

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT

SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO WAR AND THE
MILITARY: A DISCUSSION

by
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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF

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This study explores the dialectical interplay between war, the military and society. It is an analytical survey of the main sociological literature on the subject; through the classical, modern, as well as global and postmodern writings. It also discusses the concepts and themes promoted by the European and American Schools of military sociology. It suggests that a theoretical intersection point between Weber, Karl Marx, C. Wright Mills, and Zygmunt Bauman remains focal and seminal in the sociological interpretation of the reflexive impact of war and the military on society. It concludes by arguing that completing a framework of explanation, on war and military, remains a challenge for sociologists, or sociological theory.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND

War and the military transform society. Equally societal changes influence war and the military. A dialectical perspective reflects this interplay. Moreover, the emergence of advanced modes of warfare, and changing military structures, have both led to the development of novel models of analysis for explaining the interaction between war, military and society. The main concern of this introduction is to trace the changes, in theoretical sociology, of war and military, and their impact on society.

War is an armed struggle within or among societies (Colson 2007; Shaw 2006). It is a recurring social phenomenon, which reflects social conflict in one of its extremely violent and lethal forms (Kelly 2000; Malešević 2010b; Shaw 2009). To Shaw, in particular, it is considered as the “archetype of organized violence” (Shaw, 2009: 97). While it breaks open as a conflict, produced by society, war also reflexively produces and re-produces society and culture (Lewis 2007; Rao, Bollig, & Böck 2007; Rosen 1995). In effect, war and warfare dialectically co-evolve with society (Kelly, 2000). Hunters and gatherers, tribal, agricultural, industrial, or postmodern economic modes of production have historically produced and reproduced corresponding warfare systems, political regimes and social structures (Andreski 1968; Karsten 2008; Kelly 2000). Furthermore, war, as a situation, often engulfs and involves all aspects and assets of a society (Paret, 1992). To sociologists, war is institutionalized and formalized by rules

and regulations, values and norms, set by society (Frankel 2011; Shaw 2006). In turn, it equally weighs on cultural, political, economic as well as overall social processes (Kelly 2000; Nuciari 2006; Shaw 2006).

Attempting to demonstrate the scope and magnitude of war, and its influences, an early architect of theoretical sociology, writing in wartime 1917, Georg Simmel treated war as “an absolute situation” (Malešević, 2010a: 205). While war is a pervasive phenomenon (Falk & Kim, 1980) and often a total event (Malešević, 2010b), the military is the institution which specializes in directly organizing, regulating and executing it, on behalf of society. The military is the armed organization in charge of preparing and conducting the process of warfare. It operates under the direct control of state, as well as a range of non-state actors (Colson, 2007). Hence, military organizations act as the “managers of violence”, (Harold Lasswell, 1950, cited in Jenkins, 1974: 57).

The reflexive interaction between warfare and society identifies an enormously significant role for military institutions in social life. They are the armed branch of state and society (Mann 1988; Shaw 2006). Consequently, warfare and the military form one of the most prominent power clusters in society (Mann 1988; Shaw 2006). Finally, social history, displaying a functionalist perspective, maintains that armies have been the historical founders of social systems. In other words, the military has been a requirement or even a prerequisite for founding social order and state structures (Colson 2007).

From the founding fathers to the post-moderns, sociological thought has evolved its understanding of war and the military. There occurred a shift from a European state-centered approach towards a global one. Hence, the Weberian notion of the state's monopoly over organized violence has been expanded in order to account for the increasing non-state military actors, who fight more unconventional forms of wars. This thesis asks how sociology has historically accounted to the phenomena of war and the military in relation to society. It argues that a theoretical framework remains incomplete. Yet, the thesis maintains that the scope of sociological inquiry on the subject of war and military has advanced from its original classical into the global and postmodern interpretations. Thus, in addition to the traditional state-centered approach to the subject, a variety of other explanations have materialized. In other words, today, sociologists observe that all over the world strong states, almost imperial in their outreach, and weaker states fight their wars, through conventional structures of armed forces. The stronger ones are capable of initiating non-territorially confined battles. The weaker states and their militaries execute more limited wars, whether against each other or within regional confines, by proxy. More importantly, within a global and a postmodern framework, no-state actors have also emerged with the capacity of launching sporadic and dispersed attacks, against states or other entities. Again, sociologists advanced from a model which began at perceiving a state as the war-making machine, a la Weber or Simmel, to one that goes beyond state-war dialectic, namely towards society-military interplay.

This, for example is particularly evident upon observing the dynamics of the latest revolutionary developments across the Arab World. Here, wars have been raging almost continuously. Throughout the twentieth century, and way into the twenty-first, the Arab-Israeli conflict endures. It is one of those WWII legacies that remain unsolved (Rukavishnikov, 2007). Other, than the inter-state wars of 1948, 1967, or 1973, a series of intermittent smaller-scale wars involving non-state actors complimented that broader history of battles in the region. Furthermore, Iraq has been involved in three subsequent Gulf Wars, since the 1980s; one against Iran, then against Kuwait, and finally against the international community at large. Each episode marked nearly a whole decade of the countries. In Lebanon too, violent conflicts never seem to cast away their shadows; a civil war 1976-1990, augmented by an Israeli invasion in 1982, which recurred in 2006. Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, and Egypt have recently joined the turbulence of revolutions, often armed and increasingly resembling civil war scenes. In all cases, the roles of the armed forces, and the state, have been challenged. In places like Egypt and Tunisia, the military was the primary force that prevented the total collapse of state and society. Yet, the two militaries managed to secure the exit of the heads of the two states. The states of Yemen, and Libya don't seem much immune against further violence, however, partly as the revolting forces tended to raise arms against the state. In Syria, the strong ideological cohesion of the military, which has virtually been in power for the past forty years, continues to dislodge the armed revolution.

Again, from Max Weber (1864-1920) to Zygmunt Bauman (1925-), sociologists have constantly attempted to understand and explain war and militancy among human groups or societies. This thesis addresses the question of change in sociological perception of war and the military, in light of the changing realities of warfare. Classical sociological concepts about war and the military are addressed in chapter II, before discussing the modern ones in Chapter III, and then the postmodern explanations, in Chapter IV. Finally, Chapter V serves as a Discussion and Conclusion.

CHAPTER II

INFERENCES FROM CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY.

August Comte (1798-1857), known to have invented the term “sociology”, understood war and the military within his general “positive philosophy” of social development (Comte, 1896). He studied and reviewed a hierarchy of sciences that included Mathematics, Physics, Biology, and Chemistry in order to outline laws of human progress, particularly in the advanced societies of his times. Thus he introduced sociology in his last treaties of three volumes, (published between 1839 and 1842), as a science of social dynamics. He envisioned it and located it as a science, among the other sciences. He claimed that social phenomena are subject to natural laws. Comte furthermore believed that interpreting the history of advanced West European societies, to prove their development, and unlock the main principles of their evolution, led to an ultimate regeneration of the social sciences.

In Book VI, “Social Physics”, he studied the “recurrence to war” (Comte: 160). In this part, he traced the rise of a dual theological and military system, all the way from polytheism into the age of monotheism. The pertinence of his work centers around the historical observation he made about industrialization and the decline of the military, as he had anticipated. At the time, his “ideas influenced statesmen from Turkey to Brazil” (Malešević, 2010a: 194). In more detail, Comte still thought that without war and military activity, humanity would not have evolved towards industrial levels:

“As long as primitive Man was averse from all regular toil, the military life alone furnished a field for his sustained activity. Apart from cannibalism, it offered the simplest form of subsistence. However deplorable the necessity, its universal prevalence and continuous development, even after subsistence might have been obtained by other means, proves that the military *régime* must have had some indispensable, though provisional office to fulfill in the progression of the race. It was indeed the only one under which human industry could make a beginning” (Comte, 1896, Vol. II: 326).

Karl Marx (1818-1883), in his historical notes on ancient city-states considered war as a condition lived and imposed upon their inhabitants (Gallie, 1979). “War is the great common task, the great common labour which is required to perpetuate the occupation of the land which is the necessary condition of their livelihood together” justified Marx (cited in Gallie, 1979: 78). However, it was through news-reporting on world events between 1848 and 1860 that much of what Marx was empirically

observing gradually evolved into a theoretical understanding of war and the military. (Both Marx and Engels discussed the reports prior to publication¹.

During that period, Marx and Engels reported particularly on war situations, worldwide. Their main focus was on subjects of military operations, rebellions, or strikes (see Avineri, 1968: 264). They covered such happenings erupting across China, India, Afghanistan and Crimea, to the Middle East, Algeria and Morocco (Avineri 1968).

Throughout, a large set of observations could be constructed out of their writings. First, a global tendency of empires to divide and rule, versus predestination of some societies to fall prey to conquest, are observed. Second, in some historical instances, civilization was transmitted through brutal conquest. For example the press was introduced into Asia, by Western conquerors. Another of Marx's complex portrayal of the intercourse between conqueror and conquered could be read: "The ruling classes

¹ Though written upon Marx's request many articles were published under Engel's name, in the *New York Daily Tribune* (Avineri, 1968).

of Great Britain have had, till now, but an accidental transitory and exceptional interest in the progress of India. The aristocracy wanted to conquer it, the moneyocracy to plunder it, and the millocracy to undersell it. But now the transformation of India into a reproductive country has become of vital importance to them, and that, to that end, it is necessary, above all, to gift her with means of irrigation and of internal communication...” (Marx 1853, in Avineri, 1968: 126-7). Third, in other instances, wars of conquest broke down entire societies. Fourth, conquest invites rebellion, and emancipation of armies, as well as guerrilla warfare –a subject favorite to Marx. Fifth, religion, minorities, Holy places, clergymen were historical prompters of war of conquest as well as native-army revolts. Sixth, trade is seen as the most significant generator of war. Marx and Engels dwell on such examples as the maritime and rail routes of tea trade between China, Russia and Europe. Vice versa were the Western trade routes of opium into China, and the rule of India by the British East India Company. Finally, it is rather interesting to note that Marx employs the term “civilization war” in reference to the role of the press, e.g. in Spain or Britain, to politically agitate wars (Avineri 1968)..

Thus, trades, religion, transmission of civilization, imperialism, or colonization were central themes in early thought of Marx and Engels. The articles were reflecting a certain shaping of both thinkers’ orientation. This could be inferred from their later exchange of letters commenting on events and following 1860. By then, Marx had given ultimate attention to the battles and episodes of the American Civil War, its military

campaigns, and developments in relation to the global outlook in light of respective slave and serf movements in America and Russia (Marx and Engels 1969: 221-223).

Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), formulated his “synthetic philosophy” for which he had set up categories of principles (1890). Specifically, in the *Principles of Sociology*, he studied the main social institutions, like ceremonial, political, ecclesiastical, professional and industrial institutions. He addressed the military systems under the political institutions.

Spencer, known for his social evolutionary perspective, contended that societies evolve into larger aggregations or break up because of war. Within the inside, societies develop their social structures in reaction to conflicts. Furthermore, as he analyzed primitive societies, in particular, he noted that “the army is the mobilized community, and the community is the army at rest” (Spencer, 1890 Vol. I: 47). This permitted the political leadership, in those societies, to emerge out of the military. The military functions also intersected with the economic organization. Thus, for example, warriors were also the hunters. In other stages of evolution, the knights acted or became the landlords. Also, like Comte, Spencer acknowledged the relationship between religion and the military functions (Spencer, Vol. III: 109-115).

Gradually, in the more advanced societies, the division of labor leads to a separation between the political, religious, economic, and military units. For instance, changes in economic systems, from agriculture to trade or industry, reshaped the authority of the military. In particular, the connection of military officers or warlords to

land ownership took different forms. Likewise, the system of conscription evolved. With time, corresponding distribution of workforces required a lesser proportion of men to serve as warriors, and more of them to serve the more specialized economic functions (Spencer, 1890).

