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ASPECTS OF RURAL AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LEBANON

By

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THE OFFICE DU DEVELOPPEMENT SOCIAL: AN ANALYTICAL DESCRIPTION

by

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CHAPTER I: Introduction

General Problem

After World War II, the western world's main concern was the reconstruction of its devastated socio-economic system. It was firmly believed that this reconstruction could only be brought about through a drastic restructuring of the world economy. The memory of the Great Depression further reinforced this conviction and since the world's equilibrium was seen as one being based on a balanced economic system, any disruption in the smooth flow of the economic cycle could generate mass unemployment, political problems, and other similar disasters.

This view pervaded all areas of academic thought at the time. It had a particularly strong impact on the emerging development theories which were the result of the nascent international aid movement that started in the post-World War II period.

As a result, some of the outstanding development theories of the time were almost exclusively based on economic analysis with little reference to the social

dimension of development.[1] It was believed that the only way to progress and affluence was by economic growth, capital accumulation, and high rates of industrialization.

This tendency gathered further momentum with the "mathematization" of economic theory which occurred in the fifties. Models of development were devised and a set of prerequisites or predetermined elements of growth

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[1] I particularly refer to the definitions of underdevelopment presented in the following texts:

Jacob Viner, "The Economics of Development," The Economics of Underdevelopment, eds. A.N. Agarwala and S.P. Singh, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 9.

Jan Tinbergen, Development Planning, (London: World University Library, 1967).

Alfred Bonné, The Economic Development of the Middle East, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945).

F. Pazos, "Economic Development and Financial Stability," I.M.F. Staff Papers, (III, October 1953), pp. 228-253.

B. Singh, Federal Finance and Underdeveloped Economy, (Bombay: Hind Kitabs Ltd., 1952).

Irma Adelman, Theories of Growth and Development, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957).

Evsey D. Domar, Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957).

established.[2] The theory of economic development became a "recipe" for increasing GNPs, per capita incomes, and other

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[2]There is an infinite amount of literature on the subject. I particularly refer here to:

Evsey Domar, "Expansion and Employment," American Economic Review, XXXVII, (March 1947), pp. 34-35.
_____, "The Problem of Capital Formation," American Economic Review, XXXVIII, (December 1948), pp. 777-794.
_____, "Economic Growth: An Econometric Approach," American Economic Review, XLII, (May 1952), pp. 479-495.
_____, "Capital Expansion, Rate of Growth and Employment," Econometrica, XIV, (April 1946), pp. 137-147.
_____, "Depreciation, Replacement, and Growth," Economic Journal, LXIII, (March 1953), pp. 1-32.

R.F. Harrod, "An Essay in Dynamic Theory," Economic Journal, XLIX, (March 1939), pp. 14-33.
_____, Towards a Dynamic Economics, (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1948).
_____, "Supplement on Dynamic Theory," Economic Essays, (London: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1952).

For an elaboration of the Harrod-Domar analysis see: W.J. Baumol, Economic Dynamics, (New York: MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1951), Chapter 4.

W. Fellner, Trends and Cycles in Economic Activity, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1956), Chapters 2 and 3.

D. Hamberg, Economic Growth and Instability, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1956), Chapters 2 and 3.

Amartya Sen (ed.), Growth Economics, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1970). Note: specific attention to the following articles compiled in this reference:

N. Kaldor, "A Model of Distribution," p. 81.
J. Robinson, "Model of Accumulation," p. 115.
R.F. Kahn, "Analysis of Growth," p. 141.
R.M. Solow, "Model of Growth," p. 161.
H.G. Johnson, "Money in a Growth Model," p. 253.
N. Kaldor and J.A. Mirrless, "Growth Model with Induced Technical Progress," p. 343.

indicators of economic growth.

Gradually however, the West started to suffer from over-industrialization and from the social disequilibrium that economic change brought within its wake. This situation was nonetheless palliated by the presence of deeply rooted institutions and social structures that acted as "shock absorbers" and rapidly succeeded in attenuating the negative effect of some of these imbalances.

The direct result of this was a new awareness that spread among development theorists: there was a sociological dimension to development that could not be dissociated from the economic. This viewpoint received further support from international organizations specializing in aid for development - a support which took the form of an academic contribution in publications of all sorts and was actualized in the field work of these organizations.

The introduction of the sociological element as a dimension of development revived the controversy that had emerged around the relationship between the traditional apparatus in a country and the rational planning schemes of socio-economic development.

In fact, ever since Max Weber made the distinction between tradition and rationality as being the main variable in differentiating technologically advanced economies from underdeveloped societies heated polemics over this issue

have never ceased.[3]

Two major trends can be depicted in this controversy: First, tradition is seen by most observers, particularly economists, as an obstacle to industrialization and growth which should be done away with if any accomplishments are to take place at all.[4] Second, traditional beliefs and practices are seen as functional factors which serve to stabilize the disturbances that might accompany

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[3]Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (tr. by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons), (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).

[4]I mainly refer to:

A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962).

M. Godlier, Rationalité et Irrationalité en Economie, (Paris: Maspero, 1966).

B. Higgins, "The 'Dualistic' Theory of Underdeveloped Areas," Economic Development and Cultural Change, (New York: Norton, 1956), pp. 99-115.
_____, Economic Development, (New York: Irwin Inc., 1958).

A.W. Lewis, "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor," The Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies, (vol. 22, 1954), pp. 139-191.
_____, The Theory of Economic Growth, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1955).

Ragnar, Nurkse, Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953).

the developmental process.[5]

The intention of this study is to explore the coexistence of traditional and rational considerations, in the particular case of Lebanon. More explicitly, the aim here is to evaluate the extent to which the confessional mosaic, regional political rivalries and other particular characteristics have been taken into consideration in formal planning for socio-economic development in Lebanon, as well as in routine activities and bureaucratic procedures. It is indispensable, for this purpose, to trace a brief historical retrospect of development planning in Lebanon.

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[5]This standpoint is mainly noticeable in the writings of:

J. Sawyer, "Social Structure and Economic Progress," American Economic Review, (Vol. 41, 1951), pp. 321-329.

Gayl D. Ness, The Sociology of Economic Development, (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).

Fernando H. Cardoso, Sociologie du Développement en Amérique Latine, (Paris: Anthropos, 1969).

Neil J. Smelser, The Sociology of Economic Life, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963).

Polly Hill, "A Plea for Indigenous Economic," Economic Development and Cultural Change, (vol. 15, 1966) pp. 10-20.

Albert O. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Development, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958).

Hla Myint, The Economics of the Developing Countries, (London: Hutchinson, 1964).

Andrew G. Frank, Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology, (London: Pluto Press, 1971).

The whole idea emerged after the civil crisis of 1958 that brought General Fuad Chéhab to the presidency. Considered as the "man-in-the-middle," as well as the most powerful impartial man in the country because of his great influence on the army, General Chéhab brought to power all his doubts and mistrust in a bankrupt administration which he believed to be the perfect example of inefficiency and cradle of bribery.

This distrust in the existing structure led the regime to begin search for an alternative. Two solutions were at hand. First, the whole structure could be totally abolished and then gradually replaced by a more efficient system. Or secondly, new agencies could be created which would supervise the old ones and limit inefficiencies.

The reasons for abandoning the first were numerous and stemmed from the great number of drawbacks that such a decision would entail. Among these was the fact that apart from the length of time an operation of this scale would need to be actualized - and the regime needed immediate results - the Government was reluctant to operate such a drastic re-organization at a time when an ultra-sensitive public opinion rendered the consequences of such a re-shuffling totally unpredictable.

It is mainly for these reasons that the second alternative was adopted. However, instead of trusting local experts and administrators with the construction of this additional set up, the regime opted for asking foreign

experts to do it. The belief was that being from outside the system the foreign experts (mainly French) could be objective, detached, and free from all local biases and could therefore produce a perfectly rational scheme. In effect, this is exactly what happened. The various French experts who came to Lebanon did produce a purely rational structure. The general conception of the mission however, as will become apparent later, did not fully realize the significance or relevance of the traditional Lebanese social order for implementing some of its proposed development schemes.

One of the realizations of the French experts of particular interest to this study, is the "Programmes de Polarisation" submitted by the Institut de Recherches et de Formation pour le Développement Harmonisé, commonly known as the "IRFED Mission." This program is the first rational and organized contribution to socio-economic development in Lebanon. Its structure, implications, drawbacks and failures will be analyzed in Chapter II.

Suffice it to say at this stage that the program was conceived as an actualization of the basic philosophy of the regime, namely, bridging the revenue gap between the high-income group and the low-income majority by insuring a more equitable redistribution of income.

An element of the "Programmes de Polarisation,"

the Office du Développement Social,[6] will be used in this study as an example of a rationally conceived organization operating in a traditional setting.

The choice of ODS was warranted by the fact that it is the only element of the entire structure that operates directly in the field. Adding impetus to the decision was the fact that the ODS was already an autonomous agency; therefore, represented the trend ensued in the Chéhab regime - one of eliminating some of the institutional and structural impediments to development.

It was thought that this autonomy, by avoiding numerous bureaucratic 'red tape', would increase the efficiency of the agencies.

The ODS was established in 1959 for the expressed purpose of elevating the socio-economic standards of the whole country. Despite its expressed concern with rational planning and the implementation of specific development schemes, the Office - like other Governmental agencies - reflects the delicate sectarian balance, regional and communal loyalities, and other non-rational considerations which permeate the rest of the society.

Specific Propositions

It is the main intention of this study to evaluate

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[6]Hereafter referred to as the ODS.

the extent to which the ODS has taken into account the traditional setting and environmental peculiarities of the Lebanese case. This will be done by examining three levels or dimensions of the ODS: its objectives and concepts, its organizational structure and its field operations.

A number of supplementary questions also emerge at this point. They will be examined from the viewpoint of our general perspective. Examples of such parallel questions are:

- To what extent has the ODS, after eleven years of operation in the field, (it only started to work at full capacity in early 1961) realized the objectives it was originally set to perform?
- Bearing in mind the regional, traditional setting, what accounts for its success or failure in that respect?
- Is confessionalism an obstacle to the promotion of development as seen in the planning scheme of the ODS?
- Are political rivalries an obstacle to growth and rational planning as seen once again by the ODS?
- Is confessionalism and local politics a hindrance to a rational bureaucratic organization which is supposed to actualize socio-economic plans for development? To what extent is this fact reflected in the bureaucratic structure of the ODS?

The study will be divided into four parts. The

first part will describe the "Programmes de Polarisation" and thus, place the ODS into the general context of national and regional planning. Part two will present the objectives of the ODS and administrative structure conceived to realize these objectives. Part three is a case study on the operational strategy of the ODS. Finally, in part four a tentative evaluation of the work of the ODS in the past decade will be briefly outlined. This evaluation will be geared at discovering to what extent the ODS has adopted rational planning and action schemes of development to the traditional system peculiar to Lebanon; and whether this adaptation has led to a greater efficiency of action.

CHAPTER II: Regional Planning in Lebanon

General Perspective

The modern approach to development is based on the idea that development necessarily involves the structural transformation of societies rather than measures that merely stimulate economic growth. Moreover, it is apparent first, that social change is a necessary condition for maximum economic growth in most countries today and secondly, that the goals of social development include improvements in the quality of life for all social groups and therefore require social change for their achievement.

Furthermore, economic growth in most of the high-income countries is largely a self-sustaining process given sufficient resource investment and competent policy direction. Today, it is explicitly recognized that this was made possible by the fact that the countries concerned possessed social structures, institutions, and human and technical resources that were already well-adapted for purposes of generating and maintaining high rates of economic growth. By contrast, the social institutions and non-economic (as well as financial) resources of most

low-income countries are still seriously inadequate for such purposes. Therefore, the eradication of these inadequacies is coming to be considered a crucial consideration in overall development strategy.

The fulcrum of the problem is the low rate of participation of the general population in the development process in low-income countries. This participation is of a two-fold nature: first, the local community members participate in the formulation of the objectives and planning strategies; and second, they contribute to the support and the implementation of the development plans and objectives.

The mass underemployment that characterizes low-income societies and the unequal sharing of benefits it inevitably generates have rendered the promotion of intensive and widespread public participation in the development process essential for the generation of rapid, long-term economic growth, as well as a desirable social objective. In this sense, the ultimate goal of national development becomes the improvement in the volume and distribution of national income, i.e., of the levels of living of the population. Planning after all, is a systematic way of using all available resources to achieve this objective. Although, as mentioned earlier, it is impossible to separate and identify the economic and social elements in this process, the methodology of planning requires that sectors

of human activity be defined, that specific targets be set within them, and that allocations are made to achieve these targets.

In setting targets and making allocations, the policy makers and planners bear in mind the specific problems besetting their countries: low levels of literacy and vocational skills; slow growth or stagnation of industry and agriculture; unequal distribution of population and income; uncontrolled growth of cities; relative poverty of rural areas and persistence of disease. The solutions offered by these planners, however, are often partially conceived. Agricultural development projects and agrarian reform are usually conceived of as a remedy for an underdeveloped or stagnating agricultural sector; industrial estates or particular projects become an answer to the demand for industrialization, and physical planning is offered as a solution to uncontrolled urban growth. But agricultural development projects and industrial projects cannot be fully productive unless supported by the appropriate social services and physical infrastructure. Physical planning becomes instantly obsolete if it is not accompanied by appropriate measures to decentralize industry, to check the drift from the countryside to the cities and to open up alternative and attractive settlement areas. Other instances of problems and "solutions" can be given which point in the same direction: the problems of

national development are interrelated, and hence the efforts made to solve them must be mutually supporting.[1]

One way of insuring that development problems and potential solutions are viewed comprehensively is by interposing a stage between planning at the national level and planning at the community level; i.e., a stage at which policies, sectoral allocations, and specific investments can be coordinated and harmonized. The allocation of resources may be decided at the national level, taking into consideration the country's needs, and the actual spending may be done at the project level, taking into consideration the specific requirements of the project. But projects do not function in isolation even if they are executed separately. They have to be activated by people in the areas of project location, and the needs of these people reach beyond the limits of any single sector. Thus, there may be an advantage in having an intermediate level of planning, a level at which the approach can be broad enough to encompass the various needs of the people who will be affected in the various aspects of the problems involved and specific enough to permit the execution of specific projects or group of projects, including multi-purpose ones.

This intermediate "regional" level of planning and

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[1] On this issue see A.G. Frank, Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Sociology, (London: Pluto Press, 1971).

development has recently aroused considerable interest.[2] A precise definition has also been coined.[3] Regional planning is usually defined as planning for regions within a country; it is what might also be called "area planning." Although tautological, the definition has operational merit if simply for the reason that decisions have to be made as to where particular investments are to be applied; the decisions are best made on the basis of feasibility studies which take into consideration the economic and social features of particular areas. No precise and rigid criteria can thus be used to formulate a definition which has universal applicability. The boundaries of spatial areas in any particular country may be administrative, cultural or geographic, but they are not necessarily coterminous, nor do they insure that the area defined by them are regions for which planning can be undertaken. The regions for which regional planning can be undertaken sometimes cover more than one administrative, metropolitan, cultural, or geographic area, or it may be contained within any of these. Of necessity, therefore, universal definitions must give way to operational ones; for the planner the region is an

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[2] I refer here particularly to the United Nations approach to development and planning on a regional level, International Social Development Review, pamphlets I, (1969); and pamphlet II, (1969); and pamphlet III, (1971); New York

[3] Ibid.

area for which planning can be undertaken because it is economically or socially feasible or desirable.

Ideally, regional planning is a multidisciplinary approach to development and is intended to give locational and institutional shape to national policies and plans. In the first instance, regional planning may supplement overall national planning in order to (a) help localize investment and (b) help eliminate structural, institutional and social obstacles at a level at which they can well be tackled together. Thus, regional planning conditions the basic rules of rational planning and adapts them to the traditional superstructure; and, by doing so helps the implementation of well-adapted programs of development and their continuation. Regional planning may also be a technique for relating the economic, social, and physical aspects of planning; for assessing the social and economic effects of spatial arrangements proposed or decided upon; for avoiding particular investments or the provision of particular facilities in a micro-analytic framework, i.e., in terms of what is best for the success of the project, and sometimes vested local interests, rather than in terms of its broad economic and social impact.

Regional planning can also be a technique for the more economic exploitation of the physical resources in a given area and for better development of its human resources. The creation, through deliberate investment, of a

growth pole in a particular area can stimulate or revive the development of resources and skills in such a way that there can well be a spill-over effect which will lead to the development of neighboring or even distant areas.

Furthermore, regional planning offers a comprehensive and systematic approach to solving the problems of rapid urban growth which, especially in the case of Lebanon, takes place at the expense of the rural areas. It can provide a framework for promoting the most rational distribution of population in a given area, for dealing with internal migration and for the establishment of new patterns of settlement. It can be a means of taking advantage of the external economies inherent in large, urban agglomerations or otherwise rationalizing - as much as is feasible - the distribution of additional investment in power, transport, and utilities as well as the dispersal of new industries.[4]

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[4] In a free enterprise, laissez-faire economy, such as the Lebanese economy, the public sector can only influence the regional distribution of investments in a very subtle and indirect way, e.g. industries in a specific region do not pay corporate taxes for the first five years; special "friendly advices" from officials of the Ministry of National Economy etc. However, officially, the government seldom interferes with private business. In the introductory statament of the current six-year plan (1972-1977), for example. the Minister of Planning, Dr. Hassan Moucharafieh, describes the plan as being "obligatory for the public sector but only optional as far as the private sector is concerned." The Six-Year Development Plan (1972-1977), the Ministry of Planning, Beirut: Direction Centrale de la Statistique, 1972 - p. 210 (translations are mine).

Also, regional planning provides an opportunity for encouraging and sustaining local initiative, creativity, and participation, for giving cultural or ethnic groupings a means of expression or for leading communities away from traditional apathy.

Finally, regional planning can provide a framework for seeking the balanced development of different regions of a country and for mapping out the particular strategies required to deal with underdeveloped areas without sacrificing existing "growth poles or "growth centres."

However, since area planning is often identified with "regionalism" or parochial chauvinism, the very concept of regional planning is not uncontroversial. By its very nature, however, national planning has had to take into account considerations such as the nature and location of material and human resources;[5] the imbalances in development

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[5]Although national development implies increase in national income, the rate of national development is too often measured solely by the rate of increase in national income. It must be observed that an increase in national income is reflective of economic progress achieved up to the moment of measurement; the progress is not necessarily an indicator of future growth. A structural analysis of national income might reveal for instance, excessive dependence on one sector of the economy or other disparities. Since the base for future long-term economic growth is both the level of economic development reached and the country's broader economic potential, planners try to optimize instead of simply maximizing economic growth. An optimum rate of growth signifies more regionally balanced as well as sectorally balanced economic development. Hence, national plans incorporate spatial considerations.

of urban and rural areas; the dispersal of population as an obstacle to the satisfaction of their needs; the growth of the cities; the existence of depressed but potentially valuable areas and the existence of endemic disease. In this sense, the national concern with regional problems can prevent the development of a regional consciousness by drawing attention to the problems of a particular region and aligning it with other regions. Regional planning can thus become a unifying and not a divisive force in national unity.

Regional considerations also impinge on national attention because of two disparate attitudes towards development. On the one hand it is mainly concerned with the need for a balanced approach on the grounds that the fruit of development should be shared fairly among the different regions or areas of a country; that underdeveloped regions are breeding grounds for social and political unrest; and that their existence slows the development process. Balanced regional development, it is held, can provide a strong stimulus for furthuring national development. On the other hand, it is argued that a balanced approach is wasteful of resources; that investments should be located in areas which by natural endowment and other advantages provide optimum conditions for growth, promising a quick return in the short run. In such situations, it is claimed, the development of an enclave may have beneficial spill-over effects. Evidence of this happening, at least in

Lebanon, is very meagre. In fact, the existing situation is that of a developing area enticing the populace and capital from less favored areas, thus further impoverishing the latter.

