Empirical realism and the legitimacy of ontology: A dialogue

Abstract

The purpose of this dialogue between an ‘empirical realist’ and a ‘traditional ontologist’ is to clarify and evaluate the presuppositions of the kind of antiontological position exemplified by empirical realism. After ontology is defined and the empirical realist’s position explained, the traditional ontologist pursues a series of dialectical developments and criticisms of the empirical realist’s claim to have a coherently non-ontological position. The eventual conclusion is that the empirical realist’s opposition to ontology just arbitrarily assumes ontology to be associated with infallibilism (by way of logically necessary truth) and incompatible with fallibilism instead of conveying the illegitimacy of ontology itself or convincingly explaining the non-ontological standing of their position. The significance of this dialogue for critical realism is that it extends the case against anti-ontological epistemologies in general and empirical realism in particular by demonstrating the problems that result from the attempt to evade the charge of an implicit ontology. © W. S. Maney & Son Ltd 2015.