Herbert Spencer also agreed with August Comte on the prospective decline of the military impact (Nuciari, 2006). He speculated that with industrialization, a further growth in population and in capital would cause more separation of the military from other societal institutions. Spencer explained that the “absorption of the energies in industry, directly and indirectly antagonized militant action. Consequently, the separation of the fighting body from the general body of citizens was accompanied by a decrease in its relative mass” (Vol. I: 478). He attributes this decrease to the mounting costs of both raising an army, and mobilizing it across evolving and growing lands of emerging large nations (Spencer, 1890).

Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936), wrote, on his early relation to sociology, that initial interest in the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes introduced him to other English writers. From there on, he read Herbert Spencer, and then shifted to exploring Auguste Comte. Indeed, he also read Karl Marx, and thus began his own sociological endeavor.

Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1955) is among his most celebrated works, in which he traced the societal trends of across traditional and rural development towards modern and urban ones. He underlined the enlargement of social relations from the familial circles towards a broader “social collective” (Tönnies, 1955: 3-7).

Influenced by Thomas Hobbes' notion of natural law, in which the social progress evolves from a state of war between all against all. Tönnies, thereupon, gave particular attention to explaining elements of fear, threat, and social conflict. More relevantly, he contributed an analytical model on the relationship between commerce and war.

Tönnies depicted commerce as a peaceful social activity. Unlike war which he regarded as asocial, commercial endeavors are productive, whereas warring is destructive (Tönnies, 1971: 324). However, they both expand and travel geographically. Consequently, both war and commerce are ruled by aspects of rational planning, calculating, and organizing. Furthermore, both forces involve financial investments. Accordingly, like commerce, a successful war does yield revenues, profits, as well as territorial and political gains that make up for the heavy expenditure it originally entailed. In this regard, Tönnies explains that while neither war nor commerce are essentially modern social practices, both have developed their scopes to become large-scale modern phenomena. Production, transport, communications, banking, finance, trade, and political interests are all conjoined in a broadening world trade. In turn this worldwide trade dictates competition, conflict, and war (Tönnies, 1971).

Tönnies viewed the emergence of a capitalist system that, out of the commercial imperative, gave rise to the centralization of administration. This occurred, first in the rise of the modern city, and then in the formation of the modern state. Capital and the state join hands when reaching out toward faraway land and across the seas. They bring

under their dominion, partly by means of their commodities, partly by means of their armed forces, whole territories and their inhabitants (Tönnies, 1971: 325).

In this context, he observed how the military evolved from a “warriors caste”, in the Middle Ages, (Tönnies, 1955), into the standing army, as of the seventeenth century (Tönnies, 1971). The warrior caste grew out of the leaders of smaller feudal communities, and came to compose the nobility. Not only was such earlier stratification based on class, but also on gender, he noted. While males were fit to serve in armies, females raised the male children (future warriors) and took charge of farming and agriculture, all of which served the military potentials of a community or *Gemeinschaft* (Tönnies, 1955). The state then became the representative of urban interests, in the embodiment of the *Gesellschaft*, the collective will and the centralized power. Here, Tönnies understood the state “especially by legal definition, is nothing but force, the holder and representative of all natural rights of coercion”. This conception, as will be observed later, coincides with Weber’s definition of the state. Modern interstate wars, correspondingly, became economic in nature (Tönnies, 1971: 330).

Still, to Tönnies the state, acting on behalf of commercial or economic interests of the various cities, depended on the countryside in two aspects. The rural areas supplied the fighting soldiers, and also sustained warfare, economically, by producing food for the army (Tönnies, 1971). Modern armies, thus, came to serve as political instruments (Tönnies, 1971), raised to protect the homeland or to conquer new territories (Tönnies, 1955).

Science, technology, public opinion and propaganda are also affected in war conditions. They are all fostered under warfare conditions (Tönnies, 1971). Science and knowledge are remarkable social forces in modern times. They strategically facilitate and develop the economy of warfare, as well as the exploitation of local/enemy resources. Military technology, in particular, historically invested scientific progress for the regulation, and often mass destruction of human lives. The means of military technology, again, serve *destructive* ends. Nonetheless they are, paradoxically, dependant on the *productive* forces of society (Tönnies, 1971).

Finally, public opinion and propaganda are two elements Tönnies addressed, in relation to war. Interestingly, he argued that dogmatic patriotism, just like religious faith, is crucial during wars. War makes patriotism an obligatory duty for the public. Indeed, it is through propaganda that governments or political forces work on shaping respective public opinion (Tönnies, 1971).

Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), who described Comte's term "sociology" as a "rather barbarous name" (Durkheim, 1960: 1), explored the nascent science as one that focuses on all "social things" (Durkheim, 1960: 3). In both his masterpieces *The Division of Labour in Society* (1984), and *Suicide* (1951), the French sociologist extracted rich insight onto war and the military. In the former, he provided a broad interpretation on war and peace. In the latter, he gave several examples on the social sway on the military.

Durkheim addressed war and peace inter-relatedly, in the light of rights, morals, limitations, justice, and solidarity. He wrote:

“... peace in itself is no more desirable than war. The latter has its drawbacks and advantages. Have there not been peoples and individuals whose passion has at all times been war? The instincts to which it corresponds are no less powerful than those that peace satisfies. No doubt sheer weariness of hostilities can for a while put an end to them, but this simple truce can be no more lasting than temporary lassitude that brought it about. This is all the more true of outcomes due merely to the triumph of force. They are as provisional and precarious as the treaties that terminate wars between nations. Men need peace only in so far as they are already united by some bond of sociability”.

(Durkheim, 1984: 76).

Society, he typically argued, require stability. It forces its members and groups, with all its weight, to mutually sacrifice in order to maintain internal peace. This form of ‘negative solidarity’, or reciprocal concession, is equally applicable in terms of the relations among independent societies. They are dependent, nonetheless in peace, as well as in war and conflict over territories and rights. Therefore, a certain ‘balance of power’ dictates the organization of inter and intra societal organization. In his terms, this is a balance of both the egotism and altruism of individuals or collectives alike, in order for society to function (Durkheim, 1984).

In his study of suicide, Durkheim (1951), compared the rates of military suicides. He obviously explained that altruistic suicide is the choice of death against defeat and humility. In the army, he noted “a special environment where altruistic

suicide is chronic” (Durkheim, 1951: 228). It is a place where suicide is more common, at a given age, than among civilians. Despite two main reasons to prevent such negation of life, suicide is even higher among the officer corps, and elite troops, he found. Neither the solidarity of the family-like esprit de corps, nor the youthful strength of the officers saved them from such ending. In fact, he maintained that self-abnegation is stronger among such soldiers (Durkheim, 1951).

Through his findings, he concluded that officer suicide was not related to their families or marital status. A slight relation to alcoholism did not seem alone convincing for him to account for such suicides. He also explained that suicide rates in military service, whether among English servicemen in India, or French ones at home, reoccur far more frequently than among the civilian populations of their respective countries. Simply, he argued that causes and influences on military suicide are different from those of civilian ones. Also, within armies, engineers or administrators are less inclined towards suicide than combat troops.

Furthermore, Durkheim identified that:

“Now, the first quality of a soldier is a sort of impersonality not to be found anywhere in civilian life to the same degree... for this an intellectual abnegation hardly consistent with individualism is required. He must have but a weak tie binding him to his individuality, to obey external impulsion so docilely. In short, a soldier’s principle of action is external to himself; which is the quality of the state of altruism. Of all elements constituting our modern

societies, the army, indeed, most recalls the structure of lower societies”

(1951: 234).

Finally, upon comparatively reviewing military suicide rates, over several decades, in Belgium, Austria, England, Prussia, Italy and Austria, he observed particular changes. First, in all the countries at hand, suicide among the military was in decline. Second, he attributed this to an overall decline in traditional military essence, within those European societies. Third, the military spirit was, effectively, turning more flexible to the individualization of the soldier. Fourth, while military suicide declined, the civilian suicide rates continued unchanged. This further supported his hypothetical conviction about the rigidity of the traditional military spirit and its influence on altruistic suicides of soldiers, based on an accepting “primitive morality” (Durkheim, 1951: 238).

Georg Simmel (1858-1918) suggested a novel outlook on the emerging science, sociology, by introducing the study of conflict. He perceived sociology not only as a study of convergent units or unity in society, but also as a study of “divergent dualisms” (Simmel, 1955: 13), in competition, hostility, and war. Accordingly, he accepted conflict as a form of sociation (Simmel, 1955). Like Tönnies’ differentiation between destruction and construction, Simmel’s distinction was between sociation and dissociation, as social actions. Though it is a negative process, conflict deserved his concentration, for its positive sociological characteristics. After all, to Simmel, society is the outcome of the interaction between both positive and negative forces, whether in

economic, or political settings. Thus, he assumed conflict as a force that integrates members of a social unit, be it a family, a social class, or a religious group. This occurs on two levels – internal and external. It is, for example, in disputes and disagreements that marriages may evolve, and survive, from their inside. Also, it is against external individuals or groups that certain social units, like the Hindu caste system, tend to consolidate their internal solidarity (1955). Like Durkheim, Simmel believed that war and soldierly sacrifice generates social cohesion and solidarity (Malešević, 2010a).

Simmel (1955) proceeded to break down different forms of conflict, namely competition, jealousy, antagonism games, legal conflict, etc. For instance, he detected that in competition, conflict is milder, since it does not require the annihilation of the opponent, as that opponent remains a requisite for competition to continue. In view of that, competition indirectly involves a degree of harmony too.

Furthermore, Simmel dwelled on the effects conflict have on the internal structures of the groups involved. Conflict, strengthens or weakens, and concentrates or drains the energies of groups, as well as individuals. War, in specific, was seen by Simmel as really “a centralistic intensification of the group form” (1955: 88). In line with this logic, he added that armies represent the highest degree of organizational centralization within a society. This centralization functions against the rise of any insubordination, and insures the efficient transmission of orders. The state, to Simmel, is consequently perceived as “a war conducting power” (1955: 89). Also, unlike local conflicts, inter-state wars have a propensity to result in a balance, more favorable for the

victor. Still, however, such wars cost heavier expenses and cause greater destruction, noted Simmel. In other words, the more centralized states raise more efficient armies, the better they fight more expensive wars or endure destruction. Yet, by doing so, they seek to improve their peace conditions.

War, again, intensifies social cohesion, and confirms the decisiveness of action against an external threat. In Simmel's words, "war with the outside is sometimes the last chance for a state ridden with inner antagonisms to overcome these antagonisms, or else to break up definitely" (1955: 93). This is because war, as a state of emergency, brings about an intensified unification, which in turn often serve purposes beyond the original military ones (1955). Like Durkheim, Simmel believed that war generates social cohesion and solidarity.

On the outcomes of conflict, Simmel presented several possibilities. Foremost, he looked at conflict as successive processes whereby one extends, as a bridge to the other, and peace could be one such conclusion. Either when fighting becomes too exhaustive, or when higher goals, beyond war, materialize, peace would be sought. Conflicts, however, could end in ways other than peace. In this sense, victory, as an act of conquest, compromise, as an act of exchange, conciliation, as an act of forgiveness, or defeat, as an act of withdrawal, are examples Simmel gave on how conflicts could end (Simmel, 1955).

In addition to his observations on war, as a conflict situation, Simmel made specific remarks about the military as an organization. Modern army organization

evolved into an impersonal one. It transcends ties of kinship, tribe or locality. In this regard, a rational military structure destroyed, gradually, the primary-group affiliations of individual members. He noted that Spartans, were among the earlier people to build their armies on the basis of military evaluations (Simmel, 1955). He also assumed that the process of raising such a rational structure, out of the primordial clan and locality affiliations, excluded females, chiefly because they were regarded as the source of kinship solidarity, and unfit to be warriors. The army basically shifted from being an *organic* into being a *mechanical* structure. This was essential to warrant cohesion, and avoid familial or tribal loyalties, as well as feuds from permeating among troops. Thus, Simmel wrote that in military organizations, “subdivisions and groupings ruthlessly cut across all other types of organization, and in so doing they destroy organic in favor of mechanic associations” (1955: 193). Obviously, here Simmel is employing Durkheim’s distinction between organic and mechanical forms of solidarity.

