Audit committee effectiveness and non-audit service fees: Evidence from UK family firms

Abstract

This study examines whether the presence of an ineffective audit committee at family and non-family firms can influence the firms’ non-audit service purchases from the incumbent auditor. Using a sample of 1736 observations of UK-listed companies from 2005 to 2013, we find a significant positive association between ineffective audit committees and non-audit service fees. This association is more pronounced for family than for non-family firms, suggesting that in the UK, family firms with ineffective audit committees tend to buy more non-audit services from their incumbent auditors than non-family firms. The results also show that family firms with ineffective audit committees pay higher non-audit service fees when their family members own shares or hold board positions, indicating that both types of involvement lead to larger non-audit service expenditures. © 2020 Elsevier Inc.