

T  
569

UNITED STATES POLICY ON REPATRIATION AND COMPENSATION  
OF THE PALESTINE REFUGEES WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE  
TO UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE TO THE REFUGEES

by

Michael E. Fancher

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment for the requirements  
of the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Political  
Studies and Public Administration of the American University of Beirut  
Beirut, Lebanon

May 1964

**UNITED STATES POLICY ON REPATRIATION AND COMPENSATION  
OF THE PALESTINE REFUGEES**

**Michael E. Fancher**



## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express her deep gratitude to Professor Walid Khalidi without whose advice, support, hard work, and unfailing patience this study would have never been completed.

The writer is also greatly indebted to Dr. John H. Davis, former Commissioner-General of UNRWA, for his advice and help, and to Congressman Elford Cederberg of the 10th Michigan Congressional District who supplied much of the Congressional material used.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . .	iv
LIST OF TABLES . . . . .	vi
LIST OF MAPS . . . . .	vii
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
CHAPTER I. THE REFUGEES . . . . .	4
CHAPTER II. THE PRINCIPLE OF REPATRIATION OR COMPENSATION . . . . .	36
CHAPTER III. THE POLICY MAKING PROCESS AND UNITED STATES POLICY ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION, NOVEMBER 1947 TO DECEMBER 1948 . . . . .	81
CHAPTER IV. THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, 1949-1952	109
CHAPTER V. THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION . . . . .	160
CHAPTER VI. THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION . . . . .	205
CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	236
APPENDICES	
A. UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESO- LUTIONS REGARDING ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINE REFUGEES . . . . .	
B. CHART - "THE CONTEXT OF AMERICAN POLICY ON REPATRIATION OR COMPENSATION OF THE PALESTINE REFUGEES" . . . . .	

LIST OF TABLES

	<u>Page</u>
TABLE I. AMERICAN ASSISTANCE - 1951-52 . . . . .	114
TABLE II. POPULATION OF AND IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL, 1948-1960 . . . . .	162
TABLE III. U.S. GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC AID TO ISRAEL . . . . .	163
TABLE IV. AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO THE MIDDLE EAST . . . . .	173
TABLE V. SUMMARY OF PLANS TO UTILIZE WATERS OF JORDAN RIVER AND ITS TRIBUTARIES . . . . .	184
TABLE VI. UNRWA BUDGETS FOR RELIEF AND REINTEG- RATION AS DETERMINED BY THE ASSEMBLY, 1949-54 . . . . .	187
TABLE VII. UNRWA EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS	288

## LIST OF MAPS

		<u>Page</u>
Map 1.	The Partition Plan	19
Map 2.	Palestine -- Jerusalem -- Tel-Aviv	21
Map 3.	The Truces	30
Map 4.	The Armistice Agreement	33

## INTRODUCTION

The United States has too many reasons never to abandon its probing search for ways to ameliorate a situation [the problem of the Palestine refugees] that imposes a financial burden upon it while at the same time hampering and frustrating its attainment of its policy goals in the Middle East.--Joseph E. Johnson, "Arab vs. Israeli: A Persistent Challenge to Americans," an address before the American Assembly, Arden House, Harriman, New York, October 24, 1963.

This study proposes to deal with the evolution of United States policy on one aspect of the Palestine refugee problem: the resolution by the United Nations General Assembly "that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return. . ."

Chapter I attempts to discuss the origins of the refugee problem and to show the relationship of the causes of the flight of the Palestine Arabs to the solution to the problem which was recommended by the General Assembly. Chapter II seeks to describe the development of the principle of repatriation or compensation and to point out that the principle was established by the United Nations Mediator on Palestine as he sought to rectify some of the inequities resulting from the conflict. Chapter III is an attempt to place

United States policy on the principle of repatriation and compensation in a general context and to discuss some of the factors which determine policy. This discussion includes a survey of policy on the Palestine Question just preceding the Assembly's resolution affirming the principle of repatriation or compensation. Chapters IV, V, and VI seek to analyze the development of United States policy on the principle of repatriation or compensation as such policy is related to United Nations assistance to the Palestine refugees.

The sources mainly drawn upon for this study have been United States and United Nations official documents and publications, unpublished materials obtained from the American Embassy in Beirut, and UNRWA information and documents. The writer also obtained much valuable information from interviews with Dr. John H. Davis, former Commissioner-General of UNRWA, Dr. Harry N. Howard, former United States member on the Advisory Commission for UNRWA, and Mr. Sherwood G. Moe, UNRWA Assistant Director for Liaison at United Nations Headquarters in New York and assistant of the United Nations Conciliation Commission's Special Representative. Other primary sources included memoirs and biographies of the policy-makers. Among the important secondary sources used were those dealing with Zionist military strategy used during the Palestine conflict. These materials are mainly discussed in Chapter I itself.

Appendix A includes the complete texts of all United Nations resolutions dealing with the Palestine refugee problem.

Appendix B is comprised of a chart which attempts to show the chronological development of United States policy on the principle of repatriation or compensation and the evolution of United Nations assistance to the refugees. It seeks to place the decisions and policies in a general context, the American domestic political scene, the Cold War, the Middle Eastern environment. It is hoped that this chart will enable the reader to obtain a more clear picture of the policy-making process and the considerations and pressures which influence this process.

CHAPTER I  
THE REFUGEES

In 1946 the total population of Palestine was estimated to be 1,982,000 persons, of whom 1,269,000 were Arab and 678,000 were Jewish, or 64 per cent and 36 per cent respectively.<sup>1</sup> In November, 1948, approximately 160,000 Arabs<sup>2</sup> remained in the 78 per cent of the area of Palestine that fell under Jewish control. The bulk of the Arab population of Palestine (more than 80 per cent) was scattered throughout the neighboring Arab countries and in areas of Palestine that remained under Arab control — the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip. There is no doubt that this mass population flight came as a result of the armed conflict in Palestine between Arabs and Jews during the latter part of 1947 and throughout 1948. However, since 1948 the immediate causes of the flight have been debated.

The Arabs argue that the bulk of the Arab population of Palestine was expelled by Jewish regular and "dissident" forces during the course of the civil war (November, 1947 until May 15, 1948) and the regular war (May 15 through January, 1949) in Palestine. The Arab States had intervened in Palestine on May 15 in order to prevent the Zionists from proclaiming and creating as a fait accompli a Jewish State in Palestine.

---

<sup>1</sup>Sources: Government of Palestine, A Survey of Palestine, Vol. I (Jerusalem, 1946), p. 142; and Supplement, pp. 10, 11, 17. Also, Edmund Asfour, "The Economic Framework of the Palestine Problem," in William R. Polk, David Stamler, and Edmund Asfour, Backdrop to Tragedy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), p. 319.

<sup>2</sup>Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1961, p. 27; and Asfour, op. cit., p. 336.



Furthermore, since by that time some 200,000 - 250,000 Palestine Arabs had fled their homes and sought refuge within the territories of the Arab States, these States were well aware that the Zionists intended to exclude at least a part of the Arab population from the areas they controlled in order to create an artificial Jewish majority in areas either claimed by them or allotted to them by the United Nations in its Partition Plan of November 29, 1947. Finally, the Arabs point out that the expulsions continued after the hostilities had been formally terminated by the armistice agreements concluded between the Arab States and Israel during February-July, 1949. They conclude that Israel is solely responsible for the plight and the continuation since 1948 of the refugee status of the Arabs of Palestine.

The Zionists argue that from the time of the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, they had the "right" to establish a Jewish National home in Palestine and that the United Nations recommendation of partition and the establishment of a Jewish State (and an Arab State) in Palestine was the ultimate realization of this "right". The Zionist case continues to assert that the resistance of the Arabs of Palestine to partition and the subsequent use of force beginning on May 15 by the neighboring Arab States to prevent Jewish implementation of partition and self-determination, places squarely on the shoulders of the Arabs the responsibility for the homelessness of the bulk of the Palestine Arab population. Furthermore, they contend that the immediate cause of the flight was the collapse of public security, confusion, and fear, and

that most of the Arabs left at the insistence of their own leaders and upon the orders of the various commanders of the Arab States' regular armies which entered Palestine on May 15, 1948.

Neither the Zionist case nor the Arab case, however, provides sufficient information as to the immediate causes of the flight upon which to base an analysis of the solution to the refugee problem recommended by the United Nations. This solution has as its foundation the affirmation by the United Nations of the right of the refugees to choose either repatriation to (return to their homes in) Israel or compensation for their losses if they should choose not to return. The causes of the flight as well as the refugee problem itself have in fact been obscured by polemics on both sides, and only recently has new information appeared on this question.

Two unofficial but authoritative Zionist sources (in English) provide rather comprehensive discussions of the civil war (November, 1947 through May 15, 1948) as well as the Palestine War (May 15, 1948 through March, 1949) and, used in conjunction with several other sources which mention specific dates and events, allow one to draw a rather complete picture of the flight of the Arabs of Palestine. The two main sources deserve some attention.

The first is The Edge of the Sword: Israel's War of Independence 1947 - 1949 (New York: Putnam's, 1961) by Lt. Colonel Netanel Lorch of the Jewish Defense Forces. Colonel Lorch still somewhat inhibited by

the fact that the Israel Government has preferred to keep obscure the strategies employed by the Jews during the Palestine conflict<sup>3</sup>, tends to minimize the numbers and kinds of weapons possessed by the Jewish forces at the time, the extent of their mobilization, their objectives and strategies. Some of these discrepancies, however, can be corrected by a comparison of the Lorch statistics and accounts with those of the second source, Jon and David Kimche's A Clash of Destinies (New York: Praeger, 1960). In his article, "Plan Dalet, the Zionist Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," Walid Khalidi<sup>4</sup> has discussed the original Hebrew sources used but not specifically mentioned by both Lorch and the Kimches: Ha Sepher Ha Palmack (The Book of the Palmach) Volumes I and II and QURVOT (Battles). Professor Khalidi in this article has attempted to correct and point out some of the inaccuracies in the Lorch and Kimche accounts by comparing them with Ha Sepher and QURVOT.

The flight of the Arabs of Palestine is divided into six phases. The first and second phases occurred during the civil war; the third, fourth, and fifth during the Palestine War itself; and the sixth after the conclusion of the armistice agreements. The phases are as follows: (1) the period of isolated incidents and retaliations (of relative quiescence) between November 29, 1947 and March 31, 1948; (2) the Jewish initiative before the regular war beginning April 1 and lasting

---

<sup>3</sup>Meaning the civil war and the Palestine war.

<sup>4</sup>Walid Khalidi, "Plan Dalet, The Zionist Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," in Palestine: Collected Papers (Beirut: Arab Cultural Club, May 15, 1963), reprinted from Middle East Forum, November 1961.

through May 14; (3) the opening phase of the Palestine War, May 15 until June 11 (the first truce); (4) the interim between the first and second truces, July 8-9 until July 18; (5) the period beginning with the second truce and lasting until the end of the Palestine War, July 18, 1948 through July, 1949 when the last armistice agreement was concluded between Israel and Syria (March is usually given as the end of the War); and (6) the period after the conclusion of the armistice agreements, July 1949 through October 15, 1954. It is during the civil war, especially the second phase, that the causes of the flight have been obscured, and because they have been obscured in this particular phase, the Zionists have been able to construct their case as it has been described earlier.

The causes of the flight are extremely important for the purposes of examining United Nations assistance to the Palestine refugees and for determining the responsibility of the various parties involved in the conflict, i.e., concerning the provision of relief and the implementation of a "solution" to the refugee problem. Therefore, this study will treat in some detail the first and second phases of the flight. There is a considerable amount of rather widely-circulated source material dealing with the four phases occurring after May 15, and the Zionists admit that they effected some expulsions during these phases. Thus, this writer does not feel that it is necessary to examine in a detailed manner the final phases. However, the materials available, the localities from which the Arabs were expelled, and the estimated numbers expelled will be enumerated later in the study.

The Civil War, November, 1947 through May 15, 1948 - The first period of the civil war can be described as one of Jewish consolidation, a period in which Arab villages held fast, Jewish mobilization continued on an increasing scale, and arms were procured by the Jews to enable their forces to take the initiative after April 1.

The second stage was one of Jewish initiative designed to dislodge the Arab inhabitants of Palestine so that by May 15, Jewish forces could claim that partition had been effected and proclaim a Jewish State in Jewish-controlled areas of the country.

Jewish strategy during the civil war had both military and political purposes. As Arab defense forces relied to a great extent upon the traditional "Faz'ah" or "call of support," requiring villagers and townsmen from the district in which the forces were occupied to come to the aid of these forces, a Jewish campaign which routed the villagers and destroyed their homes, would also destroy the core of Palestinian Arab resistance. This was the military significance of the strategy adopted by the Jews. Furthermore, the strategy had two political objectives: (1) to fuse the areas allotted to the Jewish State to those in which settlements had been founded but which had not been included in the Partition Plan and in so doing "give continuity and maximum depth to the area under its control"<sup>5</sup> before May 15 and the expected invasion of Palestine by the regular Arab armies; and (2) to effect a "solution" to the population and land problems - the 45 per cent Arab minority in the Jewish State and 7 per cent of Palestinian land in Jewish hands - posed by the United Nations Partition Plan.

---

<sup>5</sup>Lorch, op. cit., p. 95.

The UN Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, had allotted to the Zionists 55 per cent of Palestine with 90 per cent of all Jewish land holdings falling within the area of the Jewish State. However, of 13.5 million dunums included within the Jewish State only 7.5 million were cultivable (at that time) and only 1.5 million dunums were Jewish owned. On January 30, 1948, the Zionist Review in its Jewish National Fund Supplement reported that 300,000 dunums could be purchased "without displacing or causing any injury to the non-Jewish population." Thus, the Zionists could expect to hold approximately 60 per cent of the cultivable area, i.e. 4.5 million dunums out of the total 7.5 million. This problem of Jewish land ownership "was compounded by the Zionist plans for large-scale Jewish immigration into the proposed Jewish State."<sup>6</sup>

Lorch subscribes to the Jewish official view that it was the Palestine Arabs who initiated the civil war by promoting terror, accumulating isolated incidents, causing the conflagration to become general.<sup>7</sup> He states that the Arabs had two paramilitary organizations, the Futuwwa (sponsored by the Husseinis) and the Najjada (opposed to the Husseinis), the latter finally coming under the control of the Grand Mufti, Haj Amin Al Husseini, in 1948. He continues,

... These militia-type organizations, it was hoped, would constitute a more than adequate reply to the Haganah - a great expectation soon to be disappointed.  
... the Palestine Arabs ... had no full time military force at their disposal, no consolidated organic units, no unified command.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>Khalidi, op. cit., p. 72.

<sup>7</sup>Lorch, op. cit., pp. 39 and 55.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., pp. 38-39.

Jewish strength is one of the points of controversy and characteristically the Kimches, Zionist propaganda experts, hold one view and Lorch, the military expert, another. The Kimches assert,

"The Haganah (Jewish Defense Organization) members were not formally mobilized but were called up every month for rudimentary training in field craft and in the use of firearms."<sup>9</sup>

And, Lorch states,

"The bulk of the military forces at the disposal of the Yishuv were organized in the Haganah ..., probably one of the largest and best-trained underground armies in modern history."<sup>10</sup>

Moreover, Lorch indicates that the two independent underground groups, the Irgun Zvai Laumi (IZL) and the Stern group or Lohamei Herut Israel (LHI) and the Jewish Settlement Police operated in addition to the Haganah. The Stern group and Irgun were independent underground groups considered as "dissidents" by the majority of the Yishuv. Haganah was divided into two parts, HISH and HIM. HISH consisted at the outset of four mobile brigades capable of carrying out offensive operations within specific assigned areas. HIM, garrison forces, was to take defensive positions on the peripheries of the Jewish settlements. Lorch states that the registered membership of HIM in the fall of 1947 was 32,000, but "many more trained men could be called up in time of need."<sup>11</sup> In the fall of 1947 the PALMACH ("shock troops") was reconstituted<sup>12</sup> to act as a covering force while the militia (Haganah) mobilized. The PALMACH had available

---

<sup>9</sup>Kimche, op. cit., p. 73.

<sup>10</sup>Lorch, op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., pp. 45-46. (Emphasis mine)

<sup>12</sup>Originally created in 1941 for use in World War.



2,100 men and women and another 1,000 on active reserve; these were organized into four battalions, three territorially based - Jezreel, Galilee and the Jordan Valley, Judaea and the Negev - and one, a "headquarters battalion," including the naval company and reconnaissance units. Also, under Haganah were organized the GADNA (Youth Battalions), an efficient intelligence service, and civilian auxiliaries. A much later report confirms the contention that Jewish strength in 1947-1948 must not be underestimated; this is the Data and Plans submitted to the Jerusalem Conference by the Israel Ministry of Finance in 1953 which lists as one of the problems to be faced in developing the Israel economy the fact that at the beginning of 1949, Israel had 100,000 men and women, one third of her total manpower still in the army.<sup>13</sup>

Yet, if the Jews had such military superiority over the Arabs of Palestine, why did they wait until April to take the initiative? It is likely that the Jewish forces required time to mobilize and to obtain weapons with which to arm their increased military manpower, these arms not being available until early April. Also, the Jewish forces had to wait until the British began their withdrawal on a large scale. Finally, it was quite possible that the Zionists preferred not to take any initiative during this period and allowed a period of quiescence. Then, they could strike suddenly and obtain their objectives by means of a coup rather than a protracted effort.

The diplomatic strategists who had considerable influence and

---

<sup>13</sup>Israel, Ministry of Finance, Data and Plans, p. 9.



importance in the Jewish war effort, probably feared the reaction of world public opinion to the obvious wholesale expulsion of the Arab population. A period before the Jewish all-out offensive in which repeated clashes caused the military situation in Palestine to escalate, would provide some cover for the offensive. The vacuum in the territories allotted to the Jews and in the territories they desired to control had to be created just on the eve of the termination of the British Mandate in order to insure that neither the United Nations nor any one of the Great Powers would interfere. Upon the termination of the Mandate the legal vacuum had to be filled by a Jewish State which was in possession of as much of Palestine as possible. The Jewish forces were given six weeks to obtain their objectives. Plan Dalet or Plan D was designed to accomplish this end.

The strategies of the first phase - Professor Khalidi in his fore-mentioned article alludes to "Plan C" which was operational during the quiescent period. It has already been said that this was a period of consolidation of Jewish forces and positions, and of maintaining a territorial status quo. During this period constant pressure was exerted against the Arabs, but until March 1 not a single Arab village was vacated.<sup>14</sup> Incidents began on November 30, the day after the UN adoption of partition. At this time the Jews began to develop what the Kimches call a "philosophy of retaliation" designed to prevent a too rapid escalation of events.

---

<sup>14</sup>Khalidi, op. cit., p. 74.

Lorch labels the first Jewish reaction to Arab attack as "selective retaliation" quoting the Vaad Leumi (National Council) which proclaimed on December 10, "Expel those amongst you who want blood to be shed"...<sup>15</sup> The Irgun and Stern gangs, however, did not prove to be as "selective" as the Haganah in their method of retaliation, preferring to interpret the "those" of the Vaad Leumi proclamation as all Arabs. Lorch also states that the "entire month of December witnessed a process of segregation throughout the country," sealing off physically and economically the Arab and Jewish populations.<sup>16</sup>

On January 10, the first units of the Arab Liberation Army composed of volunteers from the neighboring Arab countries and Palestinians trained in these countries under Syrian and Iraqi commanders, attacked a Jewish settlement in upper Galilee, and were repulsed by British troops. During the period under survey, the Liberation Army units stiffened Arab defenses in the main cities, but the bulk of the forces concentrated in the purely Arab area near Nablus. Units of the Liberation Army harassed several Jewish settlements but did not succeed in taking any until May 1.

As the progress of segregation continued and larger numbers of the population began to participate in the hostilities, the Jewish forces adopted an allegedly new philosophy of retaliation.

"It was decided to undertake counterattacks of the type engaged in by Arabs: when they harassed Jewish communications, their communications would be harassed; if they beseiged Jewish cities, Arab cities would be similarly beseiged."<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup>Lorch, op. cit., p. 57.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 58.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 66.

During the last weeks of February, the Jews tried a new tactic, perhaps an effort to test both Jewish skills in sabotage and the Arab reaction to long-range Jewish penetration into Arab territory. This was "Operation 35"<sup>18</sup> involving sabotage actions against six bridges. It was successful.

Terrorism and the battle to control communications continued in March, and by April 10, it has been estimated that 30,000 Arabs had left Palestine.

Plan D and the second phase.- Lorch describes the initiative planned by the Jews during the first period:

"In March Haganah High Command prepared a comprehensive operational Plan D... Zero hour for Plan D was to arrive when British evacuation had reached a point where the Haganah would be reasonably safe from British intervention and when mobilization had progressed to a point where the implementation of a large scale plan would be feasible. The mission of Haganah was simple as it was revolutionary. To gain control of the area allotted to the Jewish State and defend its borders and those of the blocs of Jewish settlements and such Jewish population as were outside those borders, against a regular or pararegular enemy from bases outside or inside the area of the Jewish State."<sup>19</sup>

Plan D dealt with the capture of Arab cities and villages. Arab bases within the territory allotted to the Jewish State were to be "permanently held", others "would be held only temporarily as long as the need existed."<sup>20</sup> In a policy statement, the originator of Haganah,

---

<sup>18</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 87 (emphasis mine).

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp. 88-89.

Eliyahu Golomb, had said: "Our function is to defend by force of arms - wherever and whenever and against whomever such defense will be required - our freedom of settlement, of immigration, of development and of self-determination."<sup>21</sup> In Plan D Haganah was employed for this purpose.

On April 1, the first instalments<sup>22</sup> of an arms shipment negotiated by the Jews with Czechoslovakia arrived at a secret air-field in the south. The successful unloading and dispersion of these weapons was the first operation of the Plan. The rest of the arms arrived on April 3 by ship, some were unloaded at Haifa and others at Tel Aviv. Professor Khalidi in his article has listed the various operations included in Plan D and pointed out their objectives. This method will be followed here although the descriptions of the operations will be amended somewhat:<sup>23</sup>

1. Operation Nachshon, April 2. Designed to open a corridor connecting Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, as Jerusalem appeared at the time to be the most difficult of the five "mixed" cities of Palestine for Jewish forces to capture. Such a corridor would enable the Jews to get convoys through to Jerusalem and would cut the main part of Arab Palestine in two. This operation involved the capture of Arab villages in the Jerusalem area including Kastel, in the Latrun sector, and finally, Deir Yassin.

---

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p. 88 (emphasis mine).

<sup>22</sup>Called "Balak 1". Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>23</sup>Two additional operations, numbers 3 and 4, have been added to Professor Khalidi's list. Source: Lorch, op. cit., pp. 96-97, 131.

2. Operation Harel, April 15. A continuation of Nachshon. To seize Arab villages in Latrun area, viz Sarris, Beit Surik, Biddu.
3. Operation    ?   , April 18. PALMACH and local HISH forces captured Tiberias and routed the population.
4. Operation Abraham, April 19-20. Established a Jewish settlement on the route to the Negev to neutralize Arab village of Breir and assist passage of convoys. Breir itself was finally captured on May 12.
5. Operation Misparayim, April 21, 22, 23. Haifa captured and its Arab population routed.
6. Operation Chametz, April 27. Arab villages around Jaffa destroyed and Jaffa cut off. Lydda airport opened for Jewish use.
7. Operation Jevussi, April 27. An attempt to move into British positions in Jerusalem as the British forces withdrew. Mt. Scopus was the chief objective. The operation was not successful.
8. Operation Yiftach, April 28 - May 10. Safed and "the finger of Galilee" taken and Eastern Galilee "purified" of Arabs.
9. Operation Matateh, May 3, Arab villages in Tiberias, Eastern Galilee destroyed.
10. Operation Maccabi, May 7-15. The Latrun area again attacked.
11. Operation Gideon, May 11. Beisan occupied and semi-sedentary bedouin communities in neighborhood dispersed.
12. Operation Barak, May 12. Breir destroyed and villages in area attacked. See also no. 4, Operation Abraham.

13. Operation Benami, May 14. Acre occupied and Western Galilee "purified" of Arabs.

The map on the page following shows the UN Partition Plan and the military operations carried out before May 15.

The key to the success of Plan D was - in this writer's opinion, - the massacre of Deir Yassin. This small Arab village a few kilometers from Jerusalem had been declared a demilitarized area and was not even on the highway leading into Jerusalem, yet it became the chief factor which contributed to the success of Nachshon.

Operation Nachshon was designed to open a road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; Lorch describes the method employed in the operation in the following way:


. . . a corridor was to be occupied on both sides of the road, about six miles wide in the plains, about one to two miles in the mountainous area. Once the corridor was secured by the occupation of strongholds and Arab villages, convoys could freely move on the road and only a few armored cars would be needed for patrol purposes. The 'Nachshon Brigade' consisted of three battalions. One of them was to be responsible for the Hilda-Latrun sector, from the starting point of the convoy route to the entrance of the mountains; the second for the mountainous area from Latrun to Kiryat Anavim about ten miles away from Jerusalem. The third and smallest battalion was earmarked for reserve.<sup>24</sup>

Moreover, if necessary the Haganah could enlist the support of at least the Irgun, and probably the Stern Gang. Rony Gabbay, an Israeli political scientist writing on the Palestine question, asserts that,

---

<sup>24</sup>Lorch, op. cit., p. 91.

# THE PARTITION PLAN



*The UN Partition Plan of Palestine showing the military operations carried out by the Zionists before May 15, 1948 outside the proposed UN Jewish territory.*

*Source: WALID KHALIDI*

# THE PARTITION PLAN




- 20 Haifa
- 21 Safed
- 22 Tiberias
- 23 Beisan
- 24 Nablus
- 25 Jerusalem
- 26 Beer Sheva
- 27 Gaza

The UN Partition Plan of Palestine showing the military operations carried out by the Zionists before May 15, 1948 outside the proposed UN Jewish territory.

Source: WALID KHALIDI



# THE PARTITION PLAN



Op. Ben Ami

Op. Chametz

Op. Pitchfork

Op. Jevussi

Op. Schiffon

Op. Nachshon

Op. Meccabi

Op. Harel

Tel Aviv  
Jaffa

Ramallah

Latroun

Jerusalem

Dead  
Sea

NEGEV

U. A. R.

LEBANON

L. Huleh

SYRIA

L. Tiberias

Galilee

Haifa

TRANSJORDAN

- Proposed Arab State
- Proposed Jewish State
- Zionist Military Operations Area.

The UN Partition Plan of Palestine showing the military operations carried out by the Zionists before May 15, 1948 outside the proposed UN Jewish territory.

Source: WALID KHALIDI

At the beginning of April, an agreement was reached between the Haganah and the Irgun . . . which brought the latter under the full command and direction of the Haganah. According to this agreement the Haganah was responsible for assigning military tasks to the Irgun and for approving any plan of attack presented by it.<sup>25</sup>


Lorch gives April 6 as the date for the beginning of Nachshon; Professor Khalidi, April 2; the Kimches, March 31. It is certain that it did begin before the Lorch date, probably on April 2, a date also cited by Gabbay who alludes briefly to the operation.<sup>26</sup> The map on the following page shows the routes to be carved out, some of the villages involved, and the center of Arab resistance to the endeavor. The offensive began at the two ends of the corridor. On the west end initial operations were successful, but in the east "the beginning of the operation . . . was less auspicious."<sup>27</sup> The operation called for the battalion operating between Latrun and Kiryat Anavim to take Beit Mahsir and Sarris, but on the same day the Arabs of Kolonya crossed the road to Motza to form an effective blockade more near to Jerusalem than the area which was to be subdued according to plan. On April 3, the Arabs centered their attention on Kastel, the Palestinian Arab Commander of the Jerusalem area, Abdul Kader Al Hussein, being in charge of the operation. The siege of Kastel lasted until April 10, the town changing hands more than once. Kastel was held between the 3rd and the 9th by the Jews and was captured on the 9th by the Arabs, Hussein being killed in the operation.

---

<sup>25</sup>Gabbay, Rony E., A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict (Geneva: Etudes d'Histoire Economique, Politique et Sociale, 1959), p. 76.


<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 77, footnote 87.

<sup>27</sup>Lorch, op. cit., p. 91.



Smaller map in right-hand corner from Netanel Lorch, The Edge of the Sword (New York: Putnam's 1961), p. 112

	MUSLIMS	JEWS	CHRISTIANS
Under 250 persons	●	○	○
250-500 "	●	○	○
500-1,000 "	●	○	○
1,000-2,000 "	●	○	○



Under 250 persons  
250-500 "  
500-1,000 "  
1,000-2,000 "

Villages and Towns of over 2,000 inhabitants are shown by circles exactly proportionate to the number of persons, with sectors coloured in proportion to the religions of the inhabitants.

Larger map from map compiled by Research Staff of Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry from estimates of December 31, 1944

The Lorch map shows the corridor to be carved out by Nachshon and the population map shows what villages were involved in the operation.

Arab resistance at Kastel is shown as well as the position Deir Yassin.


Center of Arab resistance at Jerusalem end of corridor

# PALESTINE

## INDEX TO VILLAGES AND SETTLEMENTS

### JERUSALEM TEL-AVIV.

THE ROAD TO JERUSALEM DURING THE FIRST PHASE (UNTIL 15 MAY) OF THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE



Later in the same day Deir Yassin was captured. There are two conflicting stories on the capture of the village, the first contending that it was originally captured by the Haganah and then turned over to the Stern and Irgun groups, the second asserting that Deir Yassin was taken by the initiative of the terrorist groups. By both sides it is admitted that "after the occupation the attackers slaughtered 254 men, women and children and threw their bodies down a well."<sup>28</sup> The rest of the villagers were then taken to Jerusalem and paraded through the streets. This was a turning point in the battle for Kastel. The Arab forces holding Kastel were for the most part comprised of villagers from the Kastel-Jerusalem area. The massacre caused them to disband in order to protect their own families and homes. Thus, on the morning of April 10, when a Haganah unit set out to recapture Kastel, they found it "unoccupied much to its [their] great surprise."<sup>29</sup>

The raison d'être of Operation Nachshon was to open up the supply and arms route to Jerusalem, which according to the Zionists, was in danger of falling into Arab hands. Upon examination of Plan D in its entirety it is obvious that Nachshon was but a first step in the Zionist plan to conquer as much of Palestine as possible before May 15. Jerusalem was of strategic importance to both Arabs and Jews as well as the British occupying forces. And, although Jerusalem had

---

<sup>28</sup>Gabbay, op. cit., p. 89; also see Menachem Begin, The Revolt - Story of the Irgun (New York, 1951), pp. 162-164.

<sup>29</sup>Lorch, op. cit., p. 92.

not been allotted to the Zionists by the Partition Plan, the Jews considered Jerusalem the capital of the Jewish State which they were determined to proclaim on May 15 in the Jewish-controlled areas of Palestine. At the beginning of April, many strategic points in the city were held by the British, the Jews wanted to be in a position to occupy those key points when the British withdrew. Jerusalem was the most important of the "mixed cities" to be captured under Plan Dalet, operations Harel, Jevussi, and Schfifon being designed to complement Nachshon.

For the Jews, the opening up of the supply route to Jerusalem was enough justification for the systematic expulsion of the Arab population and complete destruction of the villages falling within the limits of the corridor they carved out. Kastel constituted an obstruction, and Deir Yassin was a convenient method of disposing of the main part of the Arab forces at Kastel. Indeed, the Irgun and Stern groups did not fail to publicize their deed.

Gabbay lists as two of the chief reasons for the Arab flight "the Arab's inclination to exaggerate events" and the reversal of the "fear psychosis" created by Arab leaders among the population in order to encourage them to fight. Deir Yassin and a similar massacre at Katamon, an Arab quarter in Jerusalem, are cited as events played up by the Arabs themselves to such an extent that the population took flight.<sup>30</sup> Certainly fear of repeated massacres did encourage the Arab

---

<sup>30</sup>Gabbay, op. cit., pp. 87-90.

population to leave, but such flights usually took place if the "fear psychosis" was underlined by the presence of Haganah forces operating with the framework of Plan D.

Concerning the Deir Yassin incident, Lorch asserts,

The Jewish Agency and the Haganah High Command immediately expressed their deep disgust and regret. The massacre at Deir Yassin was to become a weapon in the hands of the enemies of Israel from that day on.<sup>31</sup>

The Jewish Agency conveyed its apologies and regrets for the incident in a letter to King Abdullah of Transjordan. And, M. de Reynier, the Red Cross Representative in Jerusalem, investigated the incident just afterwards. His eyewitness account was given world press coverage. The Arabs made the most of the publicity, to be sure, but the real value of the Deir Yassin massacre was, in this writer's opinion, in its usefulness to the Zionist High Command. It focused attention away from the systematic expulsion of the Arabs in other areas of Palestine carried out between April 1 and May 14 (and afterwards) under Plan D. Later, the Deir Yassin incident could be and was used to explain the Arab "exodus" from Palestine, the responsibility laid on undesirable Jewish terrorism and the psychotic Arab reaction to this terror. Thus, the Jewish State could be exonerated of responsibility in the creation of the problem of the Arab refugees. The clarification of the circumstances surrounding the Deir Yassin massacre would therefore seem to be important in getting at the meaning of the resolution designed to solve the Arab refugee problem (Resolution 194 (III)) passed by the United Nations General Assembly on December 11, 1948,

---

<sup>31</sup>Lorch, op. cit., p. 92.

as this resolution established that the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement lay with the parties directly concerned.

The beginning of the Palestine War and the third phase of the flight - Although Plan Dalet was carried over into the period following May 14, the important fact to remember is that at least thirteen operations were begun before this date, and that these operations were directly responsible for the flight of 200,000 to 250,000 Palestine Arabs.

Yigal Allon, Commander of the PALMACH, described in Ha Sepher Ha Palmach (Vol. 2, p. 286) the situation which was brought about by the April-May Jewish offensive and which existed at the time of the Arab intervention:

"This stage of the war which was made possible by the gradual British evacuation and ended with the invasion of the Arab armies into the country, gave Haganah valuable victories. Thanks to the local offensive war, the continuity of the Jewish territories was accomplished and also the penetrating of our forces into Arab areas. The Arab flight which reached great numbers made it easier on our forces to supervise vast areas and was a burden to the enemy who had to put all of its efforts into the absorption and organization of the refugees. It is easy to imagine the spirit of defeat that the refugees took with them to the Arab areas. If it wasn't for the Arab invasion there would have been no stop to the expansion of the forces of Haganah who could have, with the same drive, reached the natural borders of Western Israel, because in this stage most of the enemy forces were paralysed."<sup>32</sup>

Therefore, by May 15, according to Allon, Plan D had substantially achieved its objectives, i.e. the destruction of local Arab resistance to the Jews and the creation of an area under Jewish control

---

<sup>32</sup>Quoted in Khalidi, op. cit., p. 77 (emphasis Khalidi's).



which included most of the Jewish settlements and had both depth and continuity (see page 19 ). Furthermore, Allon states that Haganah was prepared to and capable of expanding to Israel's so-called "natural borders" but was prevented from accomplishing this by the intervention of the Arab armies. During this intervention the expulsion of the Arabs of Palestine continued, and by June 11, the first truce in the Arab-Israeli War, another 300,000 to 350,000 Arabs had fled. First, the Israelis admit that during this period Arabs were expelled as a result of the intervention of the Arab States. But, then the Israelis argue that Arab army commanders asked the population to leave their homes and villages in order to clear the way for an all-out offensive against Jewish positions. It has already been mentioned that local Arab strength depended upon the villagers remaining in their homes and villages. Thus, the Arab army commanders would not request the villagers to leave as the Arab villages provided a base for military operations and villagers, additional fighting men. The Arab States were already suffering a disadvantage by the presence of refugees in their territories as the governments had to provide relief and a measure of security for the refugees. Therefore, if one discounts the second cause given by Israel for the third phase of the flight of the refugees (the beginning of the Palestine War), one can conclude that the refugees were, for the most part, expelled directly by Israeli forces or through the threat of force. Lorch describes this phase in some detail, and in particular discusses the employment of the Israeli air force

against Arab villages.<sup>33</sup> The Kimches mention specific operations, mostly those carried over into this phase from Plan D.

The map on page 30 shows the positions of the parties on the dates the first (June 11) and second (July 18) truces came into operation. This map may be compared to that on page 19 which shows the areas allotted to the Zionists and the Arabs under the Partition Plan.

The end of the first truce and the fourth phase - On July 9 the first truce expired and hostilities were resumed in the period the Kimches refer to as "The Ten Days War."<sup>34</sup> The Israelis sought to consolidate their position in the central Palestinian plain and in the hinterland of Jaffa and Tel Aviv.

During the period of the first truce the Jews were able to build up their strength in both arms and men and to deploy their forces in order to gain more territory. Jon Kimche in an earlier book Seven Fallen Pillars (London: Secker and Warburg, 1950), describes in some detail the build-up:

" . . . Israeli emissaries scoured the whole of Europe and America for possible supplies. American Jews were contributing generous supplies of dollars and the arms merchants were prepared to deal for dollars. The Czechs were most helpful. A regular airlift began to operate from Prague to Agir in Southern Palestine. Rifles, ammunition and guns were now arriving. So were the first bombers - Flying Fortresses smuggled from the United States, and the Beaufort fighter - bombers tricked out of England ... etc.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup>Lorch, op. cit., pp. 140-246, especially pp. 225-233.

<sup>34</sup>Kimches, op. cit., p. 228.

<sup>35</sup>Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars, pp. 249-251.

Kimche also enumerates the advantages gained by the Arabs during this period. Then, he goes on to describe the events in Lydda and Ramle:

"An armoured column [of PALMACH under Allon] captured Lydda airport on July 12th; the key point of Beit Nabala [supposedly under the control of the Arab Legion commanded by Glubb Pasha] was taken the following day. It was the first big operation of the War [?]. Alon [Allon] operated with three brigades - 6,000 men. Ramleh and Lydda fell on the 13th; and a flood of 60,000 panicky Arab refugees was compelled to take the road to the nearby Arab lines. This was no Haifa [where the Jews allegedly asked the Arabs to stay, but, in fact, the Carmeli Brigade effected the capture of the city under operation Misparayim of Plan D and the Arabs evacuated almost immediately.36]. The Jews no longer hoped the Arabs would stay [?]. They had tasted the benefits which the earlier Arab policy of evacuation [designed and implemented by the Jewish High Command] had bestowed upon them."37

On the 15th and 16th the so-called "Anglo-Saxon Brigade" under Yigal Yadin, Israeli Director of Operations, "switched from the eastern front, and Nazareth was entered on the following day, with forty-eight hours to spare for mopping-up and the occupation of the surrounding villages before the 'cease-fire' sounded."38

The second truce was called on July 18; in ten days of fighting "1,000 square kilometers of Arab-held territory" had been occupied by the Israeli Army,

"which left Israel in occupation of 1,300 square kilometers of territory allotted to the Arabs in the partition plan. It left the Arabs with 330 square kilometers of territory allotted to the Jews, not including the Negev, which though effectively cut off by the Egyptians from the rest of Israel, was nevertheless not fully occupied by the Egyptian army."

---

<sup>36</sup>See Lorch, op. cit., p. 98 ff.

<sup>37</sup>Kimche, op. cit., p. 254; comments in brackets [ ] and emphasis mine.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 257.

"Altogether, in the thirty-eight days of fighting, Israel had occupied fourteen Arab towns and 201 out of the 219 Arab villages within the Jewish State Area. In addition, 112 villages in Arab territory had been captured. The Arabs had captured fourteen Jewish places, including the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem ... "39

See the map on the following page which shows the positions of the parties after the conclusion of each truce - June 11 and July 18. The map shows the territory which changed hands during the fighting between the truces.

The beginning of the second truce and the fifth phase of the flight - Neither side was content with the situation established by the second truce on July 18. The Arabs refused to accept as a fait accompli the Jewish State, and the Jews "were determined to 'tidy up the loose ends',"<sup>40</sup> to make adjustments in the frontiers, and to consolidate their position in the Negev. Thus, the truce was filled with incidents and provocations.

Some of these incidents are enumerated by the Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte in his Progress Report submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General on September 16.<sup>41</sup> In his report on the truces the Mediator includes a table which shows the complaints and incidents reported during the first seven weeks of the second truce. There were some 300 complaints and incidents (compared to some 500 during the first truce). Of these complaints 105 were against the Arabs

---


<sup>39</sup>Kimches, A Clash of Destinies, p. 232.





<sup>40</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>41</sup>Folke Bernadotte, Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, (Rhodes, September 16, 1948), Comd. 7530, Part II, pp. 52-57.

Map 3

The Position after the first truce on June 11 and second truce on July 18, showing territory which had changed hands during the ten days of fighting



First truce line   
Second truce line   
Territory gained by Israel   
Territory gained by Arabs 

Source: Jon and David Kimche

182 against the Jews. The number of complaints against both sides were nearly equal in most areas (the Jews usually having one or two more against them). The notable exceptions are in the following areas:

	<u>Against Arabs</u>	<u>Against Jews</u>
Attacks and raids		
on positions and villages, and abductions	17	47
Harvesting in- cidents <sup>42</sup>	0	15
Illegal air- craft flights <sup>43</sup>	2	12

All these complaints were investigated by the Truce observers. Bernadotte reported that the nature of these complaints was more serious than during the earlier period. On August 19, the Security Council issued a warning to both parties concerning violations and declaring that the parties were responsible for the actions of their forces whether regular or irregular. Four incidents reported by the Mediator, in August were especially serious: (1) the demolition by Arab irregulars of the water pumping station at Latrun which at the beginning of the second truce was in a demilitarized zone under UN control; (2) the occupation by Israeli regular forces of most of the Red Cross Zone (including Government House, etc.) in Jerusalem; (3) the killing of two UN observers in Gaza by Saudi Arabian irregular troops; and

---

<sup>42</sup> Arab farmers attempting to harvest crops in Jewish-controlled areas.

<sup>43</sup> Probably continued importation of arms.

(4) the attack by Haganah on three Arab villages, Ein-Ghazal, Jaba, and Ijzim on the Tel Aviv - Haifa road (about 10 miles south of Haifa). The UN observers upon investigation found the villages deserted, and after locating some 8,000 of the villagers, learned that the villages had been attacked by land and air and the inhabitants had been forced to evacuate. Furthermore, the Mediator reports, "at the commencement of the truce the villagers had offered to negotiate with the Jews, who had apparently failed to explore the offer." Ein Ghazal and Jaba were destroyed after the evacuation.<sup>44</sup>


Between October 14 and 21, Israel continued to make the territorial "adjustments" it desired by staging an offensive in the Negev to gain objectives in the Faluja and Negba areas. The Security Council issued "cease-fire" orders once again.

Between October 29 and 31, the remainder of Galilee was cleared to the Lebanese border. And, between December 23 and January 7, 1949, the Israelis attacked Egyptian positions in the south, surprizing them from the rear. The Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement, the first to be concluded was negotiated and signed thereafter, bringing the Arab-Israeli war after 60 days of fighting, to a close. The map on the following page shows the territorial situation at the end of the War.

---

<sup>44</sup>Bernadotte, op. cit., pp. 52-54.

The Israel-Arab border after the Armistice Agreements



Israel ≡

Source: Jon and David Kimche



The sixth phase of the flight, July, 1949 through October 15, 1954 -

After the armistice agreements were concluded an additional 12,000 to 15,000 Arabs were driven into Jordan and the Sinai. The best source on the period November, 1951 through October, 1954, is Commander E. H. Hartchinson's Violent Truce (New York: Devin-Adair, 1956). Commander Hartchinson (USNR) relates his personal experiences as a Military Observer assigned to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. Particularly important is his description of Israeli treatment of their bedouin, both expelling and resettling the tribes.

The flight as a whole - In order to see more clearly the total picture of the flight, one must recapitulate the six phases of the flight and the numbers of Arabs who became refugees during each phase:

1. The first phase, November 29, 1947 through March 31, 1948 - 30,000 Palestinian Arabs left the country.
2. The second phase, April 1 through May 14 - 200,000 to 250,000 Arabs became refugees.
3. The third phase, May 15 through June 11 - 300,000 to 350,000 Arabs fled.
4. The fourth phase, July 8-9 to 18 - at least 60,000 Arabs were forced to flee.
5. The fifth phase, July 18, 1948 through July 1949, probably some 100,000 to 150,000 fled.
6. The sixth phase, July, 1949 to date - Between July, 1949, and October, 1954, some 6,000 fled and since then an additional 6,000 to 9,000 are estimated to have left Israel, bringing the post-Armistice total to 12,000 to 15,000 refugees.

Thus, approximately 800,000 Arabs of Palestine were expelled in the course of the conflict. They became refugees in the neighboring Arab States, for the most part being forced to rely on international assistance for sustenance. Estimates as to the exact numbers vary; the Economic Survey Mission calculated in 1949 that there were some 726,000 refugees, of whom 652,000 were considered in need.<sup>45</sup> Today the United Nations has on its registration rolls 1,210,170 Palestine Arab refugees, more than one million of these eligible for relief and services from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup>UNRWA, UNRWA Reviews, Information Paper No. 1, "A Brief History of UNRWA 1950-1962." Beirut, September 1962, p. 1.

<sup>46</sup>UNRWA, "UNRWA and the Palestine Refugees in Facts and Figures: 1964," Beirut, 1964.