Demographic developments in Lebanon have an obvious bearing on the issue. The rapid growth of population unevenly distributed geographically - leaving vast, empty spaces between congested areas - conjoined with a rapid and uncontrolled rate of urbanization, make the deliberation of ways and means to correct this demographic imbalance imperative. Uneven population distribution, however, is not merely a reflection of uneven economic development of the subnational regions resulting from uneven resource endowment and historical circumstance. It is also a manifestation of national economic and social weaknesses. In this connection, the general characteristics of population and manpower in Lebanon have to be borne in mind, namely:

a) Fairly high rates of population growth, and preponderance of youth;

b) Low level of skills, and poor education and training for a majority of the population;

c) Widespread rural unemployment - or disguised unemployment - often considered as a "push" factor of rural migration;

d) Low rates of industrial employment and widespread unemployment among both the out-of-school and the educated youth in the cities;

e) Limited participation in economic and social activities and life resulting from unemployment or underemployment and high dependency ratios.

In such a situation, regional differences in manpower-employment situations cannot be corrected merely by regional policies, as may be attempted in developed industrial countries. Higher priority must of necessity be given to national issues such as the level of literacy, education, and skills, and the need for structural changes in the agricultural and industrial sectors.[6] The thesis bears repetition, therefore, that regional planning can have its full meaning only if undertaken within the framework of national development planning.

The Lebanese Case

In Lebanon, specific attention has been paid to regional and spatial considerations by the Ministry of Planning. This has resulted from concern with the congestion of Beirut, and wide discrepancies among the different geographical areas in terms of standard of living and amenities. Moreover, the basic philosophy of the Chéhab

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[6] For a structural analysis of an economy by the "input-output" method, I refer to Wassily Leontief, "The Structure of Development," a reprint from Scientific America, September 1963, (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1963).

regime, under whose auspices, both the Office of Social Development and the Ministry of Planning were created, was the bridging of this deep gap that existed - and still exists, between the different regions and communities. Ideally, this also meant the levelling off of the huge disparities that exist between the small high-income bracket and the large low-income group of the population.[7] This shows clearly in both the provisions of the current six-year plan[8] - though less apparent than in the previous five-year plan 1964-1969 - and the regional planning structure described below.

The preference given in Lebanon to infrastructure over more directly productive public investment was motivated by the belief that investment in infrastructure can contribute to better regional balance through the extension to the whole country of roads, water, electricity, schools, hospitals, etc... and generally improved conditions for the development of productive enterprises. Further, the political reality in Lebanon renders the regional infrastructural realizations an efficient tool of political propaganda. To the local communities, the success or popularity of a deputy is judged by the number and quality of such realizations in

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[7] A more thorough analysis of this issue will be attempted in Chapter V.

[8] The Six-Year Development Plan, op.cit.

the region concerned. Though not yet developed into a true consciousness, because of the persistence of strong local charismatic leadership, this element is becoming an increasing determinant of voting behavior especially among the young.

There was some reservation as to the usefulness of this approach,[9] but it was finally adopted, and the infrastructural expenditures were divided into three categories:

a) Projects with clear overall national interest, e.g. international roads, airports, scientific research and social security.
b) Projects with regional implications which could not be distributed evenly, e.g., projects in such fields as agriculture and community development.
c) Projects with ascertainable regional impact such as those for the processing of drinking water, urban planning, education, and health facilities.

The Five-Year Plan of 1964

A regional planning program, also known as the "Programmes de Polarisation," which was submitted by the

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[9] See Government of Lebanon, Planning Commission, Situation Financière et Plan d'Investissements Publics, (Beirut, October 1964), p. 60.

Institut de Recherches et de Formation en vue du Développement Harmonisé (IRFED), was embodied in the five-year plan adopted in May 1964. The plan envisaged the creation of a network of nodal points (Noyaux de Développement Rural) for balanced development in the country. The nodal point was seen as a service center which could contribute to the rational development and modernization of the area around it.

Criteria for the determination of the nodal points were established on the basis of studies and surveys conducted throughout the country.[10] Using these criteria, a hierarchy of nodal points was proposed. Beirut was designated as the primary nodal point to perform national and regional functions. Three district capitals and five

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[10]These were more in the nature of inventories of economic and social facilities and institutions by district, caza, and village. However, very extensive and serious studies have been conducted lately by the Rural Development Service of the ODS. Worthy of special mention is the two-fold study (a study and a complementary three-year development plan) on the caza of Hermel. The RDS staff members should be praised, not only for the effort they had to put into the collection of the basic statistical data - totally nonexistent before - but also for the fact that their work conditions were extremely precarious, the region being famous for its political instability. The study consists of an extensive evaluation of the various demographic characteristics (age pyramid, literacy rates by sex, sex ratios, infant mortality rates, mortality rates, birth rates, etc...); education, health and hygiene; social and economic reality; and housing conditions. Agriculture, handicrafts, local industries, hydrologic resources, mineral resources, and ownership received special attention in both the study and the plan.

other centers, important from an administrative or geographical point of view, were selected as secondary nodal points. Twenty-five agglomerations including fourteen administrative centers (cazas) were chosen as tertiary nodal points. Finally, provision was made for thirty-nine quaternary points, intended to link the tertiary ones with the most isolated population clusters.

For each nodal point to perform its functions as a service center, a standard set of facilities, structures and institutions, or "equipment," was envisaged. Thus, the quaternary nodal points were each to be equipped with an urban planning scheme, drinking water, electricity, a municipality, a mokhtar,[11] a pilot primary school, a dispensary with permanent nurses and midwives, an agricultural extension specialist, social workers, a periodic market, etc. The secondary nodal points were to receive more elaborate economic, social, institutional and administrative "equipment." In the implementation of the scheme, the backward areas of North Lebanon, Bekaa, and South Lebanon were to be given priority.

As shown in ~~Chapter~~ Chart I, an elaborate administrative structure was established to make the scheme operational. In the Ministry of Planning, a Regional Activities Division

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[11] Mayor, or village chief.


Ministry of Planning
Presidents of Boards of Administration of Autonomous Offices
Council of Planning
Representatives of the various ministries
O.D.S
Mohafazat
Technical Committee
Consultative Council
Caza
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N.D.R*
N.D.R*
N.D.R*
Village
Social Worker
N.D.R*: Noyau du Developement Rural

was set up to make regional studies of economic and social conditions, help the administrative chiefs of the districts (Mohafez) and subdistricts (Qaimaqam) tackle issues related to development and assist in the formulation of regional plans.

At the regional level, two types of bodies were to be established in each district:

a) A regional technical committee, headed by the Mohafez, and bringing together the district representatives of the technical ministries most concerned with development issues, including those of the Office of Social Development. The Committee was to be the planning unit for the district.
b) A regional consultative council, also headed by the Mohafez, composed of representatives of the main economic and social interests as well as of the different subdistricts.

To complete this structure, "équipes polyvalentes" were to be placed in the districts. These were teams made up of specialists from a variety of disciplines, e.g., agriculture, education, civil engineering, health, economics, social work. In addition to conducting research at the subdistrict level, these teams were to propose development plans to the regional technical committees and to work under the supervision of the regional representatives of the

Regional Activities Division of the Ministry of Planning. At the village level, the rural "animateurs" of the Office of Social Development and the agricultural extension workers of the Ministry of Agriculture were to assist in the implementation of projects through the quaternary nodal points.

From the outset, however, the plan has been beset by political, juridical, and administrative obstacles to the extent that it has been virtually abandoned in favor of the simpler approach of direct allocations of projects to the various parts of the country. This is done either through the community development programs of the animateurs of the Office of Social Development or through the recommendations of the regional representatives of the related ministries (Public Works, Health, Agriculture, Education).

The impasse reached over the implementation of this regional planning program, leads at present to the following situation:

a) The regional technical committee composed of representatives of the technical ministries most concerned with development issues and headed by the Mohafez, which was to be the planning unit for the district, witnessed a drastic metamorphosis of its perogatives. In effect, the related ministries opposed the idea that their regional representatives participate in regional planning independently. Judicially, this opposition was

warranted.[12] It was hence "recommended" to the technical committee's members to confine their interests to the execution of plans imposed on them by their headquarters in Beirut. They can, however, help as a consultative body to the planners in the ministry. This leads obviously to a double function, as the regional consultative council's only perogative is that of being consulted on matters regarding their region when development plans were to be set. Their other function now, is to act as the regional executive body of the central authority.

There has been no attempt whatsoever to modify this law; even though, all the officials I have met seem to agree that it leaves no room for initiative on the part of the regional representatives of the interested technical ministries. These representatives, clearly, are more familiar with the local affairs than their colleagues in Beirut who hardly ever come to the region concerned. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that apathy and disinterest should manifest itself among the regional representatives.

b) This centralization of planning would have been beneficial if the various ministries coordinated their

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[12] In the by-laws of the Ministry of Agriculture, for instance, the officials of the Ministry have no right to participate in planning unless officially asked to do so by the high authorities of the ministries.

planning. But, this coordination can only be realized through a specialized agency of coordination which in all countries is the Ministry of Planning. In Lebanon the law does not force the various ministries to refer tothe Ministry of Planning for agreement on their projects. The text clearly stipulates that the "help" of the coordinating agency should be requested when "deemed necessary" by other ministries. However, the more recent text[13] which tackled the creation of the Ministry of Planning; its administrative organization; and its perogatives; stipulates that an inter-ministerial committee should be formed,[14] headed by the Minister of Planning and composed of Director Generals of all ministries and Presidents of the Boards of Administration of the autonomous agencies (e.g., ODS, Electricité du Liban, Plan Vert, etc.). The members of this committee were to "analyze the various development plans, and cooperate to accelerate realizations and establish harmony and homogeneity between the general overall plan and the subplans."[15]

This contradiction led to a total change in the activities and scope of the Ministry of Planning. Originally meant to coordinate and harmonize the

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[13] Law of June 12, 1962.
[14] Ibid., article 43, p. 5.
[15] Ibid., (translations are mine).

implementation of the various ministerial subplans, it has been faced with the intransigence of other ministries to cooperate. Supported by the old legislation, this uncooperative attitude openly conflicted with the prerogatives of the newly established Ministry of Planning. The operational conflict became flagrant when the machinery was truly set in motion, i.e., in 1964. But, by that time, the term of office of the supporter of the total idea of developmental planning, General Fuad Chéhab, had expired, and as is generally the case in Lebanon, the activities of the whole state apparatus are frequently conditioned by the tendencies and preferences of the new President in power. Thus, under the mandate of President Charles Hélou the argument evolved into a sort of compromise. The late Cheikh Maurice Gemayel, who was several times trusted with the portfolio of planning, had to abandon his original idea of making of the Ministry of Planning a super-ministry that would coordinate the efforts of all the other ministries, having realized the difficulties with which he was faced. Believing in basic statistical data as the sine qua non condition of development, he transformed the Ministry of Planning from a planning agency, which in fact it has never really been, into an office of research and study - a direction that it has kept until the present day. Occasionally, however, the Ministry

of Planning is asked by other ministries to advise their planning department on the implementation of certain projects. This reliance is entirely dependent on the good-will of the specific officials who happen to believe in team effort among the related ministries, and who, therefore, intrinsically request the aid of the Ministry of Planning.

c) The "équipes polyvalentes" were also the administrative victims of the same unimaginative judicial apparatus. It was originally planned that a total of one hundred and twenty-four technicians were to be distributed among the twenty-four subdistricts of the country (cazas) into twenty-four teams of five or six members each. However, the maximum number of technicians ever reached was recorded in 1963-1964 where only fifty members distributed in twelve operational teams was registered. At present, only twenty-eight members are working in five teams (one in each district-Mohafazat). The reasons for the failure are numerous and inherent in the judicial structure of the administration. It is far beyond the scope of this study to try to analyze in depth the reasons for the inability of the technicians to remain on the job. Suffice it to say, the crux of the problem was derived from lack of stable employment conditions. In effect, the team members were hired on contractual, non-permanent bases, which must have no doubt generated

feelings of career insecurity, let alone the inevitable lack of enthusiasm for their specific jobs.

Moreover, experience showed that it was very costly for the Ministry of Planning to employ permanently five to six officials in the various subdistricts of the country. It was also ascertained, at a later stage, that one "équipe polyvalente" in each Mohafazat could fully perform the necessary accomplishments. This is warranted by the fact that initially the objectives of the "équipes polyvalentes" were of a three-fold nature:[16] First, it was supposed to provide technical assistance. But this is amply taken care of, on the spot, by the technicians of the related ministries.

Second, it was supposed to plan for socio-economic and cultural development of the region it was assigned to. But, this is the sacro-sanct right of the planning departments of the various ministries and it should not be interfered with.

Third, it is stipulated[17] that the "équipe polyvalente" is to supervise the operations of the surveys and various research studies conducted in its region of influence. Furthermore, it is supposed to conduct its

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[16] Decree number 12492, published in the Official Gazette on April 9, 1963.

[17] Ibid., article 3, p. 14.

own research studies as well as update all the sets of information previously gathered about the region concerned. This is one of the only prerogatives it has retained. However, the studies conducted are characterized by a strong utilitarian tendency: the only domains likely to be explored are those that are defined as areas of interest to the Government's general policy trends.

d) The Noyau de Développement Rural (NDR) is the only element of the whole structure that still functions effectively. The NDR, is a temporary development unit, linked administratively to the Rural Development Service of the ODS and operating, as mentioned earlier, at the village level. The administrative headquarters of the NDR are generally located in the biggest agglomeration of the area it covers. Its operational layout is spread over fifteen to twenty villages. The general aim of these units is to raise the level of living of the local communities, by satisfying the socio-economic and cultural needs.[18] This is realized by means of a rational exploitation of both the human, and the natural potential of the community. It also implies the formation of local leadership,[19] and hence, of a body of able, responsible residents, who will gradually replace the

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[18] Decree no. 13870, article no. 3, p. 2.

[19] Ibid., article 7, paragraph (b), p. 2.

social workers of the ODS, and insure the continuation of all the implemented projects and activities in their village.

The basic flaw of this system, is the underestimation of the time element. In effect, it is stipulated that the operational life of the NDR should not exceed five years.[20] But, provided valid justification is presented, it can be extended to ten years of duration. However, the experience of both the ODS top officials and the social workers showed this conception to be inapplicable, as well as an insufficient evaluation of the time needed by the community to internalize the modus operandi of development. Taking into account the reluctant attitude of the local population to cooperate with the social workers of the ODS, and given the shortage of necessary means (both in financial terms and in manpower) to operate on an impressive scale, it is now thought at the ODS, that ten years of time are a minimum required for the formation of the local cadres and development esprit which represent the NDR's basic goals.

Moreover, there is a general feeling among the social workers and administrators of the ODS that the NDR should be looked at more as a permanent catalyst of the process of development than as a temporary joint work program.

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[20] Ibid., article 12, p. 4.

Suggestions for an amendment of the decree no. 13870 in the light of past experience, were neglected in the higher echelons of the Administration. But convinced as they were of the necessity of prolonging the duration of the NDR, the officials of the Rural Development Service were faced with a single alternative: shift the old NDR's centers to different villages but keep them in the same area. By doing so, they augmented the surface covered by the NDR and accordingly, due to staff limitations, diminished the number of nodal points. From a maximum of twenty-two nodal points in 1970, the ODS has now ninety social workers operating in sixteen NDR's that cover all of Lebanon except the cazas of Aley, Baabda, and Metn.[21] However, this decrease in the number of nodal points seems to be a successful enterprise. The fewer number of NDR's allows a stronger concentration of social workers on the same NDR (five on the average as opposed to one or two in the 1968-1970 distribution). This has resulted in a greater mobility of the social workers on a larger terrain. It has also animated the life of the NDR by creating new group activities for the social workers, who can now jointly discuss the projects in preparation; compare their respective activities and results; and perhaps more important,

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[21] Some NDR's cover two cazas, e.g. Kesrouan and Jbeil; Hasbaya and Marjeyoun.

establish a direct coordination of all the projects in the region covered by the NDR.

Moreover, if the idea of a permanent nodal point is accepted, then, given the limited material possibilities, the ODS is bound to enlarge the operational scope of its NDR's, or else, it will be entirely neglecting a large share of the Lebanese territory.

Another advantage of this new strategy lies in the possibility now opened to the social workers to operate first in the villages where the population is most receptive. Participation being an important factor of success, the animateurs can count on the "spill-over effect" to facilitate their work in the remaining villages.

In the old system, the animateurs were forced to work only in the localities of the NDR. It was not possible to cooperate with the population of a neighboring village, eventhough it might be much more receptive, because it is not administratively included in the NDR. This situation had a serious impact on both the efficiency of the ODS and the psychology of the villagers excluded from the NDR. In effect, the animateurs' activities will be most efficient if they operate not only where the necessity lies, but mainly where it <u>can</u> be treated effectively. Furthermore, the mentality of the Lebanese villager is such that he would feel deprived if the Government, neglecting him, is helping another peasant in an adjacent village,

who might not even be as needy as he is.

Another important issue, here, is the appointment of the social worker to a certain NDR. The question is: should he be sent to his native village, and be exposed to regional political and familial pressures; or should he be sent instead to some unfamiliar, remote area which is going to require a lot more effort and time to comprehend?

A further complication stems from the fact that, with age, the social worker's mobility decreases drastically.[22] An animateur, father of six children, living in Tripoli cannot possible operate in Jezzine. And with efficiency being a function of satisfaction, it becomes indispensable to solve the problem. The solution took the form of a compromise: the animateur will operate in his region but not in his village.[23]

Prior to the application of this policy, interferences of all sorts (Wasta) from deputies, ministers and high officials, were frequently used to shift a social worker back to his native region. This usage becoming common practice, the officials of the Rural Development

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[22] In the early days of the ODS there was no such problems, because the animateurs were all young and extremely mobile. With age, they have founded families and homes and their mobility has accordingly decreased. On the other hand, their experience has increased, and they became very useful to the organization.

[23] e.g., a social worker from Rachaya will be appointed to Baalbeck, one from Batroun to Zghorta, etc.

Service decided to adopt it as an uncodified rule and thus, avoid interferences.

As will become clearer later on, this is a perfect example of the adaptation of rational administrative regulations to a traditional usage. It is a typical and successful instance of reconciling universal standards to particular expectations.

A last element worth mentioning is related to the decree 13870 itself. Article N° 3 of this decree stipulates that the work of the NDRs has to be in harmony with the national and regional planning schemes, which as mentioned earlier, are effectively nonexistent. Further, article N° 6 of the same decree recommends that the realizations of the NDRs be coordinated with those of both the "équipes polyvalentes" and the regional technical committee. But these two entities are nonexistent or inoperative in ninety percent of the cases. Besides, if the "équipes polyvalentes" and the NDRs, which perform very similar functions have to closely coordinate their activities, why were they not placed under the same administration? Why are the "équipes polyvalentes" administratively dependent on the Ministry of Planning, and why are the NDRs dependent on the Rural Development Service of the ODS, which itself is administratively dependent on the Ministry of Social Affairs? These questions cannot be answered with certainty. Nevertheless, it is thought that the French expert Mecker,

who was helping the ODS when it first started, insisted that NDR be related to it in order to decentralize the development activities. After a heated controversy that lasted for more than three months, his project was finally adopted.

Following the general philosophy of community development and thus, trying to build a modern structure inspired from grass-root realities, the NDRs have set up local committees: (a) a village committee, the Social Animation Committee (SAC), and (b) a nodal committee, the Social Coordination Committee (SCC).

There is a Social Animation Committee in each village of the NDR. The SAC is usually composed of five to fifteen members representing the local notables (the Mokhtar, a representative from the Municipal Council, representatives from each one of the local specialized associations: social work, public utility, etc. and a representative from each school - private or public within the village-) and the various social categories in the village (one representative[24] for each of the following categories: small landowners, agricultural workers, mer-

[24]Each representative is elected separately only by the category to which he or she belongs. To be eligible, the candidate has to be of Lebanese nationality, over eighteen years of age, have blank judicial records, be a native, a resident, or an owner in the village. It is worth noting that the SAC and SCC members offer their services as volunteer labor.

chants, women, and the young of the village).

The SAC functions as a link between the villagers and the administration. It participates in annual and long-term planning, supervises the development of local projects, as well as the participation in these projects as defined in the contract signed with the ODS. It keeps records of this participation, and establishes a filing system that helps controlling and managing the enterprise which results from the project. It also regularly sends detailed reports to the central administration.

