AN EXAMINATION OF LEIBNIZ'S THEORY OF FREEDOM

Abstract

This thesis is concerned with Leibniz’s metaphysical and moral philosophy, specifically with a critical examination of Leibniz’s account of Freedom in order to specify the sense of Freedom which Leibniz is working with in the context of a systematic metaphysical framework he presents in his Discourse On Metaphysics (1686) and other writings belonging to that period, till late 1690’s. This task requires first a thorough reconstruction of Leibniz’s concept containment theory, given the specified context. Second comes the task of a critical investigation pertaining to Contingency, a major element of Leibniz’s system and a requisite for his account of Freedom. The conclusions of the investigation will be drawn and their implications on Leibniz’s proposed conception of Freedom will be examined and criticized. Third, I examine Spontaneity as a candidate in terms of which Freedom could be defined. The final task is to argue for a particular definition of Freedom grounded in rational activity, which I think Leibniz has provided the resources for in his Discourse On Metaphysics and to see what it amounts to, formally and practically. For the purpose of consistency and for giving Leibniz the principle of charity, I will explicitly assume that the efficient articulation of the metaphysical components and how each part contributes to the whole is what allows for the extraction and examination of the sense of Freedom individual substances are endowed with.