THE FIFTH LEBANESE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
1943 - 1944

BY
MOUHIR R. SA'ADAH

Being a thesis presented to the Department of Political Science at the American University of Beirut, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Beirut, Lebanon
1945
PREFACE

The Fifth Lebanese House of Representatives is the first completely and constitutionally elected legislative body that the Lebanese Republic has had. The first fifteen months of its existence were of great importance. It had to take decisive actions that will influence the life of the Lebanese Republic for years to come.

The present study is an attempt to examine the behavior of the House on some vital questions, and to arrive at some conclusions concerning the inclinations of the deputies and the courses which they have followed. This examination, it is hoped, may leave us in a position to consider how the work of the House might be rendered more efficient and more effective.

The writer has attempted throughout the study to confine his evidence to the actual happenings in the House itself. In this respect he has had at his disposal helpful source material. The official record of the assembly has been carefully examined. Also, since debates lose a good deal of their color when one reads them in the minutes of the meetings, the writer has often
availed himself of the opportunity of attending some of the more important meetings. When attending a meeting was not possible, he has followed carefully the reports in the press.

Mounir R. Sa'adah

American University of Beirut,
Beirut, Lebanon.

October, 1945.
THE FIFTH LEBANESE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 1943 - 1944

---

PREFACE

I. A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 5

II. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 13
   A. In the Constitution 14
   B. In the Election By-laws 21
   C. In Its Internal Organization 27

III. ELECTION OF DEPUTIES, PRESIDENT AND COMMITTEES 36
   A. Provisions for the Elections 37
   B. The General Elections and Issues Involved 43
   C. The Election of the President 51
   D. The Election of the Speaker and Committees 56
   E. The Significance of By-Elections 59
   F. The Factors Determining the Electors’ Vote 65

IV. VITAL LEGISLATIVE QUESTIONS 70
   A. Constitutional Amendments 71
   B. Foreign Policy 77
   C. Fiscal Policy 101
   D. Long Term Legislation 119
V. CONCLUSION.

Page 128

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Page 137

APPENDIX.

Page 140
I. A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
I. A POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

By the terms of the Mandate which was given to France by the League of Nations in 1920, France was expected to take steps to train the Lebanese people to become an independent sovereign entity. Upon this understanding the French High Commissioners in Lebanon began quite early to introduce the beginnings of parliamentary democratic government.

Under these conditions parliamentary rule in Lebanon went through several initial evolutionary steps. The first attempt was at the creation of an appointed directorate composed of seventeen members representing a wide range of the population. Two years later, in 1922, a small parliament composed of thirty members came into being. Then in 1925 a bi-cameral constituent assembly was chosen which gave Lebanon a constitution in 1926, and abolished the upper chamber. Another amendment created the next parliament which was made up of thirty elected and fifteen appointed members. The next two parliaments coming consecutively in 1934 and 1937 were of a similar nature.

1. See Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
The 1937 parliament was dissolved at the beginning of the war and upon this event the country gave an almost universal sigh of relief. The experiment in self-government did not produce good government. The fault was not primarily with parliamentary rule as such. Their unfavorable judgment of parliamentary institutions was understandable from their having observed a faulty experiment, but it was nevertheless unfair. Good government is no substitute for self-government. If we focus our attention in the coming chapters upon a short interval of that process, it is only to detect the faults, and avoid them, and to lay hold upon any merits and develop them.

Lebanon can and should profit by the experience of those lands that have gone through similar ordeals and come out with a workable solution. We are chiefly attracted by that form of democratic parliamentary rule that has been evolved in Switzerland where the situation is not far different from that of Lebanon. Perhaps as we scrutinize the governments of such countries we may come upon a happy solution of our own problem. But no matter what other people have done, it is always true that each people in the world has to work out its own salvation. As long as the Republic of Lebanon has confidence in itself, and is willing to learn, there is hope
for it. Herein lies its life and its possible contribution to the neighboring sister Arab nations.

This study divides itself into three main parts, descriptive, analytical and suggestive. These three aspects of the paper relate themselves to one another throughout because the approach has been along the line of taking each problem separately, describing the facts related to it, and drawing the conclusions that suggest themselves. In the first part of the paper, the general purpose is description; in the second part, it is analysis; and in the conclusion, the aim is in part directed to the better use of legislative power.

The Lebanese constitution serves as our starting point, along with the election by-laws, and the internal organization of the House of Representatives. These are the moulds that give the house its form, they define the reservations that give it its scope, as well as the liberties within the radius of which the representatives carry on their activities. The present House has taken a good deal of its color from these organs as they now stand, and the knowledge of them therefore becomes imperative if we want to understand the present moods and behavior of the House.

The second chapter is an investigation into the national currents and forces that are found in action
in the House of Representatives. The elections are seen to represent three possible phases of Lebanese political life: (1) the transitional phase from an authoritarian rule of the country to one of representative governments; (2) the resort to the will of the people through the use of the ballot; (3) the popular testing of the public's mood through the by-elections.

The transitional phase was in a large measure not taken through the initiative of a popular demand. It was largely inspired from above. There was a great deal of fumbling and reluctance on the part of those who were bringing about the change, and in some quarters the step was not a particularly welcome one.

The resort to the will of the people through the use of the ballot was quite bewildering at first, but the nation is hardly conscious politically, and democratic organization and procedure are a novel idea to the people. This fact accounts for some of the difficulties which display themselves.

The by-elections hold a place of special significance because they may be looked upon as plebiscites determining what the mind of the nation was after it had the time to draw a second breath and take stock of what it had done and what it wanted to do. So far, it will be
seen, the nation seems to stand behind the decisions it first made.

The third chapter is a consideration of some difficult problems which the House is attempting to solve. The constitutional amendments show clearly, for example, that the House stands unhesitatingly and uncompromisingly for national independence. The House at its very heart stands for and defends the complete sovereignty of the Lebanese Nation. It is possible to hear some few dissenting notes, but these do not mean opposition to independence; they are only the gasps of the fear that takes hold of one when he plunges himself into an unknown situation the results of which are incalculable.

The mind of the House on the subject of foreign policy is somewhat less certain. But in the main, the representatives show recognition of living in a transitional period which will involve serious changes and adjustments. There is uncertainty all over the world and it is hardly possible to ascertain the direction in which the wind will blow. Consequently it is seen to be unwise to enter into any commitments of a final nature. Reserve a friendly attitude toward all those nations that have shown good will toward Lebanon; cooperate with the neighboring Arab States to the utmost limit without compromising Lebanese sovereignty; keep an open mind and an alert eye; and above all do not commit
the government to a position from which disentangle-
ment becomes difficult or embarrassing; these are the
main trends that animate Lebanese Foreign policy.

In fiscal matters the House shows great inade-
quacy. This is largely due to the circumstances in
which the House finds itself, and to its fear of the
authority of the executive. On the whole, the execu-
tive branch has an unjustifiable share of fiscal autho-
rity. We shall see the reasons for this generalization,
and shall consider some remedies, in the concluding
chapter.

In respect to reconstruction, we shall see that
when the House is faced with a situation involving a
long term policy, it falters and falls. It has not yet
gained a balanced outlook and judgment that can give
confidence to the nation. Perhaps this will come in
time. What is needed is disinterestedness, character and
vision.

The bibliography includes first a general list of
books the reading of which will interpret the people
whose political behavior has come under our scrutiny.
Without such an interpretation their behavior might seem
baffling and confusing. Fortunately a good many official
records are easily available and others can be secured
with some difficulty. The writer himself has conversed
with many individuals ⋆, whose names however he is not at liberty to mention. There are periodicals of some value, but we have to keep in mind that unfortunately journalism in this land is at a low ebb. What the journals say does not always represent the mood of the country. This regrettable situation is aggravated by the strict censorship which prevails, by the power of the executive to suspend a paper by decree and by the fact that it is so easy to publish a journal with a view to making a fortune. Some of the technical books that are listed can be of help in giving information on certain technical matters.

The appendix contains relevant sections of the Constitution, together with information that finds no place in the body of the text but which either cannot be secured with ease elsewhere, or is necessary for a fuller understanding of certain points.
II. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY.

A. In the Constitution. 14
B. In the Election By-laws. 21
C. In its Internal Organization 27
II. THE LEGAL BASIS
OF THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
A. IN THE CONSTITUTION

There are one hundred and two articles in the Lebanese Constitution. Sixty\(^1\) of these deal with the composition, mode of election, time of session, functions, powers, and limitations of the parliament. This is one indication of the important place the parliament is meant to play in the political organization of the country.

According to the articles of the Constitution, it is the function of the Parliament to elect the President of the Republic\(^2\) by a two-thirds majority secret ballot vote\(^5\), make him take the oath\(^4\), bring charges of treason against him\(^5\), and appoint seven judges out of a High Court of fifteen\(^6\) to try him.

Its control of the executive branch goes still further. It gives its confidence or withdraws it from the Cabinet either collectively or individually\(^7\). It can,

---
1. The Lebanese Constitution (Al-Dussur Al-Lebnani)
   Articles: 3, 16, 19, 21, 24-52, 56, 55-59, 60, 67, 62, 70, 76-80, 82-83.
2. Ibid., Arts. 72-78.
3. \*; Art. 49.
4. \*; Art. 60.
5. \*; Art. 60.
6. \*; Art. 80.
7. \*; Art. 68.
furthermore, bring charges against any member of the Cabinet for his abuse of the office by a two-thirds majority vote. Any one member in the Parliament can call for a vote of confidence.\textsuperscript{2}

But the Parliament does not have it all its own way with the Executive. The President of the Republic has the right, in conjunction with his ministers, to dissolve Parliament\textsuperscript{5} and call for a new election\textsuperscript{4}, postpone its sessions for a period which should not exceed one month\textsuperscript{5}, send a bill back to be \textit{reconsidered}\textsuperscript{6}, and even publish a bill as law in case the government decides that it is urgent and Parliament does not reach a conclusion on it within forty days of its introduction\textsuperscript{7}.

The constitution gives the right for the initiation of laws to both the President as well as to Parliament itself\textsuperscript{8}, and no act is to be considered law unless it is passed by Parliament\textsuperscript{9} subject to the above mentioned

\begin{itemize}
\item[Ibid., Article 70.]
\item[2. Ibid., Article 37.]
\item[3. Ibid., Article 55.]
\item[4. Ibid., Article 25.]
\item[5. Ibid., Article 69.]
\item[6. Ibid., Article 57.]
\item[7. Ibid., Article 58.]
\item[8. Ibid., Article 18.]
\item[9. Ibid., Articles 16 and 19.]
\end{itemize}
limitations. Parliament is further vested with the right of changing the administrative districts, the ratification of treaties which have a permanent character or which involve financial obligations, the voting of the budget, and the amendment of the constitution.

These last two functions require some further discussion. The government is expected to present to Parliament a bill for the budget of the coming year to be considered during the October session. This budget is to be a detailed statement for expenses and revenues. Parliament has no right to increase the estimates submitted by the government. In case Parliament is unable to vote on the budget within the ordinary session, then the President ought to call for an extraordinary session, during which time the government will be authorized to levy taxes and expend funds in accordance with the budget of the previous year. In case Parliament still reaches no conclusion, then the President, in agreement with his ministers, will be allowed to sign the proposed budget.

1. See supra p. 35
2. Ibid., Art. 3.
4. " Articles 82-89.
5. " " Art. 76-79.
6. " " Art. 82.
7. " " Art. 84.
as submitted by the government. The budget has to be voted on item by item.

The amendment of the constitution can be initiated by either the President of the Republic, or by a request made by ten representatives. In the latter case the ten members have to state definitely their desire for a re-consideration of certain items in the constitution during any ordinary session. If this proposal is accepted by a two-thirds majority, then the government is asked to introduce a bill to that effect. In case the government adopts the suggestion it will approach the Parliament with the bill within four months of the request. In case the government wishes to reject the proposal then it is returned to the Parliament. This body studies the suggestion once more and votes on it. If it receives a three-fourths majority vote, then the President either accepts the decision of Parliament or dissolves Parliament and calls for a new election. When the new Parliament meets and approves the action of its predecessor, then the government will have to introduce the bill for amendment in the Parliament.

The constitution devotes several articles to the election and organization of the representatives. It

1. Ibid., Art. 88.
2. Ibid., 83.
3. Ibid., 76.
4. Ibid., Articles 77 and 85.
gives the right of voting to any Lebanese male citizen who has reached the age of twenty-one provided he answers certain requirements. The elected representative comes to the Parliament free from any conditions and he represents the whole nation. This article is primarily intended to free the representative from any pressure that his constituency might bring to bear upon him. The elections ought to be held within the sixty days that precede the end of the term of the outgoing parliament, or within three months from its dissolution by the President. In case a member drops out for some reason, then his successor ought to be elected within a period of two months. Parliament meets in two regular sessions every year as well as any extraordinary sessions. During its first session every year it elects a president and two secretaries. Thus constituted the House has the sole right to regularize its internal constitution, to decide upon the validity of the election of its own members, to keep order in the place of meeting, and to fix the salaries of the members.

1. Ibid., Arts. 21 and 29.
2. Art. 27 and 24.
3. Art. 42.
4. Art. 23.
5. Art. 41.
6. Art. 32.
7. Art. 44.
8. Art. 43.
10. Art. 46.
Parliament meets in Beirut in response to a decree issued by the President of the Republic for special sessions, as to regular sessions, they take place automatically on the appointed dates: the Tuesday that follows the fifteenth of March, and the Tuesday that follows the fifteenth of October. Each session lasts two months and a half. Any meeting which is held outside the official dates will be considered unconstitutional.

A simple majority constitutes a quorum, and a majority of those present is sufficient for the passage of an ordinary bill. No voting may be done by proxy, and with the exception of voting for elections, all voting is done publicly. The meetings are to be public unless there is a special request from the government or of five members, in which case the meeting will be in secret. The members enjoy complete immunity and they are not to be prosecuted for anything that they say during their being deputies. It is permissible for the deputy to hold a position in the cabinet also.

1. Ibid., Art. 20
2. " " " 33
3. " " " 32
4. " " " 31
5. " " " 34
6. " " " 45
7. " " " 36
8. " " " 35
9. " " " 39
10. " " " 26
This is a brief account of the duties of the Lebanese Parliament with regard to the legislative branch of the State, the limitations and checks on its power, its functions, its mode of election, and its internal organization as it is described in the Lebanese Constitution. We shall now turn our attention to present briefly the mode of the election of the deputies.
B. IN THE ELECTORAL BY-LAWS

The electoral by-laws for the Lebanese Republic fall in ninety articles. These, in their turn, are divided into six chapters: (1) the distribution of chairs and mode of voting; (2) the electoral lists and their revision; (3) those who may vote and those who may run for election; (4) electoral formalities; (5) Electoral announcements; and (6) the sanctions. We shall, in the following pages, try to outline the more important articles that deal directly with the candidates themselves.

1. The regular number of deputies that were decided to sit in the present parliament is fifty-five. These are distributed over five electoral districts which coincide with the Administrative Districts of the

2. Ibid., Arts. 1-9.
3. - ; - 10-25.
4. - ; - 26-32.
5. - ; - 33-57.
7. - ; - 63-90.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>No. of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>166,684</td>
<td>9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>328,610</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>233,920</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>204,691</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bekaa</td>
<td>151,019</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The seats are assigned proportionately to the number of inhabitants per religious sect: 2 Armenian Orthodox, 4 Druze, 3 Greek Catholic, 6 Greek Orthodox, 18 Maronites, 1 Minorities, 10 Shi'ite, and 11 Sunnite. The minorities' one representative is to be attached to the Beirut District. The elections are on equal degree and the voting is done by secret ballot. The electors do not vote for only those candidates who represent their own sect, but for as many candidates as the number of deputies that their district is allowed to send to the Parliament.

2. The number of seats assigned to each district was given in decree F.C./312, issued 31 July, 1945.
3. Electoral Bylaws, Art. 1
5. Electoral Bylaws, Art. 2.
6. " " " " " 6.
7. " " " " 3.

K.B. The population figure for the Beirut District (166,684) does not entitle Beirut to 9 deputies. There are two other figures for the population of the district in Appendix C as Appendix Q. These figures are nearer to the figure required to give Beirut 9 Deputies. The reason why 166,684 was shown here rather than the other figures is that its compilation more accurate and official than the other two. In fact the figure of the C.S.P. is nearer to - - - - - -.
These candidates ought to be Lebanese citizens, literate, over twenty-five years of age and in full possession of their civil rights. The call for the elections proceeds from the President of the Republic fifteen days before the elections are to be held and sixty days before the term of the outgoing parliament expires.

2) Every Country will have a special committee formed, the main duty of which will be to keep in close touch with the Department of Vital Statistics to revise the lists of the electors, and to send in a revised list every year to the Central Government. A court will also be appointed which will look into any claims of persons whose names have been left out, or protests against the names of some persons which are included in the electoral list by mistake or in an attempt at fraud.

1. Ibid., Art. 7
2. = 8
3. = 11
4. = 12
5. = Arts. 13 and 22
6. = Art. 14
7. = Art. 15
8. = 18
3) The law forbids any person who is engaged in any branch of the Civil Service from becoming a deputy, i.e., no man is allowed to hold jointly membership in the Chamber and a government position with a salary. Further restrictions are put on the Secretary of the State, Heads of Departments in the Central Government and the Judges of the Courts of Appeal and of Cassation: these are not permitted to run for election unless their resignation from office precedes the elections by six months. Such officials as District Governors, Kaimans, Inspectors of Education, Police Chiefs, Finance Department Officials, are not permitted to run for election in the district where they have been engaged. Finally, no candidate's claims are valid if he runs in more than one district.

4) The process of actual voting ought not to take more than two days, during which period each voter ought to go in person and hand in his vote to the man in charge of the ballot box and the latter throws it into the box. A candidate must have the majority of the votes cast to be elected.

---

I. Ibid., Art. 23
2. * * 29
3. * * 30
4. * * 29
5. * * 57
6. * * 42
7. * * 48
8. * * 58
in case some vacancies remain because some candidates did not receive the required majority, then another election is to be held between the fifth and the eighth day after the first round. In this case a plurality is sufficient for any candidate. Immediately the period for voting expires, the ballot boxes are publicly opened, a count is made, and an official record is written and signed by the appropriate officials, and the ballots are burned except the blank ones, or the ones that contain names other than those of the official candidates.

5) Electoral announcements are not subject to any fiscal restrictions, space is allotted to each candidate in those places where official announcements are stuck. Announcements may be put up in other localities provided three copies of each of these are signed and deposited in the central government bureau.

6) Strict sanctions are applied against any infringements of the electoral laws. Such offences as the obtaining of the right to vote fraudulently, trying to stuff the ballot boxes, threat of force, use of force,

1. Ibid., Art. 57
2. * * * 50
3. * * * 55
4. * * * 59
5. * * * 60
6. * Articles 68-70
7. * Art. 71
or damage of property to any person so as to intimi-
date him to vote or abstain from voting in a certain
manner\(^1\), payment or promise of a reward for voting or
for abstaining from doing so\(^2\), specific promises to
cities or to sections of the population\(^3\), the abduction
of the ballot box\(^4\), the insulting of the election offi-
ciales\(^5\), all these and similar offences are punishable
by various sanctions ranging from monetary fines to
long terms of imprisonment with hard labor.

This is a brief summary of the Electoral By-laws
describing the mode of voting and distribution of chairs,
the formation and revision of the electoral lists, the
persons invested with the right to vote and those who
may run for election, the actual process of voting, an-
nouncements, and sanctions against any infringements of
the Electoral By-laws. We shall now attempt to conclude
this introductory chapter with a brief examination of
those by-laws which regulate the internal organization
and procedure of activities in the Lebanese Parliament
itself.