After the constitution of at least three SAC's, the social workers of the NDR form a Social Coordination Committee. The SCC is composed of two representatives from each SAC; of the social workers on the team, of the members of the "équipe polyvalente," of the "vulgarisateur agricole;"[25] of the head of the regional office of the ODS; of regional delegates of the administration (or even the Qaimaqam or Mohafez, depending on the situation); of the head of the Rural Development Service at the ODS, and of the technicians whose technical advice might be needed in specific cases.

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[25]The vulgarisateur agricole is an agricultural expert, sent by the Ministry of Agriculture to explain to the villagers, in as simple a way as possible, the modern scientific techniques, trying to convince them to adopt these techniques.

The SCC is supposed to facilitate public works within the NDR. It is responsible for the cooperation and coordination among villages, especially in the case of projects that require substantial participation from the villagers themselves. It also sponsors the inclusion of new villages in the NDR; helps in annual and long-term planning, and coordinates the sub-plans of each SAC. Another of its important functions is to organize, in conjunction with the SACs and the official services, training sessions (economic, social, and cultural) whose subjects revolve around topics of specific interest to the villagers depending on the circumstances. It is also trusted with the responsibility of supervising projects and resulting enterprises, as well as the coordination of inter-village projects within the NDR.

These local committees are now, increasingly looked at as being unreliable in the short run, if not intensively guided by the social workers.[26] This being a de facto defeat of the NDR's purposes, a proposition to replace these committees by other more effective bodies is now

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[26]In the village of Beit el Fa'ss in the region of Syr-Dennie, for example, the SAC was very seriously working on an agricultural road, meeting twice a week, and keeping up an extremely decent filing system, until the animateurs had to come to Beirut for one month training session. During their absence, the SAC did not meet once. The work already realized was left to deteriorate.

envisaged.[27]

As can be seen from this presentation, the administrative structure created on the recommendation of the IRFED mission, has not been an effective measure in the promotion of socio-economic development in Lebanon. It is evident, that the only operational unit still functioning efficiently is the Noyau de Développement Rural.

This impasse raises issues of importance for future regional planning which may be summarized as follows:

a) What criteria should be applied for identifying regions in a country? Lebanon's small area seems to preclude a division into regions for planning purposes, but its topography, population, composition and distribution, and uneven area development indicate that some kind of subnational approach is required.

b) What division of responsibilities should be established between the central planning agency and the regional planning units?

c) What should be the nature and extent of local political and popular participation in regional planning?

d) What should be the administrative structure of the regional planning unit, and the composition of the staff? Should the latter be employees of sectoral ministries

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[27] A further elaboration of the failure of the SACs will be undertaken in Chapter V.

or employees of the central planning agency or local government employees, or a combination of these?

This study attempts to answer these questions by analyzing the Office of Social Development (ODS) (since it is the only planning and executive development unit on the regional level) its administrative structure and objectives, as well as its field operations. It is hoped that this analysis will clarify the nature of regional planning and allow an objective evaluation of the operational implementation of this planning.

The main underlying question of the whole study is the following: to what extent have the traditional elements been taken into consideration in developmental planning? And what has the effect of these same traditional elements been on the implementation of this planning?

This, in turn, will be analyzed in the context of the underlying perspectives of regional planning as identified earlier: the inter-disciplinary nature of regional planning which relates the economic, physical, and social aspects; the encouragement and sustained support of local initiative; and the concern with balanced growth. An approach to the solution of some of the urgent social problems such as rapid urban growth, unemployment, location and dispersion of industrial activities will be made salient. And finally an attempt will be made to emphasize the desire to prevent the development of regional

consciousness and local chauvinism by aligning the problems of a particular community with other regions and, by so doing, broadening national goals and purposes.

CHAPTER III: The ODS: Objectives and Administrative Structure

Development is not only the way to plentiness, but furthermore it is the construction of a society.

P. Massé
Le Plan ou l'Anti-Hasard

Development policy presupposes the existence of a program of actions allowing the mobilization of all material and human potentials and of the private and public resources of a country in order to reach certain objectives. These objectives are incorporated in a general vision of the various sectors as defined by the concerned specialized administrations.

The ODS was created to "coordinate the activities of these administrations as well as to encourage the population to participate in them. This participation is brought about by awakening, animating, advising, supporting, associating, and helping the people on the path of development, their development."[1]

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[1]Joseph Donato, "Présentation de l'ODS," in Les Actes du 2ème Séminaire d'Etudes sur le Développement Rural dans les Pays du Bassin Méditerranéen (April 17-30, 1967, 1ère Partie), Beirut: ODS, 1967, p. 13.

It is the intention of this chapter to identify some of the salient objectives and structural features of the ODS. This intention is three-fold:

First, an attempt will be made to assess the extent to which the ODS has recognized and articulated some of the underlying principles or perspectives inherent in the process of regional planning identified in the earlier chapter. Second, its perception of the specific development needs of the country will be identified. Finally, this chapter will try to evaluate the extent to which the ODS has been able to adapt some of the universal and rational attributes of the process of development as a planned and deliberate activity to some of the local and particular expectations of a society still sustained by non-rational and primordial ties and considerations.

I. GENERAL OBJECTIVES OF THE ODS

The main objective of rural development policies in Lebanon, is to improve the socio-economic status of the village population. More explicitly, the ODS aims at:

1. Augmenting the revenues of peasants and craftsmen. This is to be accomplished by measures such as:
   a) Improving production: its working conditions and technical status, as well as its distribution possibilities.
   b) Ameliorating the quality of local services by encouraging specialization and division of labor.

c) Organizing the distribution of food items and various sundries on the local, regional, and national markets.

d) Liberating the villagers from the pressures of their "seasonal debts."

e) Encouraging savings and personal investments.

2. Developing the overall status of the Lebanese village by: trying to decrease rural exodus; improving the quality of the local facilities, e.g. roads, telephone, electricity, drinking water and hygienic accommodations; and reinforcing the communal and familial ties.

3. Insuring comprehensive and harmonious rural development by:

- Forming a receptive and responsible community that will augment the efficiency of the technical realizations and substantiate the financial benefits they bring about.
- Establishing a socio-economic and technical structure in the village.
- Training and organizing the necessary local cadres in order to insure the success of the technical work.
- Encouraging these local cadres to participate in national development efforts.
- Gradually giving the local leaders greater initiative possibilities, and hence greater responsibili-

ties.[2]

As can be seen, great emphasis is placed on the participation of the local population in development projects, thus taking into account one of the important underlying principles of regional planning as identified earlier. In fact, the main concern of the ODS, as defined by the Director General is "to prove to each and everyone that progress is a common task that commands the rational and voluntary participation of every citizen, both as an individual and as a member in a group."[3]

Along the same line, the function of the ODS is to activate the human potential and prepare it to play an effective role in the development process. For this purpose, it has to structure the productive elements in the country and help the emerging agents of development.

Moreover, in the "Présentation de l'ODS" Mr. Donato stresses that the ODS "has to continually re-adapt itself to eventual changes; to mobility, spontaneity, and to all unpredictable events."[4] In this perspective, the ODS appears as the only direct link between a maturing

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[2]All these are codified objectives reported here as they have appeared in a pamphlet issued by the ODS in 1969 and entitled "The ODS; Rural Development," Beirut: ODS, 1968.

[3]J. Donato, op.cit, p. 13.

[4]Ibid.

population and a nascent Administration.[5]

It is obvious, however, that some framework is needed for theoretically linking policies as rational proposals and general objectives to policies centering around societal commitments. Successful realizations cannot be accomplished if these two areas do not persist in a mutually supportive relationship in respect to one another. One proposition is that governmental agencies can provide this link.

In this chapter, we shall describe the rational, administrative structure conceived to realize these objectives. An attempt will also be made to estimate the success or failure of the ODS's bureaucratic organization in realizing their objectives by analyzing which key factors of development were utilized and which ones were disregarded.

II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF THE ODS

"It is because of the urgency and because of the need for a greater flexibility of action; and also to be able to establish an efficient contact with the population at large that the Lebanese Government opted in 1959 for the creation of decentralized administrations called

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[5]Since the rest of the planning structure established by the "Programme de Polarisation" is practically inoperative.

autonomous offices."[6] These offices are composed of a board of administration which functions as the decision-making authority; and of a bureaucratic apparatus which functions as the executive body in the Office.[7]

1. The Board of Administration

The Board of Administration of the ODS is formed by representatives of the four related ministries:[8] the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs (under whose tutelage, the ODS operates), the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Public Health, and the Ministry of National Education (see Chart II). The presence of these representatives is justified by the desire of the Administration to coordinate the activities of the related ministries to those of the ODS in the areas where it operates.[9]

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[6] J. Donato, Ibid., p. 13.

[7] Decree no. 6474, article 5, p. 2.

[8] The representative of each ministry is appointed by the same decree which appoints the whole board, and chosen among the employees of second category within the ministry itself.

[9] In fact, there is no coordination. All the social workers of the ODS interviewed complained from the fact that all the related ministries often operated in the regions covered by the ODS not only without consultation, but even without prior notice. The reason for this is the complete absence of cooperation between the members of the Board and the social workers. The only concerted actions are due to the cooperative attitude of the local individual representatives of the ministries concerned, (e.g. "vulgarisateur agricol," director of governmental school, etc.) and not to the central administration. A further elaboration of this point will be attempted at a later stage in this chapter.


Ministry of Agriculture
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Work and Social Affairs
Ministry of Public Health
Board of Administration of the ODS
Consultative Committee
Director General
Lobby
Departement of Research & Programs
Rural Development Service
Department of Financial & Administrative Affairs
Department of Social Services
Youth
Development Services
Village Projects
Social Care
Social Assistance
Non - Profit Organizations

The remaining three members of the board represent the various categories of the private sector, the different regions of the country, and certain professional or scientific disciplines.

In toto, the board constructs the general planning scheme of the ODS, its annual program, and its budget. However, a few of its decisions such as the budget have to be agreed on conjointly by the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs, by the Ministry of Finance, and even by the Council of Ministries.

Nevertheless, such limitations have not affected the efficiency of the ODS. On the contrary, one can look at this legislation as being an effort to coordinate the operations of all administrations through the analysis of budget allocation. The criteria of preferences being the order of priorities as defined by the general policy of the Government. This is an indication that the ODS has recognized the multi-disciplinary character of regional planning, and has accordingly tried to adopt a structural approach to development.

2. The Consultative Committee

It is formed of ten members[10] chosen among the representatives of private organizations that deal with

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[10]These members are also appointed by decree.

social matters. This committee occasionally meets with the Board of Administration. The cooperation of the Board and the Committee is supposed to actualize the synthesis between the needs of the private sector and the realizations of the public sector, for a closer involvement of the population in plans and projects of development.

The members of both the Board of Administration and Consultative Committee are appointed by a governmental decree.[11] The president of the Board is also appointed by the same decree.[12] The Board and the Committee remain in office for three consecutive years, and their charge is renewable.[13] They can also be dismissed by the same procedure.

The legal structure of these two administrative entities was initially meant to insure three objectives:

a. the harmonious cooperation of the various governmental administrations which deal with rural development projects through the presence of delegates from the related ministries,
b. the discovery of the basic needs of the private sector through the presence of the members of the consultative committee,

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[11] Decree no. 6474, article 5, paragraph 4, p. 2.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid., article 6.

c. the construction of a joint action program which will gear the government's realizations towards a better satisfaction of the needs of the private sector, who would have directly participated in its elaboration.

In fact, none of this is happening for several reasons. First, the members of the Board are always carefully chosen from different sects in order to maintain the sectarian balance. Though this is not a codified rule it has been adopted through out the whole Lebanese Administration and has proved to be a balancing factor. In this particular case, however, this has led to what can be called "diseconomies of efficiency." In effect, being mainly chosen on the basis of their religious origins,[14] the competence of the Board members in matters regarding the ODS's operational strategy can be generally challenged.[15]

For this reason, and also because of the lack of influence of the ministries' representatives on planning policies in their respective ministries, no concerted

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[14] And/or because of political "backing."

[15] The section no. 7 of paragraph no. 5 in article no. 5 of the decree no. 6474 stipulates that the member of the Board should either hold certified degrees in the field of operation of the Office he is appointed to, or possess a "practical experience" in that same field. The law does not specify who evaluates this "experience" and on what criteria is this evaluation based. [redacted]

actions have as yet emanated from the activities of the ODS's Board of Administration.

The direct impact of this absence of joint planning is mostly felt at the village level where the social worker who has been operating in the area for sometime, is often surprised by new projects undertaken by anyone of the related ministries even without prior notification to the ODS's NDR center in the region concerned.

This lack of contact between the social workers and the members of the Board is not only detrimental to the general operational network of the ODS but more importantly it has affected the prestige of the social workers vis-à-vis the local populations.

The contention here is that a lobby formed by representatives of the related ministries and departments be attached to the General Directorate of the ODS. This lobby will be responsible for a systematic coordination of the various individual plans regarding each region separately and with the ODS's overall planning scheme.[16] By so doing, double functions, unnecessary expenditures, and all sorts of diseconomies will be avoided. This will render the Board of Administration Obsolete,[17] and probably decrease

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[16]It is obviously the duty of the Ministry of Planning to realize such a coordinated strategy, but for reasons mentioned earlier, this cannot take place.

[17]As will be shown later.

the relative autonomy of the executive body of the ODS along with its head, the Director General. But the positive aspect of such an enterprise would far exceed its drawbacks, even if the only thing it does is to structure what is now a purely individualistic initiative, namely, the cooperation of the local representatives of the various ministries with the ODS's animateurs.

Secondly, as far as the Consultative Committee is concerned, sectarian, political, and regional considerations have often interferred with the rational duty it was supposed to perform. However, this interference is the mere reflection of a traditionalistic society based on sectarian, political and regional influences.

Hence, if the Committee is the representative of a private sector stained with regional politics and sectarianism, then its recommendations should be given proper consideration even if their maturity is yet to be proven.

Third, there has been no jointly elaborated program produced by the Board and the Committee since the creation of the ODS. However, complaints and recommendations from individual members of the Committee, are always taken into consideration by the executive body of the ODS.

What should be mentioned here is that nowhere can instances of planned, rational cooperation between the Board and the Committee be found. All joint initiative has been the result of individual actions on the part of

members of either body.

Finally, the wide communication gap that exists between the Board and the Committee on the one hand, and the operational base (e.g. the social workers) on the other, has resulted in total ignorance by the Board of the activities which in fact, they were supposed to organize and coordinate.[18]

Since the only link between the Board and the executive apparatus of the ODS is the Director General, the Board's knowledge of what actually happens is limited to the regular reports that the Director presents to the Board. Neither the law, nor the internal regulations provide for any direct check on the activities of the social workers in the field.

3. The Director General (D.G.)

The Director General is appointed by a ministerial decree issued by the Council of Ministers[19] on the proposition of the Ministry of Social Affairs under whose tutelage the ODS operates. He is thus considered as the direct head of all the administrative units and employees attached to his department.[20]

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[18] Decree no. 6474 article 9, p. 4.
[19] Ibid., article 11, p. 5.
[20] Ibid., article 17, p. 6.

However, he is in turn, a direct subordinate of the president of the Board of Administration.[21]

The Director General meets with the Board of Administration as a consulting member. He has no voting power,[22] and is usually excluded from all meetings where the Board deliberates matters regarding its own proper affairs.[23]

As mentioned earlier, the distance and the communication gap between the Board members and the administrative apparatus in general has led to a relative autonomy of decision which is enjoyed by the Director General. In effect, with the participation of both the Board and the Committee in decision making and policy determination being rather low, it is the Director General who has practically monopolized these responsibilities.

This is beneficial to the general operational efficiency of the ODS, since the Director General, being very close to all the different departments, is perfectly aware of the "leads and lags" within the organization, and is therefore in a vantage point for coordinating the efforts of the various services.

Furthermore, being in office for a much longer time

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[21] Ibid., article 16, p. 6.

[22] Ibid., article 18, p. 7.

[23] The ODS's Board meets five times a month usually in the presence of the Director General.

than the Board members,[24] he is likely to be more familiar with the internal problems and specific administrative hurdles which characterize the ODS, and hence be experienced in finding appropriate solutions which will satisfy the needs of the ODS.

It is increasingly felt, therefore, at all levels of the administrative structure of the ODS, that the Board of Administration makes very little contribution to the general level of efficiency in the ODS. Its pure abolition will spare the Government the payment of substantial compensations for the seven officials of the Board, an amount of money which could be spent on a development project in a village; and extend a greater autonomy to the Director General, which as previously mentioned, could be an efficient initiative. And since the Board is not performing its function as the coordinator of the ministries' and ODS's activities in the field, its presence can hardly bear a rational justification.

However, its persistence can be warranted by a peculiarity that permeates the whole Lebanese Administration, namely, the need for "official backing." In effect, the members of the Board being representatives of the

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[24]The Board is in office three years only, while the Director General remains in office as long as he has not been shifted elsewhere by a specific ministerial decree. (Decree no. 6474, articles 5 and 11, pp. 2 and 5)

concerned ministries, provide the ODS with the support of these ministries when it is needed.[25] Moreover, the members themselves are often personally "backed" by influential political figures who, for electoral reasons, would support their followers and by so doing, support the ODS.

Further, it is the members of the Consultative Committee, usually chosen among the representatives of the various religious charitable organizations in the country, that provide the basic support to the ODS. In fact, these organizations having a strong influence on deputies, leading political figures, and even on the President of the Republic himself, can determine to a certain extent the fate of the ODS. This is the reason for which the Committee and the Board, in spite of the absence of a rational administrative justification for their existence, are kept in office.

[redacted]

[25] When the Franjieh regime came to power, the efficiency of the whole institutional set up conceived under the precedent regimes was seriously challenged. The ODS was in the middle of the controversy, and all its budgetary allocations were frozen for the whole year (1970-71). There was also the possibility of dissolving all autonomous offices, and the ODS among them, and incorporate their services to the various related ministries. It is only the energetic support of deputies and representatives of the various religious communities (whose charitable organizations are helped by the ODS) that prevented this from happening.

[redacted]

Moreover, if the criterion for the rationality of an organization is its efficiency, then the ODS may be considered as a rational organization trying to increase its efficiency by taking into account the "irrational" traditional elements that characterize the society in which it operates.

This trait will become even clearer in the analysis of the executive apparatus of the ODS which shall be attempted in what follows. This apparatus is formed by four distinct departments headed by a director. They are:

1. The Department of Research and Programs
2. The Rural Development Service
3. The Department of Social Services
4. The Department of Financial and Administrative Affairs.[26]

1. The Department of Research and Programs

The Department of Research and Programs is composed of experts in the fields of Sociology, Economics, Statistics, and Engineering. According to the law,[27] it is supposed to perform the following functions:

1. Study the country's social condition and the ways to improve it.

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[26] Decree no. 12960, article 24, p. 1.

[27] Ibid., article 25, p. 1.

2. Define the people's social needs and the importance of these needs vis-à-vis the various factors of underdevelopment.
3. Undertake technical and detailed studies of the projects aiming at the satisfaction of the people's needs as defined by the local population and felt by the ODS's technicians.[28]
4. Propose overall programs of social development for the country as a whole, and the respective yearly budgets of these programs.[29]
5. Operate continual reevaluations and studies of the orientation of the activities of the ODS, its targets and operational strategy, in order to set up goals and work policies adapted to the local conditions.
6. Supervise the realization of these programs, studies, and projects.
7. Follow the activities of the related administrations in the social field, and propose ways to orient and coordinate these activities.

These prerogatives however, have not been used to

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[28] i.e. the social workers of the Rural Development Service who are permanently present in the community.

[29] A function that the Ministry of Planning is also supposed to perform. For a detailed comment on this, see footnote no. 31 on page 65.

the optimum. The reasons for this are twofold. First, there is a lack of sufficient staff to a) undertake studies at the national scale (a function which should be performed by the Ministry of Planning); b) study in detail all the individual projects in the villages; and c) supervise the realization of these projects. Secondly, the ambiguous and hazy wording of the text[30] which defines the prerogatives of the Department of Rural Planning has led to a series of double functions with the Ministry of Planning on the one hand[31] and with the Rural Development Service within the ODS itself[32] on the other.