Thus, approximately 800,000 Arabs of Palestine were expelled in the course of the conflict. They became refugees in the neighboring Arab States, for the most part being forced to rely on international assistance for sustenance. Estimates as to the exact numbers vary; the United Nations Economic Survey Mission calculated in 1949 that there were some 726,000 refugees, of whom 652,000 were considered to be in need.<sup>45</sup> Today the United Nations has on its registration rolls 1,210,170 Palestine Arab refugees, more than one million of these eligible for relief and services from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.<sup>46</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup>UNRWA, UNRWA Reviews, Information Paper No. 1, "A Brief History of UNRWA 1950-1962." Beirut, September 1962, p. 1.

<sup>46</sup>UNRWA, "UNRWA and the Palestine Refugees in Facts and Figures: 1964," Beirut, 1964.

## CHAPTER II

### THE PRINCIPLE OF REPATRIATION OR COMPENSATION

The United Nations General Assembly adopted on December 11, 1948, Resolution 194 (III), on the "Palestine Question". In the first and operative part of paragraph 11 of this resolution, the Assembly made its definitive recommendation concerning the Palestine Arab refugees:

The General Assembly,

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;<sup>1</sup>

This version of paragraph 11 had been adopted after considerable debate in both the First Committee (Political) and Third Plenary Session of the Assembly. The first part of paragraph 11 in fact consisted of specific directives which defined the steps to be taken in solving the refugee problem. These directives were to be taken into consideration by the parties concerned and the Assembly's instrument, the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, established by Resolution 194 "to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation ..."

---

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix A for complete text.

## CHAPTER II

### THE PRINCIPLE OF REPATRIATION OR COMPENSATION

The United Nations General Assembly adopted on December 11, 1948, Resolution 194 (III), on the "Palestine Question". In the first and operative part of paragraph 11 of this resolution, the Assembly made its definitive recommendation concerning the Palestine Arab refugees:

The General Assembly,

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;<sup>1</sup>

This version of paragraph 11 had been adopted after considerable debate in both the First Committee (Political) and Third Plenary Session of the Assembly. The first part of paragraph 11 in fact consisted of specific directives which defined the steps to be taken in solving the refugee problem. These directives were to be taken into consideration by the parties concerned and the Assembly's instrument, the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, established by Resolution 194 "to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation ..."

---

<sup>1</sup>See Appendix A for complete text.

The directives established in paragraph 11 were in four areas: (1) the relationship of peace to refugees, (2) the refugees' right to return to their homes (repatriation) if they chose to do so, (3) the provisions made for the refugees after they exercised their right of choice, i.e., repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, and/or the payment of compensation, and (4) the responsibility of the governments and authorities concerned. It is on these areas and their establishment, that this discussion will focus.

Roots in the mediation effort - The principle of repatriation or compensation is rooted in the efforts of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine to (1) effect a cease-fire and truce in the fighting in Palestine, (2) to undertake "such measures as were necessary for the security and welfare of the population,"<sup>2</sup> and (3) to "use his good offices with the local and community authorities in Palestine ... to promote peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine."<sup>3</sup>

The Mediators' first task was to establish contact with the United Nations Truce Commission, a body made up of the General-Consuls in Jerusalem of Belgium, France, and the United States. The Truce Commission had been created by the Security Council's resolution of

---

<sup>2</sup>Bernadotte, Folke, To Jerusalem, (London: 1951), p. 3.

<sup>3</sup>Bernadotte, Folke, Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, (Rhodes: September 16, 1948, Cmd. 7530), p. 9.

April 23, 1948, (S/727) to negotiate a cease-fire in Palestine. The General Assembly's resolution (186 (S-2)) of May 14 empowered the Mediator to enter into cooperation with the Truce Commission to achieve the implementation of the April 23 resolution. The Mediator and Truce Commission proposed a four-week truce during which the Mediator was to seek the "peaceful adjustment of the future situation" and the settlement of issues outstanding between the parties. On June 11, the first truce entered into force.

With his first task accomplished, the Mediator entered into discussions with the parties in order to discover the areas in which "adjustments" could be made. This task occupied his energies throughout most of the period of the first truce, and he had little chance to investigate the conditions of the population of Palestine. On June 28, Bernadotte conveyed to the Arabs and Jews the text of his "Suggestions" which he submitted as a "possible basis for discussion." These "Suggestions" were concerned with the future government of the country and included the following points: (1) that a Union be formed between Arabs and Jews in the original mandated area of Palestine and Transjordan, (2) that the boundaries of the two Members be determined by negotiation on the basis of suggestions made by the Mediator, and (3) that the immigration policy of each of the Members be determined by the Member concerned for an initial period of two years, after which immigration would be determined by the common interests of the two Members.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., pp. 10-11.

The Mediator's "Suggestions"<sup>5</sup> constituted a considerable departure from the terms of the Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, this resulting from the changes in the situation in Palestine since the Assembly had recommended the partition of the country. He had attempted to formulate his "Suggestions" on "the basis of the equities involved in the Palestine dispute; the aspirations, fears and motivations of the conflicting parties; and the realities of the existing situation in Palestine." Bernadotte stated that he "could not call upon either party to surrender completely its position," and he realized that

"there could be no possibility of a peaceful adjustment ... unless there was at least a moderate willingness on the part of both parties to explore all the avenues for a peaceful adjustment, and unless both of them were prepared at some stage to forego armed force as a means of attaining their objectives."<sup>6</sup>

In order to find some "common denominator in the relations between Arabs and Jews in Palestine," the Mediator had to make his proposals both acceptable and "practicable"<sup>7</sup> in terms of the constantly changing and fluid political, military, and economic situation in Palestine. Therefore, the observer must place in their proper context the Mediator's various recommendations concerning the refugees as well as for a general settlement of the Palestine

---

<sup>5</sup>Dated June 27, Rhodes.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>7</sup>"Practicable" is a term which will be discussed later. It was first used by the Mediator in his report to the Security Council of August 1, 1948, in reference to the date upon which the Arab refugees should be allowed to return home.



problem. Although the changing situation in Palestine constantly caused the Mediator to revise some of his thinking and his approach to certain issues, he continued throughout the summer to formulate his ideas on the basis of the equities involved in the dispute, with particular regard for the welfare and rights of the population of Palestine.

At the time the Mediator submitted his "Suggestions," he felt that

The immediate solution of the refugee problem appeared to be the return to their homes of those refugees who desired to return. Even though in many localities their homes had been destroyed and their furniture and assets dispersed, it was obvious that a solution for their difficulties could be more readily found there than elsewhere.<sup>8</sup>

Therefore, he suggested that

... recognition be accorded to the right of residents of Palestine who, because of conditions created by the conflict there have left their normal places of abode, to return to their homes without restriction and to regain possession of their property.<sup>9</sup>

Herein, the Mediator considered within the framework of his Suggestions for the future of Palestine, the question of refugees (both Jewish and Arab). The Mediator considered the refugee problem to be essentially humanitarian in nature, and initially he addressed himself to it as such. The recognition of the refugees right to return home he considered to be the first step in their actual return

---

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 63.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

home. He envisaged that the recognition of their right to return and the return itself would occur during the truce - "without restriction."

Thus, Bernadotte made explicit which measures he favored to alleviate the suffering of much of the population of Palestine. First, recognition was to be accorded the right of the refugees to return to their homes and their return effected within the context of the truce and irrespective of the absence of a formal peace between the conflicting parties. Second, Bernadotte considered the repatriation of refugees preferable to their expatriation, although he did imply that some might prefer not to return to their homes. He did not make any provisions for those choosing not to return, however. Third, the refugees were to "return to their homes without restriction and to regain possession of their property."

In a letter dated July 3, the Arabs addressing themselves to the Mediator's political and territorial proposals, offered counter suggestions, incorporating the basic principles of the Arab position on partition and providing for a unitary state in the whole of Palestine.

On July 5, the Mediator received the reply of the Provisional Government of Israel. Therein the Provisional Government rejected the Suggestions of the Mediator as well as his authority to "adjust" the terms of Resolution 181 (II), the Partition Plan. The Provisional Government addressed itself primarily to the Mediator's Suggestions concerning territorial adjustment, immigration policy, the formation of a union, but in its own words, "does not find it necessary at this

stage to comment upon other points,"<sup>10</sup> including refugees. The reply of the Provisional Government to the suggested territorial adjustments in the original Partition Plan, however, can be taken as an indicator as to what the position of Israel was on refugees at that time. The reply noted that the sovereign State of Israel had been established "within the area assigned to it in the Assembly's Resolution," and the territorial changes which had been effected "resulted from the repulse of the attack launched against the State of Israel by Palestinian Arabs and by the Governments of the neighbouring Arab States."

Furthermore, the letter stated that it was the "conviction of the Provisional Government that the territorial provisions affecting the Jewish State" were then "in need of improvement."<sup>11</sup> It has been shown in the first chapter of this study that Israeli territorial policy was directly linked to population policy, i.e., that the occupation of an area by the Haganah meant the expulsion of the Arab population from that area. Thus, the Provisional Government had no need to address itself to an Arab return as it did not recognize the possibility of such a return to areas then occupied by Jewish forces. In addition, it stated clearly that Israel desired and proposed to effect further territorial adjustments in its favor.

---

<sup>10</sup>Bernadotte, To Jerusalem, p. 152.

<sup>11</sup>Bernadotte, Progress Report, p. 12.

On July 9, the first truce ended and hostilities were resumed. On the 10th the Mediator set out for Lake Success to present the problem before the Security Council, which on the 15th adopted its second resolution ordering a cease-fire. Following his return to his headquarters on Rhodes on July 19, Bernadotte consulted with Arab leaders in Beirut, Amman, and Alexandria. The refugees constituted the problem about which the Arabs were primarily concerned: "They considered the solution of this problem fundamental to a settlement of the Palestine Question."<sup>12</sup>

On July 21, Bernadotte requested the Secretary-General to dispatch immediately a senior official from the Department of Social Affairs "for the purpose of surveying this grave [the refugee] problem." He considered that "the refugees as residents of Palestine ... were in a territory for whose future the United Nations had assumed responsibility" upon the termination of the Mandate on May 15. In July, the Arab League had requested the Mediator to investigate conditions prevailing among the Arab refugees and to arrange international assistance for them as the Arab States could not bear the burden alone.

On July 26, a week after the second truce had become operational, the Mediator flew to Tel Aviv for exploratory talks with the Israel Foreign Minister, Moshe Shertok (Sharret), and on the same day Bernadotte

---

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

submitted to him by cable a proposal concerning the refugees. The points of his proposal fell within the areas established at the outset of this chapter.

First, the Mediator did not require that peace be concluded between the Arab States and Israel as a prerequisite to either the recognition of the right of the Arab refugees to return, or, to the realization of their return home. He did, however, qualify his earlier position which held that their return should be "without restriction". The qualification he made related to the relative security of the parties, specifically Israel. The security conditions he recognized were those imposed by the Security Council resolutions of May 29 and July 15 which stipulated that no military advantage was to be gained in Palestine by any of the parties during the truces. In his proposals he stipulated that, "among those who may wish to return, differentiation may be made between men of military age and all others ... "

Second, the Mediator explicitly introduced the element of choice: "the ultimate right of all Arab refugees to return to their homes if they desire." And, he made clear that the exercise of this right was the first step towards a settlement of the refugee problem.

Third, he proposed that a specific group -- "especially those living in Jaffa and Haifa" -- "be permitted to return to their homes as from 15th August." Thus, the choice was to be immediately granted

to "a limited number" which was to "be determined in consultation with the Mediator."<sup>13</sup> Again, Bernadotte qualified his original position on two points. First he limited the number to be allowed an immediate return, and, in addition to the numerical limitation, further qualified the "without restriction" clause of his June 27 proposal by giving special consideration to the refugees from Jaffa and Haifa. While on the one hand, stressing the immediacy of the return for those refugees from Jaffa and Haifa, the Mediator on the other hand, left vague and undefined the question of when the balance of the refugees would be allowed to choose and to return if they elected to do so.

Fourth, the Mediator made clear that the responsibility for the resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the returning refugees would be undertaken by the appropriate international organizations and agencies.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the Provisional Government of Israel presumably would not be required to suffer significant economic liability by the return of the refugees and in effecting their rehabilitation.

On August 1, the Mediator received the reply of the Provisional Government. This reply formed the first statement of the official attitude of Israel on the question of refugees. The Provisional Government based its rejection of the Mediator's suggestions

---

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., pp. 19-20.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

concerning refugees on three points. First, it absolved Israel of any responsibility for the plight of the refugees who, "as a result of the ... war," found "themselves uprooted from their homes and cast adrift." The Provisional Government asserted that "the root cause of the ... conflict — of which the mass flight of Arabs and their consequent suffering are mere corollaries — is the refusal of the Arab League to accept the State of Israel either as a matter of right or as an accomplished fact."

Second, the Provisional Government declared its unwillingness to discuss the question of refugees outside of the context of discussions leading to the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Arabs and Israel:

... this question will come up for constructive solution as a part of the general settlement and with due regard to our counter-claim in respect of the destruction of Jewish life and property. The long-term interests of the Jewish and Arab populations; the stability of the State of Israel and the durability of the basis of peace between it and its neighbours; the actual position and fate of the Jewish communities in the Arab countries; the responsibility of the Arab Governments for their war of aggression and their liability for reparations, will all be relevant to the question of whether, to what extent and under what conditions the former Arab residents of the territory of Israel should be allowed to return ...

The third point concerned the economic difficulties which would be created by a large scale return of the Arab population to Jewish-controlled areas of Palestine. The Provisional Government considered that their "mere maintenance" and "reintegration" would in the short-run alone constitute an "insoluble problem" and "the difficulties of accommodation, employment and ordinary livelihood

would be insuperable." Moreover, the Provisional Government stated that it was not prepared to assist in the provision of relief or to assume any financial liability for the refugees' settlement in Israel.

Thus, stating its economic, political, and security reasons, the Provisional Government established that it was "not in a position, as long as a state of war exists, to re-admit the Arabs who fled from their homes, on any substantial scale..."<sup>15</sup> These same economic, political, and security reasons defined both the long-term and short-term policy on Arab refugees of the Israel Government with or without regard to the question of peace. The only possible area open for negotiation as proposed by the Mediator would be for the return of Arabs on a scale not considered to be "substantial" by Israel. The Mediator's suggestions concerning Jaffa and Haifa were rejected. Prime Minister Ben Gurion had informed his cabinet on July 16 that "owing to the changing conditions," two facts had to be recognized: " a) The Partition Plan ... is dead .." and " b) The situation in Palestine will be settled by military power ..." Furthermore, he asserted that due to the Arab aggression "Jaffa will be a Jewish town..",<sup>16</sup> meaning that all Jewish-controlled towns and areas would be henceforth Jewish.

The Mediator reacted to the Israel reply in a report he dispatched to the Security Council stating that, "notwithstanding the

---

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp. 37-39.

<sup>16</sup> Quoted in Gabbay, op. cit., p. 109.



views expressed by the Provisional Government ... it was my firm view that the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes at the earliest practicable date should be affirmed."<sup>17</sup> The adoption at this juncture of the term "practicable" to describe when the refugees should be allowed to return was significant. The "practicability" of a particular proposal had, from the time he had assumed the post as Mediator, dictated in part its usefulness to Bernadotte. No longer was the immediate return of all or a limited number of refugees deemed "practicable" by the Mediator, and was abandoned. Thus, the Mediator no longer attempted to set the date of the return, rather he made reference to the "earliest practicable date", leaving the actual date unspecified. He did, however, retain the earlier priority of the refugee question over that of the conclusion of peace.

The Mediator not only adjusted his stand concerning the date of choice and of return, but he also indicated a change in his preference for "return to their homes", the change being based on humanitarian considerations as had been his original preference.

It must not be supposed ... that the establishment of the right of the refugees to return to their former homes provides a solution of the problem. The vast majority of the refugees may no longer have homes to return to and their re-settlement in the State of Israel presents an economic and social problem of special complexity. Whether the refugees are resettled in the State of Israel or in one or other of the Arab States, a major question to be faced is that of placing them in an environment in which they can find employment and the means of livelihood. But in any case their unconditional right to make a free choice should be fully respected.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup>Bernadotte, Progress Report, p. 20.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 21, part one, section V, paragraph 8. (emphasis mine)

Herein, the Mediator introduced the concept of "resettlement," stating that for a vast majority the return to their homes was no longer possible. Their resettlement whether in Israel or in the Arab countries, however, was to be dependent upon the refugees' chance for economic rehabilitation and employment. Bernadotte, however, did not believe that their right to make a free choice should be prejudiced by the possibilities of their resettlement; he stated that this right was unconditional.

Furthermore, the Mediator stated, in answer to Israel claims against the Arab States:

There have been numerous reports from reliable source of large-scale looting, pillaging and plundering, and of instance of destruction of villages without apparent military necessity. The liability of the Provisional Government of Israel to restore private property to its Arab owners and to indemnify those owners for property want only destroyed is clear, irrespective of any indemnities which the Provisional Government may claim from the Arab States.<sup>19</sup>

It is useful at this point to recall the areas which have been designated and to illustrate how the Mediator altered the terms of his original suggestions concerning the refugees.

In the first area, the absolute priority of the considerations of the refugee problem to that of peace was retained although "immediate" ("without restriction" as to time) was dropped in favor of "practicable", leaving the date unspecified.

Concerning area two, the right of choice, he emphasized that the refugees right to make a free choice was "unconditional" and "should be fully respected."

---

<sup>19</sup> Loc cit., paragraph 7.

To area three, he added the refugees' right to claim compensation from the Provisional Government of Israel for losses of or damage to their property, and for such losses and damage he held the Provisional Government responsible. But, the Mediator had altered his position concerning provision for the refugees after they had exercised their right as far as choice was concerned. At this time, recognizing the economic and social complexities of the problem he introduced the concept of "resettlement" of the refugees which incorporated the idea of the refugees' rehabilitation and reintegration. Resettlement was of two types, in Israel or in the Arab States. Those refugees who chose repatriation would be resettled in Israel, those who preferred not to return to Israel would be resettled in the Arab countries. The Mediator did not make it clear whether the refugees choosing return could return to their former localities (if their villages had been destroyed) or whether they would be resettled in other areas of Israel. The possibility of resettlement "in one or other of the Arab States" introduced the concept of "non-return", but at this stage only for those refugees who chose not to return.

In area four, the responsibility of the Provisional Government of Israel concerning compensation was established, irrespective of the choice of the refugee and any counter claims Israel might have had against the Arab States. Thus, if a refugee elected to resettle outside of Israel, compensation would be paid for his losses. The responsibility for the refugee's resettlement both in Israel and in the Arab States was to be undertaken by the international community. An environment in which the refugees could be rehabilitated and

To area three, he added the refugees' right to claim compensation from the Provisional Government of Israel for losses of or damage to their property, and for such losses and damage he held the Provisional Government responsible. But, the Mediator had altered his position concerning provision for the refugees after they had exercised their right as far as choice was concerned. At this time, recognizing the economic and social complexities of the problem he introduced the concept of "resettlement" of the refugees which incorporated the idea of the refugees' rehabilitation and reintegration. Resettlement was of two types, in Israel or in the Arab States. Those refugees who chose repatriation would be resettled in Israel, those who preferred not to return to Israel would be resettled in the Arab countries. The Mediator did not make it clear whether the refugees choosing return could return to their former localities (if their villages had been destroyed) or whether they would be resettled in other areas of Israel. The possibility of resettlement "in one or other of the Arab States" introduced the concept of "non-return", but at this stage only for those refugees who chose not to return.

In area four, the responsibility of the Provisional Government of Israel concerning compensation was established, irrespective of the choice of the refugee and any counter claims Israel might have had against the Arab States. Thus, if a refugee elected to resettle outside of Israel, compensation would be paid for his losses. The responsibility for the refugee's resettlement both in Israel and in the Arab States was to be undertaken by the international community. An environment in which the refugees could be rehabilitated and

reintegrated had to be created. Financial and other kinds of assistance was to be made available by the international community for the refugees resettlement. Presumably the funds for this purpose would be directed for use in the states involved according to the numbers of refugees choosing resettlement in Israel or resettlement in the Arab countries.

The United Nations Disaster Relief - On July 29, the Mediator was visited by Sir Raphael Cilento<sup>20</sup> of the United Nations Department for Social Affairs, who was sent to assist Bernadotte in the organization of relief for the refugees. Up until that time all relief had been undertaken by the Arab League, local Arab Governments, and international voluntary agencies, notably the Red Cross, the Red Crescent, and the American Friends, and the churches. All these relief operations were coordinated in August under the United Nations Disaster Relief, headed by Sir Raphael, and the United Nations Specialized Agencies -- such as the World Health Organization, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), etc. -- were called upon to give administrative and advisory support.

Sir Raphael had visited the area and conducted a preliminary survey, completed on August 7. There were an estimated 360,000 Arab refugees scattered along the frontiers of Palestine most of whom were in urgent need of assistance. For their immediate needs the Mediator

---

<sup>20</sup>See this chapter, page 43 .

dispatched telegrams on August 16 to 53 nations requesting funds and stores. UNICEF agreed to provide a global sum not to exceed \$ 411,000 for a two month's program. By September he had received supplies or pledges from 33 of the nations contacted.<sup>21</sup>

The Disaster Relief program, however, was not envisaged as a permanent or long-term relief organization and could command neither the operational ability nor the funds to administer a program on other than a short-term basis. Both Sir Raphael and the Mediator -- because the refugees' immediate return home had shown itself to be impossible at the time -- feared for the refugees' conditions as winter approached. Again, time forced a new decision to be taken concerning the refugee problem, one involving a more substantial and sophisticated relief operation.

The Progress Report - In his Progress Report, dated September 16, Rhodes, the Mediator stated that "the refugee problem is intimately related to the problem of Palestine settlement."<sup>22</sup> This statement revolutionized his initial belief that the refugee problem was purely humanitarian in nature. This change probably was based upon the Mediator's experience with later truce supervision operations. The expulsion by Israeli forces of the villagers from

---

<sup>21</sup>Bernadotte, Progress Report, pp. 61-65.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

Ein-Ghazal, Jaba, and Ijzim (See Chapter I, pp. 31-32 for further details) seems to have been important with respect to this change in attitude. Between July 18 and 25, the inhabitants of these three Arab villages were expelled. The Arab League dispatched a complaint to the Mediator. On July 30, after the observers had completed their preliminary investigations, the Mediator reported to the Security Council "that the villages were deserted and damaged.." After investigating the matter further, the Mediator found that the attack on these villages "could not be excused as a police action," and on September 9, Bernadotte

"... informed the Provisional Government ... that the type of action undertaken by their military forces was unjustified, and that the measures taken involving the systematic destruction of two villages [occurring after the evacuation of the inhabitants], were excessive and constituted a violation of both the spirit and letter of the terms of the truce. I also informed the Provisional Government ... that Arab villagers should be allowed to return forthwith and that it must do everything possible to rehabilitate them, including the restoration at its expense of all houses damaged or destroyed. The procedures for carrying these decisions into effect were to be worked out between the Chief of Staff [Bernadotte's] and the Governments concerned."<sup>23</sup>

It is important to note in this particular instance that the Mediator informed the Provisional Government that the villagers should be allowed to return immediately to their homes or villages, and that he established a mechanism to effect their return. Furthermore, one must recall that in his July 26 proposals on refugees submitted to the Provisional Government, the Mediator stated that the responsibility for the resettlement and rehabilitation of returning refugees would be

---

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., part two, section III, paragraph 17, p. 56; emphasis mine.

men by the appropriate international agencies; in the case of villagers from Ein-Ghazal, Jaba, and Ijzim, Israel was to assume responsibility for the refugees' rehabilitation, rebuilding homes, and their compensation for damages and losses. Therefore, the September 9 letter (regarding these villagers) is compared with the 26 proposals, it is possible to assume that the Mediator did not fully know the full extent to which this expulsion policy had been being carried out by the Jewish High Command, but that he was aware that such a policy seemed to exist.

During his first few weeks in the area, the Mediator seemed to have formulated an incorrect view of the circumstances which led to the Arabs to leave. In his journal he had written (covering his official visits to Cairo and Tel Aviv, June 15-18):

One palpable weakness of the Arab position was that their kinsmen in Palestine had not taken an active part in the fighting but had quit the field.<sup>24</sup>

Even if the Arabs had simply left, as the Mediator originally thought to be the case, the question of their return home was largely a political, social, and economic one, and economic difficulties posed by their repatriation could have been solved through the provision of financial assistance. However, since the Arabs had been expelled by Jewish forces for political as well as other reasons (which they were), their repatriation (or return) was necessarily related to the ultimate settlement of the Palestine

---

<sup>24</sup>Bernadotte, To Jerusalem, p. 104.



undertaken by the appropriate international agencies; in the case of the villagers from Ein-Ghazal, Jaba, and Ijzim, Israel was to assume complete responsibility for the refugees' rehabilitation, rebuilding their homes, and their compensation for damages and losses. Therefore, if his September 9 letter (regarding these villagers) is compared with his July 26 proposals, it is possible to assume that the Mediator did not in July know the full extent to which this expulsion policy had been and was being carried out by the Jewish High Command, but that he was aware that such a policy seemed to exist.

During his first few weeks in the area, the Mediator seemed to have formulated an incorrect view of the circumstances which brought the Arabs to leave. In his journal he had written (covering his initial visits to Cairo and Tel Aviv, June 15-18):

One palpable weakness of the Arab position was that their kinsmen in Palestine had not taken an active part in the fighting but had quit the field.<sup>24</sup>

Therefore, if the Arabs had simply left, as the Mediator originally believed to be the case, the question of their return home was largely humanitarian, and economic difficulties posed by their repatriation could be solved through the provision of financial assistance. However, if the Arabs had been expelled by Jewish forces for political as well as military reasons (which they were), their repatriation (or return home) was necessarily related to the ultimate settlement of the Palestine problem.

---

<sup>24</sup>Bernadotte, To Jerusalem, p. 104.

Thus, the Mediator recommended that the Assembly consider the question of relief (the humanitarian problem) apart from that of a peaceful settlement.<sup>25</sup>

The Mediator's final statement on the political aspect of the refugee problem was in part one, section VIII, of his Progress Report, the Conclusions (4):

(i) The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations conciliation commission ...<sup>26</sup>

The Mediator in paragraphs j and k following made recommendations concerning the nature of the commission and the tasks it was to undertake in addition to those related to the refugee problem. The commission was to be "appointed for a limited period, should be responsible to the United Nations and act under its authority." Such United Nations personnel as necessary should be made available to assist the commission.

The commission was to guarantee the political, economic, social, and religious rights of the Arabs in the Jewish territory and the Jews in the Arab territory of Palestine. It was to "lend its good offices, on the invitation of the parties, to any efforts toward exchanges of populations [ between the Arab State and Jewish State in Palestine ] with a view to eliminating troublesome minority problems ..."

---

<sup>25</sup>Bernadotte, Progress Report, p. 10.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

The Mediator recommended that the overall mandate of the commission should be that it employ its good offices "with a view to ensuring the continuation of the peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine."<sup>27</sup>

It is important to note that the Conclusions of the Progress Report consist of the Mediator's recommendations concerning the peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem. The presence of the Mediator's recommendation for a solution to the political aspect of the refugee problem (their repatriation) among his recommendations for the settlement of other issues outstanding between the parties, points out clearly the change which had occurred in the Mediator's thinking on the refugee question. Originally he had linked the alleviation of the miseries of the refugees to their return home, but as the situation became clear he was forced to separate the humanitarian aspect, the question of relief, from the political aspect, the refugees' repatriation (their future). However, the humanitarian aspect of the refugee problem was to receive (as before) precedence over the question of a peaceful settlement, the latter finally including the repatriation of the refugees.

Again, the areas of the solution which had been established were adapted to fit the situation existing in Palestine as well as the Mediator's new approach to the refugee problem.

---

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

In area one (that of the priority of peace or refugees), the right of the refugees to return at the earliest possible date was affirmed by the Mediator, and he requested by the Assembly its reaffirmation. This clearly meant before the conclusion of peace as it was a part of the recommendations for the peaceful settlement of the situation in Palestine; the Mediator never made such a settlement contingent upon the conclusion of peace between the parties. This settlement was to be achieved when the parties were willing to forego the use of force in obtaining their objectives. He probably chose the term "possible" as it would appear to mean "within the context of the existing situation (i.e., the truce)," whereas "practicable", if again adapted to fit the existing situation, could imply a greater dependence on conditions set by Israel.

In the second area (that of choice between repatriation or expatriation), the Mediator stated that the refugees should be allowed a choice of repatriation or compensation. He insisted on the paramouncy of choice, continuing to consider their right to make a free choice unconditional.

The third area (that of what happened after the refugees had made their choice) was redefined by the Mediator in his conclusions on refugees, this time to fit his introduction of compensation as the alternative to repatriation. In his August report to the Security Council, he had stated that the refugees choosing to return would be resettled in Israel (if their villages and homes had

been destroyed) with the help of international assistance. Those choosing not to return would be assisted in their resettlement in the Arab States. Compensation of those choosing not to return was introduced in his Conclusions as the alternative to their repatriation. Resettlement (rehabilitation) was then synonymous with repatriation, according to the Conclusions of the Mediator.

By emphasizing that the returning refugees would be given international assistance to rehabilitate themselves and that those choosing not to return (this implying their resettlement in the Arab countries) must be compensated for their losses by the Provisional Government, the Mediator was attempting to force the hand of the Provisional Government, to obtain a definite commitment by Israel (1) to recognize the right of return of the refugees, and (2) to agree to compensate those not returning for their losses. Furthermore, the Mediator sought reaffirmation of his Conclusions by the Assembly, thus guaranteeing the principle of the refugees' right to return and, if this repatriation was not realized, their compensation.

Since assistance for the refugees' resettlement and rehabilitation was to be provided by international organizations and agencies he felt the social and economic grounds on which were based Israeli objections to the return of a substantial number of refugees, would be minimized. In this way it would be obvious that Israel's main objection to repatriation was political, that Israel did not intend to allow repatriation to be effected, and that compensation should be paid. The Mediator clearly wanted Israel to assume its responsibility toward the refugees.

From the Mediator's remarks in other sections of his progress report it is clear that assistance would have to be extended to the refugees choosing not to return as well as those repatriating as the lack of assistance might prejudice the future of those refugees being resettled outside of Israel.

"The question of their ultimate re-settlement, either in their former abodes or elsewhere, must be faced and solved. ... the right of the refugees to return to their homes if they so desire must be safeguarded. Nevertheless, whether or not this right is exercised, most of these refugees will require assistance in some degree to re-establish themselves."<sup>28</sup>

And, from his conclusions, part three, "Assistance to Refugees":

... to prevent them from being overwhelmed by further disaster and to make possible their ultimate rehabilitation, it is my earnest hope that the international community will give all necessary support to make the measures I have outlined fully effective.<sup>29</sup>

He emphasized the repatriation (resettlement) or compensation concept in order to obtain the commitment of the Assembly to the principle that the wishes of the refugees be respected. From there he probably envisaged Israel's recognition of the right of return of all the refugees, the actual repatriation and resettlement in Israel of a number of the refugees, and finally the payment of compensation to those not returning. This the Mediator probably felt would commit the Arab countries to the resettlement within their borders of the refugees choosing compensation, enabling their ultimate rehabilitation, which was the Mediator's final aim. The urgency of the problem was not simply in terms of the physical need of the refugees but in terms of their future. The key to this argument is found in the

---

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 9.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 69.

Introduction to this Progress Report, where the Mediator stated that he considered that the time was "ripe for a settlement," and that he felt that if the Assembly should take "firm political decisions" the two sides would "acquiesce ... in any reasonable settlement."<sup>30</sup>

United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees - In line with his references to the responsibility of the international community for the residents (or former residents) of Palestine, the Mediator specifically proposed that \$ 29 million be appropriated for relief to the refugees for nine-month period beginning December 1, 1948, through August 31, 1949.

A Supplementary Survey of the refugee situation was completed on October 18 by the Acting Mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche, and on October 20 and 21, Bunche on a point of order raised by the United Kingdom, was given a hearing in the Economic and Social Council, the Third Committee of the General Assembly, Charles Malik of Lebanon presiding over the Committee's debates on the draft international declaration of human rights. Bunche and Sir Raphael Cilento presented their case for relief, and the estimated number of refugees was updated to 500,000. Mrs. Franklin Roosevelt, then the American representative on the Committee, requested a postponement of discussion until October 29 in order that various delegations could consult their governments concerning funds for a relief program.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>31</sup>G.A.O.R. (III), 1948, Third Committee, Part I, 108th and 109th Meetings.

On October 29, the committee again considered the report of the acting Mediator. Mrs. Roosevelt led the discussion, proposing that an organization for the relief of the Palestine refugees be established. She pointed out that the Arab refugee problem was a part of the entire "Question of Palestine" and that the refugees had to be dealt with in terms of the peaceful settlement of that problem. By proposing a separate relief organization for the Palestine refugees, Mrs. Roosevelt made it obvious that she - and the United States - had considered the question in light of the Mediator's experience with repatriation, i.e., the transition from immediate to an undefined date. Furthermore, the refugees could not fit into the programs undertaken by the international Refugee Office (IRO) in behalf of European refugees, either geographically or otherwise. And, UNICEF could not meet the needs of all of the refugees. She suggested that a budget of \$ 29.5 million be agreed upon for the period defined by the Mediator (December 1948 through August, 1949) and that funds should be made available by United Nations members on a voluntary basis and as extra-budgetary contributions, i.e., outside of their normal assessments for the Organization.<sup>32</sup> A draft resolution along these lines was submitted by Belgium, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and on October 30, a working committee was established to prepare a report to be submitted to the First Committee (Political) and the Fifth Committee (Budgetary) as well as to the Assembly in Plenary Session.

---

<sup>32</sup>G.A.O.R. (III), 1948, Supplement No. 1, draft resolution, A/C.3/315.



The Secretary-General was hesitant to create a new organization in the United Nations system which would itself assume the responsibility for providing relief to the refugees. Instead he recommended the creation of an agency to coordinate and administer relief, leaving the operations to the specialized agencies and voluntary agencies which were fulfilling the function under the Disaster Relief Program (DRP).<sup>33</sup> These recommendations were considered by the Third Committee during its discussions and transmitted in its report to the Assembly.

In Part III of his Progress Report, the Mediator had distinguished three types of assistance required by the refugees, (1) immediate relief of basic needs (food, clothing, shelter, ), (2) short-term planning and co-ordination of activities, and (3) long-range planning in order to enable the refugees to reestablish themselves. The third type, he envisaged as assistance to maintain them from the time they returned home until their first harvests would have been completed.<sup>34</sup> It must again be emphasized that this long-range assistance would probably go to refugees choosing repatriation, as those choosing compensation presumably would have the means to reestablish themselves.

After consideration of the report of the Third Committee, the Assembly adopted Resolution 212 (III), "Assistance to Palestine Refugees" (see Appendix A for text), on November 19. The Assembly in this

---

<sup>33</sup>Gabbay, op. cit., p. 121.

<sup>34</sup>Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48, New York: 1949, p. 312.

resolution considered that "the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees is one of the minimum conditions for the success of the efforts of the United Nations to bring peace to that land. "A 9-month budget of \$ 29.5 million (Dec. 1, 1948 to August 31, 1949) for relief and an additional amount of \$ 2.5 million for administrative expenses were approved, and \$ 5 million was advanced immediately from the Working Capital Fund. Voluntary contributions were requested from all members of the Organization. The Secretary General was to appoint a Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, (UNRPR) "to whom he may delegate such responsibility as he may consider appropriate for the overall planning and implementation of the relief program." The operation took over its functions from DRR on December 1, 1948, with Stanton Griffis, at that time U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, as Director. The Agency set up its headquarters in Geneva, and immediately began to secure:

- (1) Rations and protected water supplies for an estimated 500,000 refugees.
- (2) Health services in order to prevent epidemics among the refugees.
- (3) Clothing, blankets, shelter as winter was approaching.

Later, the Agency sought to provide employment for the refugees. UNRPR concluded agreements with the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, and the American Friends Service Committee, voluntary agencies which were to undertake the task of

administering relief to the refugees.<sup>35</sup>

The reaffirmation of repatriation and compensation - The First Committee (Political) considered the Progress Report in its 161st to 166th meetings, October 15 to 20, and its 200th and 228th meetings, November 15 to December 4. During the first session, representatives from Transjordan and Israel were admitted as observers, without the right to vote. And, at the first meeting of the second session, the Arab Higher Committee was granted a hearing.

Both the Provisional Government of Israel and the Arab Higher Committee rejected the Conclusions of the Mediator, even as a basis for discussion.<sup>36</sup>

On November 18 the United Kingdom delegate outlined the position of his delegation and submitted a draft resolution (Doc. A/C.1/394) which read as follows:

"The General Assembly

Endorses the principle stated in part one, section V paragraph 7 of the Mediator's report and resolves that the Arab refugees should be permitted to return to their homes at the earliest possible date and that adequate compensation be paid for the property which has been lost as a result of pillage, confiscation or of destruction; and instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the Arab refugees and the payment of compensation.<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup>See Gabbay for detailed discussion of work of UNRPR, op. cit. pp. 123-142.

<sup>36</sup>It must be remembered that during this time Israeli forces had taken initiatives in both the Negev in the South and Upper Galilee in the North of Palestine. The truce was still technically in effect and the Security Council was repeatedly calling for an end to the hostilities and cease-fire. The United Nations Yearbook 1948-49, (New York: 1950), "Action of the Security Council," on the Palestine Question, pp. 176 ff.

<sup>37</sup>G.A.O.R. (III), 1948, First Committee Annexes, p. 55.

Paragraph 7 of part one, section V, of the Progress Report of the Mediator, prefaced to the first United Kingdom draft is quoted in full on page 49 of this chapter.

Paragraph 7 related to the last area (of the four areas established by the Mediator, i.e., the fourth, relating to responsibility). This established that the Provisional Government of Israel should compensate the refugees for damaged or lost property (irrespective of any claims it had against the Arab States). This paragraph, to an extent, placed the responsibility on the shoulders of the Provisional Government of Israel for the plight of the refugees, notably for their homelessness due to the "destruction of villages without apparent military necessity." The British as the former Mandatory power, were certainly in a position to know the extent of this destruction. Their original draft not only delegated responsibility, but also incorporated the original June 27 and the July 26 proposals of the Mediator concerning the refugees, the first recognizing their right of repatriation, the second seeing that the return of at least some of the refugees would be realized without prejudicing the right of all to repatriation. The British resolution did not introduce the concept of "choice" between repatriation and compensation which the Mediator himself introduced later. As in the earlier proposals of the Mediator repatriation, resettlement and rehabilitation, and payment of compensation were to be accorded to all the refugees. No alternative to repatriation was given. "Earliest possible date" was used by the United Kingdom for the same reason as it was used by the Mediator in his Conclusions, i.e., in order to prevent the conditions from being set by Israel.

On November 23 the United States representative proposed a number of amendments to the United Kingdom draft. These were combined with additional amendments proposed by Colombia on November 24; the draft as amended read:

"The General Assembly

Resolves that the Arab refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest possible date and that adequate compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return; and instructs the Conciliation commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the Arab refugees and the payment of compensation."<sup>38</sup>

The United States proposed only to amend the United Kingdom draft resolution, but these amendments if adopted would completely change the draft and its implications.

First, the United States wished to delete the preface relating to a specific statement by the Mediator in his Progress Report. This particular paragraph (paragraph 7 of part one, section V) clearly stated that the Provisional Government of Israel was responsible for the homelessness of many refugees. By suggesting a change in the preface of the United Kingdom draft, the United States demonstrated that a change in the terms of reference was in order. Such a change in the terms of reference meant that the United States did not wish to press for the return of all the refugees. The United Kingdom draft had recognized no real alternative to repatriation and did not mention the possibility

---

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., pp. 66-67, Doc. A/C.1/397 and Doc. A/C.1/399.

of the refugees' choosing between repatriation and something else. The United States "amendments" constituted a change from the United Kingdom's use of the earlier recommendations of the Mediator -- June 11 and July 26 -- to his Conclusions, the final recommendations. The United Kingdom had recommended repatriation and compensation; the United States brought in the choice of repatriation or compensation. Moreover, the U.S. draft reorganized the recommendations of the Mediator. The Mediator had specifically stated in his Conclusions that "the right of the refugees to return to their homes ... at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation ... of those choosing not to return, should be supervised ... etc.. by the conciliation commission." Therefore, as it has been shown before, the Mediator clearly meant that resettlement, etc. should apply to the returning refugees. The United States draft, however, implied that "resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation" would apply to all the Arab refugees. The "payment of compensation" was to those not returning. Furthermore, the phrase "live at peace with their neighbours" included in the U.S. version did serve to qualify repatriation by limiting the refugees allowed to repatriate by their intent. It did not mean, however, that a formal peace was to be concluded between the parties. The United States draft completely revolutionized the United Kingdom's original draft. Since the United States representative had endorsed the

Conclusions of the Mediator "as the basis for the final settlement of the Palestine Question;"<sup>39</sup> the wording of the U.S. (Colombian) version reflected (with certain revisions) this endorsement.

On the 24th the delegate of Guatemala<sup>40</sup> proposed the insertion into the U.S. — Colombia version after "at the earliest possible date" of "after the proclamation of peace between the contending parties in Palestine, including the Arab States ..."<sup>41</sup>

The United Kingdom, however, clung to its original draft proposing the addition after "the payment of compensation" of "and to enter into contact with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees."<sup>42</sup>

Again on the 27th Guatemala presented an additional revision in the U.S. Colombia version, the first part remaining as suggested by Guatemala on the 24th (concerning the conclusion of peace) and the second part reading, "and Instructs the conciliation commission to use its good offices to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the Arab refugees and the payment of compensation."<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup>Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-1949, p. 168.

<sup>40</sup>Mr. Jorge Garcia Granados, a staunch friend of Zionism and former member of UNSCOP.

<sup>41</sup>G.A.O.R., 1948, First Committee Annexes, pp. 68-69.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., pp. 58-61.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid., pp. 69-70.

The Guatemalan delegate agreed with the "repatriation" or "compensation" formula proposing that the peace be established before the choice be allowed to the refugees. His position coincided with that of the Provisional Government of Israel which demanded a peace settlement recognizing the military status quo and opposed any further consideration of the Palestine Question by the United Nations as such consideration meant that there was a possibility of "adjustment" of the status quo.

The second amendment suggested by Guatemala was designed to keep the authority of the Conciliation Commission at a minimum, to prevent the Commission from applying pressure on the Governments concerned in order to facilitate the repatriation of the refugees.

On November 30, the United Kingdom presented a second revised draft:

The General Assembly

Endorses the conclusions stated in part one, section VIII, paragraph 4 (i) of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, and Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest possible date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which under principles of international law or in equity should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible; and Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees."<sup>44</sup>

---

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., Doc. A/C.1/394/Rev. 2, pp. 61-64.



This second revised draft of the United Kingdom constituted a defeat to the original aims of the U.K. in submitting a resolution on the refugees. Throughout the discussions on the refugees, both in the Economic and Social Council (Third Committee) and the First Committee (Political), the U.K. had shown itself to be most sympathetic to the refugees with respect to the provision of relief and the settling of their future. This second revised draft incorporated the "amendments" suggested by the United States and changed the terms of reference from the June-July proposals of the Mediator to his Conclusions, thus shifting some of the responsibility away from Israel. However, the United Kingdom clung to its original position that all the refugees should be compensated irrespective of their choice.

It was the United States formula (~~rather~~ than that of the United Kingdom) for the solution of the refugee problem which had the decisive impact and finally was to be adopted by the Assembly.

At this juncture, the states supporting the second revised draft of the United Kingdom were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Sweden, the Union of South Africa, and the United States.

The USSR, Poland, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, the Ukrainian SSR, and Yugoslavia considered the Mediator's Report contrary to the Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, and therefore, opposed

the United Kingdom draft. The USSR (and Poland) submitted a draft affirming the Partition Resolution and instructing the proposed conciliation commission to see to the implementation of the resolution.<sup>45</sup>

Syria, representing the Arab case, submitted a draft resolution providing that a commission "study and prepare proposals for the establishment of a single State in Palestine on a cantonal or federal basis."<sup>46</sup>

Guatemala opposed the second revised draft of the United Kingdom on the grounds already mentioned, i.e. peace and the authority of the conciliation commission. Specifically on the question of the commission, the United Kingdom had taken a strong line concerning its duties; the commission was to be established to implement directly the principles agreed upon by the United Nations pursuant to the Conclusions of the Mediator which were recognized as the basis for the final settlement in Palestine. Guatemala desired a weak commission, able only "to use its good offices." Paragraph 4 of the United Kingdom second revised draft instructed the commission to see to the revision of boundaries and made explicit the need for modification along the lines suggested by the Mediator.<sup>47</sup> The United States took a position between Guatemala and the United Kingdom. Mr. Philip C. Jessup speaking for the United States, reaffirmed the support of the United

---

<sup>45</sup>Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-49, pp. 168-171.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., pp. 168-172.

<sup>47</sup>G.A.O.R. (III), 1948, First Committee, Annexes, pp. 61-64.

States for the Conclusions of the Mediator, but also insisted that the frontiers established by the partition resolution could only be revised with the agreement of the Provisional Government of Israel. The position of the United States on this matter clearly pointed out that the conciliation commission would not possess as much authority to implement as the United Kingdom proposed.

On December 4 the United Kingdom draft resolution was once again amended by vote, and then voted upon as a whole, and was adopted by 25 votes to 21, with 9 abstentions. The USSR and Syrian draft resolutions were defeated. A working committee was then constituted to prepare a tabulation of all the proposals and present the report of the First Committee to the Plenary Sessions of the General Assembly on December 7. Paragraph 11 of the United Kingdom draft as amended and presented to the Assembly read:

The General Assembly

Endorses the conclusions stated in part one, section VIII, paragraph 4 (i) of the progress report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine;

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;<sup>48</sup>

---

<sup>48</sup>G.A.O.R. (III), 1948, Plenary, Annexes, Part I, p. 534.