1. Ibid., Art. 64.
2. \# \# 65.
3. \# \# 65.
4. \# \# 80.
B. IN ITS INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

The by-laws which regulate the conduct and the internal organization of the Lebanese Parliament fall in two-hundred and twenty-eight articles \(^1\). These are divided into eleven parts: (1) the election of the officers of the Chamber \(^2\); (2) the verification of elections and resignations \(^3\); (3) committees \(^4\); (4) rules of conduct in the meetings \(^5\); (5) bills and motions \(^6\); Questions \(^7\); urgent matters \(^8\); (8) petitions \(^9\); (9) leaves of absence \(^10\); (10) peace and order within the Chamber \(^11\); (11) Miscellaneous \(^12\).

1. The Chamber has four officials: a President, a Vice-President, and two secretaries \(^13\). They hold their office for a term which ends always with the regular session which begins in October \(^14\). Their election is by secret ballot \(^15\).

---

2. Ibid., Arts. 1-7.
3. Ibid., Art. 8-15.
4. Ibid., Art. 16-42.
5. Ibid., Art. 43-62.
6. Ibid., Art. 63-128.
8. Ibid., Art. 164-190.
10. Ibid., Art. 200-208.
13. Ibid., Art. 219-228.
15. Ibid., Art. 3.
2) Immediately after the election of the officers, the Chamber also elects five of its number to look into and verify the legality of the election of each deputy. This committee is free to take any action so as to verify the truth or falsehood of any accusation. Once it is through with its investigation a report is submitted to the President. This report should be ready within seven days from the date requesting the committee to look into the question. The ultimate decision lies in the hands of the Chamber, and before a deputy should lose his position, the House should pass a vote to that effect by a two-thirds majority. In the meantime, and until a decision is reached, the deputy in question has the full right to participate in the activities of the Chamber, except in the question of introducing bills. When a deputy resigns by his own free will, such a resignation has to be voted on by the members of the Chamber.

3) The Chamber's third immediate duty is the election of its primary committees: The Finance Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Public Works and Health Committee, Public Instruction Committee, Commerce-Agriculture-and-Provisions Committee, Petitions and Mo-

1. Ibid., Art. 3.
2. Ibid., Art. 9.
3. Ibid., Art. 11.
5. Ibid., Art. 15.
6. Ibid., Art. 15.
tions Committee, Industry and Resorts Committee. The members of these committees serve for a term of one full year. No deputy may sit on more than two committees at the same time, one may not combine a cabinet post with a committee membership.

Business presented to committees must pass through the President of the Chamber. One day in the week is set aside for the committee meetings. These meetings are secret, except for deputies who may attend as non-voting members and any committee is entitled to call upon any person through the President of the Chamber to appear before the Committee for testimony, expert advice, or any information that the committee requires.

After due consideration of the question, a report is submitted, within the period of one month dating from the receipt of request for study, to the whole House for final action. During the debate, the committee assigns one member to defend its views.
4) The President of the Chamber assigns the times for meetings, he calls for them, keeps order, gives the floor and announces decisions. He may also vote\(^1\). He does not participate in the discussion except for the purpose of explaining a point\(^2\). In case of participation, he gives the chair to the Vice-President\(^3\). In such a case he has no right to resume the chair during the discussion on that question\(^4\).

The secretaries keep a record of those who ask for the floor, they collect votes and count them, and take down the minutes of the secret meetings, if any minutes are to be taken at all\(^5\). Minutes become binding only when the House hears, corrects, when necessary, and approves them\(^6\).

The sanctions for offending deputies vary with the offence. In case a deputy is out of order, his attention is called\(^7\). If he persists in being out of order, his attention is called and the fact is recorded in the minutes\(^8\). Any further persistence may bar the deputy by a vote of the House from discussing or voting on the

\begin{verbatim}
1. Ibid. Art. 45.
2. Ibid. Art. 44.
3. Ibid. Art. 47.
4. Ibid. Art. 44.
5. Ibid. Arts. 46 and 86.
6. Ibid. Arts. 50-58.
7. Ibid. Art. 97.
8. Ibid. Art. 96.
\end{verbatim}
question 1. In case of disorder, rebuke is administered and if the members so desire, the offending deputy is suspended for the duration of the meeting 2. If the deputy uses, or threatens the use of force, or resorts to insult the President of the Chamber, or the members of the government, or the President of the Republic 3, then he is barred from the meetings for fifteen days 4, and a corresponding deduction is made in his salary. Announcements of this decision are then printed at the expense of the deputy himself and distributed in his constituency 5.

Deputies who absent themselves from meetings without a written explanation given before the end of the meeting, will be fined an amount equal to one-thirtieth of a month's salary. The same applies if they absent themselves from committee meetings 6. Absences from five consecutive meetings reduces the member's salary by one-half of a monthly allowance 7.

A quorum is necessary for a regular meeting. Half of the deputies plus one constitute a quorum. Decisions are taken by majority vote 8. Voting may be done by various modes: showing of hands, standing up, calling on.

1. Ibid., Art. 96.
2. * = 104.
5. * = 105.
8. * = 109 except in such cases as the amendment of the Constitution and the election of the President.
members, or by writing. Secret ballots are used only in the case of elections.

The report of a committee might be adopted or rejected. In either case, the question is open for discussion, for amendment, for acceptance or for rejection. Bills that are composed from many items are to be voted on item by item.

5) Bills may be introduced into the House by the government through the President of the Chamber. He refers them to the committee concerned after their first reading before the Chamber. The committee reports and a second reading is made. The House proceeds to discuss and act upon each item separately. If the House rejects to discuss each item separately, then the bill is automatically cancelled.

Finally, the bill goes through its third reading and action is taken either in rejecting or accepting the bill.

1. Ibid., Arts. 111-114.
2. ** Art. 116.**
3. ** Art. 121.**
4. ** Art. 126.**
5. ** Art. 130.**
6. ** Art. 132.**
7. Unless the bill deals with the ratification of a treaty, then it is voted upon as one unit.
8. Ibid., Art. 133.
9. ** Art. 142.**
A rejected bill may not be reintroduced during that particular session.\(^1\)

Bills may be introduced by individual members in writing\(^2\) through the President of the Chamber. He refers them to the House to decide whether they should be referred to the Committee on Petitions and Motions.\(^3\) The committee reports within fifteen days. Then the bill is sent to the appropriate committee and the usual procedure takes place.\(^4\) In case the House refuses to refer the motion to the Committee on Petitions and Motions, then the bill is "put to rest".\(^5\)

6) Questions and interpellations must be written and submitted to the President of the Chamber at least twenty-four hours before the meeting of the House. The President refers them immediately to the minister concerned.\(^6\) The minister may answer immediately, or postpone his answer, or refuse altogether to answer.\(^7\) If the questioner, who is the only person permitted to speak with reference to his question, is not satisfied with the answer, he has the right to explain the reasons for his dissatisfaction to the House then, if the majority

---

1. Ibid., Art. 151.
2. Ibid., Art. 147.
3. Ibid., Art. 146.
4. Ibid., Art. 149.
5. Ibid., Art. 146.
6. Ibid., Art. 183.
7. Ibid., Art. 166.
8. Ibid., Art. 168.
so desire a period for interpellation follows in which all may take a share\(^1\). If the cabinet resigns, the question is cancelled\(^2\).

7) Some bills are urgent. The mover must submit his reasons for the urgency in a written form. If the House approves, the question receives precedence over all other matters when it is referred to the appropriate committee. When the bill is composed of one single article it is permissible, upon very urgent request and approval by the House, to act upon it immediately\(^3\). In this latter case, and in case the bill passes in the House, then it might be referred to a committee to rectify its wording and give it its legal terminology\(^4\).

8) Petitions to the Chamber by any person or persons directly or through a deputy must be sent to the President on Petitions of the Chamber\(^5\). The Committee gives its recommendation. An answer is sent directly to the petitioner\(^6\) from the President of the Chamber\(^7\) and a report is submitted and read in the meeting of the House\(^8\).

Leaves of absence are granted in urgent cases. Such leaves may be granted by the President of the Chamber.

1. Ibid., Art. 173.
2. \* \* \* 173.
3. \* \* \* 181.
4. \* \* \* 185.
5. \* \* \* 200.
6. \* \* \* 203.
7. \* \* \* 207.
8. \* \* \* 208.
provided he reports to the Chamber in the next meeting. Any deputy who comes half an hour late to the meeting, or who does not sign his name in the attendance book, or who leaves the meeting before the last roll call is considered absent. The request for leave of a definite duration may be granted if it is submitted to the proper committee, approved by it and ratified by the House. If the request is rejected and the deputy absents himself, he is subject to sanctions.

10) The President of the Chamber is the sole person responsible for order and discipline in the Chamber, in the Parliament Building and in the immediate vicinity of the building. He determines the number of "officers of peace" that are needed and decides on their disposition. Entry is forbidden to the rooms set aside for the members to anybody other than the deputies and the employees of the House. Visitors occupy special seats and they are not allowed to express themselves in any manner.

11) The miscellaneous items deal with such matters as: a) the budget of the Parliament which is prepared by the President of the Chamber; b) the House elects a committee to represent it officially; c) a record of

1. Ibid., Art. 209.
2. * = 212.
5. * = 216.
each meeting is kept stating the names of the members who were present during a part or the whole of a meeting, a summary of all the decisions. Another record is to be made giving a detailed report of all that took place during the meeting. A copy of this is made available to each deputy.

1. Ibid., Art. 222.
2. Ibid., Art. 223.
3. Ibid., Art. 224.
III. ELECTION OF DEPUTIES, PRESIDENT AND COMMITTEES.

A. Provisions for the Elections 37
B. The General Elections and Issues Involved. 43
C. The Election of the President 51
D. The Election of the Speaker and Committees. 56
E. The Significance of By-Elections. 59
F. The Factors Determining the Electors' Vote. 65
A. PROVISIONS FOR THE ELECTIONS

On the twenty-first of September, 1939, the High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and the Lebanon issued a decree suspending those articles in the Lebanese Constitution which deal with the Legislative branch of the State activities, dissolving the Parliament and making no provision for any elections. Thus ended the Fourth Lebanese Parliament. Four years passed before the Fifth Parliament was elected.

The dismissal of the Parliament brought no violent protests. The consensus of opinion was that the Parliamentary system as it was represented by the Fourth Lebanese Parliament was detrimental to the general well-being of the land. On the one extreme one finds the approval of Al-Bashir which affirms that the act represents the will of the nation. It terminates a period of corruption and misrule. Sawt el-Ahrar, on the other side, anticipates the reasons which the Haust Commissariat put forth to justify its action: to put an end to party strife, to bring about administrative reforms, to save

2. Ibid., Art. 1.
3. Ibid., Art. 2.
money during a period of financial strain, to speed up action, and to make room for experimentation so as to arrive at the best form of government for the country after the war. But there is a note of surprise at even the suggestion of the termination of democratic rule because the people wanted reform of democratic rule and not the abolition of democracy and home rule. There are even weak allusions to some protests.

The situation remained the same as it had been defined in the September, 1939 decree until the 18th of March, 1943, when General G. Catroux issued a decree reestablishing constitutional rule in the country and calling for the election of a parliament within three months. This was to fulfill the promises made by the President of the Free French on the 24th of June, 1941, by General Catroux on the 26th of November, 1941, by the National Committee of the Fighting French on the 24th of December 1943, and after consultations with the British Government.

2. Ibid., Editorial, Sept. 18, 1939, No. 2774.
5. Ibid., Art. 1
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., Preamble, pp. 10967-10968.
Simultaneously another decree authorized the Head of the Lebanese State to put the electoral machinery in motion\(^1\). On the 31st of March, 1943, a High Committee for electoral registrations was formed\(^2\). On the 31st of July, 1943, the Délegation Générale de la France Combattante au Levant issued a decree to the effect that Parliament was to hold an extraordinary session within fifteen days from its election\(^3\).

The distribution of seats among the districts and sects was to be as follows\(^4\):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>no. of Deputies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BEIRUT</td>
<td>Sunnis</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shites</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armenian Orthodox</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTH LEBANON</td>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sunnis</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ibid., 150/FC, p. 10069, Article 4.
2. " 85/ET, No. 4076, April 7, 1943, p. 11017.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>No. of Deputies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MOUNT LEBANON</td>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sunnis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shites</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH LEBANON</td>
<td>Shites</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sunnis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUKA' DISTRICT</td>
<td>Shites</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sunnis</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greek Catholic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The date for the elections was fixed as the 29th of August, 1943\(^1\). Colonel Nawfal was put in charge of the security forces during the elections\(^2\).

The period which preceded the elections presented delicate and serious questions. It began with the appointment of Mr. Alfred Nacache on the 23rd of Nov-

---

1. Ibid., 2/TB, No. 4095, Aug. 11, 1943, p. 11326.
ember, 1941, as the President of the Republic. His ministers were Messrs. Sami-As-Sulh, Ahmad al-Eusayni, and Philip Bulus. They were to administer the government during the transitional period. They were dismissed when they grew gradually unwieldy in the hands of the French authorities. They were replaced by Dr. Ayyub Tabet as Head of the State and Messrs. Khaled Shihab and Jawad Bulus as his secretaries on the 28th of March, 1943.1 These encountered considerable opposition over the distribution of the Parliamentary seats among the various sects2 and over their attitude towards the bigger problem of Lebanon’s relations with its neighbors. They were dismissed on the 21st of July, 1943. The next government was headed by Mr. Petro Trad who had Messrs. A. Hayham and Tawfiq Awad as his secretaries3. It was in the days of this government that the elections were held. The three men who were Heads of the State during this period: Messrs. Naccash, Tabet and Trad are outstanding Lebanese statesmen but none of them was able to successfully harmonize the conflicting forces that combined to form the Lebanese Political Scene.

1. Ibid., FC No. 4073, March 24, 1943, p. 10969 and 1/ET, No. 4073, March 24, 1943, p. 10970.
3. Ibid., 301/FC, No. 4091, July 23, 1943, p. 11302-11305.
E. GENERAL ELECTIONS AND ISSUES INVOLVED

The elections took place on the 29th of August, 1943\(^2\), and September 5, 1943\(^3\). They resulted in the first Lebanese House of Representatives whose members were all popularly elected\(^4\). The awareness on the part of some Lebanese of the great issues and decisions involved, made the elections an event of the first order in the life of the nation.

The practice in making nominations is that groups of nominees get together and run for election on a joint list. The making of these "electoral lists" is a very interesting and complicated affair. It involves such

1. Some of the information given in this chapter will not be documented because a good deal of it has been gathered first hand by the author, and in many cases the information secured was given confidentially by persons whose integrity the author does not question, but for various reasons they wanted their identity to be withheld.
3. Ibid., 14/73. p. Il1377, No. 4097.
4. The previous Lebanese Houses of Representatives contained a certain number of popularly elected representatives and the rest were appointed.
calculations in electoral power of the various members, their religious affiliations, their personal magnetism, their financial standing, their position with regard to the "authorities," that it often results in strange combinations. It is often true that candidates on the same list do not share the same political views\(^1\). They part ways as soon as the outcome of the election is announced. We shall call attention to this later.

In the end each district came out with, at least, two major competing lists. North Lebanon and South Lebanon districts represent less complicated situations. In both of these districts a form of feudalism still persists. Both of them had two lists each headed by influential citizens. Both had lists, one made up of men who have hitherto been favorable to the earlier regimes in Lebanon, and the other made up of men who were out to destroy the old political regime and get rid of foreign domination. For instance in the North we find the names of such men as Karamieh and Hulela, sworn enemies of the previous regime, while on the other list there are such names as U. Mukaddem and T. Awad who have often been willing to go a long way with the French authorities\(^2\).

---

1. Al-Diar, Al-Ma' alumah Ma'radat Riasat Al-Jamahiryyat
2. For a complete composition of these lists please refer to Appendix No. A.
The electorate in the northern district: those who are entitled to vote according to the government records are 43,253, its total population is 221,666 and 29,675 voted. The candidate who received the highest number of votes was Mr. H. Fawzi, with 26,402 votes, with H. Karamsh next, 16,119 votes. All the twelve candidates on Mr. Karamsh's list won.

In the south, one list was headed by such men as R. Suleh and A. Usayran, who are avowed opponents of the old regime, and the other headed by such men as Y. Zeine and H. Sabri who are supporters of the old regime.

The total population of the South District is 149,207, those who are entitled to vote total 57,661, and those who actually voted are 34,394. The candidate who received the highest number of votes was Mr. A. Usayran (20,111 votes) with R. Saydun (19,683 votes), A. Al Asad (19,248) and R. Suleh (19,068). All but one of this list won in the first round.

1. For this and all further reference to the Electorate please refer to Appendix B.
2. For this and all further reference to population please refer to Appendix C.
The Buka' represents a slightly different situation. It is not as feudal as the North and the South and there are not many traditionally rooted families there. Leadership fluctuates a good deal. It has the smallest population of all the districts (143,423) and is quite heterogeneous in its makeup. This can be seen from the fact that all the major sects in Lebanon are represented in it. The list that won the elections was definitely on the side that was opposed to the old setup, with Mr. S. Hmideh (11717) topping the list.

When we come to examine the Beirut District elections, we find the situation quite confused. The "lists" show that convenience and expediency brought the candidates together. The primary concern of the candidates was to squeeze themselves into that list which in their calculation stood the greater chance of success. Only 25% of the electorate took part in the voting whereas in other districts close on 90% of the electors took part. This is an indication that in the Beirut District the issues were not clear cut and the lists presented no challenge to the public. Either lists of candidates was as desirable as the other. The truth of this is also shown in the second round when the question resolved itself into a matter of book-keeping.
The number of people entitled to vote in Beirut District is 43781 (population 255,667). Only 11429 actually voted. Mr. S. Sulh topped the winning group with a vote of 5967. Next to him came A. Hacassh with 5860 and Shanlian with 5813. It is interesting to note that the lowest recorded vote was 3 for a man who ran on an individual ballot list. The communist candidate running alone scored 2046 votes.

Mount Lebanon District has a population of 255,931; those who voted were 40,116; those who are entitled to vote are 74,324. This district is the best political barometer of the Lebanese Republic. It contains two powerful political blocs known as the Constitution and the National. Both believe in Lebanese independence and that Lebanon cannot stand in a position of isolation. This is where they begin to part company. The Constitutional Bloc, realizing the impossibility of isolationism is willing, on the basis of complete independence, to come into close collaboration with the Arab States. Incidentally, this happens also to be the line that the British Foreign Office has with regard to the Arab Countries. The policy of the Constitutional Bloc seems to fall in line with that of Great Britain. This is where, has come

1. His Majesty's Government would view with sympathy any movement among Arabs to promote their economic, cultural or political unity. But clearly the initiative in any scheme would have to come from the Arabs them selves. Anthony Eden.
the erroneous idea that the Constitutional Bloc is subsidised by the English. In all his investigation, the writer has not been able to put his hand on any genuine cases that might prove the truth of this accusation. The Constitutional Bloc, being more realistic in its attitude, gets the support of the businessmen of the country who see in the words of General Spears: "Collaboration with them (Arab Countries) means wealth. Disagreement means poverty and ruin." Thus, the strength of the Constitutional Bloc is gathered from its appeal for independence, from those who have British inclinations, those who have pro-Arab inclinations, the powerful support of the merchants and industrialists, and the high quality of its leadership.

1. A contrary view is the following: An election was held in the Lebanon during which a good deal of hard cash changed hands. The French Administration spent certain sums of money to secure a parliament and cabinet relatively favorable to French influence and economic interests there. Meanwhile, General Sir Edward Spears, head of a somewhat ambiguous diplomatic and military British mission, was reported to have sponsored the circulation, through several channels, of other considerable moneys. Fortune, Editor F. Lawrence Babcock, vol XXX, p. 264, The Explosive Middle East, September, 1934.

2. For full text of footnote 1 p. 94.
The National Bloc is not so sure as to what it ought to do. Isolationism is desirable but not feasible. Many of them would, if they could, hug the Lebanese rocks and live in poverty and peace. But they know in their hearts that this is not possible. They see that what Lebanon is undergoing now is simply a phase of a historic struggle that has gone on for centuries—a struggle to stem human and cultural tides from the East that at times threatened to overwhelm Lebanon and submerge it. But Lebanon has held its own. For centuries this has been possible because of the sympathies and genuine support of the French. Under no circumstances should the French be antagonized. This traditional "union sacrée" should be maintained. The face of Lebanon turns West to France from whence comes its strength and its help.

