Examining the internal and external causes of the Lebanese Civil War : 1975-1990.

Abstract

The origins of the 1975 Lebanese civil war have long been a subject of extensive study by scholars and writers. According to Michael E. Brown’s theory on the case of the Lebanese civil war, the political, economic, social, cultural and perceptual structures of the state seem to play a prominent role in triggering the war. From the Ottoman period until 1975, sectarianism played a major role in solidifying communal privileges and demands and in further aggravating the gap between the sectarian communities. Internally, sectarianism played a role in solidifying communal privileges and demands. Yet, as this research will reveal, there were other factors that caused conflict and played a role in providing conducive conditions for war, particularly in light of the weakening Lebanese state. Additionally, the triggering factors, the role of the elites, bad neighbors and bad neighborhoods played a role in escalating conflict and violence, which is highlighted through the Palestinian factor, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the ideology of pan-Arabism. Externally, the unstable external environment and bad neighbors, including Syria and Israel, played a major role in not only violating Lebanon’s sovereignty, but also in meddling in the country’s domestic affairs. The findings of the research showed that the major internal causes of the civil war were: the sectarian dominance, the rigid political institutions, the fragile power-sharing agreements that were unable to regulate and mitigate conflict, the weakness of the state, the different approaches of the political elites towards domestic and regional issues, and external intervention, and the state’s incapability in responding to the groups’ demands. Brown’s theory, to a great extent, proved true in the case of Lebanon.