain society as a whole has experienced a change in recent years. As elsewhere in the Gulf it was traditionally a country of haves and have-nots, but today there are three distinguishable strata. The first

¹Farougy, p. 99.

²Hazard, p. 146.

are the have-nots, be they either Shi'a agriculturalists or poor Sunnis. They despise the present situation and long for a change which in their eyes can mean nothing but improvement. Second is the new middle class consisting of the medium-sized merchants, indigenous executives, contractors and technicians and the center stratum of government officials and the few professional people.¹ They are middle class only in the sense that they do not hold the reigns of power, for they are generally far above the poorer class from which many emerged. A number of this group feel personal frustration with the present regime, and they are united in feelings with the lower class in this respect. Above them is the upper class, composed of the ruling family, wealthy merchant families and local Sunni leaders. Also included in this group are the distinguished foreigners, prominent among which are the British. These are the wielders of power and as such they have a "strong common interest in the maintenance of the social structure with some slight modifications in favor of some group or individual, but never to the extent of rocking the boat."²

The most important of these three strata is the new middle class. Its formation has resulted mainly from the advances made in the field of education. The young Bahrainis have enjoyed educational opportunities that were not available to the majority of their parents. This has qualified the younger generation to enter new fields of endeavor formerly occupied by the educated foreigners. An understanding of this revolution in education requires an examination of the educational development in Bahrain.

¹Ibid., p. 78.

²Hazard, p. 77.

CHAPTER IV

EDUCATION¹

Early History

Government education in Bahrain began after Shaikh 'Abdullah bin 'Īsa, brother of Shaikh Hamad, visited England in 1919.² While there he acquired a great enthusiasm for education, and he returned convinced that Bahrain should make efforts in this field. Inasmuch as these were years of general prosperity, the Shaikh's appeal for funds to start a school was well received and over three hundred thousand rupees were collected. A committee of local merchants was selected to supervise education and a school was constructed on the northern side of Muharraḡ and staffed with Syrian and Egyptian teachers. Shortly thereafter a second school was opened in Manāmah.

Results of the first five or six years of education were anything but heartening. Boys were unable to read or write after two years of school, and those who left after several years were incapable of filling the simplest posts in the Government offices. On the whole "the boys

¹The most thorough study on this is R. B. Winder's article "Education in al-Bahrayn" found in The World of Islam, (London: MacMillan & Co., Ltd., 1960), pp. 283-335. For the purposes of this paper I have confined my discussion to those educational facilities supported by the Government.

²Government of Bahrain, Administrative Report For the Years 1926-1937, date and place of publication unknown. Hereafter cited as Report. I am indebted to this source for almost all of the early history of education.

received a very scrappy education" and the examinations given "were entirely unreliable tests of education."¹ The reason for this poor showing was undoubtedly the fact that most members of the Education Committee took more interest in the financial advancement of their friends and relatives who were appointed as teachers than in education itself, and a teacher's pay depended not upon his ability but on his relationship with the headmaster or one of the committee members. "...In general, nepotism flourished to an extraordinary degree."²

In 1927 Colonel Haworth, the Political Agent, remarked to the Government that the amount of money spent on education was very small in proportion to the revenue (46,000 Rs) and he advocated greater efforts. This resulted in the establishment of two new schools, one in Rifaa and the other in Hedd, and the budget for the following years was increased by eleven thousand rupees.

The next year saw the construction of four classrooms for a Shi'a school in Manāmah³ and at the instigation of Lady Belgrave a school for girls was opened in Muharraq. This latter move stirred up a hornets nest. Although assurances of support were secured from some of the leading

¹For example, the examinations, held at term's end, were open to the public. The fathers often attended and usually applauded even when the boys gave incorrect answers. Naturally it was deemed inadvisable to correct the boys in front of their equally ignorant fathers.--Ibid.

²Ibid.

³Hitherto the only ones to attend school had been the Sunni children. The new school was managed by a council of Shi'a notables. Because of the lack of educated Shi'as in Bahrain, most of the senior teachers came from Iraq. The school never progressed satisfactorily because of dissention among the council members. -- See Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 93.

merchants, they were reluctant to have their names linked officially to such a radical innovation.¹ The conservative element of the population conjured up all sorts of reasons for opposing the idea. Typical of the feelings current at the time was that of one notable who feared that it would lead to an increase in immorality because "if the girls could read and write, they would correspond surreptitiously with men outside their own house."² Consequently a campaign was launched opposing the school and the project was publicly denounced at the Friday khutbah. However, the plan enjoyed the support of the Shaikha and the school became a flourishing success despite conservative attempts to discourage it.

In 1929 the dismissal of a popular teacher brought the Education Committee under public criticism, particularly the conduct of the treasurer, for it was felt that the public had not been receiving proper returns on their expenditures. This criticism led to the appointment of Mr. Faik Adham as inspector of schools. Mr. Adham had been recommended by the president of the American University of Beirut (AUB), and in addition to a degree from that school he was a graduate of the Islamiyah College. Mrs. Adham, also a qualified teacher, became headmistress of a new school for girls opened in Manāmah.³

Mr. Adham soon produced a reaction in the school system. The treasurer resigned after being unable to explain certain financial transactions, and in retaliation for what was considered an unwarranted Government interference in the school system the headmaster of the Muharraq school declared a strike of teachers and students which resulted in demonstrations

¹Ibid., p. 94.

²Report, p. 29; Winder, p. 286.

³Report, p. 29; Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 93.

and some damage. Shaikh 'Abdullah immediately fired the two Syrian headmasters and closed the schools for ten days. When they re-opened the students gradually returned to their studies but thereafter the committee's authority was curbed by the Government.

An attempt at higher education was tried in 1927 when the Government sent some boys to school in Lebanon.¹ Seven more were sent in 1929, but the financial problems of the early 1930's necessitated their return after only two years. Three were members of the ruling family and the others sons of merchants. The fact that all of them were Sunnis was strongly resented by the Shi'as. Of the seven, three were successful, three moderately so, and one was a complete failure. The reason for this general lack of success was attributed to a failure to properly screen the candidates, some of whom showed only slight interest or were merely too old.²

In 1930 the new Shi'a school capable of accommodating about 500 boys was completed in Manāmah,³ and a thorough reorganization of the curriculum was undertaken. Advanced subjects such as physics, music, and higher mathematics, which had been badly presented by unqualified teachers, were dropped. New teachers were recruited and three Bahraini graduates of the Beirut schools were hired. The pay of the teachers was established on reasonable standards and made to depend on their demonstrated abilities. By the end of the year 500 boys and 100 girls were attending Government schools.

The influence of the Education Committee had waned by 1932 and full control of education reverted to the Government with Shaikh 'Abdullah bin 'Īsa

¹Winder, p. 317, says AUB, but it must have been International College as no secondary schools were then available in Bahrain.

²Report, pp. 31-32

³Winder, p. 285.

becoming the first Minister of Education. He aided in amalgamating the Shi'a and Sunni schools into one boys school thus making room for the old Sunni school building to be used for girls' education. This move did not please the Shi'as, but in time their displeasure subsided.

During the next two years progress continued despite required economies which sometimes included combining classes under one teacher. By the end of the 1934 school year there were 966 students and many of the Shi'a boys, who had been boycotting the new school arrangement, returned to their classes. By 1936 a school had been opened on Sitra Island and others were planned.

In these early years there were differences between the subjects taught in the city schools as opposed to those in the villages. In the latter, emphasis was placed on basic skills. Boys were taught the "three R's" and the Qur'ān, and girls took the same subjects but also received instruction in sewing, embroidery and hygiene. In Manāmah and Muharraḡ the program included English, history, geography, book-keeping, and the system of pearl diving accounts in addition to these other basic subjects.¹

Secondary education for boys began in 1940 with the construction of a new building, but in general the war years greatly curtailed progress in the field of education as elsewhere. While the number of primary schools (seven) did not increase from 1938 to 1942, the enrollment more than doubled (1000-2178) and in both Manāmah and Muharraḡ over 100 girls had to be turned away owing to lack of teachers.² The Manāmah boys elementary school

¹Report, p. 31.

²Annual, 1942, p. 33. Women teachers, never easy to find, were extremely scarce during the war years.

attendance had reached 430 and in the school, which had originally been built for eight classes, lack of space required that the central hall and two passages be used as classrooms. The teachers reflected the other conditions. The standards of most of them were extremely low as they usually possessed no more than a poor elementary education. Books for some subjects were lacking and there was no syllabus for history or arithmetic. For the latter course there were no qualified teachers and as a result an "appalling low standard" existed.¹

Secondary education suffered a slight eclipse in 1945 when only ten boys enrolled as opposed to fifty the year before. The reason was the availability of well paid employment. Boys from poor families were removed regardless of their desires to stay, for the illiterate parents did not appreciate that more education was normally conducive to providing a greater earning power.²

Education Today

With the end of the war the expansion in education moved swiftly. Girls secondary schooling began in 1951 and in 1952 seven new schools were opened, four for boys and three for girls. The year 1957 saw the opening of al-Salmaniyyah School, the largest elementary school in the Persian Gulf, capable of accommodating 1000 boys.³ Two years later a new girls' secondary school was completed. It includes an assembly hall with stage, a domestic

¹Ibid.

²Annual, 1945, p. 33. The town of Budaiya seems to have been an exception. The parents were so impressed by the earning power of their educated offspring that they asked to be provided with night classes.--
Ibid., p. 34.

³Winder, p. 287.

science wing with equipment for cooking and sewing, a modern science lecture room and laboratory, a library, an art room and enough classrooms to seat 700 girls.¹ In 1960 the boys' and girls' education were both placed under a single General Director of Education, Mr. Ahmad al-'Umran. He in turn is assisted by a boys' director, Mr. Yacub Yousuf and a girls' directress, Mrs. Wafika Nair.

The fact that education is still booming can easily be seen by the figures of 1960² as compared with 1964:³

TABLE 1
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AND NUMBER OF SCHOOLS

Year	Elementary		Secondary		Total	Schools		
	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls		Boys	Girls	Total
1960	12677	6236	1065	250	20409	36	19	55
1964 ^a	18611	11330	2019	590	32550	46	29	74

^aThe intermediate school figures for this year have been divided equally between the elementary and secondary enrollment.

The population of Bahrain as of May 1964 can be approximated at 164,000. Of this figure about 25 per cent, or roughly 41,000, should be of school age.⁴ The education department shows 32,550 in attendance for the current year. In other words, very nearly eighty per cent of those eligible are in school. This jump from an average of 57 per cent in 1959⁵ can be attributed to a normal increase in school attendance due to the

¹This school is already overcrowded.

²Annual 1960, p. 10.

³Government of Bahrain, Department of Education. Report For the Year 1963, mimeographed. (In Arabic.) Hereafter cited as Tagrir.

⁴See Porter, pp. 10, 27.

⁵Ibid., p. 27.

building of new schools in the villages, and to an extraordinary increase in girls' education where the attendance has more than doubled in the last five years. Also from these figures, which admittedly are approximations at best, one can say that nearly ninety per cent of the boys and somewhat better than seventy per cent of the girls are attending school. These are exceptionally high figures when one stops to consider that they are being achieved without compulsory education and in the face of a lingering reluctance to allow children to finish their schooling after they have reached a productive age.

This increase in students has been met with a corresponding increase in the number of schools. In 1960-61 there was a total of 55, yet only three years later this number had increased to 74 and the islands can now boast that they have an elementary school in each village.¹

At present there are three stages of education in the Bahrain schools--elementary, intermediate and secondary.² The elementary group comprises four grades in which the usual basic subjects are taught. In addition there is instruction in religion and the Qur'^{ān}, English is taught as a foreign language beginning in the third grade. As previously stated there has been a difference in the curriculum for the city and the village schools, with the latter emphasizing practical and vocational subjects according to the local industry of the area, and some still do not have all the primary grades. However, great effort has been expended to raise the village

¹This includes two secondary, three intermediate, one religious, one technical and sixty-seven elementary. One of the latter is located on tiny Nabi Salih Island.

²For the full curriculum of these schools see Winder, Appendix IV, p. 328-31.

schools to the proper level, and most of the larger towns have achieved this goal.

Little can be said regarding the intermediate stage as it is in its initial phase. This scheme, brought about by combining the last two years of the elementary stage (fifth and sixth) and the first two years of the secondary stage, was implemented for two reasons. First, the education department wanted to modify their system to more closely approach that of the United Arab Republic after which it is patterned. Second, they are presently limited as to the number of secondary students which they can efficiently accommodate. The curriculum will logically include a combination of advanced elementary and lower secondary subjects. Emphasis will undoubtedly be placed on providing a more comprehensive preparation for secondary study, and with this in view the better qualified elementary teachers and some of the secondary teachers have been shifted to the intermediate schools. There is every reason to believe that this experiment will be successful and provide a better transition to the secondary level.

Secondary education is the culmination of the Government's educational system. For boys it is divided into four "streams", academic, commercial, teacher-training and technical. The latter will be treated separately. The academic curriculum follows that of the United Arab Republic (UAR) and other Arab schools. Texts are modified to more closely relate to Bahrain.¹ Commercial training began in 1953 and specializes in typing, commercial methods, accounting and principles and economics of commerce, and closely approximates that of the Egyptian school of commerce. Teacher-training was begun in 1955 and is divided into arts and sciences.

¹Winder, p. 298.

A portion of the training is devoted to purely educational subjects. Because of the dire need for teachers in the lower grades, students are encouraged to enter this field by the receipt of a government subsidy¹, and they are engaged to serve for five years. With the beginning of the intermediate grouping the secondary education has been cut to two years, but it is planned to expand it to a third in order to better prepare students for entrance into higher educational institutions. In the past many have been found wanting in relation to students on the same level in other Arab countries.

Girls' secondary education² is generally similar to that of the boys, but greater emphasis is placed on hygiene and domestic affairs, and a new course in home nursing has been added. In the last two years a girl specializes in one of three areas, science and literature, teachers-training for domestic training. The old policy of aiming primarily at supplying homes with cultured mistresses³ still applies, but the need for women teachers in the primary and secondary schools has been recognized and efforts are being made to meet these requirements.

Religious and Technical Schools

In answer to a long-standing Government desire for purely religious training, a religious school for boys was begun in 1960.⁴ The curriculum

¹in 1957 this subsidy was 60 rupees per month, Ibid., p. 300.

²Information gathered from a personal interview with Mrs. Nair, Directress of Girls' Education.

³Winder, p. 302.

⁴This school was actually begun in 1943 under the auspices of the Sunni Waqf Department but it accomplished very little and held no great prestige so it was placed under the Department of Education in 1960. - Bahrain Trade Directory. (5th ed., Manamah, Bahrain: 1963), p. 45.

is patterned after that of al-Azhar in in Egypt, and students are accepted after having completed three primary grades. Its main purpose is to provide young men learned in the bases of religion to teach in the elementary schools, and with further religious education they can serve as qādis for the sharī'a courts and advise the Government on religious affairs. The school has an excellent start and in the current year a new intermediate class was added to accommodate the first graduates from the elementary stage.¹

The boys' technical school is one of the most interesting and potentially beneficial of the Bahraini schools.² Begun in 1936 at the Manāmah and Muharraḡ boys' schools, it taught a two-year course in simple carpentry and mechanics. With the help of the American University of Beirut, three Syrian teachers were hired and twelve boys began training.³ After the first year blacksmithing and metal turning were introduced and a new school was built in Manāmah. The quality of the students improved noticeably after the introduction of a system of selective recruiting in 1941, and by 1942 the school had an enrollment of 61 boys. The main problem encountered in the early years was in student placement, as the people were content with poor quality work at cheap prices and there was little or no demand for master craftsmen.⁴ Nonetheless, the school continued to extend its curriculum. The shop areas were also expanded and by 1950 the

¹This class has 31 students from a total of 120 enrolled.--
Taqrīr 1963, p. 5.

²Most of the information concerning this school was obtained from a personal interview with Mr. Tabara, the headmaster, who very kindly gave me a tour of the facilities.