The strength of the National Bloc comes from the independent isolationists, from the Francophils, from the fear that the Christians have of the Moslems, from the open support that the French give them, and from the strength of its leadership. On the 5th of August these two blocs entered into a great struggle to bid for power.

1. See Appendix² for an exact expression of views of its leader.
The first round was undecided, but the results showed that the relative strength of the National Bloc was greater than the Constitutional Bloc. Seven of the National Bloc were elected, K. Jumblat heading with 22663 votes. The Constitutional Bloc came out with one winning candidate: K. Shamoun with 20520 votes. A more significant fact is that the leader of neither party secured a seat, with Mr. Iddé the leader of the National Bloc having a slight lead over Mr. Khuri (19556 to 19467).

In the second round, efforts were multiplied. The contest was very close and the issues were so decisive that neither side nor their supporters who watched them with "rising interest" could afford to see their side lose. Neither side lost but there was a definite shift towards the Constitutional Bloc. When the final results came the Constitutional Bloc got five new seats with K. Khuri receiving 22263 votes, and the National Bloc four seats with Mr. Iddé receiving 22561 votes.

When the dust of the struggle finally cleared, it was evident that the election returns gave a majority of deputies who would favor to push Lebanon very far towards complete independence.

1. For a study of the individual deputies See Appendix 6
THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

No sooner had the general elections ended and the results made known than great activities began to be apparent. The purpose of these activities was to secure enough votes in the Parliament to give some one candidate for the presidency the necessary two-thirds majority.

At the beginning of the campaign there were five possible candidates: Messrs. B. Khuri, E. Iddé, K. Sham'un, A. Tabet, and A. Haccash.

B. Khuri was the leader of the Constitutional Bloc which had secured six seats in Mount Lebanon, seven in the Bekaa, a possible two in Beirut, and a strong support in the North and South. He stood positively for independence with strong tendencies towards collaboration with the neighboring Arab States. He is a Maronite.

E. Iddé had stood as the leader of the National Bloc, won eleven seats in Mount Lebanon, a possible four in Beirut, and some uncertain support from the North and the South. He is also a Maronite, isolationist, pro-French, and not friendly to Arab unity.

1. Lebanese Constitution, Art. 49.
K. Shammun belongs to the Constitutional Elco, has a strong electoral backing, is young, has character of high quality, is a Maronite and at one time seemed pretty close to getting the consensus of all contending parties.

Maccash is an honest, amiable Maronite who just missed a great opportunity two months previously to make himself a real National Hero. Some of the factors against him were his hesitancy, his being outside the parties, and his lukewarm attitude towards the Arabs.¹

Tabet is a strong and capable administrator, isolationist, somewhat anti-parliamentarian, a free thinker which means that he belongs to the minority groups in Lebanon. He is strong, firm and sometimes stubborn.

There was no question as to who was the candidate of the Constitution Elco. Mr. B. Khuri had been put forward from the start as their candidate for the Presi-

¹ The An-Nahda newspaper, February 1, 1989.
dency. The National Bloc was not so certain. During the electoral campaign some of those who went on the side of the National Bloc did so with the intention of seeing the leader of the minorities as President. This, they thought, would insure his neutrality. On the other hand, Iddé's intentions were not long concealed. But, constitutionally, Iddé was not eligible\(^1\), and at least on that score one foreign power was firm that they would not recognize his presidency if he got elected\(^2\).

Two days before the Presidential elections were held, Iddé promised his support to Mr. K. Sham'un if he ran on behalf of the Constitutional Bloc. Mr. B. Enuri agreed to withdraw his own nomination in favor of Sham'un. But the next morning Iddé withdrew his suggestion and consequently Sham'un declared his support of Mr. Enuri.

1. Lebanese Constitution Art. 49.
2. A good deal of my information about the ins and outs of the presidential campaign with regard to the National Bloc comes to me from one of its members who was very well informed and whose testimony is unquestionable. He wishes that his name should not be revealed.
On the eve of the elections, a group of 35 deputies signed a pledge promising to vote for Mr. B. Khuri as President of the Republic.

The session for the Presidential Election took place on the 31st of September, 1943. Eight members were absent: Idde, Jumblat, Bustani, Akl, Husayni, Khatib, Tabit and Talhuk. When the ballot box was opened there were 47 ballots, three blank and 44 were for Mr. B. Khuri.

Here are the highlights of the speech that he made:

"In this difficult hour we must mobilize ourselves for the service of Lebanon... We shall never forget any of our friends provided our friendship with them does not compromise our complete independence... Lebanon must remain faithful to the neighboring Arab States and must cooperate with them... Our debt to the Allies is great... Our best wishes are directed towards France our tradi-


2. Parliamentary Record, Sept. 21, 1943.
tional friends... My greetings are extended to England and the United States of America and to their two great leaders the creators of the Atlantic Charter... Lebanon has always been a refuge for liberty and freedom, and we pledge ourselves to carry on that great tradition."

On the 23rd of September, the House held a meeting to hear the President take the oath of office. As soon as the secretary read the fiftieth article of the Constitution, the President entered into the Hall and took the Oath:

"I swear in the name of the Great God that I respect the Constitution of the Lebanese Nation and its laws, and I preserve the independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon."

Thus, Mr. Bishara al-Khuri was sworn in as the President of the Lebanese Republic.

1. Ibid.
D. THE ELECTION OF THE SPEAKER AND COMMITTEES

According to the ninety-fifth Article of the Lebanese Constitution, responsibility should be distributed in the State, in so far as possible, in accordance with the strength of each sect. No one sect is to monopolise the higher offices of the government to the exclusion of the other.

The Shites represent the third most numerous sect in the Lebanese State (the Maronites come first and the Sunnis next). Thus they felt they had a legitimate claim for the Presidency of the Chamber. When the votes were cast, Mr. S. Himadeh received thirty-nine out of forty-seven votes.

The Vice Presidency of the Chamber went to a Greek Orthodox, Mr. N. Ghous, who received forty out of forty-seven votes cast.

Kessrs. R. Kaz'um and Z. Lehhud were chosen as the two secretaries with thirty-nine and thirty-seven votes.

Although the Lebanese Parliament has no parties in the proper sense of the word, yet we find that some discrimination is made in the selection of committees.

1. Ibid., Sept. 21, 1943.
For instance, there had been three turnovers in the selection of committees during the period under study and yet we find no place on them for Messrs. Saccoh, Karameh, Usayran, Faraon, Ghun, Istfan and Dr. Tabit. But we cannot see any common bond among these people which can explain their exclusion.

There is another interesting observation concerning the membership on committees: the man who has been chosen most often to sit on committees is Mr. N. Shabril (9 times), next to him come Mr. Y. Sarraf and Y. Hrawi (8 times), Y. Daw and W. Mlaym (7 times each). Then follow E. Lebbud, S. Suh, Y. Salim, G. Murr, Kan'as, Yafi, Mulla, M. Beydun, Kaz'un, B. S. Khuri, Mustafa, R. Beydun, Slam, Haydar, and Hasani with six times each.

Hrawi seems to be the man who sat on the greatest number of committees (4). Nuhin, Pirisli, S. Suh, Daw, Fadil, Al-Ali, Shaslian, Sarraf, and Shabril follow next having each sat on three committees.

Although no special fees are paid for membership on committees, and absence from their meetings subjects the individual to special sanctions, yet deputies are quite anxious to belong to them. This is due largely to the sense of duty and responsibility that the deputies have towards the execution of their calling, and partly to the ambitions of various deputies, to the craving
for power, to curiosity, and possibly (this we cannot verify but we have strong suspicions that in some cases it is true) to the fact that it might be used for useful personal ends.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BY-ELECTIONS

There have been four vacancies in the Parliament since the General Election. Two were due to the deaths of Mr. W. Jaja' and Mr. S. Takla, one to the expulsion of Mr. Iddi¹, and one caused by the election of Sheikh B. el-Khuri to the Presidency of the Republic.

The addition of four new members to replace four vacancies in itself is not a very important matter. But the by-elections assume great importance when one looks at them as the barometer by which we can judge whether the nation is behind the policy of the Parliament. From this point of view they deserve very close scrutiny because they came at intervals distant enough one from the other to allow time for public opinion to react to itself to changing conditions. The first of these by-elections came on the 23rd of April, 1944, and the other a year later on the 10th of March, 1945. Fortunately, both by-elections were connected with two very sensitive districts, Lebanon and North Lebanon; the former being in reality the "sensitive district in Lebanese politics"².

¹ Parliamentary Record, March 31, 1944.
The by-election to replace Messrs. Idde and Enuri in Lebanon, and Ja'ja' in North Lebanon came first. Here is a survey of the conduct of the Parliament:
there had been the raising of the leader of the Constitutional Bloc to the Presidency and the expulsion of the leader of the National Bloc from the Parliament; there had been the Egyptian Consultations for Arab Unity in which the Foreign and Prime Ministers took part with the blessing of Parliament¹, there had been the amendment of the Constitution and the November Crisis², the Syro-Lebanese Agreement³, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister were just back from a good-will visit to Iraq and Saudia Arabia⁴, and the country had had seven months of parliamentary rule with the principles of the Constitutional Bloc and its members riding high.

The by-elections came on the same old lines. Messrs. T. Awad and S. Labad both "embraced the principles of the National Bloc"⁵. Messrs. K. Abu-Jawdeh and P. Al-

¹ See Infra p. 77
² " " p. 71
³ See Infra p. 83
⁴ " " p. 88
⁵ Sept El-Ahmar, Hawadith wa Akhbar Mahaliyyah, April 28, 1944, No. 5161.
Khazin were candidates in the Constitutional Bloc during the August General Elections and strongly supported by the same group during these elections. The elections turned out to be a test to find out whether the mood of the nation was on the side of the Constitutional or the National Bloc with all that each of these Blocs stood for.

The struggle was intense. But let us take a look at the North before we see the result. Here we find a new candidate entering the field in the person of Y. Karam. So on the surface it would appear that these two men, H. Ja'Je'f and Y. Karam represented two opposite views. That we do not know. But what interests us here is that before the elections took place, Mr. Karam found it necessary to make his stand clear by issuing the following appeal to his constituency: "... I strongly feel the burden of being a deputy in this new and great era of independence. This independence stands on two strong pillars: the unity of the sects of the Lebanese Arab Nation so as to strengthen the sovereignty and independence of the Land, and the cooperation with the sister Arab-Nations for the happiness, supremacy, and glory of the Greater Arab Fatherland... Before my eyes I place the service of my

1. See Appendix "A"
Arab country\textsuperscript{1}.

The results of the by-elections were not only a victory for the Constitutional Bloc, but a veritable land-slide\textsuperscript{2}.

The Candidates of the Constitutional Bloc received the following votes:

F. Al-Khazin 38714
K. Abu-Jawdeh 32474

While those who stood for principles of the National Bloc received the following votes:

T. Awad 912
S. Labaki 326

In North Lebanon the votes were as follows:

Y. Karam 12030
H. Ja'ja' 8065

The second by-election took place on the 10th of March, 1945. Lebanon had already had three Cabinets of Constitutional Bloc composition; its position with regard to a treaty with a non-Arab State was made clear; the Protocol of Alexandria had been signed\textsuperscript{3}; the Syrian

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} Al-Nahar, Nida Ila-Al-Aybakbin, Y. Karam, April 26, 1944, No. 29880.
  \item \textsuperscript{2} See Appendix "A".
  \item \textsuperscript{3} See infra, "Foreign Policy".
  \item \textsuperscript{4} See Appendix "B".
\end{itemize}
and Lebanese foreign policy were being carried on with greater unison than ever; the income tax bill had been passed\(^2\); an agreement had been reached with regard to the war profits tax\(^2\); censorship of the press on local matters had been raised; the President of the Republic was out of the country trying to recover from a serious illness; General Spears had "resigned" from his post.

In other words, and in the exact wording that the candidate of the Kataib told the writer personally, "The country had had enough time to see that perhaps Idde was right\(^3\)."

The Kataib put up their own candidate. Judging from his public statements and his career, one finds that he ran on almost identical lines as the National Bloc. The Constitutional Bloc nominated Mr. H. Takla as their candidate. Again, there was an intense struggle. Thirty-seven thousand three hundred and fifty nine voters cast their ballots. The results were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Takla</td>
<td>24512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr. Rababet</td>
<td>13020</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) See Appendix "D"
\(^2\) *Infra. "War Profits Tax".*
\(^3\) *Interview, March 30, 1945.*
This is a big victory for the course that the government was taking, and a confirmation that the Parliament in its broader outline was pursuing a policy which the electorate approved and strongly supported. We may look upon these by-elections as a popular referendum through which the electorate gave their unquestionable approval to the policy that the Parliament was launched upon through the Cabinet.
F. THE FACTORS DETERMINING THE ELECTORS' VOTE

There is no way by which we can measure accurately the various forces that help make up the mind of the electorate. The following paragraphs will show what some of these factors are. The order in which these factors occur does not indicate their relative importance because there is no certainty in this matter.

1. Political principles and issues. It is beyond doubt that there is a portion of the electorate, in some places small and in others big, whose vote is largely determined by political principles. The writer met on the day of elections several people who had gone into the expense and trouble to come all the way from the mountains to Beirut to cast their vote because they believed that there were big political issues at stake and they had taken the opportunity to exercise their right to decide on them. Further evidence is provided from the pains that Mr. Karam had taken in his campaign to convince the Tripoli electorate of his "sound" political principles. When one reads the literature that the various candidates distributed, one can be sure that a big

2. There is an appreciable collection of this in the library of the American University of Beirut.
part of the appeal is for political principles.

2) Personal allegiance and family solidarity.

Relationships in big sections of the country are still established on the feudal basis. The "leaders" of the country have their "men" who are sure to vote for them at any election. There is a sense of loyalty and devotion that rarely allows itself to be swept by other considerations. This is quite true of the North, the South and, to a lesser extent, of the Ruha'. The family tie is also very strong and we find at such times a family solidarity which is unsurpassed.

3) Religious affiliations. When one analyzes the voting district by district, one finds a definite tendency. All things being equal, the Maronite is inclined to vote for a pro-French policy, the Greek Orthodox is uncertain, and the Moslem for a pro-Iran anti-foreign policy, the Druze are divided but the evidence points out that they are not very far from a position between the Maronites and the Greek Orthodox.

4) Personal intimidation and bribery. In many places the "men" of a certain candidate "occupy" the district and see to it that only the "right" kind of voters get near enough to cast their votes. We can see evidence of that from the various protests that Mr. Umayran sub-
mitted to authorities previous to the August Elections. As to bribery, we have first-hand evidence of it. The writer met in a place thirty-five voters who were gathered to vote in a bloc. At the time he was with them, agents were trying to offer them 350 Lebanese Pounds for their vote. They insisted on 450. The writer has seen with a man a number of identity papers (we can not be certain of the number, but they were over 50), which had been "bought" by him at a certain price and he was trying to sell them. The writer was not able to get the final bargain but he saw money being exchanged and the papers were handed in through the window of the polling station to be registered as votes. We have an indirect but dependable report of votes bought in the Buka' for over a hundred Syrian Pounds each. Votes were publicly bought and sold in other districts. One man who arrived at the "market" half an hour too late turned to the writer and said half jokingly that he had missed his only advantage of being a Lebanese citizen. Four deputies told us that on the day of the election itself their expenses ran as high as 18000 Syrian Pounds and each one added that their case very moderate.

1. Literature distributed by various candidates. A collection of these is in the library of the American University of Beirut.
Our main concern here is to see whether these methods help sway the electorate. One must regret such methods, but at least in the case of the General Election, they were so widely practised by the bigger blocs that the results tempted to cancel one another.

The elections resulted in the country having a fairly representative Parliament whose members represent all the major religious groupings of the State and a good variety of political opinions. Many of the members had previously served as deputies. Five of them had served either as Heads of the State or Presidents, or Prime Ministers. It is to be regretted that the overwhelming majority of the Deputies are either professional lawyers or big landowners, but with the present non-party organization of the country, that is the only possible group that can push its way into the political front. There is a new spirit surging forth and it is quite probable that the coming election will be run on the party lines than we have seen hitherto. Members of the Al-Nadi, the Hizb-al-Kawi, Al-Suri, the Communists, and Al-Mida Al-Kawi, intend that that this will be the case in the future. Signs of the formation of

k. See Appendix 5
definite blocs in the House are evident, but the situation is still fluid.

The members of the House take their position quite seriously. Here are a few representative statements made by some members. They do give an idea of what the deputies themselves think their function is: "The House of Representatives is a small gathering of the people, it represents the people and holds itself responsible for the conduct of the government."¹ "The executive derives all its authority from the House"². "The executive emanates from the House"³ and is carefully watched by the House⁴. The House conveys to the executive the mood of the nation⁵ and the deputies are faithful stewards of the nation and its welfare⁶, who defend the rights of the nation⁷ by passing the necessary laws⁸.

2. Ibid., by H. Panjiyyah.
3. " October 18, 1942; by S. Himadeh.
4. " December 1, 1942, by Dr. J. Talhuk.
7. " October 8, 1942, by Akele.
# IV. VITAL LEGISLATIVE QUESTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Constitutional Amendments</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Foreign Policy</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Fiscal Policy</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Long Term Legislation</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

The Constitutional Bloc was outspoken during the campaign regarding their intention to put the Lebanese Republic on a sure foundation of complete independence. It was also on the promise of achieving full national sovereignty that the first Sulh Cabinet asked for confidence and received it from the Parliament.

Close observers came to expect two events to happen: 1) the introduction of a bill to amend the Constitution so as to strike out those parts which limited the sovereignty of the Lebanese State; 2) a readjustment of relationships between the sovereign independent state and the French Power which had hitherto exercised sovereignty over the Lebanese State. We shall here deal solely with the first issue. The second will be taken up in our discussion of the Parliament and Foreign Policy.

Mr. Riad Es-Sulh, in his speech asking for confidence, alluded to the intention of the Government to introduce a bill suggesting the amendment of certain articles in the Constitution.

2. Ibid.
On the 5th of November, 1943, the President of the Republic, acting in conformity with his constitutional right as defined in the 76th Article of the Lebanese Constitution, presented the Parliament with a bill for the amendment of the 1st, the 11th, the 52nd, the 90th, 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, 95th, and 102nd Articles in the Constitution.

The First Article which read originally as follows: "Great Lebanon is an independent state and an indivisible unit. Its frontiers are those recognized by the Mandated French Republic and the League of Nations".

This was modified to read: "Lebanon is an independent and completely sovereign state and an indivisible unit. Its boundaries are: North: from the mouth of al-Nahr al-Kabir following the course of the river till its point of confluence with Wadi Khalid which pours into it at the same altitude of Jisr el Kamer.

East: The Kammah line which separates Wadi Khalid from the Nahr el-Asi valley (Grontes) passing through the villages of Maysarah, Hurbanah, Heit, Fish, Fisan, at the altitude of the villages of Birfa and Matrah; this same line follows the lines of boundary of the northern district of Ba'labek north east and south east.

1. Ibid., p. 40
to the eastern boundaries of Buka', Hasbayya and Rashaya. South: the boundaries of Palestine as they are defined by international agreements. West: The Mediterranean Sea."

The Eleventh Article which read originally as follows: "The Arabic language is the official national language in all the department of the State and the French language is also an official language. A law will define the situations when it can be used;" was modified to read:

"The Arabic language is the official national language. As to the French language's use, it will be defined by special law."

The Fifty-Second Article which read originally as follows: "Keeping the due regard to the Third Article of the terms of the Mandate, the President of the Republic negotiates for international treaties and their ratification. His informing the Parliament of these treaties is subject to the welfare and safety of the country. All treaties which include conditions that concern the finance, or trade, and all other treaties which may not be renewed year by year will not be valid unless they are ratified by Parliament." This was modified by striking out the first fourteen words.
Articles Ninety to Ninety-four which dealt with the relationship of the Lebanese State with the Mandatory power and with the League of Nations, were abrogated.

