Liberalism, Rationality and the Subsidiarity Principle: A Vindication of the Rule-and-exemption Approach for Solving Clashes in Multicultural Societies

Abstract

The fact that individuals in liberal and multicultural societies pursue their own goods as dictated by their own values inevitably gives rise to conflicts. This paper focuses on clashes that take place between the state and substate agents. In effect, the state proposes social norms that sometimes conflict with the social norms that are accepted and promoted by the individuals and their communities. The causes behind these clashes could be either that the communities advocate for illiberal social norms and therefore contradict the liberal framework, that the state has exceeded the powers commonly attributed to it by liberalism or that both the state and the community disagree on which social norms are actually supported by liberalism.

The objective of this paper is precisely to test a specific method to solve these clashes that are now becoming more frequent and sensitive, as liberal societies become more multicultural. More specifically, this paper advocates for a certain understanding of the rule-and-exemption approach that reveals itself as a just method to solve these conflicts. The rule-and-exemption approach is frequently proposed by multiculturalist philosophers as a convenient course of action in accommodating cultural minority groups into the mainstream society. This approach, however, allows for different interpretations and not all have been equally successful.

The example of the rule-and-exemption approach defended in this paper is constructed upon two elements: the elementary canons of rational thought and the subsidiarity principle. The elementary canons are those principles which we have overwhelming reasons to accept. They help us to classify clashes between those where a certain advocated social norm violates the basic canons and those where no social norm violates the canons. The subsidiarity principle, which preferentially grants authority to the substate agent, presents an inspiring understanding on how to solve these clashes. This paper argues that the acceptance of these two elements compels the philosopher to accept the rule-and-exemption approach.