³Report, p. 31.

⁴Annual 1942, p. 36.

course of study was of four years duration. Finally in 1956 the school was placed under the supervision of the Department of Education.¹

The course of study is divided into two areas, regular secondary subjects and specialized subjects relating to vocational training. Some of the latter include rules of industry, engineering drawing, commercial methods and a new course in labor law to acquaint the students with the benefits and rights granted by the Bahrain Employed Persons Compensation Ordinance and the Bahrain Labour Ordinance of 1957.² Although this curriculum closely approximates those of the regular secondary schools, the time devoted to the various subjects is different. In the liberal arts, students receive only half the number of hours given in the regular secondary course, while in the sciences and related subjects half the time is spent on theory and half on practical work. To make the best use of the facilities, classes are organized so that one half of the students are in class while the others are getting shop work.

Technical training is aimed at specified trades. At present these consist of forging and casting, welding (both oxyacetylene and arc), metal turning, pattern making, carpentry and furniture making, automotive mechanics, general electricity and motor repair, and radio and television repair.³ It is anticipated that two new fields of bricklaying and sanitary

¹The school had formerly been directly under the Adviserate.-- Winder, p. 304.

²Madrasat al-Sinā'a", Hunā al-Bahrain, No. 146 (March, 1964) p. 5. Arabic language magazine put out fortnightly by Radio Bahrain.

³This course, taught by a Pakistani, was a new addition in October 1963. Since there are no repair shops for radios or televisions in Bahrain run by Bahrainis, it was deemed advisable to inaugurate this branch. A graduate of 1961 is presently in England studying in the field, and he will take over the teaching of the course on his return.--Ibid., p. 7.

engineering will soon be added.

Selection for these various trades is made consistent with the desires of the individual student where possible. However, the first year of study is an orientation period in which all students are required to perform basic tasks in all of the trades taught. A file is kept on each pupil both in the class and in the shops to determine in which fields he is most apt. At the termination of this period he is then directed into the area of specialization.

Prior to the 1963-64 academic year a special preparatory class had been taught as many boys had to be taken prior to the completion of their elementary education. Consequently, an elementary school course was given to those selected for training. As of this year, however, there were sufficient graduate elementary school applicants to dispense with this requirement.

In the past technical education was not popular despite excellent opportunities. The boys and their parents regarded such work as derogatory and they preferred to work at "white collar" jobs at lower pay than as a tradesman.¹ As a result a subsidy has been paid to technical students to encourage boys to enter this field.² Recently the trend seems to have changed. In fact the increase in enrollment within the last two years has been extremely high. In 1961 there were only 146 students in the school, while in the current year there are 266. The school headmaster anticipates that by next year applicants may run as high as 200. If this proves to be true, expansion will no doubt have to take place as the present facilities

¹Report, p. 31.

²This subsidy is currently 40, 50, 60, 75 rupees per month per respective grade.--"Madrasat al-Sinā'a", p. 6.

cannot accommodate many more than 300 students.

This sharp upturn in the demand for technical education is probably due to the Government's endeavors to encourage this field of training in anticipation of the country's present and future needs, and to a realization on the part of the boys themselves that technical training not only provides them with a good basic education, but also a skill from which they can derive an immediate livelihood. According to the headmaster he presently has a demand for more boys than he can fill with the current number of graduates.¹

As in the other public schools education is free. The Government provides the student with work clothes, transportation, books and other required materials and medical care. However, the school has set up a program to instill the idea of private enterprise. At the beginning of each year shares in the lunch concession (providing soft-drinks and sandwiches) are sold to the students at one rupee per share. Any student is allowed to buy up to a maximum of four shares. At the end of the year the profits from this concession are divided equally between the school and the shareholders.² In addition to imparting some business sense into the students, this activity provides the opportunity for doing some charity work, for the money which the school derives is used to provide civilian shoes and clothing for the poorer students.³

¹A good indication of the school's popularity is the fact that the more well-to-do families are now sending their boys, something that had not occurred in the past.

²As of last year each shareholder realized a profit of about ten rupees per share.

³This same type of system is used in the girls' secondary school. Coincidentally Mrs. Nair and Mr. Tabara are sister and brother!

Dropouts have averaged about three to five per cent, and, as in the other schools, family problems have been the major cause. The students seem extremely enthusiastic and very proud of their work which is of excellent quality. With the exception of some special alloy components, they have made the majority of their own carpentry tools and the school is constantly being refurbished with products of their own handicraft. A first prize for non-commercial tools and machinery at the 1963 Trade Fair attests to the quality of their products.

To save money the school has tried to make maximum use of local materials. Brass for casting is obtained by melting down the expended cartridge cases from the police firing range, and in order to secure sand for casting, samples were brought from all parts of the island and a mixture was derived which fulfills the requirement. Bapco has also been very generous in providing materials, and one of their safety inspectors checks the shop operations at least once each month. To provide automobiles for the automotive section of the school the teachers are encouraged to have repairs done by the students. They pay only for the materials used.¹

Teachers in the technical school follow the usual pattern with a good percentage being foreign. A concerted effort is being made, however, to gradually replace all foreign teachers with Bahrainis. This year there are five graduates teaching, and as a result of the policy of sending the two top graduates for further study abroad, there are presently nine graduates in England and one in the UAR. Normally after graduate level

¹The headmaster's automobile was being worked on at the time of my visit. This certainly is an indication of his confidence in his students' abilities.

training in England, the student is allowed to work for one year with a firm to gain experience.

Despite the obvious attractions for these graduates to leave teaching and go into business, teacher retention seems to be working out well. This is probably due to agreeable working conditions which provide an opportunity for afternoon and summer private business. One of the graduate teachers operates his own metal working shop after school hours. He has a thriving trade in decorative wrought iron work and is producing a good percentage of the gates and window gratings used locally. It seems only reasonable to assume that others will follow suit in various fields. For this reason the danger does exist that such part-time operations may become sufficiently lucrative to lure teachers away.

This school also provides a service for the community. Local Bahrainis of thirty-five years or less who have the requisite groundwork in academics are encouraged to enroll in the night course run by the school. They are required to pay fifty rupees in advance as a guarantee of a minimum acceptable attendance of 500 work hours in a period of two school years. If they meet this minimum the money is refunded. At the end of the course each student takes an examination, and those who pass receive a certificate of completion of the night vocational training course.¹

Higher Education

Higher education has been an important part of the Bahrain school system since its inception, and the program has been gradually expanded throughout the years. Girls entered the program for the first time in 1955

¹"Madrasat al-Sinā'a", p. 7.

and in the present year there are eight girls studying in the Beirut College for Women and one is pursuing her masters degree in education at the American University. The top ten graduates of the boys secondary school are eligible to go to the American University,¹ the top two from the technical school are sent to the United Kingdom for further vocational training, and nine other scholarships are awarded to boys chosen by the Government. Four of these are from the United Arab Republic and the other five from Iraq. In addition, 23 teachers were given leaves of absence during the past year to pursue further studies in Iraq and Egypt.² Each year sees the return of some of these graduates, and they are contributing immeasurably to the educational system and to the betterment of the society in general.³

Teachers

The procurement of qualified teachers for the Bahrain school system has been a continuing problem. Originally all of them were hired from the Levant and Egypt, and gradually Indians and Pakistanis moved into a few specialized fields though the latter are now almost negligible. Since the early 1940's Egyptians have provided the backbone of the teaching staff. In 1944 the Department of Education appealed to the Egyptian Government to supply necessary instructors, and in spite of a shortage of teachers in

¹These scholarships to AUB are considered the highest possible achievement. Those who are selected are envied, and upon graduating they are highly respected.

²Tagrīr 1963, p. 4.

³1960 was a typical year. Thirteen returned including two doctors, a dentist, an engineer, a pharmacist, a lawyer and seven others with degrees in Arabic and English literature, education and commerce. Two girls returned from BCW and were appointed to the secondary school.-- Annual 1960, pp. 16, 18.

Egypt the requisite number were seconded for work in Bahrain. Their work was valuable in the training field as well as teaching, and they were able to instruct local teachers in new and improved methods.¹ After World War II recruitment again moved back into the Levant and at present there is a good representation of Lebanese, Jordanians and Palestinians.² Living conditions for foreign teachers, formerly an obstacle to procurement, have now been improved and a new hotel for female teachers was opened this past year.³

While foreign teachers provide the basis for staffing the secondary schools, the teachers-training courses are providing the elementary instructors. To date this has proved fairly successful, but many of the graduates, especially in the girls schools, leave much to be desired. Efforts to improve their quality have resulted in the promotion of night classes in methods of teaching, child psychology and normal secondary subjects.⁴ As of 1960 the boys' phase was oversubscribed and some had to be turned away. This has provided an ideal situation as greater selectivity is now possible. Also, the output of teachers has made it possible to start aiding other areas of the Gulf. In October 1961 an educational mission of six Bahraini teachers was sent to Sharja to teach in the schools there.⁵

Before leaving the subject of education something must be said

¹Annual 1945, p. 32. In 1963 a total of fifty new Egyptian teachers were hired.--Tagrīr 1963, pp. 2,6,7.

²Syrians, among the first to be recruited in the early 1930's have continually declined and in 1963 only one was hired for the boys' schools and two for the girls'. Palestinians and Jordanians have increased rapidly, 17 and 18 respectively for boys and 10 and 28 respectively for girls were hired in the current year.--Tagrīr 1963, pp. 2,6,7.

³Ibid., p. 6.

⁴Annual 1958, p. 16.

⁵Annual 1960, p. 14.

concerning the common accusation that foreign teachers, especially Egyptians, have been responsible for imparting political agitation to the students of the Bahrain schools. A closer examination shows that such a theory has no foundation in fact. The majority of the Egyptian teachers who are sent to Bahrain are men of middle age who are products of the Farouk regime, and not the youthful, zealous Nassarites as has often been implied. They have followed a policy of keeping to themselves and usually travel directly to and from work without associating in outside affairs. As foreign teachers their pay is quite high, and they are desirous of making enough money in Bahrain so that they can later return and live a comfortable life in Egypt. Any attempts to participate in or to organize local disturbances would assuredly result in their deportation and a consequent end to their aspirations.¹

Perhaps a more careful analysis would reveal that the awakening of a political consciousness is simply the result of education and an ever increasing familiarization with world affairs. When one adds to this the residual effects of the recent nationalist movement and the inflammatory broadcasts from radio Cairo, Damascus, Algiers or Baghdad, young minds are bound to be influenced. Student demonstrations on varying scales have been a continuous occurrence whenever there has been a significant event in the Arab World.² In no case, other than in 1956 when they were combined

¹AUB graduates who have been in the Bahrain school system both as students and teachers confirmed this information. If anything the Egyptians are extremely pro-*Al Khalifah* and one of them has even taken to wearing Arab dress during the off-school hours. In fact I was told that they go to great lengths within the classrooms to extol the virtues of the present regime, even to the extent of composing laudatory poetry. Many are disliked for this very reason.

²The most recent of these events took place on 17 April 1963 when

with other factors, were these affairs a threat to security or the general peace. For the most part they were simply cases of youthful enthusiasm and energy which, if they had not been provoked, would most probably have dissipated in a few hours time with no harm done. This in fact happened in the 1963 demonstration. On previous occasions the police had aggravated the situation by providing the target for continued and more vehement agitation. Arrests were made providing local "heroes", and zeal that might have otherwise died for want of fuel only burned brighter.

In the opinion of one knowledgable Bahraini, had the demonstrators been treated like the boys they were rather than as grown men, the troubles would have been of little significance. As it occurred, however, the boys seemed to be delighted to have so much attention showered upon them and in true Arab style they felt it only hospitable to do some showering in return in the form of books, rulers, pencils, erasers and chalk. If the latest demonstration was indicative of future police action perhaps they have at last learned the lessons of mob and schoolboy psychology.

about 2000 students demonstrated in favor of President Nasser and the union of Iraq, Syria and Egypt. They carried banners and shouted slogans, but except for a bit of car thumping late in the day, they were orderly. One significant feature did emerge though. It seems that a number of girls participated and that they had their veils audaciously thrown back. --Anon.

CHAPTER V

GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

Administration and Public Services

Bahrain's government is autocratic and the Ruler's word is law. State laws are promulgated by him in the form of decrees which are published in an official gazette. Matters of special importance are also announced by radio. Foreign relations are handled by the British Political Agent who lives on the island. He has established close personal contact with the Ruler, and they meet frequently, both officially and socially. The Political Agent is the representative of the British Political Resident for the Gulf (who is also situated at Bahrain) and his duties are, as the title implies, generally political in nature. His assistant deals with consular affairs and routine work involving much communication with the oil company.¹

From 1926 until 1957 the Bahrain Government employed Sir Charles D. Belgrave, an Englishman, as advisor to the Ruler. Throughout the course of his thirty years of association with Bahrain, Belgrave established a system of government modeled after that of the British with various departments dealing with the many fields of administration. Some of the departments have traditionally been headed by Englishmen employed by the Shaikh, and

¹Hay, R. The Persian Gulf States. (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1959), pp. 92, 31, 25.

most of the others are headed by members of the ruling family.

The three councils which were organized as a result of the nationalist movement in 1953-56 still exist, but their posts are no longer elective. The Health and Education Councils, composed of eight members each, are now fully appointed, three by the Government and five by the Municipal Councils.¹ The Administrative Council, whose duties are to aid in running the affairs of government, is composed of ten members. Seven are from the ruling family and the other three are the Secretary to the Government, the Director of Education and the Registrar of the Bahrain Courts.

Since shortly after the beginning of Belgrave's tenure the revenue of the state has habitually been divided into three parts. One third is paid to the Ruler, one third is budgeted for the expenses of the state, and one third is set aside as a reserve fund composed of British stocks and bonds. The country has no income or land taxes though residence taxes on homes and businesses are levied within the cities.

To aid the main Government, municipalities have been established in the larger towns. The first of these was established in Manāmah in 1919 and today there are five. The initial project for the Manāmah organization was the numbering of houses in order to levy a tax to provide for a labor force to clean and repair the streets. Subsequently these municipalities have taken an active part in improving the living conditions within the urban areas. Malarial breeding areas have been eliminated, sewage and drinking water facilities have been improved to promote health, markets have been renovated and made sanitary, inspections of food establishments

¹Belgrave, J. Welcome to Bahrain. (4th ed., Manāmah, Bahrain: Belgrave, 1960), p. 41.

are conducted and merchants are checked to insure that they are not cheating the public. Welfare and charitable services have been extended to the destitute, free burials are provided for paupers, and during the month of Ramadhan meat is sold at cost to the poor. Cemeteries, public parks, sports areas, libraries and public baths have all been provided, often with the financial aid of the Government.¹

Through its various departments the Government has also undertaken public works projects. The cities have main water supplies and fresh water is being provided for the majority of the good-sized villages. Electricity, considerably boosted since the use of gas turbines powered from the gas wells of the Awali oil field, has now reached most areas. Education and medical care are free. +

The most recent and perhaps most farsighted development project is the construction of an entirely new town to accommodate some 15,000 people. Known as 'Īsa Town it is located about four miles from Manāmah on the Awali road. The land was donated by the Ruler and work was begun in December 1963. It is planned that the town will consist of about 2500 dwellings which will be offered for monthly rental to families of limited income. The rental is expected to pay the capital cost over fifteen years, when ownership will pass to the occupant. The estimated cost of each house will be about \$4000 and they will consist of two or three large ground floor rooms, a kitchen with sink and running water, and a shower room. Space for an additional room is provided and there will be a small walled compound and a garage. Public buildings, to be provided free by

¹Report, p. 45. Many of these facilities are found only in the main cities of Manamah and Muharraq.

the Government, will include a civic center, market place, a traffic-free shopping center, clinics, four schools (two for boys and two for girls), mosques, a swimming pool and a sports arena. Lots have also been allocated for private development and to provide flats on a rental basis to workers (ownership is restricted to Bahrainis). Total cost of the project is estimated at 16.8 million dollars.¹

Public Health²

Public health and medicine are two fields where great strides have been made. The Department of Public Health is mainly concerned with preventive medicine. It performs free vaccinations against the contagious diseases, fights flies and mosquitoes by spraying breeding areas, and supervises quarantine rules and regulations. Publicity on health is made a part of everyday life by means of the press, the radio and the schools. Municipalities are aided in removing refuse, disposing of the bodies of dead animals, and keeping watch on the maintenance of septic tanks.