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[30]The decree no. 12960.

[31]The law of June 12, 1962 part III, articles 30 and 31, stipulates that the Council for Planning and Development which is part of the Ministry of Planning is also supposed to "present overall programs of development" (paragraph 1, p. 4). In spite of the presence of the ODS's Director General on this Council, we tend to believe that there is no effective coordination between the two bodies as far as "planning for overall development" is concerned. This reinforces the conviction that there is no specialized governmental agency that unifies and coordinates the plans and programs of the various administrations in Lebanon. The source of this atrophy is an irrational legislation which led to double functions and hence to no function at all, since each department expects the one that shares the same prerogatives to perform the duties at its place.

[32]The Rural Development Service within the ODS, is according to the law (Decree no. 12960, article 26, p. 2), only responsible for the realization of plans and programs conceived by the Department of Rural Planning. [redacted]

The belief is that the DRP could be far more effective if it concentrates its limited possibilities on planning the policy of the ODS and not aim at designing development plans for the country as a whole. Nevertheless, its behavior is warranted by the desire of the ODS's administration to avoid working in a vacuum and establish some guidelines for its field operations.

The fact that the ODS itself is the only unit of the whole institutional structure for development which is still operational, has imposed on its governing body heavier charges than it was initially supposed to bear.[33] Being practically alone in the field, its reaction can easily be comprehended.[34]

2. The Rural Development Service

The RDS was created in 1963, but it only started effective operations in 1964. According to the law, it is responsible for:[35]

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[33]As it was shown earlier (Chapter II), the structure initially conceived by the IRFED mission collapsed leaving the ODS alone to pursue the work originally planned for an entire institutional network.

[34]The only other governmental agencies operating permanently (or semi-permanently) in the villages are:
a. The Ministry of Agriculture through the "vulgarisateur agricole."
b. The Ministry of Health through the village dispensaries (when they are available).

[35]decree no. 12960, article 26, p. 2.

1. Carrying out the operations of social awakening.[36]
2. Executing the programs and development plans.
3. Managing the projects related to social development.
4. Insuring the necessary contacts between the local population and the administration.
5. Coordinating the organization of development services on the village level.
6. Dispensing elements of civic education to the local population especially to the youth.[37]

In fact, the Rural Development Service is doing much more than its specified functions. In a sense, it is even monopolizing the field work of the ODS as a whole.

In spite of its limited possibilities, it is providing all of the socio-economic studies of the villages, as well as coordinated and comprehensive short-term development plans both at the village and regional level

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[36] As "social awakening" was defined to us by both the social workers and the executives of the ODS, it is synonymous with civic education and the creation of a "group consciousness" which is often lacking in the villages because of local political rivalries.

[37] This year's budget is exceptionally high - 800,000 L.L. (Previous years never exceeded 400,000 L.L., and in 1971 there was no money at all since the budget allocations of the whole ODS were frozen). This is too small an amount of money even for micro-projects. Especially when one thinks that, apart from the overall infrastructural realizations, the RDS is the only administration in Lebanon dealing with community development projects. A further debate of this issue will be attempted later in this chapter.

(e.g. the Hermel Study and three-year plan). It is also proposing the village projects, sponsoring their realization, managing their functioning, and evaluating their results.

In other words, the Rural Development Service appears to be doing all the community development work in the ODS through the social workers placed in the villages.

Administratively, the Rural Development Service is composed of three different departments: the Department of Village Projects; the Department of Development Services; and the Youth Department.

The Department of Village Projects is responsible for:[38]

1. The "psychological preparation" of the villagers in order to insure a higher receptivity and a greater cooperation from the local population in development projects;
2. Sponsoring the creation of local committees and discovering the local leaders;
3. Gathering information about the socio-economic conditions in the villages;
4. Cooperating with the Department of Rural Planning in order to define the needs of the village population;
5. Submitting the development plans established in conjunction with the villagers;

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[38]Decree no. 12960, article 26, paragraph B 1.

6. Designing the blueprints of the village projects and proposing ways to realize them;
7. Supervising the village projects realized by the villagers;
8. Coordinating, printing, and distributing information about the ODS in general and its activities.

The department of Development Services is responsible for:[39]

1. Supervising the handicraft industry, especially if located in the rural areas, and encouraging its development;
2. Organizing and managing the rural social clubs;[40]
3. Training the local leaders, and supervising the centers conceived for this purpose;
4. Encouraging cooperation and group activities in the villages;
5. Supervising and managing the various service centers created according to the village needs (e.g. social centers, sewing schools, etc.)

Lastly, the Youth Department is responsible for:[41]

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[39] Ibid., paragraph B2, pp. 2 and 3.

[40] Some villages have a literary and/or sport club where the young meet to discuss issues, organize activities, and exchange ideas. Active members of these clubs are usually the most dynamic elements in the village, and contribute substantially to all village activities.

[41] Decree no. 12960, article no. 26, paragraph B3, p. 4.

1. Civic Education;
2. Encouraging the creation of youth clubs in the villages;
3. Organizing the volunteer movement of youth for social help and work camps[42] as well as managing these camps in conjunction with the Department of Village Projects;
4. International exchange of youth;
5. Encouraging sports as well as literary and artistic activities in the rural areas.

However, in reality, the functions are not so structured. The social worker in the village acts as the representative of all three services together. It is the social worker who takes care of the "psychological preparation" of the villagers; who sponsors the creation of local committees; studies the socio-economic structure of the village; proposes the project in cooperation with the villagers; supervises its execution and evaluates its benefits. It is also the social worker who contacts the

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[42] Work camps are an ingenious combination of volunteer labor who work on village projects, social services (e.g. teaching the children) and cheap tourism for young people. The procedure is the following: young students from all over Europe (mainly from France) come to Lebanon in summer on charter planes for very low costs. Once in Beirut, they are toured through the city and its surroundings and then driven up to the village they have been assigned to. In the village, they are offered lodging and food. In return, they help on the ODS's project as volunteer labor in the mornings and teach the children or help the villagers in some other way in the afternoons.

local handicraft manufacturers and informs the Rural Development Service of their existence; who recommends the individuals most likely to become efficient local leaders; and who helps coordinating the activities of the Youth Department (e.g. work camps) with the situation peculiar to the village.

In this sense, the social worker can be seen as the only direct link between the local population and Administration. His delicate task consists of winning the confidence of the local population, thereby, encouraging receptivity. On his success depends the success of the whole policy of development.

Having realized the importance of the role played by the social workers in the whole process of development, the Administration has imposed on them serious and extended training.

One of the standards of acceptance for the social worker is a preliminary exam that must be taken before training can begin. This preliminary examination is composed of a written three-hour general cultural essay and an oral examination on a socio-economic problem in a specific village.[43] Admission is based on scores but also

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[43]The decision of January 21, 1962 (no. 2/7), Part II, article 4, p. 2. The candidates, however, have to be holders of the Lebanese baccalaureate or an equivalent technical degree (in agriculture, mechanical engineering, etc.) in order to be allowed to sit for the examination.

on the needs of the ODS for social workers.

The training session itself usually lasts between eight and ten months.[44] The trainees are taught courses in sociology, experimental psychology, applied rural economics, elementary management, and development theories.

The male students are also taught concepts of agriculture (primarily about fruit trees and vegetables), raising cattle and keeping poultry, irrigation and forestry principles, handicrafts, rural architecture, public works, education, hygiene and first aid, and social work. They are also taught principles of cooperative work and long-term loans, as well as basics of commercial accounting.[45] The female students follow courses[46] in education, preventive hygiene, social work, and principles of cooperative work, and long-term loans.[47]

A total of one hundred and fifty-one "lab" hours are also planned for the male students. During this time they follow "practical work" sessions in community development, cooperative work, loans, audio-visual techniques, and the mechanics of agricultural machines.[48]

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[44] Ibid., p. 4.
[45] A total of one hundred and sixty-five hours.
[46] Ibid.
[47] A total of sixty-eight hours.
[48] Ibid. p. 5.

The female students have ninety-one "lab" hours on community development (67 hours) and audio-visual aids (24 hours).[49]

Field trips to the rural regions, as well as to the specialized, related institutions are followed by thorough group discussions.

A two-month period of exercise in field work is planned. During this period the trainees (both male and female) begin to familiarize themselves with village life by establishing socio-economic studies of the villages;[50] applying community development principles; handling audio-visual aids; and discovering the right local leaders to train. In a last phase, the trainees effectively contribute to some of the ODS's projects.[51]

The evaluation of the trainees work is estimated according to their scores on seven different examinations.[52]

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[49] Ibid., p. 5

[50] These studies include a general description of the village (housing conditions, social situation, facilities, needs, professional activities, employment percentages, demographic variables, resources, etc.) as well as a project outline with budget, calendar of realizations, and estimated benefits.

[51] The theoretical part of the training is handled by professors from the Lebanese University as well as by specialists in the various fields of study included in the training, the latter being often employees of the Government.

[52] A written examination at the end of each phase, and two written and one oral test at the end of the session.

This system is not only helpful to evaluate the trainees' work, but more important it helps avoiding the various pressures (from deputies, notables, etc.) aiming at supporting one of the candidates. In effect, if a candidate has failed the entrance test and is nevertheless, "helped" to participate in the session, albeit he (or she) does not have the necessary qualifications, he (or she) cannot possibly manage to escape being judged on seven different occasions and will most probably fail at some point.

This practice is reminiscent of the Chéhab regime which was characterized by a desire to replace nepotism and "wasta" practices by meritocracy. The examination procedure had also been generalized to all applicants for civil service employment,[53] as well as to all applicants for educational scholarships abroad.[54] The only flaw in this system is the extreme slowness of corrections and publishing of results. The reason for this is the large number of bureaucratic controls and checks through which the results have to pass in order, once again, to prevent external pressure.

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[53]It is the "Fonction Publique" which is the governmental agency in charge of coordinating this procedure in the Administration.

[54]This is still applied to day to all governmental employees who want to pursue their studies abroad, and who manage to secure financial assistance from some international agency.

During the training period, the trainees are paid a monthly salary of 150 LL,[55] in return for which they sign a promise to serve as government employees for a minimum period of five years starting after their nomination to a specific post.[56] If they fail to fulfill this condition, they will have to pay back to the Government the full amount received in monthly salaries during the entire training period.

This procedure has led to satisfactory results. The Rural Development Service has now a total of ninety trained social workers spread all over the territory. Their activities are directly reported to the Director of the Rural Department Service to whom they are administratively responsible. The Director, in turn, refers to the Director General of the ODS and through the latter to the general Administrative apparatus.

Hence, it seems as if the Rural Development Service is the only tangible and viable link between the

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[55] If they are already employees of the government, following the training session on recommendation from their superiors, they keep receiving their initial salary, plus a bonus if they are shifted from their original work region.

[56] Op.cit., article no. 18, p. 7.

local populations and the State[57] as a whole.

3. The Department of Social Services

Prior to the creation of the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs (i.e. prior to 1952), the State's contribution to social services was limited to financial subsidies distributed to the various charitable organizations, orphanages, and asylums, according to a rigorous sectarian pattern in order to keep the sacro-sanct rule of confessional balance.

After the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs was created, the situation remained roughly the same, except for an increase in the size of the subsidies granted to those associations.

With the establishment of the ODS in June 1959, it was primarily trusted with the task of organizing social services. The Government was then faced with two options: it could either take over all social services from the private sector - organize them under a centralized management, and eventually re-structure the whole welfare

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[57] In fact, due to the absence of other development activities sponsored by other agencies (e.g. Ministry of Planning), the Rural Development Service becomes the only governmental agency in the field and outside the field. Bearing in mind this fact, and knowing that the government is aware of this situation, it all seems as if the state by granting the RDS such a limited budget (800,000 LL) is not encouraging community development and is not likely to do so in the coming six years.

activities in the country, but at the expense of facing a strong opposition from all the religious hierarchies in Lebanon.[58] Or the ODS could indirectly contribute to re-structure in a more rational manner the activities of the independent charitable institutions, by coordinating their activities as much as possible. This was a prerogative all the institutions in question were perfectly willing to grant, since, in exchange, the funds they obtain from the ODS would eventually grow in amount.

It was soon realized that the private sector was too deeply implanted in the field of social services, and that a complete take over of the existing associations would lead to an open confrontation which would not serve either party's purposes.

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[58]Since a substantial portion of such voluntary and benevolent associations are confessional and communal in character, a "monopolization" of these organizations by the state was bound to create a serious clash with the notables of the various religious communities. Furthermore, since an important part of the electorate in Lebanon is highly influenced by the political attitudes of the clergy, the deputies and leading political figures in the country always interfere with the Government on the side of their sects' clergy protecting its interests to gain its support.

In the case of the ODS, a negative action on the part of the Government (e.g. taking over the social services) would have generated a serious wave of generalized protest from religious communities, clergy, and deputies. Following a religious civil war which seriously shook the country (summer 1958), and in presence of an intense religious consciousness, such an opposition would have had unpredictable implications, a chance, that the régime then in function, was not willing to take.

Hence, it was agreed to opt for the second alternative, and to establish a sort of compromise which would allow the Government to supervise the work of the charitable associations through the Department of Social Services at the ODS, and yet, allow these associations to operate without direct tutelage from the Government. This is once again another instance of reconciling the secular or rational interests of the ODS to the inescapable social reality of the confessional and pluralistic character of the social structure of Lebanese society. The former demands a secularization of social services and its extension according to need; the latter requires same tampering with the allocation of such services in the interest of equity and amity among the various confessional groups.

This also raises another touchy question, one which has vital implications for the balance between state interest and private initiative in the process of development. An increasing measure of government intervention - while necessary for a more effective and equitable allocation of resources - is likely to threaten private initiative, particularly in an area where non-governmental agencies have played an effective role in meeting some of the unmet welfare needs of the various communities.

In light of this issue, the prerogatives of the Department of Social services were defined[59] as follows:

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[59]Decree no. 12960, article no. 27, pp. 4-7.

1. To propose, prepare, and execute all programs and projects related to social services.
2. To coordinate the activities of all voluntary associations, which deal with social services, hospitals, diepensaries, orphanages, and all the various institutions that take care of the blind, mentally retarded, deaf, and dumb. It should also coordinate the activities of all private technical schools, private centers for technical formation, and to specific communities or welfare associations or to specific individuals practicing in the social or professional fields.

The Department of Social Service is actually composed of three different departments: the Department of Social Assistance; the Department of Social Care; and the Department of Voluntary Associations.[60]

The Department of Social Assistance is responsible for receiving and registering the applications for assistance, investigating the cases applied and suggesting the approval of refusal of assistance. It is also in charge of organizing and updating the filing system related to both the individual cases and to the institutions of social assistance.

The Department of Social Care closely supervises

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[60] Ibid., paragraph B1, B2, B3.

the activities of all institutions of social assistance in the country.[61]

The Department of Voluntary Associations sponsors, supervises, and coordinates the activities of the various charitable associations. It is also responsible for keeping separate files for each of these associations, and updating it periodically.

As can obviously be seen, departments such as the Department of Social Services should be incorporated in the Ministry of Social Affairs instead of the ODS.

Our belief is that taking care of handicapped children, teaching them technical skills, trying to place them in a system in which they now can efficiently survive, and other such benevolent functions, is an indispensable measure for a developing welfare state. However, if we establish a comparative "return-on-investment" analysis between helping a handicapped child to learn a trade, and creating a project that would help healthy people to increase their revenues and solve their problems,[62]

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[61] This supervision takes the form of regular visits to these institutions in order to insure their observance of certain regulations of social assistance (e.g. the children must take sports; receive an education in conformity with the programs of the Ministry of Education; they should also be well fed; clean; and books and stationary should be available, etc.)

[62] We are perfectly justified in doing this since the ODS itself deals with both types of activities.

it is probable that the economic returns of social services will be much lower than those of properly conducted community development. Further, when it is realized that the Department of Social Services obtains approximately ten times more credit allocations than the Rural Development Service, questions as to the real objectives of the ODS start to emerge. Does the ODS want to improve the standard of living in the rural areas or does it want to be a charitable institution?

What are the needs of socio-economic development in Lebanon? Is the ODS serving them by granting ten million LL (out of an average budget of fifteen million LL) to "non-profit organizations" which more often than not thoroughly abuse these subsidies?

Is development based on charity or self-help? Is it not considered a luxury to spend ten million LL on social services when only 800,000 LL goes to community development proper?

Is it equitable to spend thousands of pounds on one handicapped child, when for the same amount a whole village with hundreds of inhabitants can be developed?

Even if we admit the fact that the ODS is primarily interested in structural changes and not in economic development alone, we cannot find a rational explanation for such a misuse of funds. It is even more difficult to grasp when one realizes that the very source of the distortion

of the concepts of the ODS lies in the socio-political structure itself - the very structure the ODS purports to change.

In effect, the precarious position of the autonomous offices, whose existence depends entirely on the "good intentions" of the successive regimes towards them, make them seek strong support wherever they can obtain it.

The Department of Social Services seems to be used as a practical means of securing this support. First, because (as mentioned earlier) most of the charitable institutions that the Department of Social Services subsidizes are formed and managed by the clergy of the various religious communities. The logic is that the religious authorities would be strongly unfavorable to all attempts on the part of the Government to abolish an agency (the ODS in this case) which provides so much assistance to their projects.

Second, the deputies and notables of the various sects have also been drawn by the clergy (through the influence of the latter on the electorate) to support the ODS.

Third, the direct support of the deputies and ministers has also been secured through the Department of Social Services, by satisfying their demands and helping an institution or even a child they would have recommended. The deputies, in turn, considering these services as an

efficient tool of political propaganda would become extremely reluctant to abolish the source of these services, namely the ODS. In sum, the DSS functions as the "supporting" department of the ODS.

Pushed to the extreme this process has led to a confusion between the means and ends of the ODS. If it aims at promoting socio-economic development in the rural areas then it should reinforce its meagre potentials by pumping more resources into the Rural Development Service. If instead it looks at development through charity and welfare then it should reconsider its initial objectives and modify the text of the law that created it. This is yet another instance where the ODS had to adapt some of its initial rational and secular objectives to the communal and parochial realities of a confessional and pluralistic society. In more crude terms, the ODS must have realized that if it is to justify its existence, it must redefine or extend its professed interest in socio-economic development to incorporate a larger concern in charitable and benevolent services.

In our meetings with the responsible administrators of the ODS, we felt a consensus of opinion on the necessity of increasing the community development projects (in both size and quantity) because they were characterized as the main activity of the ODS. Especially since the Rural Development Service is, as mentioned earlier the only

governmental unit that undertakes field projects. Neglecting the Rural Development Service therefore, means neglecting community development in the country.

4. The Department of Financial and Administrative Affairs

This department is composed of two services: the service of Administrative Affairs, which is in charge of the employees (their requests, complaints, etc.), and the service of Financial Affairs, which prepares the budget, and manages the cash funds of the ODS. This service is also responsible for the supply of office stationary, furniture, office machines, and maintenance expenses. It also keeps the accounts and the Cashier's Office of the ODS.[63]

5. The Lobby[64]

The Lobby (Diwan) is attached to the General Directorate and is in charge of judicial matters, clerical work, contacts with other administrative units, publications, and public relations.

III. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In summation, originally planned by western planners (the French experts of the IRFED mission) to be a rational

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[63] Decree no. 12960, article 28, p. 7.

[64] Ibid., article no. 29, pp. 7-8

administrative entity performing a definite function, the ODS had to adapt to the traditional peculiarities of the country. This adaptation was grossly pushed to a point where the means of the ODS overshadowed its avowed and codified objectives. The reason for this should not be sought only in the lack of general planning and coordination in the country. More important perhaps, it certainly is a reflection of the tenacity and survival of traditional ties and their relevance in maintaining social order and political stability in the country. There is also a noticeable amount of uncertainty among administrators as to what the government's aims should be which led to the absence of a specialized governmental agency and hence, to the proliferation of agencies which are roughly conceived for the same purposes.

