• Does Kant refute Hume's derivation of the concept of cause? 

  Osborne G. (CHARLOTTESVILLEPO BOX 7147, CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA 22906-7147 USA, 2007)

  Kant has long been held in some quarters to undermine Hume's derivation of the concept of cause. At least part of what Kant aims to show in his second analogy, according to adherents of this view, is that our putative ...
• An argument against reduction in morality and epistemology 

  Koons J.R. (OXFORD9600 GARSINGTON RD, OXFORD OX4 2DQ, OXON, ENGLAND, 2006)

  [No abstract available]
• Irreversible generalism: A reply to Dickie 

  Conolly O.; Haydar B. (, 2005)

  Irreversible generalism, the view that reasons given for the evaluation of art are general and do not admit of exceptions, is defended from the criticisms levelled against it by George Dickie in 'Reading Sibley'. The ...
• Against functional reductionism in cognitive science 

  Khalidi M.A. (, 2005)

  Functional reductionism concerning mental properties has recently been advocated by Jaegwon Kim in order to solve the problem of the 'causal exclusion' of the mental. Adopting a reductionist strategy first proposed by David ...
• The good, the bad and the funny 

  Conolly O.; Haydar B. (LA SALLEPO BOX 600, LA SALLE, IL 61301 USA, 2005)

  [No abstract available]
• Hume's argument in treatise 1.3.3.3: An exposition and defense 

  Osborne G. (, 2005)

  Hume claims to prove in Treatise 1.3.3.3 that the causal maxim is neither intuitively nor demonstratively certain. The aim of this paper is to elucidate some puzzling features of his argument and thereby show that objections ...
• The Irrationality of Physicalism 

  Lewtas P. (Kluwer Academic Publishers; NEW YORK233 SPRING ST, NEW YORK, NY 10013 USA, 2014)

  This paper argues, not that physicalism is wrong, but that it is irrational. The paper defines standards of rationality, both metaphysical and epistemological, that physicalism necessarily inherits from science. Then it ...
• The normative implications of benefiting from injustice 

  Haydar B.; Overland G. (HOBOKEN111 RIVER ST, HOBOKEN 07030-5774, NJ USA, 2014)

  In this article we investigate whether non-culpably benefiting from wrongdoing or injustice generates a moral requirement to disgorge these benefits in order to compensate the victims. We argue that a strong requirement ...
• Descartes' metaphysical skepticism [Le scepticisme métaphysique de Descartes] 

  Hartz G.A.; Lewtas P.K. (Editura Academiei Romane;, 2014)

  Descartes held the theological doctrine of voluntarism (that logic and value depend on God's power). We argue that when Descartes' demon steps into God's shoes in the First Meditation, that spirit inherits this same power ...
• On color categorization: Why do we name seven colors in the rainbow? 

  Jraissati Y. (Wiley-Blackwell Publishing;, 2014)

  What makes it the case that we draw the boundary between blue and green where we draw it? Do we draw this boundary where we draw it because our perceptual system is biologically determined in this way? Or is it culture and ...
• Extreme poverty and global responsibility 

  Haydar B. (OXFORD9600 GARSINGTON RD, OXFORD OX4 2DG, OXON, ENGLAND, 2005)

  This essay addresses the questions of whether and how much responsibility for extreme poverty should be assigned to global and domestic institutional orders. The main focus is on whether the global order brings about the ...
• When is a Concrete Property Basic? 

  Lewtas P. (ABINGDON4 PARK SQUARE, MILTON PARK, ABINGDON OX14 4RN, OXFORDSHIRE, ENGLAND, 2014)

  We more or less understand how composition works in the case of objects. We cement bricks together to build a wall. We stir together red paint and yellow paint to get orange paint. In both cases, one way or another, A = B ...
• Physicalism and the intrinsic nature of consciousness 

  Lewtas P. (Wilfrid Laurier University Press; NEW YORK32 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, NEW YORK, NY 10013-2473 USA, 2014)

  This paper presents a metaphysical argument against physicalism based on the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. It argues that the physical, as physicalism must understand it, consists entirely of ...
• Leibniz and the Square: A Deontic Logic for the Vir Bonus 

  Johns C. (ABINGDON4 PARK SQUARE, MILTON PARK, ABINGDON OX14 4RN, OXON, ENGLAND, 2014)

  Seventeenth century philosopher Gottfried Leibniz's contributions to metaphysics, mathematics, and logic are well known. Lesser known is his 'invention' of deontic logic, and that his invention derives from the alethic ...
• Immoral beliefs 

  Bashour B. (HOBOKEN111 RIVER ST, HOBOKEN 07030-5774, NJ USA, 2013)

  In this paper, I argue that there exists a class of immoral beliefs. These beliefs are immoral not for the usual reasons, i.e. because of their tendency to cause harm, their immoral acquisition, or the fact that they involve ...
• Proving universalism wrong does not prove relativism right: Considerations on the ongoing color categorization debate 

  Jraissati Y. (Routledge; ABINGDON4 PARK SQUARE, MILTON PARK, ABINGDON OX14 4RN, OXFORDSHIRE, ENGLAND, 2014)

  For over a century, the question of the relation of language to thought has been extensively discussed in the case of color categorization, where two main views prevail. The relativist view claims that color categories are ...
• What new wave materialists can't say 

  Lewtas P.K. (Blackwell Publishing Ltd; HOBOKEN111 RIVER ST, HOBOKEN 07030-5774, NJ USA, 2014)

  Most phenomenal concept strategists, or concept dualists, trace the explanatory gap to thin phenomenal concepts that fail to represent phenomenal properties as physical entities. New Wave Materialists, a subgroup of concept ...
• Emergence and consciousness 

  Lewtas P. (NEW YORK32 AVENUE OF THE AMERICAS, NEW YORK, NY 10013-2473 USA, 2013)

  Most definitions of radical emergentism characterize it epistemologically. This leads to misunderstandings and makes it hard to assess the doctrine's metaphysical worth. This paper puts forward purely metaphysical ...
• Categorical perception of color: Assessing the role of language 

  Jraissati Y. (ZAGREBNASEROV TRG 6, ZAGREB, 10020, CROATIA, 2012)

  Why do we draw the boundaries between blue and green, where we do? One proposed answer to this question is that we categorize color the way we do because we perceive color categorically. Starting in the 1950's, the phenomenon ...
• Laruelle and the reality of abstraction 

  Brassier R. (Edinburgh University Press;, 2012)

  [No abstract available]

View more