A child welfare service is also provided, and since 1958 visits have been made to the homes of new mothers. These welfare teams give post-natal care, free milk and nourishing foods. About 7000 families are visited a year and 30,000 children are taken to clinics for treatment. One important phase of this work is carried out in the schools where clinics have been established by the Department of Education. Physicians have checked for eye

¹Economist Intelligence Units, Ltd., Quarterly Review. Middle East Oil and the Arabian Peninsula. (London: Spencer House) Issue No. 15, September 1963. Hereafter cited as EIU. For details see the special issue of Huna al-Bahrain, 20 July 1963.

²Most of this information was derived from the Bahrain Trade Directory. pp. 105-108.

disease and performed pathological and radiological examinations.¹ Each student has a medical record which is kept current throughout his school life. These records form an excellent medical history for future use.

At present Bahrain can boast of having ten hospitals and 24 clinics. These include a tuberculosis hospital, isolation hospitals for both men and women, a mental hospital², and a child and maternity hospital which provides gynaecological and lying-in services as well as professional pediatric care. The tuberculosis hospital patients are provided training in vocational courses during their convalescence so that they will have a means of support when released. Twenty per cent of these patients come from surrounding Arab countries.

Some idea of the extent of these services can be gathered from statistics. In 1963 the medical and health services spent 19,333,000 rupees, which was probably close to 25 per cent of the annual budget. In 1957 a total of 385,000 out-patients were treated, yet for 1961 and 1962 this total averaged over 825,000. This tremendous expansion in medical services has resulted in a pressing need for more doctors and nurses. A modified course for nurses training is run and Bahraini doctors are training abroad, but it will be many years before the staff can hope to catch up with the increasing number of patients.

¹Annual 1959, p. 11. Mrs. Nair, Directress of Girls Education, told the writer that the first time a doctor tried to examine the girls they all ran away. Now they have no inhibitions and doctors and nurses are held in high esteem.

²There is medical care but no resident psychiatrist.

Labor¹

The labor movement in Bahrain caught the Government inadequately prepared and in July 1955 a Department of Labor was established.² Initially it acted merely as an employment agency registering and placing Bahrainis in jobs, but in 1957 this service was extended to include foreign nationals as well. The same year saw the appointment of a Commissioner of Labor to supervise the department's activities. Since the passage of the Workers' Compensation Ordinance in 1957 this department handles all labor problems, investigating each complaint and trying to bring both parties to a mutually acceptable solution. In cases of death it receives the compensation due and sees that it is distributed to the heirs and dependents of the deceased.

In carrying out its task of placing registered, unemployed workers, the Department noted as early as 1957 that there was a deplorable lack of skilled labor,³ and as late as 1961 not one skilled laborer was registered.⁴ While this does not mean that there are no skilled laborers on the island, it is indicative of the lack of improvement in this field, one that is liable to frustrate attempts at economic development in fields other than oil. Even the semi-skilled workers may be improperly categorized, for in Bahrain "there is no clear-cut distinction between one category of laborer (semi-skilled) and the other (unskilled). The same laborer claims to be a painter, carpenter or pipe-fitter. He might have been doing all these

¹The main source for this discussion was Beling's article "Recent Developments in Labor Relations in Bahrayn."

²Prior to this, one of the ruling family used to arbitrate disputes between Bapco and its employees.--Ibid., p. 168.

³Annual 1957, p. 32.

⁴Annual 1961, p. 26.

jobs with various employers and therefore acquired some little skill in each occupation."¹ Nonetheless, as the following table indicates, the Department has done a fairly good job in finding employment for both local and foreign workers.

TABLE 2
PLACEMENT OF UNEMPLOYED
BAHRAINIS AND FOREIGN NATIONALS

Year	Bahrainis		Non-Bahrainis	
	Registered--Placed	Registered--Placed	Registered--Placed	Registered--Placed
1956	1448	1189	no registration	
1957	2843	1034	828	241
1958	1866	1247	993	421
1959	1122	977	639	324
1960	936	428	686	108
1961	1053	803	1088	100

Apparently the Government policy of giving job priorities to Bahrainis has been working out well. Since 1957 two thirds of those Bahrainis seeking work have been employed as opposed to one third of the foreigners. It should be mentioned that the Bahrain Petroleum Company has helped in this area by making it a point to secure its workers through the Department of Labor thus lending it prestige in the eyes of the labor force.²

Despite the fact that the labor movement was closely associated with the nationalist movement, it was not suppressed. Probably as a result of British encouragement, the Government granted labor several important concessions. These included the right to strike and the freedom to organize. Then in January, 1958 the Bahrain Labour Ordinance was put into effect which was extremely liberal despite certain revisions by the Ruler.³ Labor unions

¹Annual 1957, p. 28.

²Ibid., p. 31.

³These changes were primarily in labor organization.

are authorized but well controlled, and since 1956 none of the labor leaders had been willing to step forward and start a union.

Besides the present lack of nationalistic impetus other factors hinder the formation of trade unions. The 1956 employment census showed that of 687 establishments in Bahrain, 93 per cent employed less than five persons¹ and it can be reasonably assumed that many of these were relatives of the owners. Such fragmentation does not lend itself toward collective bargaining. The oil company, the single largest employer, has tended to hire foreigners for tasks above the level of unskilled labor. This has resulted in large wage gaps between the unskilled workers and those above them. Therefore, instead of providing the leadership in labor actions as is common for skilled workers in industrial societies, these foreigners tend to identify themselves with management rather than with the workers.² The possibility of small unions gathering together to form a large, influential federation is no longer possible as the Ruler deleted the authorizing portion of the draft ordinance. Affiliation with an international labor organization might supply the spark needed to start local organizing, but such affiliations are still frowned upon. It seems safe to assume that any re-emergence of the labor movement will have to be closely tied to politics and a resurgence of Arab nationalism. Assuming this does happen, the country now has the legal framework needed to cope with future labor problems.³

¹Porter, p. 42. In this connection, almost half of the employed population is working for seven firms. As a number of construction firms were working for Bapco, it is estimated that the oil company either directly or indirectly employs forty per cent of the population.--Beling, "Recent Developments...", p. 160.

²Baer, G. "Labor in the Arab East," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. XI, No. 6 & 7 (June-July, 1960), p. 182.

³Beling, p. 169.

In conclusion, it is interesting to note the similarities and differences between the labor situation in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, or more specifically at Bapco and the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). Surprisingly enough there were industrial compensation provisions enacted in Saudi Arabia as early as 1937, and ten years later the Labor and Workman Regulations were promulgated.¹ Despite these forward steps Aramco had its problems in the early 1950's, and a group of Saudi employees set up the "Committee Representing Saudi Workmen" which organized a major strike in October 1953.² It was the repercussions from this labor agitation in Saudi Arabia which awakened the labor movement in Bahrain.

Early in 1956 both Bapco and Aramco took steps to form workers committees, but by April these had collapsed in both companies due to lack of worker participation.³ The continued problems in Saudi Arabia finally led to the issuance of the Royal Anti-Strike Decree of June 11th, 1956,⁴ and since that time labor organizations have been banned. As stated previously, the opposite was true in Bahrain where the suppression of the nationalist movement did not lead to a total suppression of labor, but rather to the granting of the concessions noted above. Consequently the labor position in Bahrain vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia is now reversed from the position of 1947, and Saudis look at the concessions granted to the Bahrainis with a degree of envy.

¹Beling, Pan-Arabism and Labor, p. 68. These industrial compensation provisions of 1937 may have had an influence in shaping some of the demands of the Bahraini strikers during the troubles of 1938. (See above pp. 10-11.)

²Ibid., "Recent Developments in Labor Relations in Bahrayn," p. 160.

³Ibid., pp. 165-66.

⁴Ibid., p. 160.

The Courts¹

The oldest courts in Bahrain are the sharī'a courts, the majlis tijāra, and the Joint Court. As in the case of all Muslim states the religious or sharī'a courts were the oldest, and in consonance with the two predominant Muslim sects on the island these consisted of one for Sunnis and another for Shi'as. The second oldest judicial institution was the majlis tijāra. It consisted of two separate courts, the majlis al-urfi, composed of two or three local merchants who dealt with commercial cases, and the salafieh al-ghous, or diving court. When the British Political Agency was established at Bahrain, a Joint Court was set up to hear cases involving Westerners and Bahraini subjects. It was presided over by the Political Agent and the Ruler or his representative.

By the early 1920's it became obvious that the religious and commercial courts were no longer suitable for the conditions which prevailed. The sharī'a courts were extremely slow and a decision on a simple case was often pending for a year before judgment was delivered. It was not uncommon to find between two and three hundred cases pending at any given time, and decisions often suffered from personal conflicts of various interest groups, with the people playing the qādis against one another in order to further someone's interests. As for the diving court, it was "a notorious institution consisting of one or two old pearl merchants whose judgments were inevitably in favour of the merchants and nakhudas (pearl boat captains) and against the divers."²

¹For the background and present structure of the judicial system in Bahrain I am mainly indebted to the Administrative Report for the Years 1926-1937, and to an interview with a Bahraini lawyer.

²Report, p. 20.

After Belgrave's arrival in 1926 the Bahrain Court was established to judge cases between Bahraini subjects.¹ This court presided over cases involving crime, civil complaints, diving disputes, land claims, and fish-trap rights. Death sentences were submitted to the Ruler for confirmation and in civil cases the claims of divorce and inheritance were in most instances passed along to the sharī'a courts.² It soon became obvious that the Bahrain Court was inadequate to cope with all the cases that were brought before it, and in order to lighten its load the Bahrain Small Court was instituted in 1927. This latter tribunal was originally designed to deal with civil cases in which the amount of money involved was 100 rupees or less, but in 1935 it was authorized to hear cases of 400 rupees, and to try minor criminal offenses other than those involving diving.

These courts remain substantially unchanged today. The Bahrain High Court deals with all matters of criminal law plus civil cases involving finances of over 5000 rupees. The lesser courts, of which there are now five, handle general civil matters and financial cases of less than 5000 rupees. For criminal cases three judges are used, and all criminal sentences can be appealed to the Appeal Court, composed of the Secretary to the Government and two members of the ruling family one of which is the Minister of Finance. In civil cases the appeals are heard by the Minister of Justice, also a member of the ruling family. In the past all of the judges have been of the Āl Khalīfah, but recently three Jordanians have been hired. Also two of the ruling family are now in Egypt

¹Belgrave was one of the original judges on this court.

²Report, pp. 18-19.

studying law, whereas in the past few if any of them had been so trained. No tijāra court operates today, but there is a council of merchants who are used to advise the court on commercial and diving cases. There is no such thing as a suit against the ruling family. Such cases are taken to the Ruler directly.

Little has been done to correct what one lawyer has termed a mystifying conglomeration of laws and customs. Doctor Sanhuri, the Egyptian specialist called upon during the HEC's drive for reform, never really began work, and except for the criminal code which the British legal adviser drew up and the labor laws of 1957, no changes have been made. Civil law is still based on laws and decrees from the Ruler (which have not been codified), on custom and on the precedents set by earlier decisions.

It should become obvious to the observer that the legal system is controlled by the ruling family, from which come the judges for the regular courts as well as the majority of those for the appeal courts. This, combined with control of the police who are the only indigenous security force on the island, insures the absolute power of the Ruler. At the same time, however, it gives this power a legal and unoffensive air in the eyes of possible critics.

The judicial system in Bahrain appears quite equitable, and barring special interest by influential parties a case is undoubtedly wholly straightforward. But as indicated in the case of the five CNU members, this justice is not only capable of being manipulated, it has in fact been manipulated to serve the interests of the state when the occasion demanded. The fact that this perversion of justice was participated in by the Ruler's adviser, and, by the absence of any complaints or pressure apparently condoned by

the British Political Agent and Resident, makes it all the more reprehensible. Were this the extent of such machinations one could possibly attribute it to a one-time lapse of good judgment on the part of the Government and the British, but subsequent events seem to indicate that this may not have been an isolated occurrence.

In a recent publication by an Indian lawyer who was a former resident barrister in Bahrain, both the Government and the British are condemned for manipulation of justice.¹ The author charges that there has been considerable collusion between the judiciary and the police to insure the conviction and subsequent deportation of those persons whose removal would be "beneficial" to the authorities. This has been described by the author as follows:

The methods of the Bahrain State Police are notorious in Bahrain and the state of an accused person in Bahrain, unless he runs his own private detective agency, is far from comfortable. The Bahrain State Police has a system of incrimination which approximates very nearly to the system of the Socialist Police States. The accused is first of all sized down in the estimation of the public by a tide of rumors of crimes of all sorts thereby estranging him from friend and stranger alike. The next stage is the systematic subordination and procurement of as many witnesses as possible as prosecution witnesses who will not only purjure but also discredit in advance all possible defense witnesses. Thus isolated and unable to produce any witnesses to substantiate the defense case, the Bahrain State Police then confronts the accused with a barrage of purjuring witnesses. Under odds so heavily weighted against him the accused seldom escapes conviction.²

He continues by saying that the police are able to secure purjuring witnesses by virtue of their control over the issue of exit and entry visas within the island. This is particularly true in the case of

¹Abraham, K. V. British Justice in Bahrain. Kerala, India: Kongalathu House, 1963.

²Ibid., p. 58.

businessmen, most of whom have large financial involvements in the island, though even "an ordinary person who has a good well-paid employment in Bahrain can ill afford to displease the Bahrain State Police."¹

After discovering and commenting on certain irregularities by the Resident and the Police in the case of one of his clients, the author became a source of embarrassment and was forced to leave the island by the implementation of these very tactics.

One can easily dismiss this recent book as the work of one disgruntled foreign national with an axe to grind, though documentation tends to refute such an interpretation. Similarly it can be said that, as an independent state under absolute rule, the Government can run affairs as it sees fit. No one can argue with this defense. However, the alleged, if not quite obvious, involvement of representatives of Her Majesty's Government creates a situation that is, to say the least, deplorable. Nor is it a situation unknown to the ordinary Bahraini. He sees another nation controlling the foreign affairs of his country (and obviously capable of influencing its internal affairs) which is reputedly dedicated to the concepts of freedom and justice, and yet that very same nation seems to condone the perversion of this justice and the subversion of the institutions and ideals for which it stands and purportedly seeks to promote. This is indeed a sad selling point for Western democracy.

¹Ibid., p. 80.

CHAPTER VI

THE ECONOMY

Until 1932 Bahrain's economy was based on pearling, agriculture, and transit trade. Fortunately, at a time when the pearl trade was hard hit by the depression and competition from cultured pearls, oil came along to take its place, and except for a few lean years the country hardly felt the effects of the pearl industry's decline. Agriculture has consistently played a moderate role in the economy, though Bahrain has been and will likely remain dependent upon imported food. From ancient times the island has been a commercial and distributing center for the goods of India, Pakistan, Mesopotamia and Arabia, and even today this facet of the economy is an important one. Lesser industries include pottery, fishing, boatbuilding, some mining of lime and gypsum, weaving and soft drinks, but none of them is in itself significant in the overall economy and several (pottery, boatbuilding, weaving) have been declining in recent years. For this reason only four areas of the economy will be discussed--oil, transit trade, agriculture and pearling.¹ While the latter is no longer of great importance financially, it has a special place in the history of the islands and warrants discussion from this aspect alone.

¹For the lesser industries see Belgrave, J., pp. 66-72.

