AUB ScholarWorks

The truth about metaphors -

Show simple item record

dc.contributor.author Sabra, Zainab Ali,
dc.date.accessioned 2017-12-11T16:29:22Z
dc.date.available 2017-12-11T16:29:22Z
dc.date.issued 2017
dc.date.submitted 2017
dc.identifier.other b19189345
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10938/20953
dc.description Thesis. M.A. American University of Beirut. Department of Philosophy, 2017. T:6626
dc.description Advisor : Dr. Raymond Brassier, Professor, Philosophy ; Committee members : Dr. Hans Muller, Associate Professor, Philosophy ; Dr. Saleh Agha, Lecturer, Philososphy.
dc.description Includes bibliographical references (leaf 26)
dc.description.abstract My interest in this thesis is to draw a connection between the use of metaphors and the definition of truth. I want to show how two conceptions of truth had an impact on the usage of metaphors in philosophical and islamic discourse. The goal is to find which of these two conception of truth gives the best theory of metaphors viz. which of these two theories of truth gives us a valid account regarding the interpretation of the metaphorical expressions. On the one hand, when truth is a correspondence between language and reality, figurative speech seems like a privileged attempt to go beyond what language usually denotes by connoting abstract entities. On the other hand, when truth is taken to be inter-subjective linguistic activity, figurative speech seems to be a product of social conventions, i.e. the interpretation of metaphors in this case is tightly related to the commitments and traditions of the community in question. In order to highlight the two sharp distinctions between the two definitions of truth, which have shaped the usage and interpretation of metaphorical discourse, this dissertation will refer to the correspondence theory of truth and to the pragmatic theory of truth. Thus, throughout this thesis I will try to depict that there is a deep connection between the definition of truth and the use of figurative language: when truth is correspondence, metaphors are an attempt that violates this correspondence by pointing at entities without names, when truth is inter-subjective, the split between speaker and sentence meaning collapses by treating metaphor as an assertion which refers to the individual’s commitments in the society. My hypothesis is to show that the correspondence theory of truth gives us a valid account which grounds the theory of metaphors, and hence define the metaphorical meaning, where the pragmatic theory of truth fails to. Thus I want to prove that the correspondence theory of truth provides us with a plausible theory that explains the use of metaphors in discourse because
dc.format.extent 1 online resource (vii, 26 leaves)
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Theses, Dissertations, and Projects
dc.subject.classification T:006626
dc.subject.lcsh Metaphor.
dc.subject.lcsh Truth.
dc.subject.lcsh Figures of speech.
dc.subject.lcsh Names.
dc.title The truth about metaphors -
dc.type Thesis
dc.contributor.department Faculty of Arts and Sciences.
dc.contributor.department Department of Philosophy,
dc.contributor.institution American University of Beirut.


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search AUB ScholarWorks


Browse

My Account