Sympathy for Whom? Smith's Reply to Hume

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dc.contributor.authorMuller, Hans D.
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Philosophy
dc.contributor.facultyFaculty of Arts and Sciences (FAS)
dc.contributor.institutionAmerican University of Beirut
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-24T11:24:53Z
dc.date.available2025-01-24T11:24:53Z
dc.date.issued2016
dc.description.abstractThis essay presents a critical examination and development of an exchange between Adam Smith and David Hume on the nature of sympathy. I identify four objections to Smith's account in a letter from Hume and then argue that Smith's system has the resources to reply to all of them. As such, this essay shows that Smith's system provides a more robust foundation for a sentiment-based system of ethics than has been traditionally recognized. Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2016.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2016.15
dc.identifier.eid2-s2.0-85021780273
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10938/26135
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of the American Philosophical Association
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectEthics
dc.subjectHume
dc.subjectPhilosophical psychology
dc.subjectSentimentalism
dc.subjectSmith
dc.subjectSympathy
dc.titleSympathy for Whom? Smith's Reply to Hume
dc.typeReview

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