Wider reflective equilibrium -

Abstract

The debate over moral intuitions has a distinguished pedigree. We are far, however, from 19th and early 20th century intuitionism(s) whereby a presumed intuitive faculty is said to have direct access to moral truth. What contemporary moral philosophers grant intuitions is no more than initial credibility, and that for want of better starting points. These philosophers disagree as to how to proceed once we acquire our presumptively credible intuitions – usually through thought experiments. A prominent suggestion, insofar as method is concerned, is to treat moral intuitions as data, and to strive, a là natural sciences, to arrive at a theory that makes them cohere. Principles are devised that give system to the relevant intuitions, and the lack of coherence forces revisions of both intuitions and principles. The said method was articulated and furthered by John Rawls who dubbed it wide reflective equilibrium. Not all philosophers, however, are satisfied with intuitions. Many argue that they are not credible, not even initially, as they are (inter- and intra-personally) unstable, culturally variable, and subject to emotional manipulation. Wide reflective equilibrium, as such, is no longer tenable a method, nor thought experiments a device. The different arguments against intuitions, however, derive sustenance from the fact that people’s intuitions are not on a par. Understanding intuitions as externalizations of the agent’s epistemically-relevant dispositions explains the discrepancy in reported intuitions, and admits it as a fact to reckon with. Intuitive differences are then taken into consideration in defending reflective equilibrium, and, subsequently, modifying it by (re-)establishing the centrality of moral psychology in moral method, and the inevitability of expert intuitions – hence wider reflective equilibrium.