The underlined phrase, "earliest practicable date," was substituted for "earliest possible date" of the earlier versions in order that repatriation would be implemented at a time when it was practicable in terms of the relative security of and acceptability to the parties. The meaning of "practicable" in this, the final draft took on a new meaning when it was combined with the "live at peace with their neighbours", the latter taking care of the security aspects of the return, the former becoming to mean economic and social "practicability", quite in line with the Israeli reply to the Mediator's original and comprehensive proposals on refugees (July 26).

The Zionist interpretation of this change is related by Ben Halpern, one of their more important writers on this question:

... Israel (by the substitution of "practicable" for "practical") had succeeded in obtaining a wording that formally respected her sovereignty and her need for reasonable security ...<sup>49</sup>

This statement infers that until this change was adopted neither Israel's sovereignty nor security were respected. This, however, was not the case, as one of the seven premises upon which the Mediator had based his Conclusions was the fact of the establishment of the Jewish State. Moreover, the Mediator in making his proposals for the return of the Arab refugees to their homes took into account the security of the parties to the Palestine conflict by (1) giving preference to certain categories of refugees, excluding men of military age so that

---

<sup>49</sup>Halpern, Ben, The Idea of the Jewish State, Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1961, p. 396.

the balance of forces established at the time the truces were effected would be maintained, (2) choosing refugees who previously lived in an area well enclosed in the Jewish-controlled territory, and (3) taking personal responsibility for the repatriation of the refugees and enlisting international assistance to aid in their resettlement and rehabilitation.

John Foster Dulles spoke for the United States during the Plenary debates. He advocated more specific directives for the Conciliation Commission, i.e., establishment of a cease-fire and an effective truce, conclusion of peace. He felt that the General Assembly should attempt to influence the parties directly concerned whose primary responsibility was reaching a settlement in Palestine. The Conciliation Commission was established to help, but not to assume this responsibility.<sup>50</sup> Mr. Dulles' remarks defined the United States position on the authority of the Conciliation Commission, a point which had been debated in the First Committee.

Roll-call votes were taken paragraph by paragraph on the draft. The Guatemalan delegate continued to support the amendment proposed in the First Committee -- "return ... after the proclamation of peace ..." -- but it was rejected 37 votes to 7 with 5 abstentions. This amendment did in fact conflict with the recommendations of the Mediator who had assumed a cessation of hostilities before a return could be effected but did not require that a peace treaty be finalized.

---

<sup>50</sup>G.A.O.R. (III), 1948, Plenary, Summary Records, 184th Meeting, pp. 953-954.

The United States proposed that the preamble referring to a specific Conclusion of the Mediator be eliminated as Mr. Dulles said that it had no operative effect.<sup>51</sup> Mr. Dulles' suggestion was put into the form of an oral joint amendment (United States and United Kingdom) and put to the vote, 44 voting in favor and 8 abstaining.<sup>52</sup> This constituted a final victory for the U.S. as the United States formula included certain revisions in the original — recommendations of the Mediator (see pages 66 and 67 ).

Paragraph 11 was then voted upon and adopted by 29 votes to 6 with 13 abstentions. It read as follows:

The General Assembly

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;<sup>53</sup>

The Resolution itself (see Annex A for text) was then voted upon in entirety and adopted 35 votes to 15 with 8 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

---

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 954.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p. 995.

<sup>53</sup> G.A.O.R. (III), 1948, Plenary, Annexes, p. 531.

In favor — Liberia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Siam, Sweden, Turkey, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, Uruguay, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland.

Against — Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the Ukrainian SSR, the USSR, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, the Byelorussian SSR, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt.

Abstain — India, Iran, Mexico, Bolivia, Burma, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala.<sup>54</sup>

The Significance of Resolution 194 (III).— At this stage the question must be asked: Was Resolution 194 (III) the firm political decision that Bernadotte recommended the Assembly should take on the question of a final settlement in Palestine? Before answering this question it must be observed that the Security Council — according to the recommendation of the Mediator — was to issue a permanent injunction against military action in Palestine in order to establish the climate in which a peaceful settlement could be negotiated. This the Council failed to do as Israel continued to make the adjustments in frontiers that it desired, specifically in the Northern Galilee and Negev areas. Therefore, the decision the Assembly was to take was not as firm in terms of the existing situation in Palestine as the Mediator would have liked. Resolution 212 (III) of November 19

---

<sup>54</sup> G.A.O.R. (III), 1948, Plenary, Summary Records, p. 995.

(relief) and Resolution 194 (III) of December 11 (peaceful settlement) did conform partly to the Conclusions of the Mediator and adhere to his suggestion that the question of relief for the refugees be considered apart from the peaceful settlement of the situation in Palestine.

The reaction of the Assembly to the assassination by Jewish terrorists of the Mediator in Jerusalem on September 17, the day after he had submitted his Progress Report, probably determined to a large extent the degree to which individual members accepted his recommendations, specifically the Conclusions.

The Mediator had as a basis for his proposals Resolution 181 (II), the Partition Plan, and had been instructed to "use his good offices . . . to promote peaceful adjustment." At the time he submitted his Progress Report he considered <sup>that</sup> the points of the Partition Plan regarding territory, the formation of an Arab as well as a Jewish State, the status of Jerusalem and the economic union<sup>55</sup> all were in need of reconsideration and adjustment in order to achieve a peaceful settlement. The Israelis and the Arabs both rejected not only his proposals but the authority by virtue of which he initiated the proposals. Israel based its opposition on the military status quo and desire to obtain recognition of the status quo as a fait accompli. Israel spoke at times of the Partition Plan as inviolable and on other occasions of it as "dead" depending on the audience and the situation at hand. The Arabs retained their initial position rejecting partition altogether.

---

<sup>55</sup>He recommended that the areas remaining under Arab control be joined with Transjordan, Yearbook of the United Nations 1948-1949, pp. 307-309.



The General Assembly in November-December had accepted the Conclusions of the Mediator as the basis for the final settlement in Palestine. Resolution 194 (III) of December 11 was based on the Conclusions, but the Conclusions were not specifically mentioned. In the case of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III), it has been shown that the United States was responsible for the exclusion of a reference to the Mediator's particular recommendation concerning the solution of the refugee problem. The United States advocated such an exclusion because in its own formula for the solution to the refugee problem, the U.S. had changed and somewhat reorganized the Mediator's Conclusions, i.e., part one, section VIII, 4 (i). Such changes effected the areas of the directive which paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) constituted:

Area one (the relationship of peace to refugees) was somewhat redefined by the use of "live in peace with their neighbours" and "earliest practicable date." The refugees' return was not contingent upon the conclusion of a formal peace but was dependent on their intent and the practicability -- which the United States seemed to consider should be established by Israel -- of their return.

Area two (the refugees' right of choice) was allowed the priority given it by the Mediator. Resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11, adhered to the either-or formula of the Mediator. Furthermore, it incorporated the United Kingdom's original view that all the refugees should be compensated.

Area three (the provisions for the refugees after they exercised their right of choice) combined the earlier with the later recommendations of the Mediator. In the Conclusions of the Mediator,

resettlement was synonymous with repatriation, i.e. resettlement, etc. was to apply to the refugees returning to Israel. But, according to paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) resettlement (as a specific concept) seemed to apply to those choosing repatriation and those choosing to live outside of Israel. Thus, the Conciliation Commission was to facilitate the refugees' resettlement (inside Israel or in the Arab States) and their economic and social rehabilitation and the payment of compensation (regardless of their choice). In both the first and second parts of paragraph 11 the either-or designation, repatriation (resettlement, etc.) or compensation, was not retained (as specifically stated in the Mediator's Conclusions).

Area four (responsibility) was itself subdivided and responsibility distributed over the authorities and governments concerned: (a) Israel was declared responsible for the payment of compensation, (b) the Conciliation Commission was to undertake the facilitation of the refugees repatriation, etc., (c) the United Nations was to undertake relief, and (d) the parties concerned (the Arab States and Israel) were designated responsible for the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 11.

Paragraph 11, Resolution 194 (III), was the formula suggested by the United States for the solution of the refugee problem. This formula did not, in fact, embody the spirit of the Mediator's recommendations concerning refugees, as it appears that the Mediator had based his final proposals upon his recognition of the immediate causes of the refugees' flight from Palestine. It seems that such recognition

would not (and could not) be accorded by the United States to these causes (i.e., the use of threat and force by Jewish regular and irregular forces to accomplish the expulsion of the Arabs from Palestine). The Mediator had requested that the Assembly take "firm political decisions" concerning a settlement in Palestine, and that he thought both sides would "acquiesce" to these decisions. Resolution 194 (III) represented a political decision of the Assembly, but as the recommendation of the Mediator for the solution of the refugee problem was altered and its wording made vague in paragraph 11, the value of the decision (if compared to the Mediator's recommendations) would appear to have decreased. Still, if the resolution was to be implemented both sides would have to make concessions; Chapters IV, V, and VI of this study deal with the concessions required from each party so that the settlement of the Palestine refugee problem according to Resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11, could be achieved. The United States actively sought to obtain these concessions, and its efforts along this line to a great extent determined the approaches adopted by the United Nations as the world organization sought to alleviate the conditions of the refugees and solve the problem of their future.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS AND UNITED STATES POLICY ON THE PALESTINE QUESTION, NOVEMBER 1947 TO DECEMBER 1948

The refugee status of the Palestine Arabs was closely linked to the determination of the political future of Palestine. American support for Jewish aspirations in Palestine and of the United Nations decision to partition the country, helped to bring about the establishment of the Jewish State in Palestine. Therefore, policy on the refugees was bound to be directly related to United States recognition of Israel, i.e., of the right of the Zionists and the Jews of Palestine to self-determination and to create a Jewish State in the larger part of Palestine. Furthermore, American policy concerning both the Jewish State and the Arab refugees must be viewed in terms of its relation to general policy and its service to the national interest<sup>1</sup> of the United States.

- 81 -

---

<sup>1</sup>Foreign policy can be generally defined as a strategy designed to protect and promote outside of its territory the national interest of a specific country. For a more detailed discussion see Max Beloff's Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1955) especially Lecture III, "The Institutions of Democratic Foreign Policy," pp. 61 ff.

Also, Dean G. Acheson states: "Foreign policy is the whole of national policy looked at from the point of view of the exigencies created by 'the vast external realm' beyond our borders ... It is an orientation, a point of view, a measurement of values -- today, perhaps, the most important one for national survival. Obviously, our military capability to do or deter certain specific and varied things has an immense bearing on foreign policy. So does our economic capability, that of our friends and adversaries, and their relative growth or stagnation. Since internal fiscal and economic policies, public and private, affect both military and economic affairs, they, too, affect foreign policies or can affect them." -- "The President and the Secretary of State," in Price, Don K., ed., The Secretary of State (The American Assembly), New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1960, p. 39.

The nature of foreign policy - Policy-making must be considered dynamic, as a process. Policy itself is the ultimate product of many decisions taken by countless numbers of people who stand somewhere at or between two poles of authority, the vote and the Presidency of the United States. The decisions themselves may be the product of processes within institutions, or they may be simpler initiatives by individuals. In any case, the policy-making process must be considered as a series of decisions taken by groups or individuals ranging on a spectrum from lower to higher levels of authority (the levels often interacting, sometimes overlapping), the policy-makers at all levels possessing specific amounts of authority.

This authority is derived directly from the Constitution of the United States. Yet, "the Constitution ... is not clear in its references to the conduct of foreign policy, these references being mostly confined to Articles I and II. Still it is clear from the references made that in foreign affairs 'the role and power of the Presidency is superior to that of Congress'." And, much of this power the President delegates to his subordinates: his Executive Staff, the Department of State, other administrative agencies, the overseas administration.<sup>2</sup>

Congress also has a share and an interest in the formulation of foreign policy, i.e., through its control of appropriations and through the public expression of views although with varying degrees of

---

<sup>2</sup>Schleicher, Charles P., International Relations, Cooperation and Conflict, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963, pp. 447-449.

authoritativeness and influence. Each house has a Committee on Foreign Relations and conducts its own investigations in the field of foreign affairs. Thus, the President, his Executive Staff and agencies, the Department of State, and Congress constitute the formal policy-making apparatus.

Informally policy is influenced by the party system, elections, the religious and ethnic geography of the country, and pressure groups. There are always conflicting views as to what constitutes the national interest. There is a traditional tendency towards non-involvement in international affairs and another more liberal tendency favoring both involvement and commitment. As the national interest has both its internal and external components, finally each decision must be weighed, the situation within the United States on one tray of the balance, and the external context on the other.

The national interest - Perhaps the best example of recent debate revolving about the national interest with the traditionalist - restrictionists on one side and the internationalists on the other, which is not irrelevant to a discussion of U.S. policy on Palestine, focused on the problem of displaced persons in Europe after the Second World War. For humanitarian reasons many Americans felt that the United States should take in a "fair share" of these people. In April, 1947, Congressman William Stratton of Illinois introduced a bill proposing the annual admission as non-quota immigrants of 100,000 displaced persons for four years.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup>Divine, Robert A., American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957, pp. 110 ff.

The restrictionists saw the issue in terms of internal policy based on national interest. They argued that American war veterans would have to compete for jobs with the displaced persons, that such a measure would upset the ethnic balance of the country (underpinned by 1924 immigration legislation), that the displaced persons were infested with the horrors of war and the ideas of communism. Their arguments were based on the idea that admitting the displaced persons would "weaken the nation internally and thereby endanger America's leadership of the free world."<sup>4</sup>

Those advocating the revision of restrictive policies and the passage of the Stratton Bill argued that the United States had a "moral obligation" to accept a number of these people, that such a policy would enhance U.S. prestige in Europe and display the American capacity to assert leadership.<sup>5</sup>

The bill was debated at length in both houses and eventually emerged from debate and committee greatly altered in favor of the restrictionists. It was not only made restrictive in numbers of persons to be admitted, but in effect it discriminated against Jewish displaced persons and, to some extent, Catholics as well. As a measure restricting the entrance of certain ethnic and minority groups the bill was so bitterly opposed by northern liberals that some voted

---

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 116.

with the most conservative element against the bill. In June 1948, President Truman signed the bill, but planned to reintroduce the legislation when Congress convened again after the November elections.

Opinion as the balancing factor - Policy-making within the formal structure is competitive with the President, Congress, the Secretary of State, members of the Department of State, and agencies of the Executive branch acting as the chief competitors.<sup>6</sup> The determining factor in this competition is more often than not public opinion or support. But public opinion to a large extent, is governed by the informal structure, the lower authoritative levels of party, pressure group, and organized, articulate opinion.<sup>7</sup>

Gabriel Almond in his book, The American People and Foreign Policy, describes the public attitude on foreign policy as superficial and unstable, these tendencies creating "the danger of under- and over-reaction to changes in the world political situation." And, he continues,

The instability of moods and the typical public indifference to foreign policy in the absence of threat / directly to the United States / accords a disproportionate influence to minority groups. American policy towards Palestine is a case in point.

---

<sup>6</sup>Hans J. Morgenthau on "John Foster Dulles, 1953-59," in Graebner, Norman A., An Uncertain Tradition, American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961, p. 289.

<sup>7</sup>"One study indicates that approximately 30 per cent of the American electorate is unaware of almost any event in American foreign affairs, and that although another 45 per cent is aware of important events in the field it is not really informed. Only about 25 per cent shows a consistent knowledge of foreign affairs." -- Martin Kriesberg, "Dark Ages of Ignorance," in Council on Foreign Relations, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, ed. Lester Market, New York: 1949, p. 51 -- quoted in Schleicher, loc. cit.

<sup>8</sup>Almond, Gabriel A., The American People and Foreign Policy, New York: Praeger, 1960, p. 86.



Almond lists as the "most significant and active foreign language organizations" those of the Jews, Germans, Italians, Poles, Irish, Czechs, Hungarians, Greeks, and Yugoslavs.<sup>9</sup> And, the Jews constitute not only a significant foreign language group but also a part of the American Judeo-Christian or Judeo-Catholic-Protestant religious heritage. Consequently, they wield considerable influence in religious as well as secular attitudes.

Almond describes the influence of these ethnic and linguistic groups as generally taking the "form of efforts to enlist American support for policies affecting their homelands," i.e. "preservation of national territory, achievement of national independence, or the protection of minority ethnic or religious groups ... from persecution by the dominant groups."<sup>10</sup>

Jewish activity in the postwar period was directed first, towards enlisting American support for the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine, and second, towards obtaining a change in American immigration policy allowing for the admission to the United States of Jewish displaced persons. The second objective, however, was subject to the Zionist objective of establishing a Jewish State, and (Zionist-controlled) Jewish organizations on occasion even opposed revision of U.S. immigration policies in order to emphasize the

---

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 184.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 183.

need for a Jewish homeland. Before 1942, American Zionism was mainly engaged in Jewish philanthropy, the leadership of the international Zionist movement being concentrated in Great Britain with its political and diplomatic efforts oriented towards the achievement of the Zionist nationalist program in Palestine.

The 1939 White Paper issued by the British Government to restrict Jewish immigration and land purchase in Palestine threatened to "undermine Chaim Weizmann's policy of 'gradualism',"<sup>11</sup> - the gradual building up of a Jewish majority in Palestine until self-determination in the whole country could be demanded for the Jews. The Zionist leadership, faced with British opposition, shifted the center of its diplomatic and political activity to the United States in order to capture American Jewish influence and resources, these, preliminary to the exertion of pressure against the United States Government itself. In May, 1942, the Emergency Council of the Zionist Organization of America called a conference at the Biltmore Hotel in New York City. Eight resolutions were adopted - later known as the Biltmore Program - the last three resolutions of which called for support of (1) the right to establish a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine, (2) the right of the Jews of Palestine to create a defense force and to cooperate in the war effort by forming a Jewish fighting force, and (3) the right of the Jewish Agency to control immigration into Palestine and to develop its "unoccupied and uncultivated lands."

---

<sup>11</sup>Stevens, Richard P., American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy (1942-1947), New York: Pageant, 1962, p. 2.

With this declaration the American Zionists, who had hitherto hesitated to formulate the ultimate aim of the movement ... now promulgated the political program which henceforth guided their efforts in the Jewish community.<sup>12</sup>

The Zionists were well aware of the strategic importance of the American Jewish community, and that, as in the case of the other American minority groups, "the ultimate pressure exercised by the Jewish minority is in the electoral process."<sup>13</sup> In 1945 American Jewry constituted 47.3 per cent of world Jewry.<sup>14</sup> The American Jewish community constituting only three per cent of the total U.S. population in 1936, could nevertheless exert influence out of proportion to its numbers due partly to the fact that the Jews had settled predominantly in urban areas:

... In the six populous states of New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey and Ohio were found in 1936 over 68 per cent of the total Jewish population in the United States. These, together with seven other populous states (California, Connecticut, Michigan, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri and Texas), included over 90 per cent of American Jewry ...<sup>15</sup>

This concentration in urban areas also made easier the task of the Zionists in organizing Jewish opinion in support of the Zionist program.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., pp. 4-5.

<sup>13</sup>Almond, op. cit., p. 186.

<sup>14</sup>Halpering, Samuel, The Political World of American Zionism, Detroit: Wayne State University, 1961, p. 54.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 48.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 49.

Between 1942 and 1947 the Zionists were able to create in the minds of American political leaders the concept of the "Jewish vote." This was a useful concept because the Jewish community was divided among and concentrated in areas with large numbers of electoral votes for Presidential aspirants. They argued that the "Jewish vote" could swing a doubtful state in an election.

Zionist persuasiveness had been at first effective in Congress. As early as 1922 Congress had adopted a joint resolution in support of the Balfour Declaration, but the Zionists did not then nor for some time thereafter "obtain much satisfaction from the President or the State Department."<sup>17</sup> Later, however, against the background of the European Jewish tragedy of World War II, and as Zionist propoganda became more effective and the movement more powerful in the U.S., the President was brought to consider the Palestine question increasingly in terms of national political realities rather than in terms of foreign policy considerations. By 1945-46, the Zionists had developed a two-pronged strategy: first, the military arm operating in Palestine would create a situation which, as it would be in the realm of foreign affairs, caused the State Department to react; and second, the diplomatic arm, in order to obtain a favorable United States decision concerning the military activity, would appeal to the President on the basis of national politics. The final decision would of course be made by the President.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>17</sup>Safran, Nadav, The United States and Israel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 38.

<sup>18</sup>For further elaboration see:

- (1) Stevens, Richard P., op. cit.
- (2) Weizmann, Chaim, Trial and Error (New York: Harper, 1949)
- (3) Manuel, Frank E., The Realities of American-Palestine Relations (Washington: D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1949).

Both Republicans and Democrats have bid for the "Jewish vote," In the 1944 Presidential campaign both parties included a "Palestine plank" in their platforms. Senator Robert A. Taft, "Mr. Republican" himself, openly advocated his party's support for a pro-Zionist policy. President Roosevelt, closely in touch with the problems of formulating policy on this issue, refrained from positive commitment, but his Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles became one of the more ardent supporters of Zionist aspirations in Palestine.<sup>19</sup> Prominent Zionist leaders were enlisted to support the candidates of both parties, Rabbi Hillel Silver, the Republicans, and Rabbi Steven Wise, the Democrats. Traditionally the Jewish vote had been Democratic. President Roosevelt was considered by "the Jewish masses in America and throughout the world as the great friend and champion of their people," and even the Zionists feared to oppose him.<sup>20</sup> However, although the majority of the "Jewish vote" was considered safely democratic, it seems to have been also thought that a significant minority could be persuaded either way by the U.S. posture on Palestine.

The implementation of policy - Policy-making depends to a great extent on the successful functioning of the entire apparatus involving not only competition among but also cooperation of the parts.

---

<sup>19</sup>Welles, Sumner, We Need Not Fail, Boston: 1948.

<sup>20</sup>Emanuel Newmann, American Zionist, February 5, 1953, quoted in Stevens, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

For instance, the President must have a good working arrangement with the Secretary of State, and the Secretary with his Department, the public, Congress, other governmental agencies, so that policies can be fully developed, financed, and supported. Moreover, the effective implementation of a particular policy depends greatly on the relationship of the Secretary of State (and the entire policy-making apparatus) to the United Nations; and, United States policy on Palestine is a particularly illustrative case in point. Within the United Nations American influence can be felt in three areas: (1) the forum provided by the General Assembly and the Security Council, (2) the Secretariat and the Secretary-General, and (3) the specialized agencies or subsidiary agencies of the United Nations as instruments of action.<sup>21</sup>

The instrument through which United States policies are promoted in the United Nations is the Permanent Mission. The Mission was established by the "United Nations Participation Act of 1945" (amended in 1949), and Presidential decrees annually confirm its mandate. The Mission has the day to day task of keeping in contact with other missions and the secretariat, and channels ideas, reactions, and suggestions of the others back to the State Department "as grist for the decision-making process."<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup>Paul H. Nitze, "The Secretary and the Execution of Foreign Policy," in Price, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

<sup>22</sup>Riggs, Robert E., Politics in the United Nations (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1958), p. 13.

Differentiated from the Mission only by its budget is the United States Delegation to the United Nations, its members appointed by and under orders from the President. The five permanent representatives and five alternates are drawn from all parts of the decision-making apparatus, formal and informal:

Typically, the Secretary of State, the Permanent Representative, two Congressmen, and one or two prominent public figures or high-level diplomats comprise the front-line representation at the General Assembly.<sup>23</sup>

On the Delegation, also, are the advisers, coming both as Presidential appointees and as specialists from the State Department.

Because the United States Delegation to the United Nations is close to Washington and is in constant communication with both the White House and the State Department, its function as an initiator of policy is paradoxically greatly limited. However, it can and does recommend proposals and strategies to be considered in the formulation of policy.

The context of policy-making - The American national context in which the policy-making process functions is an important determining factor. The context of 1948 in which policy on Palestine had to be formulated was confused; some of the elements have already been mentioned. The United States had only recently assumed a new position in world affairs. Public sentiment — with Congress as its chief spokesman —

---

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 15.

had not entirely decided to abandon its isolationist position with regard to American involvement abroad. The Communist threat to Europe, the need for reconstruction of war-damaged nations, and general sympathy for refugees in Europe and victims of Nazi and Communist persecution as reflected in the Stratton bill, were factors in favor of increased involvement, while rising post-war American nationalism and increasing fear of the Communist threat from within favored non-involvement.

In the realm of foreign policy the Truman Administration, 1945-1948, had been quite successful. General George C. Marshall served the President admirably as Secretary of State for the period during which the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan emerged. Marshall had been appointed in January, 1947, just on the heels of a Democratic defeat in the Congressional elections of 1946. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, had managed to secure the Truman Administration's commitment to a bipartisan foreign policy.<sup>24</sup>

The role of Senator Vandenberg in the construction of foreign policy in this period symbolized the learning process which many of the pre-war isolationists had gone through. The Russian Communist threat to Western Europe -- particularly to Greece and Turkey -- and the withdrawal of England from her traditional position in the Mediterranean created a power vacuum in which we had no choice but to enter.<sup>25</sup>

Marshall was tailor-made for the situation; he was a "non-political" figure, and he carried to the office immense prestige both at home and abroad. Moreover, Marshall commanded the complete respect

---

<sup>24</sup>A move also advocated by James V. Forrestal, the first Secretary of Defense -- See Mills, Walter, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), pp. 341 ff.

<sup>25</sup>Almond, op. cit., p. xiii.



of President Truman, and Marshall saw his role as one of adviser to the President, not as an initiator of policy.

Secretary Marshall reorganized the State Department . . .

... so as to clarify the lines of authority. As an Army commander, he had not devoted himself to detailed planning. Instead, he had been accustomed to fixing objectives and entrusting his staff with the problem of recommending means of attaining them. He carried that habit into the State Department. Demanding orderly staff procedure, he strengthened the position of Under Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson and in effect made Acheson his chief of staff . . . Under Marshall's command, Acheson ran the Department of State, with authority over administration and the formulation of policy. Acheson discussed policy with Marshall and sought his decisions on important matters, but the orders that went through the Department came from the Under Secretary.<sup>26</sup>

In June 1947, Acheson left the Department and Robert A. Lovett, a conservative Republican and Wall Street banker, became Under Secretary in his place. Also, during that summer the National Security Act was passed, providing for coordination of economic, defense, and foreign policy. To provide the needed coordination the National Security Council was created. Strictly in the field of foreign policy, the Policy Planning Staff was formed with George Kennan as its head.

Almond refers to this period between 1946 and 1949 the "imaginative stage" of American foreign policy, "the period that created the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the American policy of aggressive support of European integration, and the beginning of the technical-assistance (or Point Four) program."<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup>Alexander de Conde, "George Catlett Marshall, 1947-1949," in Graebner, op. cit., p. 249.

<sup>27</sup>Almond, op. cit., p. xiii.

Concerning the Palestine issue, American policy in 1947 had been uncertain, vacillating. Secretary of the Navy -- later Defense -- Forrestal and former Secretary of State James Byrnes sought to keep Palestine out of the realm of American partisan politics. Forrestal took it upon himself to appeal to Senator Vandenberg and Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York State to refrain from using the issue to win votes in the coming elections. Forrestal had in mind chiefly the defense and strategic interests of the United States and her allies, and the importance of Middle Eastern oil. For the most part, Forrestal's arguments failed to convince political leaders to forego the opportunity to solicit votes among supporters of the Zionist cause.<sup>28</sup> Although Congressional leaders and the Truman Administration had agreed to support a bipartisan foreign policy, Palestine was to be an exception, and, in fact, it was to be drafted into the party platforms of the major parties.

Palestine and American policy - In order to understand better the reasons for the decisions of 1947-1948, one must follow carefully the events on three fronts, in Palestine, in the United Nations, and in the United States as the campaign for the elections in November 1948, came into full swing.

The chronology of political and military events and their respective policy responses shows that American policy was influenced by

---

<sup>28</sup>Mills, op. cit., pp. 347-348. Forrestal warned that "there would inevitably be two things coming up: (1) the arming of the Jews to fight the Arabs, (2) unilateral action by the U.S. to enforce the decision of the General Assembly." p. 349.

(1) the political situation in the United Nations and the military situation in Palestine, and (2) the pressures of partisan politics at home. The first response came mainly from the Department of State as it was advised of the situation developing both in New York (through the Permanent Mission) and in Palestine. The second -- which also depended on the political and military developments -- came from the President in his capacity both as nominee for office and titular head of his party and from his political advisers.

The chronology shows quite clearly that policy was predominantly the prerogative of the State Department when the situation in New York on Palestine did not warrant the activation of the political arm of Zionism. This arm was used decisively to secure U.S. support for the passage of partition, the President overruling the State Department:

President Truman favored a homeland for the Jews, and in November, 1947, supported a United Nations plan for the partition of Palestine between Arabs and Jews, a policy that committed the United States to the principle of an independent Jewish state. Truman's political advisers and intimate members of his White House staff had urged that policy, but specialists on the Middle East and other career men in the State Department disliked it. Believing the partition plan unworkable, the Policy Planning Staff, for instance, recommended the withdrawal of American support from it. The State Department specialists contended that Truman's political advisers championed the idea of a Jewish state, not because of any concern for foreign policy or national security, but in the interests of gaining Jewish votes and winning an advantage in domestic politics.

Arguing that the opposition of the State Department career men to partition flowed largely from anti-Semitic biases and not from diplomatic considerations, the President's political advisers warned him that those men were trying to undermine his policy, a warning he could not believe.<sup>29</sup>

---

<sup>29</sup> de Conde in Graebner, op. cit., p. 256.

The diplomatic aim of Zionism achieved four additional favorable and significant policy decisions between November, 1947, and November, 1948: (1) the recognition of Israel by President Truman in May, (2) the incorporation into the party platforms (notably the Democratic) of a pro-Zionist "Palestine plank," (3) the response of the United States concerning observers for the supervision of the truce in Palestine, and (4) Truman's statement on boundary revision during the Zionist military offensive in the Negev.

Partition as a solution to the Palestine problem had always been met with the intense opposition and hostility of the Arabs. After the United Nations adopted its resolution of November 29, 1947, armed conflict broke out between Arab and Jew in Palestine for the first time since 1939. The United Nations Palestine Commission created by the partition resolution, failed to bring the Arabs and the Zionists to any kind of agreement. The Great Powers, specifically the United States and the Soviet Union, would not commit any military forces to implement partition. By March it seemed that an alternative course of action had to be adopted by the United Nations, either on a temporary or permanent basis. On March 15, President first enunciated a change in U.S. policy (away from partition), and on March 19, Warren Austin of the United States suggested a United Nations trusteeship for Palestine. On March 25, President Truman issued a formal statement to the effect that a "temporary trusteeship" proposal should be examined in order to improve the chances of peace in Palestine. On April 1, the Security Council adopted two resolutions tabled by the United States: (1) requesting

a truce in Palestine, and (2) calling a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine. From April 16 to May 15 the Second Special Session of the Assembly was convened at Lake Success and on May 14, the resolution empowering the United Nations Mediator for Palestine (Bernadotte) was adopted.

On May 15, the State of Israel was proclaimed and accorded immediate de facto recognition by President Truman. The dialogue between the State Department and the President is most apparent in this case. By his recognition of Israel on May 15, President Truman apparently reversed the policy the State Department — with Truman's support — had advocated since March. By his action Truman had recognized as a fait accompli Jewish implementation and enforcement of partition. This he did just as the United States Delegation to the United Nations had voted to empower a mediator to negotiate further on the future of Palestine.

Secretary Marshall opposed immediate recognition. During a conference Marshall stated,

"Mr. President, this is not a matter to be determined on the basis of politics. Unless politics were involved, Mr. Clifford / Clark Clifford, one of Truman's political advisers / would not even be at this conference. This is a serious matter of foreign policy determination and the question of politics and political opinion does not enter into it."<sup>30</sup>

The Security Council on May 29, adopted a resolution calling for a four-week truce and cease-fire in Palestine, this to be determined and negotiated by the Mediator. On June 11, the first truce went into effect.

---

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 257.

During May there had been heated debate in the Senate on the Stratton Immigration Bill; this had ended on June 2 with the passage of a bill authorizing the admission of 200,000 displaced persons over a two-year period (the only liberal victory on the measure), but incorporating all the restrictionist measures concerning the origins of persons to be admitted as well as the cut-off date of December 22, 1945. The bill was then referred to the House, and on June 11, was passed with virtually all the restrictionist measures intact. A few days later a conference committee reported a final version "which represented a complete victory for the restrictionist viewpoint."<sup>31</sup> This was voted upon and passed in the last days of the Congressional session, and the bill was reluctantly signed by a disappointed President on June 25. "In its present form," Truman stated, "this bill is flagrantly discriminatory."<sup>32</sup>

The Republican Party Convention met in Philadelphia in late June to nominate a candidate for the Presidency, and on June 23, the party platform was adopted. In the platform was included a brief pro-Zionist "Palestine plank," which read as follows:

We welcome Israel into the family of nations and take pride in the fact that the Republican Party was the first to call for the establishment of a free and independent Jewish Commonwealth. The vacillation of the Democrat Administration on this question has undermined the prestige of the United Nations. Subject to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, we pledge to Israel full recognition, with its boundaries as sanctioned by the United Nations and aid in developing its economy.<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup> Divine, op. cit., p. 126.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p.128.

<sup>33</sup> Porter, Kirk H. and Johnson, Donald Bruce, National Party Platforms 1840-1960 (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1961,) p. 453.

The exponents of bipartisanship had attempted to persuade the Convention to adopt a more moderate "Palestine plank" confined simply to the "welcome." However Zionist pressure brought about the adoption of the more comprehensive plank.

Between June 23 and 25, the Progressive Party, a splinter group from the Democratic Party, held its founding convention in Philadelphia, and adopted an extremely favorable "Palestine plank" from the Zionist point of view. The plank demanded the immediate de jure recognition of Israel, its admission to the United Nations, lifting of the arms embargo, preservation of the boundaries laid down by the United Nations in the Partition Plan, extension of financial assistance to Israel, noninterference with Israeli control of immigration policy, provision of American shipping facilities for the transportation of Jewish displaced persons who desired to emigrate to Israel, and the internationalization of Jerusalem. The Progressives also appealed to the Arabs to accept the partition of Palestine.<sup>34</sup> Also, the Progressives incorporated a plank calling for the repeal of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (the Stratton bill as amended).<sup>35</sup> Henry Wallace was both the founder and nominee of the Progressive Party.<sup>36</sup>

On June 28, Bernadotte submitted his proposals for the future government of Palestine. By July 6, the rejection of his proposals by

---

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 440.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 441.

<sup>36</sup> There is little doubt as to where Wallace's sympathies lay on the question of Palestine. Abba Eban lists Wallace along with Henry Morgenthau, Judge Samuel Rosenman, Isidore Lubin, Robert Nathan and Ben Cohen as staunch supporters of Weizmann in his final drive to win recognition for the Jewish State. -- in Weisgal, Meyer and Carmichael, Joel, eds., Chaim Weizmann, London: 1962, p. 265.

the Provisional Government of Israel was in his hands. On July 10, Bernadotte left Rhodes for New York, to present the case to the Security Council; he was to remain there until July 17. The first truce ended on July 9, and on the 11th fighting was resumed. The second truce became operative on July 18, to last until the conclusion of the armistice agreements between the Arab States and Israel (the last concluded in July 1949).

On July 12, less than a week after the Israeli rejection of the Mediator's proposals and during the Mediator's stay in New York, the Democratic Convention met in Philadelphia, adopting on the 14th a party platform containing a "Palestine plank" somewhat more substantial than that of the Republicans but more moderate than that of the Progressives.

The Democratic Party's "Palestine plank" read as follows:

President Truman, by granting immediate recognition to Israel, led the world in extending friendship and welcome to a people who have long sought and justly deserve freedom and independence.

We pledge full recognition to the State of Israel .....

We approve the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations resolution of November 29th and consider that modifications made thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel.

We look forward to the admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations . . . . We pledge appropriate aid . . . . in developing its economy and resources.

We favor the revision of the arms embargo to accord the State of Israel the right of self-defense. We pledge ourselves to work for the modification of any resolution of the United Nations to the extent that it may prevent any such revision.

We continue to support . . . the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the Holy Places in Palestine. <sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup>Porter and Johnson, op. cit., p. 432.



The Democratic platform also called for the revision of the Dis-  
placed Persons Act, pledging support of the original Stratton bill.<sup>38</sup>

The Democratic Party's platform is the most meaningful of the three as it was to influence policy both before and after the November elections. It clearly shows the relationship of the situation in Palestine and the United Nations to American politics. First, the Democratic Party declared its support for President Truman's policy concerning the recognition of Israel, taking credit as Truman's party for this policy. Second, the unconditional full recognition of Israel was pledged. This indicated that a Democratic Administration, if elected, would not use recognition as a means for influencing Israel to pursue a particular policy. Third, American approval of the claims of Israel to the boundaries established in the United Nations Partition Plan did not conflict with United Nation's policy or with Zionist aspirations, but, the plank stated that if modifications were to be made, they would have to be acceptable to Israel. This pointed out that the United States (if the Democratic Administration remained) would not support any territorial suggestions made by the Mediator that were unacceptable to Israel. Fourth, the plank pledged its support for the lifting of the arms embargo in Israel's favor. This implied that American support for the May 29 Security Council resolution (prohibiting the introduction of military personnel and arms into Palestine) had been withdrawn and that the U.S. would not use its influence if the Israelis chose to violate the balance of forces upon which the first truce was

---

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 435.

based. Such a comprehensive plank had been adopted because the Democrats had nominated as a compromise candidate President Truman. The position of both the candidate and the party was considered to be weak as two factions -- the Progressives and the Dixiecrats -- had held their own conventions and nominated their own candidates, breaking off from the main body of the party.

On July 16, the Mediator discussed with the French, Belgian, and United States delegates the possibility of obtaining observers quickly if the second truce order was accepted by both parties. The delegates consulted assured the Mediator of prompt action and stated that observers would be on Rhodes within a few days. The observers were desperately needed to enforce the truce, especially in effecting the demilitarization of Jerusalem. The Mediator was obliged for the second truce to nearly reconstitute the Observer Corps as a number of the original observers had returned home. Furthermore, there had been a considerable number of violations during the first truce, and the Mediator sought to minimize both the number and seriousness of these violations. However, first as the second truce became operational Israel launched its offensive against Ein-Ghazal, Jaba, and Ijzim. Also, the Mediator had made a change in the policy concerning the introduction of men of military age into the truce area. He allowed Israel to receive such immigrants as long as they were placed in particular areas where they would be periodically checked by observers. The second truce, unlike the first four-week truce, was of unspecified duration and required a larger number of observers committed for a longer period

of time. Israel's military successes during the interim (July 9-18) encouraged Jewish forces to violate the provisions of the second truce, once established, especially since Israel feared little international interference (U.S. interference) with respect to violations of the truce.

The American Government did dispatch 30 officers for the observer corps, but not the 125 originally promised. August came and the State Department remained bogged down in bureaucracy. Ralph Bunche was sent to Washington and Lake Success to bring pressure to bear on the authorities. The modest number of men requested from the United States could not be provided, and Bernadotte was prompted to remark,

... It was depressing to have to recognize the fact that even the most trivial decisions with regard to any measures designed to lend force to its [the United Nations!] words were dependent on the political calculations of the Great Powers. According to what I was told by a very reliable source [probably Bunche], the American attitude was influenced by two considerations. If American troops were used in connection with the truce control, they were afraid in the first place that that might seriously complicate relations with Moscow. And in the second place they were afraid that if anything were to happen to American soldiers, if for example they were fired upon by Arab or Jewish snipers, that would cause a storm of resentment in the U.S.A., which in its turn might influence the Presidential elections in November.<sup>39</sup>

Bernadotte completed on September 16 his Progress Report and on the following day was assassinated. The reaction in the United Nations and throughout the world to the murder of the Mediator by Jewish terrorists placed the Zionists in an extremely delicate position.

Secretary of State Marshall addressed the General Assembly on September 23, lending American support to the Report and particularly the Conclusions of the late Mediator.

---

<sup>39</sup> Bernadotte, op. cit.; pp. 166-178, 193.

In October Jewish Forces staged their military offensives in the Negev and in Upper Galilee. Again the diplomatic offensive was taken up in Washington and New York, President Truman responding "that no change in the original United Nations partition plan should be made unless acceptable to Israel."<sup>40</sup> This policy statement was the official incorporation into pre-election foreign policy of one pledge of the Democratic Party's "Palestine plank;" the American attitude concerning the provision of observers for the supervision of the truce constituted unofficial support of the spirit of the entire plank.

The elections came in early November, Truman defeating Dewey by 24,106,000 to 21,969,000 of the popular vote, and 304 to 189 of the electoral vote. And, the Democrats regained control of Congress (lost to the Republicans in 1946), winning by a margin of 93 seats in the House and 12 in the Senate.<sup>41</sup>

The November elections over, President and President-elect Truman continued to pursue his policies, then with the assurance of four more years in office and at least two of them to be spent with a Democratic Congress.

The American vote on Resolution 194 (III) - It was shown in Chapter II that paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) did not strictly conform to the Conclusions of the Mediator and that this resolution was

---

<sup>40</sup>Lilienthal, Alfred, What Price Israel, Chicago: 1953, pp. 111-113.

<sup>41</sup>Freidel, Frank, America in the Twentieth Century, New York: 1960, p. 496.

probably not the "firm decision" he felt the Assembly should take with regard to the political aspects of the Palestine Question. The Mediator was certainly too optimistic in his assumption that the parties to the conflict would adhere to the Assembly's decision if they felt that this decision prejudiced their interests. Israel considered as conflicting with her interests both the injunctions of the Security Council calling for cessation of the hostilities and the decision of the Assembly to support as the basis for the final solution of the Palestine problem the Conclusions of the Mediator. The Arabs were prepared to accept the truce and cessation of hostilities but not the Mediator's proposals for the final solution of the Palestine problem as set forth in his Conclusions.

Neither the Security Council nor the Assembly had the ability to enforce their decisions; this power remained with the Member States, notably the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was opposed to Resolution 194 (III) as well as the entire mediation effort, and could hardly be expected to exert pressure in favor of the principles of Resolution 194 (III). The United States, on the other hand, supported with qualifications the mediation effort and the Conclusions of the Mediator. The principles of Resolution 194 (III) had incorporated the U.S. Formula for the solution of the refugee problem, and so American support for this resolution was no problem.

The forces favoring American commitment to the Jewish State and support of the Zionist purpose spared no effort during 1947 and 1948 to achieve Zionist territorial aspirations and their desire for

recognition of the Jewish State. The situation in Palestine demanded that they enlist as much support as possible and use the diplomatic arm of Zionism to complement every military advance in Palestine.

The forces opposing United States commitment to the Jewish State both in principle and in fact rallied around the person of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine as he alone spoke for the equities involved in the Palestine conflict and for the Arab and well as the Jewish side. Public opinion was sympathetic to the Mediator and his efforts received considerable attention from the press. The fact that his proposals were opposed by both sides seemd to attest to their neutrality. The Mediator could enunciate policies that the United States could not openly advocate at the time. But, the pressures generated by the party conventions and the demands on the candidates to support the Zionist program, overcame any opposition to a pro-Israel policy in the Middle East.

The President, the resolutions committees of the party conventions, Presidential advisers Clark Clifford and David Niles, Judge Samuel Rosenman, Mrs. Franklin Roosevelt, Henry Morgenthau, and the American Ambassador to Tel Aviv, James McDonald (appointed just two weeks before the Democratic Convention) favored commitment.

Secretary Marshall, Under Secretary Lovett, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, members of the State Department, United Nations Delegates Warren Austin, Philip Jessup, and John Foster Dulles, members of the defense and military establishments, the National Security Council, members of the Policy Planning Staff, and the oil companies generally opposed commitment.

The assassination of the Mediator could perhaps have brought about a change in the American attitude concerning the Jewish State. If any single person could have persuaded the President to reconsider his policies, it was probably Marshall. However, Marshall's conception of his role as Secretary did not call for open and sustained opposition to the President. Thus, after expressing his opinion Marshall would retire, leaving the President to pursue his own policies. Perhaps if Marshall had pressed further, the U.S. might have adhered more to the Mediator's specific Conclusions on the refugees and might have taken the steps necessary to exert pressure on Israel to comply with the decisions of the United Nations concerning the cessation of hostilities. Thus, the Mediator's observation concerning the United Nations following the United States' failure to send observers -- "that even the most trivial decisions with regard to any measures to lend force to its words were dependent on the political calculations of the Great Powers" -- remained valid.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, 1949-1952

This study has been concerned thus far with the origins of the refugee problem, the adoption by the United Nations of a solution to this problem, and United States policy on refugees as it fits within the context of American policy on the entire question of Palestine.

This and the two following chapters propose to deal with United States policy on the principle of repatriation and compensation of the Palestine refugees as such policy influenced the development of United Nations assistance to the refugees.

Instruments of action - It was mentioned in the previous chapter that the United States can hope to influence United Nations decisions and policies through (1) the General Assembly and the Security Council, (2) the Secretariat and the Secretary-General, and (3) the agencies and subsidiary organs of the United Nations Organization. The means by which the United States can exert this influence may be formal or informal.

