Does stardom affect the informativeness of a CEO's insider trades?

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dc.contributor.authorSabherwal, Sanjiv
dc.contributor.authorUddin, Mohammad Riaz
dc.contributor.departmentOSB
dc.contributor.facultySuliman S. Olayan School of Business (OSB)
dc.contributor.institutionAmerican University of Beirut
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-24T12:15:37Z
dc.date.available2025-01-24T12:15:37Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.description.abstractThis study examines whether the celebrity or star status of a chief executive officer (CEO) affects the informativeness of his insider trades. Using three different measures to identify star CEOs in a sample of S&P 1500 firms, we find that trades of non-star CEOs predict future abnormal returns and earnings innovations and that trades of star CEOs do not. The predictive power of non-star CEO trades is mostly attributable to opportunistic trades, not routine trades. We also find evidence suggesting that the abnormal returns associated with non-star CEO insider trades are due to the lower visibility and consequently less scrutiny of non-star CEOs compared with star CEOs. © 2019 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12412
dc.identifier.eid2-s2.0-85074783765
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10938/33392
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherBlackwell Publishing Ltd
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Business Finance and Accounting
dc.sourceScopus
dc.subjectChief executive officer
dc.subjectG14
dc.subjectG23
dc.subjectG29
dc.subjectInsider trading
dc.subjectOpportunistic trade
dc.subjectRoutine trade
dc.subjectStar
dc.titleDoes stardom affect the informativeness of a CEO's insider trades?
dc.typeArticle

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