The Limits of Negotiated Settlement Under Fire: Lebanon and Israel from the May 1983 Agreement To The 2026 Negotiations

Abstract

Lebanese Israeli relationship has been through the years an issue shaped by conflict, failed agreements, and regional dynamics. Since the Nakba in 1948, attempts by the Lebanese government to regulate this relationship within its neighborhood have largely failed. The May 17, 1983, Agreement between Lebanon and Israel was the first treaty after the 1949 Armistice that aimed to redefine relations between both sides. However, its breakdown left unresolved issues that re-emerged in later negotiation frameworks. In the period post 2024, after the Hezbollah–Israel wars, comparable conditions returned to the table, showing how the questions raised in 1983 still shape the drive in 2026 towards a similar agreement. The presence of resistance movements in Lebanon has rooted the concept of dual governance, with Hezbollah playing a central role in after 1982 period. Its presence and armed autonomy limit the Lebanese government’s ability to exercise full monopoly over the use of force. At the same time, the Lebanese internal political structure, based on sectarianism and power-sharing, continues to influence both the conflict with Israel and the prospects of any agreement.

While existing scholarship has extensively examined the May 17 Agreement, its background, and the role of internal and external actors, far less attention has been paid to the way history seems to repeat itself, where similar actors, constraints, and negotiation dynamics reappear in the present context.

By critically engaging with both historical and contemporary cases, this project analyzes the current negotiations between Lebanon and Israel through a comparative framework linking 1983 and 2026. It focuses on three main factors: negotiations under fire, internal fragmentation, and external intervention. Drawing on concepts such as hybrid sovereignty and negotiating under fire, the study argues that ongoing military pressure and imbalance of power shape negotiation outcomes. At the same time, the lack of internal consensus and strong involvement of regional actors complicate the process and reduce the chances of reaching a sustainable agreement.

The findings suggest that although negotiations are ongoing, the conditions in 2026 are not favorable for a stable and long-term agreement between Lebanon and Israel. Instead, agreements reached under these circumstances are more likely to reflect coercion and imbalance rather than mutual compromise. Therefore, the project concludes that without a real ceasefire, inclusive internal participation, and a more balanced negotiation environment, the prospects for a durable Lebanese Israeli agreement remain limited.