The Reception of Avicenna’s Distinction Between Essence and Existence in the 13th Century Islamic World: The Qūnawī-Ṭūsī Correspondence

Abstract

The broad focus of this thesis is a correspondence between Sufi mystic Ṣadr al-Dīn al Qūnawī (d.1274) and Persian philosopher and polymath Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d.1274). More specifically, this thesis looks at a particular part of this correspondence, the first question (al-masʾala l-ūlā) by al-Qūnawī, and al-Ṭūsī’s reply (jawāb), providing an in depth analysis of the background and context. In this question, al-Qūnawī solicits the Avicennian doctrine of the distinction between essence and existence in everything else other than God and explores how it relates to the Necessary of Being. Upon investigation, this distinction proves to be problematic on a metaphysical level when it comes to God, in light of the identification of God’s essence and existence: how can God, who is utterly unique, simple, and one, be said to exist, at the same time when all other contingent beings are said to exist? Al-Qūnawī’s critique will hinge on this problem of unity vs. multiplicity as he puts forward an ontology of utter oneness of being, the theory of waḥdat al-wujūd. Although he did not coin the term himself, this theory is associated with al-Qūnawī’s master, Ibn al-ʿArabī, and has been used to denote his school of thought. Despite the astute points al-Qūnawī makes, al-Ṭūsī is not convinced and replies to him, bringing forward yet a new ontological understanding of Being, i.e., his concept of al wujūd al-maqūl bi-l-tashkīk, being predicated ambiguously. While al-Ṭūsī thinks of himself as defending a rational philosophical Avicennian paradigm, we will come to appreciate his original contributions to a line of thought that culminates in Mullā Ṣadrā’s thought over 350 years later.