Transit Trade

Bahrain's general lack of industry has required it to rely on imports for the great volume of modern manufactured products. Its close ties with Britain have led quite naturally to a dependence upon English goods for supplying the bulk of its needs, and until recently this included many items from India as well. During the past six years Britain has supplied between 25 and 27 per cent of all Bahrain's imports, while the United States has become the second greatest supplier followed in turn by India and Japan.¹ Its position as an entrepot for the Arabian coast has resulted in the re-export of over one third of all imports. Consequently transit trade and customs dues have formed an important part of the Bahrain economy, and until the increase in oil royalties in 1950 they provided the largest source of income for the state.

Customs receipts have been increasing steadily as a result of an increasing population and a rising standard of living. For 1961, customs receipts amounted to 16,864,005 rupees or just over three and a half million dollars, and they accounted for about 23-1/2 per cent of the budget.² All general merchandise is subject to a 5 per cent ad valorem tariff. Luxury items are taxed 10 per cent and tobacco and alcohol 15 per cent.³ The following chart shows the value in millions of sterling pounds of the imports and re-exports from 1957 through 1962:⁴

¹EIU, Annual Supplement, September, 1963, p. 30.

²Annual 1961, p. 7. For a list of the principle items imported see Ibid., p. 8.

³EIU, Annual Supplement, September 1963, p. 30.

⁴Ibid. (For converting sterling pounds to dollars or rupees multiply by 2.8 and 13.3 respectively.)

TABLE 3

BAHRAINI IMPORTS AND RE-EXPORTS

Year	Imports	Re-exports	To Saudi Arabia	Re-ex. as % of imports
1957	17.32	6.16	3.58	35.8
1958	18.49	6.80	4.34	36.8
1959	19.57	8.14	4.57	41.6
1960	21.78	7.94	4.15	36.5
1961	22.46	8.02	4.11	35.7
1962	23.39	8.24	3.74	35.2

As can be seen from this chart, re-exports have consistently been falling in relation to total imports. This has been mainly due to the sharp decrease in trade with Saudi Arabia. Since 1958 the proportion of Saudi Arabian re-exports has fallen from 64 per cent to 45.5 per cent in 1962, and for the first eight months of 1963 this showed a further decline to 42 per cent.¹ This drop has been due to three factors--the devaluation of the Saudi Riyal in 1957 which reduced the purchasing power of the currency, a high head tax placed on persons leaving Saudi Arabia to shop in Bahrain so as to protect the Saudi merchants, and the construction of the deep-water pier at Dammam. Prior to the construction of this pier "most of the cotton goods, foodstuffs, lumber, hardware and other products destined for eastern Arabia... (were) unloaded at Bahrein and repacked for shipment to the coast by small dhow."² Now Bahrain is being by-passed by much of this trade.

To promote the entreport trade Bahrain became a free transit area in 1958, and in 1957 work was begun on a new deep-water jetty in the

¹ EIU, No. 16, January 1964, p. 18.

² Sanger, R. A. The Arabian Peninsula. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 147.

vicinity of the naval base at Jufair.¹ This pier, which became operational in May 1962, has a 6-berth jetty capable of handling ocean-going ships, thereby dispensing with the costly and time-consuming method of offloading by lighter. Storage facilities have also been improved with warehouse and open stacking space increased, and fork-lift trucks employed to speed operations. This activity indicates that the Bahraini authorities are well aware of the importance of trade in the economy of the country and that constant improvement will be necessary in the face of growing competition.

Agriculture

Bahrain has always been noted for its fertility, and no doubt agriculture played a more important role in the past than it does today. The captain of Alexander the Great's fleet described the island as "well wooded and productive" and Idrisi in the twelfth century mentioned that the island was well populated and that the fertile environs produced "corn and dates in abundance."² One historian relates that there were once "800 different species of dates", and most of the common fruits were to be found.³ Even as late as 1861 the area in the vicinity of Sūg al-Khamīs was referred to as "rich date plantations and gardens",⁴ though this description hardly fits the region today.

With the possible exception of dates, lucerne (a form of alfalfa)

¹Annual 1957, pp. 5, 65. Transit goods are levied a holding charge of 32 rupees per ton but are exempt from customs for a period of 21 days if on a through bill of lading. For charges and port fees see Bahrain Trade Directory, pp. 81-91.

²Belgrave, J., p. 69.

³al-Nabhāni, p. 5

⁴Whish, R. W. "Memoir on Bahreyn," Transaction of the Bombay Geographical Society, 1860-1862, Vol. 16.

and vegetables, agriculture in Bahrain, at least within this century, has not been significant.¹ The Bahrain dates are not of the quality of those of al-Hasa, and even in good years it has always been necessary to import them from surrounding areas. The area under date cultivation is perhaps one fifth of the island, and there has been little effort to increase this acreage. Prior to the oil era and the introduction of a more varied diet, dates were the most important crop, and they formed the staple food of the local population.² Since the early 1930's, however, a series of conditions have combined to reduce the crop's importance. Date prices decreased; the cost of labor increased; the oil company provided better wages; and unsatisfactory tenure conditions resulted in little attention to the date palms. More than half the date gardens belong to the ruling family and they spend little or no money on their improvement. Cultivation has been casual with little fertilization and there appears to be no system of replanting when a tree dies. Even to the casual observer it is obvious that little is being done to prevent the rapid decline in the date groves, a condition which has resulted in a crop decrease of fifty to sixty pounds per tree.³

Lucerne is grown quite extensively, and, along with the inferior types of dates, it is used as fodder for cows and donkeys. It has the desirable characteristic of growing rapidly even in poor soil. An extremely hearty plant, it will often grow for as long as ten years when once rooted, and it provides a crop a month.⁴ Unfortunately it is vulnerable to attacks from the cotton worm and on occasion whole districts have been adversely

¹Report, p. 35.

²Annual 1958, p. 2.

³Ibid.

⁴Report, p. 36.

affected.¹

Throughout the years attempts have been made at growing various fruits, cereals and other money crops but they have been generally unsuccessful. Fruit trees of all varieties have been cultivated but yields have been unimpressive. Trees are not properly cared for and they are seldom pruned.² Only citrus and almonds survive in any quantity and even those are nearly all dying out. Figs were once extensively grown, but they were attacked by disease and now only a few trees remain. An experiment in 1930 showed that cotton could be grown, but quantities could not be produced to compete on the world market. Attempts have been made again with a seed from Aden and while preliminary results seemed hopeful³ nothing has been mentioned recently concerning its large-scale cultivation.

The high influx of foreigners to Bahrain has made garden vegetables an attractive commercial undertaking, and from 1952-59 the number of gardens increased from 150 to 576.⁴ Almost all of the common vegetables can be grown successfully under irrigation, but even in this area problems have been incurred. The local market is limited in scope and the large consumers and a group of contractors virtually control it. They have done two things which have had a seriously depressing effect on the local farmers. In 1957 they contended that the high incidence of amoebic dysentery was attributable to the use of human manure by many of the conservative farmers. Consequently, they immediately began importing large quantities of vegetables from Lebanon causing the sales of local produce to deteriorate rapidly.⁵ The situation failed to improve in 1958 and local growers were

¹Annual 1942, p. 38.

²Report, p. 36.

³Annual 1957, p. 3.

⁴Annual 1959, p. 2.

⁵Annual 1957, p. 3.

once more forced to accept uneconomical prices. This poor state of affairs was also evident in the sharp decrease in the amount of land under vegetable cultivation.¹ In 1959 amoebic control measures were instituted which helped to reduce the use of human waste and by 1960 farmers seemed to be taking a greater interest in the hygienic aspect of gardening.² As of 1963 the number of gardens had increased to over 600 and a resurgence seems to be occurring as sales of local produce have increased and farmers have received more favorable prices.³

Two other new areas of interest seem to be gaining popularity with the farmers. In 1956 European poultry was introduced for the first time and did very well under local conditions.⁴ Subsequently Black Leghorns and Plymouth Rocks were tried and the results were so encouraging that ducks and geese were introduced in 1958.⁵ The demand for poultry has been so great that the Budeya Experimental Farm has been unable to supply all the farmers' needs. This new boom has not been without its problems, however, and in 1960 fowlpest was prevalent indicating that regulations for poultry farming may be required to control this highly contagious disease.⁶

The other area of interest has been in stock breeding. A pedigree Red Sindi herd was slowly built up at the Budeya farm and farmers began to take more of an interest in their animals. The position was excellent until 1960 when an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease occurred. Although it was

¹Annual 1958, p. 2.

²Annual 1960, p. 2.

³Bahrain Trade Directory, p. 121.

⁴Annual 1957, p. 4.

⁵Annual 1958, p. 3.

⁶Annual 1960, p. 2.

controlled it was closely followed by rinderpest in 1961. With no quarantine restrictions on the import of livestock, it is doubtful whether local farmers will want to increase their stock while the risk of infection is so great.¹

Bahrain's low rainfall makes agriculture totally dependent on irrigation. In the late 1920's many artesian wells were drilled which allowed for an increase in the area under cultivation, but this has proven to be a mixed blessing. With the drilling of more wells the static head of water dropped causing some of the wells in the south of the island to dry up.² Since 1956 there has been a drop in the static head in excess of four inches per year. In 1958 the seriousness of this situation "was made abundantly clear to the Agricultural and Water Committees (but) no active measures were undertaken to alleviate the position. Numerous new wells were bored and no rehabilitation work was carried out in connection with the defective wells."³ One writer has stated that this condition was "being met by the Water Committee,"⁴ but as late as the end of 1961 the position was described as "deteriorating rapidly."⁵ This presents a problem that the Government will have to remedy quite soon. Some corrective measures such as water conservation and control of present over-irrigation will help considerably, and the off-shore sea springs are a source as yet untapped. With a rising population and more demands on the water supplies due to modernization, the Bahrain authorities must be made to understand that water is not the dispensable resource that it was a few decades ago.

¹Annual 1961, p. 2.

²Belgrave, J., p. 69.

³Annual 1958, p.2.

⁴Belgrave, J., p. 69.

⁵Annual 1961, p. 2.

Other problems plague Bahrain's agriculture. Insect pests have long been a menace to crops, but their incidence has risen sharply in the past few years mainly due to the lack of regulations governing the importation of agricultural produce from other areas. The Indian almond and the mango crops have been particularly hard hit by the fruit fly, and although efforts have been made to control this increase in crop damage, lack of adequate funds has prevented an effective campaign.¹

Mechanization is yet another area where adequate financial support has been lacking. As late as 1957 only one tractor was available for use on the whole island.² By 1961 there were only four and the Agriculture Department was still unable to meet the demands of the farmers in this field.

Agriculture in Bahrain suffers from the same inequities that have plagued the Middle East for centuries. Most of the good agricultural land is owned by the ruling family or the monied class who are relatively indifferent to it except for the money that can be derived from the tenants. The tenant has no incentive to improve the property as he is in the precarious position of being subject to eviction at any time. If he works industriously to create a profitable farm much of the money from his efforts goes into the owner's pocket. What is more, another person who is willing to pay the owner a higher percentage of the profits for the privilege of securing land that has already been improved and made financially lucrative may acquire the tenancy at the expense of his predecessor's labor. Little wonder then that farmers refuse to concentrate on land improvement or long-term crops. Instead they grow seasonal produce from which they do not stand

¹Annual 1961, p. 3.

²Annual 1957, p. 4.

to lose a great deal in the event they are indiscriminately evicted or their tenure is terminated. According to the Department of Agriculture the short tenure system employed in Bahrain is gradually reducing the potential of the land,¹ and as stated earlier, this is clearly evident in the condition of the date gardens.

In relation to other areas of the economy and general development, agriculture seems to hold the position of the "poor relation". This general feeling is implied in all of the annual reports of the Department of Agriculture. Whether this situation is a result of the fact that the farmers are Shi'as and had for many years held the position of "milch cows" in the eyes of the ruling family is unknown. Perhaps it is merely a matter of oversight or one of priorities. The experimental farm at Budeya is certainly a model of what can be accomplished, but as one writer has so candidly stated, "if there is no real drive for reform, experts can produce expensive little demonstration projects, but they will not be able to achieve any general and genuine improvement in the position of the cultivators."² This concerted drive for agricultural reform is what is needed in Bahrain if this sector of the economy is to become a viable part of the whole.

The Pearl Trade

Historical sources indicate that pearl diving is one of the oldest industries in Bahrain, and until the advent of oil it was undoubtedly the most important. References to Bahrain's pearls are believed to date from as early as 2000 B.C., and from descriptions of the methods of diving given

¹Annual 1961, p. 2.

²Warriner, D. Land Reform and Development in the Middle East. (2nd ed., London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 9.

by Abu Zaid Hassan in the tenth century, it can be seen that the methods of operation have changed very little over the years.¹ The value of the pearls sold in Bahrain has certainly been a factor in attracting the invaders who have checkered its history, and to this day the chief pearl market of the Persian Gulf is at Manāmah.²

Pearl diving is pursued in all areas where there is a solid, level bottom devoid of rugged rocks. The season is normally from early June until early October, but the exact dates are issued by government proclamation.³ The average depth of the pearl banks is eight fathoms with the extreme being about fourteen. Supposedly there are over two hundred well-known banks in the Gulf.⁴

Several factors have contributed to make the area around Bahrain suitable for pearling since the days of antiquity. The shallow water and intense summer heat combine to make the water warm, a condition that is apparently to the pearl oyster's liking. It is this high water temperature which also makes it possible for the divers to stay in the water for extended periods of time. The importance of this fact is evidenced by the immediate cessation of diving as soon as the water temperature begins to drop. To these factors is added the proximity of India which provided a large, wealthy market.⁵

The diver's work rig is a rather simple one. Usually he wears a loin cloth, puts a bone or tortoise-shell clip on his nose, places leather

¹Belgrave, J., p. 61.

²The Persian Gulf Pilot, p. 6.

³In 1963 the season was from 3 June to 8 October.--Bahrain Trade Directory, p. 115.

⁴The Persian Gulf Pilot, p. 6.

⁵Villiers, p. 373.

guards on his fingers, and hangs the oyster bag around his neck. The descent is made by use of a rope with a stone attached. The diver places his foot on the stone and at his signal an assistant, or puller, releases the weight which carries him to the bottom. He then proceeds to fill his net with oysters, the usual amount gathered averaging about ten per descent. When the diver runs out of breath he jerks on a second rope and signals the puller to bring him up. Upon reaching the surface the diver rests while the puller empties the net. Rest periods vary with water temperature.

The time a diver spends under water has been exaggerated a great deal. Some sources say two minutes,¹ others a minute and a half,² but, considering the depth and the activity involved, the estimation of not more than a minute and a half and usually less than one minute seems to be more reasonable.³

After the day's diving is over everyone beds down for the night and the next morning the shells are opened and the pearls extracted. They are collected by the ship's captain or nakhuda, and after tying them in a piece of red cloth he stores them in a large chest. When the empty shells have been discarded the ship is washed down and the day's diving commences.⁴

To the casual observer this seems like a romantic type of life, and today there may be an element of truth in such an observation. However, in the not too distant past romance was scarcely the adjective to describe the conditions which prevailed, as can be seen by the following description of the diving industry in 1924:

¹London Times, 25 May 1920.

²Belgrave, J., p. 63.

³The Persian Gulf Pilot, p. 6.

⁴Belgrave, J., p. 63.

Bahrein is a city of bondage and oppression. The way the people are ground down is pitiful. It is not the heel of any political ruler that does it, however. Pearl diving is the only industry of the place, and theoretically the system under which the men work is a good one...but actual conditions are past describing. Nine out of ten of the divers live and die hopelessly in their Nochatha's (captain's) debt. These debts are to a certain degree based on real loans, but the Nochatha resorts to false entries, crooked bookkeeping and all sorts of trickery and fraud to get the divers into his debt, and to keep him from getting out. A man in debt may not change his employer, nor may he leave town except under bonds to return. The general poverty is pitiful. A successful season helps only a little. The Nochatha sells the pearls, and whatever be the results he reports. It is a rare thing for anybody to 'escape from the account book' as the Arab says. The courts are in the hands of the Nochathas. The divers cannot read or write, and have no way of proving the falsity of entries against them. In debt they are, and in debt they stay, for the whole of their lives.¹

Nor was this the worst of it, for a diver's debts were transferred to his sons who became liable for their payment. By the time the sons had reached diving age the nakhudas saw to it that accumulated interest raised the debt to a large figure from which the son had little chance of escaping unless he was lucky enough to be on a ship that came up with a really big pearl. While the divers were young they were happy to dive as almost no other occupation existed, but it was for the old that the system became like slavery, for though they desired to quit, they found themselves financially obligated to continue.²

In 1923, on the suggestion of and with the support of Major Daly, the Political Agent in Bahrain, Shaikh Hamad waged a campaign of reform. He reduced the interest on advance payments to divers, limited the amount of these advances and instituted a simple system of diving accounts. Every

¹Harrison, P. W. "Economic and Social Conditions in East Arabia," The Moslem World, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (April, 1924), p. 167.

