Patronage, clientalism, and the maintenance of the confessional state -

Abstract

Patronage and clientalism are a system of service provision and support networks based on personality or political party which frequently supplant the national state. In Lebanon, patronage networks are especially strong due to the inherently designed weakness of the state structure. Lebanon's state structure is also based on a confessional power sharing model based on religion. This thesis argues that there is a deep relationship between the pervasive and all encompassing nature of patronage in Lebanon and the resilience of sectarianism and confessional politics. It argues several hypotheses; that Lebanese Sunnis will have more faith in connections than personal merit, that they will have more faith in patronage networks than state services, that there will be a relationship between income and greater connections and access to patronage, and that there will be a relationship between greater connections and greater levels of political activity. The thesis uses quantitative data gathered from a 300 person survey of Lebanese Sunnis to examine the relationship between patronage and sectarianism in Lebanon. The data found that a relationship does exist, and that respondents generally have low faith in the ability of the state to provide for its citizens and that patronage networks are much more effective than the state in comparison. The data also found that respondents who are more politically active and hold more sectarian viewpoints are more likely to receive the benefits of patronage networks and are more likely to have higher incomes. The respondents who were politically active also overwhelmingly supported sectarian Sunni parties; this reinforces the belief that access to patronage networks reinforces and requires sectarian sentiment and solidarity, contributing to the maintenance of confessionalism in Lebanon.