This in turn led to excessive misspendings and formed a vicious circle. Caught in this muddle, the ODS is now modestly trying to react in a more rational manner: new structures are conceived, new ways of cooperation are sought and larger possibilities are envisaged. But as long as a generalized, drastic re-structuring is not initiated the situation will continue to depend on the receptivity and goodwill of scattered individual initiative.

To be perfectly fair, however, we have to mention two attempts by the ODS's Administration aiming at a more

rational modus operandi of its administrative machinery. The first one regards the issue of appointing the social worker in his native village or elsewhere.[65] And the second relates to the choice of the villages in which the ODS plans to operate.

When the Rural Development Service started its operations, the choice of the villages used to be agreed on after consulting the local representatives of the various technical and administrative services.

The main criteria for this choice are:[66]

1. socio-economic deficencies;
2. natural and human homogeneity;
3. geographic balance among the various regions of the country; and
4. the receptivity of the local population.

After the choice was made, the region was declared a "zone under study," and a team of two or three social workers was sent on the spot. This preparatory period normally lasted for a year or two if the local conditions requested its extension. During this period the animateurs had to undertake a thorough socio-economic study of the region;[67] establish close contact with the greatest possible

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[65] This issue has been analyzed in Chapter II.

[66] M. Georr, Director - Rural Development Service, ODS. "Le Service de Développement Rural. Rôle, Moyens, Réalisations," an article in Les Actes du 2ème Séminaire sur le Développement Rural dans les Pays du Bassin Méditerranéen.

[67] It is a study on housing conditions; demographic variable; sources of income; quality of available infrastructure; etc.

number of people in order to discover the most valuable individuals; and elaborate the main lines of a regional development plan in conjunction with the representatives of the related ministries.

This system, however proved to be extremely costly for the Rural Development Service and was consequently abandoned in favor of a "sectoral system" which was in turn abandoned. The "sectoral system" consisted of deciding which agricultural sector was to be favored each year, and work in the regions that belonged to the sector.[68]

The sector was chosen in coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture and in accordance with the overall agricultural policy of the Government (when the policy was available). This system was abandoned because it left out of the ODS's range a large surface of territory, and was hence considered an unfair solution.

The third alternative was that the animateurs themselves would choose the villages (within the region they are appointed to) and start a number of small non-economic projects[69] in them, in order to gain the sympathy

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[68] e.g. if olives were the chosen sector, then the ODS would operate in Koura, Choueifat, and the South region for example. If the next year oranges were the chosen sector then the regions that grow oranges would be the field of the ODS's operations.

[69] i.e. projects with no returns e.g. building a fence to the cemetery, or buying a new bell to the village church, or even building a mosk or a church in the village, etc.

of the villagers, and obtain their cooperation on future and more substantial projects. This proved to be an efficient practice and is still followed at present, though more reluctantly, by the Rural Development Service.

The procedure now is to rely on the social worker's recommendations since the whole country is covered by the new disposition of the Noyaux de Développement Ruraux.[70]

In spite of these rational practices, however, direct interferences of high officials in the choice of the villages have never ceased.[71] This has often led to dramatic failures because of lack of preparation and haste in execution.

An example of such a failure has been the subject of a case study undertaken in the following chapter on the village of 'Azki.[72]

We have also tried in Chapter IV to describe the operational strategy of the ODS by choosing another similar project in a different village, Kfarhatta, where the ODS's efforts have been successful.

The aim of these two case studies is to show the

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[70] See Chapter II.

[71] A former Minister of Work and Social Affairs who was originally from South Lebanon, even refused to agree on the budget of the ODS if, at least 50% of it was not devoted to the South.

[72] Chapter IV.

general spectrum of operations of the ODS, as well as the various stages through which the project passes from being an embryonic idea to the final touch it receives.

CHAPTER IV: The ODS in the Field

What has been the impact of this particular administrative set-up, with its ambiguous perspective and often confusing and overlapping functions, on the operations of the ODS in specific field projects? Have the field operations of the ODS - both in their choice of specific projects and their location - been honest to its professed objectives? Have they complied with, or departed from, some of the underlying principles of regional planning and community development identified earlier? Can the success or failure of specific projects be a reflection of such considerations?

It is the intention of this chapter to explore these and related questions in an effort to shed more light on the nature and operational network of the ODS as an agency for regional planning and development.

I. VILLAGE PROJECTS: SCOPE AND PROCEDURE

A comparative analysis of the types of projects realized by the ODS in the various regions of Lebanon would have reflected the specific needs of these regions had the policy for choosing projects been a uniform one. However, since as mentioned earlier, the choice of both

the region and the project is often subject to external influences, such an analysis is only useful in as much as it allows us to determine the regional allocation frequencies by type of project.

Accordingly, the economic projects seem to be the most favoured type of project.[1] There is also a substantial number of projects concerned with providing the community with the basic equipment it lacks.[2]

If the time element is introduced in the analysis, it is noticed that 73% of the total number of projects (507) realized between 1967 and 1970 have been implemented in 1967 and 1968 (374). In fact, a total of 180 projects have been initiated in 1967, 194 in 1968, but 71 only in 1969 and 62 in 1970. There were no projects at all in 1971. The reason for this is the drastic budget squeeze imposed on the ODS as a result of the new régime's policy vis-à-vis the autonomous agencies.

Nevertheless, in spite of this squeeze the Rural Development Service of the ODS has initiated over 900 projects in less than ten years of operations, 507 of which have been implemented between 1967 and 1970. The breakdown

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[1]Economic projects include: agricultural roads, formation of cooperatives, improvement of agricultural production and revenues (e.g. by building reservoirs, concrete vineries, irrigation canals, etc...)

[2]Basic equipment projects include: cesspools, sanitary equipment, and the building of an infrastructure (e.g. drinking water and electricity networks, roads, etc...)

of the latter is shown in the following table:

PROJECTS REALIZED BY THE RURAL DEVELOPMENT SERVICE OF THE ODS BETWEEN 1967 AND 1970

TYPE OF PROJECT	MOHAFAZATS															
	NORTH				SOUTH				BEKA'				MOUNT LEBANON			
	1967	1968	1969	1970	1967	1968	1969	1970	1967	1968	1969	1970	1967	1968	1969	
RURAL ECONOMY	18	14	3	6	15	20	9	14	20	22	9	5	15	26	13	
BASIC EQUIPMENT	17	23	8	4	26	15	3	6	15	12	6	1	23	19	10	
LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS														1		
PREPARATION & TRAINING	10	9	1	-	2	5	-	-	3	8	-	3	2	6	-	
YOUTH	1	3	3	2	1	2	-	1	3	2	2	2	1	3	2	
FESTIVALS	5	3	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	1	-	-	2	-	-	
YEARLY TOTAL	51	52	15	12	45	43	13	22	41	45	17	11	43	54	26	

TOTAL PROJECTS BY MOHAFAZAT AND SECTOR

MOHAFAZAT	RURAL ECONOMY	BASIC EQUIPMENT	LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS	PREPARATION & TRAINING	YOUTH	FESTIVALS	TOTAL BY MOHAFAZAT
MOUNT LEBANON	62	58	1	8	9	2	140
NORTH LEBANON	41	52	-	20	9	8	130
SOUTH LEBANON	58	50	-	7	4	4	123
BEKA'	56	34	-	14	9	1	114
TOTAL BY SECTOR	217	194	1	49	31	15	507

Source: RDS statistics.

As can be seen, the most favored region is Mount Lebanon with 27% of the total number of projects. If we were to adopt an equitable distribution scheme, the share of each region should amount to 25% of the total.[3] Hence, Mount Lebanon with 27% is within a tolerable margin of fluctuation. However, the anomaly is that it has acquired its extra 2% at the expense of the mohafazats of South Lebanon and the Beka', which are less developed regions according to the classification established by IRFED.[4]

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[3]Since the ODS operates in 4 Mohafazats.

[4]The IRFED report, Le Liban Face à son Développement, (Présentation condensée de la première étude IRFED 1960-1961), (Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique), 1963.

Therefore, although the percentage difference is small (3%) the gap between Mount Lebanon and the South becomes substantial when thought of in terms of absolute amounts (17 projects) and their cumulative side effects on the communities and the region as a whole.

[redacted]

An additional note at this point relates to the creation of local organizations and institutions in the communities where the ODS operates. More specifically, according to the statistical data of the Rural Development Service, only one single organization has been sponsored by the ODS in four years (1967 to 1970).[5] A meagre result for an organization which aims at "structuring the local communities."

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[5]This is also related to the failure of the ODS in implementing the Social Animation Committees and Social Coordination Committees respectively at the village and regional level, as initially planned (refer to Chapter II for a more extensive analysis of this issue).

The main cause of all these structural deficiencies is the lack of overall national planning and its direct consequence namely, the acute vulnerability which characterizes the ODS and opens the way for external pressures of all sorts.

It is that same lack of national planning that has led the ODS to adopt a strategy of micro-operations. In other words, the development process is seen as separate, small projects in individual villages, coordinated at the regional level by the Rural Development Service. This "partial development" could be efficient, in the economic sense, only if seen as part of general development policy, as it was initially meant to be.

In effect, great diseconomies have resulted from the lack of well-defined overall planning for the various administrations. An agricultural road constructed by the ODS, for instance, becomes obsolete in less than three years[6] if the Ministry of Public Works decides to extend the local road to the area that the previous road reached. Ditches will later be dug into the new road by the telephone services and probably left open a long time before the Ministry of Public Works decides to re-asphalt the ditches. The same process will be followed by the

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[6]This is the usual period of time used by the ODS's social workers for their local development plans.

electricity service, the municipality (when it extends the sewage systems), and the water company, at different periods of time, forcing the Ministry of Public Works to re-asphalt the ditches until it deteriorates so much that the Ministry decides to re-asphalt the entire road. This chaotic spending is due to the absence of prior consultation and coordination among the related administrations regarding their projects in the same region.

As it is, therefore, this "partial development" should not be evaluated in economic terms. It should be thought of more as a contribution to the social awakening of the population than as a measure of economic development. In spite of the fact that in their preliminary propositions the social workers invariably insist on the economic benefits of the projects they offer, it is thought that these projects are but a means to gain the confidence of the local community. Hence, although deprived of economic interest, the "micro-project" becomes the link between the local population and the Government, and paves the way for future cooperation. In the minds of the people, "l'Etat Gendarme" becomes "l'Etat Providence." This implies that the local population does not trust the social worker until the project is underway. Prior to that, any attempt on the part of the animateur, to gather information about the village is faced with strong reluctance, if not hostility. This poses the

question of the validity of the usual preliminary studies conducted by the social workers, and on the basis of which projects are adopted or rejected. It seems as if people would be inclined to give more reliable information to the animateur, if they understood that he is not a tax collector, or some sort of "secret agent" (a fantasy often conjured up by the peasants)[7] sent by the Government to unveil their modest reality. Taking this into consideration, it would be a better policy to divide the required study into two parts. A first part would be undertaken before the project is launched concerning the general information about the village and its potential receptivity. A second part relating to more detailed information (door to door interviewing, for example) would be done during the realization of the project. This second set of information could be extremely valuable for future and more important projects.

Before we proceed to the presentation and analysis of the two case studies, a brief discussion of the procedure involved in conceiving and undertaking a village project is in order.

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[7]Instances have been reported to me by the villagers, that when the animateur first came to the village, he was thought to be a "spy" (literally) sent by the Government under the coverage of the ODS. This attitude is quite common especially in deprived, isolated villages.

For a project to be approved and initiated, a number of administrative steps have to be invariably followed.

1. The population of a certain village presents to the social worker of the NDR in the area a demand for a project. Another possibility is that the social worker in the region sees a need in the village and thus conducts a preliminary study followed by a proposal for a specific project.[8]
2. The study and the proposal are then sent to the Director General agrees on the project as a whole, he signs what is called a "preliminary agreement." Before signing however, he can decrease the amount of money planned for the project or reject the project altogether.[9] The signature of the "preliminary agreement" is the starting point of the execution process.

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[8]There is also the case of a village imposed on the social worker by higher authorities. 'Azki, our second village study, is a perfect example of the repercussions of such a policy.

This is a significant element which could have serious implications, particularly since the success or failure of a project depends on the scope and extent of local initiative.

[9]Or increase it, but this has only happened in very few instances.

3. A "project committee" is formed of two eminent members of the local population (chosen by the social workers) and the two social workers interested in the project. This committee's function is automatically terminated when the project is completed. In the meantime, it is responsible for the coordination of the work, for signing the various contracts and the bills incurred.[10]

4. A "project file" is prepared, which includes:

   a. A formal application signed by the local population.

   b. A study done by the social worker on the socio-economic benefits of the project.

   c. A technical engineering study conducted by the ODS's engineer evaluating the exact costs of the project.

   d. A contract, signed by the Director General of the ODS as first party, and as a second party one of the members of the project committee on behalf of the local population.

   e. A detailed budget for the project is established and joined to the file. This budget mentions the expenses of both the population and the ODS.

   f. A formal promise to pay the contribution agreed on, is

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[10]The two village representatives on the project committee are unpaid volunteers. The two animateurs are only performing their duties and hence are not compensated.

signed by the people, and its authenticity is certified by the Mokhtar.

g. A card summarizing the general description of the project is filed.

h. A financial statement on the project is elaborated and signed by the director of the Rural Development Service and also attached to the file.

i. An official renouncement of the property offered by the population to the project is signed by all individuals concerned. Its authenticity is certified by the notary public.[11]

j. A final general socio-economic study on the village, is conducted by the social workers and includes information on the social structure of the village, its sources of income, its agriculture production, its demographic characteristics, and its housing conditions.

When the file is complete, it is sent to the director of the Rural Development Service who, in turn, transfers it to the chairman of the Department of

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[11] In the case of an agricultural road, for instance, the individuals who offered parcels of their land on which the road passes, had to sign official renouncements including the number of the parcel, its characteristics, the surface offered, etc.

Village Projects.[12] After that, the file receives a final check in the Office of the Director General and is then sent to the Finance Department in order to freeze the quantity of money necessary for the execution of the project.

As soon as all this is done, the effective work starts in the village.[13] The progress of the work on the project is registered in the minutes of the meetings of the "project committee," and joined to the file. An illustration of this whole procedure and of the operational strategy of the Rural Development Service in general, will be presented in the following two case studies.

II. THE CASE STUDIES

Two similar projects sponsored by the ODS in two different villages of Lebanon have been thoroughly analyzed. The first can be considered as a successful project, while the other is definitely a failure. The purpose of this analysis, is to expose the deficiencies

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[12] The chairman of the Department of Village Projects is, in fact, the only employee in this department. Having to examine alone project files from all over the country, he inevitably retards the beginning of the operations in the village. Two more employees in this department would definitely accelerate the procedure.

[13] It usually takes a month for a file to leave the offices of the ODS after it has been completed. What takes a long time is the preparation of the file and the gathering of the necessary documents.

inherent in the field work system of the Rural Development Service; to determine as much as possible the sources of these deficiencies; and ultimately, to offer a set of alternative remedies. Concomitantly, it is hoped that the reasons for the success and the causes of the failure will become apparent.

This analysis will also be used to illustrate the coexistence of the rational and traditional element in the everyday decisions of the social worker, their conflicting points, and their complementarity.

A brief methodological note is appropriate if only to elucidate the manner and justification for the selection of the two particular projects.

From a total of 320 project files that have been thoroughly studied, a number of conclusions were drawn:[14]

1. The agricultural roads seemed to be the projects that involved the largest number of people in terms of local participation in both money and volunteer labor.
2. The agricultural roads could be considered more as "economic" projects than projects for "social awakening", like youth clubs for instance. As such, their

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[14] We have sampled these files at random from a total of 507, representing the projects undertaken after 1967. We chose however to sample eighty files from each of the four Mohafazat.

relative success or failure can be more accurately determined by means of a set of semi-reliable indicators such as: quantity and cost of fertilizers transported before and after; losses in transportation; costs of plowing by tractor as compared to costs of manual plowing before the road was opened and the tractor could reach the land; average increase of per capita income of the villagers who benefited from the road; etc.

3. The agricultural roads also seemed to engender a whole series of secondary projects, with economic (e.g. irrigation canals), as well as social (e.g. public gardens) implications.

For all of these reasons, the agricultural road was chosen to be the type of project that will be studied. Further study allowed the isolation of two files: Kfarhatta in the caza of Zahrani, Mohafazat of South Lebanon, and 'Azki in the caza of Tripoli, mohafazat of North Lebanon. A preliminary study based on a ten day field trip in each of the villages during the summer of 1971,[15] confirmed the impressions that resulted from the study of the files: Kfarhatta promised to be a successful project and 'Azki represented a failure.

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[15] July 12-22 in 'Azki, and August 2-12 in Kfarhatta.

Two other field trips[16] of one week each allowed the assessment of the true results of the two projects.

KFARHATTA[17]

General information

The village of Kfarhatta is in the caza of Zahrani thirteen kilometers away from Saida on the road to Jbaa. It is four hundred to five hundred and fifty meters above sea level. Built on a hill, its houses slope northward. Most of the village houses were destroyed in the earthquake of 1956, and have been replaced by newly built houses. There are three hundred seventy-one houses in Kfarhatta all equipped with water and electricity. Three hundred and twenty of these houses are made of concrete, thirty of bricks, twenty of blocks of stone, and only one is made of mud. The main street of the village, as well as the internal small streets between the houses, are all asphalted and in good condition.

The village also has a public telephone booth, and seventeen private telephones, an active municipality,

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[16] June 10-17, 1972 in Kfarhatta, and June 25 to July 2, 1972 in 'Azki.

[17] All the data on the village was obtained from interviews with the Municipal Council, school teachers, youth club members, dispensary doctor in the village and in Lebaa (a neighboring village), social workers of the ODS, along with my own personal observations and contacts in the village.


Jba'
A'in en Nasser
Old
Market Place
A'in
Abu Jameh
N
From
Saida
above 450 meters
350.450 meters
new road
houses
school buildings
mosk
village limits

a youth club, and a coed governmental school which employs twenty-eight teachers for over three hundred students. The seventeen classes however, are situated in five different buildings, sometimes as far apart as three hundred meters. This inconvenience is mainly felt by the students and teachers on cold and rainy days.

Kfarhatta is totally deprived of any form of medical care. There is no dentist, no legal nurse or even a midwife. The doctor comes from Lebaa once every fortnight. The closest dispensary is in the village of Krayyeh ten kilometers away. Difficult and serious cases are taken to Saida.

There are 3,000 people in the village, all Muslims of the Chiite sect. Two thousand three hundred are permanent residents; five hundred spend only their summers there, and two hundred have migrated to Saida, Beirut, or the U.S.A. It is worth noting that the percentage of emigrants is low relative to the number of residents. The reason for this is the high percentage of landowners in the village who work their own land. As our study will show, this is a profitable enterprise making Kfarhatta a rather wealthy village.

1. The Economic Sector

Agriculture

The cultivated surface in the village exceeds

5,000 donoum,[18] divided as follows:

Irrigated	Not Irrigated	Forests
2,000 donoums	2,000 donoums	1,000 donoums

The irrigated area is planted with:

Medlar trees	100 donoums
Oranges	100 "
Plum trees	100 "
Pomegranate	50 "
Vegetables	1,650 "

The non-irrigated area, is planted with:

Almond trees	100 donoums
Vines	300 "
Fig trees	100 "
Olive trees	500 "
Grains	1,000 "

Source: The Municipal Council

Oaks and tall bushes grow in the area covered with forests. The publicly owned land[19] is used as two public gardens of two donoums each. An additional donoum

[18] The donoum is equal to 1,000 square meters.
[19] i.e. owned by the municipality.

used to be the old market place, but is now unused.[20]

Agriculture is not sufficiently mechanized in Kfarhatta. Before the new road was built, there was only one tractor in the whole village which could barely reach twenty percent of the cultivated land. Most of the land is formed of small internal parcels that can only be reached by muddy, narrow footways which cannot be used in winter at all. For this reason most of the plowing and tilling was either done by hand or by rented oxen.