²Report, p. 48.

diver was required to have a book showing his debt to the boat captain, and a staff of government inspectors were employed to check the accounts each season. Inaccuracies or abuses received swift and severe punishment at the hands of the courts. During the sale of the pearls a representative group from among the crew were required to act as witnesses to insure that they received their proper share of the profits. After these changes were instituted a diver's debt was buried with him and his children did not become liable for them.¹

These changes were not made without some stiff opposition from the merchants and captains who had vested interests in the old system, and for several years there were troubles at the beginning of the diving season. However, the Shaikh enjoyed the support of the influential religious leaders and the new regulations were finally accepted. By 1934 diving rules and the system of accounts were made part of the curriculum of the Government schools and the divers learned to protect their own interests.²

Although the pearl banks have always been open to all the Arabs of the littoral and there have been no tribal limits, the outer boundaries are known and intrusion by outsiders is resented.³ Similarly, "there is a homicidal prejudice against the introduction of new methods,"⁴ and mechanical apparatus of any type is forbidden. Anyone caught using drags, dredges, or compressed air diving suits is subject to a 30,000 rupee fine.⁵

¹London Times, 6 August 1934.

²Ibid.

³The Persian Gulf Pilot, p. 6.

⁴Villiers, p. 374.

⁵Bowen, R. L. Jr. "The Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf," The Middle East Journal, Vol. V, No. 2 (Spring, 1951), p. 171. Customs officials at Bahrain were initially suspicious of oil company divers who spent much time underwater examining the piers and pipelines. They used to watch them with binoculars to insure that no oysters were brought up.--

The pearls are sold to a tawwash who in turn sells them to the big merchants who come annually from Europe, Persia, Saudi Arabia and India, but, regardless of where the pearls are sold, the majority eventually find their way to Bombay and then to Paris, "the world's pearl emporium."¹ The Indian market is so influential that the price of pearls in Bahrain is entirely dependent upon the demand in Bombay.² The price of a pearl is determined by its color, size, shape and texture, and a matching set of larger than average pearls will bring four times the price of one. It has been variously reported that one outstanding pearl was sold for \$120,000 or \$75,000.³

In the early 1930's the pearl industry was adversely affected by the American and European depressions and by the increased production of Japanese cultured pearls. Cultured pearls were first introduced about the time of World War I, but it was not until the late 20's and early 30's that they began to flood the market. At first the cultured pearl quite favorably competed with the Gulf pearl selling at about one third of the price, but now the cultured pearl sells for less than one thirtieth of the others.⁴ The cultured pearl has also debased the market, for despite the fact that

Ibid. Likewise, in 1925 one pearl merchant hired a motor launch and visited the pearl fleet where he purchased the pearls at a very low price because his competitors were not present. This action aroused a storm of protest and the Government forbade the use of launches for the remainder of the season. The following year, however, launches became the accepted thing and they are used for provisioning and for transporting a doctor to visit the fleet during the course of the season.--Report, p. 52.

¹Bowen, p. 177.

²In 1942 there was a 25 per cent drop in the pearl market because of disturbances in Bombay.--Annual 1942, p. 13.

³London Times, 6 August 1934; Bowen, p. 162.

⁴Villiers, p. 372.

it is worth only a few per cent of the value of a real pearl, a good cultured pearl can defy detection and "there are only a few pearl merchants in the Persian Gulf who can tell a good cultured pearl from a Gulf pearl without destroying the two in the effort."¹ Consequently the layman has no chance of distinguishing between them, and since "milady scorns to wear gems which will be regarded as cheap," there has been a general decline in the demand for real pearls.² Because of this difficulty in telling the two kinds apart, the sale of cultured pearls is strictly prohibited.³ It need hardly be added that the oil industry, which has provided high wages and far better working conditions, has also had a further depressing effect on pearling. Some idea of the drop in the pearl trade can be gathered from the following chart.⁴

TABLE 4
NUMBER OF DIVERS AND
BOATS ENGAGED IN PEARLING

Year	Boats	Men
1930	508	19300
1935	316	11550
1940	191	7500
1945	121	5100
1950	94	840
1952	20	563
1954	12	450

The total value of the pearls sold has fluctuated correspondingly, from approximately three and a half million rupees in 1900 to two million

¹Bowen, p. 164.

²Villiers, p. 372.

³In 1935 two Arabs were sentenced to seven years imprisonment for cheating Bahraini pearl merchants.--London Times, 5 August 1935.

⁴Sinān, M. B. Al-Bahrain, Durret al-Khalij al-Arabi. (Bagdad: 1963), p. 214. (In Arabic.)

in 1930 and half a million in 1937. In 1950 the estimated value had risen again to over one and a half million rupees, but this fails to reflect the inflation in operating expenses and wages.¹

The Bahrain Government has tried to encourage the industry. Registration fees for diving boats have been remitted and customs concessions granted, but it is certain that the pearl trade will never recover its former position of importance. There is reason to hope, however, that the industry may have reached a level which will meet a fairly constant demand.

The Oil Industry

Interest in Bahrain as a prospective oil producing area antedated the actual discovery of oil by a decade. Oil seepages on the island had attracted the attention of Major Frank Holmes, a New Zealander, who represented the small London syndicate of Eastern and General, but in 1922 Holmes found Shaikh Hamad completely disinterested in oil. The island's pressing problem at the time was water and the Ruler would not listen to talk of oil concessions; but he did agree that if Holmes drilled and brought in a good water well he would consider the proposal of a concession.² Holmes produced the sweet water well and received a contract to drill twenty more. In addition, in late 1925 he obtained "an exclusive exploration permit and option for the whole island principality..."³

¹Bowen, pp. 168-69; Belgrave, J., p. 65. These figures, like those of the chart, are only approximations.

²Beatty, J. "Bahrein Strikes Oil," The Reader's Digest, Vol. XXXIV, No. 204 (April, 1939), p. 63.

³Longrigg, S. H. Oil in the Middle East. (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 100.

Several geologists were hired to study the land and advise Holmes. All but one said that drilling was not worthwhile, and even the dissenter felt that the island had only a fair prospect.¹ For two years Holmes tried to interest British firms in chancing a well, but despite a dogged determination that earned him the description of "the worst nuisance in London", the British consistently said no.² Finally in December 1927, shortly before the Bahrain concession was due to lapse, the Gulf Oil Corporation accepted an option on the rights and concluded two important agreements with Eastern and General for both Bahrain and the Hasa mainland.³

Gulf sent some of their geologists to Bahrain before the end of 1927. They reported that prospects looked good and they marked two of the best spots for test wells. Unforeseen problems soon cropped up, however. As a signatory of the Red Line Agreement in the summer of 1928, Gulf Oil was only able to work the Bahrain concession as part of a group or, failing this, individually after the permission of the other signatories had been given. Gulf was turned down on both counts, and therefore had to relinquish the concession.

On December 21st, 1928, the Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) bought the option. Under the terms of the option contract the Eastern and General Syndicate was to obtain a renewal of its concession which had expired on the 2nd of December 1928, and then transfer it to Socal.⁴ At this point further problems came to light. The British Government refused

¹Beatty, p. 63.

²Ibid.

³Longrigg, p. 101.

⁴Finnie, D. E. Desert Enterprise. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 35; Kirk, G. Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, The Middle East in the War. (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 345, note No. 4.

to allow renewal of the concession unless "the managing director and the majority of the directors should be British, that the concessionary company should be British-registered, and that none of the rights and privileges granted by the Shaikh should be controlled directly or indirectly by foreigners."¹ Socal immediately contacted the State Department and after some negotiations a compromise was reached whereby the operating subsidiary was incorporated in Canada, the top management was to be British, and all dealings with the Bahrain Government were to be conducted through the British Political Agent.² The transfer became fully effective in 1934 when the Shaikh granted a mining lease to the Bahrain Petroleum Company Limited (Bapco) which had been established in 1929. This lease was for 55 years and covered an area of 100,000 acres on the main island.³ In 1940 the original concession was extended to cover all lands and territorial waters of the "present and future domains" of the Shaikhs, and it is valid until 2024.⁴

The first well in Bahrain was started in 1931 and on the 31st of May 1932 oil was struck at a depth of 2008 feet.⁵ As soon as the first well was determined to be a producer, development drilling was begun and work

¹Kirk, pp. 345-46.

²Finnie, p. 35.

³Bahrain Petroleum Company. A Short Account of the Operations of the Bahrain Petroleum Company Limited. A mimeographed handout of the Bapco Public Relations Office. Hereafter cited as Account.

⁴Sell, G. "Twenty-five Years of Middle East Oil, Bapco Operations in Bahrain," The Institute of Petroleum Review, Vol. XII, No. 142 (October, 1958), p. 333.

⁵This discovery had a great significance, for it was the first oil discovery in the southern Gulf region and it soon stimulated interest in other areas; but apparently its significance was not recognized at the time, for it took eleven days for the news to reach London and even then it was buried on page 15 in the "Telegrams in Brief" section of the Times.-- London Times, 11 June 1932.

started on the establishment of a full-scale camp. Because Bahrain had no deep-water port at that time all of Bapco's supplies were handled by lighter. Large storage tanks were floated ashore and a submarine loading line was installed. In December 1934 the first sale and shipment of crude oil was made.

By the end of 1935 Socal was running into problems trying to market its crude oil, so in November it placed orders for the construction of a 10,000 barrel per day refinery which was planned for expansion as needed.¹ Meanwhile Socal had been negotiating with the Texas Corporation for marketing facilities, as the latter had the markets but no Middle East supplier. Finally on June 28th, 1936, the two companies reached an agreement and the California-Texas Oil Company (Caltex) was formed providing for a 50-50 split in Bapco production and in the use of the Texas Corporation's eastern marketing facilities. These facilities were expanded in January 1947 when Caltex purchased a company that had been distributing in Europe and the Mediterranean, and they now have a wide coverage in the Eastern Hemisphere.²

A new area of interest opened up in the 1940's. The Truman Proclamation of September 28th, 1945, regarding the continental shelf and minerals appertaining thereto set a precedent in international law that was soon seized upon in the Persian Gulf. The obvious probability of oil deposits lying under the offshore areas led King Sa'ūd to issue a proclamation on the 28th of May 1949. This in turn led to a rash of similar actions by the local rulers in the Gulf.³

¹London Times, 16 November 1935.

²Account, p. 2.

³Young, R. "Further Claims to Areas Beneath the High Seas," The American Journal of International Law, Vol. XLIII, No. 4 (October, 1949), p. 791.

The Shaikh of Bahrain issued a proclamation on June 5th, 1949,¹ which stated that the sea bed and subsoil of certain areas of the high seas of the Persian Gulf "belong to the country of Bahrain and are subject to its absolute authority and jurisdiction." These areas were defined as "bordering on the territorial waters of Bahrain and extending seaward as far as limits that we, after consultation with the neighboring governments, shall determine more accurately in accordance with the principles of justice, when the occasion so requires."²

Occasion so required in 1958, and on February 22nd, after some preliminary discussions between King Sa'ūd and Shaikh Sulmān, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia concluded an agreement regarding the marine frontiers between the two countries.³ Article two of this treaty designated an area to the northeast of Bahrain in which Bahrain was to receive half of the net profits from any offshore oil strikes. Sovereignty of the area was maintained by Saudi Arabia, and it was to carry out any oil operations in the vicinity. In 1963 it appeared that this agreement was to prove financially profitable, for the Arabian American Oil Company began drilling on a new offshore field at Abu Safa, located 27 miles northeast of Dhahran and falling within this zone.⁴

¹For the text see "Proclamation No. 37/1368, June 5, 1949," Supplement to the American Journal of International Law, Vol. XLIII, 1949, pp. 185-86.

²Ibid.

³London Times, 3 March 1958. This agreement was significant as it marked the first time a Shaikh of Bahrain had departed from the agreement of 1892 and carried out dealings with a foreign country in person and not with prior British consent. Having little choice, the British latter approved.

⁴Oil and Gas Journal, 10 June 1963, p. 139.

The Bahrain oil field is about fourteen by one and a half miles in size and it is located more or less centrally on the island. The depth to the top of the producing zone is about 2000 feet. Oil production is mainly from two zones though four have been found. The third has not produced commercial quantities and the fourth only high pressure gas. This gas is important in Bahrain oil production, however, because the paying field has no gas cap. Initial production was obtained by natural water drive, but after a few years there was a noticeable decline in reservoir pressure indicating that water was not filling at the same rate that oil was being withdrawn. To correct this pressure loss, gas injection from the fourth zone was started and it is now controlled to maintain reservoir pressure near the original level. This gas from the deep wells is being fed into the oil field at the rate of 35 million cubic feet daily, and because of its high pressure it is not necessary to compress it further. It has uses as fuel also, both for the cracking process in the refinery and for the Government's electric power station outside Manamah.¹

Since 1960 the production from the Awali field has been maintained at just over 45,000 barrels per day. As of the end of 1962 there were 155 oil producing wells, 5 gas producing, 6 gas injection, 20 being repaired and 22 abandoned. Thirteen new wells were drilled and from the start of production in 1932 the cumulative production reached almost 280 million barrels.²

Exploitation has been a constant part of the Bapco program. New

¹ Account, pp. 3-4.

² Bahrain Petroleum Company Limited. Annual Report to the Ruler of Bahrain. (Manamah: Oriental Press, 1962), p. 4. Hereafter cited as Bapco Report with appropriate date.

wells were tried on the main island at Buri in 1959, offshore at Fasht al-Jarīm in 1960-61 and on Hawār Island in 1962. The first two produced no result, and while oil was reached on Hawār it was not found in sufficient quantities to warrant commercial production. Following failure of this test well on Hawar the company reportedly relinquished their concession there,¹ but oil company officials failed to confirm this. Seismic surveys are presently in progress off Bahrain's west coast, but no results have been published.²

The Bahrain refinery started operations in 1936, and by 1938, as its capacity was in excess of the local crude oil production, the company decided to import crude oil from Saudi Arabia. Tank barges were first used for this purpose.³ The refinery was expanded in 1944 and 1945, and a 12-inch, 34-mile pipeline was laid to bring oil from the mainland. Between 1947 and 1952 this line was doubled to meet the expanding requirements of the refinery.⁴

Each year has seen an increase in the refinery's output,⁵ and in 1962 it reached an all time high of over 88 million barrels for a daily average of 240,000 barrels. This constituted an 11 per cent increase over 1961, and further modifications were carried out to increase the output of diesel oil and kerosene as there has been a rising demand for these two products. At present the refinery produces naphtha, gasoline, kerosene, power kerosene, aviation turbine fuel, diesel oil, fuel oil and asphalt.⁶ Crude

¹Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 3 February 1964, p. 7.

²Ibid.

³Sell, p. 334.

⁴Account, p. 4-5.

⁵An exception was the 1957 total which was 6.8 per cent below that of 1956 because of the stoppage of flow from Saudi Arabia from November 1956 to March 1957 due to the Suez affair.--Sell, p. 334.

