Moral folk intuitions : psychological foundations and normative implications

Abstract

It seems that in the last few decades, rationalist models started giving way to emotive-intuitionist models of moral judgment. This came about due to the role of the empirical sciences in providing evidence for the role of emotions and intuitions in the making of moral judgments. However, even if the descriptive accounts favored the intuitionist’s side, a normative account need not necessarily follow. Moral intuitions might be the main source of our moral judgments, but ought they be? Some argue that intuitions are a reliable source for moral judgments (e.g. Railton, 2014; 2017) while others argue they are not (e.g. Singer, 2005). Before we can answer this question, we need to identify what is meant by moral intuitions and what processes underlie them. In this paper I argue that our moral intuitions are not infallible, but not dumb brute gut-feelings either and that they can inform some normative moral theory. I back up my claim with findings from the literature.