Both natural and chemical fertilizers are used by the farmers. They are transported on mule backs to each individual parcel.

The Natural Fertilizers

Type of Culture	No. of farmers using natural fertilizers	% of total
Vegetables	35	31
Grains	30	20
Fruit trees (irrigated)	15	9
Fruit trees (non irrigated)	15	10

Source: The Municipal Council

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[20]The municipality also owns 975 donoums around the village out of which 500 donoums are arable.

The Chemical Fertilizers

Type of Fertilizer	No. of farmers using chemical fertilizers
Nitrate of Ammonia	35
Sulfonitrate	30

Source: The ODS's social workers.

Parasitic diseases of the cultures are strongly fought by all sorts of appropriate measures in most cases.

Types of disease	No. of farmers using chemicals
Olive fly	35
Red Spider effect on oranges	30
Mildew	15
Almond wasp	15

Source: The ODS's social workers and personal contacts.

Land Ownership

As far as land ownership is concerned, it is divided in the following way:

No. of Absentee landlords	Surface owned (donoums)	
	irrigated	not irrigated
6	110	90

Source: The Mokhtar and the Municipal Council

Resident Landowners

Surface owned (donoums)	No. of landowners
Less than 5	100
From 5 to 10	200
From 10 to 25	25
From 25 to 50	5
From 50 to 100	5

Source: The Mokhtar and the Municipal Council

Hence, 89.7% of the owners are small landowners, who own less than ten donoums. These surfaces are irrigated by the local source which covers approximately 2,000 donoums of land.

Animal Husbandry

Animal husbandry, is also an important activity in Kfarhatta. As can be seen from the following table, it is done (except in the case of goat raising) more for familial usage than for commercial purposes.

	Number of				
	Sheep	Goats	Milk cows	Plowing cows	Chickens
Familial usage	300	10	20	25	200
Commercial usage	100	100	5	20	-

Source: Municipal Council

Professional activities

Income in Kfarhatta is derived from five main sources: Agriculture - 350,000 LL; Employment - 300,000 LL; Commerce - 80,000 LL; Handicrafts - 60,000 LL; and Services - 85,000 LL.[21]

The professional activities are divided in the following way:

Type of activity	Number
Agriculture	95
Garbage collector and public cleaners	39
Mason	25
Army	6
Police	30
Teachers	17
Services (employees in banks, hotels, etc.)	15
Grocer	12
Butcher	33
Driver	20
Carpenter	1
Barber	3
Unemployed	50 (these people are all physically able to work)
Dressmaker	25

Source: Youth Club members

[21] Source: Youth Club members and Municipal Council

2. Education

As stated above, the governmental school houses three hundred coed students, and employs twenty-eight teachers. But the illiteracy rates in Kfarhatta are extremely high among old (over 60) people (98%) especially women (100%).[22]

The present educational situation is described by the table below:

Academic Level	University		Technical		Secondary		Primary		Elementary	
Sex	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F	M	F
Number	10	3	5	1	25	15	75	25	200	200
Total	13		6		40		100		400	

* The Elementary cycle is ended by the "certificat" degree, the primary cycle by the "brevet," and the Secondary by the "Baccalaureate Parts I and II."

Source: The school teachers and the youth club members.

As can be noticed the level of education and the number of girls are negatively correlated. The contrary would have been surprising. It is a general phenomenon of rural, less-developed areas to neglect the education of girls. This tendency is now fading out with the greater

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[22] Source: Youth Club members.

emancipation of the woman in the village. Nevertheless, the direction of the causation is still obscure and would be worth exploring: is the woman getting better education because she is more emancipated, or is her emancipation a result of better education?

3. Housing

As mentioned earlier, all of Kfarhatta's three hundred and seventy-one houses are equipped with electricity, drinking water and cesspools. Ninety-five percent are inhabited by their owners, and only five percent are leased.

The density is higher in the southern part of the village where the school is located. The houses are mostly situated on both sides of the main road. However, one quarter inside the village behind the old market place is also densely populated (though to a lesser extent).

In spite of the average cleanliness of the main streets (all equipped with neon lights), there are a lot of flies and mosquitoes due to the existence of stables (for cows, sheep, and mules) built between the dwellings.

4. The social aspect

Like most small Lebanese villages, Kfarhatta's social structure continues to be characterized by traditional norms and patterns of behavior. People have retained strong attachments to usages and habits of the

past. This conservatism is apparent in every aspect of their social life: in their behavior vis-à-vis their wives and daughters; in their generous hospitality; and especially in their political views.

In spite of the existence of two distinct clans in the village, there is no serious political confrontation. Moreover, if an important issue is raised e.g. the ODS's project, the two groups will closely cooperate for the general welfare of the village, forgetting their rivalries. This trait is essential to all community development work, especially since it is rare to find in Lebanon a village like Kfarhatta where politics is only second to general welfare. Does this imply that political conservatism, and lack of a reactionary groups are beneficial to the development process? This issue is undoubtedly worthy of further exploration.

The pattern of influence is a simple two-group division: the influential people (the Mokhtar, School Director, Sheikh of the village, the members of the Municipal Council) and the rest of the population. It is worth noting that the Mokhtar's son is also the director of the governmental school and a member of the municipal council. This shows the existence of a small clique which monopolizes certain functions in the village. However, the rest of the people do not seem to be bothered at all by this situation. This is mainly due to the fact that the people

in charge are extremely valuable people, and they have done a great deal to the village.

The youth club members also represent an active group of people who are concerned about the improvement of the village. They are enthusiastic followers of each and every plan that helps the village raise its standard of living. Most of these members are under thirty, and all are educated.

The presence of such dynamic elements is a necessary and vital condition for the success of development projects. For no matter how much capital is poured into an apathetic society, it does not replace the resourcefulness of the human element; the catalyst of the whole process.

This was soon realized by the ODS's social workers, and stirred their enthusiasm for a collaboration with Kfarhatta's population on a project. Consequently, they have personally felt their efficiency increasing.[23]

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[23]This raises an issue of importance regarding the social workers' support for a project. There is a tendency among the ODS's social workers to underrate a village economically, and hence, describe it to their superiors, as being more needy than it really is in order to obtain the necessary agreements to start a project. They do this because they feel that the local population is receptive, and that as a result, the probability of the project succeeding is higher. The reason for this became self-evident when we realized that they are judged by their administrative superiors on the number of successful projects they have contributed in creating. The logical thing to do then, was to operate in villages where a fair guarantee of success exists. This constitutes a drastic change in the whole philosophy of community development. Further investigations, however, showed the source of this malfunction to lie in the higher spheres of the Administration and not in the ODS.

However, their excitement led to an over-estimation of the benefits of the project, as well as to a slight exaggeration in their description of the poverty of the village. Nevertheless, these facts are not substantial enough to endanger the reliability of their study, and it was not deemed necessary to report them here. Suffice it to say, that we have relied on personal investigation in assessing the benefits of the project and in gathering the aforementioned facts about the village.

THE PROJECT

As can be understood from the village study just reported, and as can be even more clearly felt from the animateur's study, Kfarhatta has great problems in transporting its agricultural produce to the distribution centers. This, as mentioned earlier, is mainly due to the fact that the cultivated parcels are away from all accessible roads. In fact, they can only be reached by narrow, muddy footways. During the rainy season, it is impossible to walk on them. Even mules or donkeys cannot be risked there since the steep slope (30° in certain places) becomes very slippery. Furthermore, transportation of fertilizers and tools to the land and produce from the land was always a dangerous enterprise. The fear of the animal falling and damaging the contents was present at all times. The losses thus endured were substantial and they augmented with the increase in the total production

of the village. This production is now divided as follows:

Type of production	Quantity	Unit
Medlars	10,000	Cases (1 case = 6 to 7 kgs).
Almonds	10	Tons
Grapes	10	"
Olives	10	"
Oranges	30	"
Plums	15	"
Figs	5	"
Pomegranates	5	"
Walnuts	2	"
Potatoes	2	"
Tomatoes	5	"
Parsley	2	"
Radishes, cabbages, mint	2	"

Source: The Municipal Council.

According to the social workers' study, more than 50% of the income derived from agriculture went for transportation expenses. Though slightly inflated, this figure was not far from reality. In effect, there would be a definite amelioration in the revenues of the villagers if transportation costs were decreased. They would further increase their incomes if they replaced the costly, traditional ways of cultivation with the more

economical and efficient mechanized systems. However, it was impossible for tractors and trucks to reach the cultivated land through sixty centimeters of wide, muddy, roads. Constructing an agricultural road, therefore, imposed itself as a necessity.

Three different projects pertaining to roads were envisaged. The first one would link the old market place to the source of Abu Jameh. Its length is 1500 meters. The second one would link the old market place to Tartak. Its approximated length is 1200 meters. The last one would link the road to Jbaa to the source of Delbet Ain en-Nasser - a distance of 750 meters.

The social workers recommended the first project, but the engineering study showed it to be the most expensive of the three projects to accomplish. Finally, the Tartak road was opted for. The official explanation for this choice was that Tartak would directly help a greater number of small landowners than Abu Jameh. This is true if we consider that the parcels of land added up to a total of 12,000 LL divided in the following way:

- The Municipality paid 5,000 LL cash
- The population collected and paid 3,000 LL cash[24] and gave stones from people's land and offered volunteer

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[24] 2,000 LL of this figure were used as expropriation payments to people who had to give the pieces of land on which the road was to pass.

labor adding up to a total value of 4,000 LL.[25]

Effective work started on June 15, 1971 and was reinforced by the volunteer work camp that the ODS sponsored in the village. This work camp grouped forty young people (mainly French) who worked for four hours everyday on the project, from July 14 to August 31, 1971.

A contractor was entrusted to open the road, but he was not efficient and created a number of problems for the social workers and the villagers. However, being the cousin of the director of the Social Services department at the ODS he had to be handled "diplomatically." The other part of the project (building the walls on both sides of the road), was entrusted to another contractor after a heated controversy that lasted for more than a month[26] delaying further the termination of the project.

Apart from the few problems created by the contractor, there was only one crisis causing an incident during the whole time the work lasted. By mistake, the bulldozer driver broke two full-grown medlar-trees from one of the parcels. The owner of the parcel vehemently protested, and the tension built up against the contractor's workers.

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[25]On the average, over thirty people were permanently working on the project until its termination. Most of these were the youth club members.

[26]The people in the village insisted on entrusting the project to some other contractor.

Because of this tension, the controversy degenerated into a fight between the villagers and the workers. It took the mediating parties two days to reconcile the antagonists. As a result, the work stopped for two days.

RESULTS AND EVALUATION

The road was finished in September 1971[27] and has been used all winter. It is 880 meters long, and 300 donoums of land all planted with fruit trees (mainly medlars) profit from it directly. The direct benefit thus goes to seventy-eight families. However, it satisfies the entire village because it is now used as the promenade area on free days since it has become a very pleasant road to walk on, especially on the southern end where the river runs.

Over one hundred meters of walls three meters high have already been built. At two places the road is sufficiently large for a truck to make a full turn.

The direct economic benefit of Tartak can already be roughly assessed. The yearly production (over 200 tons) of fruits and vegetables used to be transported on mules and donkeys from the land to the village. The

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[27] Some of the side walls are not finished yet. The reason for this delay, is the slowness of the villagers who promised to build the walls for their land and have not yet done so. But the unfinished part does not exceed 15% of the total length of the walls.

transportation cost was 25 p.l. per case. In other words, for the transportation of the medlar production alone more than 1,500 LL were paid by the medlar growers. This is not mentioning the numerous accidents that resulted from a mule slipping and damaging its contents or the impassability of the road because of the mud.

All these expenses are nonexistent now that the truck reaches the land and transports the produce safely, from its very origin to the distribution centers. Moreover, six thousand sacks of fertilizer used to be transported every year. The cost of transporting these sacks on mule backs from the village to the land was 50 p.l. per sack which represented a total cost of 3,000 LL.

Between January and April of this year, six thousand five hundred sacks of ten kilograms of fertilizers have reached the cultivated area itself at the same price paid to reach the village prior to the construction of the road. i.e. a direct saving of 3,250 LL, or on the average $\frac{3,250}{78}$ = 42 LL per family on fertilizer transportation alone.

As mentioned earlier, prior to the construction of the road, the tractor could not reach the land. Plowing was then done by oxen. The cost of plowing one donoum using oxen is 20 LL while the tractor plows the same surface for 5 LL and in less than 10% of the time needed by the oxen.

Four hundred donoums are now accessible to the tractor. This means that the cost of plowing this surface is now 2,000 LL instead of the 8,000 LL it used to be. i.e. a net gain of 6,000 LL or on the average $\frac{6,000}{78}$ = 77 LL. per family not mentioning the amount of time gained which can be used in other productive projects like cattle raising or bee-raising.

On the whole, therefore, the agricultural road of Tartak, in Kfarhatta, can be considered a very successful project. From the economic viewpoint, it has already yielded a few tangible results, and is likely to yield a lot more as mechanization increases and as the resources are used more optimally.

The sociological impact of such projects is harder to determine because of the lack of substantial research, an activity that, given the scope of our study, we could not afford to undertake. Nevertheless, it is apparent now that a local group of people have shown a potential for efficiently supporting responsibilities regarding their village. More importantly, suggestions for specific projects aiming at the betterment of the village are now emerging from the population itself in the form of detailed applications presented to the ODS's workers. This paves the way for future successful realizations on the path to development.

Another aspect of this success is the enthusiasm

with which general discussions about the needs of the village are conducted. In effect, everybody was ready to contribute in time, labor, and money - as much as could be afforded - for the improvement of the local standard of living.

If the objectives of the ODS are to make the Lebanese peasant attached to his land and revive his interest in his village by helping him increase his revenues, then, it can safely be inferred that this objective has been attained in Kfarhatta.

This success will also be evaluated, at a later stage, in terms of key factors of development such as the scope of participation and local initiative, the degree of self-help, the emergence of local leadership, the extent and form of organization, and the proportion of re-investment in further development projects.

'AZKI[1]

General Information

The village of 'Azki is in the caza of Tripoli, (Mohafazat of North Lebanon) seventeen kilometers away from Tripoli on the road to Menniyeh. It is three hundred and ten meters above sea level, and is administratively linked to Syr Denniyeh. The village is built on the side of a valley, and the land in the valley is mostly owned by the villagers themselves. There is no way to go down to the valley and hence to reach the parcels except through a narrow, dangerously inclined footway.

In the past twenty years, 'Azki has liberated itself from the tutelage of feudal rule. In effect until 1950 the whole village was the property of one man. The villagers used to work on his land and be paid with produce as was the custom. The main activity in the village was the keeping of silk worms[29] and hence the growing of raspberry trees which the silk worms feed on.

When the wave of changes in agricultural cultures moved over Lebanon, 'Azki was included and its inhabi-

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[28]The data on 'Azki was mainly obtained from the social workers' study and from contacts with one of the members of the project committee. Personnel contacts with the villagers and responsibles such as those realized in Kfarhatta, proved to be unsuccessful and sterile because of the hostility of the people towards the ODS and its social workers.

[29]This was the favorite activity in all Lebanese villages in the past.


Hay ed_Dai'a
Hay Rass el_Wadi
Hay es_Sultani
Heelan
N
Towards
Tripoli
above 300 meters
village limits
below 250 meters
houses
new road

tants started growing apricots, peaches, apples, oranges, and vegetables of various kinds. This allowed them to increase their revenues and since land was cheap at that time, they started buying the land their ancestors had been working on for years from the heirs of the former owner of the entire village.

Nevertheless, the land production is no longer sufficient to meet the increasing needs of a population which doubled in less than thirty years due to birth rate and to a drastic decrease in both infant mortality rates, and mortality rates. Moreover, the growing importance of education and the wider contacts with the city led to the search for new sources of income in Tripoli. Leaving 'Azki, the young people "went down" to Tripoli to work in commerce, tile and wood manufacturing.

Some families migrated permanently to Tripoli while others remained in contact with the village to which they return in summer. Still a third group lives in 'Azki and commutes daily back and forth to Tripoli.

'Azki's population is composed of three hundred ninety-one permanent residents distributed among fifty-eight families (which in fact are all relatives) and of one hundred ninety-six newcomers who form twenty-eight families. These emigrants belong to a nomadic tribe which used to move continually in the region. A few years ago they settled in the northern part of the

village, built houses and started working their land.

In summer seventy-three persons (13 families), who usually live in Tripoli, go up to 'Azki to spend the summer. Most of these families own houses and land in the village. A total of two hundred and eighty-four people have migrated from the village.

1. The Economic Sector

Agriculture

The cultivated surface in the village is approximately 913 donoums of which only 303 donoums are irrigated. The whole surface is planted with apricots, peaches, apples, pears, oranges, and plums. The land was irrigated by the source of Syr - twelve kilometers away. Agriculture was not sufficiently mechanized in 'Azki. Over 90% of the land was plowed and tilled by hand or by rented oxen.

Most of the peasants in the village use chemical fertilizers and all use natural fertilizers.[30] A total of 3,000 sacks of fertilizers are used each year in the village. These sacks were transported on mule backs from the village to the parcels down in the valley. The same procedure was used to transport 'Azki's agricultural production (25,000 cases of fruits)[31] to the village.

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[30] We were unable to obtain precise information on the types of chemical fertilizers.

[31] Source: the social worker's study.

Land Ownership

One hundred eighty out of the total three hundred and three irrigated donoums belong to the people in the village. The rest is worked on 25% partnership basis for the worker and 75% for the owner.

Only one hundred sixty-three out of the total of six hundred and ten non-irrigated donoums belong to the villagers. The rest is rented from absentee owners. Hence, over 62% of the land is owned by absentee owners.

Animal Husbandry

The fact that the entire agriculture produce of the village was transported on mule backs and donkeys revived the interest of the villagers in animal raising activities. However, there is also in 'Azki an inclination for cattle raising especially milk cows. There are now over sixty-three milk cows (out of which fourteen are big Deutsche ones) and forty-seven calves in the village.

Professional activities

The professional activities in 'Azki are divided in the following way:

Type of activity	Number
Crafts (carpenters, masons, electricians, etc.)	33
Agricultural workers	19
Farmers (working own land)	19
Employees (in Tripoli's municipality; Iraqian Petroleum Company; in the sugar factory; wood factory)	26
Farmers (own oxen and work in 'Azki and in neighboring villages)	5
Drivers	3
Merchants (1 grocer, 1 owner of a textile shop)	2
Police	1
Army	1

Source: The social workers' study.

2. Education[32]

'Azki's governmental elementary school was founded in 1960. It is now composed of two rooms that house seventy-three students (forty boys and twenty-three girls). There are two teachers in the school (one woman).

Sixteen students (fourteen boys and two girls) go to the primary school in the neighboring village of Tleelan, and ten others (all boys) go to the secondary

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[32] Source: the social workers' study.

school in Tripoli.

Illiteracy rates are very high in the village (96%) especially among the elderly (98%) and women (100%). It is still considered useless and even improper to send the girls to school. However, because the new teacher is a woman, more girls are now sent to school.

It is worth mentioning that before the school was built, the "sheikh" and his wife used to run a small "Kuttab"[33] where they would teach the young and adults how to read.

3. Housing

Until 1955 all of 'Azki's houses were mud houses. There was not one single concrete house in the whole village. Moreover, the villagers used to keep their cattle (cows, mules, and donkeys) inside the one room and house in which they themselves lived.

With time, stables were built between the houses and new concrete dwellings replaced the old ones. However, there are still twenty-eight mud houses, twelve of which are still occupied by both cattle and people. There are also twenty-six concrete houses.

Eighty-one percent of 'Azki's houses have no sanitary facilities whatsoever and ninety percent have

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[33]The Kuttab is a one class school conducted by the sheikh where the children learn to read.

no separate kitchen. None of the houses have drinking water. The only source in the village being "Ayn es-safl", all the villagers have to carry water to their homes on mule backs.

'Azki is divided into three main quarters: Hay ed-Dai'a, Hay es-Sultani, and Hay Rass el-Wadi. Each of these "Hays" is a cluster of fifteen to twenty houses built rather close to each other in the case of Hay ed-Dai'a, far from each other in the case of Hay es-Sultani, and scattered in the case of Hay Rass el-Wadi. Density is highest in Hay el-Dai'a. The "Hays" are separated from each other by rather large surfaces of land.

