Deconstructive vs Pragmatic: A Critique of the Derrida–Searle Debate

dc.contributor.authorBornedal, Peter
dc.contributor.departmentDepartment of Philosophy
dc.contributor.facultyFaculty of Arts and Sciences (FAS)
dc.contributor.institutionAmerican University of Beirut
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-24T11:24:55Z
dc.date.available2025-01-24T11:24:55Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractThis article presents a critical account of the debate between Derrida and Searle in which I defend Austin’s and Searle’s pragmatic analysis of speech against Derrida’s complex deconstructionist approach. I first formalize Derrida’s argument, reducing it to its main tenets that can be positively identified and critically reviewed. On the basis of this formalization I argue that the apparent incompatibility between Derrida’s and Searle’s approach to language becomes clear once we formalize, according to their type and content, the three concepts of “intention” that are confusedly referred to under one and the same label in the debate. This formalization reduces and clarifies the obscurity associated with the Derrida–Searle debate, and helps demonstrating the shortcomings of Derrida’s position. © 2019, © 2019 International Society for the Study of European Ideas.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2019.1652039
dc.identifier.eid2-s2.0-85071310040
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10938/26154
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherRoutledge
dc.relation.ispartofEuropean Legacy
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectAustin
dc.subjectDeconstruction
dc.subjectDerrida
dc.subjectIntention
dc.subjectPragmatism
dc.subjectSearle
dc.subjectSpeech-act theory
dc.titleDeconstructive vs Pragmatic: A Critique of the Derrida–Searle Debate
dc.typeArticle

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