Deconstructive vs Pragmatic: A Critique of the Derrida–Searle Debate
| dc.contributor.author | Bornedal, Peter | |
| dc.contributor.department | Department of Philosophy | |
| dc.contributor.faculty | Faculty of Arts and Sciences (FAS) | |
| dc.contributor.institution | American University of Beirut | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-01-24T11:24:55Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2025-01-24T11:24:55Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2020 | |
| dc.description.abstract | This article presents a critical account of the debate between Derrida and Searle in which I defend Austin’s and Searle’s pragmatic analysis of speech against Derrida’s complex deconstructionist approach. I first formalize Derrida’s argument, reducing it to its main tenets that can be positively identified and critically reviewed. On the basis of this formalization I argue that the apparent incompatibility between Derrida’s and Searle’s approach to language becomes clear once we formalize, according to their type and content, the three concepts of “intention” that are confusedly referred to under one and the same label in the debate. This formalization reduces and clarifies the obscurity associated with the Derrida–Searle debate, and helps demonstrating the shortcomings of Derrida’s position. © 2019, © 2019 International Society for the Study of European Ideas. | |
| dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2019.1652039 | |
| dc.identifier.eid | 2-s2.0-85071310040 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10938/26154 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Routledge | |
| dc.relation.ispartof | European Legacy | |
| dc.source | Scopus | |
| dc.subject | Austin | |
| dc.subject | Deconstruction | |
| dc.subject | Derrida | |
| dc.subject | Intention | |
| dc.subject | Pragmatism | |
| dc.subject | Searle | |
| dc.subject | Speech-act theory | |
| dc.title | Deconstructive vs Pragmatic: A Critique of the Derrida–Searle Debate | |
| dc.type | Article |
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