Self-interest : whose game is it anyway? utilitarianism and agency in Nietzsche

Abstract

This thesis engages the moral philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. The aim of this study is to render Nietzsche’s moral views in light of his rejection of utilitarianism and his conception of the self. The key point that I want to stress in my dissertation is that Nietzsche’s rejection of utilitarian moral schemas follows from his rejection of the traditional (Cartesian) view of the ego. I will employ Herbert Spencer, a dominant intellectual authority in Nietzsche’s time, to set up a framework in which Nietzsche’s arguments against utilitarianism can be understood. To do this, the first chapter explore Spencer’s Data of Ethics, a work that figured largely in Nietzsche’s thought, if not in his published works. After presenting Nietzsche’s critique of Spencer in chapter 2 of this study presents the full battery of Nietzsche’s objections to utilitarianism in chapter 3. This will lead Nietzsche’s conception of the self, which I will claim underlies his rejection of utilitarianism. I will attempt to phrase Nietzsche’s theory of the self as an arena of competing drives in chapter 4. In tracing out this line of argumentation I will profitably explore a number of Nietzsche’s central concepts. Most notably, this study will excavate Nietzsche’s idea will to power and the distinction between master and slave moralities. This will proceed from a close reading of Nietzsche’s earlier works, most importantly Human, all too Human and Daybreak.