Article Ninety-Five which read originally as follows: "Only temporarily and acting in accordance with the terms of the Mandate and to establish justice and agreement the various sects will be justly represented in the offices and in the cabinets provided this is not detrimental to the general welfare", was modified by striking out the third to the twelfth words.

Article One-Hundred-and-Two, which originally read as follows: "this constitution is to be put in charge of the French Republic in her capacity as mandated by the League of Nations. All decrees contradicting this constitution are abrogated"; was modified by striking it all out except the last sentence.

The debate was opened by a member of the opposition who inquired whether the bill was planned to be turned over to a special committee, and urging that such a matter of complex implications should be studied very carefully before any action should be taken. This request was followed by an affirmation given by the Leader of the Opposition.

1. Ibid., pp. 42-51.
But the Constitution was very clear on such a point. Article 67 stated that when the Parliament is presented with a bill to amend the Constitution the House is to persist in the discussion until a decision is reached.

The opposition insisted that the atmosphere was not one in which a responsible decision could be reached. Here the leader of the Bloc of the North called for the question, but on taking the opinion of the House the discussion was resumed. The leader of the Opposition -- Mr. E. Idde withdrew from the meeting, accompanied by Mr. A. Sa'id. The discussion continued and Messrs. Karameh, S. Sulh, S. Munla, S. Slam, H. Fawarson, E. Lahnud, J. Tsalhuk, R. Frenjlyeh, Y. Salem, spoke with enthusiasm in favor of the bill and in many cases affirmed that the bill bore no ill-will towards any one, but was intended to give legal form to the independence of the Lebanese Republic. Messrs. Naccash, Abbud, Sarraf, Bustand and Nafi wanted thorough study and careful deliberation before any such serious step was taken.

When the bill was finally put to vote, item by item, an amendment was introduced to the first item, making the southern boundaries of Lebanon as the southern limits of the districts of Karj-Ayun and Tyre.¹

¹. Ibid. p. 50.
This amendment opens up a very interesting question as to whether the bill was intended to be ambiguous about the boundaries between Palestine and Lebanon. It might, of course, have been the result of hurry or a slip. It is not possible to ascertain the cause.

As a last act to make the bill law, the whole bill was voted on and it received the necessary majority. The bill was signed and became law on the 9th of November, 1943.

The Constitution was amended again on the 1st of December, 1943. The House decided unanimously to amend the Fifth Article of the Constitution which described the official flag of the Lebanese Republic as being composed of blue, white and red stripes arranged vertically with a cedar tree in the middle of the white.

According to this amendment, the "Lebanese flag is red, white, and red arranged horizontally with a green cedar tree in the center of the white. The area of the white is equal to the combined areas of the red stripes. The head of the cedar touches the upper red stripe and the bottom of the cedar touches the lower red stripe. The cedar extends over two-thirds the length of the white area."

1. Ibid., p. 52
2. Ibid., p. 66
B. FOREIGN POLICY

On the 7th of October, 1943, the First State Government that had been appointed by the President of the Republic on the 25th of September, 1943\(^1\) approached the House for a vote of confidence. The Cabinet had carefully prepared a plan\(^2\) which it proposed to carry through if the House wished to give it the confidence. One-half of the speech for confidence occupied itself with the foreign policy of the Cabinet\(^3\), and judging from the discussion that followed\(^4\), one can safely assume that the government's attitude towards foreign policy was the pivot around which the question of confidence turned.

The Cabinet received confidence by an overwhelming majority\(^5\). This indicates that the Cabinet's view was that of the majority of the House.

---

1. 1/X, Sept. 25, 1943
2. Majlis al 'Ummah, pp. 11-17.
3. Ibid., pp 11-14.
4. * pp 19423
5. * p. 57
Another evidence that confirms this view is the fact that when the Foreign Affairs Committee was elected twelve days later, membership was given to those who approved. None of those who differed with the government secured any membership, although one of them (Mr. C. Al). received thirteen votes out of forty. What were the main lines that the Cabinet proposed to follow in its foreign policy? These may be summed up in:

1) Liberation from any agreements that tend to compromise Lebanese independence and sovereignty.

2) Very close collaboration and cooperation with the neighboring Arab States.

3) Cooperation and sympathy with the Allies.

The first of these was destined to bring about a storm which shook the whole country to its foundations. It took the initial form of a constitutional amendment.

The French authorities held that the Constitution of the Lebanese State was a bilateral affair binding two parties and consequently no unilateral changes ought to be enforced. They further felt that the resulting

1. Ibid., p. 57
2. Supra, p. 7
text--after the amendment--conflicted with certain international obligations that the French have taken upon themselves. Thus the President of the Lebanese Republic, the Cabinet, and the Parliament have associated themselves with an act contrary to the constitution and to international obligations. The French authorities were, consequently, forced to resort to a new popular consultation, and until this was to take place, the Chamber of Deputies is dissolved\(^1\), and the application of the Lebanese Constitution is suspended\(^2\).

That same night, November 10 to 11, the President of the Republic, some of the members of the Cabinet and one deputy were arrested and a force of French soldiers were sent to prevent any entry to the Parliament Building.

Simultaneously, another decree was issued by the French Delegation decreeing that Mr. Emile Ide was appointed to act as the Head of the Lebanese State to be responsible directly to Mr. J. Halleu, the Delegate General et Plenipotentiaire\(^3\).

It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the details of the crisis. We shall confine ourselves to the share that the deputies played throughout the period:

1. Ibid., Art. 2
2. Ibid., Art. 3
3. Ibid., 465/FQ, p. 286
The President of the Chamber sent an urgent call for a meeting of the Parliament on the 11th of November. Only six members and the President of the Chamber were able to force their way into the Parliament through the cordon of soldiers. They issued a strong protest against the French act of aggression and sent copies thereof to the governments of the Arab States and to those of Great Britain, the United States of America, and Russia.

Being refused access to the parliament building, the deputies convened in various places. Thus on the 12th of November, they met at the house of Mr. S. Slam and gave a vote of confidence in the government composed of Mesers. Shahlal and Aralal giving them the right to act both as representatives of the President of the Republic and the Cabinet. This meeting was attended by 33 deputies.

On the 16th of November, another meeting was held under the chairmanship of the Vice President of the Chamber—Mr. N. O'han—the President having joined the

1. These were: Mr. S. Rimadeh (President), and Mesars. Sa'di el-Marla, H. Pharaoh, Sain Slam, R. Kan'an, M. Al-Fadl, and R. Baydun. See Parliamentary Records p. 62.
2. Ibid., p. 62
3. " p. 63
two ministers at their place of refuge in Bahaymun, and passed a resolution that no negotiations for settlement will be acceptable unless they are held directly with the President of the Republic and his ministers.

On the 17th and 18th, the meetings were held at the Hilmat School, on the 19th, there was a meeting at the home of the Mifti, and on the 20th, a meeting was held at Bahaymun under the chairmanship of Mr. Rimadah. All three meetings were intended to keep the deputies in touch with developments.

On the 22nd of November, 1945, the Delegate General et Plenipotentiaire p.i. of the Fighting French issued a decree abrogating the suspension of the constitution, the dismissal of the Parliament, and the appointment of the Head of the State.

During its first meeting after the release of the government, the House passed two resolutions of interest to our discussion: 1) a vote of thanks to Great Britain, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Egypt,

1. Ibid., p. 63.
2. Ibid., p. 65.
3. Afrege, p.468/PC
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Trans-Jordan for the sympathy they had shown and the help they had offered during the crisis. This vote was passed unanimously.

2) A motion was introduced condemning what Mr. Ede had done and calling for a severe punishment. This was passed by a majority with six members voting against.

This whole episode helped to underline the fact that the mood of the House in general was for complete independence and it helped to define its attitude towards the French. We can trace no decision made by the Parliament which tends to modify or to compromise this attitude. Lebanon was Intent upon entering on no agreement with any other non-Arab State which would compromise its sovereignty.

The attitude of the Deputies on the question of close collaboration and cooperation with the neighboring Arab States is not as clear-cut and definite as their attitude towards foreign interference with Lebanese Sovereignty. We shall first deal with the attitude toward collaboration with Syria.

1. Majlis Al Nuwwab, op. cit., p. 64. It is to be noted that Messrs. Naccash, Tabat, Ashkar, Murr, Istfan, Khuri, Jumblat, Ede, Ghabril, were absent from this meeting. See p. 53.

2. Ibid., p. 70: those members who voted against the motion were Messrs. Akl, Bustani, Nasayni, Sa’d, al-Khatib, Der Balosian.

Syria and Lebanon, although recognized as two separate political units by the French authorities, were knit together in many ways. Many of the enterprises of the two units were never made separate and were subject to a joint organization which went under the name of "Joint Interests" and was handled by the French authorities. When the question of the transfer of these "Joint Interests" came up, the negotiating parties, both Lebanese and Syrian decided that for reasons of expediency, policy, and economy, many of these "Joint Interests" were to be handled jointly. They drew up an agreement which was submitted for ratification before the Lebanese Parliament. It was during the discussion over this question that the attitude of the House was presented most clearly.

The writer will concern himself here with those parts of the "agreement" which have some relation to the subject under discussion namely: the relations between Syria and Lebanon. Syria and Lebanon were to exercise

1. In 1920, the State of "Greater Lebanon" was created by the French as distinguished from Syria.
2. These were known as the "Common Interests" as well as the absence of any economic or passport barriers between the two sections.
3. Refer to "Bulletin Officiel Des Actes Administratifs Du Haut Commissariat".
a joint administration of such interests as the customs, the supervision of companies that enjoy special concessions and function jointly in Lebanon and Syria, the tobacco monopoly. There shall be a Supreme Council composed of six members—three from each State—, each group voting as one unit and its decisions must be unanimous. Each six months of the year the Council meets in Damascus under a Syrian Chairmanship, and the other six months in Beirut under the Chairmanship of a Lebanese. The Supreme Council has the right: to legislate concerning the interests in its charge, to direct and supervise the joint interests, to fix the budget and salaries, to appoint all its employees, to initiate international commercial and economic agreements and submit them to the two governments for ratification, to delegate any of these functions. Syria and Lebanon are to form one customs union and all goods shall move freely within these territories subject to no restrictions or taxes whatsoever. There shall be an equitable method by which the income from this enterprise will be distributed. This agreement is to remain in force for two years and

1. Ibid., Art. 1, p. 133
2. = 2, p. 133
3. = 3, p. 133
4. = 4, p. 133
5. = 5, p. 133
is self-renewing unless any one of the two contracting parties wishes to abrogate or to amend it. In this case, a six months notice is necessary.

It is evident from this agreement that its ratification definitely meant a compromising of the absolute sovereignty of each State, at least in economic matters. An annex to this agreement which took the form of an exchange of correspondence, tried to modify the question of legislation by stating that the legislation is subject to ratification by the Cabinets of the two States.

The opposition universally admitted that economic cooperation was desirable at least for a short period. But they had mental reservations and fears: Naccache warned the House that by the terms of this agreement the legislative powers vested constitutionally solely (sic) in the hands of the Lebanese Parliament, were threatened with violation. Zuwayri was suspicious of the term "Supreme Council." Akl was reluctant to vest the economic interests of Lebanon in non-Lebanese hands. Haydar em-

1. Ibid., Art. 6, p. 134.
3. " p. 137.
4. " P. 139.
5. " 5: 134.
phrased the fact that absolute sovereignty was an obsolete concept. H. Pranjiyeh waved away any fear of Syria wanting to encroach upon the independence of Lebanon because Syria had recently for the first time in her history recognized the independence of Lebanon within its present frontiers, and during the Lebanese Crisis she was openly and strongly on the side of Lebanon. S. Suhb traced the economic history of Syria and Lebanon to show that economic separation was suicidal and undesirable, and that economic union means no compromise in political independence. Abbud went much further to show that unity between Syria and Lebanon embraced more than economic interests: it was cultural, racial and emotional; and even if an economic separation were possible and desirable from a material point of view, he would be opposed to it. Sa'd felt that the wording of the agreement was suspiciously elastic and indefinite. Dr. Tabet urged that any agreement that

1. Ibid., p. 140
2. Supra, Amendment of Constitution
3. Majlis al Nuwwat, op. cit., p. 151
4. Ibid., p. 142
5. " p. 143
6. " p. 145
Lebanon must make ought to be free from any sentimental consideration; he was in favor of complete separation. Mu'aim was for the agreement but against giving the power of legislation to any other body than Parliament. Ya'kub Sarraf felt that the pivot of the whole discussion turned around the fear of endangering Lebanese sovereignty and independence, but the best surety for that in dependence was the making of agreements with Syria which has shared with Lebanon all the sorrows and dangers of the past. K. Jumblat affirmed that the natural unity of geography and economic interest between Syria and Lebanon were beyond question.

When the final vote for the ratification of the agreement was taken the majority voted for it. Lahhoud and Mu'aim abstained from voting and Akle voted against.

The writer thinks that this debate, both by what was said and what was left unsaid, divides the attitude of the Parliament with its relation to Syria into three categories: 1) those in Parliament, who favor a complete union with Syria. They may not be

1. Ibid., p. 145.
2. Ibid., p. 146.
3. Ibid., p. 147.
4. Ibid., p. 148.
5. Ibid.
opposed to an independent Lebanon, but if they were to make their real choice, they would stand for an extreme unity with Syria. Nevertheless, they would support any act of collaboration. (2) There is the middle category. These insist on the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon but believe that bilateral agreements which are of mutual benefit to both Syria and Lebanon are necessary and desirable: they watch jealously over keeping Lebanese national identity but they are willing to cooperate. (3) There are those extreme isolationists who want to keep aloof of any rapprochement and who look at Syria as an aggressive power that might endanger Lebanese independence.

We could say that the last group are in a very small minority in the House. The force of logic, circumstances, history and experience are somewhere between the two extremes. That is where the majority of the House actually stands.

The attitude of the House towards the Arab question and the Arab countries in general, was expressed on many occasions.

The three Cabinets that have so far been formed were under the premiership of two men—Mr. R. Sulh and Mr. A. Karameh—who had made themselves famous in their struggle for Arab unity and identifying Lebanon with it.
Here is the testimony of one of them which could have been made by either one without any reservations: "We who have fought Lebanon in the past because it was not Arab; we who have asked for Syrian unity, have come today to this parliament to recognize Lebanon's independence, to struggle for its maintenance. That is so because Lebanon has become Arab". When a Parliament gives a vote of confidence to a man who publicly and officially states his views as being so strongly pro-Arab, it is an indication that they are not opposed to these views.

On several occasions and especially during the November Crisis, the various Arab States protested and threatened interference on behalf of Lebanon. The reaction of the House passed unanimously a vote of thanks for what they had done.

On the 31st of March, 1944, the Cabinet asked for an appropriation of 15,000 Syrian Pounds to make a trip of good-will to Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The Prime Minister stated his purpose as to reach "cooperation with the Arab countries of as wide a magnitude as the meaning of the word allows". The Chairman of Foreign Affairs

1. Ibid., page 635
2. " pp. 61 and 370.
3. " p. 370
4. "
Committee in recommending this bill stated that the Committee welcomed and endorsed any policy which strengthened the ties of brotherhood among the various Arab States. In fact the House waxed so enthusiastically that they increased the grant to twenty-five thousand Syrian Pounds and passed the bill unanimously.

As time passed and consultations for "Arab Unity" progressed to the point of taking some definite shape, the mood of the House became more conservative and cool. So that when the Cabinet approached the House on the 23rd of September, 1944, for an appropriation of 20,000 Syrian Pounds for the expenses of the Lebanese Delegation to the Arab Conference at Alexandria some of the members took the opportunity to make their attitude very clear: so we hear As'ad al-Bustani insisting "We want no partner in our independence." Lebanon is above all other considerations. Lebanon is a national house for its children only. Let us alone in our corner, we shall break the rocks to make space for ourselves to live with poverty but in peace. We trust no project for amalgamation or for unity." Mr. Jumblat was as clear. "We do

1. Ibid., p. 370
2. Ibid., p. 371
3. Ibid., p. 631
4. Ibid., p. 632
5. Ibid., p. 633
not want to enter with the Arab countries into any political unity or federation. At this point, the Prime Minister found it expedient to make his position very definite. He was grateful to the Deputies for enlightening him with their opinion. As for him, he wanted to reiterate that his policy is concerned with making Lebanon absolutely independent within its present frontiers and cooperating with the sister Arab nations.

On his return from the Alexandria Conference, there was more caution in his approach. During the parliamentary meeting held on the 14th of October, he was careful not to present the Protocol of Alexandria for ratification. He seems to prefer confirming the discussion to the special section that dealt with a reiteration of recognition of Lebanese independence and sovereignty within its present frontiers.

Why does this contradiction occur between the desire of the House to cooperate in theory and its unwilling-

---

1. Ibid., p. 634.
2. " p. 635.
3. See Appendix H.
4. Maqala Al-Nuwwab, p. 708. For a complete text of the "Protocol of Alexandria" see Al-Diar, Al-Nuwwab Al Kamalah, vol. 4, No. 686, Oct. 11, 1944, pp. 1 and 4. Some members of Parliament had seen also a declaration made by the Prime Minister of Syria, "there is Arab unity we must reach it, and a united Syria which we want." Al-Nahar, "Khitaab al-Jabri an al-Mushawarat" vol. 12, No. 2889, Oct. 15, 1944. Also a statement by the Transjordan Consul in Cairo: "The idea of uniting Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Palestine is the foundation stone in building Arab unity." Al-Nahar, August 5, 1944, Hadith Kunsol Shart al-Ordun. No. 2993.
ness to cooperate in practice? Why is this over-emphasis on Lebanese independence? A big part of the difficulty is due to a suspicion that the word "Arab" is very often a convenient term for "Moslem". These suspicions are not without foundation. For in the minds of some, the two are identical. Let us give some evidence: Mr. Maraghi, the Sheikh of the Azhar, in a specially signed statement to Akhbar el-Yawm says, "I am among the supporters of Moslem Unity which God wills. It is one of the great ends towards which Islam aims. Arab unity is a way to Moslem unity, for the Arab World is a Moslem world... I have great longing for the day when the Arab countries will be tied to the other Moslem countries". A statement made to the writer by a man who has accompanied the Arab movement from its early militant days confirms that among the ardent supporters of the movement in Egypt there are men who do not differentiate between the words Arab and Moslem. The Foreign Minister of Lebanon had to remind the members of the Conference of Arab Foreign Ministers many times that there were non-Moslem Arabs. In an interview with the a high Christian personality who has occupied posts as high as the second place in the Syrian State, he

2. See Infra. 43
made it clear to the writer that the best that the Christian can hope for in an Arab country, is a subordinate position accorded to him by deference. This is not a desire for isolation. We do not think that there are many people in Lebanon who would disagree with Major General Spears in his statement made in a speech to the deputies of the North in Tripoli: "I personally am convinced that the Arab friendship, offered and accepted at Alexandria, gives to the Lebanon within its present frontiers its surest guaranty, a guaranty without which it can scarcely live. No country in the

1. We have refrained from giving the names of the people for fear of causing embarrassment to those concerned.

The following extract from a published copy of a lecture given by Mr. R. A. R. Gibb, a British authority on the Near East who has been closely associated with the Middle East Section, Research Department, Foreign Office, entitled "Middle East Perplexities" is also interesting. The lecture was given before the Royal Institute of International Affairs, on July 13, 1944:

"The alternative is a Moslem Revolution, an anti-Western movement appealing to the old Moslem sense of solidarity, aiming at the reunion of the Arab lands under the banner of Islam by means of violent upsurge of the Moslem masses, the driving out or extermination of all the superficial Western institutions that seem to have brought only division and corruption, the reassertion of the supremacy of the Moslem, of Moslem Law and of Moslem institutions in their own homelands. For years past, at first slowly and secretly, now more and more openly, the foundations of a Moslem Revolution have steadily been organized; but whether they will ever be strong enough in the near future to bear the weight of open action depends mainly on the turn of events."
world is in greater need of friendship of its neighbors than Lebanon. Collaboration with them means wealth, disagreement means poverty and ruin. But many are willing to face poverty and ruin rather than expose themselves to a loss of their identity and endanger what they consider to be their unique culture.

