Wittgenstein’s Philosophy as Method: A Grammatical Inquiry into Cartesian Dualism

Abstract

Wittgenstein once claimed to have solved all philosophical problems after the publications of the Tractatus. When he revised and developed his philosophy in the Investigations, he made similar remarks that philosophical problems are a result of a confusion and misunderstanding of grammar of our language. The claim being made that once we have achieved clarity (perspicuous representation) in the grammar of our words and concepts, philosophical problems associated our words and concepts will completely disappear.

In this paper, I set out to examine whether Wittgenstein's method does dissolve philosophical problems. I start by examining three features that characterize his method: anti-theory, intellectual humility, and anti-scientism. From there, I reconstruct Descartes articulation of the mind-body problems and try to show how Wittgenstein's method dissolves the problem by in his remarks on private language by examining the grammar of our sensation words (such as "pain"). The argument I try to make is that Wittgenstein dissolves Descartes' mind-body problem by revising our concept of mind and mental phenomena as a something, i.e., an entity. By examining the grammar of sensation words such as "pain", Wittgenstein shows us that there is no reason to posit mental phenomena as a substance.