The formal means allow direct action; these include the right to be heard on issues being debated in any of the forums available within the United Nations system, the vote, and the right to representation (if nominated) on any of the special committees and subsidiary organs



of the Assembly and Council. The United States is a member of all the Standing Committees of the General Assembly and has used its influence in those which have been concerned with United Nations policy on the refugees, i.e. The First Committee (Political), the Third Committee (Economic and Social), the Fifth Committee (Budgetary), and the Interim Committee. Membership on this last Committee is important as one of its sub-committees determines the agenda for the General Assembly sessions. It has already been mentioned that United States membership on the Truce Commission for Palestine and in the Truce Observer Corps, both subsidiaries of the Security Council, was of considerable significance during the summer of 1948. Discussed in this and the following chapters is United States representation on the Conciliation Commission for Palestine and membership in the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the agency created in 1949 to succeed United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees.

The informal means can be defined as channels through which it is possible to direct pressure in order to support or change a specific policy of the United Nations. In this respect, personalities most often have been the focus of American attention. These have included the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Mediator and the Acting Mediator (Bunche), on Palestine, the Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, and the Director (now Commissioner-General) of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency.

The environment -- Between 1949 and 1952 United States foreign policy primarily addressed itself to the East-West Soviet Union-United States conflict. American policy during this period had two basic objectives: (1) to halt military and territorial expansion by the Soviet Union into countries on the periphery of the Communist-controlled areas (especially Greece, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan), and (2) to prevent Communist economic and political subversion of the emerging and uncommitted nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

In order to achieve its first objective, the United States attempted to draw these states on the periphery of the Communist world into the American and European collective defense structure. Greece and Turkey were brought into the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, i.e., the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) created on April 4, 1949. In March, 1950, the United States succeeded to renew earlier agreements allowing the U.S. to send a military mission to Iran. On May 25, 1950, the United States, France, and Great Britain concluded the so-called Tripartite Agreement, which committed the three powers to a guarantee of the armistice lines and the frontiers established between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The guarantor powers felt that such an agreement would prevent (or at least minimize the danger of) the resumption of hostilities between the Arab States and Israel. In June, 1951, the United States signed an agreement with Saudi Arabia allowing for the establishment of an American military air base at Dahrn in the Arabian Peninsula. And, in October, 1951, the United States outlined a proposal for an Allied Middle East Command in an attempt to create a

regional defense organization (with Arab States as members) which would be closely tied to the NATO countries. The proposals for the Middle East Command were first submitted to the Egyptian Government which at the time was embroiled in a controversy with Great Britain concerning the Sudan and withdrawal of British troops from Egypt and the Suez Canal Zone. The Egyptian Government rejected outright the proposed Middle East Command, and, as a result, the Command failed to gain acceptance in other Middle Eastern countries.

Recognizing that "military security and social and economic welfare were closely related,"<sup>1</sup> the United States sought to obtain its second objective through the granting of economic aid and technical assistance to developing countries under the Mutual Security Program.

In his inaugural address of January 20, 1949, President Truman outlined a program for technical and economic assistance to the underdeveloped areas unlike any other program previously embarked upon by the United States. Within the framework of this program came the Act for International Development of September 6, 1950, the Mutual Security Appropriation Act of 1951, and the Point Four Program. Under Point Four and other assistance programs the United States committed itself to the development of all the countries in the Middle East.

---

<sup>1</sup>Howard, Harry N., "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951," reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin, January 1952, p. 840.

Just after the Truman inaugural address, George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, elaborated a comprehensive plan for the economic development of the entire Middle East. Britain, France, and the United States were to be associated with the scheme which envisaged the expenditure of \$260 million. The British were not enthusiastic about the McGhee proposals, however, and by August-September it was evident that they would not be accepted. These proposals were directly related to the resettlement of the Palestine Arab refugees (in both Israel and the Arab States), and as throughout the summer they were apparently adapted to fit the desires of Israel with respect to the question of the resettlement of the refugees, the Arab States also rejected the proposals. The McGhee proposals will be discussed further in this chapter as they relate to the efforts of the Palestine Conciliation Commission.

In 1950, the United States signed an agreement for technical assistance with Iran, this during the Iranian-British dispute over oil concessions. On February 26, 1951, a general agreement was concluded with Israel. Jordan on March 2 signed an agreement to institute a cooperative program to develop the country's resources, and on June 6 contracted with the Technical Cooperation Administration (Point Four) to carry out water development projects. The Knappen, Tippits, and Abbott Engineering Company of New York was engaged to survey a project to restore underground cisterns. On February 27, Lebanon signed an agreement to develop the water resources of the Litani River, and on

May 29, signed a second agreement with Point Four. For expansion of rural improvement programs, Iraq signed an agreement on April 10, and Syria followed suit on May 2. An agreement was also concluded with Egypt on May 5.

American expenditures for technical assistance in the area totaled \$2.3 million in 1951 and rose to \$54.5 million in 1952. The following table shows the distribution of funds:

TABLE I  
AMERICAN ASSISTANCE - 1951-52

Country	1951	1952
Egypt	\$103,000	\$634,000
Iran	1,460,000	23,450,000
Iraq	23,400	1,762,000
Israel	96,300	14,950,000
Jordan	132,700	4,680,000
Lebanon	130,700	2,350,000
Lybia	157,400	1,100,000
Saudi Arabia	97,300	690,000
Syria	88,100	4,390,000
Yemen	--	450,000
Total	\$2,271,900	\$54,456,000 <sup>2</sup>

Import-Export Bank loans had been granted to countries in the Middle East between 1945 and 1951. The countries receiving these loans were Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt. The total amount of these loans was \$266,110,000 for the entire period; Israel in two loans granted in 1949 received \$135,000,000, 50 per cent of the total.<sup>3</sup> One can see from the table above that American National political considerations were clearly reflected in the amount of aid

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 816.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 815.

given to the countries of the Middle East, especially with respect to the Arab States and Israel. For obtaining financial as well as political support from the United States, Israel retained the advantage it had had over the Arab States. By 1951, the United States was substantially involved in the affairs of the Middle East and concerned with winning Arab support in the Cold War, but on the question of Palestine the United States persisted to place first national political considerations. This was certainly due to the predominance of the President in the determination of foreign policy, and to the fact that President Truman was kept constantly aware of the needs and desires of the World Zionist Organization.

The Conciliation Commission for Palestine and Resolution 194 (III).

It has been mentioned that in his Progress Report the Mediator recommended that a conciliation commission be established to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between the parties to the conflict, the Arab Governments and the Provisional Government of Israel. Resolution 194 (III), following this recommendation, created the Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) consisting of three members. The Commission had three functions: (1) to assume the functions of the Mediator as defined in the Resolution of May 18, 1948-- Resolution 186 (S-2), (2) to carry out directives given it by the General Assembly and the Security Council, and (3) to undertake at the request of the Security Council all the functions assigned to the Mediator and

---

the United Nations Truce Commission by Council resolutions in order that the office of the Mediator be terminated.<sup>4</sup>

With respect to the specific directives of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) the Conciliation Commission was to

"facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations."

The directives to the Conciliation Commission which constitute the second part of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III), however, did not bind the Commission to activity only in this area of the refugee problem, i.e. resettlement, etc. As the Commission was heir to the Mediator--according to the general directives mentioned above--it was also empowered to seek the settlement of the Palestine refugee problem as recommended by the Assembly in the first part of paragraph 11. Thus, the Commission was bound to the repatriation--or--compensation - formula and was to direct its efforts to the achievement of a solution to the refugee problem according to this formula, and then to carry out the directives of the second part of paragraph 11.

---

<sup>4</sup>See text of Resolution 194 (III), paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, Appendix A.

The Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP) is classified as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly<sup>5</sup>, and is regarded as a "political commission, composed of states and appointed by a decision of the General Assembly,"<sup>6</sup> i.e., the member states being responsible for the instruction of their respective representatives and the Assembly responsible for issuing general directives to the Commission as a whole, such directives giving only the objectives to be achieved, the specific means for achieving these objectives to be determined by the representatives (and their respective governments). The CCP's status as a "political commission" as well as the fact that it was created for an unspecified period of time, did not conform to the recommendations of the Mediator concerning the Commission -- that it was to be "appointed for a limited period, should be responsible to the United Nations and act under its authority" (see Chapter II, page 55). The directives given by the Assembly to the Commission empowered it to undertake conciliation and "a procedure of mediation," as well as those functions of an "executive" nature assigned to the Mediator, i.e., the promotion of the welfare of the population of Palestine.

---

<sup>5</sup>See Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Volume I, 1955, Art. 22, Annex, p. 703; and Hamzeh, Fuad Said, International Conciliation with Special Reference to the Work of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, the Hague: 1963, p. 99.

<sup>6</sup>Hamzeh, op.cit., pp. 99-100.



A committee composed of the Great Powers -- the United States, China, France, the United Kingdom, and the USSR -- concurred on the nomination of the United States, France, and Turkey as members of the CCP. Hussein Cahid Yalchin,<sup>7</sup> Claude de Boisanger, and Mark Ethridge were selected by their respective governments for membership on the Commission. Mr. Ethridge, the American appointee, was at the time editor of the Louisville (Kentucky) Courrier-Journal and had served the United Nations previously on the Special Commission for the Balkans.

The Commission first met in Geneva on January 17, 1949, and on the 24th established its headquarters in the demilitarized zone of Jerusalem. In the interim the Commission had requested the Acting Mediator (Bunche) to preside over the armistice negotiations on Rhodes. The Commission then embarked on its conciliatory function (paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of Resolution 194 (III)) attempting to bring about a rapprochement between the disputants. Between February 12 and 25 the governments concerned were visited by the CCP which sought to establish in these preliminary talks a modus operandi and to begin negotiations in the areas given priority by the parties.

The policy of the Commission during these initial stages was one of non-commitment. During the different discussions, consultations and conferences, the Commission methodically avoided taking a stand.<sup>8</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup>The first chairman of CCP; the office alternated among the three members.

<sup>8</sup>Gabbay, op.cit., p. 238.

During the early months the CCP confined its activities to simply transmitting the proposals of one party to the other. By not taking a stand concerning the principle of choice between repatriation and compensation, and its relative priority to questions of resettlement and rehabilitation, the Commission violated the terms of the solution established by the Mediator as affirmed by the General Assembly in Resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11. The right of choice was to be recognized by the parties, and the choice of repatriation or compensation be effected before the Commission was to begin to facilitate any repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation or compensation of the refugees (as it had been directed to do in the second part of paragraph 11).

The Arab States showed themselves to be prepared to cooperate with the Commission. The modus operandi established was based on the Arabs' requirement that they be considered as one party in the discussions and that they would not be asked to meet directly with Israel. Their willingness to cooperate with the CCP constituted a change in their attitude with respect to Resolution 194 (III) which they had opposed during the Assembly debates in December.<sup>9</sup> This change probably came about partly as a result of Egypt's final defeat in its war with Israel (December, 1948, to January 7, 1949), and its willingness at the time to open negotiations through the Acting Mediator for an armistice with Israel. The Arab leaders were also well aware of the fact that they could no longer hope to gain any military advantage in Palestine; the

---

<sup>9</sup>See Gabbay for Israeli explanation of the Arab change, op.cit., pp. 269-273.

best they could expect would be concessions by Israel through negotiation, the basis for which being the Conclusions of the late Mediator and the terms of Resolution 194 (III). During the early discussions the Commission learned that the Arabs were not prepared to enter into any negotiations with Israel until the question of the refugees was settled; "at least in principle ... the right of the refugees ... to return to their homes, must be regarded as the condition sine qua non for the discussion of other questions."<sup>10</sup>

The Government of Israel, however,

"was not prepared to accept as a principle the injunction contained in paragraph 11 the right of the refugees to choose repatriation or compensation and, and further was not prepared to negotiate on any point separately and outside the framework of a general settlement."<sup>11</sup>

Israel had rejected the proposals of the Mediator concerning repatriation as well as the Mediator's Conclusions which the Assembly had affirmed as the basis for the peaceful settlement of the Palestine situation. Israel had never been prepared to accept repatriation of a substantial number of refugees. Its acceptance of the Commission was probably the result of a United States requirement that Israel cooperate with the CCP in order to obtain American de jure recognition. It seems that Israel agreed; the United States extended full recognition on January 31, 1949.

---

<sup>10</sup>G.A.O.R. (V), General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (CCP First Progress Report hereafter), 11 December 1948 to 23 October 1950, Supplement No. 18 (A/1367/Rev. 1), New York: 1951, p. 2.

<sup>11</sup> Loc. cit.

The McGhee proposals - In March Assistant Secretary of State McGhee went to Beirut in order to explain his scheme to the CCP, and, according to Jon Kimche "received further assistance and reinforcement for his views from the American member of the Commission, Mr. Mark Ethridge."<sup>12</sup> Under the McGhee plan all the countries of the Middle East were to receive financial aid and technical assistance from a special economic agency run by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The standards of the inhabitants of the Middle Eastern countries were to be raised and the resettlement of the refugees effected. No reference was made to the priority of the choice of the refugees between repatriation and compensation relative to their resettlement.

The Beirut Conference - Upon the invitation of the Commission, the Arab Governments met in Beirut with the representatives of the CCP between March 21 and April 5 for a more formal exchange of views. Just before the Beirut Conference, Mark Ethridge requested the United States Ambassador to Tel Aviv, Mr. James McDonald,<sup>13</sup> to "intervene with the Israeli Foreign Ministry in the hope of obtaining a statement on

---

<sup>12</sup>Jon Kimche, Seven Fallen Pillars, p. 308.

<sup>13</sup>James McDonald was one of the members of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine and the Jewish refugee situation (1945), a firm supporter of the Zionist movement, and an active participant in the United Jewish Appeal. He was appointed two weeks before the Democratic Convention of 1948, as the first United States Ambassador to Israel. Under Secretary of State Lovett questioned the choice of McDonald because of his close identification with the Zionist, but Clark Clifford, the President's political adviser, "said he did not know anything about that but that the President had called him that he did not want any discussion on the matter." to Mills, The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 440-441.

See: (1) Lilienthal, Alfred, What Price Israel (Chicago: 1953), pp. 100-102.

(2) McDonald, James, My Mission to Israel, 1948-1951, (London: Victor Gollancz, 1951).

refugees as a conciliatory gesture toward the Arabs. "I did my best, but I was not surprised when Sharret/[Shertok] replied with a flat refusal, pointing out that such a statement could only be made after careful consideration by the whole cabinet." <sup>14</sup>

In Beirut the Commission learned of the Arab States' unanimous insistence on the absolute priority of the refugee question for both humanitarian and political reasons. The Arab Higher Committee and the Arab States denied that their propaganda had affected in any way the refugees' decision to flee their homes and villages. "The Commission was informed that two to three hundred thousand people had fled before the end of the British Mandate." <sup>15</sup>

The Commission agreed to give the refugee question priority on humanitarian grounds but found it necessary "to make certain observations regarding the practical application of this principle [repatriation] ....

The Commission was of the opinion that even if this principle were to be accepted, it would be necessary to take into account the possibility that not all the refugees would decide to return to their homes. The Commission believed, therefore, that the Arab States should agree in principle to the resettlement of those refugees who did not desire to return to their homes. <sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>14</sup>Peretz, Don, Israel and the Palestine Arabs, Washington: 1958, p. 38.

<sup>15</sup>G.A.O.R., CCP First Progress Report, p. 12.

<sup>16</sup>Loc. cit.

These "observations" the Commission had made at the Beirut Conference were probably linked to the McGhee plan for the development of the Middle East as the Commission was concerned primarily with obtaining a commitment from the Arab States for the resettlement of refugees (those who did not desire to return to their homes). By attempting to obtain this commitment of the Arab States to resettlement before addressing itself to the principle of the right of choice of the refugees between repatriation and compensation, the Commission violated the terms of the first and operative part of paragraph 11, Resolution 194. In so doing the Commission bypassed the first two of the four areas previously designated as constituting (in order) the steps to be taken to achieve the solution to the refugee problem. Areas one and two were, respectively, the priority of the consideration of refugees to peace and the refugees' unconditional right to make a free choice between repatriation and compensation. Area three--the one adopted by the Commission as its starting point--was to come only after the refugees had exercised their right of choice, and was concerned with the resettlement and rehabilitation and the payment of compensation. The Commission seems to have passed over these first areas or stages because of Israel's refusal to accept in principle the right of the refugees to return to their homes or even to discuss this principle outside of the context of a peace settlement. Moreover, if the refugees were not allowed to make their choice and plans for economic development and resettlement were to be implemented, the refugees would be resettled de facto in the Arab States in which they

resided, and Israel would not be required to allow the repatriation of a substantial number.

The Position of Israel - Rony Gabbay describes, from his point of view, the Israeli dilemma with respect to the refugees:

The problem was not when to accept the refugees back--  
i.e., before the conclusion of peace settlement or after.  
It was whether to accept them back or not.<sup>17</sup>

Gabbay, however, ignores both the causes of the refugee problem and the Israeli position in July which made Israel's refusal categorical. Israel's rejection of the principle seems to have had two bases. First, acceptance of the principle of return would undermine the Zionists' entire case freeing Israel from responsibility in the matter of refugees. Denying the refugees' right to repatriation also denied their right of choice between repatriation and compensation; thus, Israel had no responsibility for the payment of compensation. Second, there was also the danger that pressure might be exerted upon Israel once the principle had been accepted to repatriate a substantial number of refugees. This, Israel felt would prejudice its design to effect the "ingathering" of all Jews into the Jewish State.

From April 7 to 9, the Commission met with the Israeli Government in Tel Aviv. Mr. Ben Gurion stressed the phrase in paragraph 11 which stated that the refugees returning home should "live at peace with their neighbors" and insisted that return was then contingent on

---

<sup>17</sup>Gabbay, op. cit., p. 273. (emphasis mine).

the establishment of peace. Moreover, he stated that aside from a small number of refugees which could be repatriated, the bulk of the refugees should be resettled in the Arab countries.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, concerning the return of the refugees to Jewish-occupied areas the Government of Israel made its position clear. The refugees repatriated would not return home but be "resettled" in areas which would not affect the security interests of the Jewish State, this repatriation and resettlement coming within the scope of the Israeli economic development scheme. This constituted a subtle adjustment of the Mediator's contention that many refugees would not have homes to which they could return; he probably had envisaged their return to their own villages and homes, the rebuilding of which would fit into a scheme of economic development which would receive international financial assistance.

The Lausanne Meetings--the first phase - The Commission then proposed to continue the discussions on April 27 in the neutral city of Lausanne. Israel and Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt sent delegations to the Lausanne Meetings, Iraq and Saudi Arabia stated that they "would adhere to the point of view expressed by the other Arab States."<sup>19</sup>

On April 28, Major General J. H. Hilldring, a long-time friend

---

<sup>18</sup>G.A.O.R., CCP First Progress Report, p. 12.

<sup>19</sup>Hamzeh, op. cit., p. 105, footnote 2.



of Zionism who had been offered a position in the State Department as Special Assistant for Palestine Affairs,<sup>20</sup> was dispatched to Tel Aviv. He bore a note from President Truman to the Israel Government which asserted that he (Truman) was "much embarrassed by Israel's unyielding attitude on Jerusalem and on refugees."<sup>21</sup>

On May 11, after a long period of bitter debate Israel was admitted to membership in the United Nations (its application submitted on December 2, 1948). The United States had played a key role in obtaining the necessary number of votes. On May 12, a Protocol, which is known as the "Protocol of Lausanne" was signed by the parties concerned "extending their exchange of views to all problems covered by the General Assembly's resolution / 194 (III) of December 11, 1948 ] and accepting the Partition Plan of Palestine [ Resolution 181 (II) of November 29, 1947 ] as the basis of discussion. The Protocol declared that:

"The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, anxious to achieve as quickly as possible the objectives of the General Assembly's resolution of Dec. 11, 1948, regarding the refugees, the respect for their rights and preservation of their property, as well as territorial and other questions, has proposed to the delegations of the Arab States and to the delegation of Israel that the working document attached hereto [ This was the map of Palestine annexed to Resolution 181 (II), showing the territory attributed to the Arab and

---

<sup>20</sup>Which he refused because of ill health.

<sup>21</sup>McDonald, op. cit., p. 155.

Jewish States respectively ] be taken as a basis for discussions with the Commission.

"The interested delegations have accepted this proposal with the understanding that the exchange of views which will be carried on by the Commission with the two parties will bear upon the territorial adjustments necessary to the above-indicated objectives."<sup>22</sup>

The acceptance of the Lausanne Protocol meant concessions by both Arabs and Israelis. By signing the Protocol the Arabs formally acquiesced in principle to the territorial provisions of the United Nations Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, an extremely important commitment which they had heretofore avoided.

The Arab States acceptance of the principle of the partition of Palestine as incorporated in the Protocol was a tremendous victory for the Zionists. The Israelis, on the other hand, made no comparable concession to the Arabs. It can be argued that the Protocol forced them to resurrect the Partition Plan the provisions of which they have declared "dead" in July, but it is more likely that Israel accepted the Protocol because it envisaged changes in the Partition Plan; Israel desired that the changes it had made by force be recognized by the international community. Furthermore, General Hilldring's visit and American support for Israel's bid for United Nations membership (Israel's application had been submitted on December 2, 1948, with the complete support of the United States) probably influenced to some extent Israel's decision with regard to the Protocol of Lausanne.

---

<sup>22</sup>Hamzeh, op. cit., pp. 105-106.

During this first phase of the Lausanne discussions the delegations put forward proposals regarding frontiers as well as refugees. The Arab delegations on May 23 proposed that the refugees should be allowed to return to areas then occupied by Israel but not allotted to the Jewish State in the Partition Plan.<sup>23</sup> The Israeli delegation, for its part, insisted that its frontiers with Egypt and Lebanon "should be those which had existed between the Mandated Territory of Palestine and these two countries respectively, and, with regard to Jordan, it proposed that the Armistice Line should be taken as a basis for negotiations."<sup>24</sup>

The Commission transmitted the proposals of one side to the other, but neither would accept the offers of the other. The CCP itself demanded from the Israeli side a definite commitment to repatriate a number of refugees, the number set by the Commission being 200,000. The State Department supported these efforts through Ambassador McDonald in Tel Aviv, and through Mark Ethridge on the CCP.<sup>25</sup>

---

<sup>23</sup>"These areas were around Lydda, Ramle, Beersheba, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Western Galilee, and the coast line north of Gaza." Peretz, op. cit., p. 41.

<sup>24</sup>Hamzeh, op. cit., p. 106.

<sup>25</sup>Kimche states that "without informing either London or Paris, the Americans...tried to force a settlement...by persuading Israel to accept the return of 250,000 Arab refugees." op. cit., p. 309.

McDonald's journal of the period during which he served as Ambassador to Israel offers considerable insight into the mechanics of the process of making Palestine policy. It seems that Ambassador McDonald was not only the "President's man" in the conduct of relations with Israel, but also the Israel Government's chief means of reaching the President. McDonald writes:

. . . When a situation became so important that a decision had to be made on the Presidential level, in full conscience I communicated directly with the President... Usually I marked such telegrams "for the personal attention of the President and the Secretary." Thus I knew my views would reach the White House without risking the charge that I was short-circuiting the State Department. I never received any indication that Secretary Marshall or later Secretary Acheson regarded my procedure as other than correct.

Occasionally when I wanted to let the President know my views but felt the matter did not justify direct communication with Mr. Truman, I communicated with him through his White House aides. From time to time, too, I telegraphed or telephoned them and asked them to use their judgement whether or not to present a particular view to the chief. But I used these informal approaches to the President rarely: I much preferred to "keep to channels."<sup>26</sup>

McDonald asserts that the "State Department's insistence on general principles concerning boundaries and refugees--principles which were wholly unacceptable to Israel--and the failure of the PCC [CCP] could not but eventually lead to some drastic result."<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>26</sup>McDonald, op. cit., pp. 140-141.

<sup>27</sup>Ibid., p. 164.

On May 29, President Truman dispatched through McDonald a note to Prime Minister Ben Gurion:

It expressed deep disappointment at the failure of Eytan [Walter Eytan, Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and head of the Lausanne delegation] at Lausanne to make any of the desired concessions on refugees or boundaries; interpreted Israel's attitude as dangerous to peace, and as indicating disregard of the U.N. General Assembly resolutions of November 29, 1947, and December 11, 1948; reaffirmed insistence that territorial compensation should be made for territory taken in excess of November 29th and that tangible refugees concessions should be made now as essential preliminary to any prospect for general settlement.

And, the "operative part" of the note further threatened that the United States would "reconsider its attitude toward Israel."<sup>28</sup>

A week later the formal Israeli reply was forthcoming. Ambassador McDonald describes it as "four pages of cogent argumentation"<sup>29</sup> completely rejecting the American note. The Israeli note dwelled on the security reasons for the rejection of a refugee return, and argued that the refugees' homes had either been destroyed or were occupied by Jewish immigrants. Thus, the note stated, the humanitarian reasons for the refugee return were no longer valid. And . . .

. . . The note ended by reasserting Israel's regard for the friendship of the Government and people of the United States as "an asset of Israel's foreign relations, than which none was higher in value." Israel hoped that this reply would restore the "sympathetic understanding" of

---

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 165.

<sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 167.

the United States Government for its problems and anxieties.<sup>30</sup>

The State Department's reply as described by McDonald indicated that . . .

"There was apparently indecision and much heart-searching in Washington. Cool heads won the day. Our [the American] note abandoned completely the stern tone of its predecessor . . . The crisis was past."<sup>31</sup>

The Truman note was a move McDonald attributed to the State Department rather than the President:

. . . The May-June crisis had at least the value of teaching the State Department that good intentions were not enough. Moreover, thereafter the Department and I only occasionally differed. I like to think that this was not merely because the Department and I had become better acquainted. I am satisfied that President Truman's influence on both the Department and myself was decisive in bringing us more nearly in accord.<sup>32</sup>

Yet, there is a considerable amount of evidence to cause one to reassess Ambassador McDonald's conclusions concerning the State Department (and the President) and the alleged relaxation of efforts to press for a solution to the refugee problem. For instance, on June 9, Israel submitted proposals to "fix" the international frontiers between Israel and the States of Egypt, Lebanon, and Transjordan. If these proposals were accepted, Israel declared that it would repatriate and be responsible for all Arabs then located in the Gaza area (some

---

<sup>30</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>31</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 168.

300,000), "whether inhabitants or refugees, as citizens of Israel."<sup>33</sup> Gaza, according to this proposal, would be annexed by Israel. Israeli motives for submitting the scheme have been described by Gabbay and include the following five points as summarized by the present writer:

1. The territorial provisions would consolidate further the military status quo and completely nullify the provisions of the Partition Plan,

2. The acceptance of the Gaza refugees and inhabitants would comprise the definitive offer of Israel concerning repatriation.

3. The Arabs would not remain in Gaza, but would be resettled throughout the country. Gaza would no longer be occupied or used as "a base for subversion" by Egypt.

4. The Palestine Government established by Egypt in Gaza, the remaining fragment of Palestine, would be disbanded.

5. "In order not to raise suspicions among the Arabs concerning expansionist ambitions," Israel proposed to take a "neutral" stand concerning central Palestine (ostensibly the Jerusalem, Ramallah, Nablus area).<sup>34</sup>

These proposals Gabbay insists were made upon the suggestion of Mark Ethridge, the American member of CCP.<sup>35</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup>Gabbay, op. cit., p. 244.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 244-245.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 244, footnote 99.

These proposals were significant because Israel had adjusted its stand of March-April-May requiring that all discussions take place within the context of a general peace settlement. With the Gaza scheme Israel proposed the "settlement" of both the territorial and refugee questions. Israel's attitude concerning central Palestine -- according to Gabbay -- displays Israel's willingness to make concessions to the Arabs. However, if one is to concede that the United States did actually bring about the Israeli change of attitude concerning the relative priority of refugees over peace, one must also recall that the United States had firmly supported the internationalization of Jerusalem and had opposed the Israeli ambition to make Jerusalem the capital of the Jewish State. Even the national party platforms of 1948 had reflected this stand in spite of Zionist pressures (see Chapter III, pages 99 through 103). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Israel could not effect any unopposed annexations in central Palestine, especially in the Jerusalem area. If this assumption is valid, Israel's offer to take a "neutral attitude regarding the disposal of the central part of Palestine"<sup>36</sup> was hardly a concession. Israel had conceded to discuss refugees before the conclusion of peace and outside the context of such negotiations, but only at the price of the annexation of Gaza.

The Arabs submitted counter-proposals affirming their acceptance of the Lausanne Protocol and the territorial provisions of the Partition

---

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 245.



Plan and demanding that refugees from the area allotted to the Arab State be allowed to return to their homes. This attitude in the long-run helped to cause the repatriation-or-compensation formula to break down. Because these proposals limited the return to refugees coming from outside the Jewish State (of the Partition Plan), it could be concluded that the Arabs were prepared to relinquish (at least temporarily) the principle of the right of all refugees to return as well as their right of choice between repatriation and compensation.

The CCP merely transmitted these proposals to the Arabs and Israel. Both sides found them unacceptable.

Preservation of the rights and property of the refugees and the "technical effort" of the CCP. The CCP devoted a large part of its efforts during the first phase of the Lausanne Meetings to the "study of preliminary measures which should be taken for the preservation of the rights and property of the refugees."<sup>37</sup> On June 14, a "technical committee" was constituted according to paragraph 12 of Resolution 194 (III) which empowered the Commission "to appoint such subsidiary bodies and employ such technical experts . . . as it may find necessary."<sup>38</sup> On June 22, the Technical Committee arrived in the area in order to investigate the different aspects of the refugee problem. The Committee was to (1) determine the precise number of

---

<sup>37</sup>G.A.O.R. CCP First Progress Report, p. 14.

<sup>38</sup>See Appendix A for complete text of Resolution 194 (III).

refugees, their places of origin, means of subsistence, etc., (2) seek means to reunify broken Arab families in Israel, (3) examine the condition of Arab orange groves in Israel, (4) discover means to employ refugees, such as works projects in refugee camps, in the "host" countries (the Arab States on the frontiers of Palestine in which the refugees have stayed), etc., (5) evaluate the possibilities of employment of refugees in the "host" countries, (6) investigate further Israeli attitudes concerning repatriation, and (7) look into the possibilities of resettlement both in Israel and the Arab States. In order to carry out its task the Technical Committee employed the assistance of the Director and staff of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees. This was done in accordance with the amendment introduced in the discussions of the Political Committee by the United Kingdom to its first draft of the resolution that was to be amended and adopted in the Plenary Session of the Assembly as Resolution 194 (III) (see Chapter II, pages 68 through 76); the final version instructed the CCP "to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees."

The conclusions of the Technical Committee were presented to the CCP on September 7, during the second phase of the Lausanne Meetings. For the purposes of this study, several of these conclusions are worth attention. First, the statistical expert attached to the Committee concluded that the refugees from Israel-controlled territory amounted to some 711,000 people. Second, seeking the immediate repatriation of

Arab orange grove owners and workers, the Committee surveyed the orange groves, finding 50 per cent of the plantations destroyed, 25 per cent receiving care, and the third 25 per cent in need of care in order that the trees might survive. Israel, however, refused to entertain this repatriation scheme, agreeing instead to the establishment of a mixed committee to deal with the conservation of the Arab groves and compensation of Arab owners. Later the question of the orange groves was linked to that of compensation as a whole, and the small-scale and special repatriation scheme put aside. Third, the Committee recommended the institution of land development schemes through which refugees could be settled. To deal with the refugee problem in all its aspects, the Committee proposed the creation of a new, comprehensive United Nations organ which was described in detail in its progress report.<sup>39</sup>

On July 1, the CCP suspended its discussions, resuming its work on July 18, with Paul Porter, formerly with technical assistance in Greece, taking over the place of Mark Ethridge and Reuven Shiloah, head of the Israeli Foreign Ministry's intelligence service, the place of Walter Eytan. Don Peretz contends that this change in personnel produced a significant change in policy:

---

<sup>39</sup>G.A.O.R. CCP First Progress Report, Appendix 4, pp. 28-29.

. . . Now the Israeli delegation agreed to discuss the refugee problem first, within the framework of general negotiations, and to make specific proposals for a settlement of the problem.<sup>40</sup>

However, it has been pointed out in this study that the first change in Israel's attitude had come during the previous phase of the Lausanne Meetings. But, the Israeli July proposals did demonstrate a departure from the Gaza scheme which had linked both territorial and refugee issues.

On July 28, the Israeli delegation--"in response to pressure by the State Department. ."<sup>41</sup>--proposed to accept 100,000 refugees, bringing the total number of Arabs in Israel to 250,000, the maximum number it would accept. The repatriated Arabs would be settled in specified areas so that they would "fit into the general plan of Israel's economic development." And, "this repatriation would form part of a general plan for resettlement of refugees which would be established by a special organ created for the purpose by the United Nations."<sup>42</sup>

The Commission found the Israeli proposal unsatisfactory, and simply transmitted it without comment to the Arab delegations. The Arabs considered the Israeli proposal contrary to Resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11, as well as the Protocol of May 12, and insisted that the refugees should be repatriated according to their own suggestions of

---

<sup>40</sup>Peretz, op. cit., p. 43.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>G.A.O.R. CCP First Progress Report, p. 14.

May 23, i.e., that the refugees originating in the territories allotted to the Arabs should be allowed to return. Furthermore, they stated that the refugees not repatriated (allowed to return) to areas allotted to the Jews should receive territorial compensation within the terms of the Lausanne Protocol. It must be recalled that under the Lausanne Protocol the Arab States had recognized the principle of partition and implied some sort of recognition for the rights of the Jews within the territory allotted to the Jewish State in the Partition Plan. Thus, the refugees who would be given territorial compensation would receive territory from the area of the Jewish State as defined by the Partition Plan. Finally, the Arabs were willing to discuss the repatriation of the 100,000 refugees suggested in the Israeli proposal, but only if these refugees were to return to areas allotted to the Jewish State in the Partition Plan.

In August McDonald had returned to Washington and consulted with the President and with Clark Clifford, suggesting to Clifford that he keep a close check on Palestine policy.<sup>43</sup>

The day the CCP received the Arab reply to the Israeli proposal, August 15, the Commission submitted to the delegations a memorandum covering the resettlement and repatriation of the refugees,

---

<sup>43</sup>McDonald, op. cit., p. 170.

the economic development of the area, the territorial question, and the problem of funds for assistance to the refugees and for the development of the area. Moreover, all governments were asked for an official estimate of the number of refugees which they would be willing to accept.

Specifically relevant to the priorities of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) were the following provisions of the August 15 Memorandum:

(a) The solution of the refugee problem should be sought in the repatriation of refugees in Israel-controlled territory and in the resettlement in Arab countries or in the area of Palestine not under Israel control of those not repatriated... Repatriation in Israel as well as resettlement .... would take place subject to technical and financial aid given to each party by the International community. . .

(b) In case an economic mission be charged . . . with the establishment of major works projects . . . with a view to facilitating the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the Arab refugees . . . all parties would undertake to facilitate the [its] task . . .

(c) All parties would specify that the above-mentioned conditions concerning the Arab refugees would not prejudice the rights which the parties reserve in connection with the final settlement of the territorial question in Palestine . . .<sup>44</sup>

These provisions pointed clearly to the fact that the right of all refugees to repatriate and their right of choice between repatriation and compensation had been disregarded. Moreover, the CCP proposed to redefine the solution from one of repatriation or compensation to one of repatriation or settlement. This bypassed the question

---

<sup>44</sup>G.A.O.R. CCP First Progress Report, p. 15.

of Israel's responsibility to the refugees with respect to both repatriation and compensation. The phrase "of those not repatriated" in paragraph (a) of the Memorandum is extremely significant as it implied that not all those refugees choosing repatriation would be allowed to return home. Furthermore, repatriation and resettlement were considered no longer subject to the economic and social conditions prevailing in the Arab countries and in Israel to the development of the economic potential of these countries, and the eventual ability of these countries to reintegrate and employ these refugees. Rather, the fate of the refugees would be subject to the decisions of the international community in terms of financial assistance for their repatriation or resettlement. Thus, if the international community elected to resettle the refugees in the Arab countries and directed financial assistance toward this end, the refugees would be resettled in the Arab countries rather than repatriated to Israel. This provision, to a considerable extent took the decision-making power out of the hands of the parties directly concerned. Paragraphs (b) and (c) quoted above simply underlined the revolution wrought by the Commission in its terms of reference and the changes made in the directives given to it by the Assembly.

The Arabs on August 29, stated that they would be willing to proceed from the August 15 memorandum, specifically on the refugee question. They also declared willingness to cooperate with the Economic Mission which was to be established. The delegations of Jordan and Syria declared that they would be willing to receive refugees, according to the recommendations made by the Economic Mission. Egypt and Lebanon

stated their already dense populations and political character prevented their receiving refugees.

On August 31, the Israeli delegation replied to the Memorandum, stating that . . .

. . . it was prepared to sign a declaration along the general lines suggested by the Commission with regard to the refugees, subject to the following reservations: that the solution of the refugees problem was to be sought primarily in resettlement in Arab territories; that though the Economic Mission would be facilitated in its task and its proposals would be given full consideration, the Government of Israel could not bind itself in advance to implement the solutions proposed; that any repatriation in Israel would take place subject to financial assistance furnished by the international community and that such assistance would be extended to include the resettlement of Jewish refugees from the Arab-controlled areas of Palestine.<sup>45</sup>

The Israeli delegation reiterated its earlier offer concerning the number of refugees it would be willing to repatriate, and declared that the Economic Mission would have to confine itself to this number when making its recommendations.

Discussion of the August 15 memorandum was closed on September 15, the General Committee of the CCP suspending its activities until October.

The Conciliation Commission in its initial effort had failed to effect a solution to the refugee problem. The United States through its representative on the CCP and through other diplomatic channels had attempted to influence Israel to accept a number of refugees as a concession to the Arabs. United States policy to win concessions from Israel

---

<sup>45</sup>Ibid., p. 15.



had failed; it seems that the U.S. may have even attempted to exert financial pressure on Israel in order to gain these concessions, i.e., withholding the Import-Export Bank's loan to Israel until October (see page 114 of this chapter). At that time the full sum was granted in two installments, one on the 19th and the other on the 26th.

The Economic Survey Mission and the establishment of UNRWA. On September 8, the Economic Survey Mission headed by Gordon R. Clapp of the United States<sup>46</sup> stopped in Lausanne for discussions with the delegations. The Mission had been constituted to investigate the conditions in the Middle East created by the hostilities, and to make recommendations to the CCP and the General Assembly for the alleviation of these conditions, with a view to promoting peace and economic stability in the area. The CCP suggested that the chairman of the Economic Mission be nominated by the United States, and that three deputy chairmen be nominated by the United Kingdom, France, and Turkey. On September 11, the Mission departed for Beirut, then establishing its headquarters there.

On November 16, while still in the Middle East, the Mission transmitted to the General Assembly its interim report. Upon the recommendations of the Survey Mission, the General Assembly established in its Resolution 302 (IV) of December 8, 1949, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (see Appendix

---

<sup>46</sup>Clapp was head of the Tennessee Valley Authority, an irrigation and hydroelectric project in the southern United States.

A for text of Resolution 302). The Agency was given a dual mandate: (1) to administer relief to the refugees according to need, and (2) to see to the reintegration and rehabilitation of the refugees, attempting to make them ultimately independent of international assistance.<sup>47</sup>

In entrusting these two tasks to UNRWA, the Assembly had stated that they would be carried out "without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of . . . resolution 194 (III). ." However, if the refugees were to be successfully reintegrated and rehabilitated according to the programs instituted at that time, i.e., large-scale works and development projects in the Arab countries, the right to choice between repatriation and compensation would have been prejudiced as their resettlement would have been accomplished and a solution to the refugee problem (not the solution adopted by the Assembly) achieved.

The Refugee Office - Continuing to pursue its efforts to preserve the rights and property of the refugees the CCP undertook in August, 1950, under the chairmanship of Mr. Ely Palmer of the United States, to establish a permanent body to remain in the Middle East to study the technical and legal aspects of compensation. On December 14, 1950, the General Assembly established the Refugee Office in accordance with the recommendations of the Commission.<sup>48</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>48</sup>Resolution 392 (V), December 14, 1950, see Appendix A.

The Paris Conference - Seeing that over a period of three years it had not effected a solution to any of the issues outstanding between the parties to the Palestine conflict, the CCP in September, 1951, called a conference in Paris. At the Paris Conference a comprehensive series of proposals were submitted to the delegations, the "discussion of the proposals . . . to be preceded by a declaration of pacifc intentions by the parties which . . . should take the form of a preamble."<sup>49</sup>

The Commission's five proposals stipulated:

. . . inter alia, that an agreement be reached concerning war damages, such an agreement to include mutual cancellation of claims; that the Government of Israel agree to the repatriation of a specified number of Arab refugees; that it accept the obligation to pay, as compensation for property abandoned by those refugees not repatriated, a global sum based upon the evaluation arrived at by the Commission's Refugee Office; that the Governments concerned agree upon the mutual release of all blocked bank accounts; and that they agree to consider, under United Nations auspices, and in the light of the experience gained in the last three years, the revision of the Armistice Agreements between them.<sup>50</sup>

The proposals submitted by the Commission at the Paris Conference illustrate the extent of the CCP's divergence from its original terms of reference: (1) the preamble declaring "pacifc intentions" corresponding to Israel's insistence on a "non-aggression pact," (2) the clauses stipulating mutual cancellation of war damage claims violated the established principle concerning responsibility<sup>51</sup> and compensation on a global basis represented a considerable change from the original

---

<sup>49</sup>Hamzeh, op. cit., p. lll.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. lll ff.

<sup>51</sup>Affirming refugee claims of compensation for loss or damages irrespective of any made by Israel against the Arab States.

which stated that "compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible," and (3) the clause urging that the Government of Israel agree to repatriate a specified number did not conform to the terms to reference which asserted that "the refugees [all] wishing to return to their homes . . . . should be permitted to do so . . . ."

The Arab delegations at this point requested clarification on the Commission's structure and instruction. Replying, . . . .

. . . the Commission pointed out that the Conciliation Commission is a body composed of three States, under instruction by the General Assembly to assist the governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them. The Commission as a body functions under instructions from the General Assembly. The representatives of the three States receive their instructions from their respective governments.<sup>52</sup>

The Arab delegations denied that the Commission was competent to deal with the question of war damages. And neither the Arab delegations nor the Israeli delegation could agree to a text for the preamble concerning the pacific intentions of the parties.

Finally, the Israeli delegation refused to admit the CCP's competence to deal with the Armistice Agreements.

---

<sup>52</sup>G.A.O.R. (VI), Progress Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (Second Progress Report), 23 January to 19 November 1951, Supplement No. 18 (A/1985), Paris: 1951, p. 6, underlinings mine.

Unsuccessful, once again in its endeavors, the Commission terminated the Paris Conference.

The failure of the Commission at the Paris Conference was noted in Assembly Resolution 513 (VI) of January 26, 1952, and the Commission was called upon to continue its efforts to reach a settlement on the issues. This the CCP decided to do by continuing discussions in New York, remaining available to the concerned parties through their United Nations delegations.

The Commission's Refugee Office continued to work on the problem of blocked refugee accounts<sup>53</sup> and that of compensation. On the former, a specific agreement was concluded in 1952, the Government of Israel agreeing to release, as a first installment, the sum of \$1 million. Concerning compensation, the Commission launched an effort to identify and evaluate Arab property, a project to come to fruition only several years later, due mainly to technical difficulties.

The reasons for the failure of the Conciliation Commission -  
The primary reason the Conciliation Commission for Palestine failed to implement the provisions set forth in Resolution 194 (III) was because one of the parties to the conflict recognized neither the validity of the principles of the resolution, nor the authority of the

---

<sup>53</sup>In the Paris proposals the question of blocked accounts was considered to be a mutual concession, to be made by both sides. Later the Commission discovered that Jewish accounts had been blocked in only on Arab State, the amount being so small as to make such a proposal meaningless.

Commission. But, instead of using its influence to obtain recognition of the right of repatriation and of the refugees' rights of choice, the Commission addressed itself to the winning of concessions from Israel concerning repatriation of specific numbers of refugees and concessions from the Arabs concerning the resettlement in the Arab States of refugees not repatriated. The Commission had confined its efforts to conciliation attempting to effect a rapprochement between the parties. The Commission's function with respect to the rights of the refugees (and the welfare of the population of Palestine), however, was of an executive nature; it was not to compromise the solution recommended by the General Assembly in paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III), i.e. their right to choose between repatriation and compensation. And, the Commission had no authority to redefine the repatriation-or-compensation-formula to one of repatriation-or-resettlement.

The United States, as the chief initiator of these changes, had failed to effect the solution it had recommended, because the United States failed to recognize the priority (and importance) of the rights of the refugees relative to the permanent solution of their difficulties.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency - By the time the Assembly met in its Fourth Session it was obvious that the Palestine refugee problem was not temporary. The Economic Survey Mission had linked the problem to employment of the refugees and resettlement, recommending the establishment of an agency to work along specific lines it suggested. Thus, the General Assembly adopted on December 8, 1949, Resolution 302 (IV) establishing the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:

(a) To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works programs as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission;

(b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available;<sup>54</sup>

This so-called dual mandate entrusted to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency was further elaborated in the Final Report of the Economic Survey Mission, "Conclusions and Proposals:"

The approach to economic development in the Middle East proposed by the Economic Survey Mission thus include . . .