⁶Bapco Report 1962, pp. 6-7.

oil runs to the refinery for 1962 were as follows:

TABLE 5
REFINERY PROCESSING 1962

	U.S. Barrels
Bahrain	16,487,577
Saudi Arabia	71,982,462
Total crude run	88,470,039
Other stocks processed	209,218
Grand total	88,679,257 ^a
Daily average	242,957

^aThis total throughout ranks the Bahrain refinery as one of the three top refining centers in the eastern hemisphere. The Aramco refinery at Ras Tanura processed 90,886,021 barrels in 1962. Figures for Abadan for 1962 are not known, but as of 1960 it was over 124 million.--Arabian American Oil Company. Aramco 1962, p. 20; Issawi and Yeganeh. The Economics of Middle Eastern Oil. (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1962), p. 15.

Since 1945 some of the refined products have been sold to the United States Armed Forces. The other portion is sent to Caltex markets in the east, and to southern and western Europe.¹

Until 1946 all large tankers were loaded at a deep-water, two-berth island off Sitra, but increased capacity required the building of a four-berth wharf at the end of a three-mile long causeway.² Both of these structures have since been improved and a new two-berth island, capable of handling the largest tankers, was put into operation in August 1961.³ During the same year work was started on the four-berth wharf to enable it to accommodate the large tankers. This work was completed in mid-1962.⁴

¹Longrigg, p. 219.

²Sell, p. 335.

³Bapco Report 1961, p. 12.

⁴Bapco Report 1962, p. 10.

Sixteen oil lines varying in size from six to twenty inches carry refined products from the tank farm on Sitra Island to the marine terminal which has been outfitted with modern mechanical hose handling equipment. Due to the opening of a new deep-water channel ships of 54,000 dead weight tons, the largest in the oil company fleet, can now be loaded at the island berthing facility.¹

In the beginning of its mushrooming operations the oil industry required a wide range of skills which were not to be found in an island where pearling and agriculture were practically the sole occupations known to the inhabitants. Therefore, most of the early staff and labor had to be recruited from outside.² Throughout the years Bapco has endeavored to increase the ratio of Bahraini workers within the work force.³ Within the last ten years, however, the ratio of advancement has not been great. In 1952 out of a total of 8716 employees, 5770 (66 per cent) were Bahrainis.⁴ Ten years later these figures were 7166 and 5212 or slightly less than 73 per cent.⁵ By comparison Aramco's ratio had risen from 65 per cent in 1954 to 80 per cent in 1962.⁶ An explanation of this can possibly be found in the demand for skilled labor both inside and outside Bahrain. This creates a steady turn-over of Bahraini employees who join Bapco, learn new skills

¹Ibid., p. 11.

²O'Ferrall, J. M. "Human Relations in the Bahrain Oil Industry," Industrial Welfare, Vol. XLII, No. 5 (September-October, 1960), p. 276.

³Figures for 1962 showed the following employees: Bahraini-5212; Commonwealth-828; United Kingdom-764; Gulf Arabs-300; Americans-16; others-46. --Bapco Report 1962, p. 12.

⁴Finnie, p. 107.

⁵Bapco Report 1962, p. 12.

⁶Aramco 1962, p. 20.

in a variety of trades, and then find jobs outside the company.¹ Many turn up on company payrolls in the other oil producing areas where wages are generally more liberal.² With the continual opening of new oil areas to draw off Bapco talent, it seems unlikely that this ratio will see any spectacular increase.

One of the company's desires is to improve the skills of the workers and train local personnel for positions of greater responsibility. To accomplish this a training program was begun in 1948 and within five years over 400 employees were undergoing training including 138 in voluntary evening classes.³ In 1954 Bapco opened its Vocational or Craft Training Center and the next year a four-year program of apprentice training was started which graduated 32 students in 1959.⁴ Presently the training program falls into three main categories--instruction at the vocational training center, a four-year apprenticeship scheme to recruit and train government-school graduates, and supervisory development training.⁵

In 1961 the vocational training course was modified to train talented Bahrainis for professional qualifications.⁶ The group progressed so well that the planned three years was reduced to two and a half. Upon completion

¹O'Ferrall, p. 277.

²See Finnie, p. 108-09, 93. One Aramco employee told the writer that if it had not been for Bahrainis Tapline would never have been built. Though he did not know how to prove this fact he knew it to be true. Finnie also mentions Bahraini workers with Tapline (p. 93). Initially Bahrainis provided the semi-skilled labor needed by Aramco but have since been replaced by Sa'udis.

³Finnie, p. 121.

⁴O'Ferrall, p. 277.

⁵Ibid.

⁶During much of the year more than 10 per cent of the total Bahraini staff are under full-time formal training in the vocational training course.--Account, p. 6.

of this level, successful candidates will be considered for further training overseas which may lead to a university degree. A fifth stage was also added to the Bahraini Development part of this training so that employees who show potential for development in either commercial or technical fields may be chosen for extended courses overseas.¹

The apprentice training has proven extremely popular with over 200 applications a year, which has required an expansion of the school facilities. In 1963 the company began recruiting graduates from the government secondary schools. These boys receive only one year of the apprentice training course, and upon completion the better students are picked to compete for higher education in England.

Supervisory development courses aim at training selected employees for positions of leadership and special responsibility. Students are given training in supervisory skills as they relate to their job requirements. By the end of 1961 over 120 employees had started courses in this field,² and 103 completed the training in 1962.

In September 1962, twenty Bapco trainees passed the London University General Certificate of Education and were sent to the United Kingdom. In the apprentice training course 89 boys received their graduation certificates and 11 members of a special group of apprentices passed the Lancashire and Cheshire Secondary School Leaving Certificate examinations, five with distinction.³ From these figures it can be seen that the Bapco training program is not only benefiting the company but is providing an educational service for the country as well.

¹Bapco Report 1961, pp. 18-19.

²Ibid.

³Bapco Report 1962, p. 23.

Bapco also provides many services for its employees. Benefits include a thrift plan in which the company matches the savings of the employees, a housing plan which provides loans for employees to either build new homes or finance repairs, a tuberculosis leave plan to finance those requiring long convalescence, and a death and disability plan. Employees may also accrue up to 56 days leave in order to perform the pilgrimage to either Saudi Arabia or Iraq.

In the field of health the company has done much for the island as well as for its workers, providing equipment for the Government's hospitals, giving out health films and slides for use in schools, distributing monthly health posters, participating in anti-malaria campaigns, giving polio vaccinations, and maintaining two modern, well-equipped hospitals and two outlying dispensaries to provide free medical service for all of its employees. The results obtained in the field of malaria have been outstanding. At one time nearly 95 per cent of all Bahrainis suffered from the disease. In 1962 only 15 cases were confirmed, pointing to near elimination of malaria as a health factor.¹

An area in which Bapco has made great strides is local purchasing. In 1958 only nine million rupees worth of merchandise was bought locally, but by 1962 this had risen to over 19 million.² At the same time local sales of Bapco products have been increasing. Jet fuel sold in 1962 totaled 1.6 million gallons compared with 412,758 in 1961. In all Bapco contributed 154 million rupees to the Bahrain economy in 1962 by way of wages, local

¹Bapco Report 1962, p. 17.

²It should be remembered that "local purchases" really means using the local merchants as middlemen since few of the oil company's needs are produced locally.

purchases, local contracts, royalties, taxes and import duties.¹

Payments to the Bahrain Treasury prior to 1950 amounted to about 1.2 million dollars per year. Subsequently the rate of royalty was increased from 3 to 10 rupees a ton, and a fluctuating income tax was instituted so as to provide the 50-50 principle of profit sharing which had previously been accepted elsewhere. Also payments were made for the first time on Saudi oil entering the Bahrain refinery.² Oil receipts for 1961 amounted to over 16 million dollars,³ and they supplied over 72 per cent of the 1963 Bahrain budget.⁴

The Public Relations Department has been a key feature of Bapco's operations, and this office supervises activities in many areas. To promote a better understanding of the company and its operations tours are provided for Bahrainis, visitors, and members of the local governments. Company operations and aid programs are advertised by the media of films, a monthly news magazine, a weekly paper and personal visits by the Department's staff to villages, clubs, schools, local activity groups and hospitals. A monthly luncheon for people of the Bahrain community is held with the company's management personnel, and tours for Bapco employees are arranged for visiting places of interest within the island, such as the archeological excavations, the naval base and local industries. One of the most promising types of tours has been that of Government representatives visiting their counterparts at Bapco. This has provided the opportunity for head-to-head talks in areas of mutual interests, and seems to be leading to

¹Bapco Report 1962, p. 16.

²Longrigg, p. 218.

³Annual 1961, p. 69.

⁴EIU, Annual Supplement, September 1963, p. 17.

a greater degree of respect and co-operation.

Donations and financial assistance have also been a part of this program. Over fifty television sets have been donated to local clubs. For the past ten years the company has been contributing to a fund for the construction of a sports stadium, and three new schools were built and given to the Government in 1952.¹ When complaints or requests for help are received from outside sources, the company, working through Government channels, tries to give them its full and immediate attention.

How well have these activities succeeded? Is the oil company liked? Liked, no; needed, yes. Bahrainis realize that there has been a great deal of improvement in the living standards of the people and services rendered by the Government, and they have come solely as a result of oil revenue. But inequities are felt. Bahrainis complain that Europeans and other Arabs still hold jobs that can very easily be done by local talent. Cases of workers being released for what is termed "no good reason" cause considerable rancor. Whether good reason was a factor is a moot point, for the opposite is believed. The company is blamed for odd and sundry things. As an example one Bahraini expressed to the writer the opinion that, since Bapco's use of dynamite in its seismic surveys, the spring water on the island has become salty. The possibility of some other explanation never occurred to him and he firmly believes that Bapco is responsible. Unfavorable comparisons between Bapco and Aramco are also made. Bahrainis point to Aramco as an ideal, where Westerners are kept in their place and act as guests, not owners.²

During the troubles of 1953-56 Bapco reacted by "an unacknowledged

¹Bapco Report 1952, p. 40.

²See Owen, pp. 105, 110.

but undeniable attempt to disassociate the company from the unpopular policies of the Government, in order to forestall the type of unrest which led to nationalization in Iran."¹ They could not, however, disassociate themselves from their own unpopular policies, and a Mr. Ibrahim Ishaq, a Bapco employee, stated in an article in a local newspaper that he and a friend had been indignantly thrown out of the Bapco Dining Hall though no sign restricting entrance was apparent. In relation to the incident his remarks are noteworthy:

These rash inhuman treatments are beyond the limit of tolerance. I have been to the Aramco Dining Hall in Dhahran... (and) it is open, not only to every employee of the company, but to everybody in Arabia as well (sic!). Therefore could Mr. Brown kindly tell us the reason why the Bapco Dining Hall is not open to Bahrainis?

Is this how the subjects of His Highness Sir Shaikh Salman should be treated? Do you honestly believe that if there had been two Europeans in our place, they would have been treated in such a disgraceful and shocking manner?

These Britons who have stinking ideas about Asians do not seem to possess enough sense to realize that by having such an attitude they are not only boiling our blood, but digging their own graves.

It is time we struggled for our rights, because now we are living in the age of (the) TWENTIETH CENTURY.²

Whether such an occurrence actually happened or whether this is simply a piece of fabricated propaganda is immaterial. What it reflects is an attitude; and this attitude is still prevalent in the island today. Bapco's British management has no doubt encouraged it, but, given any foreign management, the feeling will not be alleviated until there are sufficient Bahrainis in managerial positions as to give the company a "national" atmosphere. Although local management can never eliminate all

this is nothing

¹Hazard, p. 189.

²al-Qafilah, letter to the editor, 24 July 1953.

complaints and feelings of inequity, at least the worker will feel that his problems are being looked after by a fellow Arab. In this regard, and as a final word on the oil company, the following is worth quoting:

It is perhaps typical of the mind of eastern Arabia, as of all Asia, that denial of admission to an Englishman's club in Bahrain should rankle, while denial of vaccination to non-members of the ruling family in Qatar should be accepted without resentment. The apparent paradox is resolved when it is firmly understood that to the Arabian a man's health is of far less moment than his human dignity, and that actions done by a fellow Arab arouse less bitterness than if done by a westerner.¹

¹Hazard, p. 81.

CHAPTER VII

THE ANGLO-IRANIAN DISPUTE

The political status of Bahrain has been a bone of contention between Britain and Iran for well over a century, and it has resulted in a continuous exchange of diplomatic correspondence in which both parties have stated their arguments. To date, Iran still claims that Bahrain is legally part of her territory, while the British have taken the stand that the islands are politically independent.

Persian claims of sovereignty are based on the fact that Bahrain was part of her territory from 1602, when Bahrainis who had expelled the Portuguese requested her protection, until 1783 when the Āl Khalīfah conquered the island. Subsequent to this loss of possession several events occurred which Iranian authorities claim point to the fact that both Britain and the Khalīfah Shaikhs recognized that Persia still held dominant interests in the islands.

One of the earliest of these events occurred in January 1820 when British forces were engaged in eliminating the piratical haunts of the Jawasmi. Sir William Keir, the Commander of the British in the Persian Gulf, was instructed that Britain did not want to unduly antagonize Persia over British policy in the Gulf waters,¹ but that if Bahrain was guilty of

¹Adamiyat, p. 83.

piracy "the most desirable course would be to make it (Bahrain) over to the Imān (of Musqat), subject to the payment of the former tribute to Persia, but to this arrangement the consent of Persia was necessary."¹ According to Persia this brought to light two points, tacit recognition by Britain that Persia had to be consulted regarding Bahraini affairs and that Bahrain had been paying tribute to Persia, obviously as a vassal.

A second significant event took place in August 1822 when William Bruce, the British Resident in Bushire, concluded the Treaty of Shiraz with the Governor of Fars. The second and fifth articles of this treaty are pertinent to the Persian argument and they state in part:

Second, the Island of Bahrein which has always been subordinate to the province of Fars...

.....
Fifth, ...4. Should His Royal Highness...require the services of one or two cruisers from the station to proceed to any of the islands or parts of Persia, they are to be furnished and particularly so on the present occasion, when an expedition is in contemplation against Bahrein to reduce it to obedience.²

Again following the troubled years of the late 1850's, Shaikh Muhammad bin Khalīfah in 1860 appealed to the Governor of Fars for protection,³ and in 1869 Lord Clarendon, the British Foreign Secretary, in answer to protests made to the British Government over the treaty of 1861, stated that Britain would inform the Persian Government of any measures that it had to take in punishing the Shaikh of Bahrain.⁴

¹Ibid. Quoted from Factory Records of The East India Company, Vol. XXXIV. Warden to Keir, January 26, 1820.

²Ibid., Appendix I, pp. 254-55.

³Ibid., Appendix II, pp. 255-58.

⁴Ibid., Appendix III, pp. 258-59; Hurewitz, pp. 172-73.

These latter two events were again interpreted as a recognition of Persian authority on the part of both the Shaikhs and the British, and with those previously stated comprise the Persian case for sovereignty.¹

Are these claims valid? As to the 181 years of Persian rule, it appears, in addition to its final termination by the Āl Khalīfah, that it was interrupted on at least three previous occasions--in 1717, from 1720 to 1737 and again for an unspecified period around the year 1765 at which time the island was under the rule of an Arab shaikh whose dominion was on the Eastern (i.e., Iranian) side of the Gulf.² To claim as the Persians do, that they have never given their consent for its transference to an independent status is somewhat absurd. As one writer has pointed out, international practice could hardly support this rule, as an admission of its validity would permit any state "to advance a claim to territory on the grounds that its loss in the past had not been confirmed by an express approval of the owner."³ It might be added further that such an admission would throw almost every area of the earth into a legal maze.

Warden's statement in 1820 can be attributed to a time when Britain had no interest in Bahraini affairs and certainly indicates a willingness to place the Shaikh of Bahrain under anyone who was capable of seeing that he "toed the line", hence the reference to the Imān of Musqat as an equally agreeable solution to the realization of a stable situation. Admittedly

¹There are many other instances cited by both Doctor Adāmiyat and Persian authorities, but they constitute little more than a reiteration of these bases.

²"Readers' Commentary," The Middle East Journal, Vol. X, No. 2 (Spring, 1956), p. 235.

