Economic bonding, corporate governance and earnings management: Evidence from UK publicly traded family firms

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dc.contributor.authorAl-Okaily, Jihad
dc.contributor.authorBenYoussef, Nourhene
dc.contributor.authorChahine, Salim
dc.contributor.departmentOSB
dc.contributor.departmentFinance, Accounting & Managerial Economics (FAME)
dc.contributor.facultySuliman S. Olayan School of Business (OSB)
dc.contributor.institutionAmerican University of Beirut
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-24T12:15:38Z
dc.date.available2025-01-24T12:15:38Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractThis study examines whether auditor–client economic bonding and corporate governance moderate the adverse effects of principal–principal agency problems on earnings quality in U.K.-listed family firms. We find that although earnings management is lower in family firms, there is a higher tendency of earnings management for those firms with economic bonding. However, such an impact may be moderated by good governance mechanisms where the latter may alleviate the adverse effects of the lack of auditor independence on the association between earnings management and family firms. © 2020 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/ijau.12186
dc.identifier.eid2-s2.0-85079163127
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10938/33401
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Journal of Auditing
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectAgency theory
dc.subjectAudit committee
dc.subjectCorporate governance
dc.subjectEarnings management
dc.subjectIndependence
dc.subjectNon-audit services
dc.titleEconomic bonding, corporate governance and earnings management: Evidence from UK publicly traded family firms
dc.typeArticle

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