. . . Prosecution of the program of work relief for refugees to be inaugurated by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency . . . in such a manner as to shift more and more responsibility for the execution of the programs on to the shoulders of the individual Governments and to ensure that these programs for temporary employment include those projects which can add to the productivity of national and regional economies and lay the basis for subsequent larger developments offering a permanent livelihood to more people in the years to come.<sup>55</sup>

Thus, the original usage of the term "works" in UNRWA's title meant "work relief" as defined by the Mission. Through projects of a public works nature the Mission proposed to transfer refugees from "relief" to employment on "works" projects. After completing its investigations in the area, the Mission selected four "pilot demonstration" projects: (1) in Jordan, a project to develop the potential of the Zerka River, (2) in Arab Palestine (the West Bank of the Jordan

---

<sup>54</sup>Resolution 302 (IV), see Appendix A.

<sup>55</sup>United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Final Report of the Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, Part I, U.N. Doc. A/AC.25/6, p. 12.

River) a project on the Qilt River, (3) in Lebanon, a project for the development of the Litani, and (4) in Syria, a land reclamation project in the Orontes Valley (Ghab Swamps). These projects "were chosen on the basis of a formula which considered need and acceptability, short-term practicability, possibilities in training in various skills and types of planning, employment, and the contribution which they might make as a basis 'for more important and larger development schemes.'"<sup>56</sup>

The Survey Mission and the General Assembly stressed the need for the economic development of the whole area while doing its best to avoid confrontation with the political aspects of the refugee problem. Although the Mission had been created "to study measures which might alleviate economic dislocations arising from the Palestine, conflict, stabilize the economic life of the area, and problems related to repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees,"<sup>57</sup> the principle of repatriation or compensation was avoided. UNRWA assumed its functions on May 1, 1950, taking over its relief function from UNRPR. On June 12, the Council of the Arab League recommended that the Arab host governments cooperate with UNRWA as long as the work of the Agency did not prejudice the rights of the refugees under paragraph 11, Resolution 194 (III).

---

<sup>56</sup>UNRWA, UNRWA Reviews, Information Paper No. 5, "UNRWA Experience with Works Projects and Self-Support Programs: An Historical Summary (1950-1962)," Beirut, 1962, pp. 1.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid., pp. 1-2.



For operational purposes, UNRWA adopted a definition of a refugee, considering as eligible for assistance those "refugees who resided in Palestine for a minimum of two years prior to the outbreak of the conflict in 1948, who lost their homes and their means of livelihood, who are in need, and who now reside in one of the countries in which UNRWA is providing relief, as well children of such refugees, wherever born." This working definition was designed "solely for the determination of eligibility for relief. For the purpose of repatriation or compensation . . . the term 'Palestine refugee' is used with a different, less restrictive meaning."<sup>58</sup>

The Technical Committee of the CCP had estimated there to be some 711,000 refugees and the Survey Mission concluded that there were approximately 726,000, of whom 652,000 were thought to be in need, although in September, 1949, it was estimated that there were 971,243 on relief in the Arab countries and 48,000 in Israel (including 17,000 Jews).<sup>59</sup>

It has been estimated that approximately 70 per cent of the refugees on relief were farmers and agricultural workers in Palestine before 1948. Among them were also more than 100,000 Beduins who had lost a large part of their grazing lands. A minority of refugees from

---

<sup>58</sup>UNRWA Reviews, Information Paper No. 1, "A Brief History of UNRWA (1950-1962)," pp. 5-6.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 1, footnote 1.

the upper classes and professional groups found little difficulty in becoming self-supporting in the Arab countries. The people who lacked skills or possessed only agricultural skills found little opportunity for employment as the Arab countries in which they took refuge had already an excess of unskilled and agricultural labor.

For the refugees on its registration rolls UNRWA has provided since its establishment services in a number of areas: rations, shelter (for about 40 per cent in camps), health, education, social welfare, and training. For the initial program the Agency was allotted \$54,000,000 of which \$47,000,000 would come from the United Nations (for 18 months from January, 1950), but by June, 1951, only \$37,000,000 had been made available to the Agency. This sum itself had not been readily contributed to the Agency. Contributions were often delayed and pledges apparently forgotten. At one time just after its establishment the Agency had been forced to borrow from the United Nations Working Capital Fund in order to meet its commitments for the month following.<sup>60</sup> This uncertainty of receipt of contributions and the amount of money finally made available to the Agency along with refugee opposition to the projects recommended by the Economic Survey Mission - as the refugees felt accepting employment in the host countries would prejudice their rights under paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 - accounted for the failure of the projects begun by UNRWA during the first phase of its operations. Works, such as road building and afforestation, did succeed to some measure

---

<sup>60</sup>UNRWA, Information Paper No. 5, op. cit., p. 5.

but "they failed to produce the results envisaged by the Economic Survey Mission."<sup>61</sup>

The United States was largely responsible for the promotion of the so-called "economic solution." American influence was felt in both the Advisory Commission for UNRWA, comprised of representatives of the United States, France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom (established in paragraph 8 of Resolution 302 (IV) of December 8, 1949), and the Conciliation Commission.

On December 2, 1950, the General Assembly had adopted Resolution 393 (V) which considered . . .

that without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) . . . the reintegration of refugees into the economic life of the Middle East, either by repatriation or resettlement, is essential in preparation for the time when international assistance is no longer available, and for the realization of conditions of peace and stability in the area;<sup>62</sup>

In order to carry out the purpose established in the above recommendation of the Assembly, a "reintegration fund" of \$30 million had been established for UNRWA's use. The fund itself was comparatively modest, and the projects under survey were along the lines suggested by the Economic Survey Mission. However, in the summer of 1951 the UNRWA Advisory Commission began to approach the Arab governments in order to gain acceptance of large-scale land and water development schemes designed to resettle refugees in the "host" countries. It was then

---

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

<sup>62</sup>Appendix A, Resolution 393 (V), paragraph 4.

clear that the Arabs would be the recipients of international assistance so that reintegration-resettlement could be carried out irrespective of repatriation. The Advisory Commission and the Director of UNRWA (its presiding officer) interpreted "reintegration" as meaning homes and jobs for the refugees, i.e., constructing villages adjacent to work opportunities, some near cities where work was available, but for the most part, in agricultural areas where cultivable land was available.

In March, 1951, UNRWA concluded an overall agreement with Jordan in which the Government undertook to facilitate resettlement and reintegration. The agreement with Jordan was finally the only one of its kind as the three remaining "host" governments were willing to sign agreements for specific projects only--those which did not infer their acceptance of reintegration and resettlement in the absence of the recognition by Israel of the rights of the refugees.

The decision of Jordan to sign the agreement was probably influenced by the United States. The Jordanian Parliament followed up its acceptance by passing legislation to make all refugees within its territory citizens of the Kingdom. On the part of Jordan, alone, this extension of citizenship to Palestinians formalized the incorporation into Jordan of much of central Palestine, i.e., the West Bank of the Jordan River.

The Advisory Commission was in communication with the Conciliation Commission during 1951, and after the CCP's failure at the Paris

Conference continued to develop the "economic solution" as the alternative to the settlement of the problem through negotiation with the parties concerned. Recommendations were made by the Director of UNRWA to the General Assembly during its consideration of his Annual Report. These recommendations brought about the adoption on January 26, 1952, of Resolution 513 (VI) which has previously been mentioned (establishing the three-year reintegration program).

The United States appeared to have exerted the influence on the Advisory Commission, the CCP, the Director of UNRWA, and the Secretariat of the United Nations which brought about such a strong "get going" approach to the refugee problem. One must remember that 1952 was an election year in the United States, and as early as December, 1951, the Administration and political leaders began to take note of Zionist aspirations.

The interest of Americans in the "resettlement" of the refugees in the Arab States and United States contribution to such an effort was expressed in the proposals submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations by 20 prominent Americans, "The Arab Refugee Problem, How it Can be Solved." These proposals were submitted by Archibald MacLeish, former Assistant Secretary of State and author, Paul Porter, former United States representative on the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, and Sumner Welles, former Under Secretary of State, among others. They outlined in some detail a solution to the problem based on "resettlement" and the development of the Arab States, they discussed assistance to the refugees, the cause of their flight and

their numbers. They cited a precedent from the American Revolution upholding the Israeli policy on the refugees and spoke of immigration to Israel, the resurgence of anti-Semitism in Europe, the situation of Jews in Muslim countries, and the problem of Jewish refugees.<sup>63</sup> These proposals were obviously drawn up by persons sympathetic to Zionism, and probably subscribed to by people unaware of the details of the refugee problem. Yet, they contributed to the climate of opinion in the Assembly of the United Nations which gave impetus to the change which already had taken place with regard to the terms of reference of the Conciliation Commission.

Therefore, despite the failures of the programs recommended by the Survey Mission and the opposition of the Arab countries to reintegration through resettlement within their territories, in Resolution 513 (VI) of January 26, 1952, the General Assembly endorsed,

. . . without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) . . . relative to reintegration either by repatriation or resettlement, the program recommended by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the relief and reintegration of Palestine refugees, which envisages the expenditure of \$50 million for relief and \$200 million for reintegration over and above such contributions as may be made by local governments, to be carried out over a period of approximately three years starting as of 1 July 1951;<sup>64</sup>

---

<sup>63</sup>"The Arab Refugee Problem, How it Can be Solved," Proposals submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 1951. For a clarification of the issues see Fayeze A. Sayegh, The Palestine Refugees, Washington, D.C.: February, 1952. Dr. Sayegh, a Palestinian, refutes much of the evidence presented to support the case of those presenting the proposals to the Assembly.

<sup>64</sup>Appendix A, Resolution 513 (VI), paragraph 2.

Under this program the administration of and responsibility for implementation were to be transferred to the local Arab governments no later than July 1, 1952, thus solving the refugee problem without effecting any repatriation. Moreover, relief expenditures were to be reduced as the reintegration program was carried out, and upon its completion, expenditure on relief was to be discontinued.

The United States became largely responsible for the promotion of this particular "economic solution," authorizing the appropriation for fiscal 1952 and 1953 of more than 40 per cent of the cost of the relief and reintegration program.<sup>65</sup>

United States financial support for the United Nations assistance programs - The first American indication that financial assistance would be forthcoming for the refugees had come in October, 1948, when Mrs. Roosevelt addressed the Economic and Social Council (see chart, Appendix B). The United States on November 19 had also voted in the Assembly to adopt the Resolution 212 (III) establishing UNRPR. Pursuant to this resolution, President Truman submitted a proposal to the 81st Congress which was passed on March 24, 1949. This was a resolution "for the Authorization of a Special Contribution by the United States for the relief of Palestine refugees:"

---

<sup>65</sup>U.S. Government, Interim Report Special Near East Refugee Survey Commission, December 11, 1953, mimeo from U.S. Embassy, Beirut p. 15.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled. That there is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, not to exceed \$16,000,000 as a special contribution by the United States to the United Nations for the purposes set forth in the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations of November 19, 1948, providing relief for Palestine refugees.<sup>66</sup>

This resolution was adopted as a special measure to meet the need for relief which was thought to be temporary, as the United States then hoped that the Conciliation Commission would "solve" the refugee problem according to the terms of Resolution 194 (III).

The failure of the Conciliation Commission during 1949, however, caused the Administration to reconsider its policy. The change was fully apparent in the speech of President Truman to the Fourth Session of the General Assembly as it convened in the fall. He stated that the United States was reluctant to support permanent relief agencies<sup>67</sup> having realized by that time that "repatriation" or "resettlement" of the refugees could not be accomplished in a short period of time -- and that Congress was more ready to allocate funds for technical assistance than for direct relief. He continued,

---

<sup>66</sup>Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents, 1941-1949, Washington: 1950, p. 855.

<sup>67</sup>See two issues of International Conciliation: James M. Read, "The United Nations and Refugees--Changing Concepts," March, 1962; and Elfan Rees, "Century of the Homeless Man," November, 1957.



We are already carrying on a number of activities in this field. I shall encourage Congress, when it reconvenes in January, to give high priority to proposals which will make possible additional technical assistance and capital investment. . . we cannot achieve permanent peace and prosperity in the world until the standard of living in underdeveloped areas is raised.<sup>68</sup>

Although the refugee problem was discussed in the context of Congressional debate on the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950, assistance from the United States was to be made under a separate act, the United Nations Palestine Refugee Act of 1950 (22 U.S.C. 1556). And, Congress, with an eye to exercising some control over its appropriations,

. . . Provided, that, whenever the President shall determine that it would more effectively contribute to the purposes of the said United Nations Palestine Refugee Aid Act of 1950, he may allocate any part of such funds to any agency of the United States Government to be utilized in furtherance of the purposes of said Act and any amount so allocated shall be a part of the United States contribution to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and shall be so credited by said Agency.<sup>69</sup>

The 1950 Act authorized the contribution of \$27,450,000 to UNRWA for the period May 1, 1950, through June 30, 1951.<sup>70</sup>

The 82nd Congress incorporated assistance to the Palestine refugees into the Mutual Security Act of 1951, the purpose of this Act being . . .

---

<sup>68</sup>Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs, 1949, New York: 1951, pp. 101-102.

<sup>69</sup>U.S. Government, Public Law 165, 82nd Congress, Chapter 479, 1st Session, H.R. 5113, Section 204, p. 3.

<sup>70</sup>UNRWA Reviews, Information Paper No. 2, "Summary Data on Assistance to the Palestine Refugees (December 1948-31 December 1962)," Table I.

. . . to maintain the security and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, to develop their resources in the interest of their security and independence and the national interest of the United States and to facilitate the effective participation of those countries in the United Nations system for collective security.<sup>71</sup>

Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 Congress authorized funds not in excess of \$50,000,000 to be contributed for the fiscal year 1952, "for the purposes, and under the provisions, of the United Nations Palestine Refugee Act of 1950," restating the proviso concerning the President's competence to reallocate those funds.<sup>72</sup> The "Presidential proviso" included in the legislation points out that Congress did not necessarily consider the United Nations Relief and Works Agency competent to accomplish the reintegration and resettlement of the refugees:

Congressional legislation on the matter of Palestine refugees simply underlined the policy of the Administration which was throughout the period under survey attempting to conciliate the differences between the parties and to achieve some kind of a settlement on the question of Palestine. However, because the repatriation-or-compensation-formula established in Resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11, for the solution of the refugee problem was ignored, the United Nations had failed to solve the problem as it was of a political nature as well as an economic and social nature. Then adhering to a reintegration-resettlement formula, the United Nations embarked upon a new type of "economic solution."

---

<sup>71</sup>Public Law 165, op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>72</sup>Ibid., p. 3.

## CHAPTER V

### THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATIONS

By 1952 Arab Israel relations were somewhat stabilized; the Jewish State had been established in Palestine and the war between Israel and the Arab States suspended by the armistice agreements. Incidents along the borders of Israel and its Arab neighbors were frequent, but the territorial provisions of the armistice agreements generally remained in effect. Israel did continue to make minor territorial adjustments in its favor by moving into demilitarized zones and, as in the case of the bedouin living in the zone bordering on the Sinai (around el-Auja), driving out Arab inhabitants of the zones in order to establish Jewish paramilitary agricultural settlements.

Israel was primarily concerned with absorbing its population and consolidating its position in the territories it had taken during the Palestine War, especially those areas which were not Jewish before 1948-1949. To be sure, Israel required (and demanded) military assistance from the United States and other sympathetic nations, but the need to rebuild villages destroyed or damaged as a result of the conflict, to fill with Jews the places in the economy that the Arabs had been forced to vacate, and to provide for increasing numbers of immigrants caused the Zionist Organization to focus its attention primarily on fund-raising for the purpose of economic development and to finance Israel's constant deficit.

The economy of Israel as well as that of the Palestine Jewish community before 1948, remained heavily dependent on capital imports to finance both industrial and agricultural development. Furthermore, the resources of the country did not (and do not today) suffice to support the population in Israel or approach the economic requirements of the Zionist ambition to "ingather" all the Jews. Israel imported foodstuffs and consumer goods as its agricultural production and level of industrial development could not meet the needs and demands of the rapidly expanding population.

The American Government provided direct aid to meet some of Israel's needs and indirectly aided Zionist fund-raising in the United States by making contributions of American citizens for the purpose of Israel and Jewish relief tax-exempt, i.e. deductible from income before taxation. Under the two administrations which followed Truman, as under Truman himself, American aid to countries of the Middle East (with the exception of Greece, Iran, and Turkey) was heavily influenced by national political considerations. "Until 1959 Israel . . . received each year from the United States more aid than all the Arab states put together."<sup>1</sup> Tables II and III on the following pages show the population of and immigration to Israel from 1948 to 1960 and U.S. Government economic aid to Israel, May, 1948 through the end of fiscal 1961.

---

<sup>1</sup>Harry B. Ellis, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict Today," in Georgiana G. Stevens, ed., The United States and the Middle East (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964).

TABLE II  
POPULATION OF AND IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL, 1948-1960

Year	Total population at end of year	Jews	Arabs and others	Total immigration	Total emigration	Net immigration
1948 <sup>x</sup>	2,115,000	700,000	1,415,000			
1948	920,000	765,000	155,000	101,837	1,154	100,683
1949	1,173,900	1,013,900	160,000	239,954	7,407	232,547
1950	1,370,100	2,203,100	167,000	169,720	9,966	159,754
1951	1,577,800	1,404,400	173,400	174,014	10,476	163,538
1952	1,629,500	1,450,200	179,300	23,408	13,500	9,908
1953	1,669,400	1,483,600	185,800	10,388	13,000	2,612
1954	1,717,800	1,526,000	191,800	17,485	7,500	9,985
1955	1,789,100	1,590,500	198,600	36,327	6,400	29,927
1956	1,872,400	1,667,500	204,900	54,996	11,400	43,596
1957	1,976,000	1,762,700	213,300	71,100	11,400	59,700
1958	2,031,700	1,810,100	221,600	26,093	11,700	14,393
1959	2,088,700	1,858,800	229,900	23,045	9,750	13,295
1960	2,150,400	1,911,200	239,200	23,644	8,800	14,844

x May 1948.

Source: Yusif A. Sayigh, The Israeli Economy, 1963, (In Arabic), translated by M. Usamah al-Azm in Israel's Prospects for Economic Independence (M.A. Thesis, American University of Beirut, 1964), p. 61.

TABLE III

U.S. GOVERNMENT ECONOMIC AID TO ISRAEL  
May 1948 to 1961 (Fiscal Years) (Obligations in \$ million)

Year	Technical Aid	Special <sup>a</sup> Assistance	Total MSP Assistance	DLF	Public Law No. 480			Exim bank	IMG	Grand Total
					Title I	Title II	Title III			
1950	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	135.00 <sup>e</sup>	-	136.2
1951	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.5	-	-	21.5
1952	0.9	63.5	64.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	64.4
1953	2.5	70.0	72.5	-	-	-	0.04	-	0.9	73.44
1954	1.4	52.5	53.9	-	-	-	20.7	-	2.1	76.7
1955	1.4	39.7 <sup>b</sup>	41.1	-	-	12.7 <sup>f</sup>	0.4	-	2.0	56.2
1956	1.4	25.5 <sup>d</sup>	26.9	-	-	27.7	1.6	-	2.6	58.8
1957	1.7	25.0 <sup>e</sup>	26.7	-	-	10.5	2.3	-	1.5	41.0
1958	1.4	7.5	8.9	15	-	39.2	2.3	27.55 <sup>g</sup>	0.6	93.55
1959	1.6	7.5	9.1	10	-	38.3	1.7	-	0.5	59.6
1960	1.4	7.5	8.9	15	-	37.6	0.5	-	0.3	62.3
1961	1.0	7.5	8.5	16	-	25.9	0.8	35.9	0.3	87.4
CUMULATIVE										
TOTAL OBLI- GATIONS		14.7	306.2	320.9	56	191.9	-	198.45	10.80	831.09

Source: Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1963), p. 306.

<sup>a</sup>Development Assistance 1952-1957. Includes Relief Assistance in 1952 and 1953.

<sup>b</sup>Fifty per cent (\$20 million) was extended to Israel on a loan basis.

<sup>c</sup>These credits were authorized in calendar year 1949. A total of \$86.4 million of principal has been repaid, leaving the principal outstanding as of June 30, 1961, at \$48.6 million.

<sup>d</sup>Includes \$5 million of third-country currencies. Of \$25.5 million total, \$12.5 million was available on a loan basis. <sup>e</sup>Of \$25 million total, \$10 million was made available on a loan basis.

<sup>f</sup>Values are carried at costs to the Commodity Credit Corporation and not at market prices.

<sup>g</sup>Includes \$24.4 million for irrigation; \$0.35 million for research atomic reactor (has been repaid); and \$3.0 million for privately owned paper mill.

The Election of Eisenhower - in 1952 - The Korean War, the Rosenberg and Hiss cases, and the dismissal of General MacArthur caused American voters to turn to a popular figure who they hoped would make the United States secure against corruption in Government, inflation, and Communism. General Dwight Eisenhower, the Republican Party's candidate for the Presidency in 1952, was this figure. Within the Party there had been a considerable struggle for the nomination. Eisenhower represented the liberal wing, and Senator Robert Taft of Illinois, the more conservative faction. Taft also controlled--to his own advantage--the Republican National Committee. The struggle resulted in General Eisenhower's nomination, in spite of Taft, and Eisenhower's acceptance of a more conservative running-mate, Senator Richard Nixon of California. The Party's platform was also a move to conciliate conservative elements; John Foster Dulles,<sup>2</sup> the long-time Party spokesman on foreign affairs, drafted the foreign policy plank.

The "Palestine plank" written by Dulles for the Republican platform did not commit Eisenhower to a specific policy but was conciliatory toward the Jewish State:

---

<sup>2</sup>Dulles, as a member of the United Nations Delegation throughout the Truman Administration, was well informed on the Palestine situation. Furthermore, he had had a direct confrontation with the Zionists as he had run in 1949 to succeed himself as Senator from New York State (Dulles had been appointed to complete the term of a Senator who had died in office) and had been defeated by Herbert Lehman, a firm Zionist. Dulles, a devout Christian and an active churchman, opposed Zionist aspirations to make Jerusalem the capital of the Jewish State; he declared that Jerusalem should be an international city under the control of the United Nations or another appropriate international body. Dulles' electoral strength was in the Up-State rather than the Down-State area encompassing New York City and environs. His position on Jerusalem lost him many New York City votes; he was defeated by Lehman by a margin of 197,000 votes.

John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles, 1888-1959 (New York: Harper, 1959), pp. 115-116; and Lilienthal, op. cit., pp. 112-117.

The Republican Party has consistently advocated a national home for the Jewish people since a Republican Congress declared its support of that objective thirty years ago.

In providing a sanctuary for Jewish people rendered homeless by persecution, the State of Israel appeals to our deepest humanitarian interests. We shall continue our friendly interest in this constructive and inspiring undertaking.

We shall put our influence at the service of peace between Israel and the Arab States, and we shall cooperate to bring economic and social stability to that area.<sup>3</sup>

In 1952 the Republicans could easily get by with such a plank, included as a friendly gesture rather than a commitment to a specific policy. Eisenhower's appeal was broadly based. Although he needed votes from the minority and particularistic groups within American society, he could hope to win their support on the larger issues such as Korea, the Communist threat, civil rights.

The Democratic Party, however, was not in this enviable position. Its candidates, Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois and Senator John Sparkman of Alabama, did not have the appeal of an Eisenhower and had to rely on the support of many interest groups. The Democratic platform's "Palestine plank" endorsed the Truman policies; it read as follows:

---

<sup>3</sup>Porter and Johnson, op. cit., p. 498.



We seek to enlist the people of the Middle East to work with us and with each other in the development of the region, the lifting of health and living standards, and the attainment of peace. We favor the development of integrated security arrangements for the Middle East and other assistance to safeguard the independence of the countries in the area.

We pledge continued assistance to Israel so that she may fulfill her humanitarian mission of providing shelter and sanctuary for her homeless Jewish refugees while strengthening her economic development.

We will continue to support the tripartite declaration of May 1950, to encourage Israel and the Arab States to settle their differences by direct negotiation, to maintain and protect the sanctity of the Holy Places and to permit free access to them.

We pledge aid to the Arab States to enable them to develop their economic resources and raise the living standards of their people. We support measures for the relief and reintegration program voted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in January 1952.<sup>4</sup>

In contrast to the Republican "Palestine plank", the Democratic plank was specific in its commitment. Significant were the pledges to encourage direct negotiation between the Arab States and Israel (refused by the Arabs; demanded by Israel), to give economic aid to the Arab States, and to support the relief and reintegration (ostensibly by resettlement in the Arab States) of the Arab refugees as recommended in Resolution 513 (VI) of the General Assembly.

Eisenhower polled 33.8 million votes to 27.3 million for Stevenson, and won 442 of the 531 electoral votes.<sup>5</sup> In Congress the Republicans

---

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 476.

<sup>5</sup>Freidel, op. cit., p. 515.

won a slim margin with "much of the Republican power . . . still lodged with those old guard elements who had favored Taft rather than Eisenhower for the nomination." The 83rd Congress convening in January, 1953, was organized as follows:<sup>6</sup>

SENATE

Republicans	48
Democrats	47
Independent	1

HOUSE

Republicans	221
Democrats	211
Independent	1

A tie in the Senate could be broken by the Republicans with the vote of the Vice President.

While it was obvious that the Republican candidate was much more popular than his party, it was also certain that the new President's policies would be subject to careful scrutiny by Congress from both his own party and the opposition. Moreover, since Truman's policy on Palestine had so far been acceptable to both parties in Congress, there would probably not be much change.

The 1956 elections - Eisenhower and Nixon ran again on the Republican ticket in 1956, and Stevenson again--with a new running-mate, Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee--on the Democratic ticket. The party conventions, the campaign, and the elections all occurred in the midst of conflict in the Middle East.

---

<sup>6</sup>Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower, the Inside Story (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 84.

The Democratic Party platform accused the Eisenhower Administration of ineptness in managing the situation between Israel and the Arabs: "Only the good offices of the United Nations in maintaining peace between Israel and her neighbors conceal the diplomatic incapacities of the Republican Administration."<sup>7</sup> Candidate Stevenson addressed himself to these incapacities as he spoke throughout the country.

The Republican platform was devised to point out the achievements of the Eisenhower Administration and under the heading, "The Middle East and Southeast Asia," listed the "northern tier" policy uniting Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan in a defense pact (the Baghdad Pact). Furthermore, the plank asserted, "We have maintained and will maintain, friendly relations with all nations in this vital area, seeking to mediate differences among them, and encouraging legitimate national aspirations."<sup>8</sup>

Again Eisenhower won in 1956 and by an "even larger majority than in 1952, out of a slightly larger total vote."<sup>9</sup> The President polled 35.6 million votes, taking 41 states, 457 of the electoral votes, and 57.4 per cent of the popular vote; Stevenson polled 26 million votes, took 7 states, 73 electoral votes, and 42.0 per cent of the total vote. Eisenhower made gains among the Negroes and other racial minorities, but "Democrats rolled up an even larger proportion than usual of the Jewish vote."<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup>Porter and Johnson, op. cit., p. 525.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 556.

<sup>9</sup>Charles A.H. Thomson and Frances M. Shattuck, The 1956 Presidential Campaign (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 345.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 352.

Again the President's popularity led that of his party; the Democrats won the Senate 49 to 47, and the House 233 to 201.<sup>11</sup>

It is not surprising that Eisenhower lost a percentage of the "Jewish vote" during a time when he could not (and would not) pursue a policy which supported in any way (or ignored) Israel's invasion of Sinai. However, it is significant that he gained in all the states in which the "Jewish vote" is reputedly strong--New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, etc. These gains were made in the other minority groups and more than balanced his loss.<sup>12</sup>

For a candidate as popular as Eisenhower the loss of a small percentage of a minority groups' vote meant little, especially since the largest portion of that groups vote was Democratic in the first place. For the Democrats the gain in Jewish votes was significant as it demonstrated that unless they could find a candidate capable of achieving a landslide, they would have to continue to court the Jewish vote.

The Eisenhower Administrations, 1953-1960 - Dulles, appointed by Eisenhower as his Secretary of State, undoubtedly enjoyed the President's confidence and was able, until his death in 1959, to maintain a relationship with the President which assured his control of foreign policy. As Under Secretary of State Eisenhower had appointed General Walter ~~B~~odell Smith.

---

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 354.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 532.

During the two Eisenhower Administrations, Secretary Dulles was responsible for initiating foreign policy. Dulles, however, could not go beyond the limits which Congress would allow, and appealed to the more conservative elements from both parties. Dulles devised policies "by drawing upon his own knowledge, experience, and insight . . . the Department of State merely implemented these policies."<sup>13</sup> The conflict between East and West, as Dulles saw it, was total, and he felt that whoever wasn't with the United States was against the United States.

The United States continued to press for the incorporation of the Middle East into Western defense structure. Military aid to Greece, Turkey, and Iran was increased. At the end of 1954, Pakistan was drawn into the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) creating an unbroken line of defense along the southern border of the Soviet Union which extended from Western Europe to Pakistan and the East. In April, 1954, Iraq accepted an American military mission. In January, 1955, the Iraq-Turkey Treaty was signed which incorporated in April Great Britain and before the end of the year Iran and Pakistan. The so-called Baghdad Pact was brought into being.

During the winter of 1956 Eisenhower made a notable change in United States policy toward the Middle East:

---

<sup>13</sup>Morgenthaw in Graebner, op. cit., p. 293.

Veering away from the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, in which we, the British and French agreed to act 'both within and outside' the UN., American policy shifted in favor of action through the UN.<sup>14</sup>

This change was important as it broke the commitment of the United States to act in accord with Britain and France and probably was the basis for the policy adopted by the United States' (within the United Nations) concerning the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Sinai and attack on Suez during October-November 1956.

In January, 1957, President Eisenhower enunciated a new approach, the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine, authorizing the President to extend economic and military assistance to any country of the Middle East requesting protection against "overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by International Communism."<sup>15</sup> This proposal, was, however, made at this time not only to counter the danger of Communism in the Near East but also to prevent Egyptian interference in the internal affairs of other Middle Eastern nations, a threat which the Administration felt was imminent due to the increased influence of Nasser and the signing of the Cairo Solidarity Agreement by Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan in January of 1957.

The final and most substantial change the Eisenhower Administration made in United States Middle Eastern policy was its attempt at a rapprochement with Nasser in 1959-60. At that time Egypt became the

---

<sup>14</sup>Donovan, op. cit., pp. 388-389.

<sup>15</sup>Richard H. Nolte, "United States Policy and the Middle East," in Stevens, op. cit., p. 165.

largest single recipient in the Middle East of American economic assistance, principally in foodstuffs under Public Law 480. Jordan also received an increment in 1958-59-60; before that time the United States had taken Britain's place in subsidizing half of the yearly budget of the Hashemite Kingdom. The following table shows American economic and military aid to the Middle East (including Greece, Iran, Turkey, and the Baghdad Pact Organization which became CENTO when Iraq withdrew following the coup d'etat in 1958):

TABLE IV

AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO THE MIDDLE EAST

(July 1, 1945 to June 30, 1962)

	<u>Economic</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Total</u>
	(in Millions of Dollars)		
<u>Middle East &amp; South Asia</u>			
Greece	1,784.8	1,602.8	3,387.6
Iran	732.3	577.9	1,310.2
Iraq	21.6	46.1	67.7
Israel	874.7	3.0	877.7
Jordan	325.2	24.1	349.3
Lebanon	80.4	8.6	89.0
Saudi Arabia	46.6	*	46.6
Syria	75.8	----	75.8
Turkey	1,581.3	2,288.0	3,869.3
U.A.R. (Egypt)	628.6	----	628.6
Yemen	22.9	----	22.9
CENTO	27.4	----	27.4
TOTAL	\$ 6,201.6	\$ 4,550.5	\$10,752.1

\* Classified military aid.

Source: Time Magazine, March 29, 1963, p. 13.



Assistance to the refugees - During the Eisenhower Administration the United States continued to influence United Nations programs designed to assist the Palestine refugees. Until 1958-59 Resolution 513 (VI) of January 26, 1952, was the primary basis for American policy on the refugee question.

The United States actively sought a solution to the problem through the reintegration-resettlement formula. The solution under paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) - the repatriation-or-compensation formula - was postponed by the use in United Nations Resolutions of the phrase, "without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 ..!" Such postponement meant, however, that these provisions were being prejudiced by the fact that the solution (according to paragraph 11) was purposely being delayed and that an attempt was being made to solve the refugee problem without reference to paragraph 11. This "economic solution" was an attempt to resettle the refugees before they had made their choice between repatriation and compensation, i.e., resettlement inside Israel and resettlement elsewhere with compensation, respectively.

The first and operative part of paragraph 11, Resolution 194 (III) proposing the solution to the refugee problem which had been designed to respect the wishes of the refugees was ignored. The Conciliation Commission continued to work under its specific directives of the second part of paragraph 11 (the facilitation of repatriation, resettlement, etc.). And, the Commission continued to maintain close relations with the director of the United Nations Agency - UNRWA - designed to give assistance to

the refugees. Because, in the absence of the solution to the problem according to the wishes of the refugees, such a relationship was maintained between the conciliation Commission and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, the Agency became wedded to the "economic solution" pressed by the United States both through the CCP and the Advisory Commission for UNRWA. Being connected with a "solution" to the refugee problem which disregarded their right of choice, UNRWA works programs were opposed by both the refugees and the host governments, and, the Agency's execution of the relief function, to some extent, was hindered and made more difficult.

American policy was formulated with cognisance of both the Arab and Israeli positions concerning the settlement of all the issues outstanding between them. However, American national politics apparently made the United States respond more favorably to the Israeli requirements than those of the Arab States although the United States sought closer economic and military relationships with the Arabs.

Israel demanded "Arab recognition of the status quo: (1) no large scale repatriation of refugees; (2) no major border changes than those based on mutual adjustments; and (3) no alternation of the status of Jerusalem as Israel's capital.<sup>15</sup> The Arabs remained firm on their original position: "(1) implementation of previous UN resolutions as to demarcation lines and Jerusalem; (2) recognition by Israel of

---

<sup>15</sup>This was not recognized by the United States (and still is not). The American Embassy was (and is) in Tel Aviv.

the principle of repatriation and compensation as stipulated in paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948; (3) establishment of a UN office to take charge of Arab properties within Israel and to effect compensation.<sup>16</sup>

The Work of the Conciliation Commission, 1958-1961 - Resolution 513 (VI) of January 26, 1952, had "considered that the Governments concerned had the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement of their outstanding differences,"<sup>17</sup> reaffirming the original position of the Assembly with respect to responsibility for reaching a settlement, i.e. implicit in Resolution 194 (III). United Nations facilities, including the Commission were to be used by the parties to achieve a settlement, It has been mentioned that after its failure to effect a solution by means of conciliation and mediation, the Commission directed its efforts towards the release of blocked Arab accounts in Israel and the identification, and valuation of Arab refugee property.

After the conclusion of the Agreement for the release of blocked accounts with Israel in 1952, the Commission encountered technical difficulties. The release operation finally commenced in the summer of 1953, and as of June 30, 1961, a total of £2,790,045 of the accounts had

---

<sup>16</sup>Harry N. Howard, UNRWA and the Arab Refugees, Some Random Notes (mimeo American Embassy, Beirut: 1961), Part II.

<sup>17</sup>United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Historical Survey of Efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to Secure the Implementation of Paragraph II of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), "The Question of Reintegration by Repatriation or Resettlement," Doc. A/AC.25/W. 82/Rev. 1, 2 October 1961, p. 28.

been released. The Commission had had difficulty in working out procedures for transfer with the Arab governments, Jordan and Lebanon finally being the only Arab "host" countries with which such arrangements were implemented.

After 1952 the Commission's Refugee Office was staffed only with land experts. Moving from Jerusalem to New York the Refugee Office completed the work of identification of property on the basis of documents collected during its stay in the Middle East and otherwise made available to the Commission. Some 450,000 record forms of properties owned by Arab individuals were prepared. Valuation was carried out in New York by a specialized staff and the process was accelerated in 1958 following the Sixteenth Progress Report of the Commission.

The procedure adopted by the Conciliation Commission to identify and value property was significant as individual properties constituted the basis for the work done to implement compensation. This signified the possibility of departure from the stand taken by the Commission at the 1951 Paris Conference, i.e. that compensation be a "global sum based on the evaluation arrived at by the Commission's Refugee Office." Compensation might thus be paid to individuals according to their losses rather than to the refugees as a group; such a policy would be more in accord with the recommendation of the Mediator who had sought to respect the rights and desires of individual refugees.

The United States in 1955 (Dulles) and 1957 (Eisenhower) had pledged support for some form of international loan to facilitate the payment of compensation by Israel. Such compensation both the President

and the Secretary of State felt was due from Israel to the refugees.

In 1958, the Government of Israel repeatedly declared a willingness to pay compensation to the refugees under certain conditions. The definitive Israel position - which, of course bypassed the refugees' right of choice - seems to have been stated by Ambassador Abba Eban on November 17, 1958, in a meeting of the Special Political Committee of the United Nations:

"The basic solution of the refugee problem lay in the integration of the refugees into the countries in which they had dwelt for ten years and in which they lived among their kinsmen. If that solution were carried out, and if the international assistance offered in 1955 was still available, Israel would be prepared to pay compensation, even before the achievement of a final peace settlement for the solution of other outstanding problems. In fixing the level of compensation owed by Israel it would be necessary to take into account the claims of Israel citizens who had a right to compensation for property left behind in Arab land."<sup>18</sup>

Rehabilitation through reintegration and resettlement - Truman's 1952 Budget and Mutual Security Messages (January 21 and March 6, respectively) called for American support of the General Assembly's resolutions of December 2, 1950, and January 26, 1952, which established reintegrations as the basis for a solution to the Palestine refugee problem. Eisenhower continued to support reintegration. The second week in May 1953, Secretary Dulles and the Director for Mutual Security Harold Stassen, began a tour through 12 countries of the Middle East

---

<sup>18</sup>G.A.O.R. (XIII), 1958, Special Political Committee, Doc. A/SPC/SR. 106, pp. 12-13.

and Southeast Asia.<sup>19</sup> On June 1, Dulles publicized the results of his visit in a broadcast to the Nation over radio and television. He outlined the strategic and military importance of the area, commented on the situation in Egypt and other aspects of his trip. He declared that although Israel and Jordan had legitimate claims to political status in Jerusalem, "the world religious community has claims in Jerusalem which take precedence over the political claims of any particular nation." He described the wretched conditions under which 800,000 Arab refugees existed, and stated,

"Some of the refugees could be settled in the area presently controlled by Israel. Most, however, could more readily be integrated in the lives of the neighboring Arab countries. This, however, awaits on irrigation projects, which will permit more soil to be cultivated.

"Throughout the area the cry is for water and for irrigation. United Nations contributions and other funds are available to help refugees, and Mr. Stassen and I came back with the impression that they can well be spent in large part on a coordinated use of the rivers which run through the Arab countries and Israel."<sup>20</sup>

Thus, Dulles made the refugees' right of repatriation dependent upon the numbers which "could be settled" in Israel. He did not refer to their desires in the matter but to the economic potential of the Arab countries and Israel and the refugees' opportunity for integration.

---

<sup>19</sup>While in Jordan, Dulles was presented with a statement by representatives of the Palestine Arab refugees. See Izzat Taumous, et al, Statement Presented by Palestine Arab Refugees to His Honor Mr. John Foster Dulles Secretary of State of the United States Government (Amman, Jordan, May 15, 1953).

<sup>20</sup>Report on the Near East, address by the Secretary of State, June 1, 1953 (Washington, D.A.: Department of State Publication 5088, June 1953), pp. 3-4.

This statement of Secretary Dulles formed the basis for United States economic policy in the Middle East as well as policy on the Palestine refugees.

United States Area Policy - In 1952, Mr. Mills E.unger, Chief of Water Resources Development, Technical Cooperation Administration (TCA or Point Four) in Jordan, surveyed the Jordan Valley and prepared the broad outlines of a plan to utilize the Yarmuk River and some of the waters of the Jordan River to irrigate the area. Mr. T.R. Welling, Director of TCA in Jordan, on July 1, 1952, presented the project-called the "Bunger Plan" - to the Jordan Development Board. He stated that the Plan fulfilled two basic requirements:

"Firstly, the proposal should aim at the maximum development of the Jordan Valley without involving international negotiations which might not be feasible at the present moment and, secondly, should comprise a scheme which could easily be filled into any subsequent scheme derived from the use of the Lake Tiberias."<sup>21</sup>

The Bunger Plan, however, did not meet the requirements of the United States policy, i.e. that the effort be a coordinated one benefiting both the Arabs and Israel and effecting a solution to the problem of the homelessness of at least a part of the Arabs of Palestine. Thus, it was put aside temporarily<sup>22</sup> as in August, 1953, the plan for the "Unified Development of the Water Resources of the Jordan Valley Region"

---

<sup>21</sup>UNRWA, "Special Reports on Jordan," Bulletin of Economic Development, No. 14, (Beirut: July 1956) p. 83.

<sup>22</sup>UNRWA in March and December, 1953, however concluded an agreement with Jordan for the execution of the Yarmuk project if further engineering surveys established that it would be feasible, Ibid., p. 85.

was completed by Charles T. Main, Inc. of Boston under the direction of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Plan became known as the TVA plan and was described<sup>as</sup> an "engineering office study outlining the utilization of the Jordan Valley's water resources without regard to political boundaries." Furthermore, "it was based upon previous surveys of the Valley and did not involve actual field investigation in the region itself."<sup>23</sup> The TVA plan served as the point of departure for the negotiations begun in 1953 and carried on until 1955 between the Eisenhower Administration and the countries concerned.

On October 16, 1953, President Eisenhower announced that Eric Johnston would be sent to the Middle East as his personal representative, with the rank of ambassador. His task was "to explore with the governments and countries of that region certain steps which might be expected to contribute to an improvement of the general situation in that region."<sup>24</sup> He was to undertake discussions with the Arab countries which had riparian interests in the Jordan River, the Arab League, and Israel sharing of the waters of the Jordan and the development of the region by means of irrigation. Johnston returned from his initial round of discussions on November 17 and reported to the President and Secretary Dulles that:

---

<sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>24</sup>Department of State Bulletin, October 26, 1952, p. 553.



"acceptance of the proposals by the Jordan Valley states would not only go far toward resolving the highly controversial question of rights to the vital water of the River Jordan, but clear the way for the construction of irrigation and hydroelectric installations to provide an economic base in the Jordan Valley for upward of 300,000 people. This would offer an opportunity to settle a substantial number of the Arab refugees now living on international relief rolls in the Arab countries of the region."<sup>25</sup>

Such opportunity for resettlement would be offered to the refugees without reference to their desires concerning repatriation or compensation.

The original TVA Plan provided for a distribution of the water as follows: 67 per cent for the Arabs irrigating 490,000 dunums in Jordan, 30,000 dunums in Syria, and none in Lebanon; and 33 per cent for Israel, irrigating 416,000 dunums. The Plan/<sup>took</sup>10 to 15 years for completion, and the total cost would be \$121 million assuming a low dam on the Yarmuk River at Magarin (for Arab storage purposes) and an additional \$14 million if the Magarin Dam should be raised to a greater height.<sup>26</sup>

In June 1954, Johnston again conferred in Cairo and Tel Aviv, and on July 6, reported the four riparian countries were willing to accept in "principle" the international sharing of the waters. He therefore formulated five principles upon which the plan would be based and sought their acceptance by the Arab States and Israel. They were as follows:

1. Equitable sharing of the limited waters of the Jordan River system by the four states;

---

<sup>25</sup>Quoted in Howard, op. cit., Part II.

<sup>26</sup>UNRWA, op. cit., p. 85.

2. Establishment of a neutral, impartial authority to supervise withdrawals of water from the river system in accordance with the division ultimately accepted by all parties;
3. Amelioration of the condition of the Arab refugees from Palestine as a principle objective of the Jordan Valley irrigation program;
4. Achievement of an understanding concerning the total program, at the earliest possible time, both in the interest of the Arab refugees and in the interest of economic progress and stability in the area;
5. Open-minded consideration of the storage of irrigation waters in Lake Tiberias (Sea of Galilee), when progress in developing the valley indicated the necessity of using the lake as a primary reservoir.<sup>27</sup>

In October, 1953, the Israelis had adopted their own Seven-Year Plan<sup>28</sup> the objective of which being to increase Israeli production of foodstuffs so that Israel could supply three-fourths of its needs by 1961 rather than half the requirements that they could supply in 1953. The Seven-Year Plan and later (1956) the Ten-Year Plan served the Israelis as a point of departure during the Johnston and later negotiations.

In March, 1954, the Arabs presented their own plan, devised by the Technical Committee of the Arab League. This plan (as revised a few months later) served the Arabs as a basis for discussions with Johnston.

Meanwhile, a detailed technical study of the area was being conducted by the engineering firm of Michael Baker, Jr. and the Harza

---

<sup>27</sup>Summarized in Howard, op. cit., Part II.

<sup>28</sup>See Israel Ministry of Finance, op. cit.

Company (8 volumes, with appendices). This study became the basis for negotiations. Johnston visited the area again, during August-October, 1955, to bring the parties to agreement on the final points but no concurrence was forthcoming, and Johnston's mission was suspended upon his return to the United States.

The Plans are summarized in the following table:

TABLE V  
Summary of Plans to Utilize Waters  
of Jordan River and its Tributaries

	Total	Arab States			Israel	
		Total	Jordan	Syria		Lebanon
<u>Million cubic meters water</u> <u>supplied annually</u>						
TVA Plan, 1953,	1,305	879	829	50	-	426
Arabs' Plan, 1954 (revised)	1,429	1,142	975	132	35	287
Bunger Plan, 1952		(a)	527	(a)	(a)	(a)
Israeli Seven Year Plan, 1953		(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	540
Baker-Harza Plan, 1955		(a)	760	(a)	(a)	(a)
<u>1000 dunums irrigated</u>						
TVA Plan, 1953	936	520	490	30	-	416
Arabs' Plan, 1954 (revised)	878	644	490	119	35	234
Bunger Plan, 1952		(a)	435	(a)	(a)	(a)
Israeli Seven Year Plan 1953		(a)	(a)	(a)	(a)	900
Baker-Harza Plan, 1955		(a)	514	(a)	(a)	(a)

(a) Not covered in plan.