Thus we may sum up the attitude of the Parliament to the neighboring Arab States as being one of cautious collaboration and guarded cooperation. And as Lebanon oscillates between isolationism and collaboration, a strong centrifugal current pulls it closer to the Arab States.

The attitude of the Deputies to the Allies presents no difficulties whatsoever. It has always been one of deep sympathy and willingness to cooperate.

Of course the Allies had done their full share to deserve the gratitude and good-will of the Lebanese in general. In a speech to the Syrians made on July 31st

2. This is summed up by a statement made by Mr. P. Gemayel: "Lebanon has its special mark: it is a brother of the Arab countries and an independent home where the civilizations of the East and the West meet". Al Bayrak, Taarib li Ra's al Kataib, Oct. 12, 1944.
1941, the Leader of the Free French made the following reassuring statement: "I count that the complete unity between England and France in that which concerns the simultaneous actions of their armies on the territories of the Levant States contributes to confirm Syria and Lebanon in the certitude of conserving...their liberty and their national integrity". Mr. Oliver Lyttleton in an exchange of views on the question of Lebanon with General de Gaulle wrote the following assurance: "...Great Britain has no other interest in Syria or in Lebanon than to win the war... Both Free France and Great Britain are pledged to recognize the independence of Syria and of Lebanon". Answering a question by General

1. "Mais je compte que l'union complète de l'Angleterre et de la France en ce qui concerne la présence et l'action simultanées de leurs armées sur le territoire des États du Levant contribuera à renforcer la Syrie et le Liban dans la certitude de conserver... leur liberté et leur intégrité nationales. Le Syrie, Le General De Gaulle parle aux Syriens, July 31, 1941.

2. ". . . La Grande Bretagne n'a d'autre intérêt en Syrie ou en Liban que de gagner la guerre. Nous ne désirons d'aucune façon empêcher sur la position de la France. La France Libre et la Grande Bretagne se sont toutes deux engagées à reconnaître l'independence de la Syrie et du Liban. Le Jour, M. Oliver Lyttleton to General De Gaulle August 7, 1941, published Aug. 21, 1941."
Spears in the British Parliament, Mr. Richard Low made the following statement: "General Spears will be aware that the independence of the Levent States was proclaimed by the French Government and endorsed by the British Government in 1941, and it has since been recognized by the governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and many other governments". Mr. Churchill speaking in the House of Commons on the 9th of September, 1941, made the following statement: "...Syria shall be handed back to the Syrians... The Syrian Peoples must come back into their own. This is fully recognized in the documents exchanged between the Minister of State and the Representative of the Free French". On the occasion of presenting his credentials the Minister of the U.S.A. gave the following message, quoting the American Secretary of State: "We use all our influence to aid those who by their acts show that they deserve liberty." Russia and many other members of the United Nations recognized the independence of Lebanon and designated diplomatic agents to represent them.

In view of all these friendly gestures, the deputies felt themselves deeply indebted to the Allies. They showed

3. Wadsworth, George, from his speech on presenting his credentials, Nov. 11, 1942.
their indebtedness and gratitude in many ways:

On the 27th of March, 1944, a bill was introduced into the House by two of its members to the effect that Lebanon ought to declare war on Germany and Japan. This declaration of war came a long time later but it is interesting to note that at least some of the members of the House were ready to go that far as early as they did.

On the 25th of July, 1944, Mr. Abu Jawdeh introduced the following motion before the Parliament: "The Lebanese House of Representatives in its session of the 25th of July, 1944, has the honor to congratulate the High Command of the Allies for the continuous victories that their armies are gaining on all the fronts against the forces of evil and aggression. It is the hope of the House that complete victory will come to the Allies in a short time so that the persecuted nations will be freed and humanity will be relieved from its sufferings.

"This vote made by the House expresses the sentiment of the Lebanese Nation which has accompanied the Allies in their struggle to save the world. This vote is also in recognition of the great services and gratitude toward the messengers of peace." The motion was passed with a big majority."

2. March 27, 1944.
During its meeting on the first of January, 1943, the House passed a resolution thanking Great Britain, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and other states for the noble stand that they took towards Lebanon in its political crisis. Mr. Sulh in his speech for confidence which was given on the 7th of October, 1943, and for which he received an almost unanimous vote of confidence (one sustained), said the following: "Our government proposes to pursue the best of relations of respect and sincerity toward France... Great Britain and the United States of America... We promise to continue sharing with them their great efforts in so far as our circumstances allow." These are a few evidences to show that the House was wholeheartedly with the Allies and their efforts. But their support was sometimes conditional. This has come out most clearly in the following resolution which was taken in the Parliament on the 24th of March, 1944:

"The Lebanese House of Representatives disapproves of any project to establish a Zionist National Home in Palestine... The House wishes that this decision be conveyed by the government to the Governments of America, Britain and France.

1. Ibid., p. 64.
"The House also believes that the Atlantic Charter and the project of using an Arab Land for a Zionist National Home are contradictory." In the discussion that followed it appeared as though the House was willing to throw all the resources of Lebanon in the face of any attempt, no matter from which direction it proceeded, to transform any Arab Land into a Zionist National Home. When the resolution came up for its final vote on the 25th of July, 1944, it received a big majority vote.

There is one more point that we wish to raise before we conclude our discussion on the Lebanese House of Representatives' attitude towards the Allies: The Protocol of Alexandria which was ratified by Egypt, Syria, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and the Palestinian representatives, has two paragraphs which forbid the members of the Arab League from entering upon any agreement with another nation which might contradict the wording and the spirit of the Protocol, and it also forbids any one member from following an external policy which is detrimental to any of the other members. Since the Lebanese government ratified this measure it seems to us that they have definitely taken the stand that the external relations of Lebanon towards non-Arab States are tied to the attitude

1. Ibid., p. 542
2. Ibid., p. 566
of the rest of the Arab States.¹

In conclusion, the policy of the House of Representatives concerning Foreign Relations is (1) complete liberation of Lebanon from any international arrangements with non-Arab States which might compromise its independence; (2) cautious, slow, suspicious, but positive willingness to cooperate with Arab States; (3) a big measure of cooperation with the Allies as long as the Allies remain faithful to their expressed intentions and they work in harmony with Arab aspirations.

¹ For a moderate view of the House, see Appendix "A".
C. FISCAL POLICY

The authors of the Lebanese Constitution seem to have been quite suspicious of the wisdom of the House of Representatives in its handling of financial questions. The House is largely vested with veto powers and powers to reduce appropriations rather than in actual control of the fiscal policy of the government. It can not initiate economic legislation. In fact the Constitution leaves so many loopholes for the executive branch of the government to act independently of the Parliament in fiscal matters, that the actions taken by the Parliament at times are a simple formality.

Let us take a few examples: (1) The Lebanese Executive presented the Parliament with a bill asking for a "loan" of 25,000 Syrian Pounds to be spent on the by-elections which took place on the 23rd of April, 1944. The bill was submitted on the 18th of April, 1944, the elections took place on the 23rd and the House did not meet until the 2nd of May. That is, because of the urgency of the situation, the executive appropriated the money and spent it, and nine

1. Lebanese Constitution, Arts. 32, 84, 85. Appendix 2. " 32 and 65. "
days later the House was called upon to sanction the appropriation. What makes the matter still worse is that when a deputy suggested that the bill be sent back to the executive for a more detailed account as to how the money was spent, the suggestion received no support and the bill was passed.

3) The Lebanese executive presented the parliament with a bill asking for the appropriation of one-million nine-hundred and thirty thousand and twenty Syrian Pounds for the project of irrigating the Sidon-Tyre plains. Five hundred and eighty four thousand nine hundred and eighty pounds of this amount had already been spent by the 20th of March of that year; contracts had been given by the 20th of March to the amount of nine-hundred and eighty thousand Syrian Pounds; and a big part of the balance had already been spent for the purchase of materials and the payment of wages. There was a subdued row in the House, but it was placed before a fait accompli.

1. On the 5th of December, 1944, an additional appropriation of 12500 Syrian Pounds was asked for and granted to cover unexpected expenses during the same elections. (See Parliamentary Records, Dec. 5, 1944, decree No. 1818)

2. واعن أول بعيق مرجعاً منها، يكفين تدريباً أخرى هما إلى التفوق نسيت القرارات الإضافية

ودين نقلاً لأَنَّ المُعَيَّنَاءِ بِهِمُ الْعَدَادُ أَنْ أَنْتُواَ قَدْ اسْتَفْقَدْتُمْ حَلَبَ ابْتُحَارَ أَرَا.
3) The Executive presented a bill to the Parliament on the 8th of November, 1943, the effect of which was retroactive to the 22nd of September 1943. This bill was to "fix" the salary of the President of the Republic and his ministers. It increases the appropriations for the President by 49,000 Pounds per annum, and it doubles the appropriations for the Prime Minister over what it was in 1943. The bill includes 17,000 Syrian Pounds for the President for "secret expenses" and 15,000 for house rent. All in all, the President's bill per annum is one hundred and seventy six thousand two hundred and eighty Syrian Pounds. The debate over this bill promised to be hot, but the attempt was squashed, and the bill was passed.

4) According to the Constitution, the budget must be presented to the House for approval during its second regular sitting which comes on the 1st Tuesday which follows the 15th of October. In reality the 1944 budget was not brought before the House until the 4th of May, 1944. Not only was the budget delayed but when it was presented and some of the deputies began to tear it and the government's fiscal policy to pieces, the Prime Minister's reply was that he claimed no perfection in the budget because it was

1. Lebanese Budget, 1944, Books I and III.
2. Ibid.
3. Lebanese Constitution, Art. 32.
4. Parliamentary Record, May 4, 1944.
"extemporaneous". When the House, inspite of this explanation, persisted in a general discussion of the government's fiscal policy, a recess of ten minutes was announced and when the session was resumed, the Prime Minister, who always has first claim on the floor, made a short speech on a totally irrelevant subject connected with independence and foreign policy. This is a clever way of diverting attention.

5) For some reasons, the Executive Branch of the State found it expedient not to present the budget in due time or as near to that date as possible. They resorted to the extraction of appropriations from the House piece-meal, sometimes item by item. Even after the budget had been voted upon by the House, further demands for appropriations kept pouring in. The House protests.

1. Parliamentary Record, May 9, 1944.
2. Ibid.
3. It is not within the scope of this paper to investigate the motives of the Executive.
4. See Parliamentary Record: Oct. 29, 1943; Dec. 23, 1943; Dec. 30, 1943; Feb. 29, 1944; March 5, 1944; March 27, 1944; March 31, 1944; May 2, 1944; May 4, 1944.
5. Parliamentary Record: May 31, 1944; Sept. 5, 1944; Sept. 11, 1944; Sept. 25, 1944; Sept. 26, 1944; Oct. 4, 1944.
but votes its approval. This is a mystery.1

In spite of clamoring for economy both inside and outside the House, the Parliament approved the 1944 Budget which registered an increase of 9,637,005 pounds over that of 1943. The figure for 1944 was 34,099,000 Lebanese Pounds.2 This, we believe, unjustified extravagance is partly due to the fact that the Constitution gives great financial powers to the executive and partly because the House does not seem to be able to pick up enough courage to tackle the problem bravely and wisely. In justice to the House, we must admit that certain voices are occasionally raised against extravagance. We must note in particular

1. "جتمع أن طلب اعتبارات الإقامة كجزء من إجراءات ميزانية عام 1943 عبرت عن فساد عائم في تنفيذ أحد الضرائب. هذا الأمر يمكن أن يدفع إلى تأسيس إجراءات مالية مالية معينة للحد من فساد الذي ينتشر في هذا القطاع.

2. See Lebanese Budget for 1944.
a very able and just attack made by Mr. A. Naccash on the 9th of May where he gives figures to show that the budget of Lebanon in ratio per capita to the inhabitants of Iraq or Egypt is greater, while these countries' governments spread their activities on a much bigger group of services than the Lebanese Government. Dr. Talhuk followed with a warning that this might lead to disaster, and Mr. Ray'um suggested ways for economy.

This strange neglect of the House in its careful handling of economic matters does not stop in approving appropriations by methods that "cause insomnia", but the House also resigned its right of legislation about taxation on two important occasions: (1) When it delegated the right of legislation to the Supreme Council of the Common Interests over matters that are under its jurisdiction. It is true that a formula was arrived at which apparently satisfied the House, but the fact of the matter remained that a power outside the House had the right to impose taxes, collect them, and dispose of parts of the revenue without consulting the House.

1. Parliamentary Record, May 11, 1944.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., December 23, 1944.
The second occasion was when the House approved the imposition of a collective "War Profits" tax to be assessed and collected by a group of rich merchants who had contracted to deliver it to the treasury. We shall go into some detail over this very interesting tax because it is typical of the way the House handles such problems. The project of the tax had been inherited by the government from a previous government that was in power in 1942. At that time some effort was being made by the Supreme Economic Council and by the Middle East Supply Centre in Cairo to bring inflation under some control. One of the measures was to impose a huge tax on war profits (something like 120,000,000 Syrian Pounds), which was to be invested in banks during the war and then used for reconstruction projects after the war. This, it was felt, would serve three purposes:

1) It might arrest the wave of inflation that was sweeping the country and threatening to raise a dangerous situation for the Allies in a vital spot in their strategy;

2) The big projects of reconstruction and economic developments which were to be launched by the use of these funds after the war, would tide the country over a period of readjustment and create employment for thousands of people who had been employed on war work;

1. Most of the information concerning this tax, the writer gathered from direct sources that were available at the
3) It would remedy the situation which had arisen because a small thin upper layer of the population had amassed great fortunes while the poorer classes had suffered from scarcity and inflation. The services to be created by the proceeds of these funds were to help ameliorate the miserable conditions of the poor and to bring about a more equitable distribution of wealth.

The plan, on paper, seemed to be very reasonable and desirable. But when it was put before the local government for action, many objections were raised. There were political, economic, social, and administrative.

1. Although the United Nations have spent some $5 billion in the Middle East during the past three years, the peasants have not seen any benefit in it for themselves. The surplus has gone to a thin layer of the upper classes. Meanwhile, the poor have suffered scarcities of the cheap commodities they are accustomed to buy, a great inflation in the prices they used to pay, and crippled outlets for the things they had to sell. They have been pushed around by the wartime economy. Fortune, The Explosive Middle East, F. Lawrence Babcock Editor (6 months investigation) p. 113, Vol. XXX, No. 3

2. Parliamentary Record, Sept. 26, 1944: a report submitted with regard to this tax and dated October 10, 1942.
The project was shelved until the Parliament was elected. As soon as things took their normal shape in the Parliament, Mr. M. Beydun raised the question of the War Ex claiming that it was the duty of the Parliament to handle these questions. During the same session the Prime Minister in his "Confidence Speech" alluded to the question in a very eclectic and indirect way. Mr. Beydun's proposition was referred to the government and we hear no more mention of the tax until twenty-one days later when Mr. M. Fadle brings the question up again and calls attention to its urgency.

A long period passed during which the project was under "study" until the budget came up before the House and there seemed to be no mention in it of the War Profit Tax. Then Mr. G. Akl, a member of the Opposition, brought out the question again criticizing the government very severely on its handling of this tax. This was followed two months later by another question in the House when Mr. S. Sulh wanted to know what the causes of the delay were. The Minister of Finance admitted that there were negotiations proceeding with the merchants and industrial-

2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., October 29, 1943.
ists concerning this question and that some agreement was to be reached before long\(^1\). In answer to a similar question during the same meeting, the government promised definitely to approach the House with a bill to settle the question during that particular sitting\(^2\). On the 5th of September, 1944, the Chairman of the Finance Committee stated in the House that a bill concerning the War Profits Tax was under study. Finally, on the 25th of September, 1944, the House found itself confronted with a bill\(^3\) asking it to authorize the government to empower a committee of merchants and industrialists to levy a War Profits Tax amounting to six million Syrian Pounds from merchants and industrialists who had made profits in excess of a hundred thousand Syrian Pounds during the first five years of the war.

Mr. Akle asked in the name of God and justice that the House should defeat the bill. Mr. S. Sulh pointed to the unconstitutionality of the proposal and the fact that the House was surrendering its sacred rights to a group of merchants and industrialists. Dr. A. Tabet appealed to the House to be careful otherwise they would lose their prestige if they voted in favor of the bill. Mr. Ussayan

\(^1\) Parliamentary Record, July 25, 1944.
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Decree 17/E/K; Parliamentary Record, Sept. 25, 1944.
went even further and suggested that a commission of investigation should be formed from the House to examine the whole procedure of the case. Mr. Yafi again emphasized the fact that the House, if it approved, would sidestep its constitutional rights. The debate went on and the Opposition was gaining in momentum when Mr. Firazli moved that the discussion be stopped. This was passed; but the Opposition submitted a proposal to return the bill to the government for reconsideration. When this motion failed to receive the necessary majority, the only procedure left for those who opposed, was to break up the meeting of the House before a vote should be taken; this they did and thus the House lost its quorum and the meeting was automatically adjourned.

The next meeting found 15 members absent. The meeting proceeded by voting on the bill which was passed by 26 to 10. Out of these 26, there were 4 votes cast by members of the Cabinet. Thus the House again registered against itself another occasion when it was willing to surrender its rights to control the fiscal policy of the

1. Messrs. A. Naccash, S. Salh, A. Akl, A. Sa’d, A. Bustani, Y. Karam, and A. Urayyan.
2. A full account of this meeting will be found in Parliamentary Records, Sept. 25, 1944.
3. See Parliamentary Records, Sept. 25, 1944. The votes were as follows: 18 deputies absent, 1 abstained, 10 against, 22 deputies for and 4 minister for.
government, but evidently it had started to develop teeth.

Finally, we should like to mention that later the government, in spite of the fact that it over-ruled the decision of the House and imposed a tax that the House was unwilling to authorize, the House did not withdraw its confidence in the face of such a flagrant breach of its constitutional rights. This was occasioned by the proposed tax on animals (wauashi). The Executive had presented a bill\(^1\) asking the House to approve the imposition of a special tax. The Finance Committee rejected the proposal and the House, after some discussion, referred the question again to the Committee. When the bill came up again before the House with a recommendation from the Finance Committee that it should be rejected\(^2\), the Prime Minister openly admitted that the tax had already been gathered. The House passed the bill.

Thus, neither the Constitution, nor the Cabinet, nor the conduct of the House give much power nor confidence in the behavior of the Parliament towards financial questions. Furthermore, the system of taxation resorted to in the country renders the state of things still worse.

Until the end of 1944, the Lebanese Government had depended for a big portion of its income on indirect

---
1. Parliamentary Records, 64/1/K, Feb. 29, 1944.
2. Ibid., May 31, 1944.
taxation. For instance, in the 1944 budget we find that
the estimated income from direct taxation is 5,060,00
Lebanese Pounds while that of indirect taxation is
18,442,000 Lebanese Pounds.

Experts seem to agree that, to say the least, this
situation could not continue very long if the government
is to safeguard its interests and those of its taxpayers
and citizens.

A very careful survey of the Fiscal System of Syria
made by Professor George Hakim concludes by pointing out
that the whole taxation system of the country tends to be
regressive and consequently detrimental to the life of
the people. "A reform of the taxation system is badly
needed" he affirms. "The policy of the legislative au-
thorities, which seems to put too much stress on revenue
and ease of collection with little regard to the other
aspects of taxation, is very harmful and should be discar-
ded. Such a policy ignores the economic and social effects
of taxation and is, in the long run, very prejudicial to
the economic development of the country. As one writer
on public finance puts it, the best taxation system is
that which besides raising the necessary revenue produces
best or least harmful effects. (Dalton, H., Principles
of Public Finance, p. 14) Such considerations should

1. Al-Nuwasamat al-Lubnaniyyet, Estimates, Parts I and II.
guide future financial legislation.1

In response to this great need, the government decided to take steps toward the introduction of the most modern and sound form of direct tax: the income tax.

