The ungrounding of negative philosophy.

Abstract

This thesis will examine the critique of Kant which Schelling makes in his late work, The Grounding of Positive Philosophy. In it, Schelling argues that reason cannot, without recurring to what is outside it, sufficiently ground itself. While Kant’s project purports to be a completely immanent critique of reason, Schelling insists that there is a moment in this critique that is, though still immanent, verging on transcendence: following Kant’s critique of reason by reason alone, we are drawn out into unreason. Moreover, Schelling claims that this grounding unreason follows from the method and agenda of Kant’s first Critique. As the central point of his criticism, Schelling has the distinction between positive and negative philosophies. Kant’s, he insists, is purely negative, and therefore lacks a positive dimension. In this thesis, we will see that Kant’s philosophy really is negative and that its negativity makes it vulnerable to Schelling’s criticism. We will also see where Schelling’s criticism of it and his plan for a positive philosophy will lead us.