Max Weber (1864-1920), in tracing the origin of the city, noted that cities, especially in Europe, were founded on largely military grounds. European cities, in Weber’s view, did not emerge as purely economic urban settlements based on trade, but also as garrisoned and militarily secured areas. Weber clearly perceived the ancient and medieval city “as the fusion of fortress and market” (1958: 77). Within it, an interdependent military and civilian population evolved, along the political and economic activities they performed. The more the market expanded, so did its security

needs, leading to the training and drafting of citizens into military service (Weber, 1958).

It was in Occidental cities, however, that the earlier incorporation of soldiers into the formal state bureaucracy took place (Weber, 1958). Weber attributed this largely to the need of rulers to regulate the water systems and supplies. Interestingly, this meant that military draft was developed, in such cities, for the purpose of managing water flow for irrigation, as well as for the maintenance of water traffic routes.

Effectively, in gradual course, the army became a power-base for social organization. By being so, it became dependent on the administration that provided equipment and weapons for the soldiers. Hence, Weber maintained (1958) that this accounted for the earlier partition of the ownership of arms from a private to a public mode. Thereupon, the military where made dependent on their civilian rulers for supply and finance. Still, the separation of the individual soldier from his means of warfare, was more accentuated, when it started to take place in Europe. This permitted military service to turn into an instrument of civilian political domination over the armed forces (Weber, 1958).

By looking at Weber's other writings, the subject of war and the military appears more pertinent to his broader sociological analysis. For illustration, in his "Basic Concepts in Sociology" (1968), Weber broke down the concept of struggle into several forms. He described struggle as a form of social relationships; but, he distinguished peaceful from violent struggles. "Competition," he defined, is the pursuit

of specific advantages, within a peaceful context. Also, “controlled competition” is a struggle that occurs under one regulatory authority, e.g. the state (Weber, 1968: 85). Effectively, in all such forms, struggles involve the attempt to impose one party’s will upon that of another.

In general, he viewed struggles as stages of transition, out of which the victorious party succeeds to acquire more authority, opportunities and advantages in society. In other words, to Weber (1968), struggles are transitional processes of selection, whether through competition, economic domination, or definitive war. Blood is often shed in conflicts and wars over the *indivisible* issues, rather than the *divisible* once (Khalaf, 2002: 227). Lastly, Weber understood wars as “violent struggles” involving combat, till the possible end of even annihilating the opponent (Weber, 1968). This is particularly when the conflict is transformed into a struggle of indivisible concerns and loyalties (Khalaf, 2002).

Another concept Weber explained was the “Corporate group,” of which he gave the state as a clear example (Weber, 1968: 109). This group is rather closed and selective. It is administered by a staff in charge of leading and implementing rules and laws, as vested in the authority of that corporate group. In addition, members of corporate groups adhere and abide to its authority; exactly like soldiers do in their extensive group – the army. Furthermore, obedience to the state is the “corporate behavior” displayed by the military, more particularly during wartime (Weber, 1968:

109). It is the behavior expected, both in service of corporate affairs or corporate interests, as well as in line with corporate regulations.

Moreover, the military complies with state orders, and the state, Weber added, is effectively the “territorial corporate group” (1968: 111). In this regard, the territorial group is empowered to impose its laws, even by virtue of force and domination. In his famous words, Max Weber continued that a “compulsory political association with a continuous organization will be called a “state” if, and in so far as, its administrative staff successfully claims the monopolization of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its authority” (1968: 119).

To him, the modern state provides security, and equates its citizens in life and in death. Weber goes further when he assigns for its military “the battlefield on which to die” (Weber, 1994: 105). Accordingly, the efficiency of the modern bureaucratic army rested on strict discipline, and drew on exclusive state finance, as well as state provision of weapons. In pre-modern times, again, weapons were owned by the soldier, or his feudal lord. This transition of ownership of weapons was itself, in turn, central for the submission of the modern army to civilian, political and capitalist powers in state and society (Weber, 1994).

This sketch of the views of the founding fathers, brief as it is, allows one to infer whether they were pacifists or militaristic in their perspectives. Siniša Malešević (2010a), for instance, was inclined to argue that they were not pacifists. They have, as a matter of fact, prolifically invested in trying to explain collective violence, war and

military as instruments of change in societies (Malešević, 2010a). Early founders of sociology also analyzed the relationship between war, militarist behavior and violence as precursors of modernity (Malešević, 2010a).

CHAPTER III

MODERN SOCIOLOGY AND THE SUBFIELD OF MILITARY SOCIOLOGY.

Following World War Two, the social sciences began to address the questions on war and the military more directly (Caforio, 2006). Four particularly determining themes were introduced by Stanislav Andreski in two of his works (1954 and 1968), Samuel Huntington (1957), and C. Wright Mills (1956). Respectively, the themes are: Militarism, Military Participation Ratio, Civil-Military Relations, and the Military-Industrial Complex. The four themes gradually became central in the formulation of the post-war subfield of Military Sociology.

Militarism

Militarism addresses the degree of subjective symbiosis between the military and other societal spheres. It is an extreme form of military control over the civilian aspects of social domains. This is often the case in wartime, or in war-ridden areas of the world. Militarism is a reflection of a civilian-military situation wherein society is cultured along military values, concerns, threats, or activities.

Early in defining the concept, Stanislav Andreski (1968) suggested that sociological explanation “would be facilitated by developing militarism as the compound of militancy, preponderance of the army in the state, adulation of military

virtues and militarization” (93). Accordingly, he further detailed various meanings and derivations on the notion of militarism.

First, militarism could be depicted in a bellicose foreign policy, in which the threat or use of force is readily probable. Andreski still maintained that in “all social conflicts violence is the argument of the last resort” (1968: 26). Second, militarism exists when a predominant delineation occurs between the civilian and military administration. Third, when a society is exceedingly compliant to military needs, which yields greater military control over social life. More precisely, in this context, militarism becomes a process of ordering civilian life in line with a prevailing model of military organization. Fourth, militarism is a condition in which society turns to value military ceremonies, field drills, service and training as central aspects of its culture. This could then reflect what Andreski (1968) calls a “militaristic ideology” that celebrates and praises military qualities, army life, and values in society.

Military Participation Ratio (MPR)

Introducing other terminologies into sociology, about the military, Andreski (1968) coined a second concept, the Military Participation Ratio. It is better observed within his broader study on the subject, however. Primarily, he understood the military as an institutional force that shapes society, in a world of constant “struggle for wealth, power, and prestige”, within and among societies (Andreski, 1968: 7). Then, adopting a Malthusian reasoning, the author accepted that human societies tend to regulate their birth and death rates through struggles, frequently including killing, in the fight over the

basic essential needs of food and sexual reproduction (Andreski, 1968: 15-18). More importantly, he related military power to social stratification, and argued that to a large extent, the superior strata in society is the one which holds this military power (26).

So, he developed the Military Participation Ratio (MPR), as a tool of measurement. He was initially seeking to establish the impact of military participation on social stratification, by reducing inequalities. Andreski (1968) defined MPR as “the proportion of militarily utilized individuals in the total population” (33). Furthermore, he differentiated between the actual MPR of a society, and its optimum MPR, in relation to the societal productive capacity, divided by the costs of maintaining an efficient army. (This cost included equipment, arms, training, etc.).

Andreski (1968) concluded that MPR indicates the degree of a state’s control over its subjects, especially in wartimes (115). This is based on the extent of societal mobilization for military purposes (Graeff & Mehlkop, 2006). The idea of such measurement became widely adopted by later scholars (Weede 1986; Marsh 1988; Weede 1993; Segal & Segal 2004; Haltiner 2006; Graeff & Mehlkop 2006). Sociologist Erich Weede, for example, asserted that as military discipline and skills form part of the human capital in society, they contribute to economic progress and income equality, whenever MPR increases, specifically in the less developed countries (1986).

Added research further detailed the elements of MPR into Women Ratio (WR), and Conscripts Ratio (CR) in the military, age or race cohorts in MPR, etc. (Haltiner, 2006). Other studies used the MPR concept to research the changes and later reduction

in the average size of military populations across some Western societies (see Segal & Segal 2004; Caforio 2006; Haltiner 2006). Their research underscores a trend of decreasing MPR that very likely signifies a “diminished importance of national militaries as social institutions” (Haltiner, 2006: 367).

Civil-Military Relations

Civil-Military Relations (CMR) is the interdisciplinary concept for analyzing the interplay between the civilian spheres and the military spheres in society (Caforio 2007; Feaver 1996). CMR is a complex and a dynamic concept (Albright, 1980). In addition to being interdisciplinary, CMR does not follow a universal model in all societies and states (Caforio, 2007; Janowitz, 1981; Rukavishnikov & Pugh 2006).

The concept is studied by various social scientists. Mainly, sociologists and political scientists have developed the concept, though for different purposes of inquiry (Feaver, 1996). Political scientists study CMR in order to address state and civilian control over the military (Feaver, 1996). Their research concerns governmental and institutional dimensions. (It broadly serves in decision-making and policy analysis). Thus, it centers on state control of the armed forces, economic budgetary, and employment considerations, as well as the effectiveness of the armed forces in asserting state interests within the international arena (Feaver 1996; Rukavishnikov & Pugh 2006; Williams 2006). On the other hand, sociological investigation into CMR focuses on the interaction of social groups and social structures (Williams, 2006). It explores the

integration or disintegration between the military and the parent society (Harries-Jenkins 1974; Feaver 1996).

Works by Samuel Huntington, Morris Janowitz or Charles Moskos have been formative in the field of CMR (Feaver, 1996). Their theoretical debates started focusing on military versus the government. Janowitz and Moskos explored this in relation to the wider frameworks of history, economy, and social conditions. In fact, although Huntington was earlier in addressing and theorizing CMR, it was Janowitz who incorporated the concept into sociological perspective. Based on Janowitz's work, research evolved to address - in addition to Huntington's military professionalism and civilian control - CMR and military families, public opinion and legitimacy, media and communications, gender participation, recruitment patterns, and defense budgets, etc. (Feaver 1996; Rukavishnikov & Pugh 2006).

This dimension of modern social research on the military continues and expands. As will be shown, postmodern and global sociological notions have also contributed to the study of CMR (Caforio 2006; Moskos 2000). In short, the contemporary sociological approach to CMR studies most noted: conscription and the social makeup of the armed forces, military role and structure, gender integration, legitimacy and public support, post-service readjustment into society, technological developments, and the military-industrial structures, all became salient (see for example, Harries-Jenkins 1974; Rukavishnikov & Pugh 2006).

Military-Industrial Complex: The Power Elite and the Military Clique

Resorting to the concepts of militarism and CMR, C. Wright Mills concluded direct links between the military and the industrial economy, by arguing that “Without an industrial *economy*, the modern army... could not exist; it is an army of machines” (Mills, 1959: 222). Militarism, he reiterated, is “a case of the dominance of means over ends” (1959: 222). In such a state, the civilian sphere, which perceives the military as a tool for political ends, falls under military influence (Mills, 1959). In his own words, Mills describes militarism as “the tendency of military men not to remain means, but to pursue ends of their own, and to turn other institutional areas into means for accomplishing them”. (1959: 222). This imbalance in CMR occurs most in the economic realm. More specifically, Mills noted that the modern wars and armies rely on machinery that is industrially produced. Yet, unlike traditional perceptions, especially by economists, Mills (1959) agreed that the military, as in the United States, does not feed on industry. Instead, the modern army forms an integral active part of industrial production (Mills, 1959).

Hence, militarism is the aim of the military at acquiring power in society against money, economy and politics (Mills, 1959). Military men, seeking such adjustment in power balance, versus the civilian sphere, often believe that “their ends must be identified with the ends as well as the honor of the nation; the economy must be their servant; politics an instrument by which, in the name of the state, the family, and God, they manage the nation in modern war” (Mills, 1959: 223). As such institutions of

education, politics, family, religion, science, as well as economy could all serve militarism and the goals of military commanders.

