Abstract:
From the beginning, foreigners played a critical role in aiding the Islamic State’s meteoric rise. Between 2013 and 2019, tens of thousands of individuals traveled from at least 80 different countries to join the swelling ranks of the self-declared “caliphate” in Syria and Iraq.
Since the group’s final collapse in March 2019, the vast majority of surviving foreign fighters and non-combatants remain trapped in a state of legal limbo. While a large number have been killed, many thousands more remain in indefinite detention at the hands of Iraqi or Kurdish Syrian authorities, unable to return to their countries of origin. A large portion of these individuals are children at high risk of statelessness.
Scholarly consensus holds that states must repatriate and, where necessary, prosecute citizens back in their home countries. These calls have been echoed by military authorities who participated in the campaign against the Islamic State, and by regional officials. While a number of logistical and theoretical obstacles stand in the way of states effectively repatriating all foreign fighters, a thorough analysis shows that these issues can be easily overcome. Ultimately, the decision to repatriate has proven to be a political decision, one dictated by swings in public opinion and assessments of electoral risk by leaders.