Source: UNRWA, Bulletin of Economic Development, No. 14,  
"Special Reports on Jordan" (Beirut: July 1956), p. 83.

Although in August, 1955, when Johnston embarked on his final visit to the area, all that was said to prevent the implementation of the Plan was "only formal political concurrence,"<sup>29</sup> it seems that Johnston underestimated the difficulties involved. The decision of the Arab League concerning the scheme was postponed. It seems that Johnston's Mission was designed to bring about agreement of the Arabs and Israelis and establish the basis of a working relationship between the two parties. The Johnston mission sought to effect at least a first step in a settlement between the Arabs and Israel without reference to the issues outstanding between the parties - refugees, frontiers, status of Jerusalem - or to the recommendation of the United Nations concerning the modes of settlement of these issues, such recommendations being based on the equities involved in the Palestine conflict as well as taking into consideration the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.

Dulles' address of August 26, 1955 - Although Johnston had failed to win Arab approach for the Jordan River development scheme, Dulles persisted in his support of the "economic solution" to the refugee problem. On August 26, 1955, he addressed the Council on Foreign Relations concerning Middle East policy; he stated,

"To end the plight of the 900,000 refugees required that these uprooted people should, through resettlement and, to such an extent as may be feasible, repatriation, be enabled to resume a life of dignity and self respect. To this end, there is need to create arable land refugees can find permanent homes and gain their own livelihood

---

<sup>29</sup>Howard, op. cit., Part II.

through their own work. Fortunately, there are practical projects for water development which can make this possible. . . (for statement on compensation, see this chapter, page 177 ).<sup>30</sup>

Again the refugees' right of choice was ignored, their repatriation depending on feasibility. Dulles did not define this feasibility, however. Was it economic or political, or both? Was it to be determined by the international community, Israel, the Arabs, or the United States? Probably the feasibility of such repatriation would be determined by the United States in consultation with Israel, and the number allowed to return would certainly not exceed the 100,000 considered feasible by Israel during the time the Conciliation Commission had held its discussions.

UNRWA and rehabilitation through reintegration and resettlement - The eventual rehabilitation of the refugees was the goal set for the United Nations in the recommendations of the Mediator in 1948. He had recommended, however, that this rehabilitation be achieved (1) after the right of the refugees to repatriation had been secured, and (2) their choice of repatriation or compensation had been made. Furthermore, the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees was to be achieved through repatriation (of those choosing to return) and resettlement, and the refugees' reintegration into the economic life of the Middle East. Although the General Assembly had adopted as a formula - "without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11

---

<sup>30</sup>Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Policy, 1955, New York: 1956, pp. 351-352.

of resolution 194 (III)" - to provide for the principle of repatriation or compensation, the Assembly in January, 1952, had officially embarked on a program which bypassed the principle, i.e., the "economic solution". Moreover, it had designated UNRWA as the vehicle for implementing the program and laid down specific instruction to UNRWA concerning agency expenditures and programs; these appear in the following table for the years 1949 through 1954 (actually in effect 1/1/50 through 30/6/55):

TABLE VI

UNRWA Budgets for Relief and Reintegration as  
determined by the General Assembly, 1949-1954

Resolution	Date	For Fiscal Year	Works	Relief Budget Adopted - Revised
302 (IV) <sup>1</sup>	8 Dec. 1949	1/1/50-31/12/51 1/1/51-30/6/51	\$13.5 <sup>*</sup> \$21.2	\$20.2 discontinued 31/12/51
393 (V)	2 Dec. 1950	1/7/51 - 30/6/52	\$30 <sup>2</sup>	\$20
513 (VI)	26 Jan. 1952	1/7/51 - 30/6/54 <sup>3</sup> 1/7/52 - 30/6/53	\$200 \$100 <sup>4</sup>	\$50 \$18 <sup>5</sup> \$20 of 393 (V) to \$27
614 (VII)	6 Nov. 1952	1/7/53 - 30/6/54	maintain \$200	\$18 \$18 of 513 (VI) to \$23
720 (VIII)	27 Nov. 1953	1/7/54 - 30/6/55	maintain \$200	\$18 \$18 of 614 (VII) to \$24.8
818 (IV)	4 Dec. 1954	1/7/54 - 30/6/55	maintain \$200 \$36.2 <sup>6</sup>	\$25.1 \$18 of 720 (VIII) revised

\* In million \$ U.S.

<sup>1</sup>Establishing UNRWA.

<sup>2</sup>Reintegration fund.

<sup>3</sup>Three-year reintegration and relief program.

<sup>4</sup>From above \$200 million, first installment.

<sup>5</sup>From above \$50 million.

<sup>6</sup>From \$200 million but not within program.

Source: Resolutions of Assembly

The vote in the Assembly on Resolution 513 (VI) of January 26, 1952, was 49 in favor, 0 against, 5 abstaining. The Arab States had supported the resolution, as they "were by no means opposed to projects for economic development." Yet, "they were fearful as to possible infringement of refugee rights under Resolution 194 (III)... and did not consider the development projects per se, as a solution of the Palestine problem."<sup>31</sup> The Johnston Plan had attempted to link refugee resettlement in the Arab countries directly to economic development and its implementation had been envisaged as a part of UN programs, specifically UNRWA programs, UNRWA, however, had proceeded on its own to conclude agreements since the Arab "host" governments:

1. In 1951, with Jordan for agricultural development projects, vocational training, and financial support for enterprising individuals through the Jordan Development Bank.
2. In 1952-53, with Egypt to survey the Sinai peninsula with a view to settling 50,000 refugees from Gaza.
3. In 1953, again with Jordan for the irrigation of the Yarmuk-Jordan-Valley-making use of the Bunger and Baker-Harza Plans.
4. Syria and Iraq were approached to allow agricultural development schemes.

By June 30, 1954, only \$7 million had been expended out of the \$200 million of the projected reintegration fund. None of the projects

---

<sup>31</sup>UNRWA, Information Paper No. 5, p. 5. footnote 11.

had been embarked upon (with the exception later of a part of the Jordan Valley irrigation scheme -- the East Ghor Canal Project -- which wasn't expected to come to fruition for several years to come).

Thus, in light of their experience, the Director and Advisory Commission of UNRWA recommended to the 1954 fall session of the Assembly that part of the \$200 million fund should be used to finance general development programs in the area and that the Assembly authorize greater flexibility in the use of the part of the fund remaining for UNRWA. Although the Assembly requested the cooperation of the "host" governments in carrying out reintegration projects, the 1954 session was the last in which large-scale projects were to be recommended.

By June, 1955, only \$18,743,150 of the \$200 million had been expended. In July, the Johnston Plan was submitted to UNRWA, but the failure of the Johnston's final attempt to bring about an agreement between the Arabs and Israel meant in effect that economic collaboration of the two parties in the absence of a political settlement was impossible.

UNRWA reported to the Assembly in 1955 that progress toward the Assembly's goal to reintegrate the refugees and render them self-supporting had been impeded due to:

- (a) the absence of a solution to the Palestine problem along the lines of General Assembly resolutions regarding repatriation and compensation;



- (b) the meagreness of physical resources made available for development; and
- (c) the attitude of the refugees and, in some cases, of the Governments of the area.<sup>32</sup>

The Assembly noted this fact in its Resolution 916 (X) of December 3, 1955, stating

. . . that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the program for reintegration of refugees endorsed in paragraph 2 [either by repatriation or resettlement] of resolution 513 (VI) and that the situation of the refugees therefore continues to be a matter of grave concern. . .

By incorporating the lack of progress according to paragraph 2 of Resolution 513 (VI) into the Assembly's reference to the repatriation - or - compensation-formula recommended in Resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11, the Assembly improved the status of the reintegration-by-resettlement-or-repatriation solution. Apparently the two solutions were to be considered as equally acceptable, although the solution according to Resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11, affirmed the refugees' right of choice between repatriation and compensation and considered that this choice should be effected before the refugees were to be resettled in Israel or the Arab countries. In any case, the wishes of the refugees were to be respected as a matter of priority. The elevation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Resolution 513 (VI) to consideration along side of the principle of repatriation or compensation was, therefore, not in conformity with the Assembly's decision to respect the wishes of the refugees.

---

<sup>32</sup>UNRWA, op. cit. p. 11.

In 1957 it became obvious that UNRWA could make no progress on the large-scale development projects. The Suez conflict had made the Agency's financial situation critical during 1956-1957; the Israel attack and subsequent occupation of Gaza<sup>33</sup> placed even more of a strain on the Agency's resources. Up until June 30, 1957, UNRWA had expended \$37,676,327 on self-support projects (small-scale), under which 23,796 names had been permanently removed from relief rolls, and another 140,279 temporarily.

At the beginning of 1958 UNRWA was forced to cut expenditures on its education program and the remaining self-support projects, and the Agency found it could not resume its individual grants program, the first to be cut and finally discontinued. All projects activities were terminated, construction on its vocational centers was deferred and the two small teacher-training centers in Jordan were closed.

All that now remained of the total rehabilitation effort were certain improvements in general education, two medium sized centers for vocational training, and a small placement service." Activity during 1958 consisted of 'tidying up' certain minor projects on which UNRWA had already embarked."<sup>34</sup>

Therefore, it was not sure in 1958 that UNRWA would be able to continue its activities.

---

<sup>33</sup>At this juncture Israel revived her offer to repatriate all the inhabitants of Gaza, this time, however, making no territorial concessions to the Arabs.

<sup>34</sup>UNRWA, op. cit., p. 12.

The Eisenhower proposals, August, 1958 - On August 13, 1958, President Eisenhower addressed the Third Emergency Session of the General Assembly called to deal with the critical situations in Lebanon and Jordan which had arisen during the spring and summer. This speech was the first enunciation of a new look in American Middle East policy. Richard Nolte in his article, "United States Policy and the Middle East," refers to this policy as one of "disengagement" and noninterference in the internal affairs of the countries in the Middle East.<sup>35</sup> Eisenhower asserted,

"The peoples of the Arab nations of the Near East clearly possess the right of determining and expressing their own destiny. Other nations should not interfere so long as this expression is found in ways compatible with international peace and security.

"However, here as in other areas we have an opportunity to share in a great international task. That is the task of assisting the peoples of that area, under programs which they may desire, to make further progress toward the goals of human welfare they have set for themselves. Only on the basis of progressing economies can truly independent governments sustain themselves. . . .

To help the Arab countries fulfill their aspirations, here is what I propose:

First - that consultations be immediately undertaken by the Secretary-General with the Arab nations . . . . to ascertain whether an agreement can be reached to establish an Arab development institution on a regional basis.

Second- that these consultations consider the composition and possible functions of a regional Arab development institution, whose task would be to accelerate progress in such fields as industry, agriculture, water supply, health, and education, among others.

---

<sup>35</sup>In Stevens, op. cit., p. 171.

Third - other nations and private organizations which might be prepared to support this institution should also be consulted at an appropriate time.<sup>36</sup>

The President then requested Secretary-General Hammarskjold to seek the bases for an agreement among the Arab States in order that an Arab development institution would be established. President Eisenhower also pledged United States financial assistance for this purpose, and requested the Secretary-General to inform the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development through which the U.S. would channel funds for the development institutions.

In his August 13 address President Eisenhower made no direct reference to the Palestine refugees, but his proposals finally became important as the basis for the recommendations of the Secretary-General concerning the continuation of assistance to the refugees.

The report of the Secretary-General - On December 12, 1958, the General Assembly requested Secretary-General Hammarskjold to undertake an investigation of the refugee problem and of the activities of UNRWA. He was then to make recommendations to the Assembly concerning the continuation of United Nations assistance to the refugees. Resolution 1315 (XIII) (of December 12) also viewed the financial situation of UNRWA as dangerous to the peace and stability of the Middle East, and requested . . .

---

<sup>36</sup>Council of Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1958 (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 355.

The Secretary-General ... to continue ... his special efforts to secure the additional financial assistance needed to meet the Agency's budget and to provide working capital;<sup>37</sup>

In accordance with the Assembly's instructions, the Secretary-General presented his Proposals for the Continuation of United Nations Assistance to Palestine Refugees on June 15, 1959. Hammarskjold treated the economic, political, and psychological aspects of the problem. He felt that the economic development of the area required the prior or concurrent resolution of the political and psychological aspects of the problem.

The Secretary-General addressed himself primarily to the economic aspects of the refugee problem, apparently incorporating the proposals made by President Eisenhower to the General Assembly on August 13, 1958. He estimated that between 1960 and 1970 the labor force in the Middle East--exclusive of refugees--might be expected to increase to 5.6 million and would require approximately \$12 billion in new investment both from domestic and external sources for absorption. He also estimated that the labor force of refugee population by 1970 would have become .5 million by 1970 and some \$1.7 billion would be required for integration at that date. The Secretary-General then urged governments to make funds available to UNRWA. Furthermore, he recommended that the Agency should be continued and that programs be instituted in order to make the refugees employable as rapidly as possible.<sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup>See Appendix A for complete text.

<sup>38</sup>United Nations, Proposals for the Continuation of United Nations Assistance to Palestine Refugees, 14th Session of the General Assembly, Doc. A/4121, 15 June 1959.

The Arab Governments and the refugees, however, were dismayed at the Secretary-General's affirmation of programs which appeared to prejudice the rights of the refugees with regard to repatriation and compensation. The Arab Governments and the refugees rejected any programs designed to effect the refugees' reintegration and resettlement in the Arab countries without first obtaining Israel's recognition of the right of the refugees to repatriate and implementing their choice between repatriation and compensation. The Secretary-General proposed a step-by-step process of development and reintegration of the refugees and envisaged that they would exercise their right of choice in stages as the development of the area progressed. The Arabs clung to the areas established in Resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11 - the absolute priority of the refugee question before all others, the right of the refugees to choose repatriation or compensation, reintegration of the refugees according to their choice, i.e., by repatriation and resettlement (in Israel) or resettlement in the Arab countries. The Israel Government was to allow those refugees who chose to repatriate to do so and to pay compensation to the refugees choosing not to return.<sup>39</sup>

The Mandate of UNRWA - The United States had been instrumental in the development of United Nations policy since the adoption of Resolution 194 (III), and American promotion of rehabilitation, reintegration, and resettlement as a solution to the refugee problem before any political solution was effected was in part responsible

---

<sup>39</sup>See Howard, op. cit., Part II, "Arab League Statement on Hammarskjold Proposals for Continuation of UNRWA."

for the failure of UNRWA in its attempts to carry out the reintegration function assigned to it. Many members of the United Nations, in fact, had come to feel that UNRWA was responsible for the continuation of the refugee problem because it continued year after year to spend most of its budget on the provision of relief. UNRWA's mandate had been extended by the Assembly seven times and still the problem was not solved:

<u>Resolution</u>	<u>Date of Adoption</u>	<u>Length of Mandate</u>
Resolution 302 (IV)	8 December 1949	1 January 1950 to 30 June 1951
Resolution 393 (V)	2 December 1950	1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952
Resolution 513 (VI)	26 January 1952	1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953
Resolution 614 (VII)	6 November 1952	1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954
Resolution 720 (VIII)	27 November 1953	1 July 1954 to 30 June 1955
Resolution 818 (IX)	4 December 1954	1 July 1955 to 30 June 1960
Resolution 1456 (XIV)	9 December 1959	1 July 1960 to June 1963

The short-term the mandates granted to UNRWA by the Assembly did not encourage the Agency to do long-term planning for the refugees and the constant financial pressures made agency program-planning difficult. Hammarskjold's report ameliorated this situation to a great extent. As the Agency's status within the United Nations system was in need of improvement, Hammarskjold also worked toward this end.

Such improvement was necessary as UNRWA's status within the United Nations Organization was reflected in the prestige the Agency was accorded in the Arab host countries.

United States policy and United Nations Assistance - The United States had exercised its influence directly in the United Nations to achieve the policies it desired, that the United Nations adopt its ideas with respect to the refugee problem. The Palestine Conciliation Commission and the Advisory Commission for UNRWA provided the chief channels through which policy was directed. Secretary-General Hammarskjold had been assisted by UNRWA officials and American economic experts in preparing his report to the Assembly. Furthermore, the Director (Commissioner-General) of UNRWA had to be an American nominated by the Secretary-General (with the concurrence of the State Department). He provided yet another means by which the United States could hope to influence UNRWA policies and programs. The Directors have been so far:

Mr. Howard Kennedy, 1950-51, an exception because he was Canadian.

Mr. John B. Blanford, 1951-53.

Mr. Henry R. Labouisse, 1954-58.

Mr. Leslie Carver, Deputy Director who became Acting Director 1953-54 and 1958-59.

Dr. John H. Davis, 1959-64.

Mr. Lawrence Michelmore, 1964 ---

The Directors, however, have generally served as a restraining force on the attempts of the United States to force a solution to the refugee problem which was unacceptable to the refugees, such action



increasing the likelihood that the peace of the area might be threatened. The Directors were responsible for the implementation of programs and for the day-to-day operations of the Agency. Moreover, they submitted annual reports to the Assembly recommending programs and expenditures.

Mr. Blanford and Mr. Labouisse were both faced with continued United States pressure to implement large-scale development projects. This pressure was directed through the Conciliation Commission and the UNRWA Advisory Commission and was most intense between 1952 and 1955. In the ensuing period of 1955-59, UNRWA was able to concentrate on its relief function, practical self-help and small-scale refugee loan projects, and on improving its program of general education. United States pressure on the Agency to implement the large-scale projects apparently decreased during the 1955-59 period. In 1958-59 a revolutionary change was effected in the directives given to UNRWA by the Assembly. UNRWA was finally relieved of the task achieving a solution to the refugee problem according to the reintegration-resettlement formula.

In 1958, Mr. Henry Labouisse was able to effect the change in the Assembly's directives which became the significant factor in the development of UNRWA programs after 1959. In the Assembly's resolution of December 12, 1958, the Director of UNRWA was requested to

plan and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees and, in particular, programs relating to education and vocational training;

Because large-scale self-support projects which resettled refugees in the Arab States were unacceptable, education and vocational training became in 1958-59 the means through which UNRWA sought to rehabilitate as many of the refugees as possible and provide a means through which they might be reintegrated into the economic and social life of the Middle East. Moreover, the initiation of a large-scale program to educate and train refugees could not prejudice either their right to repatriation or their actual return to their homes in Israel.

The vocational training program and the expansion of general education - The success of this program to date has been to a large extent the result of the efforts of the Commissioner-General (Director) of UNRWA, Dr. John H. Davis, who followed Mr. Lebouisse and assumed the position when the Agency's financial resources were low and when UNRWA was struggling to obtain contributions to finance the relief needs of the refugees. He soon found out that his first job lay in the realm of public information and education, i.e., establishing the proper intellectual climate within the United Nations General Assembly, so that the Assembly would endorse by its resolutions and its members would affirm through special contributions an expanded programme of vocational and teacher training for the refugees. UNRWA was granted in the 1959 Session of the Assembly a three-year extension of its mandate, July 1, 1960 to June 31, 1963. In his first Annual Report (1959-1960) the Commissioner-General asserted,

'UNRWA itself cannot solve the refugee problem. Any general solution to the complex problem, of which the refugee problem is a part, will be brought about largely by forces outside UNRWA - forces which will govern and shape the future of the Middle East. UNRWA can and should work in harmony with these forces. Ten years of UNRWA history bear out the fact that major development projects designed with the specific purpose of resettling the refugees are unacceptable to the refugees and host governments alike. It is the Director's opinion that major development projects in the Middle East should proceed independently of UNRWA and without direct reference to the resettlement of refugees.'

'In the Director's opinion, the Agency should concentrate its efforts during the new mandate period on: (1) administering relief (including food, shelter assistance and health services); (2) providing general education, both elementary and secondary; (3) teaching vocational skills, awarding university scholarships; and (4) offering small loans and grants to individual refugees who have skills and want to become self-employed.<sup>36</sup>

He pointed out that the refugees who were dependent upon international assistance since 1948 were for the most part of farmer or peasant stock. The Arab countries, already having an abundance of farmers and unskilled workers, have not been able to provide employment for the refugees. Also refugee youth, denied the opportunity for training in the traditional way alongside their fathers, are both unemployed and unemployable. These young people had not been trained in skills to fill the jobs for which numbers of qualified people in the Middle East are few. Dr. Davis did not hesitate to state that the outlook for the Palestine refugees was for a continuation of conditions similar to those of the past twelve years.

---

<sup>36</sup>United Nations, Annual Report of the Director of UNRWA, 1959-60, G.A.O.R. (XV), Supplement No. 14 (A/4478), p. 2. (emphasis mine).

Congress and appropriation for assistance to the refugees - The

Senate Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa interested itself in the question of assistance to the refugees and in 1953 particularly studied the Palestine refugee problem. A Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it consisted of four Senators: Robert A. Taft (Chairman), William F. Knowland, J. William Fulbright, and Guy M. Gillette. On May 20, 21, and 25 the Subcommittee held hearings on the "Palestine Refugee Program." The Members of the Subcommittee had been briefed by a staff memorandum submitted to them on May 19. Curiously enough the memorandum did not include the text of Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948, although it did give as "legislative background," all other resolutions to that date regarding the Palestine refugees.

The most important witnesses testifying before the Subcommittee were Under Secretary (at the time Acting Secretary) Walter Bedell Smith who put the case for the large scale development projects and Arthur Z. Gardiner, Politico-economic Adviser for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, who outlined the projects in detail. Pursuant to these hearings the Subcommittee and the Committee on Foreign Relations dispatched a Special Near East Refugee Survey Commission to the area (a committee of both houses although initiated in the Senate) to further investigate the situation. The Commission in its interim report to the Congress recommended the large-scale projects (this report submitted before its visit to the area).

The Mutual Security Act of 1953 appropriated \$194,000,000 to the President for use in his programs to reintegrate the refugees and "to assist in maintaining economic and political stability in the area."<sup>37</sup> The Mutual Security Acts of 1954 and 1955 reappropriated this sum for the same purposes, but since it was evident that the large-scale programs were unacceptable to the Arab States and the refugees and that Israel would not accept the repatriation of any substantial number of refugees (or the principle of their right to repatriation), Congress in 1957 stated

In determining whether or not to continue furnishing assistance for Palestine refugees in the Near East, the President shall take into account whether Israel and the Arab host governments are taking steps toward the resettlement and repatriation of such refugees.<sup>38</sup>

Thus, Congress chose to exert some pressure of its own. This position was reconfirmed in the Mutual Security Acts of 1958, 1959, and 1960, recommending that a certain percentage of the funds supplied to UNRWA be devoted to the purpose of resettling and repatriating the refugees. In 1958 and 1959 Acts Congress recalled its earlier "Presidential proviso" establishing the President's right to seek a solution to the refugee problem through Agencies of the American Government rather than the United Nations.

---

<sup>37</sup>Public Law 118, 83rd Congress, H.R. 5710, p. 2.

<sup>38</sup>Public Law 141, 85th Congress, S. 2130, p. 7.

United States policy at the end of the Eisenhower Administration -

Dulles' policy statement of August 26, 1955 served as the basis for United States policy during the latter part of the Presidency of Eisenhower. In 1958 his points concerning economic development were reaffirmed by President Eisenhower in his statement to the United Nations.

The last statement of policy made by the Eisenhower Administration confirmed and supported the changes that had been taking place within the United Nations. Hammarskjold's recommendations concerning the political and psychological aspects of the problem were reflected in the Assembly's revival of the Conciliation Commission. Francis O. Wilcox, then United States representative, addressed the Special Political Committee of the United Nations on November 16, 1960, endorsing fully the Assembly's decision to revive the CCP and to support UNRWA vocational training and education programs:

We must continue to support the Director of UNRWA and his staff in the constructive approach outlined in his latest report.

We must recognize the precarious financial position of the Agency, and all governments should consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions. Also the financial burden should be more equitably shared than has been the case heretofore. . .

The Palestine Conciliation Commission must continue its efforts to prepare the way for progress toward a solution of the refugee problem.

The Governments directly concerned must, in recognizing their primary responsibility for the fair and peaceful resolution of this issue, take greater initiative toward the attainment of a solution.<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup>Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1960, New York: 1961, p. 131.

The United States was updating its approach and making changes in order that its policies more adequately dealt with the situation in the Middle East.

During this period the United States openly supported the independence of the Arab States. It granted increasing amounts of economic aid to these countries - particularly Egypt - and avoided immediate involvement in inter-Arab politics. The United States continued to support Israel, but did not allow its attachment to the Jewish State to hinder a closer relationship with President Nasser. The 1960 Presidential Campaign and election occurred within the context of this change.

The election of Kennedy - John F. Kennedy was probably one of the most controversial politicians that ever became the Presidential candidate of either the Republicans or the Democrats. Kennedy had campaigned in nearly every state in the Union and entered all the primaries in order to gain the nomination of the Democratic Party. And, in the first week of July, 1960, Kennedy arrived at the Convention in Los Angeles to battle Lyndon Johnson for the nomination. Johnson had a wide array of supporters including Sam Rayburn, Dean Acheson, Ben Cohen, Clark Clifford, all men who had served under Roosevelt and/or Truman. Kennedy, however, was well organized and was able to overcome opposition from the Johnson camp and defeat a sudden draft-Stevenson campaign.

Chester Bowles was chairman of the Platform Committee, and the platform which was drafted was "joyously described by Herbert Humphrey as 'the most liberal in the party's history.'" The platform was long and detailed; the most notable and controversial plank was the civil



rights plank, said to be "the strongest ever issued by any political party."<sup>2</sup> In the plank entitled "The Underdeveloped World" a paragraph on the Middle East was included and read as follows:

In the Middle East we will work for guarantees to insure independence for all states. We will encourage direct Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, the resettlement of Arab refugees in lands where there is room and opportunity for them, an end to boycotts and blockades, and unrestricted use of the Suez Canal by all nations.<sup>3</sup>

The "Palestine plank" of 1960 was a complete endorsement of the demands of the American Zionist Organization. Israel and the Zionists had demanded direct negotiations with the Arab States and recognition of Israel as a part of the Middle East. They sought the end of the Arab boycott and <sup>to</sup> secure for Israel the right to use the Suez Canal. Furthermore, the reference to "the resettlement of Arab refugees in lands where there is room and opportunity for them" could imply that there was neither "room" nor "opportunity" in Israel and that the Arab refugees must be resettled in the Arab States.

The Republican Party nominated Vice-President Richard Nixon and United Nations Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. as its candidates. The Republican Platform included a rather comprehensive "Palestine plank":

---

<sup>2</sup>Victor Lasky, J.F.K., The Man and the Myth (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 402.

<sup>3</sup>Porter and Johnson, op. cit., p. 578.

In the Middle East, we shall continue to support the integrity and independence of all the States of that area including Israel and the Arab States.

With specific reference to Israel and the Arab nations we urge them to undertake negotiations for a mutually acceptable settlement of the causes of tension between them. We pledge continued efforts:

To eliminate the obstacles to a lasting peace in the area, including the human problem of the Arab refugees.

To seek an end to transit and trade restrictions, blockades and boycotts.

To secure freedom of navigation in international waterways, the cessation of discrimination against Americans on the basis of religious beliefs, and an end to the wasteful and dangerous arms race and to the threat of an arms imbalance in the area.<sup>4</sup>

This plank in the Republican Platform is significant in view of the close contest which took place between Kennedy and Nixon. The Republicans probably hoped that their conciliatory attitude toward Israel would induce a part of the "Jewish vote" to support the Nixon-Lodge ticket. This, in view of the forces within the Democratic Party apposed to the Kennedy candidacy, was a possibility.

The Kennedy campaign organization was prepared to seek and enlist the support of every minority and particularistic group on the American political scene. The Kennedy strategists studied the "Catholic vote", the "Negro vote," the "Jewish vote" and attempted to court them one by one. The campaign for the votes of the minority groups was crucial in the election results in 1960, in contrast to the results of 1952 and 1956. Kennedy defeated Nixon by only 119,450 popular

---

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 605.

votes. Counting write-in votes and other votes for minority tickets, Kennedy did not receive a majority of the 68,836,385 votes cast. The official tally gave Kennedy 34,227,096 votes and Nixon 34,107,646. In electoral votes Kennedy had 303 and Nixon 219. Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia received 15.

The Kennedy Administration - The Kennedy Administration was made up of young men and "eggheads" not of the Adlai Stevenson persuasion. For Secretary of State, Kennedy bypassed Chester Bowles and Senator William Fullbright, to appoint Dean Rusk, a careerman from the State Department, representative to the United Nations, and, at the time, President of the Rockefeller Foundation. Kennedy's relationship with Rusk appeared to be formal but characterized by mutual confidence and respect. According to Theodore Sorensen, a special adviser to the President, Kennedy preferred to back the policies of his Secretaries rather than run the risks of overruling them.<sup>5</sup> Clark Clifford, a former Truman advisor, aided the new Kennedy Administration to effect the transfer.

President Kennedy proposed an ambitious "first hundred days," seeking to attack during this period nearly every foreign and domestic problem faced by the United States.

---

<sup>5</sup>Theodore C. Sorensen, Decision-Making in the White House (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 80.

In Middle Eastern affairs he relied on the advice of experts with long-standing experience. He appointed John Badeau as Ambassador to Cairo and William Polk as adviser on the Policy Planning Staff which was headed by W.W. Rostow.<sup>6</sup>

Rusk, unlike Dulles, believes in making use of the Department of State bureaucracy in the formulation of policy. Moreover, he delegates authority and relies on the proper channels for information on specific questions and areas.<sup>7</sup>

During the first months of the Kennedy Administration legislation was slow-moving through Congress although the Democrats controlled both the House and the Senate. Conservatives from both parties seemed to join in opposition to the President's policies.

The men in the Kennedy Administration apparently responsible for the formulation of policy on the Palestine refugee problem - Rusk, Badeau, Polk - were familiar with both the issues involved and the national as well as the international implication of policies developed by the United States on any aspect of the Palestine Question.

---

<sup>6</sup>Badeau, a noted scholar on the Upper Nile and formerly with the American University of Cairo and American Friends of the Middle East, was appointed to continue the improvement in the Washington - Cairo rapprochement. Polk is a scholar from the Harvard Center for Middle East Studies, Rostow an economist from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

<sup>7</sup>Public Affairs Press, The New Frontiersmen, Profiles of the Men Around Kennedy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961), pp. 16-17.

Their first step was to reaffirm the long-standing American position in the United Nations - i.e., with respect to repatriation or compensation.

The adoption of Resolution 1604 (XV) by the General Assembly -

On April 21, 1961, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1604 (XV) which noted "with deep regret" that neither the repatriation or compensation of the refugees "as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194" had been effected, nor had the refugees been reintegrated by repatriation or resettlement as provided for in Resolution 513 (VI) of January 26, 1952. The Conciliation Commission was urged to continue its efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) and was requested to report on its progress not later than October 15, 1961.<sup>8</sup>

The United States voted in favor of the resolution and during the discussions of the Special Political Committee and the Plenary Session supported the provisions embodied in the resolution.

On October 13, the Commission reported to the Assembly, that it had sought to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 in the three following ways: (1) by continuing its program of identifying and valuating refugee property in Israel, (2) by continuing in its efforts to secure the release of blocked refugee bank accounts, and (3) by the appointment in August of Joseph E. Johnson as Special

---

<sup>8</sup>See Appendix A for full text.

Representative of the CCP to seek practical steps which might be taken with regard to the refugee problem.<sup>9</sup>

Joseph Johnson is an American who has a long record of service in international affairs and who was at the time of his appointment (and still is) the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It was obvious from the time of Johnson's appointment that both the office of Special Representative and the definition of his mission had originated in Washington. Johnson himself has confirmed this contention:

My own appointment--for I believe the concept of a Special Representative was evolved in Washington, and I know I was proposed for the assignment by the United States--began the most recent efforts of American officials to break out of the long impasse [with respect to the solution of the refugee problem].<sup>10</sup>

Other such efforts Johnson considered were those of John Foster Dulles which came to the surface in the Secretary's speech of August 26, 1955 - involving the payment of compensation by Israel to the refugees and the reintegration of refugees through the economic development of the Middle East - and of Dag Hammarskjold in his 1959 report concerning the development of the Middle East and the reintegration of the refugees.

Johnson, furthermore, has defined quite adequately the position of the United States on the CCP and the role it would have to

---

<sup>9</sup>G.A.O.R. (XVI), CCP 19th Progress Report, 13 October 1961, A/4921, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>Joseph E. Johnson, "Arab vs. Israeli: A Persistent Challenge to Americans," address before the American Assembly, Arden House, Harriman, New York, October 24, 1963 (Mimeo, American Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon).

play in achieving a solution to the problem:

Because the United States is by all odds the most important member of the Conciliation Commission, and because any progress on the refugee question must depend in very large measure on the Government of the United States, I also had extensive and intensive conversations with United States officials [in addition to conversations he had with United Nations personnel and Arab and Israeli high officials].<sup>11</sup>

Johnson was to do some extensive traveling in the Middle East and to hold discussions at the highest levels with Arab and Israeli officials. Sherwood G. Moe, an American and UNRWA Assistant Director for Liaison in New York, was asked by the CCP to accompany Johnson and to act as his assistant.

Between August 31 and September 20, Johnson toured the UNRWA area of operations and visited officials of the Arab host Governments and the Israel Government. The details of the conversations were kept secret, although information did leak to the press. The Conciliation Commission on October 13 reported that Dr. Johnson felt that it was not at the time possible to form and submit any firm conclusions; he informed the CCP . . .

. . . that high officials of the host countries and of Israel had expressed the view that it might be possible to take practical steps with regard to the refugee problem without prejudice to the positions of the Governments on other aspects of the 'Palestine Question.'<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>12</sup>Loc. cit.

Dr. Johnson submitted his report on November 24 as an addendum to the 19th Progress Report of the Conciliation Commission. Part I of Johnson's report was entitled "Factual Background Information" and was based on the Mediator's Progress Report and two working papers prepared by the Secretariat of the United Nations upon the request of the Conciliation Commission--in its 18th Progress Report. Together these working papers constituted a Historical Survey of the Efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III). The first was on "The Question of Reintegration or Resettlement," and the second, "The Question of Compensation." The first paper was especially significant as it utilized the repatriation-or-resettlement formula (which meant that the larger part of the refugees would be resettled in the Arab countries) rather than that of repatriation or compensation.<sup>13</sup> Thus, from the outset of his mission Dr. Johnson did not interpret the provisions of Resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11, to mean that all the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date and that their resettlement, rehabilitation, etc. should be facilitated by the Conciliation Commission. He considered the solution to be repatriation or resettlement, i.e., return to their homes (repatriation) or resettlement in the Arab countries. This is an extremely important fact to note here as Johnson

---

<sup>13</sup>See CCP, Historical Survey.



was the first person to attempt to implement the right of the refugees to choose between repatriation and compensation and to devise a method for effecting the choice. Because he chose to define the solution in terms of repatriation or resettlement he reallocated responsibility for the settlement of the refugees problem according to paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III). For both repatriation and compensation as defined by paragraph 11 the burden of responsibility fell on Israel. By stating his terms of reference as repatriation or resettlement, responsibility was divided between the Arabs and Israel. This was an extremely important modification if one recalls that the Mediator had made his recommendations in the light of the equities involved in the Palestine conflict as well as the situation existing at the time. By the time he had submitted his Conclusions it had probably become clear to him that Israel, was, for the most part, responsible for the plight of the Arabs of Palestine and that Israel should be responsible for their repatriation and for payment of compensation.

Again the question of responsibility goes back to the causes for the flight of the Arabs from their homes and villages. Here Johnson did not commit himself, but merely stated both the Arab and Zionist "versions."

. . . Put in its simplest and most general terms, the exodus was, as the United Nations Mediator Count Bernadotte, reported in 1948, 'a result of the conflict in Palestine.'<sup>14</sup>

However, Johnson failed to look more carefully into the recommendations

---

<sup>14</sup>G.A.O.R. (XVI), CCP 19th Progress Report, A/4921/Add.1, p. 6.

of the Mediator, the development of his ideas and views on the refugee question, and his experience with the supervision of the truces, and to note the entries in Bernadotte's journal To Jerusalem.

Johnson does note in this connection, however, that a comparison of the text of paragraph 11 with the Conclusions of the Mediator shows "the General Assembly did not fully accept all his conclusions with respect to the refugees."<sup>15</sup> This is true, but the Assembly did accept the repatriation-or-compensation formula with qualifications--i.e., peaceful intent of returning refugees and the practicability of the date of their return.

Johnson pointed out in his report the relationship of his efforts to the previous efforts of the United Nations to solve through repatriation or resettlement the refugee problem. He stated,

Although the Conciliation Commission for Palestine has no direct responsibility for assistance to the refugees, there is necessarily a close relationship between the task of the Commission under paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) and the provision of assistance.<sup>16</sup>

The Johnson Mission was based on the Hammarskjold report of 1959; Johnson was being sent to look into the political and psychological aspects of the problem prior to the development of a program which would effect the reintegration of the refugees through resettlement or repatriation. The economic analysis of the problem and potential of the Middle East prepared by the late Secretary-General presumably

---

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 7.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 10.

would be the basis for the economic rehabilitation and reintegration of the refugees.

In his Conclusions, Part C of his report, Johnson made four specific recommendations to the Commission. First, he stated that the focus of attention should continue to be on refugees, he considered that the wishes of the refugees must be respected (the principle of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III)), and he recommended that the refugees be regarded as a special case among all other homeless people in the world, that the Palestine refugees remain as wards of the United Nations until their problem is solved. Second, he urged that the cooperation of the governments concerned be obtained. And third, he said again that there was no early solution to the problem, but that a solution involved a "step-by-step process." Fourth, he pointed out the need for the machinery appropriate to the task of achieving such a step-by-step solution.<sup>17</sup>

The solution proposed was along the following lines:

Refugee heads of families, insulated by the United Nations from pressure from any source, should be allowed to choose voluntarily between a return to Palestine and compensation. These choices must be made specific--that is each refugee should know exactly what opportunities for resettlement existed in Israel and what amounts of compensation would be made available as an alternative. Compensation should be based on 1947-1948 values of property in Palestine, plus accrued interest. The United States and other members of the United Nations, including Israel, would contribute to this compensation. Israel would have the right to run a security check on each refugee opting for return.

---

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

Those refugees who had lacked property in Palestine would receive a reintegration allowance, wherever they might choose to go. Such allowances would be administered through the United Nations. . .<sup>18</sup>

Furthermore, Johnson declared that there were four concepts which were important in reaching a settlement. These were "acquiescence, simultaneity, disengagement, and gradualism."

Johnson did not feel that formal agreement between the parties was possible and that a "kind of tacit acquiescence" would be enough to permit the practical measures to be taken. Repatriation and resettlement "would begin simultaneously and proceed in parallel"--simultaneity. "For instance, the first refugee family returning to what is now Israel and the first to be resettled in an Arab country would move the same day, and representatives of both sides would observe the transfers." Johnson stated that each side must be given the right to disengage itself if it was not satisfied with the operations. Finally, he stated that the process must start slowly and accelerate gradually as neither side could absorb a flood of refugees.<sup>19</sup>

In his report to the Conciliation Commission Johnson concluded that . . .

---

<sup>18</sup>Ellis in Stevens, op. cit., p. 143.

<sup>19</sup>Johnson, "Arab vs. Israeli.."

. . . An implementation of the letter alone of paragraph 11 . . . would be meaningless to the refugees if it did not also lead to an implementation of what I would term the spirit of the paragraph, namely opportunities for them to live worthwhile lives. This thought is, in fact, reflected in the language of the paragraph itself, which looks to 'repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees.' For this to come about in the sixties will require accelerated economic growth for the area as a whole. Indeed the reintegration of the Palestine Arab refugees, whether by repatriation, resettlement or both, with compensation where appropriate, into a useful life in the Near East, will depend upon the rate of this development.<sup>20</sup>

This paragraph of Johnson's report reflects both the content and the language of the 1959 recommendations of the Secretary-General, and demonstrates the link between the efforts of the Secretary-General and those of the Conciliation Commission through its Special Representative.

In his October, 1963, address before the American Assembly, Johnson pointed out that several things are implicit in his recommendations concerning a step-by-step settlement of the refugee problem such as he proposed:

Neither the Arabs nor Israel would get what they want. Both would have to give up something. Israel would continue to exist as a state, with a predominantly Jewish population. The refugees would not be recompensated in full for the injustices they have suffered, and only a handful of them would return to the actual homes they left a decade and a half ago. Arab politicians would have to abandon a propaganda weapon they have cherished for those years. Israel, for her part, would have to take in some refugees she does not want, without any prior agreement on the number

---

<sup>20</sup>G.A.O.R. (XVI), CCP 19th Progress Report, Add. 1, p. 19.

(which parenthetically but most importantly, I am convinced would, under the procedures I propose, be very small, fewer than one-tenth of the total of true refugees and their descendants). And she would do so without obtaining what she wants on other specific issues.<sup>21</sup>

In terms of the areas which have been listed before as comprising the settlement of the refugee problem (political aspects) recommended by the Assembly, Johnson's suggestions were revolutionary. First, they were based on a repatriation-or-resettlement formula distributing the responsibility for the plight of the refugees among the Arab States and Israel rather than directing it to Israel. Second, they prejudiced the fight of the refugees to choose between repatriation and compensation as a significant number would receive neither. Johnson assumes that the refugees are an asset in the hands of Arab politicians rather than a liability. However, for the most part the refugees comprise a large group of disenfranchised persons who have neither a permanent home, citizenship, or a political identity. Johnson fails to realize that the Arab politicians--like politicians in other countries--reflect for the most part the wishes and feelings of the people they represent or govern. Under the procedures envisaged by Johnson very few refugees would be expected to elect to return to their homes; moreover he implies that these procedures were designed to achieve such results. If this is true, the concessions made by Israel would be minimal, and once again the Arabs would be forced to make the meaningful concessions (as concerning

---

<sup>21</sup>Johnson, "Arabs vs. Israeli..."

the acceptance of the Protocol of Lausanne, etc). Although Johnson implies that the refugees would be allowed a free choice, he clearly asserts that the number expected to choose repatriation would be small, and in discussing the four bases of the operation, he states that any one of the parties would be permitted to "disengage" itself if the "operations were not proceeding along the lines that [It] had been given to expect."<sup>22</sup> Thus, Israel (and the Arabs) could terminate the program at will or at a time when it felt that enough refugees had been allowed to repatriate (to resettle). Again, the Johnson effort as proposed and possibly engineered by the United States, attempted to effect a solution to the refugee problem which bypassed (1) the right of all the refugees wishing to return to their homes to do so, and (2) the right of those choosing not to return to the payment of compensation by Israel for their losses. In essence Johnson proposed to effect a token repatriation and compensation in order to settle the issue in terms of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III), and then to resettle the refugees in the Arab countries.

The Johnson proposals were significant not because they were designed to effect the solution to the refugee problem recommended by paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III), because this they did not do. But, these proposals represented the first attempt of the Kennedy Administration to bring about the reintegration and resettlement of the Palestine refugees in countries where there is both "room" and "opportunity"

---

<sup>22</sup>Loc. cit.

for them as pledged in the Democratic Platform upon which Kennedy ran. Joseph Johnson had been called upon to establish a mechanism for implementing the choice between repatriation and compensation, but a mechanism which would delay the choice of all the refugees, effect the return of a small number (less than one-tenth of the number of original refugees and their descendants, i.e. the 100,000 initially proposed by Israel), and thus eliminate the principle of the right of all refugees to repatriation if they so desire and to receive compensation if they do not wish to return home.

Upon his return from his tour of the Middle East, Johnson was hopeful that progress toward a resolution of the refugee problem could be made.

The Israeli attitude with respect to Johnson's mission was expressed on October 11 in an address to the Knesset by Ben Gurion in which he said, "Israel categorically rejects the insidious proposal of freedom of choice for the refugees."<sup>23</sup>

The Arabs opposed a solution based on gradualism but appeared conciliatory toward the concept of a Special Representative of the Conciliation Commission, as his efforts appeared to be based on the principle set forth in paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III); if in the long-run his proposals were unacceptable, they could reject them.

---

<sup>23</sup>The New York Times, October 12, 1961.



The General Assembly on December 20, 1961, adopted Resolution 1725 (XVI) which requested the Conciliation Commission (and the Special Representative) to intensify its efforts in both seeking a solution and in completing the identification and evaluation of refugee property. This resolution was based on a United States draft presented to the Special Political Committee. During the debates of the Committee the United States urged that a solution be sought according to the terms of Resolution 194 (III), paragraph 11.<sup>24</sup>

The continuation of Johnson's efforts - Johnson continued to seek an area of agreement between the parties during 1961-62 and again reported to the Assembly in the fall of 1962. Apparently Johnson felt that he could achieve some success by simply continuing his efforts in New York and did not make any further visits to the area. His work was noted in the 20th Progress Report of the Conciliation Commission submitted to the Assembly on December 7, 1962.<sup>25</sup>

Following consideration of this report and the Annual Report of the Commissioner-General (Director) of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees, the Special Political Committee entertained three draft resolutions. The first was a 21-power draft submitted by some Afro-Asian and Latin American nations which urged the parties to the Palestine conflict to enter into direct negotiations and to particularly devote their efforts to a solution to

---

<sup>24</sup>G.A.O.R. (XVI), Special Political Committee, Summary Records, 20 September - 19 December 1961, pp. 261 ff.

