Hezbollah and Israel :norms, exceptions, and game theory -

Abstract

The enduring conflict between Hezbollah and Israel dates back to the year 1982, when Israel conducted its operation Peace for Galilee that resulted in the siege of the Lebanese capital, Beirut. In 1992, Hezbollah became the sole group in Lebanon to engage in operations against Israel. This thesis will attempt to present this conflict as an application of Game Theory, arguing that from 1992 till the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000, the Deterrence model governed the conflict, whereas after the withdrawal, the Spiral Model was set in place. During the Deterrence phase, Hezbollah and Israel engaged in an ‘eye for an eye’ conduct where each operation was followed by a counter-operation of the same intensity. However, during the Spiral phase, the situation between Hezbollah was much calmer and both belligerents engaged in an arms race. Based on the Deterrence and the Spiral models and the games they represent (the Chicken Game and the Prisoners’ Dilemma respectively), the conflict developed according to rational patterns that follow a strategic logic. As a result, the conflict will be presented within the prism of norms and exceptions, demonstrating that counterpart behavior has been surprisingly stable, confined within the established framework. In fact, the conflict between these two entities developed from inception according to a special set of norms which are still in place to date. First and foremost, it is by nature a conflict between a non-state actor (Hezbollah) and a state actor (Israel). This does not mean that the state of Lebanon has a different view of Israel (it is still considered an “enemy” of the state) but it was Hezbollah that was enabled (and in many ways encouraged) to conduct military operations as a popular resistance while marginalizing the role of the Lebanese army in that arena. This point is crucial insomuch as it underlines the Lebanese state’s condoning of military resistance without making it an official act of state aggression, thus creating a