In this context, the notion of the warlord, versus the politician or the money-maker, finds itself into Mills' argument. When the warlords, the corporate directors and the politicians come to form the main circle of decision making and wealth control in a society, what Mills defined as "power elite" rules all over. At the heart of it, this elite certainly constitutes of a "military clique" which "involves a coincidence of interests and a co-ordination of aims among economic and political as well as industrial actors (Mills, 1959: 224).

This alliance of interests is also known as the Military Industrial Complex (MIC). The phrase was first introduced in the 1961 farewell speech by American President Eisenhower (Bernstein & Wilson, 2011). MIC refers, again, to the organization of power within a class of military, corporate, and political higher elite. Both Mills and Eisenhower meant to conceptualize that phenomenon of power in the United States around the middle of the 20th century (Farish & Vitale, 2010). Both warned against a growing American militarism. Gradually, scholars and critics had more to say about the concept Mills and Eisenhower introduced into lexicon (Bernstein & Wilson, 2011).

Hence, two waves of scholarly works contributed to a continuing debate on MIC. The first wave receded between the 1970s and 1980s, while the second began late in the 1990s (Fallows, 2002; Bernstein & Wilson, 2011). The debate itself concentrates

on whether or not the MIC continues to grow in power. Some critics believe that MIC is in decline, particularly in the United States, simply due to budget deficits, and economic challenges that are negatively affecting the defense industries (Dunlap, 2011). However, many scholars argue that MIC did not only grow global, but also became more complex (Bernstein & Wilson, 2011).

In short, MIC is not anymore perceived as an exclusively American phenomenon. Military historians have explored a rise of Chinese, Soviet/Russian, British, Israeli, and at a point in time Brazilian military industrial complexes. Scholars have also studied broader socio-economic networks connected to the MIC structure. Most notably are the works that located an entertainment and media MIC (see Der Derian, 2009), as well as an academic, technological, and scientific MIC that influences higher education (see Giroux, 2007).

Military Sociology

Also, around World War Two, a minor field in sociological research began taking shape, out of a body of literature that started, largely, by the works of Andreski, Huntington, and others. The subfield Military Sociology was born out of research conducted at the time on prisoners of war, families of the military, enlistment, gender and race-relations, structural cohesion, etc. (Armor, 2000). Gradually, sociological tools and methods were introduced into the study of the military (Nuciari, 2006). By the mid-1950s, “a considerable body of literature had evolved in which the systematic sociological analysis of the military is a central theme” (Harries-Jenkins, 1974: 57).

The subfield continues to evolve, mainly within two broad schools. Military sociologists (e.g. Caforio 2006; Nuciari 2006) call them the American and the European schools of military sociology. Both Caforio and Nuciari, in addition to Malešević in a comparative manner, retraced the origin of the two schools, and dutifully connected them to earlier sociological scholarship. Their historical account of the emergence of the two schools explains the geographical categorization. Indeed both schools continue to interact complementarily, and grow beyond their geographical origins.

American Military Sociology

The American school emerged at the time of “the entry of the United States into the Second World War and the resulting transformation of an army of a few hundred thousand... into a force of over seven million individuals” (Caforio, 2006: 13). The army invited a group of social scientists –e.g. George Homans and Edward Shils (Segal 2007)- to study the growing role of the U.S. military in its society, and the problems thus posed (Caforio, 2006). Sociologist Samuel Stouffer led this research team. By 1945, it prepared four volumes of: “Studies in Social Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier” (published in 1949). The work of Stouffer and colleagues, because of its extensive sampling and concrete analysis, became a milestone in the empirical social studies on the military and the generation of knowledge about the subject. It was based on interviews conducted with more than five-hundred-thousand soldiers (Caforio 2006; Nuciari 2006).

Stouffer interviewed infantrymen, and analyzed their integration into a cohesive primary combat group (Caforio, 2006). This was basic to his assertion that a “system of interiorized norms” prevented soldiers from fleeing in battle, and psychologically dictated the individual into fighting (Caforio, 2006: 15). The study also addressed the motivation to kill, attitudes towards the enemy, attitudes in combat, controlling fear, stress, morale, adaptation, cohesion, and veterans after wars (Caforio 2006; Malešević 2010b; Ryan 2010; Segal 2007). It invoked concepts from industrial psychology to interpret the data it generated. Equally, it related individual and social backgrounds, of the interviewees, and then examined them in relation to military stratification, structure and power (Caforio, 2006).

Caforio sums up a definition of the combat condition as designated by Stouffer and his colleagues. It is an awfully stressful situation, fearful, painful, anxiety-ridden, and denying of the combatant’s own individuality (Caforio, 2006: 14). Propaganda, ideology, or ideals have no place in the combat situation. They are not, Stouffer argued, the aim in the real fight (Malešević, 2010b: 223-224). Again, this empirical research was meant to inform military policy makers, and it demonstrated how by the “turn of the twentieth century, there was a fierce contest between those who struggled to explain war in traditional human terms and those who were beginning to explain war in scientific terms. Samuel A. Stouffer and his work were key to this debate, in showing how sociometrics could inform theories of human behavior in war” (Ryan, 2010: 102).

A second milestone in the American sociology of the military is the output by Samuel Huntington (1957) *The Soldier and the State* (see Caforio, 2006). It served as the theoretical complement to Stouffers empirical research (Caforio 2006; Nuciari 2006). Furthermore, Huntington's work started one of two components in the sociology of the military; the second followed Morris Janowitz's scholarly input (Caforio 2006; Feaver 1996).

Huntington emphasized more the notion of National Security Policy. It combined military security policy, plus internal security policy, along with situational security policy. Those components, he argued, each functions at two levels, the operating level and the institutional level. The institutional levels of decision making determine the operating issues of: quantity size and supplies; quality of equipment, organization and deployment; and utilization of armed forces. As mentioned earlier, his work theorized the Civil-Military-Relations concept. In his book, first published in 1957, he stated that CMR "is the principal institutional component of military security policy... Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations have a great advantage in the search for security... Nations which fail... squander their resources and run uncalculated risks" (Huntington, 2002: 2).

Furthermore, Huntington warned that when the political regime fails to attend to social, economic, and political challenges, the military often steps-in (Kennedy & Louscher, 1991). However, he identified the military officership as a profession, with functional specialization, subordinate to the political authorities, initially to block any

military coup d'état, characteristically possible when the officers act in such direction (Kennedy & Louscher, 1991). Still, the nature of interaction of the officers with the state- which licenses the army to use violence, directs the course of CMR (Caforio, 2006).

Sociologist Morris Janowitz, at Chicago University, in turn, also contributed foundational research to Military Sociology. Trained and associated with American social scientists, who studied the military, (like Harold Lasswell, Edward Shils, or Quincy Wright), Janowitz became known, eventually, as a pioneer of Military Sociology, by the 1960s (Martin, 2008). His early works dealt with cohesion, propaganda, and communication during wartime. His extensive and grounded research drew on data he gathered from interviews with German prisoners, in France; and he eventually served as analyst of intelligence issues at the State Department (Martin, 2008).

In the late 1950s, Janowitz also collaborated with Stouffer, while he was investigating the progresses in military organizations. Shortly thereafter, in 1960, he produced his own input, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Ryan, 2010). This is where he established an opposite CMR model to that of Huntington's (Caforio, 2006: 16). Janowitz argued that officers are nonetheless part of society, and therefore, explaining the interplay between them and both state and society is not a matter of political regulation, merely (Caforio, 2006). Control over the military is social in as much as it is political. This became the subject of concern to both the

Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces, Janowitz established in 1960, and its *Armed Forces & Society* journal (Martin, 2008). In 1976, he studied the social and political developments in Western societies that led to the raising, and eventual reverse restructuring of mass armies of conscripts (especially following the war in Vietnam), in a course of two centuries (Janowitz, 1976).

He emphasized, first, that as part of society, the military changes just as the parent society does. He recognized an intertwined “inescapability of collective violence and the fabric of social control” (Martin, 2008: 171). Second, this directly opened up the debate over CMR, as an active and interactive process, that could not be viewed through one political model. By 1981, he had explored various regional perspectives on CMR (Janowitz, 1981). He contributed three levels in studying the military, namely, as a professional organization; as part of a society; and as involved in a war situation (Nuciari, 2006).

From the political arena, Janowitz shifted the military analysis closer to the social one. Charles Moskos added the economic factor into their analytical models. He proposed the study of the military profession in relation to the market needs, namely as a job. In 1970, he compared the social status of military men, following the soldier/officer distinctions (Harries-Jenkins, 1974). Yet, his more profound theoretical proposition attended to the interplay between the military and the civilian domains. He sought, in line with Janowitzian ideas, to regard the interplay as dynamically

progressing, at points ‘diverging’ and at others ‘converging’ with the social (Caforio, 2006).

Moskos accepted “that the historical transformation of the military be interpreted as a dialectic evolution in which institutional persistences (divergent) react against the pressures towards assimilation to civilian life (convergent) present in society at large” (Caforio, 2006: 21). The military as a social institution invites a soldier with the moral or symbolic incentives it offers (Caforio 2006; Levy 2007). As an occupation, the military invites a recruit that is paid material and financial remuneration for service, just like any other occupation pays (Caforio 2006; Levy 2007). The military thus evolves and ranges along Moskos’s pluralistic I/O (Institution/Occupation) theoretical model (Caforio, 2006). Later on, Yagil Levy (2007) expounded that symbolic and material benefits are the respective forms of reward given by the institution or the occupation, thus in theory as well as in practice, transforming the soldier into a laborer as well.

European Military Sociology

The school of “European military sociology” started taking shape around late 1960s (Nuciari, 2006). “Scientific production became wide, and research paths differentiated according to various problematic and theoretical orientations of scholars (Nuciari, 2006, p. 63). By, 1986, the European Research Group on Military and Society (ERGOMAS) was founded. Its work originally emanated by acknowledging the difference between the American versus the European social and military contexts.

Equal balance was maintained between the empirical and theoretical considerations, as in the American practice (Caforio 2006; Nuciari 2006).

Yet, European social scientists, (British, German, French, Italian, etc.) were more oriented towards cross-cultural approaches to the topic (Caforio 2006; Nuciari 2006). They focused more on interdisciplinary subject-matters in the study of military societal interplay (Caforio 2006; Nuciari 2006). Caforio lists mass media, public opinion, globalization, cohesion, peacekeeping among many themes the European scholars have explored in relation with the military (Caforio, 2006).

A recent volume on European military and society covered an array of themes on the subject. *Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis*, edited by Jürgen Kuhlmann and Jean Callaghan (2011). It provides a theoretical background, compares East, West, and North European case-studies, and then re-assesses civil-military relations within the European contexts. Democracy, changing patterns of CMR, and international security transformations are main introductory issues. Then, Bulgarian politics, military and reform are among the case-studies. Another example pertains to the military and modernization in Romania. Also analyzed is the demise military drafting in France (Kuhlmann & Callaghan 2011).

Prominent among the European contributors to military sociology was Jürgen Kuhlmann himself. He was cofounder of ERGOMAS, and his research specialized in Civil-Military Relations. Kuhlmann also acted as executive secretary of the International Sociological Association (ISA) Research Committee on Armed Forces and Conflict

Resolution, between the late 1980s and mid1990s (Kümmel, Caforio & Dandeker, 2009).

Other leading European military sociologists are Christopher Dandeker, Gerhard Kümmel, Timothy Edmunds, Anthony King, Giuseppe Caforio, Marina Nuciari, Bernard Boëne and Harries-Jenkins. Their research deals with transformations in European military roles and structures (Dandeker 1994; Edmunds 2006); as well as cosmopolitan contexts and collective identity of soldiers (Kümmel, Caforio, & Dandeker, 2009).

