Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsourcing Using an Optimized Tournament Model

Abstract

With the wide adoption of smart mobile devices, there is a rapid development of location-based services. One key feature of supporting a pleasant/excellent service is the access to adequate and comprehensive data, which can be obtained by mobile crowdsourcing. The main challenge in crowdsourcing is how the service provider (principal) incentivizes a large group of mobile users to participate. In this paper, we investigate the problem of designing a crowdsourcing tournament to maximize the principal's utility in crowdsourcing and provide continuous incentives for users by rewarding them based on the rank achieved. First, we model the user's utility of reward from achieving one of the winning ranks in the tournament. Then, the utility maximization problem of the principal is formulated, under the constraint that the user maximizes its own utility by choosing the optimal effort in the crowdsourcing tournament. Finally, we present numerical results to show the parameters' impact on the tournament design and compare the system performance under the different proposed incentive mechanisms. We show that by using the tournament, the principal successfully maximizes the utilities, and users obtain the continuous incentives to participate in the crowdsourcing activity. © 1983-2012 IEEE.