With this in mind and acting under some pressure, the executive submitted to the Finance Committee a proposed law for the introduction of an income tax in the Lebanese Republic2. The law had received a good deal of attention before it was presented to the committee and during its committee stage. In fact there were three different proposals made but that of the government was the one that received the final approval of the House.

In brief the income tax was to take the place of the "Frais d'Activités". It divides incomes into three different categories: (1) incomes derived from capital and which require no labor to produce them; (2) incomes derived from capital and labor; (3) and incomes derived from labor alone3. These different categories of income were to be subjected to varying degrees of progressive taxation after a certain minimum is exempted to secure a decent livelihood for all concerned.4

2. The bill was presented on the 20th of May, 1944, under No. 1260 and it came up before the House for discussion and action on the 16th of November, 1944. See Parl. Rec. for Nov. 16 and 21 for this and other references for discussion of law.
3. See Appendix "P".
4. Ibid.
The government and the Finance Committee admitted that the tax in its present state as presented in its 110 Articles was not in its final stage. There were many difficulties: (1) the people of the country were not accustomed to direct taxation on income, and they needed to be initiated gradually into it, (2) there were no dependable statistics or records to work on, (3) the people of the country kept no exact records of their incomes, and (4) the government lacked the experience.

This was to be the first step and in the light of further experience, readjustments were to be made. There was no sharp or basic criticism of the law as it was presented to the House. True, one member objected against its interfering with individual rights, another wanted to know how the proceeds from this tax were to be spent, and a third member wanted to make sure that the tax did not discourage re-investment which is very badly needed in a country like that of Lebanon. But on the whole, both the Opposition and the government parties were very encouraging. The discussion does not reflect a very thorough knowledge of fiscal laws. This is why we should like to summarize a criticism of the law made by a man who was solely motivated by sound economic principles and his national duties as a private citizen. This is outside the scope
of this paper which limits itself to the actions of the House, but we do it in an attempt to evaluate the judgment of the House itself.

Professor Himadeh sees the tax as a composite one, mixing various systems and principles of taxation, and omitting certain others in such a way that the final result comes out as a negation of the recognized principles of the Science of Economics; especially does it contradict the principle of just distribution of the burden of taxation.

Furthermore, he points out that the tax as it is generally accepted in some economic circles, is based on the individual's ability to pay. But the Lebanese income tax does not take the gross income of the individual so as to determine his ability to pay. Aside from the fact that it completely leaves out any income made from rent to the subject to another tax, it divides incomes into three categories and imposes a special rate on each one of these separately. Professor Himadeh gives examples in figures to point out how the tax disregards this principle of just distribution of the burden.

Professor Himadeh adds that even if we admit that the proposed tax is progressive, which it ought to be, yet the ratio between one category of increase in percentage of rise is so big that it weakens the importance of the tax

1. Himadeh S., A report to the Chairman of the Finance Committee, unpublished on July 14, 1844 (not published)
and diminishes the government's income from it.

The exemptions are also so small that the professor is inclined to conclude that the chief motive of the legislator seems to have been to increase its income regardless of the justice of the distribution of the burden. It must be noted in this connection that Professor Hakim's condemnation of the taxation system of the country was based partly on the fact that the legislator had his eye on increasing the income rather than helping the taxpayer.

The formulators of the tax claimed that they had divided the income into various categories so as to tax the unearned income more heavily. But Mr. Himadeh's report shows that the result is quite the contrary. The smaller the effort that the income earner puts, the smaller is his burden. For instance, the tax exempts completely incomes derived from deposits.

In some instances also the tax is levied twice, once on the gross income of a company, and once on the dividends that it distributes to the share-holders. Finally, the tax omits altogether to take into consideration the taxing of those business concerns that engage in activities distributed over various countries of the world, such as insurance companies.

The above represents, in brief, the judgment of those who are in a position to know. The report was made avail-
able to the deputies, the members of the Finance Committee, and the members of the government. In fact, an alternative plan was also submitted by Professor Hamedh working in conjunction with Messrs. Hakim and Teilhac. But despite all these facilities to allow the deputies to produce a scientific tax, they decided on the one that subjects itself to very justifiable condemnation.

We have tried in this section of our study, to analyze the behavior of the House on fiscal matters. We conclude that this is a very weak spot in the activities of the Chamber of Deputies and the weakness results partly from the strength and aggressiveness of the Executive and partly from the carelessness, ignorance and lack of courage of some of the members of the House in general.
D. LONG TERM LEGISLATION

Prime Minister R. Sulh, speaking in the Lebanese House of Representatives when he asked for the first vote of confidence, promised to present to the House a detailed reconstruction project which would have a separate budget and would be considered as law binding on all the succeeding governments for the next five years. This project was to deal with irrigation, transportation, rebuilding of cities, and the revival of the rural life.

Seven days later, Mr. N. Daud representing the Buka district presented a request for some definite needs that his constituency wished to have answered. These included the drainage of swamps, the piping of drinking waters, the building and repair of roads, the opening of schools. The Prime Minister reiterated his previous promise and welcomed any suggestions.

Not to be outdone, the Opposition adopted the proposed project and came forward with a definite suggestion for the reconstruction of the rural life. Mr. Akl made the following proposals: the building of roads, piping of drinking

2. Ibid., Oct. 15, 1943.
water, the opening of government free schools, the construction of hospitals and clinics in various districts. He also proposed that committees of experts should study these proposals and draw out plans for their execution, and that there should be every year a rural festival that will help to demonstrate the importance of the farmer to the life of the country.

During the same meeting, Mr. Alfaidi wished that his own district of Southern Lebanon should receive its adequate share of the project.

The Cabinet, in the meantime was getting the project ready and when they were in a position to present more definite plans, the Prime Minister outlined their intentions as follows: They were presenting for the approval of the House a Five Year Reconstruction Project which was to cost the country thirteen million Syrian Pounds for the first year. Estimates for the following years were impossible to give due to the fluctuation of prices. The funds were to be gotten from special sources that do

1. Ibid., Oct. 28, 1943.
2. * February 24, 1944.
not usually figure in the budget. These were to be the reserve fund, war profits tax, shares from "Joint Interests", profits from the National Lottery, and the balance from the gold reserve that has accrued from the depreciation of the paper currency. The funds were to be distributed equally on the five districts of Lebanon and they were to be spent on the piping of drinking water to the population, the building of roads to complete the net that knits the country together, the erection and equipment of schools and hospitals, and beautifying the main cities: Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, and Zahle. There were three causes for the embarkation upon such a project: reconstruction was a prerequisite for progress, the absorption of labor that would gradually be released from war work, and the withdrawal of money from circulation so as to put a halt to inflation and the continuous rise in prices.

What really surprises the investigator in this, is that there was not a remark made by any of the deputies after what the Prime Minister had said, although there were several evident contradictions. We shall point out these contradictions very briefly:

1) One of the expressed purposes of the project was to lessen the amount of currency in circulation
by freezing a good deal of it. But the project does exactly the contrary of that; it proposes to unfreeze a good part of the reserve fund and to use also a big share of the war profits tax.

2) The project also proposes to use some of the country’s share from the “Joint Interests” for its execution. But the income that comes from the “Joint Interests” brings with it also many responsibilities that the State will have to shoulder. A big item among these is National Defence. If some other source of income through new taxes is to be found, then the burden of taxation, which is already pretty heavy, will have to be made more so.

3) The reconstruction project was to draw very heavily on the income from the National Lottery. But the National Lottery itself was contrary to national interests. One of the main evils from which the country was suffering was speculation. People were trying to find ways and means by which they could amass great fortunes with the least exertion of effort. Instead of creating ways to combat this psychological state of being, the government banked on it and created the “National Lottery” as if to profit from a national disease. The “National Lottery” put the official stamp upon a national wound that the government should have tried to heal.
5) The government proposed, furthermore, to use the balance of its profits from the gold reserves. At this time the confidence of the nation in the currency was at a very low ebb. The lack of confidence was well based. The amount of currency in circulation had multiplied several times since the beginning of the war. The future of the franc was very uncertain. The government should have done all that was in its power to back the Syrian currency with whatever means she was able so that in case the worst did come, they would have something to hold to. On the contrary, the government was reducing the security the currency had.

6) To add to all this, the country was suffering from great shortages, both in materials and in labor. It needed a way by which consumption could be reduced. By the project, the government proposed to enter the market with thirteen million pounds to buy materials that were already scarce, use services that were already short, and employ people who were already engaged in other works.

The objections are not against the idea of the project as such. The time, means and proposals of the execution of the project make it unwise. That is why we are surprised that the deputies made no remarks.
On the 25th of March, 1944, the government felt that it was in a position to approach the House with a proposal. But, contrary to what was expected, the project was to cover works to be accomplished in one year (1944) making no provision for the following years nor binding the government to a five year program. Furthermore, the required funds for the execution of the project did not include an item from the difference in price of the gold reserve as was previously indicated. The deputies did not find themselves in a position to study fully and take action on such an important project without being presented with the details. A motion to postpone discussion until the next meeting was passed.

During the next meeting some of the deputies seemed to be more prepared to deal with the problem. They wanted to be presented with a full five year project as an integral part of the bill, and another part would be that portion to be accomplished in the year 1944. The government pointed to the difficulty that due to the fluctuation of prices, it was impossible to give

1. Ibid., March 27, 1944.
2. " " 29, 1944.
the exact estimates for a five year project. In addition, the government anticipated the criticism of the House and explained why school and hospitals and "other" important items had been omitted: that was due to the absence of the necessary materials that would not be assured during war time. But the deputies were firm. They wanted a five year project to be voted on as one unit. Not until their wishes were complied with would they take any action.

Finally, the Cabinet revealed the whole plan. There was no mention in it of school, hospitals, reforestation, agricultural experimental stations, or any of the vital needs of the country; and with the exception of the irrigation projects which were to consume only one-third of the appropriations, the project hardly created any productive enterprise that would become self-supporting and would relieve the taxpayer of his burden. The bulk of the project directed itself to the building of roads which, although vital, yet are quite secondary when compared with other great needs. Furthermore, the maintenance of highways necessitates constant expenditures of funds that the budget might not find available in the future.

Criticism were very superficial and the project was

1. Ibid., March 31, 1944.
passed in its entirety. In this way the House pledged itself to spend a yearly sum of money equivalent to 30% of its total budget over a period of five years. Thus, a project which had promised to be and could have been a mark of foresight and farsightedness in remedying the ills of the land and putting its life on a secure basis as well as directing its economic life into constructive and creative directions, was so quickly conceived and executed that an opportunity was missed. Such a project should have been the result of a thorough study of the resources of the country, its important needs, and its capacity to solve those needs gradually and intelligently. Such a study should have been made by specialists who are equipped intellectually and physically to make responsible recommendations.

One of the unfortunate things about the House is that its composition is made up overwhelmingly of lawyers and land-owners. Many of the debates resolve themselves to certain legal technicalities and in the heat of the legal discussion, the issue is forgotten. This was quite true in the present instance. The most heated part of the discussion concerned the question of whether it was a five year project or a one year project. Hardly anything was said as to what sort of project it was or

1. See Appendix "n".
whether it was feasible and wise or not. To give one instance: the project appropriates one million pounds to be spent on "beautifying" the city of Beirut, while many districts in the same city are ravaged by malaria and not a plaster is appropriated to deal with this great menace. This is a representative symptom in many of the actions taken by the cabinet. They seek the spectacular while they often neglect the vital and essential.

National reconstruction is certainly needed. There is hardly an area in the national life that does not require construction, but true statesmanship approaches such problems in quite a different way from what both the cabinet and the House have shown so far.
CONCLUSION

People get that kind of government which they deserve. That is true of nations which have had a long period of political history during which they have evolved their own institutions. Such organizations become part of the life of the nation.

The Lebanese Republic neither physically nor socially has had the freedom to develop a national life of its own. Lebanon has been largely conceived in, and brought into being out of, portfolios. Its government has been subjected to various experiments that often disregarded the interest and the natural expectations of the people. These experiments were often imposed from above and were often intended to serve other purposes than those for which they were apparently made.

After our brief study of the assembly's behavior, it is worth considering how its activities can be brought more into line with the best interests of those whom it represents.

The Constitution

It is apparent from a close study of the Lebanese Constitution that its authors intended to leave the
Legislative Assembly as weak and impotent as possible: this intention appears in the provision that the Executive (the President and his Ministers) may dissolve the Assembly, may suspend its activities for a while, and may claim the floor for a cabinet member any time and for any length of time that the cabinet members choose. This provision makes it very hard for any deputy to introduce any legislation, and in fact gives wide veto powers to the Executive, other than the veto power which properly belongs to him. On top of all that, the original constitution allowed the Executive Branch to appoint one-third of the deputies and made it clear that the Mandatory Power was the ultimate authority in all things.

Even as it now stands, with provision that all the deputies are to be elected, it is not at all difficult for the Executive to pass almost any measures through the Assembly. The average number of deputies who abstain themselves from meetings is calculated to be 15. Add to these six members who are in the Cabinet, also the President of the Chamber and that makes twenty. It leaves an average of 25 voting members out of a total of 65 deputies in the House. If the Executive can secure only 15 votes, it can carry through whatever measures it proposes.

The Constitutional Amendments that were effected in November, 1943, tended to aggravate the situation,
because they tended to take away whatever powers the Mandatory authorities had, and to leave the question unanswered as to who was to assume those powers. Naturally these powers went to the Executive.

The Constitution as it now stands is therefore really very inadequate. It was hammered out to serve an altogether different purpose from that which should now be the concern of the Lebanese people. It is important that the Lebanese people should have an organic law that will safeguard their political life and create that equilibrium of adequate checks and balances that are essential for any democratic state. Patchwork will not do. The Republic must become in fact a sovereign state whose citizens can be held responsible among other citizens in a democratic world.

In the meantime and until such an organ is created, the House will stand to profit from having the members of the Cabinet appointed from outside as well as from within the body of representatives. It has often been apparent that the ambition of some deputies to reach the Cabinet has rendered their conduct unworthy of their position as legislators. In any case, the House as it now stands, does not have the best talent of the land, and the talent which has remained outside the House
Electoral Laws and Their Implications

The electoral laws as they stand on paper are good, but there is need of more than laws to make an election genuine and democratic.

The Lebanese people need to be trained into the democratic way by the opportunity of practising it on the various levels of their national life. Switzerland, which is a small country also, is an example for the Lebanese to set before themselves. The present political life of the country is too centralized to allow local pride, local participation and local initiative. Almost all governmental decisions are made by the central government. This gives it an undue burden of details. It deprives the citizens of experiencing democracy in action. Participation in local activities as autonomous groups, study of problems, discussion of differences, compromise and acceptance of majority rule will enable them to develop the virtues and standards of patience, tolerance, courage, love of freedom and sense of responsibility which are the secret of democratic success.
Internal Organization

The internal organization of the Assembly is inadequate. An elementary need is that the deputies acquaint themselves with accepted procedures of parliamentary behavior. Further it is clear that the method used in the election of committees and of officers is also inadequate. No nominations are made before the voting. As it is, the House lacks expert membership. The majority of deputies are lawyers and landowners. Committees should in fact be appointed by the Chairman and should then receive confirmation by the House. This change would give system and plan to the membership of the committees.

In the second place, the House should not be the sole agent to decide upon the constitutionality and validity of its own elections. There ought to be a high court of judges with power to look into claims and counter-claims and to give their verdict concerning the validity of an election. This is one way which might lessen infringements upon the electoral laws.

Any income that comes to the deputy by virtue of his being a deputy, other than his salary, should be subject to judicial investigation.
The Elections

The general elections have given the country a fairly representative body which, after several acts that were of great importance, received confirmation through the results of the by-elections. It is to be hoped that some day the political life of the country will be organized more on a party basis, and that issues in the elections will be contested on the basis of principles.

These principles should not be mutually exclusive. Parties, to give real life to the nation, need to be in agreement on some fundamental principles. The difference among them should be in the process of realizing common objectives. In other words, a nation politically healthy has its citizens divided into parties who hold alternative plans for the realization of the same ends. It is only when the party in office becomes clogged in its activities, or fails in its leadership, that it is replaced by the electorate by another group that believes fundamentally in the same things but has an alternative plan for their realization. Where parties are mutually exclusive, strife and social exhaustion will result.
Constitutional Amendments

The constitutional amendments that the House brought about were largely negative in their nature. They were meant to bring the era of the Mandate to an end. But the Constitution needs to be changed. This change should not be hurried, since it is not good for any constitution to have too many and too frequent alterations.

With regard to the particular amendments that were made by the Assembly, it is beyond doubt that the constitution of Lebanon should include no articles that compromise its independence. By clearing its constitution from any vestiges of subordination to another state, the Republic of Lebanon gave expression to its will to live its own national life.

Foreign Policy

Lebanon, geographically, historically and culturally, cannot live by itself. Even if it could live by itself, duty urges it to take a different course. Lebanon is the meeting place of world currents which here mingle and are synthesized into something else. This is the unique contribution that Lebanon can make.
The Lebanese have certain justifiable fears. Some are rooted in past experiences. It takes time to live out the past and it is not wise to hurry this process. One of the more justifiable fears is that Lebanon is not yet sure of itself as a nation. Since this is the case, close association with others might make it lose its identity. In the meantime, the Lebanese government will do well to follow the words of its outstanding leaders and foreign ministers, that Lebanon should develop friendly relations and mutual trust with all those who show good will towards it, but should not entangle itself with agreements and treaties which will create future embarrassment.

**Fiscal Policy**

The House does not have the appropriate machinery to check upon and decide fiscal matters. But since it must have control, there needs to be created a department to audit the State accounts and this department ought to be independent of the executive and directly answerable to the House. Furthermore, the Parliament should have, and should exercise the power of withdrawing its confidence from any cabinet that does not present the budget in the appointed time.

1. See Appendix "G"
Long-term Legislation

There are many problems in Lebanon that need to be systematically studied, and solved through legislation. Many of these problems cannot be left to individual judgment. Reforestation, irrigation, public health, education, summer resort development, reclamation projects: these are only a few of the areas in the national life where a systematic study could be made and a long term policy followed.

The public should be educated to the extent and the purpose of these projects. Achievements, already made, and future plans, could be made easily available to the public.

These are things that under more favorable conditions, the Legislative Assembly of the Lebanese Republic might well undertake.
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND


II. PRIMARY SOURCES:


3. *Al-Dustur Al-Lubnani*


7. A collection of pamphlets and other literature distributed during the 1943 general elections and preserved in the Library of the American University of Beirut.