<sup>25</sup>G.A.O.R. (XVII), CCP 20th Progress Report, 14 October 1961-7 December 1962.

the refugee problem. The second draft was submitted by Afghanistan, Mauritania, Pakistan, and Indonesia and suggested that the United Nations appoint a custodian for refugee properties in Israel. The third draft was that tabled by the United States. This draft simply thanked the Commissioner-General and staff of UNRWA for carrying out their task, thanked the Conciliation Commission, extended UNRWA's mandate until June 30, 1965, and urged Member Nations to contribute to UNRWA.

The United States draft was significant because it omitted the usual preambular phrase which notes with regret that the repatriation or compensation of the refugees has not been implemented. Cyprus proposed the addition of the preamble "by which the Assembly would note with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), had not been effected." On December 18, the vote was taken on the drafts, the U.S. draft, being given precedence over the others. The Cyprus amendment was adopted, 68 to 2 with 34 abstentions. The U.S. draft as amended was adopted by the Plenary Session on December 20, 100 to 0 with 2 abstentions. The two countries abstaining from the voting were Israel and the Cameroons.

Dr. Johnson was indignant with respect to the Israel abstention on the resolution as it showed that the Israel Government had no confidence in his mission.<sup>26</sup> In January, 1963, Johnson submitted his resig-

---

<sup>26</sup>New York Times, December 19, 1962 (Western Edition).

nation to the Conciliation Commission. Johnson's feelings concerning the attitude of Israel towards his mission had been confirmed in November, 1962, when Foreign Affairs Minister Golda Meir "recalled a Knesset resolution of November, 1961 [probably following Ben Burion's October address ], which stated there could be no returning of Arab refugees to Israel and that the only solution to the problem was their settlement in the Arab States."<sup>27</sup> The Johnson proposals had been apparently designed to fit the position Israel had last taken with regard to the repatriation of a specific number of refugees. However, this stand had been taken in 1950-51; by 1961-62 Israel was not prepared to accept the return of any refugees and made its position quite clear on this point. Thus, the Kennedy Administration had failed in its initial effort to improve Arab-Israeli relations; the Johnson effort, it seems, had been conceived as a first step in this direction.

The Kennedy Administration, being defeated in its initiative, did not press the issue of repatriation or compensation further. On December 3, 1963, the General Assembly affirmed its support of UNRWA's work and requested the Conciliation Commission to continue in its efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III).<sup>28</sup> The draft had been submitted by Afro-Asian nations, not by the United States. The United States did vote in favor of the draft

---

<sup>27</sup>Yearbook of the United Nations, 1962, pp. 141-143.

<sup>28</sup>See Appendix A for text of the resolution.

(which included the preamble concerning the lack of a solution according to repatriation or compensation), but it was clear that the United States was not prepared to exert its influence to achieve such a solution.

The Johnson Mission on the surface was an attempt to solve the refugee problem according to the wishes of the refugees, but the present writer has attempted to show that this effort did not in fact seek to implement the solution recommended in paragraph 11. The Johnson Mission attempted to use paragraph 11 in order to gain acceptance of the solution proposed earlier in the Hammarskjold proposals.

It is significant that Johnson made use of the reintegration-through-repatriation-or-resettlement formula, and that Johnson had envisaged reintegration would be primarily achieved through resettlement. The Johnson effort was political in nature; the reintegration through resettlement solution had been previously been attempted without reference to repatriation and UNRWA had been the vehicle by which such reintegration-resettlement would be accomplished. Thus, if a change in policy is to be noted, it is the change in the Assembly's attitude toward UNRWA. It is important that the Assembly did not attempt to push the resettlement schemes through UNRWA when it failed to achieve a solution through a political effort as it had done in the past. The Assembly's change in attitude on this matter was probably a result of a change in the attitude of the United States.

In fact, it seems that the United States had altered its position with respect to UNRWA. Such changes had begun to take place in 1959 when UNRWA launched its program to expand vocational and teacher training and education. By that time the Advisory Commission of UNRWA had become more of an advisory body than one used by the United States primarily to dictate policy to the UNRWA Director as had apparently been the case in the early 1950's. Moreover, the Commission constituted a link between UNRWA the governments represented thereon. The Advisory Commission had grown to include representatives of the Arab host governments as well as of the United States, Belgium, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and France. The United States had not lost its influence on the Commission as the U.S. still supplied on a matching basis some 70 per cent of the total UNRWA annual budget, but this influence was used to accomplish different ends.

UNRWA's programs in education and vocational training. The Commissioner-General of UNRWA in 1959-1960 recommended a three-year program for the expansion of UNRWA's education and vocational training programs. This expansion was to be in two phases. The first phase proposed to (a) improve elementary and secondary school teaching through teacher training and expand classroom facilities, (b) expand vocational training by opening nine new centers, seven for boys' vocational training, one for boys' teacher training, and one for girls' combined vocational and teacher training, (c) double the number of university scholarships, and (d) reorganize the loans and grants program, this last point coming outside the field of education. In the second phase

UNRWA sought to double the capacity of five of the vocational training centers listed in the first phase.

The program set down, the Commissioner-General began to look for funds. World Refugee Year was asked to provide \$4 million to establish at least four of the vocational training centers and help finance the small loan program. WRY raised for UNRWA more than the \$ 4 million requested. Between 1959 and 1963 UNRWA received nearly \$2.5 million for its education and training program from regularly contributing governments which increased their contributions specifically for this purpose. Expansion in general education was financed through UNRWA's regular budget. The following table shows the expansion of the UNRWA programs:

TABLE VII

UNRWA EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS<sup>29</sup>

I. General Education.

A. Total Enrollment:

<u>1951*</u>	<u>1955</u>	<u>1958-</u> <u>1959</u>	<u>1959-</u> <u>1960</u>	<u>1960-</u> <u>1961</u>	<u>1961-</u> <u>1962</u>	<u>1962-</u> <u>1963</u>	<u>1963-</u> <u>1964</u>
43,112	104,751	120,239	123,883	128,501	137,137	145,458	157,331

---

<sup>29</sup>See UNRWA, Annual Report of the Commissioner-General, 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963 (A/5513). Annex.

B. Administrative and classroom construction in UNRWA/UNESCO Schools:

<u>Building program 1953-1955</u>	<u>Building program 1959-1962</u>
700	1,649

II. Vocational Training.

A. Output 1959-1963:

<u>1959</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963**</u>
152	385	315	693	885

Cumulative output, 1952-1963: 3,296

B. Total Enrollment:

<u>1958-1959</u>	<u>1962-1963</u> (full capacity to be realized in 1963-1964).
600	3,692

III. University Scholarships.

<u>1950</u>	<u>1952-1953</u>	<u>1954-1955</u>	<u>1955-1956</u>	<u>1961-1962</u>	<u>1962-1963</u>	<u>1963-1964</u>
90	217	300	350***	469	532	750

\* Initial year.

\*\* Provisional.

\*\*\* Remained stable figure until 1962.

In October, 1963, UNRWA opened its tenth center, the goals of the program were realized substantially. A new method was devised for the Agency to finance the operational costs of these and other centers. Extra-budgetary amounts were to be pledged for a vocational training scholarship fund. Governments, voluntary agencies, service organizations, individuals, and groups were invited to contribute. A

sponsorship program was introduced to establish contact between the refugee recipient and his benefactor. Contributions were made in currency or in supplies designated for use in the schools themselves or in other areas of UNRWA operations, the value of such supplies being put into the scholarship account. In the UNRWA budget for 1963 alone, it was estimated that \$1.2 million will come as special income for the sponsorship program. Moreover, the 1963 budget makes provision for the construction of two additional centers, one in Lebanon and one in Gaza, as well as operation of existing facilities at full capacity.

<sup>tenth</sup>  
The center opened in October, 1963, was the first of its kind of the Middle East. Built adjacent to the Sibliin Vocational Training Center, Lebanon, the new center provided for the teaching of instructors in vocational training and the training of industrial foremen; boys enrolling are required to be graduates of UNRWA vocational training courses. The other UNRWA first in the area is the residential Ramallah Girls' Training Center near Jerusalem, Jordan. It provides primary and secondary teacher training to 300 girls and vocational training in nine subjects to 333 girls.

The Commissioner-General, Dr. John Davis' statement of November 4, 1963, to the Special Political Committee reiterated his personal commitment to the programs he forwarded during his five years of office. His words serve both to clarify his stand on the issues of the Palestine problem and to emphasize the need for and importance of education and training:



"UNRWA's basic function is to serve the needs of the Palestine refugees, working of course within the frame of reference laid down by the General Assembly. Pertinent to any discussion of the work of the Agency is the necessity for an understanding of the needs of the Palestine refugees under conditions which now exist. In terms of UNRWA's responsibilities, the needs of the refugees, fall into two general categories, i.e., relief services and educational services . . .

" . . . it is my belief that the Palestine refugee problem can be solved insofar as employable individuals and their dependents are concerned. This, I believe, is true regardless of what type of general and overall solution may ultimately be worked out or developed with respect to the broader issues involved. The truth is that under any circumstances which may develop with respect to an overall solution of the Palestine issue, the refugee problem comes down to two basic components: the existence of jobs and the training of people to be eligible for these jobs. This would be true if paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) were implemented in full and without regard to the ratio between those who might choose repatriation and those who elect compensation as a mode of settlement. Similarly, it would still be true if in the course of history the Palestine issue were to be resolved without any implementation of paragraph 11 at all.<sup>30</sup>

This statement by the Commissioner-General points out already that the refugee problem is both a political and a human problem, and that even if a political solution to the problem were to be effected, the human problem would remain. The adoption of a new conception of the activities of UNRWA by the United Nations General Assembly was essentially to the continuation of the Agency and to its effective implementation of its mandates. The Assembly had adopted this essential new attitude by 1959; UNRWA was then freed of its obligations

---

<sup>30</sup>UNRWA, Address of the Commissioner-General to the Special Political Committee, November 4, 1963 (Mimeo, UNRWA Office of Public Informations).

to undertake the obligation of implementing or seeking to implement large-scale resettlement projects under the reintegration-resettlement formula.

Improved relations - In line with these changes UNRWA was able to continue to improve its relations with the United Nations Organization itself, and with the host governments.

During the summer of 1961 the UNRWA staff was reorganized: the departments--Health, Welfare, Education, etc.-- were given a status within the Agency more in line with comparable operational divisions within other U.N. agencies. Department "chiefs" and heads of Agency offices in the host countries were made "Directors" and Dr. Davis became known as the "Director of Directors" until his title was changed to "Commissioner-General" of UNRWA.

Agency operations were decentralized in order to allow more autonomy to the field offices and to the directors in the four host countries. Davis stressed a less formal and legal relationship between the Agency and host governments, one based on the common interests of the parties in the operational sphere rather than on the conflicting interests in the legal realm. He made known the contributions the Arab Governments made directly to the refugees--in monetary value approximately \$65 million since 1948 and to the work of UNRWA another \$11 million in cash.

Through the Annual Report the role of the Commissioner-General was changed from one of reporting to the General Assembly on the operations of the Agency to that of recommending to the Assembly the programs which should be undertaken by the Agency.

The improvement in the status of UNRWA within the United Nations System and in the Agency's relationships with the host countries, has made the Agency more able to cope with the operational problems and challenges of long-range assistance to the refugees. As the Commissioner-General said . . .

" . . . one must realize that any general solution to the refugee problem will not completely end the need for relief during this generation. As a minimum figure, there must exist some 250,000 refugees, including dependents who, for all practical purposes, are unemployable because of physical deterioration, mental attitude or lack of skill. Actually, the number in this category may prove to be considerably larger and will in part be a function of the overall economic climate of the Middle East in the future; the more competitive the labor market, the larger the number of refugees who will remain unemployed. Many of these persons may continue to be in need of relief for the remainder of their lives, or failing to get such relief may be forced to live in dire poverty.<sup>31</sup>

Congress and assistance to the refugees - The Congressional attitude concerning appropriations for relief and other assistance to the refugees remained much the same during the Kennedy Administration. One study completed by Congressman Leonard Farbstein for the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs<sup>32</sup> dealt mainly with

---

<sup>31</sup>Loc. cit.

<sup>32</sup>United States, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st. Session, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Arab Refugees from Palestine, report by Leonard Farbstein, April 4, 1963 (U.S. Govt. Printing Office: 1963).

possibilities of the refugees' reintegration into the economic life of the Middle East. Moreover, Congress in the Act for International Development of 1961 reiterated its condition in determining the provision of assistance, that the President should take into account,

whether Israel and the Arab host governments are taking steps toward the resettlement and repatriation of the refugees. . .<sup>33</sup>

This condition was affirmed in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963 as well.<sup>34</sup> Congress proved anxious to solve the refugee problem as it is responsible for the approving of the U.S. contribution to UNRWA.

The Kennedy Administration and policy on the refugee question -

The Kennedy Administration did not adopt a new policy on the Palestine refugee question. Rather the new Administration continued to pursue those carried out by the Eisenhower Administration. Kennedy apparently preferred to remain personally disengaged from the issue as he did not directly intervene as Eisenhower had done. Nor has Secretary of State Rusk interfered directly in the making of policy on the refugee question. Dr. Joseph Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was probably chosen by Rusk as a friend and former colleague, as Rusk was formerly President of the Rockefeller Foundation. The closest instance of direct interference from President Kennedy himself was the sending in 1962 of Dean Sayre, a close friend

---

<sup>33</sup>Public Law 195, 87th Congress, S. 1983, September 4, 1961, p. 9.

<sup>34</sup>Public Law 205, 88th Congress, H.R. 7885, December 16, 1963, p. 5.

of the President, to UNRWA Headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, and to Israel for private and unpublicized discussions with high officials.

The Kennedy Administration followed the policy of the Eisenhower Administration, preferring to work through the United Nations rather than to work alone or in cooperation with the United Kingdom and France as in the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Eisenhower had attempted to influence United Nations policies by putting his own personal stamp of approval upon them and to become himself involved in the policy-making process within the United Nations. His address of August, 1958, demonstrated this. The proposals Eisenhower made at that time became linked to the 1959 recommendations of the Secretary-General for the continuation of assistance to the refugees. Kennedy did not seem personally to commit himself to any particular policy in the area either in the Democratic Platform of 1960 or during his term of office. Perhaps he was merely carrying out to its logical conclusion the process of disengagement which had begun to take place, disengagement of the United States from the internal politics of the Middle East, to disengagement of the person of the President from the political implications- both national and international - of the Arab-Israeli dispute. It is too early yet to conjecture what the President's motives for adopting such a policy might have been or to ascertain that he did in fact really disengage himself from the intricacies of the Palestine refugee problem.

## CONCLUSIONS

During the past fifteen years some half-score of serious attempts have been made to resolve the problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but none with success. . . one persistent factor has been largely responsible for the disappointing outcome of past programs . . . This factor has been a failure on the part of policy makers to adequately assess, weigh, and take into account the deep feelings of the peoples indigenous to the region.--Dr. John H. Davis, former Commissioner-General of UNRWA, to the American Council for Judaism, New York City, May 9, 1964

Before drawing any conclusions on the subject of this study one must recall that the Palestine refugee problem has a political and a humanitarian aspect and that repatriation or compensation was established by the United Nations primarily as the solution to the political aspect of the problem.

This writer concludes that there has been no fundamental change in United States explicit policy on the principle of repatriation or compensation as defined in the first part of paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III) of December 11, 1948. No change has occurred because there has been no progress toward a resolution of the issues outstanding between the Arab States and Israel and because the factors which determine this policy have not altered to any great extent.

First, the United States has by and large been able to obtain its foreign policy objectives in the Arab States without being obliged to press for the solution to the refugee problem according to Resolution 194 (III).

Second, American policy-makers have consistently allowed national political considerations to determine the amount of pressure that might be exerted upon Israel in order to achieve any concessions on refugees or other issues. Moreover, the same individuals have been important in the determination of policy in at least two of the three administrations under review. Among these individuals have been Clark Clifford, Dean Rusk, John Foster Dulles, Judge Samel Rosenmann, Robert Taft, etc.

Third, paragraph 11 of Resolution 194 (III), although constantly postponed and relegated to the background, provides an element of stability in the Middle East as it constitutes a statement by the United Nations and the international community which points out that the status quo achieved in Palestine in 1948 is inequitable and that the rights of the Arabs of Palestine as well as those of the Jews should be respected. Whether or not a solution according to the resolution is effected the principle stated in paragraph 11 gives the Palestine refugee a special status within the Middle East and within the United Nations system. The Arab countries could not in 1948 and cannot today absorb economically or politically the Palestine refugees which remain dependent on the United Nations for assistance. If they

were forced to do so there undoubtedly would be a serious and incalculable deterioration of the situation between the Arab States and Israel. Because the refugees who are not employable are granted United Nations assistance they do not constitute to the Arab host countries an economic problem of such magnitude as to hinder development and economic growth. Furthermore, the continued existence of the refugee problem has not so far been per se a serious threat to the internal security of the Arab countries who failed to go to war with Israel for lack of a solution.

With respect to the humanitarian aspect of the problem, United States has changed, and the United States has, in fact, been the principal initiator of change in the United Nations approach to this aspect. The changes, three in number, were as follows:

1. From temporary, short-term relief programs such as United Nations Disaster Relief and United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR) to a longer-term, large-scale operation, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). Disaster Relief and UNRPR were essentially non-operational, undertaking mainly the coordination of relief which was administered directly by the international voluntary agencies. UNRWA assumed the relief function of these agencies as its first task and sought to effect the rehabilitation of the refugees as its second task. With respect to this second task, the Economic Survey Mission's recommendation that UNRWA undertake small-scale public works and camp-improvement projects called "work-relief"



as well as small-scale loan and self-help projects for the refugees, constituted the basic for the initial directives given to UNRWA by the General Assembly. It must be indicated that the relief function--the first task--of UNRWA has not fundamentally changed since this time; changes, however, have been made in the second task of the Agency, the task of rehabilitating the refugees.

2. From small-scale works and self-support projects to large-scale regional development planning and reintegration of the refugees through their resettlement, primarily in the Arab countries.

3. From large-scale and regional development, reintegration and resettlement projects to vocational training and expand education programs for the refugees.

While these changes fall explicitly in the humanitarian context, they do, however, indicate the unfolding of a United States indirect approach to the solution of the political aspect itself. It will be noted that the third change listed above is a more subtle and long-term interpretation of the indirect approach than the regional development schemes.

The Truman Administration sought the repatriation of a specific number of refugees, working primarily through the Conciliation Commission for Palestine and the American Ambassador in Tel-Aviv.

Eisenhower sought to achieve Arab-Israeli agreement on the development of the Jordan River system and to achieve through regional economic and social development the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab States.

Kennedy attempted through a Special Representative of the Conciliation Commission to achieve a token solution according to the principle of repatriation or compensation and then a general solution of the problem through the reintegration of the refugees into the economies and social systems of the Arab host countries.

If any predictions may be attempted concerning United States policy on the principle of repatriation or compensation of the Palestine refugees, this writer would contend that policy will not change, that the United States will continue to seek the rehabilitation or the refugees through reintegrative training in order to make them independent of international assistance. The principle set forth in paragraph 11 will not be rejected, and no symbolic solution along the lines of paragraph 11--such as that attempted by Johnson--will be pressed too far unless the Arabs and Israelis both acquiesce to it. Furthermore, American policy on the principle of repatriation or compensation will continue to be founded not only on the situation existing in the Middle East but also on the requirements of the American domestic political scene. The equities involved in the Palestine conflict will remain in the background.

APPENDIX A

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS REGARDING  
ASSISTANCE TO PALESTINE REFUGEES

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND WORKS AGENCY FOR PALESTINE REFUGEES  
IN THE NEAR EAST

Text of Resolution 212 (III)  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
on 19 November 1948

Whereas the problem of the relief of Palestine refugees of all communities is one of immediate urgency and the United Nations Mediator on Palestine in his progress report of 18 September 1948, part three, states that "action must be taken to determine the necessary measures (of relief) and to provide for their implementation"(1) and that "the choice is between saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die";

Whereas the Acting Mediator, in his supplemental report of 18 October 1948, declares that "the situation of the refugees is now critical"(2) and that "aid must not only be continued but very greatly increased if disaster is to be averted"(3);

Whereas the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the Palestine refugees is one of the minimum conditions for the success of the efforts of the United Nations to bring peace to that land,

The General Assembly,

1. Expresses its thanks to the Governments and organizations which, and the individual persons who, have given assistance directly or in response to the Mediator's appeal;

2. Considers on the basis of the Acting Mediator's recommendation, that a sum of approximately \$29.5 million will be required to provide relief for 500,000 refugees for a period of nine months from 1 December 1948 to 31 August 1949; and that an additional amount of approximately \$2.5 million will be required for administrative and local operational expenses;

3. Authorizes the Secretary General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance immediately a sum of up to \$5 million from the Working Capital Fund of the United Nations, the said sum to be repaid before the end of the period specified in paragraph 2, from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under paragraph 4;

---

(1) Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Supplement 11.

(2) Document A/689.

(3) Ibid.

4. Urges all States Members of the United Nations to make as soon as possible voluntary contributions in kind or in funds sufficient to ensure that the amount of supplies and funds required is obtained, and states, that, to this end, voluntary contributions of non-member States would also be accepted; contributions in funds may be made in currencies other than the United States dollar, in so far as the operations of the relief organization can be carried out in such currencies;

5. Authorizes the Secretary-General to establish a Special Fund into which contributions shall be paid, which will be administered as a separate account;

6. Authorizes the Secretary-General to expend the funds received under paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present resolution;

7. Instructs the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to establish regulations for the administration and supervision of the Fund;

8. Requests the Secretary-General to take all necessary steps to extend aid to Palestine refugees and to establish such administrative organization as may be required for this purpose, inviting the assistance of the appropriate agencies of the several Governments, the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies and other voluntary agencies, it being recognized that the participation of voluntary organizations in the relief plan would in no way derogate from the principle of impartiality on the basis of which the assistance of these organizations is being solicited;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Director of United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, to whom he may delegate such responsibility as he may consider appropriate for the overall planning and implementation of the relief programme;

10. Agrees to the convoking, at the discretion of the Secretary-General, of an ad hoc advisory committee of seven members to be selected by the President of the General Assembly to which the Secretary-General may submit any matter of principle or policy upon which he would like the benefit of the committee's advice;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to continue and to extend the implementation of the present relief programme until the machinery provided for by the present resolution is set up;

12. Urges the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Refugee Organization, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and other appropriate organizations and agencies, acting within the framework of the relief programme herein

established, promptly to contribute supplies, specialized personnel and other services permitted by their constitutions and their financial resources, to relieve the desperate plight of Palestine refugees of all communities;

13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly, at the next regular session, on the action taken as a result of this resolution.

---

Text of Resolution 194 (III)  
The Palestine Question  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
on 11 December 1948

The General Assembly,

Having considered further the situation in Palestine,

1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and

Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;

2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States Members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:

a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;

b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;

c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;

3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission;

4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

5. Calls upon the Government and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

7. Resolves that the Holy Places - including Nazareth - religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory; that with regard to the Holy Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy Places and access to them; and that these undertakings should be presented to the General Assembly for approval;

8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area, including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ain Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu'fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective United Nations control;

Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the Jerusalem area which will provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special international status of the Jerusalem area;

The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who shall cooperate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the Jerusalem area;

9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road, rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;



Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for appropriate action that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;

10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and communication facilities;

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations;

12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution;

The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;

13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations;

14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution.

Text of Resolution 302 (IV)  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
on 8 December 1949

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 212 (III) of 19 November 1948 and 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, affirming in particular the provisions of paragraph 11 of the latter resolution,

Having examined with appreciation the first interim report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East(1) and the report of the Secretary-General on assistance to Palestine refugees(2),

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Governments which have generously responded to the appeal embodied in its resolution 212 (III), and to the appeal of the Secretary-General, to contribute in kind or in funds to the alleviation of the conditions of starvation and distress amongst the Palestine refugees;

2. Expresses also its gratitude to the International Committee of the Red Cross, to the League of Red Cross Societies and to the American Friends Service Committee for the contribution they have made to this humanitarian cause by discharging, in the face of great difficulties, the responsibility they voluntarily assumed for the distribution of relief supplies and the general care of the refugees; and welcomes the assurance they have given the Secretary-General that they will continue their co-operation with the United Nations until the end of March 1950 on a mutually acceptable basis;

3. Commends the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund for the important contribution which it has made towards the United Nations programme of assistance; and commends those specialized agencies which have rendered assistance in their respective fields, in particular the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the International Refugee Organization;

4. Expresses its thanks to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations which have materially assisted in bringing relief to Palestine refugees;

---

(1) Document A/1106.

(2) Documents A/1060 and A/1060/Add.1.

5. Recognizes that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, continued assistance for the relief of the Palestine refugees is necessary to prevent conditions of starvation and distress among them and to further conditions of peace and stability, and that constructive measures should be undertaken at an early date with a view to the termination of international assistance for relief;

6. Considers that, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 (d) of the present resolution, the equivalent of approximately \$33.7 million will be required for direct relief and works programmes for the period 1 January to 31 December 1950 of which the equivalent of \$20.2 million is required for direct relief and \$13.5 million for works programmes; that the equivalent of approximately \$21.2 million will be required for works programmes from 1 January to 30 June 1951, all inclusive of administrative expenses; and that direct relief should be terminated not later than 31 December 1950 unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly at its fifth regular session;

7. Establishes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:

- (a) To carry out in collaboration with local governments the direct relief and works programmes as recommended by the Economic Survey Mission;
- (b) To consult with the interested Near Eastern Governments concerning measures to be taken by them preparatory to the time when international assistance for relief and works projects is no longer available;

8. Establishes an Advisory Commission consisting of representatives of France, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, with power to add not more than three additional members from contributing Governments, to advise and assist the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in the execution of the programme; the Director and the Advisory Commission shall consult with each Near Eastern Government concerned in the selection, planning and execution of projects;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East in consultation with the Governments represented on the Advisory Commission;

- (a) The Director shall be the chief executive officer of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East responsible to the General Assembly for the operation of the programme;

- (b) The Director shall select and appoint his staff in accordance with general arrangements made in agreement with the Secretary-General, including such of the staff rules and regulations of the United Nations as the Director and the Secretary-General shall agree are applicable, and to the extent possible utilize the facilities and assistance of the Secretary-General;
- (c) The Director shall, in consultation with the Secretary-General and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, establish financial regulations for the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
- (d) Subject to the financial regulations established pursuant to clause (c) of the present paragraph, the Director, in consultation with the Advisory Commission, shall apportion available funds between direct relief and works projects in their discretion, in the event that the estimates in paragraph 6 require revision;

10. Requests the Director to convene the Advisory Commission at the earliest practicable date for the purpose of developing plans for the organization and administration of the programme, and of adopting rules of procedure;

11. Continues the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees as established under General Assembly resolution 212 (III) until 1 April 1950, or until such date thereafter as the transfer referred to in paragraph 12 is effected, and requests the Secretary-General in consultation with the operating agencies to continue the endeavour to reduce the numbers of rations by progressive stages in the light of the findings and recommendations of the Economic Survey Mission;

12. Instructs the Secretary-General to transfer to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the assets and liabilities of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees by 1 April, 1950, or at such date as may be agreed by him and the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

13. Urges all Members of the United Nations and non-members to make voluntary contributions in funds or in kind to ensure that the amount of supplies and funds required is obtained for each period of the programme as set out in paragraph 6; contributions in funds may be made in currencies other than the United States dollar in so far as the programme can be carried out in such currencies;

14. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance funds deemed to be available for this purpose and not exceeding \$5 million from the Working Capital Fund to finance operations pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than 31 December 1950 from the voluntary governmental contributions requested under paragraph 13 above;

15. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to negotiate with the International Refugee Organization for an interest-free loan in an amount not to exceed the equivalent of \$2.8 million to finance the programme subject to mutually satisfactory conditions for repayment;

16. Authorizes the Secretary-General to continue the Special Fund established under General Assembly resolution 212 (III) and to make withdrawals therefrom for the operation of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, upon the request of the Director, for the operations of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

17. Calls upon the Governments concerned to accord to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East the privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities which have been granted to the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees, together with all other privileges, immunities, exemptions and facilities necessary for the fulfilment of its functions;

18. Urges the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the International Refugee Organization, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization and other appropriate agencies and private groups and organizations, in consultation with the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to furnish assistance within the framework of the programme;

19. Requests the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:

- (a) To appoint a representative to attend the meeting of the Technical Assistance Board as observer so that the technical assistance activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East may be coordinated with the technical assistance programmes of the United Nations and specialized agencies referred to in Economic and Social Council resolution 222 (IX) A of 15 August 1949;
- (b) To place at the disposal of the Technical Assistance Board full information concerning any technical assistance work which may be done by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, in order that it may be included in the reports submitted by the Technical Assistance Board to the Technical Assistance Committee of the Economic and Social Council;

20. Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to consult with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interests of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948;

21. Requests the Director to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations an annual report on the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, including an audit of funds, and invites him to submit to the Secretary-General such other reports as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East may wish to bring to the attention of Members of the United Nations, or its appropriate organs;

22. Instructs the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to transmit the final report of the Economic Survey Mission, with such comments as it may wish to make, to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations and to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

---



Text of Resolution 393 (V)  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On 2 December 1950

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949,

Having examined the report of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East(1), and the report of the Secretary-General concerning United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees(2),

1. Notes that contributions sufficient to carry out the programme authorized in paragraph 6 of resolution 302 (IV) have not been made, and urges governments which have not yet done so to make every effort to make voluntary contributions in response to paragraph 13 of that resolution;
2. Recognizes that direct relief cannot be terminated as provided in paragraph 6 of resolution 302 (IV);
3. Authorizes the Agency to continue to furnish direct relief to refugees in need, and considers that, for the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952, the equivalent of approximately \$20 million will be required for direct relief to refugees who are not yet reintegrated into the economy of the Near East;
4. Considers that, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, the reintegration of the refugees into the economic life of the Near East, either by repatriation or resettlement, is essential in preparation for the time when international assistance is no longer available, and for the realization of conditions of peace and stability in the area;
5. Instructs the Agency to establish a reintegration fund which shall be utilized for projects requested by any government in the Near East and approved by the Agency for the permanent re-establishment of refugees and their removal from relief;
6. Considers that, for the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952, not less than the equivalent of \$30 million should be contributed to the Agency for the purposes set forth in paragraph 5 above;

---

(1) Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, A/1451.

(2) Ibid. A/1452.

7. Authorizes the Agency, as circumstances permit, to transfer funds available for the current relief and works programmes, and for the relief programme provided in paragraph 3 above, to reintegration projects provided for in paragraph 5;

8. (a) Requests the President of the General Assembly to appoint a Negotiating Committee composed of seven or more members for the purpose of consulting, as soon as possible during the current session of the General Assembly, with Member and non-member States as to the amounts which governments may be willing to contribute on a voluntary basis towards:

- (i) the current programme for relief and works for the period ending 30 June 1951, bearing in mind the need for securing contributions from Member States which have not yet contributed;
- (ii) the programme of relief and reintegration projects as provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 above for the year ending 30 June 1952;

(b) Authorizes the Negotiating Committee to adopt procedures best suited to the accomplishment of its task, bearing in mind:

- (i) the need for securing the maximum contribution in cash;
- (ii) the desirability of ensuring that any contribution in kind is of a nature which meets the requirements of the contemplated programmes;
- (iii) the importance of enabling the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to plan its programmes in advance and to carry them out with funds regularly contributed;
- (iv) the degree of assistance which can continue to be rendered by specialized agencies, non-member States and other contributors;

(c) Requests that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has ascertained the extent to which Member States are willing to make contributions, all delegations be notified accordingly by the Secretary-General in order that they may consult with their governments;

(d) Decides that, as soon as the Negotiating Committee has completed its work, the Secretary-General shall at the Committee's request arrange, during the current session of the General Assembly, an appropriate meeting of Member and non-member States at which Members may commit themselves to their national contributions and the contributions of non-members may be made known;



9. Authorizes the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, to advance funds, deemed to be available for this purpose and not exceeding \$5 million from the Working Capital Fund to finance operations pursuant to the present resolution, such sum to be repaid not later than 31 December 1951;

10. Calls upon the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies to utilize to the fullest extent the Agency's facilities as a point of reference and co-ordination for technical assistance programmes in the countries in which the Agency is operating;

11. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Refugee Organization, the International Labour Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization for the assistance with they have rendered, and urges them to continue to furnish all possible assistance to the Agency;

12. Commends the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, and the American Friends Service Committee for their invaluable services and whole-hearted cooperation in the distribution of relief supplies until those functions were taken over by the Agency;

13. Expresses its thanks to the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations whose programmes have brought much needed supplementary assistance to the Palestine refugees, and urges them to continue and expand to the extent possible, the work which they have undertaken on behalf of the refugees;

14. Extends its appreciation and thanks to the Director and staff of the Agency and the members of the Advisory Commission for their effective and devoted work.

---

Text of Resolution 513 (VI)  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On 26 January 1952

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949 as amended by resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950,

Having examined the report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East(1) and the special joint report of the Director and the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency(2),

Having considered the three-year programme of relief and re-integration recommended by the Director and the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency,

1. Commends the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the development of a constructive programme which will contribute effectively to the welfare of the refugees;

2. Endorses, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 or to the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 relative to reintegration either by repatriation or resettlement, the programme recommended by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the relief and reintegration of Palestine refugees, which envisages the expenditure of \$50 million for relief and \$200 million for reintegration over and above such contributions as may be made by local governments, to be carried out over a period of approximately three years starting as of 1 July 1951;

Recognizing the concern of the United Nations in the problem of the Palestine refugees,

3. Urges the governments of the countries in the area to assist, with due regard to their constitutional processes, in the carrying out of this programme and to extend to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, a subsidiary organ established by the General Assembly, their co-operation in the elaboration of specific projects and in the general performance of its functions;

---

(1) Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixth Session, Supplement No. 16, A/1905.

(2) Ibid. Supplement No. 16 A, A/1905/Add.

4. Invites the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to explore with the governments concerned arrangements looking towards their assuming administration of reintegration projects at the earliest possible date;

5. Requests the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to explore with the governments concerned the desirability and practicability of transferring the administration of relief to those governments at the earliest possible date, and considers that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency should continue to carry the cost of the supply programme, subject to paragraphs 2 and 6, and to provide assistance for the health, welfare and education programme along with the duty of making such inspection and such verification of accounts as may be necessary;

6. Considers that relief expenditures should be reduced in suitable proportion to reintegration expenditures;

7. Decides that the amount of \$20 million provided for direct relief in resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 should be increased to \$27 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1952;

8. Decides that, consequent upon paragraph 2 above, the amount of \$30 million provided in resolution 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 for reintegration should be increased to not less than \$50 million, and credited to the reintegration fund provided for in that resolution for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1952;

9. Approves the budget recommended by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the fiscal year 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953, of the equivalent of \$118 million of which \$100 million shall be available for reintegration and \$18 million for relief;

10. Authorizes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency to transfer funds allocated for relief to reintegration;

11. Urges the governments of Member States to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to termination the programme set forth in paragraph 2 above;

12. Requests that negotiation regarding contributions for the proposed three-year programme be carried out with Member and non-member States by the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds established by resolution 571 B (VI) adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 1951;

13. Expresses its appreciation of the assistance afforded to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency by the specialized agencies and the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund and urges them to render all services possible to strengthen the programme of refugee relief and reintegration, and to co-operate with the Secretary-General and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in ensuring that the total assistance of the United Nations to Palestine refugees is rendered with the maximum of co-ordination and efficiency;

14. Expresses its appreciation to the numerous religious, charitable, and humanitarian organizations whose programmes have afforded valuable supplementary assistance to Palestine refugees, and again requests them to continue and expand to the extent possible the work which they have undertaken on behalf of the refugees.

---

Text of Resolution 614 (VII)  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On 6 November 1952

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950 and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952,

Having examined the report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East(1) and the special joint report of the Director and Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency(2),

Noting that negotiations have taken place between the Agency and governments of Near Eastern countries under the programme approved in resolution 513 (VI),

Having in mind the goals for the reduction of relief expenditure envisaged in the three-year \$250 million relief and reintegration programme, approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 513 (VI) without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) or to the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 393 (V) relative to reintegration either by repatriation or resettlement,

Recognizing that immediate realization of these goals has not proved possible and that increased relief expenditures are therefore required, with a resultant reduction in the reintegration funds,

1. Authorizes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to increase the budget for relief to \$23 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1953, and to make such further adjustments as it may deem necessary to maintain adequate standards; and to adopt a budget for relief of \$18 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1954 which shall be subject to review at the eighth session of the General Assembly;

2. Authorizes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to allocate funds remaining for reintegration according to time schedules deemed appropriate up to 30 June 1954,

3. Requests that negotiations regarding contributions for the programme be carried out with Member and non-member States by the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds.

---

(1) Official Records of the General Assembly, 7th Session, Supplement 13, A/2171.

(2) Ibid. A/2171/Add.1.

Text of Resolution 720 (VIII)  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On 27 November 1953

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 and 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952,

Having examined the report(1) of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the special report(2) of the Director and the Advisory Commission of that Agency,

Noting that programme agreements envisaging the commitment of approximately \$120 million have been signed by UNRWA with the governments of several Near Eastern countries, pursuant to the plan endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 513 (VI), but that expectations as regards the execution of the projects programme have not been realized,

Noting also that the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of grave concern,

1. Decides, without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), or to the provisions of paragraph 4 of resolution 393 (V), that the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East shall be extended until 30 June 1955, and that its programme shall be again subject to review at the ninth session of the General Assembly;

2. Authorizes the Agency to adopt a budget for relief amounting to \$24.8 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1954, subject to such adjustments as may be attributable to refugee employment on projects, or as may be necessary to maintain adequate standards, and to adopt a provisional budget for relief of \$18 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1955;

3. Considers that the projects fund previously authorized by the General Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) should be maintained at \$200 million until 30 June 1955, and urges UNRWA and the governments of the Near Eastern countries concerned to continue to seek acceptable projects to enable the fund to be utilized for the purposes for which it is intended;

---

(1) Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighth Session, Supplement No. 12, A/2470.

(2) Ibid. Supplement No. 12, A/2470/Add. 1.

4. Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds to seek the funds required to meet the current needs of the relief programmes and to invite governments to take into account the need for the additional pledges which will be required to meet the total programme now established at \$292.8 million.

B

The General Assembly,

Having noted that the present membership of the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, established pursuant to paragraph 8 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, is composed of representatives of Egypt, France, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America,

Noting further that it is in the general interest that other contributing countries join the Advisory Commission,

Authorizes the Advisory Commission to increase its membership by not more than two additional members.

---

Text of Resolution 818 (IX)  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On 4 December 1954

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952 and 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953,

Noting the annual report(1) of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and the special report(2) of the Director and the Advisory Commission of UNRWA,

Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected and that the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of grave concern,

1. Decides, without the prejudice to the rights of the refugees to repatriation or compensation, to extend the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for five years ending 30 June 1960;
2. Requests the Agency to continue its consultation with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);
3. Requests the Governments of the area to continue to co-operate with the Director of the Agency in seeking and carrying out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees;
4. Decides to maintain the rehabilitation fund of \$200 million, subject to reductions for expenditures already made;
5. Approves a relief budget of \$25.1 million and a rehabilitation budget of \$36.2 million for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1955;
6. Requests the Director, in consultation with the Advisory Commission of UNRWA, to study and report upon the problem of assistance which should be given to other claimants for relief, particularly children and needy inhabitants of villages along the demarcation lines;

---

(1) Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Session, Supplement No. 17, A/2717.

(2) Ibid. Supplement No. 17 A, A/2717 Add. 1.



7. Authorizes the Director to prepare, in consultation with the Advisory Commission, the budgets for relief and rehabilitation in advance of each fiscal year, which budgets he shall transmit to the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, without prejudice to review each year by the General Assembly;

8. Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, after receipt of such budgets from the Director of UNRWA, to seek such funds as may be required by the Agency;

9. Appeals to the Governments of Member and non-member States to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to fulfilment the Agency's programmes, and thanks the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;

10. Requests the Director to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of resolution 302 (IV), as well as the annual budgets.

---

Text of Resolution 916 (X)  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On 3 December 1955

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953 and 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954,

Noting the annual report(1) and the special report(2) of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the report(3) of the Advisory Commission of the Agency,

Having reviewed the budgets for relief and rehabilitation prepared by the Director of the Agency,

Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme for reintegration of refugees endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) and that the situation of the refugees therefore continues to be a matter of grave concern,

1. Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to pursue its programmes for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the limitations imposed upon it by the extent of the contributions for the fiscal year;

2. Requests the Agency to continue its consultation with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);

3. Requests the Governments of the area, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), to make a determined effort, in cooperation with the Director of the Agency, to seek and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees;

---

(1) Official Records of the General Assembly, Tenth Session, Supplement No. 15, A/2978.

(2) Ibid. Supplement No. 15 A, A/2978/Add 1.

(3) Ibid. A/3017.

4. Notes with gratification that the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Agency have made substantial progress toward resolving the difficulties which impede the granting of rations to all qualified refugee children in Jordan;

5. Notes the serious need of the other claimants for relief as described in the special report(2) prepared by the Director pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 818 (IX), namely, the frontier villagers in Jordan, the non-refugee population of the Gaza strip, a number of the refugees in Egypt, and certain of the Bedouin;

6. Appeals to private organizations to give them increased assistance to the extent that local governments cannot do so;

7. Urges all Governments and individuals to support these private organizations with food, goods and services;

8. Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, after the receipt of the budgets from the Director of the Agency, to seek such funds as may be required by the Agency;

9. Appeals to the Government of Member and non-member States to make voluntary contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to fulfilment the Agency's programmes, and thanks the numerous religious, charitable and humanitarian organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;

10. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out their mandate, and requests the Governments of the area to continue to facilitate the work of the Agency and to ensure the protection of its personnel and property;

11. Requests the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of resolution 302 (IV) as well as the annual budgets.

---

Text of Resolution 1018 (XI)  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On 28 February 1957

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954 and 916 (X) of 3 December 1955,

Noting the annual report(1) and the special report(2) of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and the report of the Advisory Commission of the Agency(3),

Having reviewed the budget for relief and rehabilitation prepared by the Director of the Agency,

Noting with concern that contributions to that budget are not yet sufficient,

Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (IV) for the reintegration of refugees and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

Noting that the host Governments have expressed the wish that the Agency continue to carry out its mandate in their respective countries or territories and have expressed their wish to co-operate fully with the Agency and to extend to it every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations, the terms of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the contents of paragraph 17 of resolution 302 (IV) and the terms of the agreements with the host Governments,

- 
- (1) Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 14, (A/3212).
  - (2) Ibid., Supplement No. 14 A (A/3212/Add. 1).
  - (3) Ibid., Eleventh Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/3498.

1. Directs the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to pursue its programme for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the limitation imposed upon it by the extent of the contributions for the fiscal year;

2. Requests the host Governments to co-operate fully with the Agency and with its personnel and to extend to the Agency every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions;

3. Requests the Governments of the area, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, in co-operation with the Director of the Agency, to plan and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees;

4. Requests the Agency to continue its consultations with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);

5. Decides to retain the rehabilitation fund and authorizes the Director of the Agency, at his discretion, to disburse such monies as may be available to the individual host Governments for general economic development projects, subject to agreement by any such Government that, within a fixed period of time, it will assume financial responsibility for an agreed number of refugees, such number to be commensurate with the cost of the project, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);

6. Reiterates its appeal to private organizations and Governments to assist in meeting the serious needs of other claimants for relief as referred to in paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 916 (X) of 3 December 1955;

7. Requests the Negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds, after receipt of the requests for contributions from the Director of the Agency, to seek from the Members of the United Nations the financial assistance needed;

8. Urges all Governments to contribute or to increase their contributions to the extent necessary to carry through to fulfilment the Agency's relief and rehabilitation programmes;

9. Notes with approval the action of the Agency in continuing to carry out its programme for the refugees in the Gaza Strip;

10. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out its mandate, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;

11. Notes that the Agency is changing its financial period from a fiscal to a calendar year basis and that, consequently, the current budgets cover an eighteen-month period from 1 July 1956 to 31 December 1957, and that special arrangements for the audit of funds in this period are being made with the United Nations Board of Auditors;

12. Requests the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, as modified by paragraph 11 above.

663rd plenary meeting,  
28 February 1957.

---

Text of Resolution 1191 (XII)  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On 12 December 1957

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955 and 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East(1) and the report of the Advisory Commission of the Agency(2),

Having reviewed the budgets for relief and rehabilitation prepared by the Director of the Agency, and having noted the comment of the Advisory Commission to the effect that they are minimal,

Noting with grave concern that contributions to the budgets are not yet sufficient, that the financial situation of the Agency is serious, and that cuts already have had to be made in the rehabilitation programme,

Noting that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

Noting that the host Governments have expressed the wish that the Agency continue to carry out its mandate in their respective countries or territories and have expressed their wish to co-operate fully with the Agency and to extend to it every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 104 and 105 of the Charter of the United Nations, the terms of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, the contents of paragraph 17 of resolution 302 (IV) and the terms of the agreements with the host Governments,

---

(1) Official Records of the General Assembly, Twelfth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/3686 and Corr. 1).

(2) A/3735.