Only the houses in Hay ed-Dai'a have electricity. The network is installed in the houses of Hay es-Sultani, but the current has not reached there yet; and there is not even a network of wires in Hay Rass el-Wadi. There are no street lights at all, except on the main road which leads to Tripoli.

Type of Housing	Number	Presence of cattle in house	% of total	Housing Conditions: No bathroom	% of total	No kitchen	% of total	One room	% of total	Two rooms	% of total	Three rooms	% of total	Four rooms	% of total
Mud	28	12	22	28	52	28	52	26	48	2	3	0	0	0	0
Concrete	26	0	0	16	29	21	38	16	29	5	9	2	3	3	5
Total	54	12	22	44	81	49	90	42	77	7	12	2	3	3	5

Source: Personal Observation.

4. The Social Aspect

'Azki is an extremely traditionalistic village. Being a 100% Sunnite community, the village is very conservative in terms of Islamic habits and modes of behavior.

Strong political factions split the village into two antagonistic clans. The conflict is stirred further by internal familial clashes. Due to political and familial antagonism, and also because of the excessive conservatism in the village, all communal structures were prevented from emerging. There is no municipality in 'Azki, no youth club, and no local institution of any sort.

In 1968-69 the village youth started to plan for a cultural and social club in 'Azki, but were prevented by their parents. Also they had to face the strong opposition of the village elder and influential people who for once agreed on an issue.

This lack of social institutions made 'Azki a very difficult field to operate in for the ODS's social workers.

The Project

The whole process started after the insistance from the "higher spheres" of the Administration to impose on the ODS's top executives a project in the region of Syr-Denniyeh. The top executives, under pressure, forced the NDR's social workers to create a project within four

months anywhere in the region of Syr-Denniyeh.

The social worker, with the pseudonym I.A., who has close relatives in 'Azki, was responsible for the project. He was operating under the assumption that although the villagers had not been prepared[34] for a development project, this fact he thought, could be compensated for by his personal close relationships with the villagers. Moreover, since 'Azki was practically in need of everything, any project would be justified.

After a series of laborious debates with the local population, it was decided to build an agricultural road in the valley. This road would link all the small unreachable parcels of land to the main asphalted road.[35]

The project was the subject of a work camp but work started before[36] the camp was actually put in place. What helped the early start of the operations was that no engineering study was necessary because the Ministry of Public Works had already done a study in 1953. Apparently a decree was even published[37] at this time and a contractor hired, but the local population created so many problems that the contractor himself renounced the project.[38]

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[34] The usual preparation period is one year.

[35] See map.

[36] July 9, 1971.

[37] We were unable to secure this decree.

[38] A "Khouwweh" or special tax was imposed on the contractor by the local gang of racketeers who menaced him by stealing the materials and threatening to beat up the workers and blow up the road if he did not pay.

Therefore, as far back as 1953 expropriation plans were set and all the blueprints were ready. The ODS, however, slightly shifted the direction of the road in order to avoid building on privately owned land and hence be forced to pay for expropriation rights. This shift increased the costs because instead of passing in the middle of plain land, the road passed on rocks and mountainous inclinations.

The final agreement stipulated that an agricultural road 2,500 meters long and irrigation canals 150 meters long were to be built. 'Azki's participation was estimated at 25,000 LL while the ODS was to pay the remaining two-thirds of the total costs, or 50,000 LL. The project, in fact, costs less than 75,000 LL but the remaining amount was used to construct 1,250 meters of internal roads in concrete between the houses.

'Azki's contribution to the project was very hard to obtain. What the population agreed to pay amounted to less than one thousand LL; and even this sum had to be imposed on them by substracting from their wages as laborers on the project. Fifteen hundred LL were paid by people from 'Azki but who did not live there. Out of this amount 1,000 LL was contributed by people who had no direct benefit from the project.

The rest of the contribution was covered by

Plan Vert[39] which sent a bulldozer to open part of the road. The contribution of Plan Vert was estimated at 18,000 LL (i.e. thirty hours of bulldozer work).

Although the feeling persists that the villagers could have easily made the expected contribution they even refused to participate by offering labor and materials from their land. This alone would have amounted to 3,000 LL and 1,000 LL respectively. Because the planners were not obliged to encourage cooperation they put no pressure on the villagers to participate which was an unfortunate misjudgment on the part of the social workers. Any future project in 'Azki is bound to fail since the population has been conditioned to receive full external help. These circumstances conflict with the basic principle of community development, namely, self-help.

The breakdown of contributions to the project is as follows:

Cash

Contributor	Amount in L.L.
Office du Développement Social	50,000
Plan Vert	18,000
Indirect beneficiaries of the Project	1,000
Direct beneficiaries of the Project	500
Total	69,500

[39]This is a very unusual thing. It is only by the interference from the same authorities that imposed a project in 'Azki on the ODS, in conjunction with interference from the local leaders that made Plan Vert send a bulldozer to open part of the road (1,500 meters).

Volunteer labor

Contributor	Value in L.L.
'Azki's population	950

Total: 69,500 + 950 = 70,450 L.L.

Material

Contributor	Nature of Contribution	Value in L.L.
'Azki's population	Rocks	800

Total: 70,450 + 800 = 71,250 L.L.

Source: Joint evaluation study we conducted in conjunction with the ODS's local social workers.

It appears that the total contribution of the population hardly reached four percent of the original estimated cost of the project. Under such conditions community development work becomes socially meaningless even if the project allows for substantial economic success.[40]

All the administrators of the ODS we interviewed admitted this fact. But they justified it by emphasizing the ODS's need for continual support from the same people who are in a position to impose projects like 'Azki. It is as if projects like 'Azki are considered as "Public

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[40]The same kind of support obtained by overallocating money to the Department of Social Services for instance (see Chapter III).

Relations" expenses, incurred to sustain the sympathy of deputies, ministers, and other high officials of the ODS.

The construction of the road itself was a source of numerous problems with the villagers on whose property the road passed. We shall not relate all the incidences that took place because although it would make a colorful story, it would take too long.

Suffice it to mention that three cases in court between the ODS and the village have not been settled yet; and that stealing of materials (sand, rocks, mainly water) used for constructing the road was a daily event. It is also worth mentioning that a police force was asked to protect the workers from the villagers at one time. Also a social worker was beaten by one of the villagers.

As a result of these problems (and of many others we did not mention) a serious conflict arose among the population's representatives on the project committee. This conflict degenerated into an open clash between the dissident factions of the population.

Caught between the two sides the social workers could not interfere because such an intervention would have augmented the proportions of the conflict.[41]

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[41] In order to avoid conflicts at the very start of construction, the social workers decided to start the road at both ends so that the two teams would meet in the middle and thus avoid the complaints of farmers whose land would be left to the end to be reached by the road.

RESULTS AND EVALUATION

In spite of all complications, the road has been completed and can be considered a full economic success since it has allowed a net savings of 11,500 LL per year divided in the following way:

1. the transportation cost on mule backs of 25,000 cases of fruits[42] (at forty piastres per case) to the village is now eliminated since the trucks and trailers can reach the land itself. This amounts to a net savings of 25,000 x 0.40 = 10,000 LL
2. the transportation cost on mule backs of 3,000 sacks of fertilizers (at 50 p.l. per sack) from the village to the land is also abolished since the truck which used to park in the village can now reach each parcel separately and deliver its load. This amounts to a net saving of 3,000 x 0.50 = 1,500 LL.

An indirect benefit of the road is that it has encouraged building activity. In fact, two concrete houses of four rooms each were built on the side of the road even before it was terminated. Two others have been started early in June and should be finished by next summer.[43]

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[42]This is 'Azki's yearly production.

[43]More houses will be built after the entire harvest is sold.

The road itself extends 2,500 meters and is nearly nine meters wide. It has two large spaces for a truck to turn. Eleven hundred-fifty meters of walls (one to two meters high) support it on both sides where the land is above or below the road's level.

In summation, from the economic viewpoint the project is definitely a success, but the ODS has obviously failed to lay the base for the realization of solid social structures to insure the wider support and participation of the village.

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

It would be useful at this point to compare the two projects used as illustrations of the ODS's field work, namely, the Tartak road in Kfarhatta and the road in 'Azki.

We shall establish this comparison on the basis of what the ODS considers as key factors in community development[44] trying to evaluate the extent to which it has taken these factors into account and its resulting success or failure. This evaluation will be geared towards an exploration of the social impact of the projects: how they have affected the growth capacity of the community, and how well the community adapts to change.

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[44] As they have been expressed in its objectives.

The economic dimension will not be explored since both projects can safely be considered as economic successes.

Five indicators will be used in what follows to assess the realizations of the ODS; the emergence of local leadership; the degree of self-help; the extent and form of organization; and the proportion of re-investment in further development projects. These elements are generally considered as key factors in community development since they build the rational structure which will allow the community to adjust its resources to its needs.

Local Initiative

A clear way of measuring and demonstrating local initiative will be to construct a scale of five equal intervals on which both villages will be placed according to the degree of initiative that characterizes their respective population.

At interval 0 will be placed the communities which did not contribute at all to any of the decisions regarding the village. In other words, communities which did participate but did not take part in the discussions.

In interval 1 will be placed the communities which did not contribute as a whole to the decisions regarding the village, but among which one or two separate individuals did participate in debates with social workers. These communities adopt a "neutral" position vis-à-vis

the social workers, i.e. they do not propose projects but approve of anything that the social workers suggest.[45]

In interval 2 will be placed the communities which did not contribute as a whole to the decisions regarding the village, but among which a group of individuals[46] took an active part in discussion meetings with the social workers and suggested some ideas of projects for debate.

In interval 3 will be placed the communities which took part as a whole in the decisions regarding the village (in the form of general assemblies), but who needed to be actively encouraged and "pushed" to do so by the social workers themselves. Such communities being aware of both the felt and basic needs of their village, can differentiate between the two, establish an order of priorities, and suggest projects accordingly.

In the last interval will be placed the "aggressive," mature communities. Such communities meet, make decisions, and act accordingly without any external guidance except for regional coordination purposes.

In order to judge the impact of a project on the community, two scales ought to be constructed. The first

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[45]This is the result of ignorance of the basic needs of the community.

[46]e.g. members of the Youth Club - if one exists in the village in question or if the Municipal Council or any aggregate of concerned active individuals.

one would show the position of the community before the project was launched and the second - after its termination.

Ideally, a third scale could show the position of the community five years after the termination of the project and hence, allow for the effect of the time element on local initiative.[47]

A comparative analysis of the level of local initiative in Kfarhatta and 'Azki, before and after the roads were built is best represented by the following scales:[48]

Before



After



The reasons for the deterioration of the position

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[47] We could not afford to build this third scale because: a) the ODS itself had only nine years of effective service at the time the study was conducted. Consequently, we had to allow at least seven years of "maturation" and b) the old files (before 1967-68) are badly kept and not updated at all, and hence could not be used as a gauge of the initial situation in the villages.

[48] These results are based on the evaluation of the social workers in both villages.

of 'Azki, lies in the series of conflicts we have mentioned earlier which resulted from the project itself.

Kfarhatta's improvement is basically due to the initial receptivity of the population; to the smoothness in the execution of the project; and more importantly, to the long preparation of the village[49] before the implementation of the project. A preparation which was totally lacking in the 'Azki case, and which entailed in the case of Kfarhatta extended informal discussions between the social workers and the villagers about its needs, possibilities, conditions, religious composition, political affiliation,[50] expectations, and readiness for cooperation with the ODS.

Emergence of Local Leadership

The same device used to measure local initiative could be applied in the measurement of the presence of

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[49] More than one year.

[50] The political tendencies of the village are implicitly understood by the social workers in the region. However, other elements such as personal information regarding both clans, their composition, the degree of antagonism between them, etc. are indirectly gathered by means of informal discussions. This knowledge is essential in order to avoid mistakes such as involuntary favoritism and behavior which could be misinterpreted (e.g. visiting the representative from one clan before visiting the other). The correct behavior in this case is either to meet in a public place - such as school - or at the house of a neutral notable - equally respected by both clans.

local leadership in a community, before and after a project is implemented.

In this case interval 0 would mean total absence of any form of leadership in the community.

Interval 1 would be reserved for communities characterized by a proliferation of local leaders with a limited influence on small groups of three to four families.

In interval 2 will be placed the communities which have a small group of local leaders but whose influence on the mass is very limited.

In interval 3 will be placed the communities which have unorganized but influential local leadership with a strong political and/or religious bias.[51]

Communities in interval 4 will be characterized by a perfectly organized and rational leadership with a high degree of influence on the population, which nevertheless remains enlightened enough to check all attempts by the leaders to abuse the authority conferred upon them.[52]

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[51] In such a case, the interference of the political and/or religious authorities that influence the local leaders can be secured by the ODS and hence obtain a more rational and concerted position.

[52] The benefits of promoting the existence of local leadership should always be weighed against the costs incurred by the creation of an irrational, charismatic leadership which might later prove to be uncooperative.

A comparative analysis of the level of local leadership in Kfarhatta and 'Azki, before and after the roads were built, is represented by the following scales:

Before



After



The improvement in Kfarhatta was mainly due to the additional amount of confidence the people in the village placed[53] in the members of the Youth Club, the director of the school and the Mokhtar, after the success-

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[53]These results have been obtained by the short study (Appendix II) we conducted in Kfarhatta and - to a lesser extent - in 'Azki. In Kfarhatta a sample of twenty villagers was chosen, five of which were initially against the project, and the rest had actively contributed to the construction of the road (the proportions - one third in the sample are representative of the social workers' estimation of the total population's position vis-à-vis the project). Eighty-six percent of the respondents said that their confidence in the leaders increased after the completion of the project. Seventy-seven percent of this group (86%) said that their confidence did increase after the project, or in other words, the projects "reinforced their conviction in the people concerned."

ful completion of the project.

In 'Azki the project stirred latent conflicts and widened the existing splits thus contributing to a decrease of the local authority.

Degree of Self-Help

This variable is hard to compute in an accurate manner. At best one can devise a series of more or less reliable indicators such as effective participation in projects; percentage of non-beneficiaries' participation; cash value of volunteer labor per capita as compared to per capita income in the community, etc.

However, the concept of self-help itself cannot be solely measured by rates and percentages of the aforementioned type, since its implications extend beyond this range and include intangible concepts. Self-help is thus also seen as the "readiness," the desire, or even the urge to participate actively in building a better future for the community. Such a concept, therefore, can hardly be measured effectively.

We have chosen to use both the percentage of the work force in the village,[54] which contributed to the

[54]The total work force in the village was defined as the group of people who work in the village (e.g. farmers, agricultural workers, teachers, merchants, etc.). We excluded from this group all the residents who work outside the village. The lists of villagers who contributed to the projects as volunteer laborers, as well as the amount of time contributed by each individual were obtained from the social workers.

project, and the ratio of volunteer labor time (offered by the villagers) to the total labor time required to build the road,[55] as indices of self-help.

In Kfarhatta sixty-eight percent of the total labor force in the village participated in the construction of the road, while less than five percent contributed in 'Azki. Eighty-seven percent of the total labor time required by the road construction in Kfarhatta was offered as volunteer labor, while only ten percent of the total time was offered in 'Azki. Although subject to the aforementioned limitations, these results clearly show that relatively Kfarhatta's level of self-help is far superior to 'Azki's.

This could also be traced back to the lack of preparation in 'Azki, as well as to the excessive reliance of the people in 'Azki, on external authorities (e.g. the unusual help of Plan Vert).

Extent and form of organization

As we have previously mentioned in the short

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[55] The total labor time spent on the project was computed on the basis of both the bills of the paid workers and the lists of the time spent as volunteer labor. Both which were obtained from the social workers.

Note: Bulldozer work hours as well as steam rollers and other machines were considered as one man working hours, since one man usually operates these machines. Thus, if the bulldozer worked for twelve hours, for example, it was computed as one man working twelve hours.

studies on the villages, 'Azki is deprived of all sorts of organizational structures. The ODS's project tried to palliate this deficiency by creating a project-committee. But when the conflicts started, they were soon transposed into the committee itself and caused its dismissal.

Kfarhatta, on the other hand, is a well-structured community. A number of official or semi-official groupings harmoniously cooperate in the village for the general welfare and the improvement of the general standard of living. Moreover, after the project's termination, the project-committee did not discontinue its meetings. Furthermore, it has lately suggested to the Rural Development Service through the social workers in the region a number of new projects for the village.

Proportion of Re-investment in Further Development Projects

The main logic here, is that a community should be as good as a consumer as it is a producer. Hence, the increase of savings that the ODS encourages can only be used as a substantial investment which would yield even larger returns.

Due to the narrow span of time in which we were operating, we were not able to compute the amounts re-invested by the communities of 'Azki and Kfarhatta in further projects, since no such projects have yet been

started.[56]

However, in Kfarhatta we forecast a contribution to the new projects of approximately thirty percent of the total thirty-three percent contribution that the community has to offer.[57] These thirty percent will be solely drawn from the extra returns of the road.

We cannot predict anything for 'Azki, since we felt that the social workers in the region as well as the officials in Beirut are now reluctant to operate in 'Azki.

In conclusion, the field operations of the ODS as represented by the two examples of 'Azki and Kfarhatta, have once more shown the heterogeneity and versatility of field work. It has also shown the need for a general, rational planning scheme independent of all external pressure sources of imbalances and failures (e.g. the 'Azki case).

Such a scheme however, would have to take into account the specific peculiarities of each separate region, and leave enough leeway for the local planner i.e. the

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[56] In Kfarhatta, however, a work camp has started in the beginning of July 1972 working on a new project in conjunction with the villagers.

As far as 'Azki is concerned we do not think that the ODS will operate in the village in the coming three or four years.

[57] As mentioned earlier the ODS pays two thirds of the total expenses of the project and the community covers the remaining third.

social worker, to adapt the rational operations to the traditional givens for an improved local efficiency and more coordinated regional and national realizations.

It is the lack of such planning that opens the way to external interferences and consequently to negative failing and results such as those experienced in 'Azki.

Finally, judging from the quality of the results obtained in Kfarhatta (as compared to 'Azki), and relating these results to our indicators of development, it seems as if the presence of social structures in the village, and the receptivity of the local population are directly correlated to the success of the project.[58] If this holds true, it would definitely pay to prolong the "preparation period" until all the factors of success (receptivity, structuration, etc.) are present.

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[58]Over the three hundred projects studied, two hundred were undertaken in villages which had organized social structures implanted in them and all were successful projects. The success of the remaining one hundred twenty projects was lower on the average. It is worth noting that eighty of the these villages had no structures at all and that the remaining forty had only very loosely organized ones.

Nonetheless, we believe that a more thorough study of this issue could lead to interesting results (such as: highest regional percentage of structured communities; highest regional social impact of a certain type of projects, etc.)

CHAPTER V: Conclusion

It is now apparent that the lack of national and regional planning in Lebanon has forced the ODS to operate on a limited scale. Further, its operations have been restricted to a series of individual initiatives, totally unrelated to an overall scheme of development. This situation, as mentioned earlier, has led in most cases to heavy diseconomies which, in turn, have seriously affected the operational efficiency of the ODS.

The argument used by the ODS's officials to justify the procedure followed by the Office is that in the absence of structured regional and national planning, local planning has at least the advantage of allowing local participation to emerge. But, is there adequate provision for local planning, with participation of those affected in the present scheme?

In effect, local planning requires: (1) a planning mechanism, i.e. somebody must be responsible for doing the actual planning; (2) criteria which are consistent with national planning goals and are understood and accepted by the locality; (3) means of relating planning to execution; and (4) means of relating local planning to planning at the national and regional level.

