dc.contributor.advisor |
Johns, Christopher |
dc.contributor.author |
Bazzy, Mohamed |
dc.date.accessioned |
2021-01-12T02:36:58Z |
dc.date.available |
2021-01-12T02:36:58Z |
dc.date.issued |
1/12/2021 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/10938/22171 |
dc.description |
Raymond Brassier
Bana Bashour |
dc.description.abstract |
In this thesis I will be discussing Hume’s critique of the causal principle. I will explain his strategy in basing the argument on the conceivability principle. I will thoroughly elucidate the principle and provide its epistemic basis. Furthermore, I will discuss some challenges to Hume’s critique from the perspective of some modal theories of imagination. After that, I will demonstrate my argument against Hume’s critique and provide a proof for the necessity of the causal principle. Finally, I will conclude that the necessity of the causal principle is only applicable in general to causes and effects, rather than to specific causes and their respective definite effects. Therefore, I will adopt a causal principle as such: whatever begins to exist must have at least a cause, some cause, without which it won’t be existing. |
dc.language.iso |
en |
dc.subject |
Causation - Conceivability Principle - Imagination - Hume - Necessity - Ontological Equivalence - Necessary Correspondence |
dc.title |
On the Necessity of the Causal Principle. A Critique of Hume's Analysis of Causation from the Perspective of the Conceivability Principle. |
dc.type |
Thesis |
dc.contributor.department |
Department of Philosophy |
dc.contributor.faculty |
Faculty of Arts and Sciences |
dc.contributor.institution |
American University of Beirut |