Accordingly, in light of the increasing involvement of European troops in international conflicts - i.e. more than 24 civilian and military interventions, over the past decade (Ekman, 2012) - European military “transnationalization” became a subject of in-depth investigation (King, 2011). Transnational networks and missions are largely attributed to changes in the global security environment, following the Cold War – which came amidst more universal trends of social changes (Dandeker, 1994). European military sociologists, like their American counterparts (such as Charles Moskos, 2000), resorted to a postmodern theoretical framework of analysis (Boëne, 2006). Furthermore, European military sociology continued to compare statistical data, across several decades, to verify gender-related developments concerning female roles and ratios of participation in the armed forces of European societies (Harries-Jenkins, 2002).

In defining the turf of Military Sociology, both American and European, Giuseppe Caforio (2006), delineated the boundaries separating or distinguishing it from political science, it is worth noting. He wrote:

“Armed forces find their justification in the existence of inter-state violence, in large part still anomic, dominated by a sort of international anarchy, to overcome which different systems and projects have long been studied. It is the task of political science to study such systems and to propose projects in relation to them, just as it is the role of strategy to study the structure and tasks of the militaries that must confront and, if possible, dominate and control the inter-state violence; but it is the task of the sociology of the military to study the impact and consequences that the forms of violence that take place between states and the structural and operational modifications made on the military have on its components, its internal dynamics, and its relations with other social actors (Caforio, 2006: 437).

Also noteworthy, is the fact that by 1967 the Soviet Army created its own department for military sociology (Segal, 2007: 50). Russian sociologist Igor Obratsov claims that the term ‘military sociology’ as a study of the “military-social phenomena” dates back in Russia to 1897, when Nicolai Korf wrote his *Introduction to Strategy* (Obratsov, 2003: 121). Since 1989, the field has developed and produced several hundred theoretical and empirical contributions (Obratsov, 2003: 1).

Thus, sociologists of the military emphasize the changing patterns in structure and role of militaries in their parent societies (Dandeker 1994). In addition, “military sociologists seek to link together the concepts of the military as a profession, an

organization and a political force” (Harries-Jenkins, 1974: 62). They, also, attend to the question of civilian and military connections within society (see, Caforio 2007; Malešević 2010a; Nuciari 2007). Contemporary military sociology continues to attempt at formulating certain theoretical frameworks. Yet the subfield is still short of presenting full theories (Shaw 2009; Chatterji 2009). Still, it offers certain generalizations, concepts and models (Malešević 2008; Chatterji 2009). However, while the subfield developed, and became a formal branch of the International Sociological Association (ISA), by 1980, its leading scholars were keen on tracing the theoretical origins of the sociology of the military to roots in classical works of Comte, Spencer, Marx and Weber, and others from the classical sociologists (see for example Caforio 2006, Nuciari 2006 and Malešević 2010a).

Nonetheless, research in Military Sociology does not only stop at retrospectively linking the subfield’s theoretical foundation to the overall classical sociological tradition (Caforio 2006; Nuciari 2006). It is also dynamically interactive with both modern, postmodern, and global perspectives on war and the military. Thus, in addition to setting elementary parameters for research on the subject, like the age, race, gender, familial, organizational or conceptual dimensions, newer issues are addressed (see Chapter IV).

CHAPTER IV

POSTMODERN AND GLOBAL SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES.

A shift from classical modes of warfare, as well as from classical perceptions of warfare, became more evident within contemporary scholarship. The role of the military “has changed distinctly over the years due to development of technology and present day political-social contexts” (Chatterji, 2009: xi). Partly, global, strategic and technological transformations have led to this transition towards new modes and perceptions (Malešević 2008; Shaw 2009). New conflicts, new military structures, and new ideas about warfare have been emerging since the 1990s;

“... unlike the “old wars” these new violent conflicts are premised on different fighting tactics (terror and guerrilla actions instead of conventional battlefields), different military strategies (population control rather than capturing new territory), utilize different combatants (private armies, criminal gangs and warlords instead of professional soldiers or conscripts) and are highly decentralized. The new wars are also seen as chaotic since they blur traditional distinctions (legal vs. illegal, private vs. public, civilian vs. military, internal vs. external, and local vs. global)” (Malešević, 2008: 98).

Effectively, since the notion of these “New Wars”, as Mary Kaldor (1999) identified them, scholars have been expounding the traditional conceptualization of war as other means of politics, to variations on war itself by other means (see Shaw, 2009).

Namely, such variations in means of war are largely seen as global in outreach and postmodern in character. Many recent analytical frameworks do not divert from most classical understandings. Nonetheless, they do elaborate and expand on the traditional lines of thought, in light of novel manifestations in military behavior, sophistication of weapons, scope of war operations, and overall upgrading of structures, roles and fields of action (for example Dandeker 1994; Caforio 2009; Kaldor 1997; Moskos 2000). Globalization and postmodernity, practically, brought together mainstream sociology and military sociology to author a new thought to new conditions of war and the military.

The intercourse between globalization and postmodernity refreshed the sociological analysis of the new realities in military and warfare issues. This chapter proceeds from defining the phenomena of globalization and postmodernity. It then discusses the forms of new warfare, and relates them to emerging sociological frameworks.

Global Conditions and the Conditions of Postmodernity

Across Montesquieu's notion of geographical influence, Auguste Comte's scientific Positivism, Karl Marx's economic determinism, all the way to Talcott Parson's Grand Theory, sociological theory has struggled to formulate theories, conditions and narratives that explain human society and human behavior, along scientific designs, measurements and formulas. And ever since the times of its founding fathers, sociology has been in the process of constant and continuous reshaping and

remaking. Sociology and sociologists have experienced uncertainty at several junctures. Uncertainty, also typical of Postmodernity, has accompanied them along the way. Yet, sociology continues to add insight to the human injuries, brought and caused by modern and even postmodern developments; violence and warfare included.

As of the 1960s, humanity, or at least the industrialized, developed, and capitalist part of it, has been living through the era of “post-modernity”, tells us Jean-François Lyotard (Smart, 1993). He was the first to use this term or word, (often attributed to historian Arnold Toynbee, in 1979), in “The Postmodern Condition”. The specific novelty in Lyotard’s argument, that becomes particularly interesting to sociology, was his claim that this state of advanced societies, postmodernity, was a *generic social condition* (Smart, 1993).

While there is a degree of consensus about what the term refers to, there is not much agreement about what, as a body of theory, does postmodernism entails. This body of theory refers to and builds on the initial works of Jean-François Lyotard and Jean Baudrillard (Pakulski, 2006). In addition, it is enhanced through the writings of post-structuralists like Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida (Pakulski, 2006). However, given the limitations of this section, a definition of postmodern theory is adopted from the Cambridge Dictionary of Sociology: “as the very prefix post- indicates, post-modern theory reflects uncertainty as to the direction of change and critical skepticism about the grand narratives of socialism, liberalism, conservatism, and

welfarism” (Pakulski, 2006: 458). Postmodernists do not believe in meta-theory, or big narratives. They believe in episodes and details, and in that what we see is what we get.

In time, again like in space, postmodernity occurred as of the late 1950s or early 1960s in Europe and the rest of the developed or advanced countries. In Europe, the end of the 1950s marked the near completion of the massive, national and international projects of reconstruction after World War II. The post-war time and the place were fit and fertile for a postmodern atmosphere to emerge. “The pace is faster or slower depending on the country, and within countries it varies according to the sector of activity” elaborates Jean-François Lyotard (cited in Smart, 1993: 127). In his book “Postmodernity”, Barry Smart (1993) explains and expands on Lyotard’s ideas. He attempts to sketch an overview of the general situation. For, according to Lyotard, a new set of conditions directly influenced culture, science and knowledge in the most advanced and developed societies. Incredulity was becoming the order of the day (Smart 1993).

The computerization of society, as both Lyotard and Smart assume, is reshaping knowledge as well as science, creating new conditions and developments on a global scale (Smart, 1993). Telecommunications, information technologies, micro-electronics and rapid exchange of knowledge have all led, on one hand-side to changes in human procedures, both individual and societal, of decision-making and choice. Indeed, on the other hand, the power of decision-making of the nation-state over society is negatively affected: while multi-national corporations have assumed counter-abilities to exercise

control. (The second part of this chapter examines war and the military in this light). Such political, economic and technological transformations are prime components of globalization (Smart, 1993: 126-8).

Barry Smart (1993) was quick in noticing that globalization as an idea, shares many themes with the idea of postmodernity. He senses that postmodernity and globalization are condition and process so closely associated (Smart, 1993). The term “globalization” itself connotes universality and generality. Anthony Giddens (2000) states that it is technological, electronic, cultural, political, economic and financial; and it, again, has evolved through the revolution in communication starting in the 1960s.

“We live in a world of transformations, affecting almost every aspect of what we do. For better or worse, we are being propelled into a global order that no one fully understands, but which is making its effects felt upon all of us. Globalization may not be a particularly attractive or elegant word, but absolutely no one ... can ignore it ... it has come from nowhere to be almost everywhere”. (Giddens, 2000: 25- 28).

We observe that both postmodernity and globalization were not only concomitant in time -1960s- but in place too –Europe. They are the products of the same human condition of existence, or more accurately, globalization and postmodernity are a reflection of a similar and compatible intellectual set of ideas, thoughts, theories and level of knowledge. Perhaps, the dilemma on the relationship, intertwining and interconnection between globalization and postmodernity metamorphoses into an answer, stated by Lyotard himself, and echoed by Smart: “is

post-modernity itself not the great narrative of the end of great narratives?" (Smart, 1993: 129). Like globalization, postmodernity ushers the end of history of meta-narratives.

The Globalization of Security after the Cold War

Military historians (e.g. Black 2004: Keegan 2004) responded to global and postmodern reformulations, and revisited warfare in light of them. Jeremy Black (2004) critically and swiftly concluded a series of structural issues in military history that should be in order to re-relocate it within emerging realities of the time. However, to most social scientists, (Black, Keegan, Moskos, Paret, as shown below), the 1991 Gulf War was the first shift away from the Cold War forms and strategies.

Military and cultural historian Peter Paret (1992) was prompt in expecting this war to be difficult to merely note down in history as a violent conflict, in the classical sense. In his early notes, Paret expected it to become a central topic in the writing of the nascent New Military History, which, since the 1960s, shifted the emphasis of historical account away from just the stories of battles and general. In this line, the Gulf War exemplified the interconnectedness between the social, political, economic, and the military (Paret, 1992). Ethnicity, gender, technology, media, and new weapons are all issues that, Paret correctly anticipated, would attract the attention of military or social historians alike (Paret, 1992: 225).

Yet, it was French sociologist, social theorist, and leading critique of postmodernity Jean Baudrillard who set a pioneering argument, in 1991, that the Gulf

war did not really happen (Baudrillard, 1995). He observed that a CNN-effect and the TV coverage gave a worldwide audience a certain “simulacra” of reality. TV coverage has simply reproduced, simulated, or mirrored the original events. History was being recreated and framed through the cameras of embedded reporters, who accompanied the Allied troops into Kuwait (Baudrillard, 1995). Furthermore, this war did not involve a direct relational confrontation between two enemies, as in the wars or proxy-wars of the Cold War period (Baudrillard, 1995).

In outlining the initial Post-Cold War global security issues and challenges, Russian sociologist, Vladimir Rukavishnikov (2007) discusses a spectrum that ranges from transnational terrorism to ecological changes. They all began to materialize around the time when the end of the Cold War, coincided with the 1991 international-coalition war on Iraq, to liberate Kuwait. Arguably, Saddam Hussein’s expedition to occupy the neighboring smaller state was a failure, on his side, to interpret those strategic alterations, which required another decade to manifest clearly on the world map.

