Mapping the Discourse of Violent Extremism in the United Arab Emirates

Abstract

In the last decade, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has worked to establish itself as a global hub for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). After the September 11, 2001 attacks on the U.S. World Trade Center, the Emirates moved swiftly to re-establish their image after being implicated as the financial and transit conduit for the hijackers. The Emirates remained a close ally in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ and an active participant in international CVE initiatives. Between 2010 and 2020, the Emirates has established over 15 ministries, forums, and institutions working in the field of counter violent extremism, passed four related laws, and hosted numerous high-profile events focused on CVE. Many of these policies encompass broad approaches to preventing violent extremism—part of a worldwide trend in emphasizing the importance of early interventions that stop the ‘radicalization’ process of individuals joining extremist groups.

The following thesis is based on seven interviews with experts working in the field of CVE in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and on primary documents from state government and client institutions. Through a discourse analysis that examines the Emirates’ approach to CVE in its own words and interviews that provide context for the analysis, this investigation explores Emirati security in relation to violent extremism.

Looking at the relationship between power and discourse, it argues that the global discourses of terrorism—characterized by the ‘war on terror’ rhetoric—has been co-constituted through complex, intertwined global histories of economic accumulation and cultural transmission—structured by a post-colonial world order. It finds that the primary target of the Emirati CVE discourse is Islamist groups, predominantly, the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, this study locates the ‘counterterrorist’ identity of the Emirati state and its core features: a model of ‘tolerance’, moderate Islam, and role as Middle East ‘visionary’. This research also explores possible implications of the UAE’s discourse on violent extremism in relation to domestic, regional, and global structures of power and constructions of security in the Persian Gulf. It suggests that, by appropriating elements of the global ‘war on terror’ rhetoric, the UAE is able to wield discourse as a symbolic technology with the aim of establish themselves at the top of a regional hierarchy, and delegitimizing domestic dissent.