A planning mechanism which provides for the

participation of those affected will call for some sort of council, board or committee which includes citizen representatives as well as technicians and private as well as public agencies. To be effective, such a mechanism should have as good technical service or advice as can be made available and as much prestige and respect as possible in order that its recommendations may carry weight. On the technical side, this implies that the operating or advisory personnel provided by the community development program be equipped with skills in this area, or has access to this sort of competence in the several agencies serving the community, such as the related ministries, or from some other source such as a university. The planning mechanism should be a continuous one which replans constantly, rather than an ad hoc body such as the present "project-committee" formula the ODS uses, which creates a project and is dissolved with its termination. The continuous planning body is provided for by the law in the form of Social Animation Committees (SAC) at the village level, and Social Coordination Committees (SCC) at the NDR's level. The failure of these committees can be directly related to the relatively little effort the social workers have put so far into the creation of these committees. In fact, although well aware of the necessity of building solid institutional setups in the localities

they operate in,[1] they have been more inclined to realize "tangible" projects which require relatively less time and effort to realize, and on the basis of which their personal efficiency can be more easily evaluated by their superiors. This stems from the fact that the efficiency of the ODS itself is judged by the Government on the basis of the number of "tangible" projects it undertakes, and, consequently, its budget allocation or even its maintenance in office is decided accordingly.

Criteria for local planning involves norms for each type of facility or service (e.g. agricultural roads, schools, cooperatives, etc...). Such a conception usually defines the kind of socio-economic-geographical pattern toward which conscious national efforts are directed and social development is tending. It also involves local and national systems of values, a conception or hypothesis with respect to the development process, and, on the basis of such hypothesis, a strategy for development which includes priorities and timing.

In the Lebanese case, the norms for each type of project, the general conception of socio-economic-geographical pattern of development, and the development strategy have all been deeply affected by the traditional local and

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[1] We have felt this awareness through all the interviews we conducted with the with the social workers.

national system of values and has had to adapt to it at the expense of having to abandon some of the rational considerations that characterized the initial scheme of action. Thus, an amalgamation of rational and traditional elements is bound to raise very fundamental and difficult issues of national policy.

Plainly, action cannot be delayed until all the implicit policy issues have been resolved, but must go forward on provisional and often experimental grounds. This amply justifies granting the ODS's development program larger financial possibilities and broadening its operational scope. However, at the same time, the program should provide for the formulation and reporting of criteria by the local planning bodies and the receipt by them of suggested norms from the central planning agency (i.e. the Ministry of Planning) and/or from agencies responsible for specific services (e.g. the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Education, etc.). Out of such exchange, policy may evolve which can provide criteria with respect to such issues of national-regional-local development.

If local planning is to be a vital factor in development, it must affect action. The planning mechanism should, therefore, include means for inducing operating agencies, such as the related ministries, to act in conformity with local plans. Since local planning bodies

will not, and should not, be set up with supergovernmental authority, while at the same time they should not be powerless bodies to which no one pays attention, conformity with local plans must be secured as a result of participation in the planning process and voluntary acceptance of plans, combined with the exercise of specific authority over strategic aspects by the appropriate authority. Those who have power and authority for execution (i.e. the related ministries) should, thus, be tied into the planning process.

Means to link local with national planning are essential to the overall process of planned national development. There must, ultimately, be some way by which national plans can be broken down regionally and locally, in order that they may be carried out at these levels by the ODS, and serve as guides for regional and national planning. On the other hand, there must be channels through which local plans can reach the region and the center in order to be taken into consideration in the national planning process. without a drastic restructuring of the ODS's Board of Administration which will allow a substantial improvement in the communication flows between the related ministries, the Ministry of Planning and the ODS, this is not likely to take place. Thus, the mechanism set up by the ODS itself (i.e. its Board of Administration) should provide for this multi-way flow.

At the same time there should be means for direct translation of local planning into local action within the framework of the broader planning process. It should be remembered that interest and enthusiasm on the part of the local people is one of the essential, positive factors in community development, while the ability to plan and to proceed systematically toward goals is an important quality to be fostered, this must not be allowed to hamper the development process itself by delaying action until interest has flagged and frustration has increased.

This is where the need for institutional development is mostly felt. In effect, the creation of local organizations and structures will prevent frustration and flagging interests which promises a permanent impact and sets the community on the path of development.

From the point of view of institutional development, the main contribution of the ODS, and the main requirement for the program's success, lies in the creation or strengthening of vital local organizations which can function effectively and responsibly and can constitute a link to the center. So far, the ODS has failed to implement this trend.

However, since one of the avowed objectives of the ODS is to bring about a basic reorientation in the outlook and behavior of people and create the dynamics for development, it is relevant to ask whether the actual

proposed program is sufficient to make a permanent impact. Much wasted efforts have already gone into programs and projects which for one reason or another lacked the force to bring change ('Azki is one example among many). They were too small, or fragmentary, or scattered to have any multiplier effect and were swallowed up by surrounding inertia; they were too short-lived to carry on when the initial enthusiasms had waned; they resulted from the personal qualities and relationship of an individual with no institutional continuity when he was gone.

No firm rules can be offered for judging the sufficiency of time or intensity contemplated by the program, or for specifying the form of necessary follow-up, or for identifying the projects which will "walk by themselves." It would be helpful for the ODS, however, to investigate and justify the proposed time and intensity in terms of the expected impact; to indicate what follow-through is expected on projects or activities initiated by the social workers; what is expected to happen in specific localities if and when the project is terminated there; and what projects or programs are conceived as "seed" projects which would grow from within.

However, it is of the nature of community development that the structure through which it operates be as flexible as it is consistent with responsibility and stability, and that, as mentioned earlier, it grows out of the efforts

of the people to solve their problems, and be functionally related to these efforts. Rigid prescriptions as to composition, functions and procedures should, therefore, be avoided, but technical assistance in the process of organization should be one of the principal services offered by the ODS's staff, and the personnel should be equipped to render such assistance.

Along this line, it becomes extremely important that a program such as the ODS, whose basic objective is to develop initiative and responsible self-direction, should not defeat its own purpose by imposing a straight-jacket through the mechanism of planning and programming. Because of this possible danger, lack of understanding and sometimes conflict might arise between those who are seeking to link community development with national development planning and those who are concerned with the basically educational process involved in developing a responsible, active and productive citizenry.

This conflict can be avoided if in the future the planning schemes in Lebanon acquire a greater rigidity, by building into the program sufficient flexibility to respond to initiatives which arise outside of the priorities established through the planning and programming process.

One way of doing this is by setting aside a special fund to respond to initiatives arising outside of the established priorities. When programmed funds are

allocated to specific regions, technical assistance may be offered to other regions which are aroused to ask for the program's help by the example of their neighbors. This "spill-over effect" is one of the main reasons behind the extension of the Noyaux de Développement Ruraux.

In establishing priorities among areas, the choice frequently presents itself to the ODS as to whether to give priority to those with the greatest readiness, or those which have the greatest need, or those which are administratively most feasible. Both sound planning and need for flexibility dictate to the ODS the inclusion of all three criteria, and the tailoring of programs to the requirements of each. Thus, communities where initiatives have developed should not be passed over in favor of those with greater needs; neither should the needy community be left out because it has not shown initiative.

Projects designed to capitalize on the initiative of the former should be undertaken, while those designed to stimulate the latter and lay the foundation for more ambitious efforts should be launched.

In sum, an accurate and proper evaluation of a community development program such as the ODS's is extremely difficult because the objectives are intangible and also because the most important results will take time to be apparent while the ODS is a relatively new agency.

There is however a tendency to use the concrete

results - kilometers of roads, number of school rooms, etc. - as a basis for evaluating community development programs because they can readily be measured and checked against established time and costs limits. This measure is not only inadequate, but it may also be counter productive (e.g. the 'Azki project).

A second type of measure, the number of manhours of voluntary labor, provides some indication of the extent of popular participation, but unless it is analyzed qualitatively it discloses little relation to the development of responsibility, initiative and new capacities.

If hoped for results in terms of specific behavior are formulated in advance, these can be observed or measured, e.g. proportion of farmers using fertilizer, yield per donoum, etc.

The two intangible areas which should be evaluated, in line with the objectives of the program, are the elements mentioned earlier namely: the development of institutions which can serve as vehicles for popular participation in development, and the evolution of the dynamics for development.

Since these are qualitative, and subject to judgment, the most that can be called for is that these areas be included prominently in periodic evaluation reports and that the social worker in charge of the report be asked to present in full the specific evidence on which he

bases his judgment.

It is particularly important to register successes and failures as they become apparent, and to attempt to analyze the contributing factors systematically, in order to build a body of experience, which can serve as clearer guides than the broad principles which now serve to shape the ODS's development programs and offer the only present basis for their crude evaluation.

In spite of the inadequacy of existing techniques for evaluation, the results of such appraisals as are made should be utilized. Periodic review and replanning of programs should therefore, be provided for, and linked to the procedure for evaluation.

The Administrative Structure of the ODS.

All these factors call for a well adapted administrative setup which can handle this variety of tasks and coordinate them efficiently. Hence, the question raised at this point relates to whether the administrative structure provided for the ODS and described earlier, is sound in theory and realistic in practice.

The administrative aspect is undoubtedly of great importance to the success of any community development program, not only for the reasons which apply to all programs or projects, but because of the inherent complexity implied in the basic concept of community development. An administrative structure and process which applies

both the principle of popular participation and that of integral or joint effort requires features not necessarily found in other administrative systems. The lack of these features might generate serious administrative problems which might have an impact on the general efficiency of development projects. Thus, in the specific case of the Lebanese Administration, problems are arising in the following areas:

1 - Shared responsibility and authority.

Problems are arising in this area because responsibility is shared among related ministries and agencies, but lines of authority are not clear. This has led to costly double functions mentioned earlier. Further, authority is shared in certain areas and, in consequence, nobody assumes sufficient responsibility to carry out the program let alone to plan and conceive regional programs.

This lack of direct responsibility has led to a lack of initiative in the sense that nobody wants to undertake actions which might be disapproved of by the superiors in the hierarchy. Further, responsibility for mistakes and errors that have been committed are invariably thrown up the same line and lost in higher echelons.

2 - Structures or procedures designed to secure collaboration, cooperation or coordination among agencies.

Such structures or procedures (e.g. Technical Committee at the level of the Mohafazat) seem to the participant ministries to threaten their autonomy, invade their jurisdictions, or deflect their efforts and thus interfere with the fulfillment of their basic responsibilities.

In fact structures such as the Technical Committee are too loosely organized and too cumbersome to permit action. Their conception has disregarded established lines and procedures (as stipulated in the laws) and has thus created confusion and resistance.

It is essential therefore, that a new set of laws and decrees related to the planning structure be devised. In this set of laws and decrees gross violation of established procedures or other features almost bound to lead to conflict or resistance on the part of the administrative structure should be avoided. It should also be made clear to the participating ministries and agencies that as far as possible, it is to their advantage to collaborate for the sake of their own program. Lastly, when created, such coordinating bodies should be provided with skilled and sophisticated staff who understand the complexities of these relationships and have the ability to handle them.

In sum, a more rational structure implies some basic changes in the actual one. These changes can be justified by the greater efficiency they will generate.

However, the timing and priorities of these changes should take into account the particularistic reality of Lebanon and its traditional systems. Such considerations will reinforce the convergence of rational and traditional elements - a process which has been the modus vivendi of the ODS - and generate higher efficiency coefficients. Neglecting traditional considerations will inevitably lead to conflicts and will render all development programs inoperative.

On the other hand, excessive reliance on the traditional, particularistic reality will result in gross deviations from the initial concepts of the program itself. An example of such deviations is the malformation which resulted from the over expansion of the Department of Social Services, within the ODS, as compared to the Rural Development Service of the same agency. This situation described earlier in this study, poses the basic question on the true objective of the ODS: is the ODS conceived for charity and benevolent services, or is it a community development program with all what the process implies?

A transplant from the rational development program established by IRFED, the ODS in its first years of operation had to face strong traditional influences and hence adapt to its milieu. This adaptation, however, has now gone beyond the safe limits that a normal efficiency coefficient dictates. It is time for the ODS to reconsider its primary

objectives and re-mold accordingly its administrative structure and its operational strategy in order to satisfy in a more complete fashion the demands of development in Lebanon. Thus, a drastic revision of the criteria for identifying needy regions, potential communities, and types of projects, has to be operated. This revision should be undertaken in the context of detailed local, regional and national development planning, itself conceived in terms of key factors of development seen as an amalgam of rational and traditional elements.

New Concepts and Approaches

As can be seen from the ODS's example, making rational, overall development a positive objective, rather than an incidental goal of community development implies broader interpretation of the first word of this process. Consistent with present efforts to find new ways of making community development more useful to the developing countries is the need to give new thought to the concept "community". In a given geographic area, people may align themselves differently for different functions, often transcending local boundaries, to form part of a wider community of interest, while for certain activities geographic proximity may be a uniting factor. Planning for community development must take into account the ever changing relationship of residents in a given zone or region within a country, and their widening circle of

contacts as they are drawn into a money economy.

Another concept needing further analysis is the notion of "felt needs", suggesting that the convictions and motivations on which community development programs are based sprang up, unaided by outside technical help, in the minds of local residents. Does it really matter where an idea originated if the individual has made it a part of himself, enough to exert his will, to labor and sacrifice toward its accomplishment? Does it matter how long the need has been "felt" if, at the time of taking the decision to act, the implications have been fully understood and the decision is a free one, without coercion or inducement from the outside?

Along with the "felt need" is the principle of working "at the pace of the people". This stemmed from an exaggerated concern to avoid "manipulating" the people. It tended to ignore the fact that with proper motivation and education, which are vastly different from manipulation, the pace of the people can be quickened. Community development practitioners should reexamine this concept to see whether it must continue to be a slow movement, or one that can be stepped up, without sacrificing the process of human development, to make a timely contribution to overall development.

Such considerations should be thoroughly analyzed and assimilated by the ODS when it will start coining a

more sophisticated choice-of-village and choice-of-projects policy.

While we are reconsidering the familiar terms whose meanings may no longer be fully relevant to today's needs and tomorrow's challenge, we might reevaluate the relationship between the two essential elements of community development: the role of the people and the role of the government. The task of redefining this relationship is not an easy one. Community development practitioners, in the main, have evolved techniques and a style that give greater emphasis to the virtues of local participation than the role of the government. The consequences have been to hinder economic development, which realistically cannot go far without substantial government assistance. The heavy influence of government, on the other hand has often tended to undermine spontaneous or locally organized activities.

Community development is an amalgam of two separate and generally complementary strategies. One has found expression in the self-help philosophy of realizing community goals. Under this approach, community development actively encourages and assists people through their own resources to improve the social and economic conditions of community life. The second strategy has laid emphasis on securing outside public and/or private resources to assist the community economically and socially.

The exact "mix" or combination of self-reliance and outside assistance is of critical importance to the success of the community development process. Excessive use of outside resources can undermine local initiative and sap the vitality of community institutions. 'Azki is a case in point. On the other hand, undue reliance on indigenous resources, which almost by definition bear no relationship to current needs, and the neglect of external aid, places an unacceptably low ceiling on the potential for economic progress. The ratio between the two cannot be decided by any neat formula, but has to be determined pragmatically, keeping in mind such factors as the stage of development, availability of material and human resources and the readiness of the local power structure - if any - to adapt to change.

In emphasizing the contribution of community development in overall development we have meant to emphasize the importance of the potential role of the ODS in the general development of Lebanon. However, in advocating a quickened pace for progress, in stressing a more active role of government, one must also beware of the danger of going to the other extreme. One must guard against reducing community development to a device to secure local compliance with the requirements for overall development, of leading the program with activities conducive to improving productivity without regard to the fundamental objective

of human development. For this reason, the careful analysis of ends and means and the simultaneous stimulation of economic and social processes becomes especially important. Community development must, in fact, come to represent a program of intensive integral and planned investment for the improvement of human resources.

Two basic conditions must be met if the ODS is to make its fullest contribution to this science of "linking human and capital development". One is to build into its program, or into every project, the kind of analytic and evaluative devices capable of increasing the understanding of the process, and thereby reduce trial and error to the minimum and make possible planned and sustained growth. We think it can no longer afford otherwise.

The other condition is the training of personnel al all levels, mainly at the higher echelons of the hierarchy.

The major responsibility in meeting these conditions rests with the government. However, if the government does not in the near future substantially increase the budget allocations of the ODS, the only way to realize development programs that are not a total waste of scattered efforts and projects, is for the ODS to turn to some specialized international organization and obtain from outside the help it has been deprived of from within.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

ODS EMPLOYEES

List of all employees of the ODS as stipulated by the Decree no. 12969, p. 9.

No.	Office
1	Director General
2	Director of Department-Expert
3	Director of Department
4	Expert
13	Chief of Service
38	Clerk 1st Category
1	Accountant
1	Cashier
3	Assistant cashier
4	Engineer
8	Specialist
2	Social Researcher
24	Social Worker 1st Category
70	Social Worker 2nd Category
5	Social Assistant 1st Category
15	Social Assistant 2nd Category
1	Educational Counsellor
1	Athletic Coach
1	Topographer
1	Designer
5	Clerk 2nd Category

No.	Office
2	Driver
2	Telephone Operator
13	Office boy

Hired by contract

1	Doctor
1	Psychiatrist
1	Psychologist
1	Technical Education Counselor
1	Translator
1	Specialist in social work training
1	Specialist in athletics

APPENDIX II

METHODOLOGY

The research tools for this study mainly consisted of a series of unstructured interviews with twenty villagers (ten from 'Azki and ten from Kfarhatta) chosen among responsible people in both villages.[1] Included in this sample are the villagers who opposed the ODS's project, as well as those who both supported it and took an active part in its implementation. The unstructured nature of these interviews is due to the impossibility of using more rigorous research tools such as questionaires, for example. The reason for this is the substantial rate of illiteracy (especially in 'Azki), but also the fact that being unfamiliar with survey research, villagers could hardly be relied upon to give precise, accurate information. Most importantly, the reliability of the information obtained by means of questionnaires cannot be checked on the spot, while information obtained verbally can always be checked in the conversation, against other information

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[1]These interviews consisted of general informal discussions about a broad variety of subjects. Within these discussions a few questions on the village; its social structure; the impact of the ODS's project; and the attitude of the respondent vis-à-vis the project itself; as well as future projects that the ODS might implement were explored.

obtained in earlier conversations with the same villager or with other villagers.

Finally, our experience in the field showed that questionaires limit the researcher's knowledge to the items that have been reported in the questionnaire; while informal, unstructured interviews allowed for interesting issues and ideas, as well as new information previously unsuspected by the researcher to emerge.

More structured interviews were conducted with twelve social workers (Six in each village).[2] But even in this case the interviews often extended beyond the limits of the questions asked.

The general information on the ODS, its objectives, administrative structure, and operational strategy were obtained from the social workers and from some of the high officials of the ODS. Pamphlets issued by the ODS, annual reports and decrees published in the Official Gazette related to the ODS were also used for the same purpose.

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[2]The details of the interviews with the social workers are included in this Appendix on pages 175-176.

SOCIAL WORKER's INTERVIEW

1. Religious Affiliation
2. Regional Origin
3. Period of time spent in the service of the ODS
4. Regions covered
5. Results: Satisfying or unsatisfying
   Criteria of satisfaction in the specific case mentioned
6. What are, according to you, the objectives of the ODS?
7. Are those objectives efficient in as much as they shape the operational strategy of the ODS?
8. If you were asked to redefine these objectives for a better efficiency, how would you go about doing it?
9. If you have to qualify the objectives of the ODS, as they are, in terms of rational and traditional - how would you go about doing it?
10. Should rationality be increased? If yes, why? If impossible, why? If not, why not?
11. Could you delimit the importance of the traditional element in social work?
12. What is, according to you, the role of the local population in the process of socio-economic development in Lebanon?
13. Given the objectives, is the administrative structure of the ODS rightly designed to serve these objectives?

14. What are the administrative hurdles that you met in your experience as a social worker at the ODS?
15. How can these obstacles be avoided?
16. Do you think that a greater autonomy would increase the efficiency of your work and of the Office in general?
17. Could you specifically define the extra amount of autonomy needed in terms of material and/or decision-making on the spot?
18. Do you prefer rigid planning or planning that leaves room for initiative? Why?
19. In this sense, what is the importance of flexibility in planning?
20. If you were to re-structure the ODS's administrative structure for a better efficiency, at which step would you start?

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