First, terrorism, which has later prompted American Wars on Terror, after 9/11, or the Russian operations in Chechnya, in addition to lesser conflicts involving networks of militant extremism, have shaken the world-stage. Second, the continuing legacy of the Cold-War, namely, the Arab-Israeli Conflict has no clear solutions. Third, the expansive American military campaigns, from Yugoslavia to Iraq continue to reshape global geopolitics. Fourth, long-range weapons of mass destruction and nuclear programs in North Korea or Iran remain prime international concerns. Fifth, Global

organized networks of crime have been investing in human, arms, and drug trafficking, especially across Asia and Europe (Rukavishnikov, 2007). Sixth, the instability generated in regions where political change has been enforced following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, continues to hit across the Middle East or the Arab world. Seventh, the author interestingly assumes that the “entire world will soon be older and far less Caucasian and Christian than today” (Rukavishnikov, 2007: 29). This is the other side of the same story that tells of a growing Islamic population all over Europe or Russia, compounded with a growing trend of Islamophobia. Eighth, not unrelated, is the disequilibrium between the developed and underdeveloped societies, which maintains a global socio-economic inequality so enormous that it ignites periodic conflicts and wars. Finally, global environmental changes, perhaps the threat that renders most societies equal, are nonetheless sources of conflict. Ecological transformations including deforestation, planetary warming, famine, have increased global competition and conflict, which in turn invite further military intervention or action (Rukavishnikov, 2007). An “uncertain world of risk complexity” was created after the Cold War (Dandeker, 1994: 651).

The year 1991 marked a new trend of coalition or international military action. Accordingly, British military historian, Hedley P. Willmott (2002) wrote that the 1991 Allied campaign in Iraq was even the shift towards new forms of warfare. A notable main premise in his works began by arguing that it is war and not dates, eras or ages that count in history. Rather, war, particularly in the twentieth century, defined the

marks of transformation and points of reference in modern history. War is the turn of eras and change in times (Willmott, 2002: 6). Going back to the First Gulf War, the author tentatively assessed it, and concluded a list of the several turning points it represented in war history.

First, space was transformed. Satellites and other surveillance or communication systems provided means to command space, in a fuller manner than ever before in history. Second, equally time was conquered, as offenses extended day and night. Third, naval units fired ever deeper inside mainland targets, thus contributing to the broadening of the battle zones, while shortening the war duration. Fourth, air force decisively composed the primary instrument of attack. Fifth, in outcome, Iraq, the nation and the state, was totally defeated, from a long-range, even before a ground engagement, and indeed without resort to nuclear power, as in World War II. Sixth, the technologically sophisticated and remote-controlled weaponry allowed unprecedented accuracy, precision and effectiveness. A total war of this magnitude was, nonetheless, limited (43 days) and contained, largely owing to such weapons and technologies (Willmott, 2002). Finally, Willmott mentioned a key to reading the postmodern in context:

“Given the fact that the term “postmodern” is often used of the present time and that the change between the modern and the medieval world was Man’s [sic] replacement of God at the center of Creation, if someone can date the point in time

when the human being's place was usurped by the television, one would have the key to an understanding of the present" (Willmott, 2002: 21).

Gradually, the postmodern came to wed itself to the global. American strategy makers developed a global imperialist approach, to fill in the space out of which the former Soviet enemy has been dislodged. It advanced through the Iraq war, into Kosovo and beyond (Rukavishnikov, 2007). By the end of the 1990s, it was clear for scholars that, within the American ruling circles, *Dreams of Global Hegemony* were rivaling against the option of U.S. incorporation into a global system, within which their country could no more maintain its primacy, enjoyed ever since WWII (Harris, 2006: 132). Again, the attacks of 9/11 unleashed those dreams into realities.

The Postmodern Military and Postmodern Wars

The U.S. could have afforded a strategy, relying on soft power to preserve its international interests, while integrating itself within the competitive globalization process, at all its levels. Instead, a new hegemonic outlook, based on both soft and hard-power, became more prevalent (Harris, 2006; see also Dandeker, 1994: 638). The former revolved around the military doctrine of "Overwhelming Force", (broadly associated with General Colin Powell), the latter doctrine (associated with neoconservatives like D. Rumsfeld, D. Cheney and R. Perle), became known as RMA: "Revolution in Military Affairs" (Harris, 2006: 133).

According to RMA, Harris (2006) explains, values and tactics of commercial transnational organization, dispersed information networks, and technological

breakthroughs should enrich the military and help win any war, in any place. It is a doctrine that incorporated the highest elements of successful global capitalism into the military and its operations across the world. It sought to transmit the military from the previous industrial modes and structures, into the age of information technology and globalization, through which economics, politics, and cultures have evolved. Furthermore, RMA liberates, to a large extent, the political stratum from public scrutiny. The technological warfare permits far lesser casualties, which means a war could go on for as long as required, without fear of agitating the public opinion, as before (Harris, 2006: 134-5).

RMA is a doctrine that dwelled on the latest technological advancement, and awaited the appropriate war for its implementation (see Harris, 2006: 139). The 2003 war in Iraq was a “Mysterious” one, according to John Keegan (2004: 1). The Iraqi military somewhat melted away, and combatants, unwilling to fight, switched into civilians, by simply changing their outfits (Keegan, 2004: 3). The number of them taken as prisoners of war was relatively small. Furthermore, “the invaders found the population largely absent from the scene of action” (Keegan, 2004: 5). The bigger part of the mystery of that war, as such, was Keegan’s note that outside the main cities, or sights of operations, the rest of the Iraqi population were resuming their ordinary daily lives, indifferently (Keegan, 2004: 2). It was a war that RMA authored till its end:

“For example, a soldier in Iraq using laser binoculars with a global positioning device could transmit the coordinates of a target back to military headquarters in Qatar

from a field computer, via a Boeing satellite. An unmanned predator drone was then able to capture video of the same target... Using a satellite, the command center would quickly send the coordinates to a nearby B-2 bomber whose pilot, using a Lockheed Martin global positioning satellite, then dropped his bomb, correcting its course and guiding it to the target” (Harris, 2006: 137).

The Sociology of Global and Postmodern Warfare

Like military historians, sociologists also probed into explaining the war and military developments under global and postmodern circumstances. Military sociologist Charles Moskos, Bernard Boëne, Giuseppe Caforio, and David Segal, in addition to mainstream, non-military, sociologists Martin Shaw, Zygmunt Bauman, and Siniša Malešević, have articulated theoretical explanations of war and the military in contemporary contexts.

In a critical and assertive manner, military sociologist Charles Moskos (2000) highlighted the postmodern progression of warfare. His sociological interpretation simply rested within the idea that modifications in the military inspire the changes in society. Moskos, argued, however, that the latest developments in military organizations permit sociological inquiry to finally reach a comparative ideal-type model. By historically reflecting on the pre-Cold, Cold, and Post-Cold War metamorphosis (modern, late-modern, and postmodern), he was able to draw several patterns that underscore an ideal-type in formation, at least within the United States. To take a couple of examples from his typology, we observe the change in the attitude of public opinion,

on one hand-side, and the military towards homosexuals. In the first case, before the Cold-War, public opinion was supportive, and then it became ambivalent during the War, only to turn indifferent towards the military, after the War. Similarly, the military attitude towards homosexuals in the army, respectively developed, along the three interludes, from a punitive, then rejecting, and recently accepting (Moskos, 2000: 15).

Moskos and associates (2000) picturesquely invoked actual historic events, as well as cinema productions to reveal the shift from the modern into the postmodern armed forces, and their interface with civilian or political superiors. A film, produced in 1998, *Wag the Dog*, is the example they use to relate the story of a U.S. President who launches a war to distract the media and the public away from a scandalous presidential intimate issue. Later in the same year, the U.S. President Bill Clinton actually bombed Iraq, while undergoing the impeachment process, over a sexual affair (Moskos, Allen Williams, & Segal: 6). In a manner reminiscent of Baudriallard's simulation of reality, quickly the "term "wag the dog" entered postmodern lexicon as fiction seemingly became reality and vice versa" (Moskos, Allen Williams, & Segal: 6). In a later publication, Moskos (2001) dwelled more on the media-military matter. He shows, for example, how movies tend to positively represent WWII American soldiers as decent, altruistic and brave. Moskos gives as examples *Saving Private Ryan* and *The Thin Red Line* (both released in 1998). Yet, movies released in that same year, but depicting modern American military, reflected a rather negative image. In *The Siege* or *Snake Eyes* generals and commanders are shown as assassins, corrupt, or insubordinate

(Moskos, 2001). The author was echoing changes both in public opinion and media perception of the armed forces of their society. American military sociologist, David Segal (2007) equally underlined the emphasis of both media and the military, by maintaining that since the start of the 21st century, almost everywhere in the world, newspapers show in their headlines a story that highlights the military influence on civilians' daily lives (Segal, 2007: 46).

David Segal (2007) traces how the globalized corporate models also led to downsizing and outsourcing within the military. Reduced and more mobile militaries were restructured across the Western world, to attend to new international challenges, and mounting domestic financial stresses (Dandaker, 1994). This was particularly the case of U.S. armed forces, overseas, as well as many European ones. Like obsolete factories or docks, from the industrial age, large military bases were shut down. In outsourcing, much of the previously exclusive military tasks were privatized. They were relegated to contractors from the civilian sector, often less expensive and more specialized for the chore. Furthermore, extensive military operations were replaced by “contingency operations, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance” (Segal, 2007: 55). On another level, Segal (2007) remarked how innovative high-tech communication media, a key international corporate aspect, brought closer the distance between faraway soldiers and both their societies and families.

Bernard Boëne also applies the philosophical meanings of postmodernity to try and relate it to the military in Europe and America (Boëne, 2006). He gives particular

attention to media as a base providing legitimacy for military actions. But, more importantly, the author raises the paradoxes of postmodern military costs. The cost of both highly trained troops, as well the cost of technologically sophisticated weapons, increases the hesitancy of military decision makers to adopt high-risk engagements (Boëne, 2006). He deduces that while goals of postmodern wars, and resourcefulness of postmodern militaries are different, than they were under the modern Cold-War conditions, the dilemmas seem to persist concerning the costs (Boëne, 2006: 171). Boëne concludes by arguing that the postmodern decentralization or disorganized anarchy could only establish the grounds for further anarchical wars and conflicts, rather than succeeding at containing them (Boëne, 2006: 185).

Almost looking at the reverse side of postmodern and global conflicts, Giuseppe Caforio (2009) inspected irregular “Asymmetric Warfare”. He maintained that the

“negative effects of globalization have created a large disenfranchised population primarily centered in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. This disenfranchised population has become the recruitment pool and their countries have become training bases for the networked terrorist and criminal who take advantage of the tools of globalization” (Caforio, 2009: 263).

This instant of double-edged *glocalization* has permitted a somewhat unintended involution of advanced Western warfare into the resisting societies or groups of resisting underprivileged regions (Caforio, 2009). Mediatization, Communication, computerization, decentralization, and other aspects of the postmodern Western

militaries have been adopted by their adversaries on the other side of earth, and therefore permitted the underdeveloped guerrilla fighters to similarly upgrade their tactics and tools to the postmodern standards (Caforio, 2009). In asymmetrical confrontations among various national or non-national actors, friction occurs in multidimensional forms (Van Fenema, 2009). Hence, unlike previous forms of warfare, asymmetric ones are more flexibly coordinated, and less bound by territorial limits (Van Fenema, 2009). Moreover they do not necessarily end by victory or defeat, as is the case of conventional wars (Van Fenema, 2009).

Sociologist and specialist in International Relations, Martin Shaw has given extensive attention to war and society, throughout his work, since the 1980s. Despite the forty years following WWII, being times of peace in the industrialized societies of the West - and labeled as “an historical aberration” (Dandeker, 1994: 651). Shaw observed that they were times of fear and preparation (Shaw, 1984). They were not the times Comte, Spencer, or Durkheim sought, when industrialized societies would become less militant or less inclined to war (Dandeker, 1994). Shaw tells that during the 1980s the fear of nuclear apocalypse, and the incessant armament and expensive preparations for a next world war to come, outshined the relished peacefulness (Shaw, 1984). In this atmosphere, Shaw also realized that since the 1960s, Western theoretical sociology, and social sciences at large, have taken a leave from the study of war (Shaw, 1984). Since then, the author has dedicated much of his research on the subject. Throughout the 1980s, he witnessed that militarism, changed its impact on society. Namely, nuclear

warheads created a balance of deterrence that freed the industrialized societies from the traditional form of a militarism that rallied the entire social forces to militarize, the way a total war required (Shaw, 1988). By 2009, Shaw proposed his clearer theoretical framework on war and violence. Thereby, he assumes that organizing violence produces power in society. The actual sense of this structured violence is located in the stratifying dichotomy created, in war or in peace, between civil-military, soldier-citizen, or “civilian-combatant” (Shaw, 2009).

