Foreign intervention in Iran (1951-1953) :a critical survey on the academic literature -

dc.contributor.authorKashani, Seyed Sadegh.
dc.contributor.departmentAmerican University of Beirut. Faculty of Arts and Sciences. Department of Political Studies and Public Admibistration.
dc.date2013
dc.date.accessioned2015-02-03T10:46:46Z
dc.date.available2015-02-03T10:46:46Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.date.submitted2013
dc.descriptionThesis (M.A.)--American University of Beirut, Department of Political Studies and Public Admibistration, 2013.
dc.descriptionAdvisor : Dr. Waleed Hazbun, Associate Professor, Political Studies and Public Admibistration--Committee Members : Dr. Patrick McGreevy Professor, Dean of faculty of Arts and Sciences ; Dr. karim Makdisi, Associate Professor, Political Studies and Public Admibistration.
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaf 96-97)
dc.description.abstractIran’s National Movement that led to the nationalization of the oil industry constitutes a significant part of the contemporary history of Iran as well as the international relations. Its failure in 1953 has become a subject of academic research after the fall of Shah in 1979 and the publication of a book by Kermit Roosevelt the same year. My survey shows that the coup theories could be divided to two generations. Some of them which mostly were published in the 80s are ignoring the internal politics of Iran in their analysis while others published mainly after 2000 point to Mosaddeq’s domestic opponents or his own mistakes as factors that were not less important than the coup. On the other hand there is a counter-argument that analyses the Mosaddeq’s mistakes as pre-planned British measures for the defeat of the Movement executed by Mosaddeq. My survey shows that the main mistakes-betrayals were about Mosaddeq’s approach to the Tudeh Party especially during the last days, the dissolution of the parliament and the oil proposals. “Legality” of the removal and the denial of the use of force are the main reasons of the counter-argument for rejecting the coup theory. The first generation is silent on legality, but the second generation uses the “quasi-legal” term to explain the Shah’s dismissal order. According to my survey what is attributed to CIA is limited to mainly providing “safe house,” “publicizing the decrees,” and paying mob leaders. These acts could not have a determining role in changing a government without the eagerness of the internal actors. The coup theories could be divided also based on their position on the US intervention. Some appreciate it as an action that survived Iran from falling into communism and others describe it as a revolting act in the history of Iran-US relations. Mosaddeq was a hero or martyr according to some, to some others he was a politician who made fateful mistakes and finally some introduce h
dc.format.extentxii, 97 leaves ; 30 cm.
dc.identifier.otherb17901273
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10938/9890
dc.language.isoen
dc.relation.ispartofTheses, Dissertations, and Projects
dc.subject.classificationT:005877 AUBNO
dc.subject.lcshMosaddeq, Mohammad, 1880-1967.
dc.subject.lcshUnited States. Central Intelligence Agency -- History -- 20th century.
dc.subject.lcshPetroleum industry and trade -- Political aspects -- Iran -- History -- 20th century.
dc.subject.lcshIran -- History -- Coup d'etat, 1953.
dc.subject.lcshIran -- Politics and government -- 1941-1979.
dc.subject.lcshUnited States -- Relations -- Iran.
dc.subject.lcshIran -- Relations -- United States.
dc.subject.lcshGreat Britain -- Relations -- Iran.
dc.subject.lcshIran -- Relations -- Great Britain.
dc.titleForeign intervention in Iran (1951-1953) :a critical survey on the academic literature -
dc.typeThesis

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