³Khadduri, M. "Iran's Claim to the Sovereignty of Bahrain," American Journal of International Law, Vol. XLV, No. 4 (October, 1951), p. 637.

there is an implication of the predominance of Persian authority, but no definite statement was made. Regarding the tribute, this hardly serves as a basis for the claim of Persian sovereignty, for in the course of their stormy careers the Āl Khalīfah paid tribute to anyone who was in a position to guarantee them security. History records that they also paid tribute to the Imān of Musqat, the Wahhābis and Muhammad 'Ali Pasha of Egypt.¹

The Treaty of Shiraz, so often quoted as a basis for British recognition of Persia's claim, really warrants little discussion since it was never ratified by the British Government. In fact, it was repudiated and Bruce was recalled for his indiscretion. Even the Shah failed to accept its validity and he reprimanded the Governor of Fars for overstepping the bounds of his authority.

As for Shaikh Muhammad's plea for protection in 1860, it represents only one of several advanced by the rulers of Bahrain. A similar plea was made to the British in February 1839 requesting that they place the island under permanent British protection, and when it was declined the Shaikh swiftly turned to the Pasha of Egypt and paid him three thousand dollars tribute.² In 1860, at precisely the same time when the Shah's envoy was present on the island, Turkey was also queried on her possible tenders of protection.

Lord Clarendon's note of April 29th, 1869, has been interpreted as

¹Kelly, J. B. "The Persian Claim to Bahrain," International Affairs, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (January, 1957), p. 53.

²Ibid., p. 60.

³Ibid. Adamiyat (p. 157) lays great stress on the fact that the Persian flag was raised over Bahrain on this occasion, but he neglects to relate that the Turkish flag was also raised when the Porte's representative arrived.

"a tacit endorsement of the Persian rights of sovereignty in the island,"¹ but again, being "tacit" is not being specific. British authorities have stated that the Persian Government was "under a complete misunderstanding in inferring from the terms of the late Earl of Clarendon to the Persian Minister on April 29th, 1869, that any recognition of the validity of Persian claims to sovereignty in Bahrain was at that time intended," and they added:

...Her Majesty's Government had given due consideration to the protest of the Persian Government "against the Persian right of sovereignty over Bahrein being ignored by the British authorities," but in no way admitted any such right. On the contrary, the whole tenor of the Note should have made it clear that Her Majesty's Government maintained their right to enter into direct treaty relations with the Shaikhs of Bahrein as independent rulers.²

Thus we see that on grounds of ordinary reason the Persian claim is treading on rather thin ice. Nonetheless, reaffirmations of this claim have been periodically voiced whenever an international agreement is entered into by the Government of Bahrain. The most extensive diplomatic exchange took place in 1927 when Iran protested against Article 6 of the Treaty of Jidda which referred to Bahrain as "a state in special treaty relations with the British Government." Iran forwarded a note of complaint to the League of Nations and subsequent notes were sent to the Secretary-General. However, the League never took any action on the problem and therefore no settlement was ever reached.³ The British, on the other hand, apparently viewed this Persian protest with some gravity, for it sparked two reactions.

¹Adamiyat, p. 251.

²London Times, 1 March 1928.

³Liebesny, H. J. "International Relations of Arabia," The Middle East Journal, Vol. I, No. 2 (April, 1947), p. 159.

Visa regulations were implemented for Persians visiting Bahrain,¹ and on the 21st of December 1927, a decree was promulgated creating a Land Registry Office. This decree required that all real property be registered, and specified that only subjects of Bahrain were eligible to own it.² As a result many Persians sold their property and moved to Iran; those who stayed became Bahraini citizens.

Upon the discovery of oil in Bahrain and the granting of the concession to the Standard Oil Company of California, the United States entered the controversy.³ On the 22nd of May 1934, the Persian Government sent notes of protest to both the British and United States Ministers in which the usual Persian claims of sovereignty were stated along with Persia's refusal to recognize the validity of the concession, it being felt that Persia was "at liberty to claim and demand the restitution of any profit which may accrue from such concessions, as well as compensation for any damages that may result therefrom."⁴ The protests met with little response. The British refused to comment but only referred to their definitive rebuttals of January 18th and February 18th, 1929,⁵ while in the United States

¹Previously passports had not been required of Persians traveling to Bahrain but only travel permits as issued by the Persian Government for travel from one province to another. This caused a further protest and what Persia termed "the explicit recognition by the English authorities of the indisputable right of Iran over Bahrein." --Adamiyat, pp. 195-96, Farouhy, p. 103.

²This decree was later supplemented by others in 1930 and 1941.-- Farouhy, p. 103. For determination of who is a Bahraini citizen see the Bahrain Nationality Law in Ibid., Appendix IV, pp. 124-25.

³Protests had been proffered in 1930 against the original grant of a concession to Major Holmes, but they were directed toward the British only.--London Times, 27 August 1930.

⁴Ibid., 28 May and 16 June 1934.

⁵Ibid., 2 August 1934.

the Senate defeated an attempt to prevent the Government from taking steps which would "deny any right of sovereignty which Persia might have in, and to, the Persian Gulf."¹

Despite these setbacks Persia has persisted in her claims. In 1948 one of the deputies of the Persian Majlis actually went so far as to offer a £ 80,000 reward to anyone who succeeded in restoring Bahrain to Persia and in solving the petroleum question.² Further claims were voiced in 1952, and on the 11th of November 1957, following the Shah's instructions, "the Iranian Cabinet approved a draft law designating Bahrein as the fourteenth province of Iran in the new administrative redivision of the country."³ Shortly thereafter the Iranian press began speculating about the possibilities of parliamentary representation for Bahrain and the appointment of an Iranian governor for the island.⁴ These actions proved too much for Saudi Arabia and she jumped to Bahrain's defense claiming that it was "a country with its own foreign status," and that she could "believe anything but for Bahrain to be claimed as an Iranian province or as an indivisible part of Iran."⁵ Two months later Saudi Arabia herself was involved in the controversy when Iran protested against the offshore agreement between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

Today the situation remains unchanged. Britain recognizes Bahrain

¹Farouhy, p. 106. The Persian Minister in Washington, who evidently had a hand in trying to implement legislation to prevent America's denial of Persian claims, was severely reprimanded by Cordell Hull.-- Adamiyat, pp. 199-200.

²London Times, 13 September 1948; 21 April 1952.

³Lenczowski, G. Oil and State in the Middle East. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 135.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 136.

as an independent political entity and Iran still claims sovereignty. Except for visa complications the ordinary person traveling to either country would never know that a controversy exists.¹ Britain tries to play the issue down, but in Iran politicians view the problem as a required plank in any government platform; and like the question of Israel in the Arab World and civil rights in the United States, it is a problem upon which each new government has to announce a stand. Suffice it to say that Bahrain's de facto status is that of an independent state in special treaty relations with Britain. Its de jure status is a matter for speculation, for despite a plethora of personal opinions, no recognized or authoritative legal judgment has yet been rendered.

¹Persons with a Bahraini visa in their passport are denied entry into Iran.

CHAPTER VIII

THE MILITARY

British Forces

Following the Treaty of 1820 it became apparent that some arrangement would have to be found for retaining vessels in the Gulf on a permanent basis. Initial interest fell on the island of Qishm which the British occupied in December 1820. However, following Persian protests they abandoned it in 1822 and moved to Ras al-Khaimah.¹ This was eventually found to be unsatisfactory and they later returned to Qishm and established a naval base at Basidu. An air base and a second naval base were later established at Hemjam Island and Basra respectively. These bases were retained until 1935 when it was deemed advisable to consolidate them at Bahrain where land had been purchased by the Government and offered by the Shaikh for British use.²

The naval base, known as Her Majesty's Ship Jufair, is located on the northeast promontory of Bahrain Island about three miles south of Manamah near the newly constructed Minā' Sulman pier. Jufair houses the command posts of the Senior Naval Officer Persian Gulf (SNO PG), and an army contingent.³ The Senior Naval Officer Persian Gulf, a captain,

¹Adamiyat, pp. 98, 111.

²Belgrave, Personal Column, p. 106.

³The headquarters for the British military units in the Gulf is located at Aden where the Commanding Officer British Forces Middle East

has the responsibility for the security of the Gulf waters and for providing naval support for any operations therein.¹ To accomplish this mission he has at his disposal two landing ships tank (LST), two landing crafts tank (LCT), a frigate, four minesweepers and a command ship. The LST's and LCT's never leave the Gulf proper, and the minesweepers seldom venture afield. However, the frigate and command ship pay visits to many areas including the East African coast.

In addition to those operations discussed below, the Navy is concerned with preventing the gun-running and piracy that has been a part of the Gulf Arab's life for decades. Although piracy is no longer common,² gun-running is still rife, and a new trade has come into play since the discovery of oil in the Trucial shaikhdoms. Following the pattern of all other oil areas it was assumed that these industries would need workers from outside, as there is insufficient indigenous labor to fulfill the needs. Pakistanis have become particularly anxious to procure this work but few have sufficient funds to book passage by normal commercial means. To help these people in their "hour of need", local dhow owners book passage for them on their own ships, assuring all concerned that no passports or other papers are required. Announced destinations vary among Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha, and because of the low fares charged the owner has to carry a large number of people to insure a profit commensurate with the risks

is based. He has under his command subordinates representing the Army, Navy and Air Force whose commands are scattered throughout the area.

¹A specific side mission being the support of operations in Oman.

²The last piratical act of significance was an attack on a large Arab dhow in 1944.--Melamid, A. "Political Geography of Trucial Oman and Qatra," The Geographical Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (April, 1953), p. 196.

involved. The dhows do not contain the usual sanitary facilities nor are they protected from the weather. Food and water are lacking or bad, and the number of human beings who are packed into a small space is appalling.¹ Upon arrival on the Hasa coast the occupants, who are happy to be back on land, are told that last minute complications precluded docking at the port proper, but that it is "just over the hill". In one case this proved to be fifty miles and many of the group died of thirst, hunger and exposure before being picked up by the Royal Navy. Hence the British once again find themselves engaged in the suppression of illicit transport in human beings, but with the advantages that aircraft offer they are in a somewhat better position to get the job done.

The Army units on Bahrain are commanded by a brigadier who is subordinate to Aden.² They consist of a brigade headquarters, a parachute regiment and a para-battalion group. This latter unit is a composite organization of combat and combat support troops made up of a battery of artillery, a troop of engineers, a heavy-drop platoon, a squadron of tanks and a signal squadron.

The Royal Air Force base is located adjacent to the airport on Muharraq Island. There are two squadrons based there to provide the Army and Navy with air support. One squadron is composed of Hawker Hunter fighters to give air cover and close ground support, and the other is a Beverly squadron which provides airlift and heavy-drop capabilities.

¹In February 1964 the Royal Navy intercepted a forty-foot dhow off Abu Dhabi which contained well in excess of 400 Pakistanis. A naval officer told me that he would never have believed it possible if he had not seen it himself. Some had already died and others were in the last stages of life.

²He is stationed in Musqat.

In the event of an amphibious operation the assistant naval commander, designated Chief of Amphibious Warfare, has control of the naval elements plus an army signal troop, an army beach troop and half of the tank squadron. These armor units are kept afloat at all times in readiness for any eventuality.

This short survey is sufficient to show that the British have a light, highly mobile, hard-hitting force located on the island. The nature of the units and their equipment provides flexibility in tailoring a force that can be used either for airborne or amphibious operations or a combination of the two. Such an organization is essential because of the nature of the area, which is extensive yet easily accessible by both air and sea. Probable trouble spots would normally be within short striking distance of Bahrain's central location, and most of the missions would initially call for only a small force.

Besides its central location Bahrain offers other advantages. Since the building of Mīnā' Sulmān there is a deep-water berthing area available for naval use;¹ an excellent air field is available and it is located on a major air route; the oil fields and refinery provide fuel requirements without the necessity for a separate logistical base; as an island it is vulnerable only from the sea or air; and it is the most progressive of those states in special treaty arrangements and as such provides a fairly comfortable station for military dependents.

Much speculation has been and is being voiced concerning how long

¹A condition of British help in constructing the new pier was that the navy would be allowed to lease one of the six berths for their use. They may use more if available or, of course, if a situation requires it.

Britain intends to retain the Bahrain base. Theories, even in military circles, range from five years to that of "time will tell". The latter seems the more probable, and several factors point in this direction. First, there has been no change in the British position vis-a-vis the new ruler. On the contrary, upon assumption of his father's throne Shaikh 'Īsa stated that "we are content with our century-old relationship because it brings stability to the region."¹ Second, the Persian Gulf still represents the major source of Britain's supply of oil, the importance of which was amply demonstrated during the Suez crisis of 1956, and Bahrain is by far the most advantageous location for providing physical protection of the producing regions.² Third, and perhaps most significant, is the fact that a new, enlarged and very expensive headquarters building is presently under construction at Jufair. This is hardly the type of project that one would normally associate with an intent to withdraw from the island in the very near future.

The British forces on Bahrain are not well liked. While no specific charges are leveled against them other than those associated with most Westerners, they are, nonetheless, British and as such are in the unfortunate position of being guilty by association with the Political Agency and Residency, which are distrusted and generally disliked for their devious conduct during the events of 1956.

¹Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 1 January 1962, p. 3.

²Despite Kuwait's independent status, it has a defensive treaty with Britain.

United States Forces¹

United States military interests in the Persian Gulf came to the fore in World War II, and in 1949 the little-known Middle East Force Command was established. Though one of the smallest naval commands in terms of ships assigned, it is one of the largest in terms of area. The Commander Middle East Force's (COMIDEASTFOR)² area of responsibility encompasses over seventy per cent of the world's known oil supply and most of the countries, protectorates and shaikhdoms of the Middle East. Specifically this area is bounded by Burma on the East, Libya on the West, the Soviet frontier on the North and the equator on the South.³

To cover this vast area COMIDEASTFOR has three destroyers and a command ship. The employment of the latter is phased into four major areas--the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, the Indian subcontinent and the East African coast. If political conditions allow, major visits to these areas are scheduled to take advantage of the most favorable weather conditions. The major cruises are supplemented by shorter ones so as to visit all major ports at least once each year. The destroyers, which rotate into the area from the Sixth Fleet, average seven port calls during their period of deployment. To reach the inland countries within his area of responsibility COMIDEASTFOR uses an aircraft based at Dhahran, where a liaison team

¹The majority of this information was derived from personal interviews with United States Navy personnel and from a mimeographed handout titled History of Middle East Force Command.

²Presently Rear Admiral A. F. Schade.

³Included therein are the following political entities: The Federation of Southern Arabia, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Ethiopia, The Somali Republic, French Somaliland, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sikkim, Bhutan, Nepal, India, Ceylon, the Trucial States, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, Musqat, and Oman.

maintains contact with the Saudi Arabian Training Mission.

The United States does not maintain a base at Bahrain. The base is the command ship which is normally at sea nine months of the year. Several activities are carried on at the island, however, and for this reason an office is occupied at Jufair. The more significant of these activities are the routing of Military Sea Transport Service ships and providing them with necessary administrative information, maintaining liaison with the Royal Navy, British Political Agent and Resident, issuing navigational notices coming from Bahrain sources, providing arrangements for anchorage and pilots, handling the receipt and shipment of dependents household effects, and providing dependents with sundry services.¹

The main purpose for Middle East Force Command is to furnish a headquarters and communications facility capable of directing the activities of a larger force which would be moved into the area if the situation demanded. In addition, the port calls accomplish three missions. First, they afford the opportunity to meet the officials of the various countries and to establish good working relations with them as well as with the United States personnel stationed at the various embassies and consulates. Second, they make the American presence felt without the stigma attached to over-powering force.² Third, they provide the opportunity for performing charitable and goodwill missions. Sailors from the ships often have parties for children, show movies, and provide work details for construction or

¹There is also an officer assigned to the laboratory of the Bapco refinery to check the specifications of the products purchased from Bapco. One of the important areas is high performance aviation fuels.