1. Draws the attention of Governments to the critical financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and urges them to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions in order that the Agency may carry out its budgeted relief and rehabilitation programmes and that cuts in services may be avoided;
2. Requests the Secretary-General, in view of the critical financial position of the Agency, to make, as a matter of urgent concern, special efforts to secure the additional financial assistance needed to meet the Agency's budgets and to provide adequate working capital;
3. Directs the Agency to pursue its programme for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees, bearing in mind the response to paragraphs 1 and 2 above;
4. Requests the host Governments to co-operate fully with the Agency and with its personnel and to extend to the Agency every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions;
5. Requests the Governments of the area, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, in co-operation with the Director of the Agency, to plan and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees;
6. Requests the Agency to continue its consultations with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interest of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);
7. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;
8. Requests the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957.

728th plenary meeting,  
12 December 1957.

---



Text of Resolution 1313 (XIII)  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On 12 December 1958

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, and 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East(1), and in particular the observations relating to the expiration of the Agency's mandate on 30 June 1960, and noting the report of the Advisory Commission of the Agency(2),

Noting with regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of Assembly resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

Having reviewed the budget prepared by the Director and having noted the endorsement thereof by the Advisory Commission of the Agency,

Noting with grave concern that contributions to the budget are not yet sufficient and that the financial situation of the Agency remains serious,

Recalling that the Agency is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations,

1. Draws the attention of Governments to the precarious financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges them to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions in order that the Agency may carry out relief and rehabilitation programmes for the welfare of the refugees;

---

(1) Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/3931).

(2) A/3948.

2. Requests the Secretary-General, in view of the serious financial position of the Agency, to continue, as a matter of urgent concern, his special efforts to secure the additional financial assistance needed to meet the Agency's budget and to provide adequate working capital;

3. Directs the Agency to pursue its programme for refugees bearing in mind the response to paragraphs 1 and 2 above;

4. Requests the Director of the Agency, without prejudice to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), to plan and carry out projects capable of supporting substantial numbers of refugees and, in particular, programmes relating to education and vocational training;

5. Requests the host Governments to co-operate fully with the Agency and with its personnel and to extend to the Agency every appropriate assistance in carrying out its functions;

6. Requests the Agency to continue its consultations with the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine in the best interests of their respective tasks, with particular reference to paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);

7. Expresses its thanks to the Director, Mr. Henry R. Labouisse, for the devoted attention he has given to the affairs of the Agency and to the welfare of the refugees for the four years of his incumbency, to the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out its mandate, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees;

8. Requests the Director of the Agency to continue to submit the reports referred to in paragraph 21 of General Assembly resolution 302 (IV), as modified by paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 1018 (XI).

---

Text of Resolution ( 1456 (XIV) )  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On 9 December 1959

The General Assembly

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957 and 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, (1) in particular the expiration of the Agency's mandate on 30 June 1960,

Noting the recommendation of the Secretary-General and the Director of the Agency for the continuation of the Agency.

Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees, as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), has not been effected, and that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern.

Having reviewed the Agency's budget and noting with concern that contributions from Member States are not sufficient,

Recalling that the Agency, as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations, enjoys the benefits of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a period of three years with a review at the end of two years;

2. Requests the Governments concerned to co-operate with the Agency in efforts to rectify the situation described in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the Director's report;

---

(1) Official records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Supplement No. 14 (A/4213).

3. Requests the Director of the Agency to arrange with the host Governments the best means of giving effect to the proposals contained in paragraph 47 of his report;

4. Requests the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to make further efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III);

5. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the Agency and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency can carry out its programmes;

6. Directs the Agency to continue its programme of relief for the refugees and, in so far as is financially possible, expand its programme of self-support and vocational training;

7. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees.

Text of Resolution ( 1604 (XV) )  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On 21 April 1961

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) of 2 December 1950, 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958 and 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 1959 - 30 June 1960, (1),

Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

1. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has not yet been able to report progress on carrying out the task entrusted to it in paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 1456 (XIV), and again requests the Commission to make efforts to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and report thereon not later than 15 October 1961;

2. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges Governments to consider to what extent they can contribute or increase their contributions so that the Agency can carry out its programmes;

3. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to carry out the mandate of the Agency, and to the specialized agencies and the many private organizations for their valuable and continuing work in assisting the refugees.

993rd plenary meeting,  
21 April 1961.

Text of Resolution ( 1725 (XVI) )  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On December 20, 1961

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, and 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961,

Noting the annual report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 1960 - 30 June 1961, (1),

Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

1. Takes note of the efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, pursuant to the request contained in General Assembly resolutions 1456 (XIV) and 1604 (XV), to secure the implementation of paragraph 11 of Assembly resolution 194 (III); and

(a) Requests the Commission to intensify its efforts for the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) and urges the Arab host Governments and Israel to co-operate with the Commission in this regard;

(b) Further requests the Commission to intensify its work on the identification and evaluation of Arab refugee immovable properties in Palestine as of 15 May 1948, and to make every effort to complete this work by 1 September 1962;

---

(1) Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 14.

(c) Requests the Secretary-General to make available to the Commission such additional staff and administrative facilities as may be required;

2. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges non-contributing Governments to contribute, and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions, so that the Agency can carry out its essential programmes;

3. Expresses its thanks to the Director and the staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees, and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees.

1086th plenary meeting,  
20 December 1961

---

Text of Resolution (1856 (XVII) )  
Assistance to Palestine Refugees  
Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations  
On 20 December 1962

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961 and 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961,

Noting the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period 1 July 1961 - 30 June 1962,

Noting with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

1. Expresses its thanks to the Commissioner-General and the Staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees and to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;
2. Expresses its thanks to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine for its efforts to find a way to progress on the Palestine Arab refugee problem pursuant to paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III), and requests the Commission to continue its endeavours with the Member States directly concerned;
3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the staff and facilities that the Commission may require in carrying on its work;
4. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency until 30 June 1965;
5. Directs attention to the precarious financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges non-contributing Governments to contribute, and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions, so that the Agency can carry out its essential programmes.



Text of the Resolution  
Adopted by the U. N. General Assembly  
On 3 December 1963

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, 302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 393 (V) and 394 (V) of 2 and 14 December 1950, 512 (VI) and 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952, 614 (VII) of 6 November 1952, 720 (VIII) of 27 November 1953, 818 (IX) of 4 December 1954, 916 (X) of 3 December 1955, 1018 (XI) of 28 February 1957, 1191 (XII) of 12 December 1957, 1315 (XIII) of 12 December 1958, 1456 (XIV) of 9 December 1959, 1604 (XV) of 21 April 1961, 1725 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, and 1856 (XVII) of 20 December 1962,

Noting the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963 (A/5513),

Noting with deep regret that the repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) for the re-integration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern,

1. Expresses its sincere appreciation to Dr. John H. Davis, on the occasion of his resignation as Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, for his efficient administration of the Agency during the past five years, and for his dedicated service to the welfare of the refugees;
  2. Expresses its thanks to the Staff of the Agency for their continued faithful efforts to provide essential services for the Palestine refugees and to the specialized agencies and private organisations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;
  3. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the staff and facilities that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine may require in carrying on its work;
  4. Calls on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to continue its efforts for the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III);
  5. Again directs attention to the precarious financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and urges non-contributing Governments to contribute, and contributing Governments to consider increasing their contributions, so that the Agency can carry out its essential programmes.
-

**APPENDIX B**



The Context of American Policy on Repatriation or Compensation of the Palestine Refugees

Year	Resolutions of General Assembly	UN Assistance to Palestine Refugees	Palestine Conciliation Commission (CCP)	Vote in UN	US Policy on Palestine Refugees	State Department	President	Congress	Contributions for Assistance
Date	Number	Session		U.S.		Marshall	Truman	Democratic*	1/12/48 to 30/4/50
1948	19 November 11 December	212 194	(III)* (III)*	Created UN Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPA) Repatriation or compensation formula adopted	September - recommended by Mediator	Support Mediator's Recommendations - Conclusions adapted to fit US policy	Truman	Democratic*	\$16,000,000
1949	8 December	302	(IV)*	Created UNRWA - adopted repatriation or resettlement	Created to assume functions of Mediator March-April - Beirut Conference and visit to Tel-Aviv April 27 - Lausanne Meeting - May 12 Protocol - June Technical Committee constituted - August 15 Memorandum - Economic Survey Mission Interim Report in November Final Report of Survey Mission	Truman - McConald pressure on Israel - win concessions on refugees - failure of effort	Truman May 29 letter	Democratic Appropriations for relief requested and special contribution made	
1950	2 December	393	(V)*	Began reintegration projects - \$30 million	September - Paris Conference - repatriation or resettlement Blocked bank accounts receive attention Resolution 394 of Assembly establishing Refugee Office Spring - emphasis on technical aspect - Refugee Office	Begin change in solution, i.e. toward reintegration through resettlement	Truman	Democratic Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950	1/5/50 to 30/6/51 \$27,930,000
1951	26 January	513	(VI)*	Began 3-year reintegration scheme - \$200 million	CCP suspended activities	Support UN trusteeship of refugee property in Israel	Truman	Democratic Mutual Security Act of 1951	Year ended 30/6/52 \$50,000,000 (Prepared to donate \$110,000,000)
1952	6 November	614	(VII)*	Stressed relief expenditure decrease			Eisenhower	Republican Mutual Security Act of 1953	Year ended 30/6/53 \$16,000,000
1953	27 November	720	(VIII)*	Reintegration stressed - large-scale projects		Support for paragraph 11 (194-III) affirmed	Eric Johnston appointed	Republican Mutual Security Act of 1954	Year ended 30/6/54 \$15,000,000
1954	4 December	818	(IX)*	Increase in relief - reintegration fund maintained		Compensation by Israel (with loans) and development of Mid-East	Johnston continues Mission	Democratic Mutual Security Act of 1955	Year ended 30/6/55 \$16,700,000
1955	3 December	916	(X)	Labouisse stresses need for political solution - rehabilitation program continued			Johnston failure	Democratic Mutual Security Act of 1955	Year ended 30/6/56 \$16,700,000
1956	28 February	1018	(XI)	November - Labouisse stresses principle of choice Continue reintegration through resettlement	Agreement by Israel to release bank accounts		Eisenhower* committee reiterates	Democratic August 26 speech	Year ended 30/6/56 \$16,700,000
1957	12 December	1191	(XII)	Continue reintegration through resettlement	CCP becomes dormant		Eisenhower	Republican Mutual Security Act of 1957	18 months ended 31/12/57 \$31,372,000
1958	12 December	1315	(XIII)	Support education and vocational training June 15 - Hammarskjold proposals - economic solution		Stress shifted away from reintegration through resettlement to training	August 13 speech to Assembly	Republican Mutual Security Act of 1958	Year ended 31/12/58 \$22,996,000
1959	9 December	1456	(XIV)*	Davis stresses self-support and training - 3 year program	Revival of CCP - stress on paragraph 11 of Resolution 194	U.S. address in UN - affirmation of change	Eisenhower	Democratic Mutual Security Act of 1959	Year ended 31/12/59 \$23,000,000
1960	27 April	1604	(XV)	Continue programs	CCP continues evaluation of property	Wilcox confirms change	Eisenhower*	Democratic Mutual Security Act of 1960	Year ended 31/12/60 \$23,000,000
1961	20 December	1725	(XVI)	UNRWA Asst Director adviser for Johnson Mission Continue programs - financial difficulties UNRWA reorganization continues	Summer-fall - Johnson Mission to Middle East October - Johnson's report Winter - Johnson negotiates in New York	Kennedy seeks to end UNRWA - mandate to June 1963 only - Johnson appointment	Kennedy	Democratic Act for International Development of 1961	Year ended 31/12/61 \$24,350,000
1962	20 December	1856	(XVII)*	Extend mandate until 30 June 1965	Fall - CCP Progress report January - Johnson resigns	Oppose UN trusteeship of Arab property	Kennedy January - Special envoy to Ben Gurion	Democratic Foreign Assistance Act of 1963	Year ended 31/12/63 \$24,700,000
1963	3 December	1912	(XVIII) *Renewal of UNRWA's mandate	Continue programs				Democratic	(total: \$315,968,069)

\* Election years



The Context of American Policy on Repatriation or Compensation of the Palestine Refugees

Year	Resolutions of General Assembly	UN Assistance to Palestine Refugees	Palestine Conciliation Commission (CCP)	Vote in UN	US Policy on Palestine Refugees	State Department	President	Congress	Contributions for Assistance
Date	Number	Session		U.S.		Marshall	Truman*	Democratic*	1/12/48 to 30/4/80
1948	19 November 11 December	212 194	(III)* (III)*	Created UN Relief for Palestine Refugees (UNRPR) Repatriation or compensation formula adopted	Created to assume functions of Mediator September - recommended by Mediator	Support Mediator's Recommendations - Conclusions adapted to fit US policy	Truman	Democratic*	\$ 16,000,000
1949	8 December	302	(IV)*	Created UNRWA - adopted repatriation or resettlement	March-April - Beirut Conference and visit to Tel-Aviv April 27 - Lausanne Meeting - May 12 Protocol - June Technical Committee constituted - August 15 Memorandum - Economic Survey Mission Interim Report in November Final Report of Survey Mission	Truman-McDonald pressure on Israel - win concessions on refugees - failure of effort	Truman May 29 letter	Democratic Appropriations for relief requested and special contribution made	
1950	2 December	393	(V)*	Began reintegration projects - \$ 30 million	September - Paris Conference - repatriation or resettlement Blocked bank accounts receive attention Resolution 394 of Assembly establishing Refugee Office Spring - emphasis on technical aspect - Refugee Office	Begin change in solution, i.e. toward reintegration through resettlement	Truman	Democratic* Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950	
1951	26 January	513	(VI)*	Began 3-year reintegration scheme - \$ 200 million	CCP suspended activities	Support UN trusteeship of refugee property in Israel	Truman*	Democratic* Mutual Security Act of 1951	1/5/50 to 30/6/51 \$ 27,950,000
1952	6 November	614	(VII)*	stressed relief expenditure decrease			Eisenhower	Republican Mutual Security Act of 1953	Year ended 30/6/52 \$ 50,000,000 (Prepared to donate \$ 110,000,000)
1953	27 November	720	(VIII)*	Reintegration stressed - large-scale projects		Support for paragraph II (194-III) affirmed - Jung trip to Middle East - report on refugees	Eric Johnston appointed	Republican* Mutual Security Act of 1954	Year ended 30/6/53 \$ 16,000,000
1954	4 December	818	(IX)*	Increase in relief - reintegration fund maintained			Johnston continues Mission	Republican* Mutual Security Act of 1954	Year ended 30/6/54 \$ 15,000,000
1955	3 December	916	(X)	Labouisse stresses need for political solution - rehabilitation program continued		Compensation by Israel (with loans) - August 26 - Dulles speech defines policy and development of Mid-East	Johnston failure	Democratic Mutual Security Act of 1955	Year ended 30/6/55 \$ 16,700,000
1956	28 February	1018	(XI)	November - Labouisse stresses principle of choice Continue reintegration through resettlement	Agreement by Israel to release bank accounts	February 24 - Dulles to Senate foreign relations committee - reiterates	Eisenhower*	Democratic* August 26 speech	Year ended 30/6/56 \$ 16,700,000
1957	12 December	1191	(XII)	Continue reintegration through resettlement	CCP becomes dormant	Talks with Israeli ministers	Eisenhower	Republican Mutual Security Act of 1957 Humphrey study in Senate	18 months ended 31/12/57 \$ 31,372,000
1958	12 December	1315	(XIII)	Support education and vocational training June 15 - Hammarskjold proposals - economic solution		Stress shifted away from reintegration through resettlement to training	Eisenhower August 13 speech to Assembly	Republican* Mutual Security Act of 1958	Year ended 31/12/58 \$ 22,996,000
1959	9 December	1456	(XIV)*	Davis stresses self-support and training - 3 year program	Revival of CCP - stress on paragraph II of Resolution 194	U.S. address in UN - affirmation of change	Eisenhower*	Democratic* Mutual Security Act of 1959 Fulbright study in Senate	Year ended 31/12/59 \$ 23,000,000
1960	21 April	1604	(XV)	Continue programs	CCP continues evaluation of property	Wilcox confirms change	Kennedy	Democratic Act for International Development of 1961	Year ended 31/12/60 \$ 23,000,000
1961	20 December	1725	(XVI)	UNRWA Asst Director adviser for Johnson Mission Continue programs - financial difficulties UNRWA reorganization continues	Summer - fall - Johnson Mission to Middle East October - Johnson's report Winter - Johnson negotiates in New York	Kennedy seeks to end UNRWA - mandate to June 1963 only - Johnson appointment	Kennedy	Democratic* Foreign Assistance Act of 1961	Year ended 31/12/61 \$ 24,350,000
1962	20 December	1856	(XVII)*	Extend mandate until 30 June 1965	Fall - CCP Progress report January - Johnson resigns	Oppose UN trusteeship of Arab property	Kennedy January Special envoy to Ben Gurion	Democratic Foreign Assistance Act of 1963	Year ended 31/12/62 \$ 24,700,000
1963	3 December	1912	(XVIII) *Renewal of UNRWA's mandate	Continue programs				Democratic Foreign Assistance Act of 1963	Year ended 31/12/63 \$ 24,700,000 (total: \$ 315,968,069)

\*Election years



Year	Congress	Contributions for Assistance	US Middle East Policy	Events in Middle East	Arab States Refugee Policy	Israeli Refugee Policy	Soviet Policy	Global Context
					Vote	Vote	Vote on refugees	
					General	General	General	
	Democratic*	1/12/49 to 30/4/50 \$16,000,000	Recognition of Israel (de facto)	Palestine War - civil & regular Israel-Czech arms deal	212 (III) Yes	Abandoned areas ordinance Accept paragraph II only in theory	Abolish CCP	UNRRA Berlin Blockade
	Democratic*		Israel supported for UN membership	Anglo-Soviet crisis in Iran	194 (III) No - abst. Iran	Arabs oppose partition Arabs base case on 194 (III) Oppose Israeli offers	No	
	Democratic		De jure recognition of Israel		302 (IV) Yes	Gaza scheme Accept 100,000 Confiscation of property	Abstain	
	Democratic*		Egyptian-Israeli Armistice			Refuse to cooperate with CCP "Exchange of populations" policy Absentee property laws Contribute to reintegration	Detachment	
	Democratic*		Israel accepted for UN membership		393 (V) Yes	Uphold 194 (III)	Abstain	Korean War
	Democratic*		Economic assistance begun	Anglo-Iran oil crisis		Oppose reintegration	Detachment	
	Democratic*		May 25 - Tripartite Declaration		513 (VII) Yes	Oppose reintegration	No	
	Democratic*		June - Arab League Defense Agreement - supported			2,700 refugees return on family reunion plan	Abstain	
	Democratic	1/5/50 to 30/6/51 \$27,450,000	Turkey joins NATO		614 (VII) Yes	Oppose reintegration	Detachment	
	Democratic*		Mutual Security Program			Land Acquisition law	Detachment	
	Democratic*		Allied Middle East Command proposed		720 (VIII) Yes	Oppose reintegration	Abstain	Stalin's Death Renewed interest in Middle East
	Democratic*		Dahran Air Base Agreement			Oppose reintegration	Abstain	
	Republican	Year ended 30/6/52 \$50,000,000 (Prepared to donate \$110,000,000 of funds)				Oppose reintegration	Abstain	
	Republican	Year ended 30/6/53 \$16,000,000	Withdrawal of aid to Israel for two weeks - Qibya incident		918 (IX) Yes	Oppose reintegration	Abstain	
	Republican*		Middle East Defense Organization	Suez Canal Base Agreement - UK-Egypt		Oppose reintegration	Abstain	Colombo Pact - support paragraph II (194-III)
	Republican*		US-Iraq Agreement for military mission	November 23 - Hammarskjold's good offices		Oppose reintegration	Abstain	
	Republican*		US restrain Israel and Arabs as clashes occur	Czech arms deal - Egypt as result of	912 (IX) Yes	Oppose reintegration	Abstain	
	Democratic	Year ended 30/6/54 \$15,000,000	Baghdad Pact	Egypt-Israel border clashes		Oppose UNRWA's support of 194 (III)	Abstain	Interest in Nasser USSR - Yemen treaty of friendship
	Democratic*		September - Anglo-US statement on sale of arms to Arabs and Israel	Spring - Bandung Conference		Agree to release accounts	Abstain	
	Democratic*		August - London Conference - US, UK, France	October - Israel requests arms	916 (X) Abstain	Agree to release accounts	Abstain	
	Democratic*		October - November - US stand on Suez	March - Glubb expelled		Shertok no repatriation	Abstain	
	Democratic*		Richardson Mission to ease tension	July - Nasser nationalizes Suez Canal		8,000 on family plan	Abstain	
	Republican	18 months ended 31/12/57 \$31,372,000	Pressure on Israel to withdraw from Sinai	October - Invasion of Sinai	1018 (XI) Yes - abst. Iraq	Release of accounts not adequate	Yes	Hungary - Suez
	Republican*		Eisenhower Doctrine	Israeli withdrawal of troops from Sinai and Gaza		Oppose reintegration	Yes	
	Republican*		July - Marines land in Lebanon	February - UAR formed	1191 (XII)	Allow self-support on small scale	Abstain	
	Republican*		August - proposed Arab development institution	Spring - Hashemite Union		Oppose reintegration	Abstain	
	Democratic	Year ended 31/12/58 \$22,996,000	Baghdad Pact becomes CENTO	Crisis in Lebanon - Iraqi Revolution	1315 (XIII)	Support training	Abstain	
	Democratic*		Support of Israel against Arab boycott	British troops in Jordan		Agree to UNRWA three-year plan	Yes	World Refugee Year
	Democratic*		Friendship with Nasser		1956 (XIV) Yes	Agree to UNRWA three-year plan	Yes	
	Democratic*		Support of Israel against Arab boycott	Syrian-Israeli clashes		Accept Johnson Mission	Yes	July - Congo crisis
	Democratic*		Friendship with Nasser		1604 (XV) Yes - No Jordan	Support UNRWA	Yes	
	Democratic*		Support of Israel against Arab boycott	Kuwait crisis		Accept Johnson Mission	Yes	Cuban crisis
	Democratic*		Friendship with Nasser	September - Syrian coup		Support UNRWA	Yes	Berlin wall
	Democratic*		Friendship with Nasser	Israel-Syria clash	1725 (XVI) Yes	Support UNRWA	Yes	Hammarskjold's death
	Democratic*		Friendship with Nasser			Fall - Knesset vote - no return	Yes	
	Democratic*		Aid to Egypt	September - Yemen crisis		Fall - Knesset vote - no return	Yes	
	Democratic*		Hawk missiles to Israel - fall		1856 (XVII) Yes	Support 194 (III)	Yes	
	Democratic*		Hawk missiles to Israel - fall			Support 194 (III)	Yes	Cuban crisis
	Democratic	Year ended 31/12/63 \$24,700,000 (total: \$315,968,016.91)			1912 (XVIII) Yes	Support 194 (III)	Yes	
	Democratic					Support 194 (III)	Yes	
	Democratic					Support 194 (III)	Yes	

\*Election years



Year	Congress	Contributions for Assistance	US Middle East Policy	Events in Middle East	Arab States Refugee Policy	Israeli Refugee Policy	Soviet Policy	Global Context
					Vote	Vote	Vote on refugees	
	Democratic*	1/12/48 to 30/4/50 \$16,000,000	Recognition of Israel (de facto)	Palestine War - civil → regular Israel-Czech arms deal	212(III) Yes	—	Abandoned areas ordinance Accept paragraph II only in theory	UNRRA Berlin Blockade
	Democratic		Israel supported for UN membership	Anglo-Soviet crisis in Iran	194(II) No - abst Iran	—	No	
	Democratic		De jure recognition of Israel		302(IV) Yes	Yes	Abolish CCP	
	Democratic*		Egyptian-Israeli Armistice				Detachment	
	Democratic*		Isreal accepted for UN membership				Detachment	
	Democratic*		Economic assistance begun	Anglo-Iran oil crisis	393(V) Yes	Yes	Abolish CCP	Korean War
	Democratic*		May 25 - Tripartite Declaration				Detachment	
	Democratic*		June - Arab League Defense Agreement - supported				Detachment	
	Democratic	1/5/50 to 30/6/51 \$27,450,000	Turkey joins NATO		513(VI) Yes	Yes	No	
	Democratic*		Mutual Security Program				Detachment	
	Democratic*		Allied Middle East Command proposed				Detachment	
	Democratic*		Dahran Air Base Agreement				Detachment	
	Democratic*	Year ended 30/6/52 \$50,000,000 (Prepared to donate \$110,000,000 of funds)			614(VII) Yes	Yes	2,700 refugees return on family reunion plan	
ower	Republican	Year ended 30/6/53 \$16,000,000	Withdrawal of aid to Israel for two weeks ← Qibya incident		720(VIII) Yes	Yes	Land Acquisition Law	Stalin's Death Renewed interest in Middle East
ower	Republican*	Year ended 30/6/54 \$15,000,000	Middle East Defense Organization	Suez Canal Base Agreement - UK-Egypt	812(IX) Yes	Yes	Abolish CCP	Colombo Pact - support paragraph 11(194-III)
ower	Republican*	Year ended 30/6/55 \$16,700,000	US-Iraq Agreement for military mission	November 23 - Hammarskjold's good offices			Abolish CCP	
ower	Democratic	Year ended 30/6/55 \$16,700,000	US restrain Israel and Arabs as clashes occur	September - Anglo-US statement on sale of arms to Arabs and Israel	916(X) Abstain	Yes	Abolish CCP	Soviet nuclear deterrent
ower*	Democratic*	Year ended 30/6/56 \$16,700,000	Baghdad Pact	September - Anglo-US statement on sale of arms to Arabs and Israel			Abolish CCP	
ower*	Democratic*	Year ended 30/6/56 \$16,700,000	August - London Conference - US, UK, France	October - Israel requests arms	1017(XI) Yes - abst Iraq	Yes	Abolish CCP	Hungary - Suez
ower	Republican	18 months ended 31/12/57 \$31,372,000	Pressure on Israel to withdraw from Sinai	October - Nasser nationalizes Suez Canal			Abolish CCP	
ower	Republican*	Year ended 31/12/58 \$22,996,000	Eisenhower doctrine	October - invasion of Sinai	1191(XII)	Yes	Abolish CCP	
ower	Republican*	Year ended 31/12/58 \$22,996,000	July - Marines land in Lebanon	Israeli withdrawal of troops from Sinai and Gaza			Abolish CCP	
ower	Republican*	Year ended 31/12/59 \$23,000,000	August - proposed Arab development institution				Abolish CCP	
ower	Democratic	Year ended 31/12/59 \$23,000,000	Baghdad Pact becomes CENTO				Abolish CCP	
ower*	Democratic*	Year ended 31/12/60 \$23,000,000	Support of Israel against Arab boycott	February - UAR formed	1956(XIV) Yes	Abstain	Yes	World Refugee Year
ower*	Democratic*	Year ended 31/12/60 \$23,000,000	Friendship with Nasser	Spring - Hashemite Union			Yes	July - Congo crisis
y	Democratic	Year ended 31/12/61 \$24,350,000		Crisis in Lebanon - Iraqi Revolution	1604(XV) Yes - No Jordan	No	Yes	Cuban crisis
y	Democratic*	Year ended 31/12/61 \$24,350,000		British troops in Jordan			Yes	Berlin wall
y	Democratic*	Year ended 31/12/62 \$24,700,000	Aid to Egypt	Kuwait crisis	1725(XVI) Yes	No	Yes	Hammarskjold's death
y	Democratic*	Year ended 31/12/62 \$24,700,000	Hawk missiles to Israel - fall	September - Yemen crisis			Yes	
y	Democratic	Year ended 31/12/63 \$24,700,000			1956(XVII) Yes	Abstain	Yes	Cuban crisis
y	Democratic	Year ended 31/12/63 \$24,700,000					Yes	
y	Democratic	(total: \$315,968,069)			1912(XVIII) Yes	Abstain	Yes	

\* Election years



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### I. DOCUMENTS

#### A. United Nations Documents and Publications.

##### 1) United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine.

A/137/Rev. 1, General Progress Report and Supplementary Report, covering the period from 11 December 1948 to 23 October 1950.

AAC. 25/6, Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, 28 December 1949.

A/1985, Progress Report, covering the period from 23 January to 19 November, 1951.

A/AC.25/W.82/Rev. 1, Historical Survey of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to secure the implementation of Paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (III), THE QUESTION OF REINTEGRATION BY REPATRIATION OR RESETTLEMENT, 2 October 1961.

A/4921, Nineteenth Progress Report, 13 October 1961.

A/4921/Add. 1., Report by the Special Representative Dr. Joseph E. Johnson, 22 November 1961.

A/5337, Twentieth Progress Report, 7 December 1962.

##### 2) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.

A/2171, Annual Report of the Director Covering the period 1 July 1951 to 30 June 1952.

A/2470, Annual Report of the Director Covering the period 1 July 1952 to 30 June 1953.

A/2717, Annual Report of the Director Covering the period 1 July 1953 to 30 June 1954.

A/2978, Annual Report of the Director Covering the period 1 July 1954 to 30 June 1955.

A/3212, Annual Report of the Director Covering the period 1 July 1955 to 30 June 1956.

- A/3686, Annual Report of the Director Covering the period 1 July 1956 to 30 June 1957.
- A/3931, Annual Report of the Director Covering the period 1 July 1957 to 30 June 1958.
- A/4213, Annual Report of the Director Covering the period 1 July 1958 to 30 June 1959.
- A/4478, Annual Report of the Director Covering the period 1 July 1959 to 30 June 1960.
- A/4861, Annual Report of the Director Covering the period 1 July 1960 to 30 June 1961.
- A/5214, Annual Report of the Commissioner-General Covering the period 1 July 1961 to 30 June 1962.
- A/5513, Annual Report of the Commissioner-General Covering the period 1 July 1962 to 30 June 1963.
- Addresses of the Commissioner-General to the Special Political Committee, General Assembly Sixteenth-Eighteenth Sessions; and Address to World Refugee Year Conference, January 1961, Geneva (reprinted UNRWA, Beirut).
- A/2978/Add. 1, Special Report of the Director Concerning Other Claimants for Relief (G.A.O.R. (X), Supplement No. 15A).
- A/1905/Add. 1, Assistance to Palestine Refugees, Special Report of the Director and Advisory Commission (G.A.O.R. (VI), Supplement No. 16A).
- A/2717/Add. 1, Special Report of the Director and Advisory Commission (G.A.O.R. (IX), Supplement No. 17A).
- A/3212/Add. 1, Special Report of the Director Covering the period 1 November 1956 to mid-December 1956 (G.A.O.R. (XI), Supplement No. 14A).
- UNRWA, United Nations General Assembly Resolutions Regarding Assistance to Palestine Refugees 19 November 1948 through 3 December 1963.



UNRWA, UNRWA REVIEWS, A Background Information Series, Beirut: September, 1962:  
Information Paper No. 1, A Brief History of UNRWA, 1950-1962.  
Information Paper No. 2, Summary Data on Assistance to the Palestine Refugees (December 1948 - 31 December 1962).  
Information Paper No. 3, The UNRWA Education and Training Programme (1950 - 1962).  
Information Paper No. 4, The UNRWA Health Programme, 1950 - 1962.  
Information Paper No. 5, UNRWA Experience with Works Projects and Self-Support Programmes: An Historical Summary (1950 - 1962).  
Information Paper No. 6, The Problem of the Rectification of the UNRWA Relief Rolls (1950 - 1962).

UNRWA, Bulletin of Economic Development, No. 14, Special Reports on Jordan (Beirut: July, 1956).

UNRWA, Office of Public Information, Palestine Refugees Today, An UNRWA Newsletter, Nos. 1-34, January 1961 through April-May 1964.

UNRWA, UNRWA and the Palestine Refugees in Facts and Figures: 1964, January, 1964.

3) Other United Nations Documents and Publications.

Official Records of the General Assembly, Third through Sixteenth Sessions, Summary Records of the First and Third Committees and Plenary Sessions and Annexes.

A/4390, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization Covering the period 16 June 1959 to 15 June 1960.

A/4800, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization Covering the period 16 June 1960 to 15 June 1961.

A/5201, Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization Covering the period 16 June 1961 to 15 June 1962.

A/4121, Proposals for the Continuation of United Nations Assistance to Palestine Refugees, Document submitted by the Secretary-General to the Fourteenth Session of the General Assembly, 15 June 1959.

Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Vol. I (New York: 1955).

United Nations Review, Vol. VI, No. 7, "Assembly Extends Mandate of Palestine Refugee Agency for Three More Years"; and Vol. VII, No. 5, "Annual Report of UNRWA Director Calls for Expanded Vocational Training Program for Palestine Refugees."

Yearbook of the United Nations, Vols. from 1947-48 through 1962.

B. Official Documents and Publications - U. S. Congress.

- (1) Agency for International Development, Principles of Foreign Economic Assistance (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963).
- Congress, Public Law 165, Chapter 479, Mutual Security Act of 1951, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, H. R. 5113.
- Congress, Public Law 400, Chapter 449, Mutual Security Act of 1952, 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, H. R. 7005.
- Congress, Public Law 118, Chapter 195, Mutual Security Act of 1953, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, H. R. 5710.
- Congress, Public Law 665, Chapter 937, Mutual Security Act of 1954, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, H. R. 9678.
- Congress, Public Law 138, Chapter 301, Mutual Security Act of 1955, 84th Congress, 1st Session, S. 2090.
- Congress, Public Law 85-141, Mutual Security Act of 1957, 85th Congress, August 14, 1957, S. 2130.
- Congress, Public Law 477, Mutual Security Act of 1958, 85th Congress, June 30, 1958, H. R. 12181.
- Congress, Public Law 86-108, Mutual Security Act of 1959, 86th Congress, July 24, 1959, H. R. 7500.
- Congress, Public Law 86-472, Mutual Security Act of 1960, 86th Congress, May 14, 1960, H. R. 11510.
- Congress, Public Law 87-195, Act for International Development of 1961, 87th Congress, September 4, 1961, S. 1983.
- Congress, Public Law 88-205, Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, 88th Congress, December 16, 1963, H. R. 7885.
- Congress, Legislative Reference Service, "The Refugee Problem," Public Affairs Abstracts, No. 18, November 1950.
- Congress, Conference Committee Report, Special Near East Refugee Survey Commission, Interim Report, December 11, 1953. Mimeo, U. S. Embassy, Beirut, from papers collected by Harry N. Howard. pp. 22.
- House of Representatives, Arab Refugees from Palestine, by Leonard Farbstein, April 4, 1963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963).

- House of Representatives, Congressional Record, Journal of proceedings of Monday, December 16, 1963, Hearings on Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1964, pp. 23542-23570.
- Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents 1941-49 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950).
- Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Near East and Africa, Palestine Refugee Program, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, Staff Memorandum, May 19, 1953 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953).
- Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa, Hearings on the Palestine Refugee Program, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, May 20, 21, and 25 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953).
- Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on the Near East and Africa, Palestine Refugee Problem, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, July 24, 1953 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953).
- Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Arab Refugees and Other Problems in the Near East, Report of the Special Study Mission to the Near East, by Lawrence H. Smith, Wisconsin and Winston L. Prouty, Vermont, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, February 8, 1954 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954).
- Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Middle East and Southern Europe by Herbert H. Humphrey, July 1957 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957).
- Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy-Middle East, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Staff Study No. 13, June 9, 1960 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960).
- Senate, A Report on United States Foreign Operations by Allen J. Ellender, Louisiana, 87th Congress, 1st Session, Doc. 20 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961).
- Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 (S. 2996), 87th Congress, 2nd Session, April 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16 and 18, 1962 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962).
- Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on Activities of Nondiplomatic Representatives of Foreign Principals in the United States, 88th Congress, 1st Session, Part 9, May 23, 1963 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963).

(2) Documents and Publications - Department of State

Department of State, The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951 by Harry N. Howard, reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin, January-October, 1951 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1951).

Department of State, The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia and Africa During 1953 by Harry N. Howard, reprinted from the Department of State Bulletin, February 2, 1953 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953).

Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Near East South Asia, and Africa - 1954 by Harry N. Howard, reprinted from Department of State Bulletin, February 14, 21, and 28, 1955 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955).

Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa - 1955, reprinted from Department of State Bulletin, March 19, 26, and April 9, 1956 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956).

Department of State, Report on the Near East, Address by the Secretary of State (Dulles), June 1, 1953 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State Publication 5088, June 1953).

(3) U.S. Embassy, Beirut, Mimeographed Materials

Howard, Harry N., UNRWA and the Arab Refugees, Some Random Notes (Mimeo, American Embassy, Beirut, no date).

Howard, Harry N., The Question of Arab Property Rights in Israel (Mimeo, American Embassy, Beirut, no date).

Howard, Harry N., The Status of the Arab Refugees in the Arab Host States (Mimeo, American Embassy, Beirut, no date).

Johnson, Joseph E., Arab vs. Israeli: A Persistent Challenge to Americans, address before the American Assembly, Arden House, Harriman, New York, 24 October 1963 (Mimeo, American Embassy, Beirut).

C. Documents - Collections

(1)

World Peace Foundation, Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vols. IX - XIII (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press).

Council on Foreign Relations, Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vols. XIV - XXIV (New York: Harper).

Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs, Vols. I - XIV (New York: Random House).

Hurewitz, J.C., Diplomacy in the Near And Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1914-1956, Vol. II (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956).

(2) Documents - Israel

The Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel, Fourth Report, 1957 and 1958 (Jerusalem: November, 1959).

Ministry of Finance, Data and Plans submitted to the Jerusalem Conference, October 1953 (Jerusalem: 1953).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information Plan, The Arab Refugees: Arab Statements and the Facts (Jerusalem, 1961).

(3) Miscellaneous Documents and Publications

Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, Yarmouk-Jordan Valley Project, Master Plan Report - Baker - Harza Consulting Engineers, Vols. I - VI, Appendices (Amman: 1953).

Government of Palestine, A Survey of Palestine, Vols. I and II, Annexes (Jerusalem: 1946).

United Kingdom, Comd. 7530, Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine (Bernadotte), Rhodes, 16 September, 1948.

## II. BOOKS

### A. The Palestine War.

Eytan, Walter, The First Ten Years, A Diplomatic History of Israel (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1951).

Gabbay, Rony E., A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict. The Arab Refugee Problem (Geneva: Etudes d'Histoire Economique Politique et Sociale, 1959).

Hutchison, E.H., Violent Truce, Arab-Israeli Conflict 1951-1955 (New York: The Devin-Addair Company 1956).

Kimche, Jon, Seven Fallen Pillars, The Middle East 1915-1950 (London: Secker and Warbury, 1950).

Kimche, Jon and David, A Clash of Destinies, (New York: Praeger, 1960).

Lorch, Netanel, The Edge of the Sword: Israel's War of Independence, 1947-1949 (New York: Putnam's, 1961).

Manuel, Franke, The Realities of American-Palestine Relations (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1949).

Shabtai, Rosenne, Israel's Armistice Agreements with the Arab States (Tel Aviv: Blumstein's, 1951).

### B. The Policy-Making Process

Almond, Gabriel A., The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963).

Beloff, Max, Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955).

Bloomfield, Lincoln P., The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960).

Graebner, Norman A., ed., An Uncertain Tradition, American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961).

Neustadt, Richard E., Presidential Power, the Politics of Leadership (New York: John Wiley and Sons 1961).

Perkins, Dexter, The American Approach to Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1962).

Price, Don K., The Secretary of State (Englewoods Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1960).

Riggs, Robert E., Politics in the United Nations, A Study of United States Influence in the General Assembly (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1958).

C. The Truman Administration

The Arab Refugee Problem, How it can be Solved, Proposals submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations, December 1951.

Bernadotte, Folke, To Jerusalem (London: Hodder and Stoughton).

Ethridge, Willie Snow, Going to Jerusalem (New York: Vanguard, 1950).

Lie, Trygve, In the Cause of Peace, Seven Years with the United Nations (New York: Macmillan, 1954).

McDonald, James G., My Mission in Israel, 1948-1951 (London: Victor Gollancz, 1951).

Mills, Walter, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951).

Sayegh, Fayez A., The Palestine Refugees (Washington, D.C.: Amara Press, February, 1952).

Truman, Harry S., Memoirs, Vols. I and II (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1955).

Vandenberg, Arthur H., Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952).

Weisgal, Meyer W. and Joel Carmichael, eds., Chaim Weigmann, A biography by several hands (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962).

Welles, Sumner, We Need Not Fail (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1948).

D. The Eisenhower Administration

Adams, Sherman, First Hand Report (New York: 1961).

Beal, John Robinson, John Foster Dulles: 1888 - 1959 (New York: Harper and Bros., 1959).

Busch, Noel F., Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois (New York: Farrar, Straus & Young, 1952).

Campbell, John C., Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York: Harper, 1958).



Donovan, Robert J., Eisenhower, The Inside Story (New York: Harper and Bros., 1956).

Eisenhower, Dwight D., Mandate For Change 1953 - 1956 (New York: Double-Day and Company, 1963).

Lash, Joseph P., Dag Hammarskjold (London: Unwin, 1962).

Stevenson, Adlai E., Call to Greatness, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954).

Stevenson, Adlai E., Major Campaign Speeches of Adlai E. Stevenson 1952 (New York: Random House, 1953).

Thompson, Charles A.H. and Shattuck, Frances M., The 1956 Presidential Campaign (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960).

E. The Kennedy Administration

John W. Gardner, President John F. Kennedy - To turn the Tide (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962).

Lasky, Victor, J. F. K., The Man and the Myth (New York: Macmillan, 1963).

Public Affairs Press, The New Frontiersmen Profiles of the Men Around Kennedy (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961).

Sorensen, Theodore C., Decision Making in the White House (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

White, Theodore H., The Making of the President 1960 (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1961).

F. General

Cooke, Hedley V., Israel, A Blessing and a Curse (London: Stevens and Sons, 1960).

Cremins, Charles D., The Arabs and the World (New York: A. Praeger, 1963).

Divine, Robert A., American Immigration Policy, 1924-1952 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957).

Freidel, Frank, America in the Twentieth Century (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960).

Halperin, Samuel, The Political World of American Zionism (Detroit: Wayne University Press, 1961).



- Halpern, Ben, The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1961).
- Hamzeh, Fuad Said, International Conciliation with Special Reference to the Work of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (The Hague: 1953).
- Horowitz, David, State in the Making (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953).
- Kaplan, Deborah, The Arab Refugees, An Abnormal Problem (Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1959).
- Lilienthal, Alfred M., There Goes the Middle East (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1957).
- Lilienthal, Alfred M., What Price Israel (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953).
- McClellan, Grant, S., ed., The Middle East in the Cold War (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1956).
- Peretz, Don, Israel and the Palestine Arabs (Washington D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1958).
- Polk, William R. - Stamler, David, -Asfour, Edmund, Backdrop to Tragedy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).
- Porter, Kirk H. & Johnson, Donald Bruce, eds., National Party Platforms 1840-1960 (Urbana: The University of Illinois, 1961).
- Safran, Nadav, The United States and Israel (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963).
- Sayegh, Fayez A., The Record of Israel at the United Nations (New York: Arab Information Center, 1957).
- Schwartz, Walter, The Arabs in Israel (London: Faber and Faber, 1959).
- Simpson, Sir John Hope, The Refugee Problem, Report of a Survey (London: Oxford University Press, 1939).
- Stevens, Georgiana A., ed., The United States and the Middle East (Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964).
- Stevens, Richard P., American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy 1942-1947 (New York: Pageant Press, 1962).
- Taylor, Alan R., Prelude to Israel (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).

Vernant, Jacques, The Refugee in the Post War World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953).

Viereck, Peter, The Unadjusted Man: A New Hero for Americans (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1956).

### III. ARTICLES

Arab Journal, Volume X, No. 1, Winter 1964.

Fancher, Michael, "Davis, UNRWA and the Palestine Refugees," Middle East Forum, April 1964, pp. 24-29.

Hamzeh, Fuad Said, "The U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine," Middle East Forum, February-March 1964, pp. 35-36.

Hottinger, Arnold, "The Palestine Refugees - An Unsolved Problem," reprinted from Swiss Review of World Affairs, No. 8, November 1961.

Khalidi, Walid, "Plan Dalet, The Zionist Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," Middle East Forum, November, 1961, reprinted in Palestine, Collected Papers, Arab Cultural Club, May 15, 1963.

Lehrman, Hal, "What Future For the Arab Refugees?", reprinted from Commentary, September 1957.

Sorensen, Theodore C., "How the President makes a Decision - Part II: the Alive Branch or the Arrows," Saturday Review, August 3, 1963, pp. 8-12, 46, 47.

Read, James M., "The United Nations and Refugees - Changing Concepts," International Conciliation, March 1962.

Rees, Elfan, "Century of the Homeless Man," International Conciliation, November 1957.

### IV. PERIODICALS

Department of State Bulletin.

The New York Times.

The Economist.

V. OTHER UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL

'Azzi, M. Usamah, "Israel's Prospects for Economic Independence,"  
Unpublished Master's dissertation, Department of Economics,  
American University of Beirut, 1963.

Matthews, Alfred W., "United Nations Assistance to the Arab Refugees,"  
Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of Political Studies, American  
University of Beirut, 1962.

Peretz, Don, Arab Refugee Report, Rockefeller Foundation, 1962  
(Mimeographed).

Sharaf, Abdul Hamid, The Development of American Policy on Palestine  
in the United Nation's, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of  
Political Studies, American University of Beirut, 1962.

Wriggins, H., Mediation in Palestine, Unpublished term paper,  
Yale Graduate School of International Relations, May 6, 1950.