III. PERIODICALS

1. *Al-Hadith, Beirut, files for 1943 and 1944.*


3. *Al-Nahar, Beirut, files for 1943-1944.*


5. *Al-Diaa, Beirut, files for 1943-1944.*


9. *Al-Ahram, Cairo, files for 1944.*

IV. TECHNICAL


## SOUTH LEBANON

### WINNING LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>No. of Votes Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shii'te</td>
<td>A. Usayran</td>
<td>20011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R. Saydoun</td>
<td>19483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Al-As'ad</td>
<td>19424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Al-Fadl</td>
<td>19392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K. Al-Khalil</td>
<td>18806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Al-Abdallah</td>
<td>18466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>R. Sulh</td>
<td>19406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>K. Kana'an</td>
<td>18408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Y. Salem</td>
<td>17123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>N. Almasyeh</td>
<td>No majority vote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### LOSING LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shii'te</td>
<td>Y. El-Zeine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Usayran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R. El-Tamir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Al-Amir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K. Halaweh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Sharaf-al-Din</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>K. Shihab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>K. Na'tuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>J. Asuri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>N. Ghadril</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Won in the second round with 11146 votes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECT</th>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>VOTES 1st. ROUND</th>
<th>VOTES 2nd. RD.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>S. Sulh</td>
<td>5967 won</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Nusuli</td>
<td>4510</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K. Jabr</td>
<td>4663</td>
<td>3790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>A. Tabet</td>
<td>5740 won</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>A. Naccash</td>
<td>5880 won</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>J. Twayni</td>
<td>5157</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>M. Baydun</td>
<td>5690</td>
<td>6655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian</td>
<td>Shamlian</td>
<td>5813 won</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mairlian</td>
<td>5892</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SECON D LIST</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>A. Yafi</th>
<th>5795 won</th>
<th>5622</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I. Abdab</td>
<td>5611</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S. Slam</td>
<td>5193</td>
<td>5622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>M. Frayj</td>
<td>5561</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>G. Tabit</td>
<td>5440</td>
<td>7935</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>H. Abu-Shahla</td>
<td>5205</td>
<td>6057</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>N. Slim</td>
<td>5627</td>
<td>6057</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenians</td>
<td>DerKalosian</td>
<td>5540</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iskandarian</td>
<td>5554</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Winning List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of Votes Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>A. Karameh</td>
<td>16123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Munla</td>
<td>15354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. Al-Mustafa</td>
<td>15412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M. El-Abbud</td>
<td>16282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K. Al-Ali</td>
<td>15672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>H. Franjiyyeh</td>
<td>14402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y. Isben</td>
<td>15936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W. Jaf'ja'</td>
<td>15316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Butrus Khuri</td>
<td>15144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y. Darr</td>
<td>15330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>N. Ghan</td>
<td>15729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Y. Sarraf</td>
<td>15547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Losing List

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>U. Muhaddem</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Jise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K. Abdul-Kader</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N. Al-Feid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K. Kaddur</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>T. Awwad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N. Khuri</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J. Bulus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Shahin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>F. Bulus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I. Abu'yyah</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### DUKA DISTRICT

#### WINNING LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Number of Votes Received</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shi'ite</td>
<td>I. Haydar</td>
<td>11550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S. Himadeh</td>
<td>11717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>R. Kaz'oun</td>
<td>11357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Y. Hirawi</td>
<td>11205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>E. Faris</td>
<td>11289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>A. Pirzali</td>
<td>11475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>N. Daud</td>
<td>11622</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### LOSING LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shi'ite</td>
<td>F. Himadeh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J. Haydar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>A. Al-Kadri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>M. Hammar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>A. Skaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>N. Nekad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>M. Hammad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NORTH LEBANON

#### CONSTITUTIONAL BLOC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sect</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>First Round</th>
<th>Second Round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>B. Khuri</td>
<td>19467</td>
<td>22263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Lehhud</td>
<td>19205</td>
<td>21833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K. Abu Jawdeh</td>
<td>18682</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E. Shamioun</td>
<td>20520 won</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F. Al-Khazin</td>
<td>18196</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F. Khuri</td>
<td>18020</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sect</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Votes 1st Round</td>
<td>Votes 2nd Round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>W. Nu'aym</td>
<td>19801</td>
<td>21515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Awn</td>
<td>17128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L. Zladeh</td>
<td>19784</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dr. 'Ad</td>
<td>15788</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>M. Irislan</td>
<td>19164</td>
<td>21654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I. Jumblat</td>
<td>15800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Tekiddin</td>
<td>16314</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi'ite</td>
<td>A. Hejj</td>
<td>17843</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>A. Hajjar</td>
<td>18803</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>A. Lahhoud</td>
<td>14884</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>S. Takla</td>
<td>18767</td>
<td>22230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Bloc</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>A. Al-See'd</td>
<td>21350 won</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>K. Khasin</td>
<td>19290</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R. Abu-Nadim</td>
<td>17027</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>W. El-Askkar</td>
<td>19700</td>
<td>21456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Bustani</td>
<td>20200 won</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Akl</td>
<td>20685 won</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Nakhleh</td>
<td>18061</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Zwayn</td>
<td>20975 won</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>G. Yasek</td>
<td>17846</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R. Idde</td>
<td>19556</td>
<td>22581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>K. Jumblat</td>
<td>22665 won</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J. Tahtuk</td>
<td>21060 won</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Mishir</td>
<td>19749</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sect</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>First Round</td>
<td>Second Round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shi'ite</td>
<td>A. Hassani</td>
<td>21192 won</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>A. Khatib</td>
<td>17150</td>
<td>21726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>G. Murr</td>
<td>17400</td>
<td>21356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>T. Risk</td>
<td>18663</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX B

**The Electorate and Those Who Voted**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Electorate</th>
<th>1943 Voters</th>
<th>1944 Voters</th>
<th>1945 Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>43761</td>
<td>11429</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>74324</td>
<td>40116</td>
<td>39289</td>
<td>37350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>42485</td>
<td>29675</td>
<td>20187</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>37881</td>
<td>34594</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukā'</td>
<td>28680</td>
<td>20108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX C

**Population and Area of Lebanese Districts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut Town</td>
<td>19 Sq. Km.</td>
<td>235667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukā'</td>
<td>4232 sq km</td>
<td>143423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Lebanon</td>
<td>1693 sq km</td>
<td>253931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N. Lebanon</td>
<td>2004 sq km</td>
<td>221836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. Lebanon</td>
<td>2022 sq km</td>
<td>189207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures are taken from the Statistical Handbook, issued by the Jewish Agency for Palestine page 92. Compare below.
APPENDIX D

INCOME TAX RATES IN THE LEBANESE REPUBLIC

Industrial, Commercial, and Professional Occupations:

The tax shall be levied in the following percentages after deducting 1,800 Lebanese Pounds for non-married persons, and 1,800 pounds for persons who are married and have children:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial and Commercial Occupations</th>
<th>Non-Commercial Occupations</th>
<th>All Expressed in Lebanese Pounds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>on the first 5000 or fraction thereof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>on portion over 5000 and not over 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 10,000 &quot; &quot; &quot; 15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 15,000 &quot; &quot; &quot; 25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 25,000 &quot; &quot; &quot; 35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 35,000 &quot; &quot; &quot; 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 50,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pensions, Wages, and Salaries:

The tax is levied in the following percentages after deducting 900 Lebanese Pounds for non-married persons, 1,800 pounds for married persons, and 1,500 pounds for married persons with children:

3% on first 2,400 pounds of taxable income

4% on portion of taxable income over 2,400 but not over 6,000

5% " " " " " " " 6,000 " " " 12,000

6% " " " " " " " 12,000 " " " 24,000

8% " " " " " " " 24,000
APPENDIX E

THE COVENANT OF THE ARAB LEAGUE

Preamble

The signatory countries desire to strengthen the close ties that unite the Arab States, and to cementing and reinforcing these ties on the basis of mutual respect for the independence and sovereignty of each of these States, of directing their efforts towards the common good of the Arab countries, the improvement of their conditions, the guarantee of their future, and the realization of their aspirations, and in response to the desires of public opinion in all Arab countries, have decided to conclude a pact to this effect.

Article I

The League of Arab States shall be composed of independent Arab States that have signed the present covenant. Any independent Arab State can become a member of the League. An application to this effect must be filed at the General Secretariat and submitted to the Council at the first meeting held after the application is filed.

Article II

The aim of the League shall be the strengthening of relations among member States and the coordination of their political activities with the view of realizing a close collaboration among them, of safeguarding their independence and sovereignty, and of treating, in a general way, all questions relative to the Arab Countries and their interests. The aim of the League shall also be to insure, within the frame of the institutions and conditions governing each State, a close collaboration among the member States in the following matters:

1) Economic and financial questions, including commercial exchange, customs, currency, agriculture and industry.

2) Communications, including questions relative to railways, roads, aviation, navigation, post and telegraph.

3) Cultural Questions.

4) Questions of nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments and extradition.

5) Social questions.

6) Health questions.

Article III

The League shall have a Council composed of representatives of member States. Each State shall have one single vote, regardless of the number of its representatives. The function of the Council shall be to realize the
aim of the League, and to insure the executions of conventions concluded between member states on the questions mentioned in the preceding article, or in any other field. The functions of the Council shall also be to fix the means by which the League will cooperate with the international organizations which may be created in the future to insure peace and security, and to settle economic and social questions.

Article IV

A special committee representing each of the member states shall be constituted for each category of questions enumerated in article two. The work of these committees shall be to lay down the rules and determine the extent of collaboration among member states. The committee's reports shall be in the form of draft conventions to be examined by the Council with a view of submitting them for approval by the member states.

Representatives of other (non-member) Arab countries shall be enabled to participate in the work of the committees referred to above. The Council shall determine the basis of this representation and conditions under which it shall be admitted.

Article V

It shall be forbidden to use force for the settlement of disputes arising between member states. Should there be a dispute that does not affect the independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity of the member states and should the parties concerned turn to the Council for the settlement of the dispute, the decision of the Council shall be binding and executable.

In such a case, the states between which the dispute has arisen shall not take part in the deliberations and decisions of the Council.

The Council shall use its good offices in all disputes susceptible of bringing about a war between two member states, or between a member state and a non-member state.

Decisions of arbitration or of conciliation shall be taken with a majority vote.

Article VI

In case of aggression or threat of aggression against a member state, the threatened state can demand an immediate meeting of the Council.

The Council shall unanimously determine the measures necessary to counteract the aggression. If the aggression is made by a member state the vote of the latter shall not count towards a unanimous decision.

If the government of the wronged party should find itself unable, as a result of aggression, to communicate with the Council, then its representative in the
Council shall have the right to demand a meeting for the purpose mentioned in the foregoing paragraph.
In case the said representative is unable to communicate with the Council then any member state shall have the right of demanding a meeting.

Article VII
The Council's decisions by a unanimous vote shall be binding on all members of the League. Those which are taken by majority vote shall be binding only on those accepting them.
In either case, the execution of the Council's decisions in any state shall take place in accordance with the organic statutes of that particular state.

Article VIII
Each member state shall undertake to respect the form of government of each of the other member states regarding such regime as an exclusive right. Each state shall also undertake to refrain from any action tending to change this regime.

Article IX
Those states desirous of establishing between them a closer collaboration and stronger ties than those provided for in the present covenant shall have the faculty of concluding agreements to that effect.
The treaties and agreements already concluded, or to be concluded in the future, shall not be binding on other members.

Article X
The permanent seat of the League shall be at Cairo. The Council, however, may decide to meet in any other place.

Article XI
The League Council shall meet in ordinary session twice a year -- in March and October. It shall meet in extraordinary session at the demand of two members any time such a meeting is imposed by circumstances.

Article XII
The League shall have a permanent General Secretariat, comprising a general secretary, assistant secretaries and a sufficient number of officials.
The General Secretary shall be appointed by the Council by a majority of two thirds of the League members. The assistant secretaries and senior officers of the League shall be appointed by the General Secretary, subject to the Council's approval.
The Council shall establish a set of by-laws for
the General Secretariat, and service conditions for the officers.

The General Secretary shall have the rank of Ambassador, and the assistant secretaries shall have the rank of Ministers Plenipotentiary.

The first General Secretary is designated in an annex to the present Covenant.

Article XVII

The General Secretary shall prepare the League Budget and submit it for approval to the Council before the beginning of the financial year.

The Council shall determine the part to be contributed by each member state towards the expenses. The Council can modify this part, if need be.

Article XVIII

The members of the League Council and those of its officers designated in the by-laws shall enjoy, in the exercise of their functions, diplomatic privileges and immunity.

The premises occupied by the League Offices shall be inviolable.

Article XIX

The first meeting of the Council shall be called by the Head of Egyptian Government. All subsequent meetings shall be called by the General Secretary.

The Representatives of member states shall, each in his turn, assume the presidency of the Council during ordinary sessions.

Article XX

Beside the cases specially mentioned in the present Covenant, the Council shall, by a majority vote, take executable decisions in the following matters:

1) Questions relative to personal.
2) Adoption of the League Budget.
3) Adoption of by-laws relative to the Council, the Committees and the General Secretariat.
4) Closing of sessions.

Article XXI

Each member state shall deposit at the General Secretariat copies of treaties or conventions concluded, or to be concluded in the future, with a member state or a non-member state.

Article XXII

Each member state shall be free to withdraw from the League after one year's notice.

The League Council shall have the authority to
the General Secretariat, and service conditions for the officers.

The General Secretary shall have the rank of Ambassador, and the assistant secretaries shall have the rank of Ministers Plenipotentiary.

The first General Secretary is designated in an annex to the present Covenant.

Article XIII

The General Secretary shall prepare the League Budget and submit it for approval to the Council before the beginning of the financial year.

The Council shall determine the part to be contributed by each member state towards the expenses. The Council can modify this part, if need be.

Article XIV

The members of the League Council and those of its officers designated in the by-laws shall enjoy, in the exercise of their functions, diplomatic privileges and immunity.

The premises occupied by the League Officers shall be inviolable.

Article XV

The first meeting of the Council shall be called by the Head of Egyptian Government. All subsequent meetings shall be called by the General Secretary.

The Representatives of member states shall, each in his turn, assume the presidency of the Council during ordinary sessions.

Article XVI

I. Besides the cases specially mentioned in the present Covenant, the Council shall, by a majority vote, take executable decisions in the following matters:

1) Questions relative to personnel.
2) Adoption of the League Budget.
3) Adoption of by-laws relative to the Council, the Committees and the General Secretariat.
4) Closing of sessions.

Article XVII

Each member state shall deposit at the General Secretariat copies of treaties or conventions concluded, or to be concluded in the future, with a member state or a non-member state.

Article XVIII

Each member state shall be free to withdraw from the League after one year's notice.

The League Council shall have the authority to
the General Secretariat, and service conditions for the officers.

The General Secretary shall have the rank of Ambassador, and the assistant secretaries shall have the rank of Ministers Plenipotentiary.

The first General Secretary is designated in an annex to the present Covenant.

**Article XII**

The General Secretary shall prepare the League Budget and submit it for approval to the Council before the beginning of the financial year.

The Council shall determine the part to be contributed by each member state towards the expenses. The Council can modify this part, if need be.

**Article XV**

The members of the League Council and those of its officers designated in the by-laws shall enjoy, in the exercise of their functions, diplomatic privileges and immunity.

The premises occupied by the League Offices shall be inviolable.

**Article XIV**

The first meeting of the Council shall be called by the Head of Egyptian Government. All subsequent meetings shall be called by the General Secretary.

The Representatives of member states shall, each in his turn, assume the presidency of the Council during ordinary sessions.

**Article XVI**

Beside the cases specially mentioned in the present Covenant, the Council shall, by a majority vote, take executable decisions in the following matters:

1. Questions relative to personal.
2. Adoption of the League Budget.
3. Adoption of by-laws relative to the Council, the Committees and the General Secretariat.
4. Closing of sessions.

**Article XVII**

Each member state shall deposit at the General Secretariat copies of treaties or conventions concluded, or to be concluded in the future, with a member state or a non-member state.

**Article XVIII**

Each member state shall be free to withdraw from the League after one year's notice.

The League Council shall have the authority to
expel any member failing to fulfill the engagements resulting from the present Covenant. The decision shall be taken by a unanimous vote, not including that of the state concerned.

Article XX

The present Covenant can be modified by a majority of two thirds of the League members. The modification can be made specially to strengthen the relations among members, to create an Arab Court of Justice, to define the relations of the League with the international organizations which will be created in the future to insure peace and security.

Any state not accepting the amendments to the Covenant shall have the right to withdraw from the League following the entry into effect of the amendment, without being bound by the stipulation of the preceding article.

Article XXI

The present Covenant annexes thereto shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties, each according to the stipulations of its constitution.

The instruments of ratification shall be deposited at the General Secretariat of the Council, and the present Covenant shall enter into effect, in respect of each state that has ratified it, at the end of a period of fifteen days from the date the instruments of ratification of four states are deposited with the General Secretary.

In proof of which, the present Covenant has been drawn up in the Arabic Language at Cairo, on March twenty-second nineteen forty-five in one copy which shall be deposited at the General Secretariat.

A Duplicate shall be issued to each member state of the League.

Annex I

RELATIVE TO PALESTINE

At the end of last war, Palestine, as well as the other countries detached from the Ottoman Empire, was freed from Ottoman domination. Having become autonomous, it is no longer dependent on any other country.

The Treaty Lauzanne declared that its fate would be settled by the parties concerned.

But, if Palestine has not been able to dispose of its own destiny it is not the less true that its status was settled by the Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919 on the basis of recognition of its independence.

Its international existence and independence cannot therefore be questioned from the legal viewpoint, any more than the independence of the other Arab States can be put in question.
If, for reasons beyond its scope, Palestine's existence as an independent state has not become a de facto one, this circumstance does not constitute an obstacle to Palestine's participation in the work of the League Council.

The signatories of the present Covenant estimate, under these conditions and by reason of Palestine's particular circumstances, that, pending the attainment by Palestine of full power to exercise the attributes of independ-ence the League Council should have the faculty of designating an Arab representative for Palestine, to take part in the work of the League Council.

Annex II

RELATIVE TO NON-MEMBER ARAB COUNTRIES:

Considering that the member states will have to treat in council as well as in the committees, questions the usefulness and extent of which will be of interest to the whole Arab World, and considering that the Council cannot remain indifferent to the aspirations of Arab Coun-
tries, but should display every effort towards their reali-
sation, the signatory States hereby ask the Council to envisage the closest collaboration possible, when it is called upon to decide on the participation of non-member Arab Coun-
tries in the work of the Committees provided for by the Covenant.

Annex III

RELATIVE TO THE FIRST GENERAL SECRETARY:

The signatories of the present Covenant have agreed among themselves to appoint Abdul-Rahman Azzam Bey General Secretary to the League of Arab States.

This appointment will be valid for two years. The statutes of the General Secretariat will be decided upon by the League Council.
APPENDIX F

Jdeh Expresses His Views Freely:

"Nationalism is the natural foundation for the life of a new country. For us nationalism means complete independence for Lebanon as a geographical and political unit and perpetual alliance with France. Some of the Muslims speak of a union with Syria. This would be against all our interests. We Christians are a majority in this country. If we united with Syria we should be swallowed up by their dominantly Muslim population. But there are other reasons against such a union.

"To begin with, we and the Syrians are two completely different nations. Their traditions, their mode of living, are not the same as ours. Remember, not only have our sons been to European universities, but even our fathers have been brought up on Western culture and have in many instances studied abroad. The Syrians, on the other hand, are Muslim Arabs with practically nothing Occidental about them.

.......

"That alliance (with France) is the natural outcome of the position in which we find ourselves. France has helped us in the past; most of us speak her language...

"... Without the protection of a big foreign power we should be swallowed up by some of our neighbors. Besides we have a mission to perform in the Near East. We are the only Christian island in a sea of Muslim countries.

.......

"Pan-Arabism is against our interests. If some of our Muslims cherish such ideas, our Christians abhor them."

لا يوجد نص يمكن القراءة عليه من الصورة المقدمة.
APPENDIX H

THE PROTOCOL OF ALEXANDRIA

The Preparatory Committee of the General Arab Conference has terminated its work in the same atmosphere of full mutual confidence, sincere brotherhood and deep cordiality which characterised its beginning, conscious of its common responsibilities in these grave circumstances in which history is following a new course.

In the accomplishment of its mission the Committee was animated by a strong desire to unite its efforts for the welfare of all Arab countries, to ameliorate their condition, to guarantee their future and to realise their aspirations.

The fact that Mr. Musa El-alem, representative of the Palestine Arabs, joined the Committee was an object of joy and satisfaction in view of the particular gravity and the supreme importance characterising this country.

The Committee, with the unanimity of votes of the Syrian, Transjordan, Iraqi, Lebanese and Egyptian Delegations has adopted several decisions which are vital from the political, economic, cultural, social and other viewpoints.

Accordingly, the heads and members of these delegations have signed the Protocol adjoined hereto.

As to the delegations of the Kingdoms of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, they have postponed their decision pending consultations with their Majesties King Abdul-Aziz Al-Saud and King Yehya Hamiduddin.

PROTOCOL

The undersigned, heads and members of Arab Delegations to the Preparatory Committee of the General Arab Conference etc., etc.