Mary Kaldor, political scientist and sociologist, belongs to the British tradition that stresses the socio-political scopes of globalization; versus the economic American tradition (Seidman, 2008). Kaldor participated and studied the East European social upheavals by 1989 that contributed to the downfall of the Soviet Union, and end of Cold War (Seidman, 2008) She developed a dual interest in civil society as well as in war and globalization, assuming that “a vital global society would reduce the likelihood of world wars” (Seidman, 2008: 273). Kaldor viewed in the end of Cold War an end of one mode warfare, yet the reinvention and rise of another. Ideologically driven global networks of non-state actors operated wars in the Middle East, Africa, Eastern Europe, and places where the sway of globalization have weakened the state-actors (Kaldor 1999; Malešević 2008; Seidman 2008). In line with Zygmunt Bauman, Kaldor, the author of “New Wars” believes in the decline of geopolitics, and territorial primacy, in favor of identity politics (Malešević, 2008: 103). Ethnic, religious, racial, tribal or nationalistic struggles for statehood fuel those wars (Kaldor, 1999: 76-77). She likewise explains that

“the new wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war..., organized violence..., and large-scale violations of human rights” (Kaldor, 1999: 2).

“Anti-Territorial” the global wars are, stated Zygmunt Bauman (2001: 6). Disenchanted with modernity, which produced world wars, and the Holocaust, Bauman, Jewish and Polish by birth, attempted to reformulate a sociology critical to modernity and more influenced by post-structuralism (Seidman, 2008). The author of postmodern and global liquidity believes that solid hegemony over large conquered lands and peoples is not anymore the objective of the powerful. Hegemony, conquest and colonization have all changed their strategic historical essences, since disengagement has replaced engagement as the paramount technique of power” (Bauman, 2001a: 4). Power in the international arena is being redefined, not by territorial acquisition, but in freedom from attachment to space or land. The wars of the global era seek to punitively bring the enemy into compliance and paralysis; and not to occupy their territory. Hence, Bauman explains the invention of sophisticated warfare technologies as instrumental for detached or disengaged *cyberwars* or *netwars* (Bauman, 2001a: 8). Those on top of the global power hierarchy would rather minimize their costs and risks, by delegating the dull details of land wars into local civil wars, or limited regional wars (Bauman, 2001a).

Political sociologist Siniša Malešević (2008) contends that twenty-first century wars continue to resemble the classical wars of the past centuries. What changed, however, are not the ends or origins of war, but the values and technical conditions of society in the present (Malešević, 2008). Technological, ideological, economic and

other considerations are what brought about a transformation in warfare (Malešević, 2008). In his later research, Malešević (2010a) revisited the classical sociological tradition, questioned the various social paradigms on war, and eventually produced perhaps the latest comprehensive sociological study on *The Sociology of War and Violence* (2010b).

Despite the globalization process, and formation of postmodern military structures, Malešević argues that “New Wars”, as argued earlier, still involve three main requisites of any other wars of the past century (Malešević, 2008). First, the nation-state, and the pre-globalization geopolitical and economic motives continue being valid elements of war, though at a quicker global pace. Second, economic globalization is based, above all, on the existence of the nation-state, as a main actor in geopolitical balance and security. Equally, fourth, the legitimacy of fighting wars continues to be generated from the citizens, populations, or tax-payers, based on nationalism, in one form or another (Malešević, 2008: 109-110).

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This chapter proposes a conversation between Max Weber, Karl Marx, Charles Wright Mills, and Zygmunt Bauman. As they could be made to speak to each other, the four sociologists of conflict would provide a consistent narrative on war and the military. Citadels grew into large cities, even states. They were the outcome of the fused historic market-fortress, of Weber, or the modern Military-Industrial alliance, of Mills. Also out of both cases and concepts, market, fortress or alliance extended warfare across local borders. They grew with the expanded forces of the exploitative capitalism, of Marx, which further internationalized conflicts and struggle, in a liquid manner, adds Bauman, that flows without boundaries. Effectively a global Military-Industrial Complex fueled the expansion of imperial capitalism, headed by a global power elite.

Max Weber: Citadel-Market Fusion and Imperialist Capitalism Revisited.

Up through the Middle Ages, cities were at the same time urban and garrisoned spaces. They resembled, just like in most walled Chinese cities, a fortress as well as a dwelling quarter. More importantly, to Weber, the city was both the marketplace, plus the fortress (see page 15, above). The oldest military techniques or objects were the castles. They were built even before the horse and the chariot were integrated into military use. Thus, the city was both merged into and reliant upon the castle (Weber,

1958). City dwellers were also absorbed into quasi-military functions, of constructing, guarding, defending, or servicing the walls of their city. Still, the military and the civilians maintained a complex relationship, yet crucial for the city to prosper.

“The politically oriented castle and economically oriented market area of the towns at times simultaneously serving both functions, again drill field and assembly area of the army and place of pacific economic exchange on the other, often stand in plastic dualism beside one another” (Weber, 1958: 78). Given its purchase and consumption capacity, the military not only provided protection, but also enticed trade. The political class, in turn, was interested in such an economic balance, as this increased its tax revenues, from merchants and artisans seeking secure markets. The interdependence persisted, and with “progress in military technique, the financial help of the entrepreneurial guilds became indispensable” (Weber, 1958: 163). Equally, wars became lucrative; slaves were acquired, through every conquest. Since antiquity, this entire human trade has profited from wars (Weber, 1958).

In 1883, at 19, young Weber had his early personal involvement with the armed forces, as he joined the military service. His firsthand experience with the military establishment was disappointing at the beginning. Routines of training and military drills generated in him a sense of rebelliousness against such “incredible waste of time required to domesticate thinking beings into machines responding to commands with automatic precision... The officer candidate is supposed to be deprived of the possibility of using his mind during the period of military training” (cited in H. H. Girth

& C. W. Mills, 1947: 8). Following the training phase, Weber enjoyed the respect and prestige that came with his post as officer (Girth & Mills, 1947).

By WWI a mature sociologist was writing about the war and the writing of a new history of the world, whereby he acknowledges that future generations and future culture were being shaped, under the impact of changing balance between world powers (Girth & Mills, 1947). Germany's loss in the war invited Weber's scrutiny for the social structure that has created the war itself. He wrote that the political profits and prestige would be gained by the conquerors as the "prestige of power... means in practice the glory of power over other communities" (Weber, 1947: 160). Accordingly, a clear inference from war is that the "decisive means for politics is violence" (Weber, 1947: 121).

In addition to the political meaning of war, the economic factor was central to Weber's analysis, just as it was for his historical explanation of the market and fortress interplay. Yet, economic considerations, to him, were propelled by the tendency for expanding political power. He observed that ancient empires sought territorial expansion, to export their trades, but also to import from the acquired lands, taxes, fiefs, and raw material. Land was as significant as women, slaves or cattle in inviting conquest (Weber, 1947: 165). Along historical trade routes, the imperial interests of capitalism have repeatedly travelled. In modern times, less than in antiquity, monopoly over capitalist trade and not territories continued to have utmost value (Weber, 1947).

Max Weber did not overlook the colonial or imperial makeup within the powerful world states themselves: he examined them as power structures. Building on his earlier notion of arms-ownership, he explained that within the modern European state, it is those who finance the arms-industry which supplies the armies, who yield most profit out of expansionist wars. Capitalists, bankers, creditors, traders, and suppliers, who issue loans to such states, have much to profit out of the industrialization of war, and its reproduction outside their homeland. “The profit opportunities of all these groups rest upon the direct exploitation of executive powers, that is, of political power directed towards expansion” (Weber, 1947: 167). To Weber, they become partner-groups with the state. As he maintained, a “lost war, as well as a successful war, brings increased business to these banks and industries” (Weber, 1947: 168).

Indeed, as war became a constant state of affairs, the emergence of a *charismatic warlord* was unavoidable. Even more, an entire caste of warriors did rule at several historical junctures. Yet, in its modern European version, this caste became the officer corps. It has developed under the force of discipline into a more politically subordinated body. Again, “the separation of the warrior from the means of warfare, and the concentration of the means of warfare in the hands of the war lord have everywhere been one of the typical bases of mass discipline” characteristic of the modern bureaucratic state, Weber studied (Weber, 1947: 260). Furthermore, the bureaucratic army, in an age of machines, and war industries, maximized the technical and

disciplinary capacities of the military structure, just like it did to the capitalist factory (Weber, 1947).

Despite all his critique of the modern capitalist states of Western Europe, Weber regarded that the main threat to Germany rest in the East, in Russia. By 1918, he was involved in anti-socialism propaganda, following the 1917 Revolution in Russia. He addressed the Austrian Officer Corps, and warned against the socialist syndicalism and its challenges to military convictions. Enemy propaganda could infiltrate the military just like it did into trade unions, and this could deconstruct military authority (Lassman & Speirs, 1994).

Max Weber's studies on the city, bureaucracy, and discipline, yielded several analytical clarifications on war and the military. His notions on market-fortress, ownership of means of warfare, and imperial capitalism would serve in drawing a basic model on the subject. The urban settlements of the preindustrial era were centered along military organization. In the industrial phase, a further separation and institutionalization of the means of warfare, brought the military into subordination to the modern state. Warfare, however, evolved more towards imperial conquest, in a continuous search for the expansion of imperial capitalism (Weber, 1947).

Karl Marx: Internationalization of violence, MIC and Power Elite.

“Karl Marx and his followers saw military forces as necessary for the imperialism that capitalist industrial societies would have to pursue as they exhausted domestic raw materials and markets” (Segal, 2007: 46). Three aspects of Marxist

thought are relevant to the discussion, in this chapter. First, is the conflicting character of social relations, and class-struggle. Second, is the relations between societies which are living different modes or adopting different means of production. Third, is the international scope of the first two aspects, or more specifically the international violence and conflict created by global capitalism and the ensuing class struggle at a global level. The three interrelated aspects of Marxian analysis, as such, link the growth of Weber's market-fortress, to Mills Military-Industrial Complex, and highlight the growth of both the capitalist economy and the MIC, to become global structures of security and conflict.

In relation to the first aspect, Marx assumed "a materialist approach to history; the development of productive force and economic activities is central to historical change and operates through the class struggle over distribution of the social product" (Gilpin, 1987: 1). Indeed it was Lenin's *Imperialism*, in 1939, which gave the sophisticated twist from the local to the international struggle between the capitalists and their adversaries, among the oppressed or colonized societies (Gilpin, 1987). But Marx and Engels were not unaware of this factor. In their writings on the American Civil War, in particular, their awareness and interest in the international conflicts was clear (Runkle, 1964). They also observed how the end of the 19th century capital was becoming a global power, which heavily relied on technology and communication (Gilpin, 1987).

The second aspect dealt with modes of production. To Marx, societies advance with the advancement in the technologies or instruments they employ in the production process (Katz 1993; Rosenberg 1974). As such, in his analysis of the American Civil War, he made a central distinction between an agrarian North fighting an industrial South. The South was furthermore a sort of a feudal system that extensively exploited slave-holding (Runkle, 1964). In other words, the North represented a revolting social bourgeois, while South maintained its conservative feudalism. In their struggle, Marx believed in the militarization of the revolution, as he assumed “force” to be “the mid-wife of every new society” (from the *Communist Manifesto*, cited in Runkle, 1964: 133). Diplomacy was not the fruitful means of waging such war of liberation (Runkle, 1964).

