Natura Naturans :a concept of a nature for representation -

Abstract

The following thesis project proceeds from an analysis of the concept ‘conceptual representation’ and attempts to make explicit the ontological category implicit in it. I will attempt to show in what sense an attempt to develop an ontology of ‘conceptual representation’ is in fact an attempt at refining the single category of ‘functioning-representings’. This investigation will draw on the so-called ‘act-content’ model of representation; most of the thesis will be dedicated to analyzing the two fundamental metaphors in that model in an attempt to draw out the implications of their use. In Chapter II, I will analyze the “in” metaphor and will attempt to uncover certain necessary ontological relations that are implicit in the use of that metaphor. I will claim that the use of “in” is indicative of an asymmetric ontological relation between acts and contents (or, what I will call representings and representeds respectively). I will attempt to explicate this asymmetry as best I can using the concept ‘actuality’, and argue for the sense in which ‘actual representings’ are more primary than ‘actual representeds’. In Chapter III, I will analyze the “of” metaphor and will argue that it fulfills a very particular epistemic function. That function will be explicated in terms of functional role and functional classification, both of which are concepts found in the works of Wilfrid Sellars. I will argue that functional classification allows us to draw a distinction between functional kinds and natural items in such a way that that very distinction suggests the concept of a functioning-natural-item (i.e. natural items with functional properties). The fourth will attempt to both reconcile certain claims made in the first two chapters (claims that seem incommensurable), and second suggest one way of benefitting from that reconciliation. The central point of the third chapter will be that ‘conceptual