Desirous of verifying the close relations and many ties among all the Arab countries, with the object of fortifying these ties, consolidating them, and directing them for the welfare of all the Arab countries, to ameliorate their condition, to guarantee their future, and to realise their aspirations.

And in response to the appeal of public opinion in all the Arab countries, met at Alexandria between Monday, Sept. 28th, 1944, and Saturday, October 7th, 1944, as a Preparatory Committee of the General Arab Conference and agreed on the following:

1. LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

A League of Arab States shall be constituted by the
independent Arab States which are willing to join it. This League shall have a council called the "Council of the League of Arab States," in which the member States shall be represented on an equal footing.

The Council's mission shall be to execute the agreements concluded by the member States among themselves, to organise periodic meetings which will strengthen their relations with one another, to co-ordinate their political programmes for more complete collaboration, to safeguard, by every possible means, their independence and sovereignty against any aggression, and in general, to look after the affairs of the Arab countries in their interests.

The decision of the Council shall be operative on those who accept them except in case of conflict between two members of the League, and in the event of this conflict being referred to the League Council for settlement. In this case, the Council's decision shall be operative.

In any case, the use of force in the settlement of disputes between two member States shall be forbidden.

Furthermore, every member State shall have the right to conclude with any other State, whether member or non-member private agreements which are not contrary to the letter or spirit of these stipulations.

It shall not be permitted, under any circumstances, to follow a foreign policy which jeopardizes the policy of the League of Arab States or any of its members.

The Council shall act as mediator in any dispute susceptible of provoking war between one member of the League and any other member or non-member State.

A commission shall be formed of the members of the Preparatory committee to draw up the statutes of the League Council, and to examine the political questions which may lead to the conclusion of agreements among the Arab States.

11. ECONOMICAL, CULTURAL, AND SOCIAL COLLABORATION

The Arab states represented on the Committee shall cooperate closely in the following fields:

1. Economic and financial questions including commercial exchange customs, currency, agriculture and industry.

2. Communications, including railways, roads, aviation, navigation, post and telegraph.

3. Cultural affairs.

4. Questions relative to nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, extradition, etc.
5. Questions relative to public health.

An expert committee for each category of the above questions shall be formed by the representatives of the Governments taking part in the Preparatory Committee with the object of drawing up a plan defining the methods and extent of the intended collaboration, as well as the organism charged with the execution of the plan.

A co-ordination and codification committee, tooo-ordi-
nate their efforts, and to draw up their resolutions in the form of draft agreements to be submitted to the different Governments.

When all the committees have terminated their work, the Preparatory Committee shall meet to examine the results of this work, with a view to calling the General Arab Conference.

III. STRENGTHENING OF RELATIONS.

Rejoicing over this first happy result, the Committee hopes that, in future, the Arab countries will consolidate it with further decisions, especially if, after the present war, world events should lead to the establishment of institutions which will unite the States with stronger and closer ties.

IV. SPECIAL CLAUSE CONCERNING LEBANON

The Arab States represented on the Preparatory Committee affirm unanimously their respect for the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon within its present frontiers. This is what their Governments have already recognized, following the adoption by the Lebanese Government of a policy of independence, as proclaimed in the Ministerial programme unanimously approved by the Lebanese House of Deputies on October 7th, 1943.

V. SPECIAL CLAUSE CONCERNING PALESTINE

The Committee estimates that Palestine constitutes an important element among the Arab Countries, and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be infringed without endangering the peace and stability of the Arab World. Also the Committee estimates that the engagements taken by Great Britain concerning the cessation of Jewish immigration, the safeguarding of lands belonging to the Arabs, and the following of a policy which leads Palestine towards independence constitutes so many rights for the Arabs and that their rights for independence and the application of these rights is a forward step towards the ultimate goal, which is the reaffirmation of peace and stability.

The Committee declares that its feeling of sympathy for the horrors and persecutions suffered by the Jews of Europe
at the hands of some dictatorial States, is not less strong than anybody else's. But it is necessary to distinguish the case of these Jews from Zionism, for nothing is more arbitrary and unjust than the attempt to settle the problem of Europe's Jews by committing another injustice, the victim of which would be the Palestinian Arabs, no matter to what religious sect they belong.

The proposition concerning the participation of Arab Governments and peoples in the Arab Nation Fund, destined to save Palestinian lands, will be referred to the Committee of Economic and Financial Affairs, which will examine it in all its aspects and submit the results of its examination to the Preparatory Committee during its next meeting.

In proof of which, this Protocol has been signed at Farouk I University, Alexandria, on Saturday, October 7th, 1944.
### APPENDIX "II"

**Price Index of Certain Basic Commodities**  
**For Syria and the Lebanon**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>June 1942</th>
<th>June 1943</th>
<th>Dec. 1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Products</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw Materials</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuel</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactured Products</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>1,292</td>
<td>1,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Materials</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>1,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Index</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approx. Wheat Index to producers</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX "J"

Wholesale Price Index

This Index was prepared by the Bureau de Statistiques which was run by, up to the end of 1943, the Delegation Generale. Fifty-seven articles are covered - 24 foodstuffs, 18 primary materials, 7 types of fuel, 7 manufactured articles, and 6 forms of building material. Every article is weighted according to the quantity either produced or consumed in Syria and Lebanon. The following table gives the figures since 1939. (June 1939 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1939</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1940</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1942</td>
<td>484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1942</td>
<td>761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 1943</td>
<td>817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1943</td>
<td>860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1943</td>
<td>811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1943</td>
<td>901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1944</td>
<td>898</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX "K"

**Notes in Circulation Since 1939**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At the end of</th>
<th>Notes in Circulation</th>
<th>Index Jan.-July</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August, 1939</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 1939</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 1940</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 1941</td>
<td>105.6</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 1942</td>
<td>193.3</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 1943</td>
<td>219.2</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September, 1943</td>
<td>272.7</td>
<td>812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 1943</td>
<td>280.0</td>
<td>861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December, 1943</td>
<td>272.5</td>
<td>811</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ibid., p. 8
APPENDIX "L"

Cost of Living Index

The same Bureau de Statistiques prepared a monthly cost of living index for Beirut. It is based on the price of foodstuffs (5 headings) accommodation (6 headings) clothing and toilet articles (6 headings) education, medical care and recreation (4 headings) and taxes. The following are the figures since 1940 [Jan.-June 1939 = 100 $].

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1940</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1942</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1942</td>
<td>365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1943</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1943</td>
<td>419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1943</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1943</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Ibid., p. 5
APPENDIX "M"

Indirect Taxes

1. Tax on inflammable materials.
2. Judicial taxes.
3. Notarial taxes.
4. Stamp taxes.
5. Tax on Liquors.
6. Proceeds on Sales of salt.
7. Tax on tobacco.
8. Tax on matches.
APPENDIX "N"

Cabinet Posts in Lebanon

1. Interior.
2. Ravitaillement.
3. Agriculture.
5. Justice.
6. Finance.
7. Foreign Affairs.
10. National Education.
11. Hygiene.
APPENDIX "O"

Urban and Rural Population of 
Lebanon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural Population</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Population</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saida</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zahle</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDIX 'P'

**Estimated Population of Lebanon on 31st December, 1945, Arranged by Religions and Districts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RELIGIOUS GROUPS</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Beirut</th>
<th>Mount Lebanon</th>
<th>North Lebanon</th>
<th>South Lebanon</th>
<th>Saida’s</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunnis</td>
<td>54,122</td>
<td>19,523</td>
<td>98,708</td>
<td>22,322</td>
<td>23,842</td>
<td>225,564</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiites</td>
<td>10,070</td>
<td>12,119</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>121,922</td>
<td>43,528</td>
<td>500,698</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druzes</td>
<td>1,862</td>
<td>57,254</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6,843</td>
<td>5,715</td>
<td>72,111</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Muslims</td>
<td>66,052</td>
<td>94,301</td>
<td>99,777</td>
<td>100,117</td>
<td>209,148</td>
<td>407,993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maronites</td>
<td>15,016</td>
<td>171,417</td>
<td>84,003</td>
<td>26,874</td>
<td>20,874</td>
<td>216,301</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek C.</td>
<td>5,064</td>
<td>15,060</td>
<td>1,754</td>
<td>10,047</td>
<td>25,917</td>
<td>35,928</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orth.</td>
<td>19,976</td>
<td>21,737</td>
<td>40,149</td>
<td>6,942</td>
<td>18,474</td>
<td>116,568</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>3,038</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>11,122</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latins</td>
<td>2,106</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1,137</td>
<td>3,002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian C.</td>
<td>5,171</td>
<td>3,016</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>9,743</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orth.</td>
<td>55,212</td>
<td>14,941</td>
<td>975</td>
<td>1,657</td>
<td>5,222</td>
<td>55,007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaldeans</td>
<td>942</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1,794</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian C.</td>
<td>3,845</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>4,098</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Orth.</td>
<td>1,404</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>3,577</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Christians</td>
<td>93,965</td>
<td>280,276</td>
<td>154,063</td>
<td>54,027</td>
<td>55,717</td>
<td>307,556</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>4,416</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5,063</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslims</td>
<td>10,454</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>5,055</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>5,972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTALS</td>
<td>106,459</td>
<td>325,610</td>
<td>165,692</td>
<td>80,061</td>
<td>151,109</td>
<td>1,026,824</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures in this table have been obtained from the Chief Registrar’s Office. They are, in fact, the figures of the 1932 Census, to which have been added registered births and immigrations and from which have been deducted registered deaths and emigrations.
APPENDIX G

Statistical Summary of the Occupations of the Lebanese Population as at Dec 1, 1943

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City of Beirut</th>
<th>North Lebanon</th>
<th>Mt Lebanon</th>
<th>South Lebanon</th>
<th>Bekaa</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merchants</td>
<td>8,425</td>
<td>5,575</td>
<td>3,739</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>1,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>6,360</td>
<td>2,046</td>
<td>6,173</td>
<td>5,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shareholders (1)</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>7,356</td>
<td>6,977</td>
<td>2,639</td>
<td>2,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servants (2)</td>
<td>4,820</td>
<td>1,541</td>
<td>1,669</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>14,789</td>
<td>5,120</td>
<td>4,470</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctors</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>87,187</td>
<td>8,730</td>
<td>10,121</td>
<td>4,367</td>
<td>2,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>35,354</td>
<td>22,391</td>
<td>40,390</td>
<td>23,070</td>
<td>18,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Servants</td>
<td>5,466</td>
<td>2,917</td>
<td>2,550</td>
<td>1,601</td>
<td>1,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Employed (3)</td>
<td>135,801</td>
<td>164,392</td>
<td>199,610</td>
<td>126,938</td>
<td>110,701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>233,970</td>
<td>226,063</td>
<td>284,350</td>
<td>167,390</td>
<td>156,056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Shareholders - receivers of unearned income.
(2) Civil Servants: include employees of large commercial or public utility organisations.
(3) Unemployed - Beirut figures include all prostitutes.

(These figures are taken from a mimeographed copy of a pamphlet made by the Near East Supply Center on Syria and Lebanon, and dated March 1944, pages 16 and 17.)

Ibid. pages 16 and 17.
APPENDIX R

IMPORTANT ARTICLES IN THE CONSTITUTION RELATED TO
THE LEBANESE PARLIAMENT

Article 16
The legislative authority is vested in one body
which is the House of Representatives.

Article 18
The President of the Republic and the House of
Representatives have the right to initiate laws.

Article 19
No law shall be published unless it is approved
by the House.

Article 24
The House of Representatives is composed of elected
members.

Article 25
In case of the dissolution of the House of Represen-
tatives the decree for dissolution must also include an
invitation to the electorate for a new election which
ought to be completed within three months from the
dissolution.

Article 26
Beirut is the seat of the government and the House
of Deputies.

Article 27
A member of the House of Deputies represents the
whole nation and his stewardship should not be conditional
on any engagements.

Article 28
It is permissible to unite the position of a
Representative with a seat in the Cabinet.
Article 30

The House of Deputies has the sole right to examine the validity of its members, and it is not allowed to drop any deputy out unless a vote of two thirds of the whole House is given.

Article 31

Any meeting which the House holds outside the legal seats is considered unconstitutional.

Article 32

The House sits twice a year in ordinary sessions. The first begins the Tuesday which follows the fifteenth of March and continues to the end of May. The second begins on the Tuesday which follows the fifteenth of October and its meetings are set aside to discuss the budget and to vote upon it. This session lasts till the end of the year.

Article 33

The President of the Republic may call for extra-ordinary sessions... The President of the Republic should call for an extraordinary session when an absolute majority of the members ask for it.

Article 34

The meetings of the House are public, nevertheless it might meet in secret session if the government or five members ask for it. The House has a right to rediscuss a question openly that has been discussed in secret.

Article 35

Votes are given by voice of mouth or by standing up except in the case of elections then it is done by secret ballot. In the case if a vote for laws and confidence the names of the deputies are called out.

Article 36

A no-confidence motion may be made by any member. Such a motion is not discussed until five days have elapsed since its submission to the officers of the House and its delivery to the officers of the House and its delivery to the ministers concerned.
Article 38

Any bill that has not received the approval of the House may not be put for discussion again during that same sitting.

Article 39

It is forbidden to prosecute a deputy for the opinions and ideas that he expresses during the period in which he is a deputy.

Article 41

In case a vacancy occurs in the House it should be filled within two months. The term for such a deputy ends with the term that his predecessor's would have ended.

Article 42

The general elections for the renewal of the House ought to take place sometimes during the sixty days before the term of the outgoing parliament ends.

Article 43

The House decides upon its own internal organization.

Article 44

At the opening of the October session the House meets under the presidency of the oldest of its members. The two youngest members act as secretaries. Then the House proceeds to elect a president and two secretaries. An absolute majority is required during the first vote, a simple majority in the second. The voting is by secret ballot.

Article 45

No voting is done by proxy.

Article 46

The compensation for the deputies are determined by law.

Article 47

The President of the Republic is elected by secret ballot. He has to receive two thirds of the votes of the members of the House in the first round or an absolute majority in the succeeding rounds.
Article 55

The President of the Republic may dissolve the House of Representatives before the end of its term. The decree for dissolution must give the reasons for the act and must be made with the consent of the ministers.

Article 59

The President of the Republic has the right to postpone the meeting of the House for a period not exceeding one month. He may not do that twice for one single round.

Article 66

The ministers are collectively responsible to the House for questions of general government policy, and they are individually responsible for their personal affairs....
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Religious Sect</th>
<th>District</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Previous Parliament Experience</th>
<th>Public Position</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>No. of Votes</th>
<th>% of Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdel M.</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Nor. Lab</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>16252</td>
<td>54.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdulla H.</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>S. Lab</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>16466</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Jawdeh K.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>Minister '37</td>
<td>30's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Shalh A.</td>
<td>Gr. Orth.</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>'37 '37-38,'39</td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>7935</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akl G.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>20695</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali S.</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Nor. Lab</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30's</td>
<td>15672</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asad A.</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>S. Lab</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td>'37 '38</td>
<td>Minister '38</td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>19424</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Askar W.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Industry</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>21456</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baydun M.</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>6546</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baydun R.</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>S. Lab</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>19433</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bustani A.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Civil Serv.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>20200</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daoud N.</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Buja'</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>11622</td>
<td>55.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daw Y.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Nor. Lab</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30's</td>
<td>15330</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derkalosian</td>
<td>Arm. Orth. M.</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Leader</td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>6057</td>
<td>57.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eude E.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>'22,'25,'29 Pres.'36-41</td>
<td></td>
<td>60's</td>
<td>22581</td>
<td>52.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fadl M.</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>S. Lab</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30's</td>
<td>18892</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Religious Sect</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Public Experience</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>No. of Votes</td>
<td>% of Votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farun, H.</td>
<td>Gr. Cath.</td>
<td>Buka'</td>
<td>Land Lord etc</td>
<td>'29</td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>11289</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firizli, A.</td>
<td>Gr. Orth.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30's</td>
<td>11475</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franjyyk, H.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>N. Leb.</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td>'34,'37</td>
<td>Minist. 38-39</td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>16402</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hibril, N.</td>
<td>Gr. Orth.</td>
<td>S. Leb.</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>11146</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hhusn, N.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>N. Leb.</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td>Mem of Direc</td>
<td>'29</td>
<td>60's</td>
<td>15729</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haydar, I.</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>Buka'</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>Minist. '37-39</td>
<td>60's</td>
<td>11559</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himadih, S.</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td>'25,'29</td>
<td>Minist. '38-39</td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>11717</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herau, Y.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Laywer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>11205</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husayni, A.</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td>'22,'25</td>
<td>Minist. 27-28</td>
<td>60's</td>
<td>21192</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irslan, M.</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td>'34,'37</td>
<td>Minist. 37-38</td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>21654</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istepan, Y.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Nor. Leb.</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td>'29,29,37</td>
<td>&quot; 38</td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>15936</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaja, W.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>15316</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jumblat, K.</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20's</td>
<td>22563</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kana'a'n, M.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>S. Leb.</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>18408</td>
<td>75.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Religious Sect</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Previous Parliament Experience</td>
<td>Public Position</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>No of Votes</td>
<td>% of Votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caramy</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>N. Leb.</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>16123</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caramegh, A. H.</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>N. Leb.</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td></td>
<td>Multi of Tripoli</td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>16123</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cazun, R.</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Buka'</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30's</td>
<td>11357</td>
<td>54.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghallil, K.</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>S. Leb.</td>
<td>Land Lord &amp; Lawyer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>18806</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazib, A. A</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21763</td>
<td>50.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghazin, F.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Land Lord</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td></td>
<td>60's</td>
<td>22263</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghuri, B. K.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>'25, '29, '34, Minister 26-27</td>
<td>F.M. 27-28, 28</td>
<td>70's</td>
<td>15412</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghuri, B. S.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>N. Leb.</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>15144</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libhoud, E</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>21833</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulla, S.</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>N. Leb.</td>
<td>Merchant</td>
<td></td>
<td>Owner of Cinema</td>
<td>60's</td>
<td>15354</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murr, G.</td>
<td>Gr. Orth.</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>21565</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa, M</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>N. Leb.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>70's</td>
<td>15412</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naghash, A.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Judge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>5880</td>
<td>51.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuam, W.</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>21565</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale, A.</td>
<td>Judge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21330</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salem, Y.</td>
<td>Gr. Orth.</td>
<td>S. Leb.</td>
<td>Director of Water Co.</td>
<td>'25, '37</td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>17123</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baraf, Y.</td>
<td>Gr. Orth.</td>
<td>N. Leb.</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>15547</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Religious Sect</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Previous Parliament Experience</td>
<td>Public Position</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>No. of Votes</td>
<td>% of Votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamlian, H.</td>
<td>Arm. Orth.</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>'34,'37</td>
<td>Minist. 38</td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>5813</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shamun, K.</td>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>20529</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slam, S.</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Landlord</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>5622</td>
<td>52.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulh, R.</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>S. Lab.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>19406</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulh, S.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Judge</td>
<td></td>
<td>P.M. 42-43</td>
<td>60's</td>
<td>5967</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tabet, A.</td>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>22,25,34,37</td>
<td>Sec.of St. 36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takla, D.</td>
<td>Gr. Orth.</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td></td>
<td>Minist. 37-38</td>
<td>30's</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takla, S.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Civil S. &amp; Lawyer</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td></td>
<td>38. Mayor of Beirut and Tripoli</td>
<td>60's</td>
<td>22230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailhuk, J.</td>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Doctor</td>
<td>'25</td>
<td></td>
<td>60's</td>
<td>21065</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usathran, A.</td>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>S. Lab.</td>
<td>Landlord</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40's</td>
<td>20011</td>
<td>82.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafi, A.</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>'37</td>
<td>P.M. 38-39,39</td>
<td>50's</td>
<td>5795</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zowayn, G.</td>
<td>Meronite</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Landlord</td>
<td>'25</td>
<td></td>
<td>80's</td>
<td>20935</td>
<td>52.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>