The third aspect of Marx’s analysis observed emphasized the dynamic international linkages between many conflicts, wars or revolutions (Gilpin, 1987). With the Indian revolt against the British, the American Civil War, or the many other conflicts Marx studied, he came to understand more the international capitalist expansion and the need for an international revolutionary counteraction. He argued at the very early stage of the American war that France and Britain might not interfere. Their neutrality, more or less, would indirectly support the South. Only a domestic workers’ movement could promote French or British change of policy. Equally, from the Indian case, he learnt that an for an imperial power to be defeated, a synchronized resistance should occur both in the homeland and in the colonized territory (Gilbert

1978; Gilpin 1987). Accordingly, “Marx argued that the interests of most people -at least those of working people- in the rich nations coincide with those of the majority of people in the poor nations and not with the elite of their own state” (Gilbert, 1978: 347). Marx constructed a very complex understanding of international relations, international powers and international conflicts. Also, he linked the international class-struggles between an international capitalists and an international working class (Gilbert, 1978). His leading role in the *International Workingmen’s Association* served to promote revolutionary political change, worldwide, along the lines of a strategy to counter international capitalism (Runkle, 1964).

Marxism and Marxist influence on later generations of scholars have generated a closer understanding of global capitalism, its wars and its military reaches. Though many severed their intellectual roots from Marxism, sociologists like, Bauman, Kaldor or Wallerstein refined further the notions of conflict in international relations between states and societies that are divided between richer and poorer (see Seidman, 2008).

Kaldor, viewed the New Wars as particularly wars and conflicts centered within weaker states, or even communities, of the less developed part of the world (see also Kestnbaum 2008; Malešević 2008, & 2010b; Snider 2000). Equally, Wallerstein identified the world-systems as ones in which core center-powers control a satellite of peripheral states and societies; wars and military activities are therefore being *exported* south, or east, into the poorer ends of the world (Malešević 2010b: 48; Shaw 1984: 1).

C. Wright Mills: From the Warlord to MIC and the Power Elite.

The author of the acclaimed *Sociological Imagination* (1959) had reached the point of explaining the private-public interplay, only after a series of studies into the American power structure. He took off his project from *New Men of Power* (1948), through *White Collar* (1952), and then *The Power Elite* (1956). Respectively, his books examined the *mass society* in its working class and the agency of union movements, then the middle class employees, and lastly the ruling power elite (Domhoff 2005; Jamison 2006). Mills was introduced to German sociology, chiefly through Hans Gerth; with whom, in 1946 he edited Weber's essays into English (Domhoff 2005; Jamison 2006). Corresponding to the Frankfurt school, Mills blended Marxist, Weberian, as well as elements of Freudian social thought; which became best manifest in his history-biography conjunction (Caterino 2008; Domhoff 2005). In *Power Elite* Mills seems to expound on Weber's market-fortress union. At least his military-industrial complex arguably reflects the twentieth century evolution of what the medieval city combined between military and economic functions. "The bureaucratization of organized warfare may be carried through in the form of private capitalist enterprise, just like any other business. Indeed, the procurement of armies and their administration by private capitalists has been the rule in mercenary armies, especially those of the Occident up to the turn of the eighteenth century" wrote Weber (1947: 222). Following WWII American warfare was becoming the world's largest capitalist industrial enterprise, warned Mills (2000).

Echoing Weber, Mills first asserted that all “politics is a struggle for power; the ultimate kind of power is violence” (Mills, 2000: 171). Also, like Weber, he next accepted that civilian dominance have controlled the military, in modern societies, from the eighteenth century up to WWII. He attributes the rise of civilian supremacy to the modern hierarchic industrial societies that managed to transform the military into professional members of an institutional army, directly subordinate to the political government. States, he argued much like Weber, have monopolized violence within their local heartlands. Yet, this also, maintained Mills, promoted the modern large-scale interstate warfare. The Spanish Conquistador became the symbol of the warlord of the rising modern European state: he wages external wars in the name of the crown (Mills, 2000). Nonetheless, the security of a prestigious and rewarding career, especially within the officer corps stratum, of the modern standing army, became a status that even men of violence came to cherish and accept. Mills also maintained that “Prestige to the point of honor... has, as it were, been the payoff for the military’s renunciation of political power” (2000: 174).

Mills sketched a social history of the career of the American warlord, until the centralization of arms and weapons, in state hands around WWI. Till then, admirals and generals usually ended their careers at retirement, without practically ever meddling into politics. Promotion and rank were their prime career highlights. The minimal military threats to the United States, and its economic supremacy which subsidized European economies through WWI, changed by WWII. A turning point in the history of

American military occurred. Since then, Mills observed that the American mind has become more engrossed in the rising Soviet Union and the Cold War threats. The American political and economic mind began to see the world through military lenses. A “military definition of reality” subsequently gave space for the ascendance of generals into the highest circles of power in the U.S. (Mills, 2000: 186). They were particularly changed by the mounting expansion of U.S. bases throughout Europe and Asia. The Pentagon which “contains the organized brain of the American means of violence” came to symbolize their power (Mills, 2000: 186). It became the headquarters of the “modern warlords” (Mills, 2000: 187).

“In the twentieth century... the old march of world history once more asserts itself. All over the world, the warlord is returning. All over the world, reality is defined in his terms” (Mills, 2000: 171). In the United States, Mills detected two flaws in the civilian performance, which invited the military involvement. Namely, they are party politics, and administrative politics. The military was politicized “on one hand by political default, and on the other, by civilian criticism of military decisions” (Mills, 2000: 201). Accordingly, to Mills, a degree of civilian political incompetence furthered the political powers of the military and rendered them more autonomous. This Mills has translated in the various increases of incidents whereby the military have achieved direct engagement in the civilian world. While it all started with the adoption, by civilian authorities, of a military outlook on the real world, the military venture reached

into the domains of diplomacy, international affairs, public relations, economics, science, and technology.

As of 1940s, it became common to allocate key diplomatic positions to military men. Generals became the U.S. ambassadors and representatives to Russia and China; or even commanders of U.S. armies stationed in North Africa, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Austria, Japan, or Korea. Either ways, U.S. international relations became more militarized, while diplomacy and diplomats lost primacy (Mills, 2000). In the public sphere, generals gave speeches, debated budgets, argued against policies, and even interfered in the electoral campaigns. By the 1950s, they practically became immersed in party politics, and took stances between Democrat and Republican. They were effectively recognized by the civilian elites into the political arena (Mills, 2000). At least since WWI, the economic impact of the military became more felt in society, as the U.S. government began raising military budget. Modern industrial warfare brought about a “merger of the corporate economy and the military bureaucracy” (Mills, 2000: 212). Mass production became regulated by military demand. Upon their retirements, generals started reappearing as consultants or directors of large private companies. The heavy exchange between both economic and military sectors created a “great structural shift of modern American capitalism toward a permanent war economy”; thus proving Spencer’s projection of a negative relationship between industrialization and militancy, wrong, yet again, said Mills (2000: 215). Finally, science and technology were shifted from being mere economic and educational turfs, and integrated into the military

imperative. Extremely high percentages of government spending on scientific research went to serve security and military ends (Mills, 2000).

Zygmunt Bauman: Linking Classical, Modern & Postmodern

It is Zygmunt Bauman, however, who captures an essence of linking Weber, Marx, and Mills, as he spoke of a powerful global elite that has given the

“strategy of global wars, as far as global capital is concerned (and particularly its American, by far the most powerful, arm), an added advantage of lubricating afresh the wheels of a military industry dangerously under threat of rusting since the abrupt end of the cold war... the stocks of old weapons may be profitably sold off to the ‘locals’ populating remote and less ethnically sensitive lands (like Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia or Sudan) and still engaged in the old-fashioned face-to-face combat” (Bauman, 2001a: 8-9).

Not only do ideas of Bauman and Mills intersect at the notion of the power elite. An entire imagined *social reality*, to Bauman, is produced through the exercise of *sociological imagination*, as coined by Mills. Also, like Mills or Weber, Bauman accepts that the motives behind individual social behavior are produced by the surrounding social and public space (Bauman, 2002: 30). Still, reality, imagined or enacted, is the byproduct of practice, as “social life is essentially practical” (Marx, cited in Bauman, 2005: 37). Also, in agreement with Marx, Bauman argued that agencies of “revolutionary transformations” usher new historical and societal realities. This was the case in the age of modernity. Bauman combines Weber and Marx’s depictions of modernity. It began exactly with the “separation of business from the household... and

the separation of producers from the means of production” (Bauman, 2002: 77). As for postmodernity, change and transformation are limitless and unbound by the imagined or real frontiers of modernity, be they political or economic. No less bound is the injustice or the inequality, Marx has underscored. Bauman declares that “both have by now acquired *planetary dimensions*” (2005: 145).

Shortly following 9/11, Bauman began to write more on wars, and gave further articulation to his notion of anti-territorial warfare. He believed that 9/11 would signify the “*symbolic end to the era of space*” (Bauman, 2002: 87). The narrator of *liquid modernity, liquid life, liquid love and liquid fear*, Bauman stops short of authoring liquid wars. Yet, he distinguished between reconnaissance battles, asymmetric wars, and territorial wars.

‘Reconnaissance battles’ are “arguably the most common category of warfare (and violence in general) in our global frontier lands” (Bauman, 2002: 95). It is through battles, of trial and error, or undefined targets that the military and the politicians come to test the grounds for war. They are exploratory battles that aim at experimenting the enemy’s capabilities and resources. Like with Bauman’s (2001) anti-territorial wars, these expeditionary battles are not aimed at territorial acquisition (Bauman, 2002). In the globally fluid security environment, such battles dictate the strategies for actual wars to come. Also marking the shift from the *era of space* to the *era of speed*, Bauman (2002: 102) notes the shift from state to non-state, non-territorial, mobile and global violence. Those are the asymmetrical wars, transnational in scope, and unbound by

localities. Equally disastrous, they are hit-and-run wars, in which disproportionate weapons and tactics are employed (Bauman, 2002).

Finally, territorial wars, much like proxy wars, have not become totally extinct. While global elites and global powers avoid engagement in territorial combat, local powers continue the traditional wars. They are fought to mark boundaries for communities and identities. Territorial wars occur mostly in parts of the world where land is scarce. Communities threatened by globalization seek anchorage in the last solid form secure space of belonging, namely in the land. Neither the state nor society in the modern context, have insured security for such communities. The value of territory and the fight for it increase (Bauman, 2001a). So, unlike the globalization wars that are anti-territorial, the author refers to the territorial wars as “globalization-induced wars” (Bauman, 2001b: 19).

Conclusion

This study surveyed the sociological perspectives on war and the military. In the beginning seven classical authors were invoked. They were presented in a sequence which significantly reflects the chronological order of their published work. Then, five main themes in modern sociology were explored. Also, main tenets of postmodern and global sociological perspectives were highlighted. In the process, the classic, modern, and postmodern sociologists were made to converse one with another. In other words,

the ideas of mainstream sociology, political sociology, military sociology or comparative sociology, were repeatedly compared and contrasted.

In the discussion, a particular connection was proposed between Weber, Marx, Mills, and Bauman, authors corresponding to various perspectives and historical contexts. To them four, war and the military are growing arenas of power, capital and industrial interface. This is to say political, financial, and economic conditions of society, being territorially or globally perceived, are in direct connection with military and warfare considerations. Indeed the four authors signify an intellectual interplay between the earlier sociological endeavors, and the more recent ones.

There exists a vibrant debate among sociologists, today, on war and the military. The debate aims at producing more consistent theories, concepts, and models about society, violence and warfare. On one hand side, some argue that not enough has been researched or written about the subject (Shaw 2009; Siebold 2001). It is even argued that sociology “would be grossly incomplete without incorporating the study of the military” (Siebold, 2001: 140). Also, arguably, “the study of war and collective violence remains the Achilles heel of sociology” (Malešević, 2010a: 193).

On the other hand, both among mainstream sociologists and military sociologists, there appears agreement about the pertinence of their research, both empirically and theoretically (Kestnbaum 2009). Either way, a comparative historical examination across sociological thought acknowledges a much needed consistency in

the study of war and the military (Shaw, 2009). Such consistency is what allows a discussion of frameworks that link more than just four of the most eminent sociologists.

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