²It was a Middle East Force Command destroyer which was responsible for safeguarding and evacuating American dependents and officials from Zanzibar during the recent crisis.

repair projects. To date, these activities have been well received and this force seems to be doing an excellent job as an American goodwill team. Its unobtrusive methods of operation, as opposed to those of the British, have not engendered the antagonism of the indigenous population.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

In summing up this study of Bahrain today many things could be said. It is possible to reiterate in glowing terms the many improvements that have taken place in a once backward country. Similarly one could speculate on the probable course of British action in the face of growing Arab pressure to leave the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf. However, Bahrain's development has been discussed at length in several works and it has been briefly outlined in this paper. A reiteration would be redundant. As for the probable course of British action, anything said would necessarily be pure conjecture and, as such, hardly serves any useful purpose.

A more important course would be to examine the spirit of Bahrain itself, but before starting such an examination a word of explanation is in order. The remarks which follow will be found, with a few exceptions, to almost diametrically oppose the tone of those which have appeared previously. In this respect it is not the purpose of this conclusion to detract from the many accomplishments which have taken place, but to leave this subject having given the impression that all in Bahrain is sunshine and roses would not only be contrary to the facts, but an injustice to the reader.

The fact of the matter is that everything is not sunshine and roses in Bahrain today. On the contrary if one takes the time to penetrate the

facade of dual highways, new harbors, hospitals and schools, oil company restaurants and clubs, a modern air terminal, and the assurances of the ruling family that people never had it so good, he will most likely come away with the feeling that the majority of the people of Bahrain are definitely anti-Government. This majority includes the lower class and a good percentage of the middle class.

The feelings of the lower class can best be seen from an incident which happened during the rioting in November 1956. On November 3rd, when the demonstrators in Manāmah wrecked and burned the offices of the Public Works Department and the Government sponsored newspaper al-Khalīj, word of this action reached the town of Jidhafs. Although the people were three miles from the center of this action they still wanted to manifest their feelings and in so doing they burned down the school. Were they against education? Hardly, for it was the people themselves who had requested that the schoolhouse be built. It was simply a case of deep-seated animosity toward an institution of which they disapproved and for which they had no liking. In venting their pent emotions they instinctively turned upon the single available object that represented the source of their frustrations-- a Government schoolhouse.

As stated previously, the members of the middle class have, in many instances, close ties with the lower class, where many of their families are still found. It is only natural that the frustrations which beset the family should also weigh heavily on those of its members who have become part of the new social stratum. Very often these frustrations are even amplified within the middle class, for by virtue of their superior intelligence and positions within the society, they are able to see inequities that

the lower class might never recognize as such. Consequently they deplore the fact that more is not being done to better the position of the common man.

They see villages on Sitra and Muharraq Island where conditions are much the same today as they were prior to the past forty years of "enlightened rule". They see farmers hoping to obtain the use of one of the state's four tractors while the ruling family enjoys a fleet of tens of new automobiles. They see the farmer without proper veterinary care for the animals that provide his livelihood, yet the Ruler owns a herd of fine camals, runs a stable of over fifty high-bred horses (which he races on his private track), and raises hawks and hunting dogs. They see foreigners allowed to use the private swimming facilities of the ruling family while Bahrainis may not. They see special clubs for the top Bapco personnel, Indians, British military and other foreign elements where liquor is served and entertainment is enjoyed, yet the Bahraini cannot legally obtain an alcoholic drink nor does he have a first-class place to eat. At the same time it is common knowledge that the ruling family and wealthy merchants have parties within their homes where alcohol is served. They find college graduates allowed to teach only English in the schools until their "politics" are known, and they receive only half the salary of foreign teachers. These well-educated Bahrainis see members of the ruling family being placed in positions of responsibility to which they themselves aspire and which the elite do not warrant either by training or education.¹ They view the Department of Justice as an institution where those who have money and

¹The Minister of Education, Shaikh Muhammad bin Sulmān, the brother of the Ruler, has never graduated from a high school or college.

influence are assured justice, and the Police Department as an organization where security is obtainable by those who possess wealth and influence, while insecurity is felt by those who possess neither. They see the ruling family take one third of the oil money for their own use though they comprise only a small percentage of the population. They see this family living in "excessively immoderate luxury" where they "eat more than they ought, wear more than they ought, enjoy themselves more than they ought..."¹ and they want to know why they deserve it to the exclusion of others.

As a result, these lower two classes are frustrated, angry, tired, insecure and presently living without hope of change. These are feelings that new housing developments, electricity and running water will not alleviate. The need of these people is not only material but spiritual as well. They want a say in running the affairs of their country. The days of blind acceptance have long since passed in Bahrain. With the failure of the nationalist movement some of these young middle class members wonder if revolution is not the only solution, yet they are intelligent enough to see what revolution has done in other Middle Eastern countries and they abhor the instability that it seems to engender. The tragic fact is that they want a well-planned change to democratic government, even to the extent of possibly retaining the Shaikh as a monarch, but they see no hope of obtaining it under present conditions. The rulers have made no attempts to further democratic institutions since 1956; if anything the opposite is true. If they persist in this policy, and if they continue to enjoy the support of the British, there is little that the middle class can do.

¹Khālid, K. From Here We Start. (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953), p. 84.

And what about the British? In 1956 they had no clear idea of how far they wanted to go with the Committee of National Union, or what their position would be if a clash took place. Despite their warning of March 13th it should have been evident that someone missed the point that they were trying to make. But instead of realizing this and urging a degree of restraint after the Suez crisis, they did an about face and completely abandoned the nationalists. This in itself would have been injurious enough, but they added insult to injury by sitting by and condoning a parody of justice; and then, to cap all, they provided the prison facilities and the transportation thereto, thus assuring a British connection with the whole affair.¹

The real tragedy, however, lies in the fact that a fairly moderate, relatively democratic, definitely progressive, and fundamentally pro-Western nationalist movement was all but exterminated, at least in its overt form. Nor will the Bahrainis soon be extending their hands to the British again just to have them burned a second time. As a result of this inept British influence, Bahrain is now, more than ever, characterized by a deep-seated dislike for them and their motives.

Looking back on the whole history of British involvement in Bahrain, and particularly on these recent events, and viewing the complacency with which the British are seemingly biding their time, one cannot help but call to mind the words of warning recently voiced by a leading Middle Eastern personality:

Form, form, form; technique, technique, technique! Nobody

¹Johnson, P. Journey Into Chaos. (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1958), p. 155.

asks the fundamental question as to what is the whole blooming thing for. Nobody cares to find out what spirit pervades the whole thing. Nobody has the time to ascertain whether man in his freedom and in his fullness, exists at all. Roads, dams, efficiency, and the smile of rulers--that is all that matters; but spirit, freedom, joy, happiness, truth, man-- that never enters the mind...What is most needed by the free world is how to make the values of freedom understandable and real...to fill the concept of freedom with meaning and content, to save it from hollowness and hypocrisy...Without this living faith in the highest and deepest values of the 4000 years of Western civilization, all your techniques and all your perfections will ultimately only play into the hands of your enemies.¹

Unless the British wake up and attempt again, with sound planning and forceful leadership, to change what amounts to an artificial and outdated social structure, they may very well awaken on the morrow of their departure from Bahrain to find a new Zanzibar in the Persian Gulf.

¹Malik, C. H. "Developing Leadership in New Countries," from an address given to a Plenary Session of the 13th CIOS International Management Congress, at the New York Hilton Hotel, September 19, 1963. (Italics mine.)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Public Documents

Government of Bahrain. Official Gazette. Newspaper in which laws, notices and reports are published.

Books

- Abraham, K. V. British Justice in Bahrain. Kerala, India: Kongalathu House, 1963.
- Adamiyat, F. Bahrein Islands. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1955.
- Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division. A Handbook of Arabia. Vol. I, London: 1916.
- Aitchison, C. U. A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries. Vol. XI, Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1933.
- Bahrain Trade Directory. 5th ed., Manāmah, Bahrain: 1963.
- Belgrave, C. D. Personal Column. London: Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1960.
- Belgrave, J. H. D. Welcome to Bahrain. Manāmah, Bahrain: Belgrave, 1960. (4th ed.)
- Beling, W. A. Pan-Arabism and Labor. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.
- Dearden, A. Jordan. London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1958.
- Farouqy, A. The Bahrein Islands. New York: Very, Fisher and Co., Inc., 1951.
- Finnie, D. H. Desert Enterprise. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958.
- Hay, R. The Persian Gulf States. Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1959.

- Hurewitz, J. C. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. Vol. I, Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956.
- Issawi, C. and Yeganeh, M. The Economics of Middle Eastern Oil. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1962.
- Johnson, P. Journey Into Chaos. London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1958.
- Khālid, K. From Here We Start. Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953.
- Kirk, G. Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, The Middle East In The War. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.
- Kritzeck, J. and Winder, R. B. (eds.) The World of Islam. London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1960.
- Lenczowski, G. Oil and State in the Middle East. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1960.
- Longrigg, S. H. Oil in the Middle East. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.
- Lorimer, J. G. Gazeteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia. Calcutta: 1915. Completed and edited by R. L. Birdwood.
- Nabhāni, K. History of Bahrain. Mecca: Date unknown. Translated to English by Chowdhry Muhammad Akbar Munir.
- Owen, R. The Golden Bubble. London: Collins, 1957.
- Persian Gulf Pilot, The. 10th ed. London: Hydrographic Department, Admiralty, 1955. (With Supplement No. 3-1962.)
- Porter, R. S. The Third Population Census of Bahrain, May 1959. Beirut: Middle East Development Division, 1961.
- Sanger, R. H. The Arabian Peninsula. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1954.
- Sinān, M. B. Al-Bahrein, Durret al-Khalīj al-Arabi. Bagdad: 1963.
- Villiers, A. Sons of Sinbad. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940.
- Warriner, D. Land Reform and Development in the Middle East. 2nd ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1962.
- Wilson, A. T. The Persian Gulf. London: Allen and Unwin, 1928.

Articles and Periodicals

- Baer, G. "Labor in the Arab East," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. XI, Nos. 6 & 7 (June-July, 1960), 179-84.
- Bahrain Islander. A weekly paper of the Bahrain Petroleum Company Limited.
- Beatty, J. "Bahrein Strikes Oil," The Readers' Digest, Vol. XXXIV, No. 204 (April, 1939), 62-64.
- Belgrave, C. D. "Bahrain," Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XV, No. 4 (October, 1928), 440-45.
- _____ "The Portuguese in the Bahrain Islands, 1521-1602," Vol. XXII, No. 4 (October, 1935), 617-30.
- Beling, W. A. "Recent Developments in Labor Relations in Bahrayn," The Middle East Journal, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Spring, 1959), 156-69.
- Bibby, G. "Excavating A Bahrein Citadel of 5000 Years Ago," The Illustrated London News, Vol. CCXXXII, No. 6187 (11 January 1958), 54-55.
- Bowen, R. L. Jr. "The Pearl Fisheries of the Persian Gulf," The Middle East Journal, Vol. V, No. 2 (Spring, 1951), 161-80.
- Economist Intelligence Units, Ltd., Quarterly Review. Middle East Oil and the Arabian Peninsula, London, Spencer House.
- "Faster, Faster...in Bahrain," The Economist, Vol. CLXXX, No. 5890 (14 July 1956), 141.
- Glob, P. V. "The Prosperity of Bahrein Five Thousand Years Ago," The Illustrated London News, Vol. CCXXXII, No. 6187 (January 4, 1958), 14-16.
- "Growing Pains in Bahrain," The Economist, Vol. CLXXVIII, No. 5874 (24 March 1956), 641.
- Harrison, P. W. "Economic and Social Conditions in East Arabia," The Moslem World, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (April, 1924), 163-71.
- "Island Paradise," The Spectator, Vol. CCVI (January-June, 1961), 6.
- Johnson, P. "Struggle For the Middle East," New Statesman, Vol. LIV, No. 1374 (13 July 1957), 53-56.
- Kelly, J. B. "The Legal and Historical Basis of the British Position in the Persian Gulf," in St. Anthony's Papers Number 4, Middle Eastern Affairs Number One. New York: F. A. Praeger, 1959.

Kelly, J. B. "The Persian Claim to Bahrain," International Affairs, Vol. XXXIII, No. 1 (January, 1957), 51-70.

Khadduri, M. "Iran's Claim to the Sovereignty of Bahrayn," American Journal of International Law, Vol. XLV, No. 4 (October, 1951), 631-47.

Levin, B. "The Prisoners of St. Helena," The Spectator, Vol. CCV (July-December, 1960), 6-10.

_____. "The Prisoners of St. Helena Part 3," The Spectator, Vol. CCVI (January-June, 1961), 6.

Liebesny, H. J. "Administration and Legal Development in Arabia, The Persian Gulf Principalities," The Middle East Journal, Vol. X, No. 1 (Winter, 1956), 33-42.

London Times, The.

"Madrasat al-Sinā'a," Hunā al-Bahrain, No. 146 (March, 1964), 4-7.
(Fortnightly publication of Radio Bahrain, in Arabic.)

Melamid, A. "Political Geography of Trucial Oman and Qatar," The Geographical Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 2 (April, 1953), 194-206.

al-Nahdhah, Saudi Arabian newspaper.

New York Times, The.

O'Ferrall, J. M. "Human Relations in the Bahrain Oil Industry," Industrial Welfare, Vol. XLII, No. 5 (September-October, 1960), 276-78.

Oil and Gas Journal.

Petroleum Intelligence Weekly.

al-Qafilah, former Bahrain newspaper.

Qubain, F. I. "Social Classes and Tensions in Bahrain," The Middle East Journal, Vol. IX, No. 3 (Summer, 1955), 269-80.

"Readers' Commentary," The Middle East Journal, Vol. X, No. 2 (Spring, 1956), 235-37.

Sell, G. "Twenty-five Years of Middle East Oil, Bapco Operations in Bahrain," The Institute of Petroleum Review, Vol. XII, No. 142 (October, 1958), 333-36.

Whish, R. W. "Memoir on Bahreyn," Transaction of Bombay Geographical Society, 1860-1862, Vol. 16.

Young, R. "Further Claims to Areas Beneath the High Seas," The American Journal of International Law, Vol. XLIII, No. 4 (October, 1949), 790-92.

Reports

- Arabian American Oil Company. Aramco 1962. A review of operations.
- Bahrain Petroleum Company Limited. Annual Reports to the Ruler of Bahrain and Its Dependencies. Manamah: Oriental Press.
- Government of Bahrain. Administrative Report for the Years 1926-1937.
Date and place of publication unknown.
- Government of Bahrain. Annual Reports 1942-1961. Manamah, Bahrain:
Oriental Press.

Unpublished Material


- Bahrain Petroleum Company, Department of Public Relations. A Short Account of the Operations of the Bahrain Petroleum Company Limited. (Mimeographed and cited as Account.)
- Government of Bahrain, Department of Education. Report For the Year 1963.
(Mimeographed, in Arabic, cited as Taqrir.)
- Hazard, H. W. Subcontractor's Monograph on Eastern Arabia. New Haven:
Human Relations Area Files, Inc., 1956.
- Higher Executive Committee. Bulletins No. 41 & 43. Dated 26 February 1956
and 3 March 1956.
- History of Middle East Force Command. A mimeographed handout from the
United States Navy.
- Malik, C. H. "Developing Leadership in New Countries," an address given
to a Plenary Session of the 13th CIOS International Management
Congress at the New York Hilton Hotel, 19 September 1963.

Other Sources

- Bahrain Island. Personal interviews with Government Officials, school teachers,
Bapco personnel, a lawyer, British and United States military personnel,
and private citizens.
- Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Personal interviews with Aramco management executives.



Special Reference Libraries. Arabian American Oil Company and Bahrain
Petroleum Company Limited.

Special Reports and Files. Listed as Anon.



PERSIAN


Guide Map
of the
Bahrein Islands



PERSIAN

Guide Map
of the
Bahrein Islands

SCALE 1 INCH TO 1000 FEET



PERSIAN

General Map
of the
PERSIAN GULF

